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Sexualities

'I am not Homophobic But...': Disclaiming in Discourse Resisting Repeal of Section 28

Joseph Burridge Sexualities 2004 7: 327 DOI: 10.1177/1363460704044804 The online version of this article can be found at: http://sex.sagepub.com/content/7/3/327

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Abstract This article attempts to take seriously the discourse of the morally conservative in the context of the failed repeal of Section 28 in the year 2000, and explores the operation of opposition to repeal which denied that homophobia was its motivation. It is argued that such disclaiming implies an orientation towards an attribution of homophobia as unhelpful or undesirable in this context. The failure of those advocating repeal to successfully problematize such arguments is deemed to reect a collective discourse of tolerance which assisted the arguments of those against repeal. Keywords disclaiming, discourse, homophobia, Section 28, tolerance

Joseph Burridge
University of Nottingham, UK

I am not Homophobic But . . .: Disclaiming in Discourse Resisting Repeal of Section 28

Introduction
In the introduction to Invented Moralities, Weeks (1995: x) insightfully points out that it is tempting not to take the discourse of the morally conservative seriously, and argues that this orientation has been problematic for those wanting to combat such discourse. If one wishes to resist something, it seems sensible to try to understand it rst, not simply in the sense of trying to appreciate its point of view, but, perhaps more importantly, trying to come to terms with how it operates the connections it makes and the resources it mobilizes. It is insufcient to simply assume that it is wrong, and that others will recognize this the successes of moral conservatism in a variety of spheres demonstrates that insufciency. Accordingly, this article attempts to take seriously the discourse of the morally conservative in the context of the resistance given to the UK Sexualities Copyright 2004 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Vol 7(3): 327344 DOI: 10.1177/1363460704044804 www.sagepublications.com

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governments attempt to repeal Section 28 of the Local Government Act (1988) in England and Wales in the year 2000 an issue which has generated academic attention within this journal (Epstein, 2000; Moran, 2001), and elsewhere (Waites, 2000, 2001; Wise, 2000). This article draws upon insights from a variety of discourse analytic approaches in order to explore particular ways of packaging arguments for the retention of Section 28 in debates in the failed UK parliamentary repeal process primarily what is known as disclaiming (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975). The central argument is that the presence of such phenomena reects an orientation to the unacceptability or ineffectiveness of being observed as prejudiced when advocating discrimination. In arguments resisting repeal of Section 28, a separation of prejudice and discrimination was often discursively emphasized, and the rationale for discrimination located in something external to a speakers attitude to homosexuality. This article is about the operation of such discourse how it works, and its role in the pursuit of legitimacy rather than the question of its accuracy. Furthermore, in keeping with the emphasis proposed by Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993: 44), I am preoccupied with the process of articulation and not with the ontology of the described. Whilst words such as homophobia and tolerance recur throughout, my emphasis is upon whether they are being pursued or avoided, not upon their precise denition. After a brief summary of the history of Section 28, I provide an outline of the literature on disclaiming. A selection of empirical examples of disclaiming, drawn from parliamentary debates concerned with the legislations attempted repeal in England and Wales, is then followed by some comments upon the ways in which those in favour of repeal dealt with such practices.

Section 28: history and literature

Section 28 became law as part of the Local Government Act (1988) passed by the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher. This followed a period of intense controversy over what is described as the promotion of homosexuality in schools, a phrase that has acquired a signicant persistence across time and space as the denition of what is at stake over Section 28. The legislation states that: 2A-(1) A local authority shall not (a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality; (b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship. (Local Government Act, 1988) 328

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Burridge I am not Homophobic But . . .

In October 1999 the Labour government announced its intention to repeal the clause in England and Wales,1 leading to a series of heated parliamentary debates. A separate repeal process was successful in the newlydevolved Scottish Parliament, despite a high-prole Keep the Clause campaign (see Waites, 2001). However, the process failed in England and Wales after successive defeats in the House of Lords (the British Parliaments non-elected second legislative chamber). This was despite an attempted compromise over the content of the Learning and Skills Act (2000) which would require teachers to stress the centrality of the family in personal and social education. Because the Bill containing the repeal clause was rst introduced in the Lords, the government was unable to invoke the Parliament Act (1911 and 1949) and force it through despite the Lords resistance. The government subsequently abandoned the issue with Hilary Armstrong (Labour) promising that they would return to the question of repeal at an unspecied future date (Hansard, 2000f: 10347).2 Despite not being ofcially on the legislative agenda for over two years, until the recent reintroduction of legislation to repeal the clause in the current Local Government Bills committee stage (HMSO, 2003: 549), the issue has periodically resurfaced, and has salience for the Conservative Party. It was a prominent issue during the Conservatives leadership contest in 2001, and during their party conference in October 2002 where, at a fringe meeting, John Bercow MP described it as a litmus test (quoted in Grice, 2002) of the extent to which they are willing to accept a changing social world. Most research referring to the legislation has been highly critical, viewing it as symbolic discrimination that institutionalizes a hierarchical relationship between heterosexuality and homosexuality, and it is held up as a prime example of the exclusion of lesbians and gay men from full cultural citizenship (Richardson, 1998). There is a broad agreement amongst this critical literature that the legislations signicance resides more upon a symbolic level than in its legal power. Whilst it may foster a climate of self-censorship inhibiting teachers when it comes to discussions of homosexuality (Moran, 2001: 74), there is much controversy about its specic domain of applicability (Colvin, 1989: 57; Epstein, 2000: 387). Its wording is extremely vague, and there is also ambiguity about its relevance because, in England and Wales, sex education is no longer the responsibility of Local Education Authorities, the legislations named target. The most wide-ranging analysis of the political context of Section 28s passage is Smiths (1994) sophisticated post-Marxist account. Although justiably criticized for understating the resistance to its passage (Waites, 2000), Smith identies many important aspects of the legislations 329

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genesis, including the activity involved in what she describes as the strategic invention of a crisis (Smith, 1994: 185). She also notes the way in which arguments for the legislations necessity invoked the fears of parents which, operating on an almost self-fullling logic, were exacerbated by such arguments. Of particular interest is her observation of a differentiation of homosexualities (Smith, 1994: 207, original emphasis) at the heart of the discourse in favour of Section 28s passage. Many contributors to the public debate discursively separated what Smith (1994: 20416) terms the good homosexual and the dangerous queer, claiming tolerance for the former, and intolerance only for the latter. Intolerance is therefore portrayed as an exceptional matter. Writing in the context of the proposed repeal, Waites sympathetic critique (2000) preserves much of Smiths contribution but adds recognition of less strategic and more substantive concerns such as its implications for the Conservative Partys self-identity (also see Waites, 2001: 498). He points to evidence suggesting that arguments for discrimination have undergone renement over time. For example, those arguing against the equalization of the age of consent have: been primarily against lowering the age of consent rather than equalising it (Waites, 2000: paragraph 3.3, emphasis added). This subtle distinction has particular rhetorical effects in altering the discursive terrain upon which the issue is contested lowering more likely to have negative connotations than equalizing, which has a more inclusive appeal. In contrast to Smith, however, Waites views such renements, not simply as a change in arguments for discrimination based on the same prejudice as before, but as reecting a movement to new political terrain, and implying a signicant moderation of previous attitudes (Waites, 2000: paragraphs 3.3 and 4.6). In arguing that resistance to repeal operated on an assumption that sexuality is unsettled only in adolescence, Moran (2001: 77) also observes a subtlety of argumentation similar to those mentioned earlier: those resisting repeal spoke carefully, and avoided the outright condemnation of homosexuality. They tended to stop short of notions such as sin, and instead spoke euphemistically about things such as a lack of moral equivalence, as did the late Baroness Young Conservative (Hansard, 2000a: 406). These observations, identifying subtlety, carefulness and hedging in arguments in favour of Section 28s retention, emanate from differing narratives of change or its absence, but strongly resonate with more widely observed techniques used to justify discrimination in contemporary societies.

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Disclaiming and denial

In an article identifying the limitations of liberalism in the struggles of lesbians and gay men, Brickell (2001: 214) notes that within contemporary western societies: overt statements about the inferiority of any social group are increasingly frowned upon [therefore] opponents of homosexuality must strategize rhetorics which accommodate this shift. Similar themes are present in work relating to discrimination in other contexts. For example, van Dijk observes a similar process in the allegedly increasing prominence of denials of prejudice in discourse about ethnic relations. In broad terms:
[T]he more overt and blatant forms of legal and social structures and everyday practices which dene ethnic or racial discrimination are slowly being replaced by more implicit, indirect, subtle or otherwise less open, though not necessarily less effective or insidious, forms of dominance and inequality. (van Dijk, 1991: 28)

Such observations are intended to identify a tendency rather than a blanket process, but, according to van Dijk, given the declining acceptability of overtly expressed racist views, those advocating discrimination need to manage this so that it appears to be consistent with general values of tolerance (van Dijk, 1992: 115). Although tolerance can be considered to rest on a bed of disapproval (Wilson, 1993: 174) and is not politically innocent (McClure, 1990: 364), it seems to be positively valued in contemporary western societies. Thus, external reasons are found to legitimate discrimination, which is portrayed as an exceptional matter by being grounded in a potential threat or harm (McClure, 1990: 382) or some other special reasons (Galeotti, 1993: 600). Such justications are far subtler than outright condemnation and therefore more difcult to combat. Van Dijk utilizes Hewitt and Stokes (1975: 3) concept of a disclaimer, dened as: a verbal device employed to ward off and defeat in advance doubts and negative typication which may result from intended conduct. They argue that such techniques are an attempt to avoid potential negative identity typication, and are therefore orientated towards perceived cultural constraints (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975: 11). In his elaboration of their work, van Dijk neatly summarizes the concept as an introduction for a but (1992: 110, original emphasis), followed by something that might be interpreted as emerging from prejudice. Regardless of the extent to which such techniques should be connected with a wider narrative of transformation (or its absence), such disclaiming alerts us to an acknowledgement by the speaker that there exists a risk of them being observed as having a (negative) predetermined, and implicitly irrational, interest in an issue what Potter (1996) calls the dilemma of stake. This recognizes that social actors themselves often seek explanations at the level of interests, and therefore: 331

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[A]nything that a person . . . says or does may be discounted as a product of stake or interest. The referencing of such a stake is one principal way of discounting the signicance of an action, or reworking its nature. (Potter, 1996: 110)

Taking care to disclaim a particular interest (possession of racist or homophobic views) is one way of attempting to disarm such an interpretation, and giving your argument greater legitimacy. If the argument is not the product of such a stake then the speaker must have a more rational, stronger reason for making it, and the addressee asked to take it more seriously (Billig, 1996: 214). Of course, this is not to suggest that success is guaranteed the risk of an undesirable attribution cannot be negated. Disclaiming is therefore about attempting to minimize that risk rather than ensuring its avoidance. Speer and Potter (2000) highlight some of the resources that speakers use in managing heterosexist talk, that is, talk which could be interpreted as asserting the existence of a hierarchical relationship between heterosexuality and homosexuality. People orientate towards the possibility of being held to account for what they say, and accordingly try to negotiate a position that will allow them to make their point whilst acknowledging and foreclosing potential criticism. They conclude that the presence of such rhetorical techniques in discourse about sexuality indicates that what counts as heterosexism or prejudice . . . might not only be an analysts concern (Speer and Potter, 2000: 550). It is also an ongoing practical concern for social actors themselves, and can be observed in what they say and do. As already mentioned, Smith (1994) has pointed to similar themes in discourse around homosexuality, and Section 28 in particular. With specic relation to the inclusion/exclusion discourses of the New Right,3 she suggests that arguments for discrimination are made in increasingly subtle ways. However, more or less the same issues (prejudice) are assumed to be at stake, a contention strongly echoing van Dijks discussions of change (see earlier in this article). According to these commentaries, a different form is being given to the same basic phenomenon. Other interpretations, recognizing the possibility of more fundamental changes, are possible (see Waites, 2000), but observing the regularity of disclaiming and other careful speech does not necessarily require a direct judgement on such questions. In multiple readings of the parliamentary debates on Section 28s repeal I was struck by the prevalence of a particular type of argument in favour of its retention. Arguments disclaiming homophobia were widespread, and were regularly observable as a direct concern for the participants on both sides of the argument. In this article, my references to disclaiming are not intended to mobilize any psychological notions of being in denial, nor are they to be viewed 332

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as implying that those engaging in it are protesting too much and that their assertions are necessarily insincere (see Billig, 1996: 282). However, that does not mean that they are to be taken at face value either. Questions regarding how such discourse operates are semi-autonomous from that of sincerity. In my usage, therefore, disclaiming refers to the process of discursively disavowing a possible unacceptable or disadvantageous interpretation of actions, with an agnostic stance regarding the truth status of specic instances of such disavowal. Although explicit condemnation of homosexuality is rare, it is not my contention that denials are universally employed within the debates over repeal. Some unmitigated utterances are directly critical of homosexuality in a blanket sense. For example, Lord Moran (Crossbench)4 made reference to homosexuality and other perversions (Hansard, 2000a: 412), and the late Earl of Longford (Labour) made the bizarrely inaccurate claim that: Any homosexual activity is criminal (Hansard, 2000a: 403). Nevertheless, those contributions involving disclaiming are worthy of attention, both because of what they suggest about the signicance of the constraints within which speakers felt they were operating, and in terms of the signicance of what can and can not be said in relation to homosexuality in this specic context, and in contemporary Britain more generally. What follows is a selection of examples of such practices, interspersed with comments upon what they indicate about the repeal process and the way in which it was conducted.

Stressing absence: disclaiming homophobia

During the parliamentary debates on repeal a signicant portion of the debate was occupied by members opposed to repeal denying that they were homophobic. They were trying to carve out a space for the advocacy of discrimination that would not result in them being described as prejudiced a process sharing many characteristics with that mentioned earlier. For example, Nigel Waterson (Conservative) who led the opposition to repeal in the House of Commons regularly stressed that Section 28 has never been about prejudice, bigotry or intolerance (Hansard, 2000f: 1041). Here we have a fairly clear-cut assertion of what is/is not the case with emphasis upon what is absent, what are variously named as prejudice, bigotry, intolerance or homophobia, but rarely specied in greater detail. Despite a lack of clarity about their specic content, it is observably important that all are absent. A rather more rhetorically sophisticated example of the same fundamental assertion can be seen in one contribution from Baroness Blatch (Conservative) in the Lords. She stated that: 333

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It is not homophobic to care about the moral and spiritual education of our children; it is not homophobic to argue that the promotion of homosexuality to our children . . . is not acceptable; it is not homophobic to promote marriage and to teach that marriage provides a strong foundation for stable relationships and the most reliable framework for raising children; and it is not homophobic to prohibit local authorities using their funds taxpayers funds . . . to allow material or individuals to promote homosexuality as equal to marriage as a lifestyle. (Hansard, 2000e: 119)

Baroness Blatch lists four positions that she adopts, prefacing each with the direct assertion that: it is not homophobic to . . .. Repetition of this type is widely regarded as an effective rhetorical technique (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986), however, it is Baroness Blatchs unequivocal positioning of herself that is of most interest here. She accepts that her view on each of these issues would be undermined if it was homophobic, and therefore that this was a possible (although, according to her, incorrect) interpretation. Since she claims that they are not to be seen as the product of prejudice, a greater signicance is supposed to be attached to them. If not the product of homophobia, they must be founded upon something else, more reasonable and more credible such as concern for taxpayers or, more emotively, children. This is consistent with an attempt to deny and foreclose a potential point of criticism whilst simultaneously enhancing the credibility of her argument via that foreclosure consistent with the literature on disclaiming outlined earlier. By shifting the focus away from homosexuality per se, and onto its promotion and its effects upon other things, it is stressed that the source of her opposition to the proposed repeal is external to any general attitude towards homosexuality. Lord Saltoun of Abernethy (Crossbench) provided another example of disclaiming which adds another twist:
Neither the late Lord Halsbury [the original proponent of legislation of this type] nor any of those who were involved in his Private Members Bill or in supporting its second incarnation as Clause 28 . . . were, or are, homophobes. The vast majority of people who do not wish to see Section 28 repealed are not only not homophobic but are innitely more tolerant of people of different sexual orientation than homosexuals are of them. (Hansard, 2000a: 462, emphasis added)

This contains a denial a direct assertion of what is not the case but also deects the notion of intolerance directly onto the opposition. As such, it is similar to the fundamental reversal identied as prevalent in the debates in 1988 (Stacey, 1991: 288; Smith, 1994: 219). On this logic, it is they (those campaigning for gay rights) who are the powerful ones. According to Lord Waddington (Conservative), they hypocritically accuse their opponents of ugly prejudice (Hansard, 2000a: 419). Those who want Section 28s repeal are painted as the real source of any intolerance. 334

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Brickell relates similar arguments to the common claim that gay people are trying to achieve excess inequality (2001: 222, original emphasis) or special rights. He argues that within such discourse the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from full cultural citizenship is coded as an equality that is not to be exceeded (Brickell, 2001: 2245; also see Smith and Windes, 2000: 845). We are asked to believe that full equality has already been achieved, and therefore any more concessions represent things having gone too far the stated position of Margaret Thatcher (1995: 152). All these arguments seem to be aimed at avoiding an attribution of intolerance or homophobia. This end is variously pursued by an acknowledgement that such an attribution is a possible, but incorrect one homophobia is claimed to be absent from the accounts of those opposing repeal. This aims at neutralizing such a possibility, and tries to carve out a space for legitimate discrimination that does not automatically bring with it a charge of prejudice. The often-assumed relationship between resistance to repeal and prejudice is denied it is claimed that both tolerance and a desire to retain Section 28 are possible.

Stressing presence: evidence of tolerance

Not only are there many examples of an assertion of the absence of prejudice on the part of those resisting repeal, many speakers stressed the presence of tolerance, and displayed evidence for their own. Such practices approximate to what Hewitt and Stokes (1975: 4) term credentialing the provision of evidence which attempts to place the speaker in a protected category such that they should not be typied in a particular way. Beginning a statement with words such as some of my best friends . . . is a classic way of attempting to provide such protection. This particular technique has even become a clich (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 97) that most people will instantly recognize. A paradigmatic example of this practice can be seen in a contribution from Lord Elton (Conservative):
I do not wish to be put in the position of someone who is thought to be rabidly hostile to gay people. I am not. I have good friends, real friends, who are homosexual. That does not mean that I believe that their chosen path, in preference to another, should be put to people who are undecided as to their future. (Hansard, 2000a: 442, emphasis added)

He subsequently states that homosexuals should be supported in their difculty (Hansard, 2000a: 442), which seems rather patronizing and may have been more likely to be challenged in the absence of his disclaiming. An example of someone being caught out whilst apparently trying to disclaim comes from Lord Waddington: 335

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Of course it is wrong to be intolerant of homosexuals as individuals. That must be said because, as my noble friend Baroness Young mentioned, the word intolerance is so often wrongly used. But it is surely right to be intolerant of those prepared to make the target of propaganda children who are far too young to appreciate the implications of a decision to involve themselves in homosexual behaviour. (Hansard, 2000a: 41718, emphasis added)

This tries to provide a justication for selective discrimination, whilst pointing to the wrong-ness of intolerance on a more general level. It also resonates with Smiths (1994: 207) noted differentiation of homosexualities: only the specic group who allegedly want to target children with propaganda do not merit tolerance. Again this discursively separates prejudice and discrimination, and tries to legitimate discrimination through the assertion of a potential threat as discussed earlier. Newspaper coverage from the following day attests to Lord Waddingtons failure, implying that he is, despite his protestations, homophobic and prejudiced:
[Lord Waddington] fulminated against sodomy and . . . hammered home his abhorrence of the gay lifestyle . . . no-one could understand why on earth he then bothered to add the sentence: Of course, it is wrong to be intolerant of homosexuals. (Brown, 2000: 8)

This interpretation implies that his disclaiming was added as something of an afterthought. Since he had already said several overt and challengeable things before the disclaimer, it came too late to successfully full its apparent purpose. We can also see this type of clumsiness in Andrew Robothans (Conservative) claims that: I am not intolerant of all homosexuals. I do not think that homosexuality is an equivalent lifestyle, but I am not intolerant of homosexuals (Hansard, 2000c: 247). He seems to have some grasp of the idea of disclaiming, but he has failed to understand the way in which the denial is supposed to come rst, and therefore has failed to implement the practice with the skill of, for example, Baroness Blatch (see quotation given earlier). Despite the existence of such apparent failures, the widespread practices of disclaiming (where more successful) nevertheless created problems for those in favour of repeal. Intentionally, or otherwise, they often collaborated with the general denial of prejudice by those resisting repeal, or failed to problematize such denials effectively.

Responses and a discourse of tolerance?

In their discussion of arguments surrounding the extension of gay rights in the USA, Smith and Windes (2000: 91) stress that the mutual inuence of opposing arguments is more signicant than individual case-building. It 336

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seems appropriate, therefore, to consider attempts at challenging and problematizing some of the disclaiming engaged in by those resisting Section 28s repeal. Of course, one theoretical means of problematization would be to deny the denials, countering with a direct assertion that they were untrue. However, any explicit accusation that someone was a liar would probably be reprimanded and subject to sanctions for unparliamentary language in the institutional context of the British Parliament which prides itself on politeness and respectability (Harris, 2001: 459).5 With such conventions, a challenge to the truth status of a disclaiming has to be more sophisticated than a direct counter-assertion that the person was lying. Inevitably, there are examples of relatively explicit accusations, such as Ben Bradshaws assertion that the House of Lords is riddled with homophobia (Hansard, 2000f: 1049). However they tend to be fairly abstract rather than personalized. This indirectness results from another institutional factor: debate within the British Parliament is in the form of monologue speeches, albeit with interventions, rather than a more dialogic and messy form of interaction. Some of the most notable contributions aimed at resisting the disclaiming are to be found within speeches made by Lord Alli (Labour), the only openly gay member of the House of Lords, despite his own denial that he was not a champion for the gay rights movement (Hansard, 2000e: 107). He claimed that amendments proposed by Baroness Young were prejudiced and homophobic and identied other speeches of pure prejudice (Hansard, 2000b: 45960). In one particular example, he identied the type of processes to which I have been referring thus far:
I say to my friends and colleagues that to begin a speech with kind words such as I am not prejudiced, or, I accept the rights of gay people but, or, I will do anything to stop the bullying of gay young men and women, and then to oppose the repeal of section 28, cannot remove the responsibility for the legacy of hate. (Hansard, 2000a: 4256)

Lord Alli asserts that denying prejudice does not absolve responsibility for the negative consequences resulting from voting for Section 28s retention, even if peers6 claim to play no part in prejudice themselves. Interestingly this stops short of directly accusing those peers who utilize such disclaimers of actually being homophobic and lying, thereby avoiding a possible pantomime-like Oh no Im not Oh yes you are situation, or the sanctions mentioned earlier. However, the indirectness, exemplied by reference to speeches rather than people as prejudiced, may also be its major weakness. No one is called specically to account in the speech, making it easy for his opposition to ignore it. Unfortunately for Lord Alli, none of his opponents co-operated, and Baroness Young subsequently 337

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claimed not to have understood his contribution (Hansard, 2000a: 449), refusing to engage with it and denying it any legitimacy. In the same debate, Lord Peston (Labour), a high-prole opponent of the legislations passage in 1988 (Jeffery-Poulter, 1991: 224), made another attempt to problematize the arguments of those resisting repeal:
Of course, all . . . will put their hands on their hearts and say, we are not prejudiced. Indeed, those people are outraged at the suggestion that they might be prejudiced. But I must repeat the question: why focus on sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular to blame for our moral decline? I have not heard a single response to explain the obsession held by many people on this point. (Hansard, 2000a: 470)

This contribution is insightful in its recognition that denials of homophobia are now expected in such debates they are entirely obvious and routine (Of course). Again there is no direct accusation: Peston implies that no other satisfactory explanation has been given, and indirectly asks for one. However, his opponents again do not fall for this attempt to problematize their arguments. No direct answer is forthcoming a situation helped by Pestons not personalizing his question by directing it to anyone in particular. The unwillingness of those resisting repeal to accommodate the positions of their opposition contrasts with the apparent willingness of those in favour of repeal to meet their opponents halfway, thereby granting legitimacy to their opponents claims. Acquiescence to the general climate of disclaiming can be observed in various contributions made in favour of repeal. For example, Lord Whitty, the Labour peer responsible for the legislation in the Lords, stated that [u]nconscious homophobia exists in many of us and lies behind a lot of the apparent good intentions in Section 28 (Hansard, 2000a: 482, emphasis added). This statement initially seems to problematize his opponents arguments, by acknowledging that homophobia may be relevant. However, any homophobia is described as unconscious, and the responsibility for its involvement in debate is thereby displaced. Moreover, Whitty plays a part in constructing his opposition as having good intentions, legitimating their concerns, at least in part. Having constructed their arguments as based upon something external to homosexuality per se, he is helping with their disclaiming. Another example comes from Ann Keen (Labour) who seems to be expressing frustration at the prevalence of disclaiming:
Are we saying that homosexuals are not equal to other people? If we are, we should say that is how we feel. If hon[ourable] Members feel that way, they should have the courage to say so, and not hide behind Section 28 by saying that it is about protecting young people. (Hansard, 2000d: 354)

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Here she requests that those who harbour negative feelings about homosexuality admit to it, but subsequently states her belief that not one hon[ourable] Member who has spoken in this debate wants to foster an intolerant or prejudiced society (Hansard, 2000d: 354). She therefore assists in the general denial of prejudice, thereby legitimating the arguments of those resisting repeal somewhat if not based upon prejudice, they surely have some more reasonable foundation. Nevertheless, she highlights the possibility that the invocation of the protection of children allows the displacement of prejudice, and that it seems to give an alternative, less controversial rationale for retaining the legislation (even if arguably based upon stereotyping). Her contribution is insightful in terms of identifying what many of those resisting Section 28s repeal seem to be doing, but does nothing to effectively combat it. Again, no one is specically called upon to give account or justify the arguments made, and the absence of an explanation cannot be attributed to any individual. Such half-hearted problematization may relate to a more general tendency towards the appeasement of morally conservative discourse by that of social liberalism (Epstein, 2000: 389; Moran, 2001: 78; also see Phillips, 1996; Waites, 2000: paragraph 4.2) an apparent willingness to meet such discourse half way, and therefore grant it a sense of legitimacy. Nevertheless, given that there seems to be a concern to avoid the attribution of homophobia in the public debate, and a tendency to accept this disclaiming, it is perhaps possible to tentatively identify the inuence of a discourse of tolerance in relation to homosexuality in this context, something which assisted the attempt by those resisting Section 28s repeal to portray their arguments as being based on something other than homophobia and prejudice, and therefore granting them a legitimacy that they might otherwise not have achieved.

Conclusion
These examples of disclaiming indicate that an attribution of homophobia is seen as unhelpful to arguments for retention of Section 28, or as undesirable in a more general sense. If attributions of prejudice, intolerance and homophobia are problematic, then I can perhaps suggest the inuence of a discourse of tolerance evidence of a collective desire to avoid such attributions driving the contributions of those against repeal, and inuencing their opponents as well. For those resisting repeal, this resonates with a process approximating to Smiths (1994) differentiation of homosexualities since it requires that argumentation in favour of discrimination is centred upon something other than a singular, aggregated homosexuality, and attempts to justify differential treatment by exceptional or special reasons. 339

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The possibility of distinctions, such as that drawn between prejudice and discrimination, arguably relies to some extent upon a liberal conception of tolerance as social rather than political virtue (Galeotti, 1993: 588). If tolerance were conceived as more explicitly political, and as pertaining to institutions and collective public action, rather than as a mental property of individuals inuencing their interactions with others, then there might be less potential for discrimination to be justied in these sorts of ways. In arguments against Section 28s repeal, considerable care has been taken in the justication of discrimination. If such discrimination is regularly packaged with great subtlety it becomes difcult to combat assuming that is your aim; it is clearly not everyones. If measures amounting to discrimination against homosexuality can be advocated in careful terms, by talking about inappropriate uses of taxpayers money, harm to innocent children, or confused adolescent sexuality, or their condensation in the phrase the promotion of homosexuality, then it can become difcult to argue that it is homophobia or intolerance that is at stake. However, given the effort going into disclaiming the presence of homophobia and intolerance, these surely provide fertile ground for placing those resisting repeal on the defensive. In his analysis of the context of the repeal process, Waites argues that if those in favour of repeal had been able to recognize such subtle ways of arguing for retention then they might have been able to marshall a more sustained case for abolition (Waites, 2000: paragraph 4.5). Surely one way of doing this is to try to shift the location of debate on to a discursive terrain disadvantageous to those opposing repeal, and force them to confront the question of intolerance. The point is not that those wanting repeal have adequately addressed issues such as harm to innocent children, but that these constitute a discursive terrain benecial to those who want to retain Section 28. This raises the question of the need for the development of alternative strategies if the rhetorical effects of such disclaiming are to be successfully resisted although this is a project that I have not attempted to undertake. How, for example, might you problematize disclaiming in the absence of a directly dialogical context, and without explicitly calling someone a liar? In a purely formal sense, any legislation aimed at Section 28s repeal introduced in the House of Commons could be forced through via the Parliament Act (Waites, 2001: 499), even in the face of resistance from the Lords. At the time of writing, the Local Government Bill, containing a clause to repeal Section 28, has successfully passed its third reading in the House of Commons (Hansard, 2003a) despite attempts to introduce various amendments by opponents of repeal. It has also received its second reading in the House of Lords (Hansard, 2003b), and is due to go into 340

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its committee stage in June 2003. As yet it is unclear whether the government has the political will to force it through if that is necessary. In the debates so far, those resisting Section 28s repeal have again engaged in practices of disclaiming (for examples, see the contributions of the Conservatives David Wilshire, Hansard, 2003a: 73; and Edward Leigh, Hansard, 2003a: 758), and have stressed the value of tolerance (Baroness Blatch, Hansard, 2003b: 1537). Signicantly, in advocating the reintroduction of repeal, Kali Mountford (Labour) has problematized the notion of tolerance, contrasting it with an arguably more positive notion of acceptance (HMSO, 2003: 562). It will be interesting to see if this distinction is sustained throughout any repeal process, and whether it has an impact upon the forms of discursive activity that those resisting repeal feel obliged to undertake. More generally, there appears to have been something of a shift towards a more consensus-based approach to the issue, at least in the Commons. However, many Conservatives now supporting repeal are doing so conditionally, wanting parents to be able to hold a ballot if unhappy with a schools sex education policies. Others have suggested the extension of Section 28 to cover heterosexuality too potentially less discriminatory, but something which many are likely to nd highly questionable. Again, we shall see if any such factors change the potential argumentative strategies available to those for or against repeal. What is outlined here may seem to be quite negative: the subtle advocacy of discrimination is difcult to problematize. However, disclaiming homophobia will become less effective if people become aware of its implications, and can nd new means of combating its potential effects. Perhaps that will require a level of discursive complexity that is not yet widely deployed when it comes to our understandings of sexualities within contemporary society.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jos Lpez, Meryl Aldridge, Tim Strangleman, and Viktoria Sargent for their comments at various stages, as well as the two reviewers who made important suggestions for improvement. This article was produced whilst in receipt of an ESRC grant award number: R42200134082.

Notes
1. It has never applied in Northern Ireland. 2. All numerical references to parliamentary debates are column numbers. 3. In the UK context this refers to the coming together of moral conservatism and economic neo-liberalism, leading to a focus on a free economy but a strong state (see for example, Gamble, 1988). 4. Some members of the House of Lords have no party afliation, and are described as Crossbenchers.

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5. A recent example of someone falling foul of this convention, can be seen in a debate on the issue of Iraq in the year 2002. Having been described as a mouthpiece for Saddam Husseins regime, George Galloway called his accuser Ben Bradshaw a liar, and by refusing to withdraw the remark led to the suspension of the debate (Hansard, 2002: 88WH-89WH). 6. Members of the House of Lords.

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Biographical Note
Joseph Burridge is currently undertaking an ESRC funded PhD in Sociology at the University of Nottingham. His PhD involves work on Section 28, the proposed ban on hunting with dogs, and the build up to war on Iraq. Address: School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD. [email: josephburridge@hotmail.com]

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