Learning From Obama

Table of Contents
1. Learning from Obama: Lessons for Online Communicators in 2009 and

Beyond ...3
2. Learning from Obamas Cam

!uccess ...12 on t%e 'nternet ...19
aign !tructure: "o# to Organi$e for
3. Learning from Obamas Online Outreac%: "o# to &ind and Build !u (. Learning from Obamas )olunteer *rmy: "o# to +ut +eo
.our Be%alf ...2/ Online ...32
ort
le to ,or- on
0. Learning from Obamas &inancial !teamroller: "o# to 1aise 2oney /. Learning from Obama: "o# to 2o3e &or#ard ...(1
* 4ote about !ources5&urt%er 1eading ...(6 *bout t%e *ut%or ...(9
The contents of this e-book are also available as a series of standalone articles at Epolitics.com.
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Learning from Obama:
Lessons for Online Communicators in 2009 and Beyond

Without the internet, Barack Obama would still be the junior senator from Illinois. Under the rules of the broadcast era of politics, a young man with a funny name and a couple of years in the Senate might run honorably but would almost certainly lose, crushed by the ability of an e perienced candidate like !illary "linton to raise money from big donors and lock up endorsements from elected officials and party acti#ists.
But Barack Obama declared his candidacy in $%%&, not in '((', and his two)year campaign for the White !ouse could rely on the internet to an unprecedented e tent for its core functions. !is staff would employ a combination of both new and pro#en online technologies to organi*e #olunteers, to find new supporters and put them to work, to turn out #oters on election day and +of course, to raise unprecedented amounts of money - all contributing to a crucial edge in the primary and general elections.
Both Obama and .epublican ri#al /ohn 0c"ain relied on the net to bolster their campaigns. But Obama1s online success dwarfed his opponent1s, and pro#ed key to his winning the presidency. Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Sarah Lai Stirland, Wired.com, 11/ /!""#
Obama1s online staff and the contractors they employed designed, built, tested and steadily impro#ed a series of systems and procedures that formed the basis of a scalable, distributed organi*ation that by 2o#ember of $%%3 spanned the United
###.e olitics.com 7 *ugust8 2009 3
States and penetrated areas in which 4emocrats had not competed in years. 5he Obama new media team tried many techni6ues in the process, but moti#ated by the need to achie#e measurable political results, they focused on replicable models, practical tools and incremental impro#ements. In the end they were richly rewarded7 their work midwifed an astounding le#el of citi*en interest and in#ol#ement for a modern political campaign. 5he numbers alone are impressi#e7
On 0yBarackObama.com, or 0yBO, Obama1s own socnet, $ million profiles were created. In addition, $%%,%%% offline e#ents were planned, about 8%%,%%% blog posts were written and more than 9:,%%% #olunteer groups were created - at least ',%%% of them on ;eb. '%, $%%&, the day Obama announced his candidacy. Some 9 million calls were made in the final four days of the campaign using 0yBO1s #irtual phone)banking platform. On their own 0yBO fundraising pages, &%,%%% people raised <9% million. Obama $aised %al& a Billion Online, 'ose (ntonio )ar*as, Washin*ton Post, 11/!"/!""#
5he campaign took of ad#antage of more speciali*ed donations as well, from Will.I.=m1s >?es We "an@ #ideo to #olunteer software de#elopment7
In many ways, the story of Obama1s campaign was the story of his supporters, whose creati#ity and enthusiasm manifested through multitudes of websites and ?ou5ube #ideos online. It e#en resulted in #olunteer contributions like the inno#ati#e Obama A%3 iBhone and i5ouch application that enabled owners to mobili*e their friends and contacts in battleground states through the =pple de#ices. Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Sarah Lai Stirland, Wired.com, 11/ /!""#
But it was the internet fundraising that first caught campaign professionals1 attention, since it spoke a far older political language7 money.
In fundraising, Obama followed in the footsteps of !oward 4ean1s $%%8 bid by regularly soliciting small donations from a wide swath of #oters, raising record amounts online by federal filing deadlines. !e then used this money for more traditional campaigning - for e ample, flooding cable markets in strategic states with tele#ision ad#ertising. Obama spent a record)shattering <$(9 million on 5C ads between /anuary ', $%%&, and October $(, $%%3, according to 52S 0edia Intelligence. 0c"ain spent <'9$ million during the same period. Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Sarah Lai Stirland, Wired.com, 11/ /!""#
.egardless of any other ad#antages he possessed in the $%%3 election season, Obama1s ability to raise as much money as his campaign could reasonably absorb, in part by returning to the small donors who stuck with him again and again through the worst, was decisi#e - it ele#ated him to the first tier of candidates in $%%&, it saw him through rough times in the 4emocratic primaries and it pro#ided the means for him to absolutely o#erwhelm /ohn 0c"ain in the general election.
But as we shall see, fundraising was only one component of Obama1s carefully nurtured relationship with his supporters, which ran through many channels but had a single ultimate goal7 electing him Bresident of the United States.
Learning from Obamas Online !uccess

!ocial media lessons from t%e Obama cam aign Start early Build to scale Inno#ate where necessaryD do e#erything else incrementally better 0ake it easy to find, forward and act Bick where you want to play "hannel online enthusiasm into specific, targeted acti#ities that further the campaign1s goals
0
Integrate online ad#ocacy into e#ery element of the campaign +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
What can other online communicators learn from Obama1s e ampleE !is dri#e to the White !ouse has ob#ious implications for future political candidates, but e#eryone from neighborhood acti#ists to corporate marketers can learn from aspects of his online oddyssey. Fet1s spell out a few general principles first7
T%e Obama organi$ation integrated online communications into its o3erall structure and rocesses. 2ew media team director /oe .ospars was not buried in the technology or communications department, as were his counterparts in most other presidential campaigns. Instead, he reported directly to campaign manager 4a#id Blouffe, and he and others on his staff worked alongside liaisons from other campaign areas such as field organi*ing and fundraising, sometimes sharing desks in cramped spaces. Obamas internet communications strategy aimed at concrete8 focused and measurable goals8 bot% online and in t%e real #orld. G#en with the relati#ely #ast resources at hand, his internet communications staff built carefully, inno#ated only as needed, and in#ested in projects that seemed to ha#e a real chance of paying off in time to win. "on#ersely, the campaign hunted supporters through many different online channels and pro#ided them many potential tiers of engagement, with an aim to get as much effort and #alue out of each #olunteer as he or she was willing to gi#e. T%e cam aign used t%e internet to ut su orters to #or- substanti3ely bot% in9
erson and online. ;rom the beginning, the Obama site ga#e supporters the
knowledge and the means to organi*e and reach out within their own social circles, and millions ultimately participated in #irtual and real)world e#angelism on his behalf. Obama partisans badgered, recruited, cajoled and persuaded friends, neighbors, family and complete strangers o#er the entire course of the $%%3 race, and their weapons included parties, e#ents, phone banks, personal phone calls, te t messages and door)knocking, plus e#ery online tool a#ailable. =nd, the campaign trusted them to do it. T%e cam aign carefully targeted muc% of its online outreac%, hoping to ma imi*e the bang)to)buck ratio by deli#ering the right messages to the right people at the right time. 5heir emphasis on targeting is #isible in e#erything from customi*ed email messages to Hoogle keyword ad#ertising to online #ideos directed at people based on their interests or where they li#ed7
In addition to #ideos on national issues, the campaign also used geographically)specific #ideos. In the important battleground state of Ohio, for e ample, the campaign posted #ideos of Obama can#assing door)to)door near 5oledo, talking to folks about the issues facing their state. 5he email and #ideo were placed near a button in#iting #iewers to sign up to #olunteer. What Worked &or Obama 3an Work &or 4O5$ Or*ani6ation, (ndrea Wood, /7$ Strate*ic Ser8ices, 'an,ary !""2
T%e Obama o eration treated t%e su
orter relations%i as a t#o9#ay street,
with information and contributions +financial and otherwise, tra#eling up the chain e#en as staff instructions and fundraising emails came down. Besides the high)profile >?es We "an@ and other supporter #ideos that the communications staff helped spread far and wide, indi#idual #olunteer phone)bankers and block)walkers pro#ided data that the campaign used to make strategic decisions about resource allocation up until the last hours of the race. In return,
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members of the #olunteer teams dotting the country were held strictly accountable for their roles and for the goals set for them - the campaign was not afraid to >fire@ a #olunteer. &undamentally8 Obamas cam aign loo-ed u on su orters as a resource to
be maintained #it% great care - as a set of relationships to nurture - and saw the internet as the most useful technology to stay in touch with them, keep them moti#ated and put them to work.
T%e Obama Tool-it:
/ust about any online application imaginable turned up at some point in the $%%3 political season, but these are the ones that the Obama campaign found to be consistently effecti#e7 ,ebsite ;rom its email)capturing splash screen to its opportunity)hea#y na#igation, BarackObama.com was a ruthless recruiting machine. 5he website acti#ely pushed #olunteers toward resources in the 0yBarackObama.com toolkit, aiming to put them to work in their own neighborhoods and social circles. 5he site was also #ital for messaging, particularly through the official campaign blog, which distributed #ideos, talking points and other information to supporters, bloggers and the broader media world. 5hrough all the long months of the $%%3 race, BarackObama.com was the hub around which the campaign1s online outreach re#ol#ed.
;mail Gmail was the main tool used to build relationships with supporters and to raise money
- if you talk to members of Obama1s online staff, it tends to come up again and again. 5he campaign1s +opt)in)only, list topped '9 million names, to whom were sent some &%%% separate campaign)written emails totaling roughly one billion actual messages. =nd of course, email was one of the main ways indi#idual acti#ists spread the word among their own friends and family.
2yBarac-Obama.com Inspired in its approach by social networking websites, 0yBO was an online toolset that #olunteers could use to organi*e e#ents, run their own fundraising campaigns, write blog posts, recruit friends and otherwise get in#ol#ed in helping to elect Barack Obama. 0yBO was particularly important in areas in which the campaign did not ha#e professional staff, since it ga#e #olunteers the means to create their own local campaign structure - professional field staff could >parachute in@ as elections approached and immediately take o#er a functioning organi*ation. But all across the country, e#en in areas with a strong campaign presence, 0yBO pro#ided a producti#e conduit for supporter energy and a launchpad for supporter acti#ism.
2ulti9C%annel Online Outreac% 5he Obama campaign passed up few opportunites to connect online. 0ySpace and ;acebook as well as niche networks such as Black Blanet were fertile ground for the campaign itself and for supporters acting on their own, and the campaign e#entually maintained official profiles on some ': different online social networks +accumulating fi#e million >friends@ in total,. Obama1s staff worked with other online communities as well, reaching out directly to build relationships and shape co#erage in the progressi#e political blogosphere. 5he campaign used online #ideo e tensi#ely, producing some '3%% separate clips posted to ?ou5ube and BarackObama.com, and also found Hoogle =ds to be a #ery effecti#e way to catch potential donors and
#olunteers as they searched the web for political information.
<rassroots Outreac%5=ata Collection =lmost in#isible from outside the campaign itself, the grassroots system combined e perience gained from past database)dri#en #oter contact e periments with a replicable grassroots organi*ing model and internet communications to create a neighborhood)le#el political juggernaut. Colunteers across the country +but particularly in battleground areas, trained in person and online to work in their own communities, downloading >walk lists@ of houses to #isit in their neighborhoods and placing calls assigned through online >#irtual phone)bank@ applications. 5he campaign in turn trusted them to update the o#erall #oter outreach database with the results, complementing polling data with massi#e amounts of o#ernight information and pro#iding the Obama leadership with priceless insight into how their efforts were playing out on the ground. On election day, the outreach and data) collection operation morphed into a #oter)turnout operation, helping to deli#er Obama #ictories in traditionally .epublican areas and states.
Te>t messaging5cell %ones Structural constraints in the telecom industry still limit the use of cell phones as a mass communications tool in U.S. politics, but indi#idual Obama supporters and organi*ers of course used te t messaging, #ideo and #oice calls e tensi#ely in their own personal outreach. 5he campaign also amassed a central list of roughly one million cell numbers and used S0S te t messages to promote #oter turnout as well as to make campaign announcements such as /oe Biden1s selection as Cice Bresident. "ampaign staff also relied on cell phones to reach segments of the population less likely to be on a computer regularly, such as young people, minorities and the poor.
* 2o3ement or 4ot?
>In this Internet era, it1s not enough to run a campaignD you need to lead a mo#ement,@ 0indy ;inn, a .epublican online political operati#e, told me less than three days after the election. Politics Is 9o Lon*er Local. It.s )iral. 'ose (ntonio )ar*as, Washin*ton Post, 1!/!#/"#
One conclusion some ha#e drawn from the last few years of internet politics is that future political campaigns 0US5 transform themsel#es into mo#ements dri#en by mass enthusiasm if they hope to win elections. Well, maybe - but plenty of people not named Barack Obama and not boosted by a #ibrant and e tensi#e network of acti#e supporters also won on 2o#ember 8th, and it strains credulity to think that e#ery race for city council, school board or e#en "ongress will swing on which candidate most effecti#ely mobili*es an internet)dri#en grassroots army. G#en for online >mo#ements@ at the presidential le#el, the o#erall results are mi ed7 Obama may ha#e won, but 4ean didn1t in $%%8 - and neither did .on Baul in $%%3.
But who caresE Whether they use it to build a mo#ement or not, the internet gi#es indi#idual people and groups large and small the potential to ha#e a profoundly loud #oice. ;or e ample, whoe#er put the #ideo of the .e#erend Wright1s rant on ?ou5ube or sent the first >Obama)is)a)0uslim@ email committed a political act as as influential as any other in this long election season.
In any case, hard e perience shows o#er and o#er that online tools don1t care who uses them, and I suspect that those who don1t remember the history of the Obama campaign are doomed to get repeatedly walloped by those who do. So with that in mind, let1s look at the lessons of $%%3 in more detail, starting with what we can learn from how Obama organi*ed his campaign staff.
2. Learning from Obama@s Cam aign !tructure
"o# to Organi$e for !uccess

Structure isn1t se y, but to talk about the online tools of $%%3 without discussing the framework that go#erned their use brings to mind a certain metaphor about forests and trees. =2?O2G could employ most of the technology the Obama campaign used, but #ery few online communicators ha#e e#er done so either as effecti#ely or on such a scale. One important lesson from $%%37 the tools you use don1t matter as much as how you use them.
&or Obama8 Online Communications #as Communications8 4ot Tec%nology
;or starters, Obama1s new media department was 2O5 a part of the campaign1s tech team. Instead, it was an independent branch of the campaign, coe6ual with communications, field and finance, and was in fact as much a client of the technology folks as, say, the press department was. Fike other department heads, new media team leader /oe .ospars was a central part of the campaign1s top)le#el planning and decision)making processes, and he reported directly to o#erall campaign manager 4a#id Blouffe. In early $%%&, Henachowski brought in .ospars, who co)founded his own online consulting firm and worked on 4ean1s online)fueled campaign, to be the campaign1s new media director, and Ie#in 0alo#er, a #eteran of online tra#el agency Orbit*, to be chief technology officer. In an inter#iew in 0ay $%%&, Henachowski told us7 >We may be the only campaign with a full) time chief technology officer.@ While .ospars was in charge of the entire political operation, 0alo#er helped build software and took care of integrating data and #oter files.
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Obama $aised %al& a Billion Online, 'ose (ntonio )ar*as, Washin*ton Post, 11/!"/!""# "ontrast this with the arrangement at many other campaigns and ad#ocacy groups, in which the online communications team is buried in a basement and often e cluded from the communications planning process until its final stages, lea#ing the online element an afterthought with a stunted chance at success. Blus, their colleagues often lump online communicators in with >the techies,@ e pecting them to be able to fi a computer or configure a network as well as to run a coordinated email fundraising campaign - which is about as logical as demanding that your freelance writer be able to fi a printing press.
Obama1s campaign managers employed a completely different model. 5hey saw that online organi*ing has become as central to modern political campaigning as direct mail, field organi*ing, ad#ertising and media relations, and that the the internet can in fact become the backbone of campaign functions from fundraising to turning out #oters on election day. 0iss that point, and you miss one of the central lessons of $%%3.
Online Communications ,as 'ntegrated across ;ntire Cam aign
Separate and e6ual, but also integrated7 notwithstanding its distinct place in the campaign structure, the Obama new media team worked directly and daily with the their colleagues in other departments. ;or instance, the grassrootsJfield team had staff working at desks in the new media section at the same time that the new media team had staff working at desks in grassrootsJfield offices - reflecting a dri#e throughout the campaign to break down the barriers that usually e ist between competing elements of a political campaign.
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5o that end, .ospars and his colleagues essentially built a >shadow@ field team that worked with the field organi*ing, new media =24 technology folks alike. Fikewise, the new media team1s online fundraising section actually had more staff than the official campaign finance arm by election dayK
5his le#el of integration applied to technological as well as to human systems. ;or instance, the grassroots #olunteer)management software connected with the #oter database system built for Het Out 5he Cote operations, letting #olunteers update information directly - getting more #alue out of e#ery indi#idual #oter contact. Online outreach methods also reinforced each other7 #ideos moti#ated supporters to work harder, while the blog, email list and social networking outreach helped dri#e #ideo #iewership, fundraising and recruitment. Gmail dro#e fundraising, encouraged #olunteers and maintained the long)term relationships that kept supporters by the millions attached to the campaign.
5he website tied it all together, ser#ing as a base for recruitment and #olunteer action. =nd because of the need to design that website and other online imagery, the campaign gained another ad#antage rare for political communicators7 good and consistent branding. Obama1s new media team included talented and e perienced designers, who created a logo and identity package that the campaign deployed with a rigor most corporate brand e perts would en#y. ;rom online ads to print materials, yard signs and wraparound graphics for buses, the new media team turned out most of the #isual material used across the country, sa#ing some <'% million on outside consulting fees while also helping to build the clear and identifiable brand >Obama.@ =n indicator of how good a job they did7 take a good look at that new Bepsi logo.
1(
2easure8 Cut8 t%en 2easure *gain
;rom the the ethereal heights of branding to the dreary #alley of numbers7
Obama1s campaign tracked the success of e#ery e)mail, te t message and Web site #isit, capitali*ing on the analytics that are inherent in digital communications. Gach ad and e)mail was created in multiple #ersions +e.g., different headers, buttons #s. links, #ideo #s. audio #s. plain te t, to test what worked and what did not. 5he campaign de#eloped more than &,%%% customi*ed e)mails, tailored to indi#idual prospects, and made real)time impro#ements to its outreach materials. =djustments were made daily to impro#e performance and con#ersion. It worked. =s the campaign progressed, the effecti#eness of the e)mail campaign increased and con#ersion rates similarly impro#ed. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
0easurability was so important to the Obamans that it actually influenced tactical choices7 .ospars has mentioned that the campaign ran relati#ely few display ads +classic billboard)style online ad#ertising, compared with searchJconte tual ads +Hoogle =ds,, concentrating their spending on what they could >measure and count@ rather than on >amorphous@ messaging goals. 5he point7 what1s the use of doing something you can1t testE If you can1t test it, you don1t know how much good it1s doing you, and your money might be better spent elsewhere. In that #ein, /oe .ospars has likened the Obama analytics team to the Ho#ernment =ccountability =gency, which acts as an auditor and watchdog for the federal go#ernment.
5he core role of analytics in guiding new media outreach neatly illustrates the broader Obama campaign1s pragmatic and self)correcting approach. In this case, the staff reali*ed that tweaking, streamlining and optimi*ing the details of supporter recruitment and management would yield more concrete benefits than de#eloping
any particular piece of gee)whi* new technology - a mantra other online communicators should recite e#ery night before bed.
)olunteer 2anagement A Conte>t8 Training and *ccountability
!ow the Obama field operation organi*ed their #olunteer teams deser#es special mention, in part because their grassroots HO5C technology depended on it and also because it pro#ides an e cellent model for community)based organi*ers of all fla#ors. 5he structure e#ol#ed in the primaries and went national during the general election season. Its critical features7
5he campaign de#eloped a clear team structure for the #olunteer operation, replicable just about anywhere and with standard roles for each member. Gach #olunteer team included a leader +to hold e#eryone accountable,, a data manager +because data doesn1t e ist unless it gets in the system,, a phone bank coordinator, a campus coordinator and a #olunteer coordinator.
5raining was absolutely #ital, both for team members and for the indi#idual neighborhood #olunteers they organi*ed.
5eams had clear #ote)getting and #oter)contact goals and were held accountable for them.
G ample7 for the general election, the Obama organi*ation fielded 8%% teams in the state of 0issouri, super#ised by paid campaign staff, with each team co#ering 3)'$ #oting precincts and starting work weeks or months before 2o#ember 8th.
1/
One thing stands out about this system7 it re6uired a lot from #olunteers, both in terms of training and in actual sweat. 5o keep them working, the campaign was careful to let them in on the kind of strategy details that campaigns usually stri#e to hide. One trick to moti#ating people7 let them know how their efforts fit into a larger framework, in this case #ia 4a#id Blouffe1s online #ideo briefings, so that they know that their work has conte t and is actually #alued. If you want to create a successful national grassroots outreach effort, focus on conte t, training and accountability. I.e., take your people seriously and they1ll return the fa#or - they want to know that they aren1t just blindly making calls or knocking on doors.
T%e T93(8 not t%e Tiger
It1s hard to think of any organi*ation that raises se#eral hundred million dollars as >rough and ready,@ but that description does seem apt for the Obama online campaign. 5hey rarely seemed to aim for immediate perfection, but instead built tools that were needed and that worked, and then incrementally impro#ed them through testing and e perience.
=s a military history nerd, I1m reminded of the tanks of World War II - the .ussians built a standard model +the 5)98, that was good enough, easy to manufacture in huge numbers and easy for draftee farmboys to learn to use +the =mericans sol#ed the same problem with the Sherman,. 5heir Herman counterparts, by contrast, scattered their work among many projects and tended to pri*e engineering #irtue abo#e practicality, yielding tanks like the 5iger that may ha#e been indi#idually superior in battle but were few in number and often >white elephants@ that broke down in the field. Huess who wonE Scalability and usability mattered more than mere technological brillianceK
1:
2ow that we1#e talked about structure, let1s put it to work - how did the Obama campaign find and keep support onlineE
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3. Learning from Obama@s Online Outreac%
"o# to &ind and Build !u 'nternet
ort on t%e
With a team in place and technology under de#elopment, the Obama campaign wasted no time in building their most important resource7 the list of #olunteers who would work to elect the Illinois senator president. =nd just as the campaign would use new media tools to encourage #oter turnout and other action in the real world, they built their list of online acti#ists in part at physical e#ents7
;ield teams used #arious tactics, including collecting addresses at e#ents, #ia online ad#ertising and by offering incenti#es such as a free bumper sticker in e change for contact information. Often, after collecting addresses, follow)up emails steered people to 0yBarackObama.com, where they could find information on how to host e#ents themsel#es. Obama.s $oad +o White %o,se Was Pa8ed With 0mails, 1a8id :oet6l, Online /edia 1aily, 1ecember 2, !""#
Once again, integration was key - offline recruiting +@BarackObama.com@ backdrops at speeches, the U.F1s prominent placement on yard signs, block)walkers trudging through their neighborhoods, yielded online acti#ists, which in turn yielded more recruiting in the physical world. ;or all the attention we1ll pay to online outreach, remember that much of the work of building Obama1s supporter list took place face)to)face.
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Online )ideo
Of course, if you can1t reach someone in person, #ideo is often the ne t best thing. It1s immediate, it1s engaging, and it tends to e#oke a much stronger emotional response than te t and images alone - #ideo feels more >real.@ =nd the Obama campaign used #ideo e tensi#ely7 from #ery early in the race, his team already included a #ideographer and screenwriterJproducer s6uad to shoot footage both for internalJdocumentary purposes and +more importantly, for use in public as a persuasi#e tool. By 2o#ember 8th, they1d posted some '3%% separate clips on ?ou5ube, generating o#er one BIFFIO2 minutes of total #iewership.
0any of the #ideos +such as 4a#id Blouffe1s periodic online briefings, were intended for e isting #olunteers, but others were designed to deli#er targeted messages to specific groups of potential supporters. =nd as with so many other online outreach tools, supporters took the reins themsel#es, in some cases creating pro)Obama #ideos that were seen millions of times. But e#en the ones that WG.G215 #iewed by millions mattered7 the internet is an endless sea of niches, and not only was it impossible for the campaign to target e#ery possible interest or audience, they didn1t need to their supporters were busy doing it for them, and in their own +authentic, #oices. 0y own sister)in)law switched her allegiance from !illary "linton to Barack Obama in part because she watched a #ideo created by Fawrence Fessig, a Stanford law professor and online thinker whom she greatly respects.
Online !ocial 4et#or-s
If you read some of the more breathless co#erage of the internet1s role in politics as the race unfolded, you might get the idea that ;acebook and 0ySpace were the beginning and the end of online politics in $%%3. =nd it1s true that Obama and the
other presidential candidates found these sites to be fertile soil for supporter har#esting, at the #ery least because so many =mericans spend so much time on them. It1s a classic obser#ation7 if you want to find supporters, go where they are and a lot of people are on social networking websites for a lot of hours e#ery day. But the Obama outreach team kept public socnets in perspecti#e, in#esting resources in them but not to a distracting e tent, and worked hard to mo#e new recruits found there into the campaign1s o#erall #olunteer structure.
Obama limited his official presence to ': Lonline social networksM and le#eraged these platforms to direct people to the 0yBO Web site, where the campaign had a greater ability to channel people to the specific acti#ities and causes that were deemed the most important to fulfilling the campaign1s electoral strategy. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
But the campaign1s own official presence was only a slice of the pro)Obama acti#ity to which these sites played host, since millions of Obama1s >friends@ were also e#angeli*ing on his behalf on their own7
;or instance, while Obama had more than three million ;acebook friends, supporters also used the tools that they were familiar with in ;acebook to find creati#e ways to spread the message in support of his candidacy. 0ore than (%%,%%% people joined the >One 0illion Strong for Obama@ group on ;acebook. 5here were ;acebook groups for Obama for almost e#ery college in =merica. 5he campaign le#eraged participation on these e isting networks to reinforce messages across platforms and create as many touch points as possible. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
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Besides its main ;acebook >;an Bage@ and the >One 0illion Strong@ group, the campaign acti#ely encouraged supporters to create their own ;acebook Hroups based on location or interest, reali*ing that these separate groups e panded Obama1s outreach rather than diluted it. 5he campaign also created a ;acebook =pplication for fans to add to their profiles - like a badge or a button but constantly updated - which spread the campaign1s messaging directly through natural channels as friends interacted with friends.
5he Obama campaign in#ested in other site)specific tools besides the ;acebook =pp. 0ySpace allows users to customi*e their profile pages to a much greater e tent than ;acebook, for instance, so Obama1s staff created an array of buttons, badges and widgets for supporters to add - like #irtual yard signs, they ad#ertised the candidate by just sitting there on a page. 5he campaign1s ultimate goal was to use to use each ;acbookJ0ySpace supporter1s profile page as a communications hub within that supporter1s own social circle, building up up #olunteers and donors friend) to)friend.
=nd as the campaign worked in other social networks such as Black Blanet, they adapted their approach to meet the particular rules, re6uirements and customs of each site - e#ery network is different and re6uires a different approach. Of course, it didn1t always work smoothly, as when the professional staff took o#er a #olunteer1s 0ySpace page early in the campaign and encountered a sharp backlash. But that stumble and any others were only minor hurdles - and unlike /ohn 0c"ain, at least Obama didn1t ha#e his 0ySpace profile hacked.
;mail
5hough immensely popular, social networking sites still didn1t reach e#eryone online in
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$%%3, and I suspect that they achie#ed some of their prominence in media co#erage of the election because they were #isible - you could SGG how many >friends@ Barack Obama had at any gi#en moment, and you could SGG it when thousands of people changed their middle names on ;acebook to >!ussein@ in solidarity against .epublican attempts to brand him as >other.@ But just about e#eryone with internet access uses email, regardless of age, and research from the G)Coter Institute published in the summer of $%%3 found that people were significantly more likely to send or forward political email than they were to reach out #ia ;acebook or 0ySpace.
=nother data point7 many websites +including Gpolitics.com, ha#e employed the >Share5his@ widget to encourage readers to forward content or post it to social sites, and stats published by the folks at Share5his in =ugust of $%%3 showed that email) forwarding still dominated their widget1s use across the web. We1ll ne#er know how many Obama supporters bombarded their friends and relati#es with emails on his behalf, but we shouldn1t forget them or discount their ultimate effect because their work was in#isible to outsiders.
Online *d3ertising
By 2o#ember of $%%3, Obama1s new media team had spent some <'N million to buy ad space on the web, most of it de#oted to list)building7 5he presidential hopefuls relied on Web ads almost entirely for building supporter lists and garnering donations. Obama1s ubi6uitous >/oin Us@ call) to)action dro#e supporters to his site to sign up to #olunteer, throw debate) watching parties, attend local campaign e#ents, and, yes, donate. !is campaign raked in millions of small payments from online donors, and we can assume much of that cash came in as a result of search and display ads and e)mails sent to those joiners. Web (ds /attered /ore than 08er in ;"# 0lection, <ate <aye, 3lick=, 9o8 , !""#
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5he campaign did run some influence)the)discussion display ads, for instance buying space on the websites of major media outlets immediately after debates, but they focused more on the practical goal of list)building. =nd that meant search ads, since new media team head /oe .ospars has said that search ads yielded a .eturn On In#estment as high as '%) or ':)fold, presumably measured in campaign contributions. =nd though Obama ad#ertising team bought ads on some issue)based keywords, they found that targeting the ob#ious searches for >Barack Obama@ was steadily and consistently effecti#e. =s elections approached, their strategy shifted somewhat7
=s #oting time drew near during the primaries, the Obama camp targeted ads to specific states, suggesting people click through to learn more about early #oting, or find their local polling places. 5he same went for geo) targeted ads from both the 4emocratic 2ational "ommittee and Obama1s campaign seen in recent monthsD those promoted #oter registration and early #oting. Obama1s ads pushing early #oting e#en appeared in online games leading up to the election. Web (ds /attered /ore than 08er in ;"# 0lection, <ate <aye, 3lick=, 9o8 , !""#
0any other political communicators working in both the electoral and ad#ocacy spaces ha#e found searchJconte tual ads to be e tremely effecti#e for list)building, and they1re likely to be a first consideration for online political ad#ertisers o#er the ne t few years.
+olitical Blogs
.emember $%%8, when blogs were the darlings of the political world, king)makers in the waitingE ;ast)forward a few years and e#ery one of the major political campaigns dedicated time and resources to reaching out to bloggers and their
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communities of readers. 0any candidates >wrote@ +i.e., probably had their staff write, posts for prominent blogs, hosted conference calls for bloggers and paid close attention to what bloggers and commenters said about them. 5he Obama campaign was no e ception, but to a great e tent, it didn1t 2GG4 the political blogs - because it was building its own independent base of *ealous supporters.
In a sense, Obama could do an end)run around the top)le#el progressi#e blogs, adding their readers to his own network by reaching them through other channels. !e didn1t ignore the blogs, but he could afford to keep them in their rightful place as particularly influential #oices and as gathering places for potential supporters, but not as the be)all and end)all of online outreach.
Catc%ing Bem ,%en T%ey Come to .ou
Of course, for all of his campaign1s aggressi#e outreach, plenty of Obama1s donors and #olunteers found him on their own, either through a web search or by going straight to BarackObama.com. =nd as we discussed earlier, the website was a supporter)grabbing machine, encouraging #isitors to sign up from their first click. BarackObama.com was easy to find, easy to na#igate and pro#ided links to #olunteer tools on essentially e#ery page, and its designers tried ne#er to miss a chance to turn a #isitor into a con#ert.
2e t up7 let1s put all those new supporters to work.
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(. Learning from Obama@s )olunteer *rmy
"o# to +ut +eo le to ,or- on .our Be%alf

=ttracting the largest army of supporters e#er seen in a modern =merican election is one thing, but e#en more impressi#e is that the Obama campaign managed to put them to work - as online recruiters, as cash machines, but also as organi*ers, block) walkers and pro)Obama #oices in their own communities. = critical problem for anyone running for office7 if all you ask #olunteers to do when they show up at your campaign head6uarters is to stuff en#elopes, their ranks are likely to melt away like the morning dew as they find better uses for their time. 5he Obama solution7 borrow their brains, and use technology to make it possible. In part, this was through the 0yBarackObama.com toolset7
5he 0yBO Web site ser#ed as the hub for electoral acti#ities, with spokes that reached to an array of platforms, all of which dro#e con#ersation back to the Web site in order to engage the people, empower the #oices, raise the money and get the boots on the ground needed to win the election. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
We1#e already looked at the campaign1s grassroots)organi*ing model, which re6uired a tremendous in#estment in time from - and an immense amount of trust in - #olunteer team members and their recruits, but the Obamans #entured out onto plenty of other ground on which political campaigns normally fear to tread. When #olunteers were ready before professional staff arri#ed in a state, for instance, the campaign let the locals represent it in public, including to the news media something that would send shi#ers down the spine of a traditional campaign staffer.
2/
When outreach is based around #olunteer commitment rather than on strict message control, training becomes particularly important, since #olunteers will need to learn to do e#erything from planning e#ents to moti#ating slackers. Obama1s staff held many in)person organi*ing sessions and bootcamps, but they could also depend on internet #ideo to deli#er lessons at any hour of the day. Blus, #ideo helped disseminate messaging points and showed #olunteers how their work fit into the broader conte t of the entire campaign. ;or Obama, trusting #olunteers to communicate face)to) face with local #oters, opinion leaders and the media was a natural e tension of his community)organi*ing ethos - but it was online technology that made it work on a national scale.
Countering T%e !mears
5hough well)armed and feisty, Obama1s supporters weren1t alone online, and his campaign was forced to spend more time and money countering narrati#es spread by critics than any of his staff would ha#e liked. 5he Obama)is)a)0uslim)0anchurian) "andidate email chains took off just about anywhere the gullible had access to a >forward@ button, and they flew in formation with other messages, blog posts and #ideos that accused Obama of e#erything from socialism to racism to a lack of >gratitude.@ Once again, Obama1s #olunteers helped come to the rescue, and once again by working within their own social circles7
5he campaign also launched web pages and online action groups to fight the underground, e)mail whisper campaigns and robo)calls that surfaced in battleground states. In one effort, the campaign urged supporters to send out counter#iral e)mails responding to false rumors about Obama1s personal background and ta policies. Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Sarah Lai Stirland, Wired.com, 11/ /!""#
2:
I.e., when your uncle sent that cra*y anti)Obama email to you and 9% other people, you learned to politely reply)to)all with links to articles that countered the distortions. 0ultiply that by a few million acti#ists, and the Obama campaign had access to a better antidote to backstage smears than any tele#ision commercial could pro#ide.
!ocial 2edia *cti3ism
5he Obama model may ha#e emphasi*ed putting people to work in their physical communities, but why stop there - as we1#e seen, his supporters were going to spread the word in the #irtual world as well as ne t door to home. =nd the campaign was happy to gi#e them both the source material necessary and the channels to promote the results7
5he 0yBO Web site contained #ideos, speeches, photos and how)to guides that ga#e people the raw materials they needed to create their own compelling content in support of Obama. In return, supporters created more than 8%%,%%% pro)Obama #ideos and posted them to ?ou5ube. 5hey also wrote more than 8%%,%%% blog posts on the 0yBO Web site. 5he campaign could not possibly ha#e generated this much content on its own. *nd it #as better t%at it didnt. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
Why betterE Because research and e perience consistently show that the most effecti#e persuasion comes from our peers, our friends and our family. =nd that1s in turn in part because indi#idual people know how to speak in the #ernacular that1s right for their audience - college students know how to talk to college students, moms know how to talk to moms, and techies know how to talk to techies. Of course, you ha#e to trust them all to represent you well, but that was a potential that the
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Obamans not only embraced but celebrated.
=ata Collection
One result of all of that list)building, block)walking and phone)bankingE 4ata, lots and lots of data about what potential #oters were thinking and about what they were planning to do on election day. 5his flood of information - updated constantly as elections approached - not only supplemented the campaign1s internal polling, but at times +including during the run)up to the Iowa "aucuses, pro#ided a more accurate #iew of the electorate7
>We had a lot of #oter identification work. We had a lot of field data. So we1d put all that together and model out the election in those states e#ery week. So we1d say, okay, if the election were held this week based on all our data, put it all in a blender, where are weE =nd ob#iously, with technology today, we could measure this #ery carefully. We don1t ha#e to wait for a state to report in how they did that nightD we can look at it, down to the #olunteer le#el, because we trusted our #olunteers. We ga#e them the #oter file, we said here are the people on your block, you go talk to Aem, you record the result of the con#ersation. We in "hicago could look at thatO@ Obama 3ampai*n /ana*er 1a8id Plo,&&e, speakin* at a post>election e8ent broadcast on 3>Span
;rom modeling to action was a simple but decisi#e jump, and Obama1s campaign managers made serious resource)allocation decisions +including where to send the candidate, where to send surrogates and where to concentrate ad#ertising, based on #olunteer)supplied information up until the last hours of the race. 2o presidential campaign has e#er had access to #oter data on this scale or updated this constantly, and it ga#e Obama1s staff an edge their opponents may not ha#e recogni*ed e#en e isted at the time. =nd it was only because they trusted their
#olunteers to edit a database.
<etting Out T%e )ote
=ll the months of >fun@ notwithstanding, a campaign li#es and dies for election day and the ultimate goal of all of those #olunteer hours was to turn out #oters on 2o#ember 8th. 2ationwide community organi*ing fed the final Het Out 5he Cote fren*y, assisted by online reminders7
On Glection 4ay, the campaign used its massi#e list for a get)out)the)#ote effort. Gmails pro#ided people with the names of fi#e others who supported Obama and asked them to call each one to ensure they were going to the polls, and offer a ride if need be. Obama.s $oad +o White %o,se Was Pa8ed With 0mails, 1a8id :oet6l, Online /edia 1aily, 1ecember 2, !""#
2ot just emails, but also the last in a long chain of te t messages7
On Glection 4ay, e#ery #oter who1d signed up for alerts in battleground states got at least three te t messages. Supporters on a#erage recei#ed fi#e to $% te t messages per month, depending on where they li#ed - the program was di#ided by states, regions, *ip codes and colleges - and what kind of messages they had opted to recei#e. Obama $aised %al& a Billion Online, 'ose (ntonio )ar*as, Washin*ton Post, 11/!"/!""#
=s we1#e seen, e#en Obama1s online ad#ertising turned to rallying #oters during early balloting periods and on election day itself. = last)minute addition to the arsenal7 the campaign1s new media and tech teams managed to turn out a #ery efficient online
polling place finder on a short deadline just in time for the general election, which they promoted #ia online ads, the email list and direct #oter contact. Obama1s #ictory was built on a long series of technological inno#ations like this one - most of them relati#ely insignificant on their own, but decisi#e in combination.
2e t up, we1ll look at the most decisi#e of all7 the fundraising.
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0. Learning from Obama@s &inancial !teamroller
"o# to 1aise 2oney Online

Obama1s platform may ha#e en#isioned a grand reform of the political system, but the primary change he brought to political fundraising was to do more of it than anyone in history7
9 million donors made a total of N.: million donations online adding up to more than <:%% million. Of those N.: million donations, N million were in increments of <'%% or less. 5he a#erage online donation was <3%, and the a#erage Obama donor ga#e more than onceOObama also raised millions from traditional campaign bundlers - rich, well)connected fundraisers but the bulk of the more than <N%% million that Obama raised throughout the campaign was through the Internet, aides said. +Some of those bundlers, of course, also arranged for donations to be made online, so there is some o#erlap., Obama $aised %al& a Billion Online, 'ose (ntonio )ar*as, Washin*ton Post, 11/!"/!""#
5hat last line is key7 >online@ doesn1t necessarily mean >small.@ In fact, early in the primary season Obama had already assembled a network of big)money bundlers, fundraisers who tapped social and business connections to solicit large checks from other wealthy people. Obama1s big donor program accelerated as the general election approached, and regardless how many millions of small donations arri#ed o#er the internet, the bulk of the cash he raised in the end - some &:P - came from people who ga#e <$%% or more o#er the course of the campaign.
Fet1s tease two different ideas out of these numbers. ;irst, it helps a campaign immensely if most indi#idual donations, e#en the big ones, come in online rather than
as paper checks. 0oney collected #ia credit cards is a#ailable instantly, allowing a candidate to take immediate ad#antage of an o#ernight surge in income. Blus, online donation details automatically end up in a database, simplifying accounting and reporting - a serious concern in a campaign en#ironment in which the press and bloggers pour o#er a candidate1s ;G" filings online.
By contrast, physical checks present an immense logistical burden, since each one has to be processed indi#idually whether it1s collected at a fundraising dinner or arri#es in the mail. !ad Obama1s financial tsunami come in on paper, the process of opening, logging and depositing it would ha#e o#erwhelmed just about any political staff in the pre)internet era. 5he time delay might ha#e been e6ually fatal, as Hary !art found out after winning the 2ew !ampshire primary in '(38, when a surge of donations arri#ed too late to help in the ne t round of elections.
=nother point7 many +mostE, Obama donors who ga#e more than <$%% did so o#er the course of months rather than all at once. 5hey tended to part with relati#ely small amounts repeatedly, which in turn is why a small)donor list is such a #aluable resource - it1s the gift that keeps on gi#ing, 6uite literally. Unlike traditional big donors who often reach their 6uota for a gi#en candidate with a single check, small donors can contribute repeatedly, pro#iding a financial consistency that1s priceless in a years) long campaign.
5his dynamic was already apparent on the 4emocratic side of the presidential race by September of $%%&7 !illary "linton1s strategy of wrangling big money from traditional 4emocratic sources was beginning to ma out, but Obama was able to return to his much larger list of grassroots donors again and again. By $%%3 and the general election, his enormous pool of donors and #olunteers pro#ided Obama with a tremendous ad#antage o#er /ohn 0c"ain, with results decisi#e both financially and at the polls.
Of course, Obama1s supporters didn1t gi#e that money all on their own - they were the target of a series of emails and other contacts stretching o#er the course of a year or more.
Culti3ating t%e <rassroots
=s we1#e already seen, the Obama campaign turned #olunteer mobili*ation into a science, and it1s no surprise that they took e6ually great care in managing donors. 5he main tool they used to solicit moneyE Gmail - it1s not hip, it1s not se y, but it absolutely worked. Of course, e#ery communications tool from direct mail to ;acebook no doubt played a role, but the campaign1s fundraising workhorse was a combination of email and a website - some three)6uarters of the money they raised online was directly attributable to an email solicitation. While anyone can send out a message asking for money, it takes a professional operation to manage #irtual relationships with millions of people o#er a period lasting many months without burning them out in the process. =ny acti#ist database e periences >churn@ as old members drop off and new ones join, but mismanagement can turn churn into flight. 5he Obama solutions7 analytics, technical skill, e perience and tactics.
.ou ,'LL be Tested on T%is
/ust about e#erything in the Obama campaign1s mass emails was subject to testing and refinement, from sender1s names to subject lines, topics, te t, imagery and link placement. "ampaign staff would fre6uently break their supporter list +or a sample of the list, into se#eral randomi*ed groups, whose members would then recei#e different emails based on the message or feature being tested. Or, staff analysts might segment the list demographically, breaking down responses to particular messages
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based on supporters1 age, location, donation history or other characteristics.
Once they had results in hand +messages opened, actions taken, donations made, and cross)referenced with the list demographics, the team could apply this information to the ne t round of emailsOwhich in turn yielded more testing data which yielded more messages which yielded more testing data and so on.
0ultiply this process by '3)plus months of list)management, and you can get an idea of the #olume of measurement in#ol#ed in the email component of a presidential campaign. In fact, the long 4emocratic primary season turned out to be a boon for the Obama online analytics team, since it ga#e them the opportunity to slice and dice their data in e#ery state across the country, pro#iding a solid foundation for the ;all general election turnout operation.
T%e !-ills t%at +aid t%e Bills
5o write those fundraising and moti#ational messages, the Obama campaign built up a cadre of skilled e perts. ;ormer speechwriters had a particular edge, since they1d had practice at capturing another person1s #oice, but just about e#eryone in#ol#ed impro#ed from the constant practice - it turns out that if you write mass emails $% hours a day, you get good at it. Because of the importance of this speciali*ed skill, most indi#idual messages came from the national office rather than from state organi*ers, regardless of who appeared to send them. 5he campaign1s email staff steadily e panded as the campaign progressed - according to /oe .ospars, new writers paid for themsel#es within a matter of weeks by boosting donations. What did they learn that made them so #aluableE
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Basic +rinci les Be%ind Obamas ;mail &undraising !uccess
5he Obama campaign1s email strategy, and like so much else the campaign did online, built on the e perience of pre#ious political campaigns and nonprofit ad#ocacy groups, relying on incremental impro#ements o#er past practice.
= key idea7 the three 0s of political email are messaging, mobili*ation and money.
Gmails should perpetuate core messages of the campaign.
Gmails must also do no harm - list managers must take great care not to alienate people on the list.
Gmail acti#ism is really relationship)management, since people1s propensity to #ote, #olunteer and donate is based on the feelings they ha#e toward a candidate or cause.
5he more personal, informal and direct a message is, the better - usually.
5argeting helps get the most out of a list - in Obama1s case, supporters might recei#e messages with different content based on their state or congressional district, their interests, their demographics or their past pattern of actions on behalf of the campaign.
5he campaign tried to de#elop relationships between the people >sending@ the email and the people opening the email. = gi#en message could ha#e many apparent senders, with list members recei#ing emails >from@ a campaign staff member they might actually ha#e a chance to meet, for instance a
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regional #olunteer coordinator.
5he email initiation se6uence was critical to starting the process, with new list members recei#ing a pre)set series of messages after they signed up. 5he se6uence steadily >scaled the ask,@ encouraging newbies to step deeper and deeper into the Obama waters - first they might show up to phone)bank, and a few weeks later they found themsel#es de#oting 9% hours per week to managing a #olunteer team.
Besides scaling the ask, Obama fundraisers also >tailored the ask,@ for instance soliciting different amounts based on a person1s donation history - a <'% donor might be asked to donate <$% the ne t time around, but someone who1d donated <':% was safe to hit up for <$%%.
5he campaign also >#aried the ask@ - as we1#e discussed, not e#ery communication from the candidate or his surrogates begged for money. Some deli#ered talking points, others pro#ided strategy or conte t, while many were straightforwardly inspirational. Obama did not treat his supporters as =50sK
When possible, staff mapped out email narrati#e arcs in ad#ance. ;or best effect, each message had to stand alone but also be a part of the stream.
5he emphasis on narrati#e arcs didn1t preclude sei*ing on emotion and the moment, howe#er. Sarah Balin1s .epublican 2ational "ommittee speech pro#ides a great e ample, since by mocking community organi*ers she had functionally lashed out at e#eryone on the Obama list who1d embraced the campaign1s organi*ing model. Obama staff 6uickly sent out a message that ga#e them something to do about it, and they responded7 Balin1s speech was followed by the biggest day of political fundraising e#er - for Obama.
3:
Once again, content integration was key7 Including compelling and heart)tugging #ideos in emails and on donation landing pages ga#e #isitors an added push to take that ne t step and donate. One notable e ample was an email and #ideo appeal from 5ed Iennedy following his endorsement of Obama. 5he campaign used this message and #ideo to make the most of an emotion)filled moment, gi#en Senator Iennedy1s illness and his historic endorsement. What Worked &or Obama 3an Work &or 4O5$ Or*ani6ation, (ndrea Wood, /7$ Strate*ic Ser8ices, 'an,ary !""2
5he Obama campaign also understand the importance of the >#alue proposition of fundraising.@ 5hey were careful to portray donations as doing more than just pro#iding abstract support for the campaign - they made it #ery clear where money was going, and they often raised funds for a particular stated task such as running 5C ads or supporting grassroots organi*ing in a gi#en state.
4espite the best targeting, different emails acti#ated different people at different times. 2o one message had to connect with e#ery supporter or e#ery #oter - if you miss Aem this week, you might get Aem ne t week.
"o# 2uc% is Too 2uc%?
One billion indi#idual emails arri#ed in supporters1 inbo es o#er the course of the Obama campaign. Why didn1t the recipients flee his list in dro#esE Besides all the list) nurturing methods described abo#e, Obama could also rely on the fact that his supporters understood W!? they were getting so many messages7
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OIf your list members percei#e a specific situation or campaign to be urgent, you can bend the rules by sending far more fundraising appeals than your list members would normally tolerate. ;or e ample, in the N% days leading up to Glection 4ay, the Obama campaign sent o#er 3% email messages to my email inbo . On October 9%th, alone, I recei#ed a total of si messages from the campaign. 5hat1s an a#erage of more than one email a day. ?et I did not unsubscribe because I understood why they were messaging me so hea#ily. What Worked &or Obama 3an Work &or 4O5$ Or*ani6ation, (ndrea Wood, /7$ Strate*ic Ser8ices, 'an,ary !""2
=gain, testing is #ital, and smart campaigns watch the rate at which supporters drop off #ery closely - unsubscribers are #oting with their feet, or in this case with their fingers.
)iral &undraising
= final aspect of the Obama fundraising machine was its peer)to)peer component, the personal fundraising campaigns indi#idual #olunteers launched through their 0yBarackObama accounts, alongside all of their other online outreach. Supporter)dri#en distributed financial outreach raised a few tens of millions of dollars directly, but perhaps more important is that it helped mine indi#idual fundraisers1 social connections for new Obama donors, who would then find themsel#es on the main Obama list and subject to all of the encouragement described abo#e. =nd of course, it pro#ided yet another channel for priceless supporter enthusiasm and energy which would likely ha#e gone to waste in the pre)internet era of political organi*ing.
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T%e =ecisi3e ;dge
=s for the end result of all of that enthusiasm, we already know the story7 online fundraising allowed Barack Obama to opt out of the public campaign financing system and outspend /ohn 0c"ain by hundreds of millions of dollars in the general election. Online donations also helped pay for an internet)dri#en organi*ing machine that put millions of Obama supporters to work on their own streets in the days before the #ote. Swamped by an ocean of money and an army of acti#ists, .epublicans were e iled from the White !ouse and cast into the limbo of defeat.
But what about ne t timeE Fet1s look at last at how the Obama lessons apply to other political campaigns now and in the future.
(0
/. Learning from Obama:
"o# to 2o3e &or#ard

=s the presidential race heated up, the internet grew from being the medium of a core group of political junkies to a gateway for millions of ordinary =mericans to participate in the political process, donating odd amounts of their spare time to their candidate through online campaign tools. Obama1s campaign carefully designed its web site to ma imi*e group collaboration, while at the same time gi#ing indi#idual #olunteers tasks they could follow on their own schedules. Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Sarah Lai Stirland, Wired.com, 11/ /!""#
;or all their *eal and the sophistication of the tools they had at hand, Obama1s supporters weren1t the only ones acti#e online in $%%3, nor was he the only candidate willing to trust ordinary people to carry his message. .on Baul1s supporters made an early splash, swarming internet discussion groups and the comments sections of national news outlets. Blus, they raised tens of millions of dollars o#er the web, pushing the former Fibertarian far ahead of his .epublican ri#als on that score in the last 6uarter of $%%&. But Baul was a classic niche candidate, whose support would ne#er spread far beyond a relati#ely narrow circle of acti#ists. !is online prominence ser#es mainly as an e ample of the internet1s ability to amplify the collecti#e #oice of a small number of passionate people.
G#ery presidential candidate from 0itt .omney to 0ike Hra#el had a presence of some kind online regardless of how well they actually used it, though none built anything as comprehensi#e as Obama1s. But e#en the best campaigns - including his - were doomed to be o#ershadowed at times by the #oices of an unruly public. 4espite the professionals1 best efforts, the audience kept stealing the spotlight from the actors.
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;or instance, e#ery serious candidate suffered from some piece of unflattering content spread online from person to person7 0c"ain sang >Bomb, Bomb Iran,@ Gdwards had his two)minute hair)brushing episode, "linton was greeted with children and flowers while landing >under sniper fire,@ and a comparison of 0itt .omney1s past and current statements on abortion rights made for a fascinating study in contrast. Barack Obama was certainly not immune, particularly since his background set him up for persistent attempts to identify him as >other.@
In /une, the alleged Obama >terrorist fist bump@ went from #iral to +he )ie? in just three days. ;ortunately, the candidate was able to laugh it off, which was certainly not the case after the .e#. Wright #ideos went #iral - another e ample of the unpredictable power of Web politics. 0ore e#idence7 =fter wrapping up the nomination in /une $%%3, the Obama campaign launched an e tensi#e Web site de#oted solely to shooting down #iral rumors and innuendo. Obama, +he ;$e8ol,tion. in Online Politics @ (nd What %appens 9eAt, :re* /itchell, %,&&in*ton Post, !/ /!""2
5hat website launched for a good reason, since the most serious danger Barack Obama faced after he1d outlasted !illary "linton in the primaries was this7 that he would become seen as alien in enough people1s eyes that his hopes of capturing the political middle would fail. >"hange@ candidates ha#e a particular need to con#ince #oters that they1re a safe choice, as .eagan1s e perience in '(3% shows - he ran #ery close with "arter until the debates, which allowed him to con#ince enough =mericans that he wasn1t a cra*ed bomb)thrower. 5his burden of reassurance is e#en hea#ier for someone young, and +especially, for a candidate identified as black.
5he .e#erend Wright #ideos were therefore a tremendous danger, though of course Obama ne#er appeared in them himself - it was the association with radicalism +and with .adical Blackness, that mattered. But at least they set him up for his speech
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on race, one of the defining moments in his delicate assault on the =merican middle, and in that sense were a blessing in disguise. 5he Obama)is)a)0uslim emails were more insidious, since their effect had to be countered one)at)a)time rather than through a nationally tele#ised speech, and the #ery act of denying them seemed to gi#e them more credence in some people1s eyes. G#en months into his presidency, a significant slice of =mericans persisted in belie#ing that Barack Obama was either a secret 0uslim or had been lying about his religious faith in some way.
=s the 0acaca moment showed in $%%N, unflattering content can spread particularly far and fast when it gets caught in a feedback loop in#ol#ing citi*en journalists, corporate media outlets and the campaigns themsel#es7
Garly in the final Obama)0c"ain showdown, a leading campaign charge from the 4emocrats was that the .epublican wanted to stay in Ira6 >for '%% years.@ What was the source for thisE =n amateur #ideo of 0c"ain making a remark to that effect at a small campaign gathering months earlier, spread widely on the Web - in the usual fashion, first by liberal bloggers, then by the Obama campaign itself. Soon it turned up fre6uently on network and cable 5C shows and e#en in 4emocratic commercials. Obama, +he ;$e8ol,tion. in Online Politics @ (nd What %appens 9eAt, :re* /itchell, %,&&in*ton Post, !/ /!""2
=t times, the campaigns resembled ships on storm)toss1d seas, reeling from wa#e upon wa#e of words and images, occasionally buoyed up but more often all but drowned. 5he sheer #olume of content that burst forth about the U.S. elections is astonishing, not least because of how much we ha#e come to take it for granted. ?ou don1t ha#e to be #ery old to remember a completely different political en#ironment. 5he first political campaign I paid close attention to was in '(($, when I was right out of college and working in 5e as politics. 0y information sourcesE 5he three major networks and BBS +plus "22 when I was around a 5C that
actually had cable, and the =ustin =merican)Statesman. 0aybe the 2ew ?ork 5imes when I bought it at a coffeeshop o#er the weekend. Once the Sunday morning news shows were o#er, that was essentially it for substanti#e political co#erage until "221s Inside Bolitics the ne t dayO 2owE Bolitical junkies can check do*ens or hundreds of news sources e#ery hour, both corporate)owned and informal. "able news and talk radio ha#e e panded dramatically, and they1#e joined with hundreds of thousands of online news outlets, ad#ocacy sites, political blogs, email lists, podcasts and #odcasts to bombard us with information to the point that the problem isn1t too little, but too much. ;rom juicy scandals to the details of polling data and methodology, #ery few potential stories remain une amined by somebody somewhere, and the biggest obstacle to a story1s breaking big isn1t the major)media filters but the difficulty of cutting through the cacophony and the clutter. Of course this is ob#ious, but perhaps it1s so ob#ious that we tend to forget about it. Internet political professionals often concentrate our attention on the particular tools we use to get our messages out, but the real effect of the Internet and the electronics e plosion of the last ': years has been the immense deepening and broadening of the sea of information in which we now swim. Our biggest task is just to get noticed as we drift along. What We 3an Learn (bo,t Online Politics Brom the !""C 3ampai*n, 0politics.com, 11/#/!""C
;uture candidates and causes will face this problem no less, and many will sink without a ripple for e#ery one that sails triumphantly into harbor. ;or online communicators trying to na#igate rough waters, the Obama campaign will ser#e as a beacon for years to come - both a model and a guide - and an e ample of the potential of technology to translate the enthusiasm of millions of people into decisi#e action in the real world.
((
* Crystal Ball is a =angerous Toy
5he Obama campaign le#eraged all the tools of social media to gi#e ordinary =mericans access to resources usually reser#ed for professional campaign operati#es. "ompared with both his 4emocratic primary challengers and the 0c"ain campaign, his operation was cycles ahead. +he Social P,lpit- Barack Obama.s Social /edia +oolkit, 0delman 1i*ital P,blic (&&airs, 'an,ary !""2
>Obama built largest recogni*able brand faster than anyone in history, with his supporters feeling that they had influence on that brand.@ /ichael Bassik, speakin* at the !""2 So,th by So,th?est Interacti8e con&erence
0y friend 2ate Wilco likes to talk about the internet gi#ing rise to a new form of machine politics, one built on distributed armies of online acti#ists. 5his model contrasts with the classic '(th century)style =merican political machine, which was locally based7 each thri#ed when it could deli#er go#ernment ser#ices and political patronage in e change for #otes in a gi#en city or neighborhood.
5he urban political machine largely wilted away in the $%th century, and for a #ariety of reasons so did much of citi*ens1 direct in#ol#ement in the political process. By the '((%s, they weren1t seriously e pected to participate substanti#ely in politics at all, at least in most campaign professionals1 minds. = #oter1s role began and ended on election day, and he or she was otherwise mostly just a target - of direct mail, pre) recorded phone calls, and an endless array of repetiti#e 5C commercials.
5he internet, though, is a different II24 of medium - back)and)forth rather than

broadcast - and the rise of such a participatory public space has completely changed the political media ecology, opening new niches to be e ploited in turn by new kinds of organi*ing entities. 2ate1s $'st)century political machines would be a nimble breed, assembling to back a candidate or cause and maintaining influence to the e tent that their supporters stay engaged, in#ol#ed and acti#e. Some campaigns would be ephemeral, others would endure, but in most cases their limiting resource would be time - not necessarily their own, since staff can be bought, but that of indi#idual people willing to donate a piece of their li#es to what they see as a greater good.
!ere1s the thing7 despite all the attention paid to the internet1s potential for political outreach, it1s an e#en better mobili*ing tool. 5ele#ision is still the best way to reach that great mass of potential #oters who are 2O5 political junkiesD it1s a road running straight toward the !oly Hrail of =merican presidential politics, the Independent Coter. 2ot surprisingly, the Obama campaign spent the bulk of its budget on tele#ision ad#ertising, e#en though the money came in online, because they knew that 5C commercials remain the most efficient way to reach the uncommitted and unin#ol#ed.
But note what those Obama ads did7 besides reinforcing the necessary imagery for that day and locale, they also directed people to go to a website for more information. 5hey were recruiting tools, not just messaging tools, and like radio ads, direct mail, phone calls and that afternoon knock on the door, they played their part in building Obama1s '9)million)member database.
Once people joined that list, as we1#e seen, each became an outpost - a ne us for organi*ing within a social circle. Glections are won at the water cooler, at the bar, at the dinner table, o#er the phone and in bed, and Obama1s supporters were primed to know the messages, know the strategy and understand the stakes e#ery time his
###.e olitics.com 7 *ugust8 2009 (/
candidacy came up in con#ersation.
!is online supporters were actually in#ol#ed in what amounted to a carefully managed relationship with Barack Obama whether they reali*ed it or not, one nurtured by a team of people whose li#es re#ol#ed around that goal for almost two years. In the process, the Obama organi*ation achie#ed both a scale and a le#el of effecti#eness unlike any electoral campaign we1#e e#er seen, and all because of one basic idea7 that you can trust people to work on your behalf if you gi#e them the tools and the training.
5he campaign had the #ision and the technology, while the acti#ists pro#ided the energy and the ceaseless work - they were Obama1s key resource, the fuel for his entire ship. =s .epublican strategist 0ark 0cIinnon put it at a $%%( South by Southwest panel discussion, Obama +and !oward 4ean before him, weren1t successful because they understood computers, they >were successful because they understood how to make technology harness the passion of their supporters.@
Stephen Heer, the Obama campaign1s email team leader, applied the pith of a #eteran writer to the same dynamic7 >?ou de#elop a strong connection with your supporters and you gi#e them something to do about it.@ 5he result, as the world now knows7 an election #ictory for Barack Obama, a sea change in =merican politics and policy, and a model for online campaigners around the world. 2ot bad for some guy from Illinois with big ears and a funny name.
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* 4ote about !ources

Where possible, I1#e linked to the rele#ant sources within the te t of this series, and much of the material printed here deri#es from either the articles 6uoted or from other pieces listed in the ;urther .eading. 0embers of Obama1s campaign staff were notoriously reluctant to comment until after the election, howe#er, and much discussion of the campaign before 2o#ember of $%%3 was based on what outsiders could see or on the rare glimpses gi#en to professional journalists along the way. = more complete #ersion had to await the lifting of the gag rule, though the Obamans were still a tight)lipped bunch eight months after the election.
0uch of the inside information on the campaign1s organi*ing model and internal structure, along with the e tended discussion of email fundraising strategy, deri#es from talks gi#en by /oe .ospars, Stephen Heer, "hris !ughes, /udith ;reeman, Scott Hoodstein and others at the $%%3 2etroots 2ation conference, the $%%( South by Southwest conference, the Bolitics Online conference, #arious 4")based post) election panels, and in particular .oots"amp A%3 and other 2ew Organi*ing Institute) sponsored e#ents. 2otes are a#ailable upon re6uest, other than for hallway con#ersations and other moments strictly on background.
&urt%er 1eading
Still hungryE ;ind links to more articles about ObamaQs online campaign at Gpolitics.com.
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*bout t%e *ut%or

"olin 4elany is founder and chief editor of Gpolitics.com, a site that focuses on the tools and tactics of Internet politics and online political ad#ocacy. Gpolitics.com recei#ed the Holden 4ot =ward as >Best Blog ) 2ational Bolitics@ at the $%%& Bolitics Online "onference, and 4elany participated in 4" ;o affiliate W55H)$:1s li#e co#erage of the $%%3 general election night. 4elany is also the author of the e)book >Online Bolitics '%'7 5he 5ools and 5actics of Online Bolitical =d#ocacy,@ which has been downloaded from epolitics.com o#er $%,%%% times.
4elany started in politics in the early Q(%s in the 5e as "apitol +where public ser#ice is considered a contact sport, and mo#ed into the online political world in '((:. In '(((, during the first internet boom, he helped to start a targeted search engine for politics and policy, which lasted about as long as such ideas usually do. Since then, 4elany has worked as a consultant to help do*ens of political ad#ocacy campaigns promote themsel#es in the digital world, and between $%%9 and $%%& was the Online "ommunications 0anager at the 2ational Gn#ironmental 5rust. !e also plays bass in a rock and roll band.
;ind out more about consulting ser#ices from "olin 4elany, or contact him at cpdRepolitics.com to arrange a training, webinar or presentation.
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Learning From Obama

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Table of Contents

1. Learning from Obama: Lessons for Online Communicators in 2009 and

2. Learning from Obamas Cam

aign !tructure: "o# to Organi$e for

###.e olitics.com 7 *ugust8 2009