The Cost of Americas War in Afghanistan

In a paper published in March 2013, it has been estimated that for every soldier injured in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US government is expected to spend on average $2 million in the long term. Moreover, this paper stated that the US had 866,181 officially counted injured casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq as of March 2013. This paper has been published by Linda Bilmes at Harvard's Kennedy School (available at: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956). The estimated costs include the immediate requirements to provide medical care for the wounded, as well as the accrued liabilities for providing lifetime medical costs and disability compensation for those who have survived injuries. The paper concluded that years of conflict have left America burdened with heavy costs, despite the withdrawal of many ground troops from these theaters of conflict. This enormous cost to care for the injured means that the US military will have to make difficult trade-offs in other areas of defense, in spite of its shrinking defense budget. What are the real casualties? A number of interesting observations can be posited from the findings of the above paper. Firstly, the estimate of the official number of injured soldiers is staggering. At almost a million injuries, it makes a mockery of US claims regarding their casualties in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In a world rife with war propaganda, the US has been careful to conceal the true cost of its wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Americans and NATO regularly deny casualties in their encounters with the Mujahideen. If we were to rely on the claims of the Pentagon and NATO, then we would be led to believe that the US had no more than 25,000 - 50,000 injured casualties in both military theaters. It should also be kept in mind that the 866,181 injured do not include the 'private' contractors or the injured casualties of other ISAF countries. If we factor in the casualties of the private contractors and ISAF members, the numbers could rise quite significantly. A Congressional Research Service report published in mid 2013 stated that there were approximately 108,000 private contractors in Afghanistan, whereas the number of US Army personnel was 65,700. This is a ratio of 1.6 private contractors for every US soldier in Afghanistan. While the ratio of contractors versus soldiers tends to fluctuate, one can only imagine the casualties of this disproportionate presence of private contractors and its implications for US defense spending. Granted that not all contractors are involved in the security sector, but the point still stands that US casualties from the wars far exceed the official 'military' casualties generally admitted.

Secondly we may assume that the economic cost of this war is correlative to the number of military as well as non-military casualties of this war. Not only does the US have to bear the medical costs of the military casualties, it also has to pay compensation to the families of deceased soldiers. In addition, it has to cater to the needs of the private contractors, such as indirectly assisting (perhaps through private insurance companies) those that have been injured, and the families of those that have been killed. It also needs to bear the cost of transporting these contractors out of the war theater to other countries around the world. America and its allies usually also bear the financial burden when transferring Afghan spies and collaborators to third countries. Some ISAF countries have already taken Afghan collaborators with them to other Western nations. This includes the cost of travel for these persons and their families in addition to the costs of resettlement. These costs will need to be borne by the governments of these countries, whether it be from the defense budget or the overall government budget. A heavy price paid From the above observations, one can conclude that the US has paid a heavy financial and human price for its military adventures in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Reminiscing on the US mood in 2001 and 2003, the world was dumbfounded by US arrogance at the time. Its sense of superiority, overestimation of its own capabilities and underestimation of its rivals' strength was evident. US justifications for its aggressions were as untenable and abstruse as could be. The US politicians portrayed the Muslim world as a world of barbarism and wilderness that needed to be taught respect for world powers. The US invaded two countries, destroying the lives of millions, presumably to capture a few 'jealous and backward terrorists' and to neutralize some 'weapons of mass destruction'. America conveniently forgot that it, along with a few select group of states, controls more than 90% of the world's mass weaponry. If the invasion of these 'other' possessors of mass weapons was justified because they were 'irresponsible' states, then surely no nation had acted more irresponsibly and with more callous disregard for international norms as the US at the start of the new millennium. Despite the weakness of these justifications, or perhaps because of it, it was abundantly clear that America did not act due to these reasons. The real reasons for America's actions were driven by strategic calculations. America entered the Muslim world in order to radically alter the geo-strategic landscape. According to the self-indulgent political scholars of Washington, America had to respond to the September 2001 attacks by bringing 'civilization' to the Muslim world.

America would strike such a blow to the Muslims that it would rival the Mongol invasions of the Islamic land. Moreover, unlike the Mongols, the Americans would not integrate into Muslim society but rather assimilate Muslims to western 'civilization'. Besides these grandeur schemes, the invasions were also to strengthen US strategic presence in the Middle East and Central Asia, particularly vis-a-vis China. America would also gain more valuable bases in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. In addition, US military interventions would strengthen its erstwhile ally, Israel's position in the Middle East. And then of course, there was the access to the natural resources of the Middle East and Central Asia. These were the calculations behind America's moves. The results however were far beyond the intentions. America suffered enormous human losses in both conflicts. The financial burden of these wars was such that American economy grinded to a halt and eventually precipitated the Global Financial Crisis. Politically, America lost all credibility as a responsible state actor. Militarily it is overstretched and in urgent need of radical concentration. It has been so exhausted by these lengthy conflicts that it no longer has any appetite for any form of confrontation. Its passivity in the Korean peninsula, its lukewarm reaction to chemical attacks in Syria, its degradation by Israeli politicians during the Palestine-Israel peace talks, and more recently its inability to respond coherently or forcefully to the Ukrainian crisis are all examples of America's passivity and the new limits of its powers. Whilst to many of us on the outside, America's new found pacifism and its aggressions of the past decade might appear unrelated, in truth the latter has had a tremendous impact on the former. The military and financial costs of these conflicts have convinced America that it needs to be more particular in choosing its fights. It has also learned that it needs to focus on its vital strategic interests, such as the Pacific and Europe, rather than rushing off to distant theatres and fighting for another's cause. One can only hope that these lessons will be applied in the long term rather than as a temporary measure. America would be far better off if it relinquishes its role as a global 'hegemon', focuses on its vital interests, respects global diversity and the legitimate interests of divergent societies, and interacts with farther afield countries on the basis of reciprocal respect and mutual benefits. The dreams of America acting as the world's policeman are now nothing more than a forlorn hope. It is time for America to abandon its plans of imposing its values on others, and to instead embrace diversity and partnership on global affairs.