The central aims and ideas of that conception I refer to in the preface

to the first edition. As I explain in the second and third paragraphs of that
preface, I wanted to work out a conception of justice that provides a
reasonably systematic alternative to utilitarianism, which in one form
or another has long dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political
thought.
A second serious weakness of the original edition was its account of
primary goods. These were said to be things that rational persons want
whatever else they want, and what these were and why was to be explained
by the account of goodness in Chapter VII.
These ideas are quite different, but since they
both allow private property in productive assets, we may be misled into
thinking them essentially the same.
In writing this book I have acquired many debts in addition to those
indicated in the text. Some of these I should like to acknowledge here.
Three different versions of the manuscript have passed among students
and colleagues, and I have benefited beyond estimation from the innumerable
suggestions and criticisms that I have received.