Social Work, Morally Relevant Properties, and

Paternalism: Why Social Workers Need to Know Moral

Theory
Caroline E. Reid, MSW
Eastern Kentucky University
Caroline.Reid@eku.edu
C. Kamper Floyd, MA
University o Sout!ern Mississippi
"alerie #ryan, $!%
University o Sout! Ala&ama
Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, "olume ', (um&er ) *)+,+-
Copyri.!t )+,+, W!ite /at Communications

0!is te1t may &e reely s!ared amon. individuals, &ut it may not &e repu&lis!ed in any
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Abstract
0!is paper speaks to t!e
comple1ity o t!e social 2ork practice
environment t!at re3uires social 2orkers to
kno2 moral t!eory. 0!e aut!ors present a
rationale or social 2orkers usin. moral
t!eory and demonstrate !o2 t!is can
inorm et!ical reasonin. in t!e conte1t o
case decision4makin..
Key Words5 Social Work Code, Et!ics,
Moral 0!eory, $aternalism
! "ntrod#ction
Alt!ou.! social 2ork !as a Code o
Et!ics *(ASW, )++6- and eac! state !as
codes &ased on t!e national code, it
remains a 3uestion as to !o2 codes o
et!ics can lead to et!ical reasonin. amon.
social 2orkers in practice settin.s. 7t
2ould appear t!at et!ical codes can
constrain unet!ical actions, &ut t!ey cannot
promote et!ical reasonin. due to t!eir
in!erent structure as &asically non4
mali.nancy statements pro!i&itin. certain
actions. /o2ever, t!e comple1ity o t!e
practice environment inevita&ly means t!at
codes alone cannot .uide all or even most
o daily social 2orker actions 2it! t!eir
clients. 7n addition, t!e code does not
esta&lis! a !ierarc!y o et!ical principles
leavin. t!e practitioner 2it! unans2ered
3uestions suc! as !o2 one solves a
pro&lem 2!en principles collide. For
e1ample, t!e principles o promotin. a
client8s 2ell4&ein. and promotin. a
client8s autonomy oten come into conlict.
W!at is needed is a template or et!ical
reasonin. t!at, 2!ile &ein. per!aps
reconcila&le to ormal and deontolo.ical
codes, arms social 2orkers to deal 2it! t!e
ininite variation in case scenarios and
c!allen.es and t!at provides a 2ay to
navi.ate &et2een key et!ical principles in
Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e
speciic case instances. 0!is paper 2ill
present a rationale or social 2orkers usin.
moral t!eory and 2ill also demonstrate
!o2 t!is can inorm et!ical reasonin. in
t!e conte1t o case decision4makin..
9ert, Culver, and Clouser *)++6-
&elieve t!at in proessions, codes o et!ics
serve as a collective reco.nition &y
mem&ers o a proession8s responsi&ilities:
it can !elp create an environment in 2!ic!
et!ical &e!avior is t!e norm: it can serve as
a .uide or reminder in speciic situations:
can serve as an educational tool, providin.
a ocal point or discussion in classes and
proessional meetin.s: and inally, a code
can indicate to ot!ers t!at t!e proession is
seriously concerned 2it! responsi&le,
proessional conduct. 9ert, Culver, and
Clouser *)++6- maintain t!at t!e primary
purpose*s- o a proessional code o et!ics
is to !elp educate and sociali;e ne2
mem&ers into t!e proession, as 2ell as
current mem&ers o t!e proession. 7t
s!ould &e o practical use. A Code o
Et!ics s!ould tell individuals !o2 t!ey
ou.!t to act. A Code o Et!ics s!ould rest
on a pu&lic moral system t!at includes
rules and ideals.
Social 2ork8s Code o Et!ics,
alt!ou.! inormed &y contemporary
principlism, is &ased upon t!e proessional
purpose and mission o social 2ork, and as
social 2ork8s ocus and emp!ases !ave
c!an.ed over time, so !as t!e Code. 0!e
current Code o Et!ics *)++6- indicates
t!at t!e social 2ork proession is <rooted
in a set o core values44service, social
=ustice, di.nity and 2ort! o t!e person,
importance o !uman relations!ips,
inte.rity and competence> *p. ,-. #ecause
social 2ork is a moral activity re3uirin.
social 2orkers to make and implement
diicult decisions a&out !uman situations
t!at involve t!e potential or !arm and
.ood, social 2orkers s!ould !ave a solid
kno2led.e &ase and t!eory upon 2!ic!
t!ey can make decisions, especially et!ical
decisions.
0!e current (ASW Code o Et!ics
*)++6- is &uilt on principlism. 0!e most
2idely accepted ormulation o
principlism, put ort! &y #eauc!amp and
C!ildress *)++,-, includes t!e ollo2in.5
respect or autonomy *respect or people8s
values and decisions-: &eneicence
*!elpin. ot!ers-: nonmaleicence *not
!armin. ot!ers-: and =ustice *treatin. all
cases alike: distri&utin. &eneits and !arms
airly-. 0!e our principles are considered
role4speciic duties and are prima acie
*duties considered al2ays to &e in eect-.
0!e (ASW Code o Et!ics ackno2led.es
t!at it does not <speciy 2!ic! values,
principles, and standards are most
important and ou.!t to out2ei.! ot!ers in
instances 2!en t!ey are in conlict> *p. ?-
&ut at t!e same time it indicates t!at one o
its purposes is to <!elp social 2orkers
identiy relevant considerations 2!en
proessional o&li.ations conlict...> *p. )-.
0!e Code indicates t!at values and
standards s!ould &e rank ordered 2!en
conlicts arise, &ut does not speciy !o2 to
rank order.
$! A %rie& 'istory o& Social Work
(thics
@iterature identiyin. and
speciyin. t!e relations!ip &et2een social
2ork8s core et!ical values and practice !as
e1isted almost as lon. as t!e proession
itsel, alt!ou.! its ocus !as noticea&ly
s!ited over time. At t!e midpoint o t!e
last century, keen interest in 2!at social
2ork8s .uidin. values s!ould &e &e.an to
emer.e. 0!e irst ma=or 2ork pertainin. to
social 2ork et!ics pu&lis!ed in ,ABA, %he
%eachin& of Social Work Values and
Ethics &y Muriel $ump!rey, identiied
Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e
proessional, societal, and cultural values
as t!e desired ocal point o et!ics
education *Reamer, ,AAC, as cited in
#ryan, )++6-. 0!is era is oten identiied
as t!e ori.in o serious sc!olarly interest in
social 2ork8s et!ical oundation *Reamer,
,AAD, ,AAC: /aynes, ,AAA-. W!en t!e
political up!eaval o t!e ,A6+s s!ited
national ocus to civil ri.!ts and social
=ustice issues, t!e social 2ork et!ics
literature rom t!is era also relected t!is
rene2ed emp!asis. 7n ,A6+, t!e (ational
Association o Social Workers *(ASW-
adopted its irst Code o Et!ics. Eorts to
identiy 2!at social 2ork8s core values
2ere and to unite t!e proession around
t!ese principles continued on t!rou.!out
t!e ,A6+s and ,A'+s *Reamer, ,AAC-.
'onte"porar( Social Work Ethics
)iterature.
0!e most recent version o
(ASW8s Code o Et!ics *)++6- continues
to relect t!e principlist emp!asis
contained 2it!in earlier versions, 2it! its
ocus upon t!e proession8s values &ase. 7t
lists t!e previously identiied si1 <core
values> and states t!at t!ese provide <t!e
oundation o social 2ork8s uni3ue
purpose and perspective> *(ASW, )++6, p.
,-.
Social 2ork et!ics literature 2it!in
recent decades discusses t!e application o
t!ese core values across a 2ide ran.e o
practice domains and topical issues,
varyin. rom social 2orkers8 personal
perspectives on !uman nature and t!eir
resultant eects upon practice *9oldstein,
,ACA: Reamer, ,AC?- to t!e identiication
o values conlicts as encountered across
various client settin.s *A&ramson, ,ACB:
9ray, ,AA6: Al&ers E Al&ert, ,AAC: %ean
E R!odes, ,AAC-. Social 2ork et!ics
sc!olars !ave tended to emp!asi;e and
e1plore t!e diiculties in mana.in.
conlicts &et2een et!ical principles as t!ey
emer.e rom issues includin. &ut not
limited to client autonomy and paternalism
*A&ramson, ,ACB: Al&ers E Al&ert, ,AAC-,
duty to protect versus client conidentiality
*%ickson, ,AAC-, and inormed consent
2it!in coercive settin.s *Re.e!r E Antle,
,AA'-. 7n a compilation o !istorical and
empirical social 2ork et!ics literature,
Reamer *,AAD- speciies t!e values
conlicts t!at may emer.e rom eorts to
accommodate social 2ork8s core values5
personal versus proessional values, values
and &elies o t!e 2orker related to t!e
nature o clients8 pro&lems, and disputes
over t!e relative importance o t!e
proession8s values.
0!e 3uestion o !o2 one mi.!t
address t!ese conlicts o principles !as
directed t!e development o decision4
makin. models and social 2ork et!ics
curricula 2it!in recent years *c..
Con.ress, )+++: Fleck4/enderson, ,AA,:
/aynes, ,AAA: $ine, ,AC'-. All s!are a
common strate.y o askin. a series o
3uestions .rounded in an e1ploration o
principles t!at pertain to moral conlicts
and applyin. t!ese investi.ative 3uestions
to et!ical pro&lems. /o2ever, no t2o
decision models ask e1actly t!e same
3uestions, 2!ereas all re3uire individual
interpretation 2it!out any orm o pu&lic
=ustiication, 2!ic! may lead to
inconsistent, capricious decision makin.
*#ryan, )++6-. All similarly lack a
t!eoretical oundation.
Wit! t!e s!it in attention rom
values e1ploration t!at emer.ed in t!e
,AB+s to moral conlict resolution and
strate.ies to accomplis! t!is in recent
years, it is necessary or social 2ork to
more careully evaluate t!e process
t!rou.! 2!ic! et!ical conlicts s!ould &e
resolved. 0!ou.! inconsistent, decision
models do tend to elicit t!e underlyin.
moral 3uandary preventin. a simple
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outcome. /o2ever, it must &e noted t!at
t!e capa&ility to identiy a conlict in
values does not necessarily make
resolution o t!e conlict any easier. (o
matter !o2 e1plicit t!e identiication o
conlictin. values may &e, one may &e no
more prepared to decide 2!at to do t!an i
t!e conlict !ad not &een clariied in t!e
irst place. Somet!in. &eyond t!e use o
at!eoretical decision4makin. models or
<decision trees> is clearly needed.
)! The Need &or Moral Theory:
The (*ample o& Paternalism
Social 2orkers need to kno2 moral
t!eory in order to make t!e &est et!ical
decisions 2it! re.ard to clients. Social
2orkers are at risk or makin. poor
decisions, especially 2!en it comes to
&e!avin. paternalistically to2ard t!eir
clients. 0!is paper relies on t!e 2ork o
9ert and Culver *,A'A-, 2!ic! provides a
systematic and useul 2ay to deal 2it! t!e
pro&lem o paternalism in social 2ork. 0!e
aut!ors assert t!at sometimes paternalism
can &e =ustiied and sometimes it cannot &e
=ustiied. For acts o paternalism to &e
=ustiied, t!e aut!ors assert t!at t!ere must
&e a procedure o =ustiication.
Conse3uentialism, deontolo.y, casuistry,
t!e t!eory o virtue, situation et!ics, and
principlism do not aid in !elpin. to
distin.uis! &et2een cases o =ustiied and
un=ustiied paternalism. Usin. t!e
e1ample o paternalism, t!is paper 2ill
e1plicate t!e key concepts o 9ert,
Clouser, and Culver8s *,AA'- common
morality rame2ork &y applyin. !is
analytic steps and =ustiication procedure
to t!e case o paternalistic actions.
9iven t!e many people 2!o !ave
2ritten a&out paternalism, one mi.!t
2onder 2!y more needs to &e said a&out
t!e topic. 0!e classic 2ork on paternalism
is ound in Mill8s *n )i+ert( *,A'C-.
Ft!er, more recent classic articles include
%2orkin8s *,A'?- ,aternalis", Carter8s
*,A''- Justif(in& ,aternalis", and
#uc!anan8s *,A'C- -edical ,aternalis".
0!ese 2orks discuss paternalism in
relation to t!e .overnment and individual
li&erty or in t!e medical conte1t, 2!ere
paternalism is pervasive. Alt!ou.! t!ese
are classic 2orks on paternalism, none o
t!em ties paternalism to social 2ork.
Reamer *,AC?- discusses paternalism in
t!e conte1t o social 2ork. 7n t!is
oundational 2ork, !e clearly understands
t!e importance o t!e topic to social
2orkers and makes some o t!e same kinds
o points t!at are made in t!e ollo2in.
para.rap!s re.ardin. paternalism and
client sel4determination. /e also oers a
&rie !istory o some o t!e classic 2orks
mentioned a&ove. /o2ever, Reamer
mana.es to discuss paternalism in social
2ork 2it!out ever e1plicitly mentionin.
moral t!eory. 0!is is a .ap t!at t!e present
article &rid.es. 0!is article ties
paternalism to social 2ork and does so in a
2ay t!at !i.!li.!ts t!e importance o
moral t!eory or social 2ork practice. 7t is
important to remem&er t!at t!e main point
o t!is article is one a&out t!e need or
social 2orkers to !ave an understandin. o
moral t!eory. 0!e e1ample o paternalism
is intended to acilitate an understandin. o
t!is main point, and, .iven t!e
comple1ities o social 2ork practice,
paternalism is a natural c!oice.
Conse3uently, a discussion o t!e !istory
o paternalism is limited to t!ese remarks.
$aternalism is, in simplistic terms,
actin. on anot!er8s &e!al 2it!out !is or
!er e1plicit consent. A more sc!olarly
deinition is .iven &y A&ramson *,ACB-5
<$aternalism is a orm o &eneicence in
2!ic! t!e !elpin. person8s concepts o
&eneits and !arms dier rom t!ose o t!e
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client, and t!e !elper8s concepts prevail>
*p. ?CA-. 7t arises out o a 2is! to !elp
ot!ers and can &e &eneicial to clients in
certain cases, particularly 2!en clients
!ave limited decision4makin. capacity.
/o2ever, paternalistic actions undermine
t!e value o sel4determination and limit
autonomy &y takin. a2ay clients8 ri.!ts to
make t!eir o2n decisions. #ecause
paternalism limits reedom, t!is su..ests a
need or t!e a&ility to determine in 2!ic!
cases paternalistic decisions s!ould or
s!ould not &e made.
,aternalis" and Social Work: 'larif(in&
the ,ro+le"
W!y mi.!t one t!ink t!at social
2orkers are in dan.er o actin.
paternalistically in t!e irst placeG Ater
all, i social 2orkers rarely act
paternalistically, t!e claim t!at social
2orkers need to kno2 moral t!eory to
avoid actin. paternalistically is not
compellin.. 0o assert t!e claim t!at social
2orkers are re3uently in dan.er o actin.
paternalistically, one need only consider
t!e aim o social 2ork and t!e nature o
paternalistic &e!avior. Since social
2orkers care a&out !elpin. ot!ers, it is
important t!at t!ey not impede t!eir clients
in &ecomin. autonomous. 0o do so 2ould
undermine t!e very value o t!eir eorts.
/o2ever, it is diicult to discern 2!en t!e
social 2orker8s assistance is !elpul and
2!en it serves as an o&stacle or client
sel4determination. 0!is is due to several
actors, includin. t!e po2er dierential
in!erent in t!e social 2orkerHclient
relations!ip, t!e conte1t o t!e 2orkin.
relations!ip, namely, t!e kinds o issues
t!at led to t!e ormation o t!e
relations!ip, and t!e vulnera&ility o t!e
clients. 0!ese, o course, are interrelated
issues. 0!e social 2orker is placed in t!e
position o !elpin. a client &etter !er lie,
and s!e must do so 2it!out underminin.
t!e client8s pro.ress to2ard sel4
determination. As a result, t!e social
2orker is al2ays in dan.er o makin.
decisions on &e!al o t!e client8s 2ell4
&ein.. 0!e social 2orker is in dan.er o
actin. paternalistically i s!e does not
make and carry out t!ese decisions 2it!
due care.
$aternalism is an in!erent
component o social 2ork. Social 2orkers8
duties to ot!ers, includin. protectin.
ri.!ts, intervenin. in !i.! risk situations,
providin. court4mandated services or
assistance to involuntary clients, and
providin. *or not providin.- inormation
durin. t!e consent process and in ot!er
client contacts all involve evaluatin.
decisions a&out potentially paternalistic
acts *Reamer, ,AA?, as cited in Kaplan E
#ryan, )++A-. Simultaneously, social
2orkers are mandated to respect individual
sel4determination and to en!ance societal
2ell4&ein., 2!ic! may conlict in practice.
Al&ers and Al&ert *,AAC- identiy t!e very
purpose o social 2ork as em&edded 2it!in
t!e conlict &et2een t!e needs o t!e sel
and t!ose o society. 7n many cases,
a.ency policies may indicate t!at t!e social
2orker s!ould act paternalistically,
2!ereas t!e Code o Et!ics 2ould su..est
t!e opposite. Conlicts &et2een social
2orkers and clients commonly occur 2!en
t!ey disa.ree a&out 2!et!er or not
2orkers8 paternalistic actions are
&eneicial to clients rom t!e clients8
perspective *A&ramson, ,ACB, as cited in
Kaplan E #ryan, )++A-. 0!ese kinds o
decisions call or =ustiication o t!e
proessional8s actions *Kaplan E #ryan,
)++A-.
02o distinctions re.ardin. t!e
meanin. o paternalism are relevant !ere.
0!e irst distinction is &et2een
paternalistic acts and acts t!at seem
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paternalistic &ut really are not. For
e1ample, a mot!er8s actions to2ard !er
very youn. c!ildren mi.!t count as
paternalistic. Ater all, mot!ers oten act
on &e!al o t!eir c!ildren 2it!out t!eir
e1plicit consent. /o2ever, to vie2 t!is as
paternalism is clearly a&surd. Restrictin. a
t2o4year old8s reedom or t!e sake o !is
or !er o2n .ood is a parental, not
paternalistic, action. 0!is is =ust 2!at
parents are supposed to do in order to raise
t!eir c!ildren. Su..estin. t!at t!ese kinds
o parental acts are paternalistic misses t!e
point o 2!at it means to &e a parent. 0!e
second distinction is &et2een =ustiied acts
o paternalism and un=ustiied acts. A
=ustiia&le act o paternalism is one in
2!ic! an act counts as paternalistic, &ut it
is one most rational persons 2ould e1cuse.
An un=ustiia&le paternalistic act is one t!at
most rational persons 2ould not e1cuse,
t!ere&y !oldin. t!e a.ent as morally
culpa&le or causin. a person !arm.
7 all acts o paternalism are
un=ustiied, t!en it is likely t!at social
2orkers commit many acts o un=ustiied
paternalism. 0!is conclusion, i sound,
2ould severely undermine t!e social utility
o t!e social 2ork proession. 7t amounts
to t!e claim t!at t!e social 2ork proession
is &ased on practices t!at ultimately
perpetuate immorality. 0!e social
useulness o t!e social 2ork proession is
evident in t!e lives o t!e many people
2!o !ave &een !elped &y social 2orkers.
Unless social 2orkers 2ant to em&race t!e
idea t!at actin. immorally is a .ood 2ay to
.o a&out !elpin. ot!ers, t!en some acts o
paternalism are =ustiied. 7 social 2orkers
cannot properly =ustiy any acts o
paternalism, t!ey place t!eir clients in
!arm8s 2ay. 0!e (ASW Code o Et!ics
*)++6- speaks to paternalism in Section
,.+'&.
We 2ill no2 turn to 9ert, Clouser,
and Culver8s *,AA'- concept o t!e
common moral system *also kno2n as
common morality- and e1plore its key
eatures o rules, morally relevant eatures,
rules violations, and =ustiication. 7t 2ill &e
s!o2n !ere t!at paternalistic acts are like
ot!er rules violations in t!at t!ey re3uire
=ustiication to &e morally accepta&le. 7n
doin. so, 2e 2ill deine paternalism in
suc! a 2ay t!at allo2s distin.uis!in.
&et2een morally pro!i&ited and morally
permissi&le paternalistic acts.
+! Moral ,#sti&ication, Morally
Relevant -eat#res, and Moral
Theories
-oral .ules and .ules Violations.
Accordin. to 9ert, Clouser, E
Culver *,AA'-, morality is an inormal
pu&lic system. All inormal pu&lic
systems s!are t2o eatures5 *a- all t!ose to
2!om t!e system applies understand it,
and *&- it is rational to su&mit onesel to
t!e system. 0!ey deine rationality in
terms o irrationality5 <to act irrationally is
to act in a 2ay t!at one kno2s, or s!ould
kno2, 2ill si.niicantly increase t!e
pro&a&ility t!at onesel, or t!ose one cares
or, 2ill suer deat!, pain disa&ility, loss
o reedom or loss o pleasure: and one
does not !ave an ade3uate reason or so
actin.> *p. )6-. 0!eir system o morality is
an e1plicit ormulation o 2!at t!ey take to
&e implicit in t!e 2ay most people deal
2it! everyday moral issues. 0!ey su&mit
ten moral rules t!at relect t!e emp!asis on
!arm t!at is evident in t!eir deinition o
irrationality5 do not kill, do not cause pain,
do not disa&le, do not deprive o reedom,
do not deprive o pleasure, do not deceive,
keep your promise, do not c!eat, o&ey t!e
la2, do your duty *9ert, Culver, E
Clouser, )++6-. Accordin. to t!ese
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aut!ors8 concept o common morality,
moral rules are not a&solute, &ut =ustiied
violations o t!ose rules must &e impartial
and must &e pu&lic *in t!e sense t!at all
rational persons 2ould allo2 suc!
violations i t!ey 2ere in a similar
situation-.
0!e rules provide t!e oundation o
t!e common morality rame2ork. 9ert,
Clouser, and Culver *,AA'- note t!at t!ese
are .eneral, universal rules t!at are made
speciic &y conte1t. For e1ample, a speciic
case o violatin. <%o not cause pain> may
involve spankin. a mis&e!avin. c!ild,
makin. cruel comments to a riend, or
assistin. a patient 2it! p!ysical
re!a&ilitation e1ercises. /e reasons t!at
rational persons a.ree to a&ide &y t!e
moral rules so t!at t!ey avoid !avin. t!ese
!arms committed a.ainst t!em. Alt!ou.! it
is asserted t!at all are e3ually important,
t!e second ive rules tend to increase t!e
likeli!ood t!at one o t!e irst ive rules
2ill &e &roken. For instance, deceivin. a
client *rule 6- &y not providin. all
inormation a&out !er c!oices durin. t!e
inormed consent process increases t!e
likeli!ood t!at !er reedom to make an
inormed decision 2ill &e impaired *rule
D-.
-orall( .ele$ant Features
#ecause t!e rules are .eneral, t!ey
re3uire interpretation to &e applica&le in
particular cases. 7t is possi&le or people to
disa.ree a&out !o2 to correctly apply t!e
rules in particular cases. Conse3uently,
2!at may at irst seem like a .ross
violation o a moral rule may actually &e
morally permissi&le. #ecause paternalistic
acts involve, &y deinition, t!e &reakin. o
a moral rule, all acts o paternalism re3uire
=ustiication.
9ert, Clouser, E Culver *,AA'-
also make it clear t!at sometimes t!ere are
situations in 2!ic! t!ere 2ill &e
disa.reement a&out rules violations, even
2!en t!e circumstances are t!e same. 7n
every case o a potential rules violation,
t!e social 2orker must irst determine t!e
morally relevant eatures and t!en consider
t!e conse3uences s!ould everyone kno2
t!at it is permissi&le to violate rules under
t!e same circumstances to =ustiy !is or !er
position. 9ert *,AAC- presents a series o
3uestions as a .uideline desi.ned to elicit
important acts a&out a moral issue
*morally relevant eatures-, 2!ic! t!e
social 2orker s!ould ask 2!en considerin.
a violation o a moral rule
1. What "oral rule is +ein& $iolated/
2. What har"s are +ein& caused +( the
$iolation/ What har"s are +ein&
a$oided +( $iolatin& the rule/ What
har"s are +ein& pre$ented +( the
$iolation/
0. What are the rele$ant desires and
+eliefs of the person to!ard !ho" the
rule is +ein& $iolated/
1. 2s the relationship +et!een the person
$iolatin& the rule and the persons
to!ard !ho" the rule is +ein& $iolated
such that the for"er has a dut( to
$iolate "oral rules !ith re&ard to the
latter independent of their consent/
3. What &oods are +ein& pro"oted +( the
$iolation/
4. 2s the rule +ein& $iolated to!ard a
person in order to pre$ent her fro"
$iolatin& a "oral rule !hen the
$iolation !ould +e un#ustified or !eakl(
#ustified/
7. 2s the rule +ein& $iolated to!ard a
person +ecause he has $iolated a "oral
rule un#ustifia+l( or !ith a !eak
#ustification/
5. 6re there an( alternati$e actions or
policies that !ould +e prefera+le/
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7. 2s the $iolation +ein& done intentionall(
or onl( kno!in&l(/
10. 2s the situation an e"er&enc( such that
no person is likel( to plan to +e in that
kind of situation/
*9ert, ,AAA pp. ,'4,A-.
(ot all o t!e 3uestions apply to
every case. Some 3uestions are more
important in some conte1ts t!an ot!ers.
0!ere may &e, 9ert *,AAC- admits, many
morally relevant properties t!at t!e
3uestions do not !elp !i.!li.!t. 7t is t!ese
kinds o considerations t!at make t!e
3uestions <.uidelines.> 0!e ans2ers to t!e
3uestions are t!e morally relevant
properties one s!ould consider in decidin.
2!et!er a particular act is morally
permissi&le.
Justification of .ules Violations.
0!e analysis !in.es upon an
important process o =ustiication, ar.ua&ly
t!e most useul eature o t!e common
moral system o decision4makin.. 9ert
*,AAA- su..ests t2o 3uestions related to
t!e deontolo.ical concept o t!e
cate.orical imperative in order to evaluate
i violatin. t!e rules is =ustiied in a case5
,- 'ould an(one in these kinds of
circu"stances $iolate these rules/ and 28
Would it still +e allo!ed if e$er(one kne!
that these rules could +e $iolated in these
circu"stances/ 0!ese 3uestions ans2er
2!et!er or not rules violations in particular
circumstances are impartially and pu&licly
allo2ed. 0!is analysis re3uires t!e
practitioner to consider 2!et!er t!e lon.4
term conse3uences o violatin. rules do
more !arm t!an not violatin. rules in
particular situations *#ryan, )++6-.
,aternalis" as a -oral .ules Violation
Returnin. to t!e previous
discussion re.ardin. paternalism, it s!ould
&e clear t!at paternalistic acts in some
cases are =ustiied violations o moral
rules, and in ot!ers, are un=ustiied.
/o2ever, t!e deinition o paternalism
must &e made e1plicit to assist t!e social
2orker 2it! analysis o t!e situation. 9ert
E Culver *,A'A- deine paternalistic
&e!avior in t!e ollo2in. 2ay5
A is actin. paternalistically to2ard
S i and only i A8s &e!avior
*correctly- indicates t!at A &elieves
t!atI

918 his action is for S:s &ood;
928 he is <ualified to act on S:s
+ehalf;
908 his action in$ol$es $iolatin& a
"oral rule 9or !ill re<uire hi" to
do so8 !ith re&ard to S;
918 S:s &ood #ustifies hi" in actin&
on S:s +ehalf independentl( of S:s
past, present, or i""ediatel(
forthco"in& 9free, infor"ed8
consent; and
938 S +elie$es 9perhaps falsel(8 that
he 9S8 &enerall( kno!s !hat is for
his o!n &ood 9p.1748.
Fne8s actions are paternalistic,
t!en, i t!ey are motivated &y certain kinds
o &elies. For e1ample, suppose an adult
client admits !e intends to !arm !imsel
p!ysically &ut !as no desire or !is social
2orker8s assistance in !elpin. !im 2ork
t!rou.! t!is issue. 0!e social 2orker
decides t!at t!e client s!ould &e placed
under suicide 2atc!, and t!e social 2orker
does 2!at is needed to !ave !im
!ospitali;ed. *0!is is a simpliied version
o a case t!at 9ert, Clouser, E Culver,
,AA', ormulate.- 0!e social 2orker8s
action is motivated &y t!e ollo2in.
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&elies5 0!e client is &etter o alive t!an
!e is dead *condition ,-: t!e social
2orker8s trainin. provides t!em 2it! t!e
necessary skills and kno2led.e to act on
t!e client8s &e!al *condition )-: t!e social
2orker &elieves t!at !ospitali;in. t!e
client restricts !is reedom andHor could
cause !er some ot!er kind o !arm
*condition ?-: t!e social 2orker does not
t!ink t!at s!e needs t!e client8s permission
to !ave !im !ospitali;ed *condition D-: and
t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at, as a
rational adult, t!e client .enerally kno2s
2!at is in !is &est interest *condition B-.
Considerin. all o t!e &elies t!at motivate
t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior, t!e social
2orker8s c!oice to involuntarily
!ospitali;e !er client is a paternalistic one,
as deined &y 9ert and Culver. 0o &e sure,
t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior mi.!t &e
e1cusa&le. W!et!er or not it is e1cusa&le
is discussed &elo2.
A violation o a moral rule
involves, accordin. to 9ert, Clouser, and
Culver *,AA'-, causin. !arm suc! as deat!,
pain, disa&ility, loss o reedom,
opportunity, or pleasure. 7n actin. 2it!out
o&tainin. t!e consent o !er client, a social
2orker is violatin. a moral rule I
deprivin. !er client o reedom *9ert E
Culver, ,A'A. p. B,-. So, in ulillin.
condition D, one is causin. !arm, t!us
ulillin. condition ?.
As stated, some paternalistic acts
are =ustiia&le and ot!ers are not. W!at is
important to reco.ni;e is t!at all cases o
paternalism, &y t!eir very nature, violate
t!e moral rules, &y deprivin. clients o
t!eir ri.!t to reely make t!eir o2n
c!oices. Ften, ot!er rules are also
violated. 0!ereore, all potential acts o
paternalism s!ould &e analy;ed as to t!eir
moral permissi&ility. 7 social 2orkers
2is! to avoid committin. un=ustiia&le
paternalistic acts to2ard t!eir clients, t!ey
must kno2 moral t!eory.
0!is section e1plains t!e dierence
&et2een =ustiied and un=ustiied
paternalistic acts and demonstrates !o2
social 2orkers can avoid actin. in an
un=ustiia&ly paternalistic to2ard t!eir
clients. Suc! avoidance depends on social
2orkers kno2in. moral t!eory. First, an
e1planation o t!e dierent kinds o
paternalism is in order.
0o identiy cases o =ustiied
paternalism, one must &e a&le to identiy
2!ic! acts are morally permissi&le. A
morally permissi&le act is one t!at a person
is allo2ed to do &ut not re3uired to do, as
stated &y some moral t!eory. Contrast a
morally permissi&le act 2it! an act t!at is
eit!er morally re3uired or morally
or&idden. A morally re3uired act is an act
t!at one is o&li.ated to do. A morally
or&idden act is an act t!at is al2ays 2ron.
to perorm.
E1actly 2!ic! acts are deemed
morally re3uired or or&idden depends on
t!e moral t!eory under consideration. For
e1ample, utilitarians t!ink t!at t!e moral
value o an act is derived rom t!e act8s
conse3uences. %eontolo.ists t!ink t!at t!e
moral value o an act depends on t!e
intention 2it! 2!ic! a person perorms t!e
act. 9iven t!eir dierent assessments o
2!at .ives moral value to an act, it is clear
t!at utilitarians and deontolo.ists 2ill
dier on t!eir lists o morally re3uired and
morally or&idden acts. 0!ese are =ust t2o
e1amples. Ft!er moral t!eorists, ones 2!o
are not deontolo.ists or utilitarians, 2ould
say t!at moral value is derived ultimately
rom somet!in. ot!er t!an conse3uences
or intentions.
W!atever t!e case, .iven a moral
t!eory, most people 2ould a.ree on 2!ic!
acts are morally or&idden and morally
re3uired, and t!ey 2ould likely a.ree t!at
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many acts do not all into eit!er cate.ory.
Justiied acts o paternalism are morally
permissi&le. (o acts o paternalism are
ever morally re3uired. Claimin. t!at some
acts o paternalism are =ustiied means t!at
some acts o paternalism are not morally
or&idden. For t!ese acts, compellin.
reasons are needed to convince ot!ers t!at
t!e acts are morally permissi&le. Ferin.
reasons in t!ese kinds o cases amounts to
.ivin. a =ustiication or t!e moral
permissi&ility o some acts o paternalism.
W!at counts as a =ustiication or a
paternalistic actG 9ert and Culver *,A'A-
claim t!at any =ustiication o a
paternalistic act must !ave t!e ollo2in.
necessary eatures5 *,- a description o t!e
&eneit t!at 2ould &e .ained &y t!e person
to 2!om t!e paternalistic act is directed
and *)- t!e !arms prevented &y t!e
paternalistic act need to &e <muc! .reater>
t!an t!e !arm o committin. t!e act. For a
=ustiication to count as suicient, it must
say !o2 t!e paternalistic act 2ould &e
accepta&le to all rational persons in similar
circumstances. So, a =ustiication o
paternalism must s!o2 t!at *,- it 2ould &e
irrational or t!e person a.ainst 2!om t!e
act o paternalism is committed not to
a.ree to t!e act, .iven t!e c!ance and *)-
all rational persons 2ould a.ree t!at i t!ey
2ere in a similar situation paternalism
2ould &e accepta&le.
W!et!er or not an act o
paternalism is =ustiied depends on t!e
3uality o t!e =ustiication .iven or t!e act.
0!ere are dierent kinds o moral
=ustiication *9ert, Clouser, E Culver,
,AA'-. 0!e reasons t!at one .ives or
&reakin. a moral rule could &e accepted &y
almost everyone, or t!ere could &e
disa.reement a&out 2!et!er one s!ould
accept t!e =ustiication. Accordin. to 9ert
and Culver *,A'A-, i t!e =ustiication is
accepted &y all rational people, it counts as
a stron. =ustiication. Acts o paternalism
t!at are stron.ly =ustiied 2ould count as
morally permissi&le acts. 0!is amounts to
t!e claim t!at all people 2ould a.ree t!at
universally allo2in. t!e act o paternalism
in certain circumstances 2ould prevent
more !arm t!an it 2ould cause. W!en
t!ere is a disa.reement a&out t!e rational
accepta&ility o t!e =ustiication, t!e
=ustiication counts as 2eak. Acts o
paternalism t!at are 2eakly =ustiied are
acts t!at mi.!t &e morally permissi&le, &ut
t!ere may &e conse3uences or doin. t!em.
As noted earlier, t!e =ustiication o a
paternalistic act s!ould !ave t2o eatures5
*,- it 2ould &e irrational or t!e person
a.ainst 2!om t!e act o paternalism is
committed not to a.ree to t!e act, .iven t!e
c!ance and *)- all rational persons 2ould
a.ree t!at i t!ey 2ere in a similar
situation, paternalism 2ould &e accepta&le.
Consider t!e 3ualiications in turn.
7 3ualiication , 2ere alse, t!en it 2ould
&e rational or persons to act in suc! a 2ay
as to <si.niicantly increase t!e pro&a&ility
t!at onesel, or t!ose one cares or, 2ill
suer deat!, pain disa&ility, loss o
reedom or loss o pleasure: and one does
not !ave an ade3uate reason or so actin..>
Clearly t!is deies lo.ic. Consider
3ualiication ). Accordin. to 9ert,
Clouser, E Culver *,AA'-, speciyin. t!e
circumstances is a matter o speciyin. t!e
kinds o paternalistic acts one could
pu&licly advocate.

0o say t!at an act is
one t!at could &e pu&licly advocated is to
say t!at it could &e e1plicitly incorporated
into t!e inormal, pu&lic system o
morality 2it!out underminin. t!e system.
Kant8s e1ample o t!e person 2!o lies to
o&tain a loan illustrates 9ert and Culver8s
point *9re.or, ,AA6-. 7 one 2ere to
pu&licly advocate t!e moral permissi&ility
o lyin. in order to o&tain a loan, t!e
inormal pu&lic practice o lendin. money
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2ould &e undermined. 7t 2ould &e
undermined &ecause t!e lenders 2ould not
!ave t!e assurance t!at de&tors 2ould pay
&ack t!e loans. So, t!ey 2ould cease
lendin. money. $u&licly advocatin. t!e
moral permissi&ility o an act t!at is
inconsistent 2it! t!e inormal pu&lic
system o morality 2ould 2eaken t!e
system8s social eicacy.
0!e or.oin. remarks mi.!t
indicate 2!y speciyin. t!e circumstances
is important, &ut it says little a&out !o2
one is supposed to i.ure out 2!at
situations count as similar, as stated in
3ualiication ). /o2 does one i.ure out
2!ic! situations are similarG 0o i.ure out
t!e similarities in t2o dierent cases, one
needs a 2ay to sit t!rou.! all t!e eatures
o &ot! cases, pickin. out and comparin.
t!e salient eatures o eac! case. W!y is
suc! a met!od neededG 0!e reason is
simple. Suppose it is possi&le to list
everyt!in.Ievery action, t!ou.!t,
&ack.round inormation, or e1ampleI
t!at constitutes t!e conte1t o eac! case. 7t
is reasona&le to suppose t!e lists 2ould &e
too lon. to practically compare one 2it!
t!e ot!er. Even i it 2ere not practically
impossi&le, .iven t!e comple1ity o
lan.ua.e, t!ere are ininitely many 2ays to
descri&e eac! case. Wit!out a met!od to
pick out certain eatures o eac! case, t!ere
2ould &e no possi&le 2ay to *,- decide
2!ic! descriptions s!ould &e compared
and *)- decide 2!ic! eatures o t!ose lists
2ould count as compara&le eatures. Any
met!od t!at could &e used or sitin.
t!rou.! t!e various aspects o a situation
and pickin. out t!e relevant eatures o
eac! case 2ould need to .ive an
e1planation o *a- 2!y it picks certain
eatures over ot!ers, *&- 2!y t!ese eatures
are relevant, and *c- !o2 *a- and *&- relate
to paternalism. Ft!er2ise, t!ere 2ould &e
no 2ay to c!oose a met!od. 0!e
p!ilosop!ical 2ork t!at t!ese e1planations
do is =ust 2!at t!eories are supposed to do.
0!eories are =ust e1planations t!at
systematically tie to.et!er various
p!enomena in a certain domain.
#ecause one needs some sort o
met!od or decidin. 2!ic! eatures o t!e
situations are similar, t!e 3uestion arises5
can one c!oose a met!od or decidin. on
suc! eatures t!at does not presuppose
some kind o moral t!eoryG 7 t!is is a
possi&ility, t!en it 2ould count a.ainst our
main claim t!at it 2ould &e possi&le to
avoid actin. in an un=ustiia&ly
paternalistic manner 2it!out kno2in.
moral t!eory. $er!aps one mi.!t 2ant to
advocate usin. intuitions to i.ure out t!e
matter. Even .rantin. t!at t!is kind o
met!od does not presuppose some kind o
moral t!eory, t!ere are o&vious pro&lems
2it! t!is met!od. %ierent people !ave
dierent intuitions in dierent cases. So,
t!ere 2ould &e no 2ay to =ustiy any act o
paternalism. W!yG Recall t!at to =ustiy
an act o paternalism, reasons must &e
mars!aled t!at 2ould persuade ot!ers. 7
people do not s!are t!e same et!ical
intuitions, people needin. to &e convinced
2ill not respond to ar.uments &ased upon
uns!ared intuitions. #ut, t!ere is .ood
reason to t!ink t!at some acts o
paternalism are =ustiied. So, usin.
intuitions to decide t!e similarity o
dierent cases does not 2ork.
#ecause t!e =ustiication o
paternalism is a moral matter, t!e relevant,
compara&le eatures o eac! case are moral
properties. 9ert *,AAA- deines t!e
morally relevant properties in t!e
ollo2in. manner5 <A morally relevant
eature o a moral rule violation is a eature
t!at i c!an.ed could c!an.e 2!et!er some
impartial rational person 2ould pu&licly
allo2 t!at violation> *p. ,6-. 7 intuitions
can8t &e used, t!en one must rely on
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somet!in. else. W!atever met!od one
adopts, it must &e conceptually related to
t!e moral properties under consideration.
0!is restriction automatically discounts
pure descriptive met!ods. A pure
descriptive met!od is value ree. 0o use a
pure descriptive met!od to e1plain 2!ic!
moral properties one s!ould consider
salient 2ould &e violatin. t!e <isHou.!t>
distinction. Many people t!ink t!at t!is
allacy is a .enuine lo.ical allacy t!at
s!ould &e avoided: derivin. an <ou.!t>
statement rom premises t!at only contain
<is> statements conuses t!e dierence
&et2een description and prescription.
#ut suppose a descriptive met!od
is not completely value ree. A descriptive
met!od t!at is not value ree and e1plains
t!e relevant moral properties is a kind o
normative t!eory. A normative t!eory is
one t!at e1plains t!e action4.uidin. nature
o values. All moral t!eories are
normative ones, &ut not all normative
t!eories are moral ones. For e1ample, a
t!eory t!at e1plains eti3uette is a
normative t!eory t!at is not a moral one,
&ecause matters o eti3uette are not matters
o moral si.niicance. #ecause
paternalism is a moral issue, any normative
t!eory t!at e1plains paternalism 2ould
!ave to &e a moral t!eory. So, 2e !ave t!e
ollo2in. results. Eit!er a t!eory e1plains
2!at counts as similarities, or intuitions
do, and 2e !ave esta&lis!ed t!at intuitions
cannot. A t!eory is eit!er purely
descriptive or it is normative. A purely
descriptive t!eory cannot do t!e 2ork. So,
a normative t!eory must do t!e 2ork. A
normative t!eory t!at is suiciently stron.
to e1plain paternalism is a moral t!eory.
So, decidin. t!e similarities o dierent
cases means utili;in. a moral t!eory. F
course, one cannot utili;e a moral t!eory i
one does not kno2 moral t!eories.
W!ereas kno2in. at least one
moral t!eory is suicient or t!e ar.ument
presented a&ove, it is &etter, at least rom a
practical standpoint, i social 2orkers
kno2 many moral t!eories. A.ain,
dierent moral t!eories accord dierent
moral value to particular acts. 7t stands to
reason t!at dierent moral t!eories also
consider as morally relevant dierent
eatures o similar situations. For e1ample,
&ecause utilitarians are ultimately
concerned 2it! t!e conse3uences o an act,
t!ey 2ill place little or no value on t!e
intentions o t!e person actin., e1cept
insoar as t!ose intentions actually &rin.
a&out certain conse3uences. #ecause
deontolo.ists ultimately care a&out a
person8s intentions or actin., t!ey 2ill
place little importance on t!e actual
conse3uences o t!e act. Ft!er moral
t!eorists 2ill determine 2!at counts as
morally relevant accordin. to t!e t!eories
t!ey preer. So, eac! kind o moral
t!eorist is ultimately concerned 2it!
dierent aspects o any particular case.
Conse3uently, t!ere is no common .round
rom 2!ic! to decide 2!ic! description o
a case is to &e utili;ed. 7 a social 2orker,
t!en, 2ants to =ustiy an act o paternalism,
s!e needs to kno2 enou.! a&out moral
t!eories to oer reasons to someone 2!o
may adopt a dierent moral perspective
t!an s!e !as.
0o make t!e application o
paternalism, reconsider t!e case outlined in
t!e irst section o t!is paper. Recall t!e
case5 suppose an adult client admits !e
intends to !arm !imsel p!ysically &ut !as
no desire or t!e social 2orker8s counsel in
!elpin. !imH!er 2ork t!rou.! t!is issue.
0!e social 2orker decides t!at t!e client
s!ould &e placed under suicide 2atc!, and
t!e social 2orker does 2!at is needed to
!ave !im !ospitali;ed. 0!e social
2orker8s action is motivated &y t!e
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ollo2in. &elies5 t!e social 2orker
&elieves t!at t!e client is &etter o alive
t!an !e is dead: t!e social 2orker &elieves
t!at !isH!er trainin. as a social 2orker
provides !imH!er 2it! t!e necessary skills
and kno2led.e to act on t!e client8s
&e!al: t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at
!ospitali;in. t!e client restricts !is
reedom andHor could cause !im some
ot!er kind o !arm: t!e social 2orker does
not t!ink t!at !eHs!e needs t!e client8s
permission to !ave !imH!er !ospitali;ed:
and t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at, as a
rational adult, t!e client .enerally kno2s
2!at is in !isH!er &est interest.
Considerin. all o t!e &elies t!at motivate
t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior, t!e act o
!avin. t!e client !ospitali;ed is a
paternalistic one. #ut, is it an un=ustiia&ly
paternalistic actG
Alt!ou.! t!is paper !as only
descri&ed t!e case in outline, satisyin.
9ert and Culver8s t2o conditions or
=ustiication is easy to do. Considerin. t!e
irst point, t!e .reatest &eneit t!at t!e
client receives rom t!e act o paternalism
is t!at !e is prevented rom endin. !is lie
or si.niicantly causin. dama.e to it.
@ivin. a lie, it is assumed, is &etter t!an
prematurely endin. it. @ivin. a lie 2it!
less si.niicant p!ysical dama.e is &etter
t!an livin. a lie 2it! more si.niicant
p!ysical dama.e. Fne could disa.ree 2it!
t!e irst &eneit and still a.ree 2it! t!e
second. 0!e second &eneit is a
suiciently stron. &eneit t!at t!ere is no
need to list more &eneits. Wit!out a
reason t!at 2ould out2ei.! t!e &eneits
.ained rom not actin. paternalistically in
t!is case, t!e client is actin. irrationally.
Re.ardin. t!e second point, to
s!o2 t!at all rational persons 2ould a.ree
t!at i t!ey 2ere in a similar situation
paternalism 2ould &e accepta&le, amounts
to s!o2in. 2!at t!e morally relevant
properties o t!e case are and determinin.
2!et!er one 2ould pu&licly allo2 t!is kind
o violation. As ar.ued, determinin. t!e
morally relevant properties o a case
depend on kno2in. moral t!eory. Usin.
t!e moral t!eory developed &y 9ert
*,AAA-, one can i.ure out t!e morally
relevant properties o t!e case. A.ain,
not!in. !in.es on t!is particular moral
t!eory. Fne could use anot!er moral
t!eory to t!e same end. /o2ever, .iven
t!e .eneral nature o t!eir met!od o
!i.!li.!tin. morally relevant properties, it
is pro&a&ly t!e case t!at t!eir met!od is
consistent 2it! ot!er moral t!eories.
F&viously, t!e more inormation
a&out a case one kno2s, t!e easier it 2ill
&e to ans2er t!e 3uestions listed a&ove.
0!e case 2e are considerin. lacks muc!
inormation t!at one mi.!t 2ant.
(evert!eless, one can see !o2 t!e
3uestions !elp even in cases in 2!ic! t!e
inormation is lackin.. Consider 3uestions
,, ), D, and B. Acts o paternalism, &y
deinition, involve &reakin. t!e moral rule
a.ainst deceivin. ot!ers. #y actin.
paternalistically in t!is case, certain !arms
are &ein. prevented, suc! as si.niicant
p!ysical dama.e, possi&ly leadin. to
deat!. 0!e relations!ip &et2een t!e social
2orker and t!e client is suc! t!at t!e social
2orker !as a duty to act in t!e manner s!e
does. 0!e client 2ill receive certain
&eneits, as e1plained a&ove, rom !er act
o paternalism. Wit! more inormation, it
2ould &e possi&le to ans2er all ten o t!e
3uestions. From t!e ans2ers .iven so ar,
t!ere is enou.! inormation or decidin.
2!et!er t!is kind o act 2ould &e pu&licly
advocated, t!at is, 2!et!er it 2ould &e
morally permissi&le. 7 all rational persons
2ould a.ree t!at allo2in. paternalism in
t!is kind o case is =ustiied, t!en t!e act is
morally permissi&le. 7 t!ere is
disa.reement allo2in. paternalism in
Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e
similar circumstances, t!e act mi.!t &e
morally permissi&le. 7t is plausi&le, &ased
only on t!e inormation .iven a&ove, t!at
t!e social 2orker8s act is most likely
morally permissi&le. Even i it is not, t!e
e1ample makes clear !o2 a social 2orker
mi.!t .o a&out =ustiyin. an act o
paternalism &ased on !er kno2led.e o
moral t!eory.
.! /oncl#sion
0!e ar.ument developed so ar in
t!is paper may &e summari;ed in t!e
ollo2in. manner5
*,- 0o avoid actin. in a paternalistic
manner t!at is pro&lematic in a case, social
2orkers need to =ustiy t!e acts o
paternalism t!ey commit.
*)- 0o =ustiy t!e acts o paternalism t!ey
commit, social 2orkers need to kno2 t!e
morally relevant eatures o t!e cases o
paternalism t!ey commit.
*?- 0o kno2 t!e morally relevant
properties o t!e cases o paternalism
social 2orkers commit, t!ey need to kno2
moral t!eory.
*D- 0o avoid un=ustiied paternalistic
actions in a case, social 2orkers need to
kno2 moral t!eory.
7 social 2orkers are in dan.er o
re3uently committin. un=ustiied
paternalistic acts to2ard t!eir clients and
t!e ar.ument a&ove is sound, t!e
implications or social 2ork education are
clear. 0!e most o&vious implication is
t!at social 2ork educators need to take
seriously t!eir c!ar.e to teac! social
2orkers moral t!eory. Currently, most
social 2ork pro.rams teac! et!ical t!eory
t!rou.! one o t2o models. 0!e irst
model is t!e diused model. 7n t!is
model, social 2ork students do not take a
course in moral t!eory. Rat!er, students
are tau.!t moral t!eory as a part o every
class t!ey take. 0!e second model re3uires
students to take a discrete class on moral
t!eory. 0!ere is some evidence t!at t!e
second model !elps social 2ork students
develop t!eir moral reasonin. skills &etter
t!an t!e irst model. 0!e researc! su..ests
t!at &y makin. moral t!eory a part o
every class, it is eventually ne.lected *see
Sanders, )++6-. Social 2ork educators,
t!en, need to take more seriously t!e idea
t!at re3uirin. social 2ork students to take
a discrete et!ics course is more useul or
t!e moral &urdens o social 2ork practice
t!an re3uirin. t!em to learn moral t!eory
t!rou.! a process o diusion. W!atever
met!od sc!ools c!oose to teac! moral
t!eory to social 2ork students, t!ey need to
take et!ical t!eory more seriously t!an it
appears t!ey do.
Anot!er implication o t!e
ar.ument is t!at social 2orkers need to
!one t!eir moral reasonin. skills as
proessionals. 7t is not enou.! to take one
et!ics course as an under.raduate social
2ork ma=or or as a .raduate master8s
student. 7ncorporatin. moral t!eory into
t!e continuin. education pro.rams t!at
proessional social 2orkers must complete
2ould not only serve proessionals 2ell:
more importantly, it could prevent clients
rom &ein. unnecessarily !armed &y t!eir
social 2orkers. 7 social 2orkers are as
concerned 2it! t!e 2ell &ein. o t!eir
clients as t!ey claim to &e, takin. t!e
education o et!ics seriously is a moral
imperative t!at social 2orkers cannot
aord to ne.lect.
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