Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,
vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review
1
before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28, 2002
Decision
2
and the December 11, 2002 Resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
69400.
4
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel shall have
custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10) years of age. Once the
said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he
prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child, shall have visitorial
rights at least once a week, and may take the child out upon the written consent of the
mother.
"Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and finding it to be
without merit, the same is DENIED."
5

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his
minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the
mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by
his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national
and is presently residing in Japan.
"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be
brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the
school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels
L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house
of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department
store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao
City but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago
City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin
Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his
son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the said case was
withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his
biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with the May 2, 2002
Resolution of this Court.
"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner
that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the
one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents
Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the
petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin
Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily
agreed and consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was
deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to
have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since
the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The
custody of the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioners
parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of
the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has already been living separately from
the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with
another woman until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the
purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so
she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated
that she has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the
Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and
invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael
Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense he had spent in
instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the
minor from his mother. Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.
6

Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x [w]hether or not [he],
as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of
the mother who is away."
7

The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in regard to its
erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists,
however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the
period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the
biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take
care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,
8
granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,
9
thus
rendering petitioners argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the
CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"
10
alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his
mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.
11

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines
12
explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether
the father admits paternity.
13

Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally classified into
two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous,
adulterous or illicit.
14
A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time
of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.
15
On the
other hand, a spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified
to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.
16

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested
in the father or the mother recognizing them.
17
If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be
exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to
legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the
father and the mother.
18

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code.
19
Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
20

Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment
of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory
shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article
53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, without any distinction between natural and spurious.
21
The concept of "natural child" is
important only for purposes of legitimation.
22
Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child
remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his
birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers
recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals
23
held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father
may adopt his own illegitimate child;
24
in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child
of the adoptive parent.
25

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.
26
She has the right to keep him in her
company.
27
She cannot be deprived of that right,
28
and she may not even renounce or transfer it
"except in the cases authorized by law."
29

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.
30
In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment,
31
unemployment,
immorality,
32
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
33
we hold that
the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is
no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of
Appeals,
34
the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in view of
the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
35
Even when
the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for
their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent
any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are
separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de
facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never
married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with
is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
choose which parent to live with is DELETEDfor lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales
*
, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 7-21.
2
Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino (member), with the concurrence of Justices Ruben
T. Reyes (Division chairman) and Renato C. Dacudao (member); id., pp. 23-30.
3
Annex B of the Petition; rollo, p. 31.
4
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed an Amended Petition additionally impleading Loreta P.
Miguel, the minors mother, as one of the respondents.
5
CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 29.
6
The case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4, 2003, upon this Courts receipt
of respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Joaquin L. de los Santos. Petitioners
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel T. Molina, was received by this Court on July 8, 2003.
7
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 55.
8
Special Power of Attorney; CA rollo, p. 29.
9
See Memorandum for respondents, p. 2; rollo, p. 66.
10
CA rollo, pp. 111-113.
11
See CA Decision, p. 29; rollo, p. 107.
12
Executive Order No. 209 dated July 6, 1987, effective August 3, 1988.
13
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 464, 468, December 23, 1998.
14
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439, 448, March 19, 1985.
15
Article 269, New Civil Code.
16
See Article 269 in relation to Article 287, ibid. See also Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra.
17
Article 311, New Civil Code.
18
Garcia v. Pongan, 89 Phil. 797, August 31, 1951.
19
Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (15th ed., 2002), Vol. I, p. 645
(citing Castro v. CA, 173 SCRA 656, May 31, 1989).
20
Article 165, Family Code.
21
See Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561, March 25, 1992.
22
See Article 177, Family Code.
23
250 SCRA 82, 86, November 16, 1995.
24
See Article 185, Family Code.
25
Mossesgeld v. CA, supra.
26
David v. Court of Appeals, note 23.
27
Article 220, Family Code.
28
See Ibanez de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228, 238, March 23, 1915.
29
Articles 210, Family Code. The law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphanage; Sagala-Eslao v.
Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 286, 293, January 16, 1997.
30
Perez v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 661, 668, March 29, 1996; Lacson v. San Jose-
Lacson et al., 133 Phil. 884, 895, August 30, 1968.
31
Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969.
32
Espiritu v. CA, 312 Phil. 431, March 15, 1995; Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575,
January 27, 1989; Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980.
33
Child welfare as an overriding consideration in custodial award has been shown in several
cases decided by the Supreme Court: Espiritu v. CA, supra; Cervantes v. Fajardo, supra;
Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 7, June 18, 1985; Unson III v. Navarro,
supra; Medina v. Makabali supra; Lozano v. Martinez et al., 36 Phil. 976, October 10, 1917.
34
275 SCRA 604, 609, July 17, 1997; see also Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, 371 SCRA 642, 653,
December 7, 2001.
35
Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution.








FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997]
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and
welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither
may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection
for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course,
any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried
local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two
children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting
career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales
who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales
to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The
petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling
and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing respondent to
allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or
Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the written consent
of the mother or respondent herein. No pronouncement as to costs."
[1]

Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed
an appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds
emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of the parents (Art. 8,
PD 603). Under the predicament and/or status of both petitioner-appellee and
respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome morally and emotionally for the
children if we put a stop to the rotation of custody of said children. Allowing these
children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their father and the
latter's live-in partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of
children of tender age. There is no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how
temporary and/or remote, would affect the moral and emotional conditions of the
minor children. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having to live
with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not their mother may have a more
damaging effect upon them.
"Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
provides in part:
"`Art. 3. Rights of the Child. - x x x
`(1) x x x
`(2) x x x
`(3) x x x
`(4) x x x
`(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character.
`(6) x x x
`(7) x x x
`(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences,
hazards and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental,
emotional, social and moral development.
`x x x'
"With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of the minor
children, to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the
expense of hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his love for the children is genuine
and more divine than the love for himself, a little self-sacrifice and self-denial may
bring more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as father, may not
intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children may
witness and hear while in their father's house may not be in keeping with the
atmosphere of morality and rectitude where they should be brought up.
"The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The molding of
the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal
than two separate houses - (one house where one parent lives and another house where
the other parent with another woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the
Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed to use the surname of and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother.
"The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus important we be
careful in rearing the children especially so if they are illegitimates, as in this case.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered giving due
course to the appeal. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated
April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed. Petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights is
hereby denied.
"SO ORDERED."
[2]

Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case
merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has
adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have visitorial rights to his
children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the
children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The visitation right referred to
is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
[3]

There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on
the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family
Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and
children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among
other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice
and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms
of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth.
[4]
There is
nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address
themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as
well.
[5]
Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a
situation that presupposes a voidor inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not gi ven custody of their
children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare
is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor
General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by
petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the
children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as
true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears
expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and
degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is
but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral
persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a
legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined
the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages."
[6]

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-
meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would
have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to
call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case,
has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case
(can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the
judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.



[1]
Rollo, p. 29.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[3]
See Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, p. 1572.
[4]
Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution.
[5]
Arts. 176, 195 Family Code.
[6]
Rollo, p. 29.