Petitioner was incorporated to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. This Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of sutton, on October 19, 2005.
Petitioner was incorporated to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. This Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of sutton, on October 19, 2005.
Petitioner was incorporated to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. This Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of sutton, on October 19, 2005.
PRESIDENT, 217SCRA 644 FACTS: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of said business; and to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. ISSUE: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING ARE NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DAR'S CONTINUING VERIFICATION. RULING: Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first Decision that continuing review and verification may be conducted by the DAR pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet declared unconstitutional by this Court. The first CA Decision was promulgated on April 29, 2005, while this Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of Sutton, on October 19, 2005. Likewise, let it be emphasized that the Espinas group filed the Supplement and submitted the assailed MARO reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which proved to be adverse to petitioner's case. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect. In all these proceedings, all the parties' rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.
DAVID LU vs PATERNO LU YM, SR.,23 SCRA 643 FACTS:The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution filed on August 14, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC. By Decision of March 1, 2004, Branch 12 of the RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling the issuance of the shares of stock subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than par value, and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC. The appeal of the trial courts Decision remains pending with the appellate court. In G.R. No. 153690 wherein David, et al. assailed the appellate courts resolutions dismissing their complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate of non-forum shopping and consequently annulling the placing of the subject corporation under receivership pendente lite. In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate courts resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership order. In G.R. No. 170889 involved the denial by the appellate court of Lu Ym father and sons application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether the Courts have acquired jurisdiction over the case. RULING: As reflected early on, the Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position on the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.s failure to pay the correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and incidents subject of the present petitions must consequently be denied. The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) states that the Court en banc shall act on the specific matters and cases directed to them. At least three members of the Courts Second Division (to which the present cases were transferred, [7] they being assigned to a Member thereof) found, by Resolution of October 20, 2010, that the cases were appropriate for referral-transfer to the Court En Banc which subsequently accepted [8] the referral in view of the sufficiently important reason to resolve all doubts on the validity of the challenged resolutions as they appear to modify or reverse doctrines or principles of law.
PAQUITO ANDO, vs ANDRESITO CAMPO, ET AL., 513 SCRA 642 (Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) FACTS: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC which ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioner also raises anew his argument that he can choose between filing a third-party claim with the sheriff of the NLRC or filing a separate action.
He maintains that this special civil action is purely civil in nature since it involves the manner in which the writ of execution in a labor case will be implemented against the property of petitioner which is not a corporate property of PACSI. What he is seeking to be restrained, petitioner maintains, is not the Decision itself but the manner of its execution. Further, he claims that the property levied has been constituted as a family home within the contemplation of the Family Code. ISSUE: 1) Whether the regular courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. 2) Whether the complaint is a third- party claim. RULING: 1)The Supreme Court has long recognized that regular courts have no. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property levied upon. [24] It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim. 2) There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a third party in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition. Merceditas Gutierrez vs.House Of Representatives,198 SCRA 643 Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?) Ruling: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
ROQUE C. FACURA VS COURT OF APPEALS, 427 SCRA 643
FACTS: On October 18, 2002, Facura and Tuason filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint
before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao charging them with: 1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous employees of LWUA. Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers were fabricated and fraudulent as they were made to appear to have been signed/approved on the dates stated, and not on the date of their actual issuance. They further alleged that with malice and bad faith, De Jesus and Parungao willfully and feloniously conspired not to submit the fraudulent appointment papers to the CSC, and to submit instead the valid set of appointment papers bearing the December 12, 2001 issuance date.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsmans decision in administrative cases carries with it the suspension of the imposed penalty;
RULING: The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, [33] where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the government service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA. When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, and considering her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for one month and one day as justified.