RICHARD M.

ZANER
The Problem of Embodiment
SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY

MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE liAGUE / Ig64
)
Copyright z964 by Marti.nus Nijholf, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in a?iy form
PRINTED IN 'I'HE NETHERLANDS
To My Wife, ] unanne,
for lier patient a1id e1ttiuring love
603054
PREFACE
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomeno-
logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl
stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with
which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how
it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the
world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it
can become mundanized,
We see straightaway that it can do that only by m e ~ f a certain
participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is
manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the
experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become
really human and animal (tierischen) , and only thereby does it achieve
a place in the space and in the time of Nature.1
Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied
within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material
Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of
material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly
an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness,
thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now"
(ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its
intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it.
Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse-
quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal
body which is for it its own animate organism. Conversely, that
corporeal body becomes a genuinely animate organism (Leib), as
opposed to a mere physical body (Karper), only by means of
I Husserl, I dun .ru einer erinen Phdnomenotogie und phtinomenotogischen PAilosopkie
ErstesBuch, Max Niemeyer (Halle a. d. S., 19:r3), p. 103.
2
We use the preposition "by" advisedly, especially to avoid the spatial conno
tations of the more usual "in". Spatial determinations arise after, not before, em-
bodiment.
VIII
PREFACE
consciousness' intentiveness to it as its own animate organism -
that is to say, as its own embodiment, or mundanization.
The significance of the animate organism, of the intended
embodiment of consciousness in a world, for the crucial range of
problems relative to the constitution of Objective reality (the
alter ego, physical things, cultural objects, society, and so on) is
thus apparent. As Merleau-Ponty has put it, "le corps propre"
is the first stage of this constitution.
While Husserl was thus quite cognizant of the central place of
the animate organism, he did not himself devote much space in
his published writings to the analysis of it; and, what has subse-
quently appeared of his unpublished manuscripts contains little
more than highly suggestive clues toward the development of
such an analysis. On the other hand, MM Gabriel Marcel, J ean-
Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have each developed
important theories of the animate organism, each of which
purports to be a strictly descriptive explication of this phenome-
non. They each, therefore, deserve careful attention. Whether
or not, on the other hand, any or all of these theories may be
called "phenomenological," in theHusserlian sense, is a question
lying outside our immediate concerns, though we shall not be
able to ignore it completely.
Irrespective of how that may be ultimately decided, each of
these theories is highly interesting in itself for the development
of a systematic phenomenology of the animate organism. This
being so, it has seemed advantageous to us to undertake a critical
examination of each of them: first, to determine the major points
of each; second, t o examine each critically; finally, to determine
the extent to which each contributes to the phenomenology of
the animate organism.
This, t hen, is the proposal of this present study. By means of
it, we hope eventually to be able to establish at least the essential
structures of the animate organism, of the order of the consti-
tution of the animate organism, and thus to pave the way for a
systematic phenomenological analysis.
A brief note of explanation regarding the considerable refer-
ences to the works of the philosophers discussed herein in is
order. In all but a few instances, I have felt it best to render these
PREFACE IX
passages into English myself. Regarding Marcel's works, I have
utilized the generally excellent translations of his Metaphysical
Journal (the translation by Bernard Wall approved by M.
Marcel), and those of Homo Viator (by Emma Craufurd} and
Man Against H1tmanity (by Donald Mackinnon). In all other
instances I am responsible for the translations.
Regarding Sartr e, while I have referred constantly to the
translation of L'Etre et le Neant by Hazel Barnes, all the trans-
lations from that work are my responsibility. Regrettably,
neither of Merleau-Pont y's major works have appeared in English
translation.
1
Thus, all r eferences to these, as well as my references
to M. A. de Waelhens' study of Merleau-Ponty, are my own.
Similarly, regarding the references to Bergson, while there are
good translations available, I have referred constantly to the
French editions of bis works and am responsible for the trans-
lations into English.
Finally, concerning the works of Edmond Husserl to which I
have made reference, the truly outstanding and remarkably
sensitive translations of Professor Dorion Cairns - evidenced in
his translation of Husserl's Cartesia,nische Meditationen, and
his as yet unpublished G-uide to Tran.slating Husserl, which Dr.
Cairns kindly made available to me in a partially complete
form - have been of immeasurable help to me. Nevertheless,
with the exception of the references t o the Cartesian Meditations,
I am entirely responsible for the translations of Husserl into
English.
In view of this, that I have taken on myself the task of trans-
lating the majority of references, and in view of the fact that all
but the very best of translations are inferior to the original, I
have felt it only proper to include the original texts in a special
appendix. All the major passages, therefore, are marked in the
t ext with an asterisk (*) ; these passages will be found in the
Appendix, with the proper textual references (both to the original
work and to this study).
A final word of acknowledgment is, in my judgment, necessary.
1
Subsequent to the writing of this essay, MerleauPoo.ty's Phbwmenologie de la
Perception has appeared in English translation, published by Rutledge and Keegan
Paul {1962), translated by Colin Smith.
x PREFACE
Certainly the indebtedness I owe to others, and particularly to
my teachers, can never be fully expressed. The obligation to do
so, however, far surpasses the difficulty of the task. Without
attempting to determine rank or degree, therefore, I must in
humility and honesty express my profound appreciation and
gratitude to those without whom this study would not have been
possible.
My gratitude and appreciation is expressed to my teachers:
Professors Maurice Natanson, Alfred Schutz, Dorion Cairns,
Aron Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas and Werner Marx - each of whose
influence has been considerable, and whose teachings, I hope,
have to some degree been assimilated in a philosophical manner,
but who can in no way be held responsible for the content of this
study.
I should like to take this opportunity as well to express my
deep appreciation to Mr. Frederick I. Kersten, whose friendship
and discussions have been steady and strong, and whose en-
couragement has proved vital.
My gratitude must also be extended to the Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science, of the New School for Social
Research, to whom this study in another form was first sub-
mitted as my doctoral dissertation, for awarding this dissertation
the Alfred Schutz Memorial Award, and for malting available to
so many students a climate of genuine scholarship and a faculty
of truly remarkable dimensions.
Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to the Research Committee
of Lamar State College of Technology for awarding me the
research grant without which I could not have completed this
work. I must also thank Miss Nancy Darsey, who has exluoited
considerable patience and endurance in typing the final draft of
the study, and whose knowledge of grammar and syntax has
proved to have been of great help.
I can only hope that the study, for all its shortcomings, will
in some part merit the profound trust and faith of all those who
have helped me to bring it about.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface . ................... .
PART I: MARCEL'S THEORY OF THE BODY AS MYSTERY.
Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
{l) Survey of Marcel's Philosophy. . . . . . . . .
(2) The Genesis of the Problem in Marcel's Thought. .
(3) Methodological Considerations: The Problem of
System ............... .... .
Chapter II: The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery
(1) My Body Qua Mine ............. .
(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Having . . . .
{b) The "Within-Without" Relation . . . . .
(c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other" .
(2) The Meaning of Sentir . . . . . . .
(3) My Body as . ....
(4) My Body as the Repere of Existence .
Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . . . . .
(1) The Relation Between "Feeling" and "Acting"
(2) The Meaning of Bodily Acting. . . . . . . .
(3) The Meaning of the "Urgefuhl" . . .
PART II: SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE BODY.
Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . .
{l) Sartre's Ontology . . . . . . . . .
(2) The Theory of the Other . . . . . .
vn
3
3
12
14
21
22
25
'Z7
28
35
38
42
44
46
49
53
57
59
60
69
Chapter II : The Ontological Dimensions of the Body 81
(!) The Body as Being-For-Itself: Facticity . . . 83
xn
CONTENTS
(2) The Body-For-Others . . . . . . . . . . . 98
(3) The Third Ontological Dimension of the Body. 102
Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . . . 106
(1) The Apprehension of the Body-For-Itself. 107
(2) The Body as a Center of Reference . . . 116
(3) The Problem of " Ontological Dimensions" 119
(4) The Problem of the Other's Body-For-Me, and :My
Body-For-The-Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
PART III: MERLEAU-PONTY'S THEORY OF THE BODY-PROPER 127
Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . 129
(1) The Problem of "Form" . . . . . 130
(2) Merleau-Ponty's " Phenomenology" 135
(3) Merleau-Ponty's "Existentialism" . 146
Chapter II: The Theory of the Body . . 149
( 1) The Body-Proper as an Instrument of "Knowledge" J 52
(a) The Body-Proper as "Sense-Giving" 154
(b) The "Corporeal Scheme" . . . . 164
(c) The "Intentional Arc" . . . . . . 172
(2) The Body-Proper as Etre-Au-Monde . . 180
(a) The Body as "Belonging-to" the World. 182
(b) The Body as "Being-to" the World 185
(c) The Body as "Temporai,ite-engagee" 189
(3) The Body-Proper as "Expression" 192
(a) The Body as Sexual Being 192
(b) The Body as "Expression" 196
Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . 198
(I) Methodological Problems . . . 199
(2) The Theory of the Body as "Knowledge". 204
(a) First Thesis: The Body is a Latent Knowledge. 205
(b) Second Thesis: The Body is "tout etabli" . 208
(c) Third Thesis: The Body as an Ambiguity. . 218
(d) Fourth Thesis: Temporality . . . . . . . . 224
(3) The Meaning of Merleau-Ponty's Existentialism . 233
Epilogue . 239
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Index 290
PART I
MARCEL'S THEORY OF THE BODY AS
MYSTERY
I
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In several respects, the problem of the body (or, as we shall have
to say later, the metaproblem of the body) is the matrix of Gabriel
Marcel's philosophical work. In order to see this properly, it
will be necessary to describe the general feautures of his work as
a whole.
(1) SURVEY OF MARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY
In the course of a discussion of the body (in his early "meta-
physical journal"), Marcel wrote, "I think that now I see the
meaning and bearing of the foregoing inquiries. We are concerned
essentially with determining the metaphysical conditions of
personal existence." 1 Again, in a later work he returned to this
statement, noting that his concern with the "fundamental
experiences inscribed in our condition," has taken the form of
a "philosophical anthropology."2
By the time of his Gifford Lectures {I949-50), published in
two volumes as Le M ystere de l' Etre, s certainly his most mature
work, 4 he had come to realize that the reference of all his work
to man is fundamental; and he went on to affirm, "it is necessary
to add that it is a reference not at all abstractly thought, but _to
the contrary intimately lived .... " (ME, I, 54} This theme, as
will be seen, is the unifying thread of his work.
In spite of the fact that he sees this theme as central to his
1 Metaphyskal Journal, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1952), p. 255, translation by Ber-
nard Wall authorized and approved n.od with a "Preface to the English Edition," by
?.L Marcel. (Hereafter cited in the text as M].)
a Du Refus a l'InvccaJion, Gallimard (Paris, 19-40), p. 122. (Hereafter cited in the
text as RI).
3
u Mystere de l'Etr.e: Vol. I, Reflexion et Vol. II, Foi et Reallte, Aubier
(Paris, 1951). (Hereafter cited in the text as, respectively, ME, I, and M.E,ll.)
Cf. D. E. Roberts, E:i:isumialism and Religious Belu/, Galaxie Books, Oxford U.
Press (New York, 1959), p. :i78.
4
MARCEL
concern, however, it was only in the Gifford Lectures that he
clearly recognized it as such. And, at the same time, he recognized
that the fundamental question of a "metaphysics of the human
condition" must be: "Who, or what, am I ?"
1
(ME, I , 141)
Earlier, reflecting on the general crisis of modem man - which
he interprets as essentially a Joss of the sense of being
2
- Marcel
took note of "un paradoxe essentiel." At the heart of the loss of
the sense of being, there is as well an "exigence ontologique"
(ME. I. 47-66; PA, 51-53), a deeply seated inner urgency to
know oneself, to be as'sured of oneself and of what (or who) one
is. Yet, when one inquires into .being, in order to comprehend
the nature of this loss, an abyss opens out beneath one:
Is there Being? What is Being? J3ut, I cannot bring my reflection to
bear on these problems without seeing a new abyss open out under my.
feet: I, who inquire into Being, can 1 be assured that I am? (PA, 54)
I , who ask this question, cannot place myself outside the problem
I formulate: "reflection shows me that this problem in some way
inevitably encroaches on this theoretically preserved proscenium.''
(PA, ibid.) In other words,. it is impossible to inquire into being,
into this exigence I sense as urgent. to me, without forthwith
bringing myself into the very sphere of the problem I seek to
formulate:
Who am I, I who question Being? In what way am I qualified to
proceed with these investigations? If I am not, how shall I hope to see
them to an end ? Even admitting that I am, how can I be assured that I
am? (PA, ibid.)
Thus the very task of a philosophical anthropology seems at
the outset to run aground: precisely what must be investigated
is inseparable from the one doing the investigating, and thus the
problem seems to destroy itself qua problem - a state of affairs
presented as in principle "outside" or "before" me in the sense
that it could be investigated by anyone, and thus presented as
admitting a solution which could be arrived at by anyone. (PA,
55) I, who ask, "Who am I?," am also the one asked about.
l In the same place, he refers to several passages in bis earlier writings which
foreshadow the crucial role of this question: Cf. Etre et Avofr, Aubier, Editions
Montaigne (Paris, 1935), pp. 72, 73, r58-59, .180-81, passim. (Cited textually as EA.);
RI, pp . .188- 89; etc. . . '
~ Marcel, Position et A f>f>roches concr.ltes du MysUre ontologique, Introduction by
Marcel de Corte, J. Vrin (Paris, 1949}, pp. 46-51. (Cited textually as PA.)
-
INTRODUCTION
s
Asking "Who am I ?," on the other hand, I straight away recog-
nize that this question (this quest for myself) is itself its own
assuredness, it is an affirmation of myself as at least existing-in-
qoest of myself. In order to utter it, I must be:
One could say in an inevitably approximate language that my inquiry
nto Being presupposes an affirmation with respect to which I would in
some manner be passive,l a11d of whi ch I would be the stage rather than the
subject.
But that is only a limit which I cannot realize without contradiction.
Therefore, I find myself taking the position of, or recognizing, a partici-
pation which possesses a subjective reality; this participation cannot, by
very definition, be an object of thought; it cannot function as a solution,
bu.t appears outside the world of problems: it is metaproblematical. (PA,
56--57)
The human condition, then, is fundamentally an exigence
which is concretely manifested as a quest: Man is that being who,
in his being, is in quest of his being, of who he is. However much
this quest may be masked or hidden in its essential meaning, 2
and in whatever ways, this metaphysical disquiet is essential to
man as such. s But just in so far as this exigence 4 is a quest for
one's own essential identity, it resolves into a fundamental
mystery, or synonymously, a metaprobletn. This term, certainly
the most technical and rigorous one Marcel uses, should not be
understood in any theological s ~ s whatever; he himself has
often emphasized this. (Cf. PA, 88-<)1) In a strictly philosophical
sense, a mystery is "a problem which encroaches on its data,
which invades them and thereby surpasses itself as a simple
~ Cf. W. E. Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics," Philcsophy
and Phenomenological Research (hereafter referred to as PPR). Vol. xiv, No. 4 (June
1954), pp. 43!r"69 Hocking points out that "passive" does not mean "inert": "Here
at the core of individual awareness, Being is no concept, no category, no vocable
'eon tent'; neither is it an ineffable, pervasive dull thud or datum-pressure: say that it
is unsayable, and you must add that it is nevertheless passion-filled presence. Allow
that Descartes' "I am" is a statement true when uttered; it does not follow that it is
all that can -be said .. There is something equally true in the New England colloqui-
alism, "I be," which. suggests what Gilson calls "the aa of being." lt is tr:u.e that my
being appears to me as something I discover, i;:oing on there without having- consulted
my wishes, - something done to me. . . What happens is - if I correctly catch an
instantaneous deed-of-response - an act by me of consent and corroboration, as if
what is done to me I also do for myself- two deeds merging in one active fact, "l be."
(p. 443)
2 Cf. below, pp. 16-18.
3
Cf. Homo Viator, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1951), p. r38, translated by Emma
Craufurd. (Cited textually as HV.); and ME, I, p. 14; and MJ, p. 290.
4
Hocking, op. cit., p. 444, notes that this crucial notion is Marcel's own native air,
his own original insight, derived from nobody else, and that it is just this same exi-
gence which inspired his own intensive study of it.
6 MARCEL
problem." (PA, 57) Moresimply, a mystery is a problem which
cannot in principle exclude me, the one for whom it is a problem,
from consideration; and if I am taken as unessential to it, the
entire situation is altered. Thus, asking the fundamental question
of a philosophical anthropology, I, the one who asks it, am drawn
into the sphere of my own question: I become, that is to say, the
stage, and not the subject (over against an object), of the quest.
Now, Marcel insists, it is not the case that this doubling back
of the question renders the inquiry into myself impossible; nor
is it a kind of metaphysical treasurehunt; nor, he contends, does
it make any sense to give up the quest, and seek instead to
investigate myself as if I were an object, like a table, or a complex
machine. For him, an object is in principle what is indifferent to
me, the one for whom the object would be object:
An object as such is defined as being independent of the characteristics
that make me be this particular person and not another person. Thus it is
essential to the very nature of the object not to take "me" into account; if I
think it as having regard to me, in that measure I cease to treat it as an
object. (MJ, 261)
But I myself, inquiring into myself, cannot realize this sort of
distance. I cannot be n'importe qu,i in relation to myself, or if I
am so considered, I then cease to treat myself as myself. Being
an object and being myself (or, for something to be an object,
and for it to be treated as having regard to me) are mutually
exclusive alternatives.
To put the matter differently, the kind of reflection which
takes me or things as objects, Marcel calls "pmsee pensee," or
"first reflection"; that which apprehends me as me-myself, or
things as essentially having regard for me, he calls "pensee
pensante," or "second reflection." (Cf. RI, 2r; ME, I , 97-g8)
Briefly, for him, the former dissolves the lived unity of experience,
this separation occurring in a double manner. First, by treating
whatever presents itself to me as an object (synonymously, as
problem), it necessarily sets up to begin with a separation
between a "here" which is "subject," and a "there" which is
"object" (i.e., Aiming at "pure objectivity,"
secondly, it excludes what is " here" ("subject") from the "there"
1
As we shall see later on, just this separation is most unacceptable for Marcel; his
most penetrating questions bear on what meaning can be assigned to "outside." Cf.
below, pp. 12-4, and pp. 38-42.
INTRODUCTION
7
("objects") deeming it a taint on objectivity to haveanything"me-
rely subjective" enter into the "problem." First reflection is thus at
once an act of alienation and of desertion, seeking an ideal non-
involvement by the spectator in the spectacle. (EA, 25-26; ME,
I , I38-40) The paradigm for this "problematizing reflection,"
Marcel believes, is natural-scientific inquiry - by no means a
pejorative evaluation. Even of one were to point out that the
scientist is indeed quite committed to and caught up in his
investigations, this would still not affect Marcel's argument.
For the kind of commitment here is essentially bound up with
the ideal anonymity of scientific research: the scientist, qua
scientist, forgets himself for the sake of the undertaking, and may
indeed be quite involved in his non-involvement. But, Marcel
points out, he does not bring himself into the sphere of the
problem-at-hand (unless he establishes a Heisenberg principle of
indeterminacy) . (ME, I, II- 14)
Now, Marcel has no quarrel with this type of reflection per se;
it is only when one attempts to be analogously "scientific"
about the self, subjectivity, or consciousness, that he raises his
objection: just in so far as one takes it as "object" or "problem"
one will have missed precisely what one set out to discover. For, the
self cannot be an "object " and still be considered as "self": to
be a self is to be myself; and for me, my self cannot be an object.
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to reapproach the entire
domain of subjectivity, in order to be able to apprehend it from
within, that is, by recovering the unity shattered by first re-
flection.
"Second reflection," thus, is essentially a "recueillement,"
(PA, 63-64; ME, I, 98) a recapture of myself as the unity I am
concretely.
1
Here, every distinction between "subject" and
"object," "within" and "without," and the like, disappears;
there can be no detachment, so characteristic of the type, homo
spectans (first reflection) . To the contrary, Marcel emphasizes,
second reflection (recueillement) is a mode of participation (of
the type, homo particeps). (ME, I, 138-40; EA, 25-26)
The "metaphysics of personal existence," or "philosophical
1
lt is not so much a question of a BergsOniaJl intuition as oI a concentration and
"inner reflection'': Man Against Humanity, Harvill Press {London, 1952), p. 68.
{Hereafter cited textually as MAH.)
8 MARCEL
anthropology," therefore, is a "reflection fixed on a mystery."
(EA, 146) This "mystery" is most fundamentally me myself;
when, accordingly, I undertake to inquire into it, I find myself
confronted with a metaproblem. The first, and in the end, "the
only metaphysical problem is that of 'What am I?', for all
others lead back to this one." (HV, I38) However, at just the
point that one clearly recognizes this as a mystery, he runs up
against a peculiar opacity. For, although "the question, 'Who
am I?', seems to require a conceptualizable response," (EA, 158)
it seems that, as Camus put it, "Between the certainty I have
of my existence and the content I try to give to that assurance,
the gap will never be filled. Forever, I shall be a stranger to my-
self." 1 Who, indeed, am I?
In a genuine sell:se, Marcel insists, this question, no longer
being posed as a problem with a particular solution, becomes a
quest for assuredness about myself, a sort of appeal: I seem to know
that I am, but what is this "thatness ?" The quest for the human
condition becomes directed, thus, toward an "indu,bitable ex-
istentiel," a sort of "existential landmark capable of being
designated .. . . " (ME, I, Io3; also RI, 25-26)
One might think here of Descartes' quest for certainty, a quest
for an indubitable foundation for all knowledge. But, for Marcel,
as Pietro Prini points out correctly in his excellent study,2 the
Cartesian quest is completely beside the point. "Nothing,"
Marcel remarked in his early Journal, "is less instructive than
the Cartesian 'l am'." (MJ, I82) It was not clear to him until
later, however, why it is so uninstructive. Essentially, Prini
observes, Marcel's criticism consists in bringing out the intrinsic
confusion in the Cartesian reduction to the cogito:
In the Cartesian analysis of the "cogito," the obscure and global
certainty of itself which consciousness maintains while in the process of
doubting and the indubitable evidence of a pure abstraction (that is to
say, of the subject deprived of all individual determination and all
adherence to the world) have been confused with each other.3
1
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Vintage Books (New
York, 1959), pp. i:4- 15.
a Pietro Prini, Gabriel Marcel a la Methodologie de l'Inverifiable, de Brou-
wer (Paris, 1953).
3
Ibid., p. 31.
INTRODUCTION
9
The "sum" of Descartes' "cogito, ergo sum," is not itself made
thematic by Descartes; when one does so, the sum is seen to be
a pure abstract, and not at all the "I am" which manifests itself
as in quest of itself (exigence).
The reality that the cogito reveals ... is of quite a different order from
the existence that we are trying not so much to establish as to identify in
the sense oi taking note of its absolute metaphysical priority. The cogito
introduces us into a whole system of affirmations and guarantees their
validity. It guards the threshold of the valid . ... 1
Accordingly, since the "Who am I?" is not a question of
objective validity, but rather one bearing on the sense of the "I
exist," Descartes' cogito is highly uninstructive. In fact, just
because it "guards the threshold of the valid," it never gets
beyond the level of first reflection; and the "I exist" does not
even appear at that level. As Unarnuno had emphasized, we
are interested in "the concrete and personal 'I'," the "man of
flesh and bone," the "I exist" in its indecomposable unity.2
(Cf. ME, I, I05)
Ignoring here Marcel's critical discussion of certain types of
skepticism which arise at this point, 3 we can pass directly to
Marcel's own disengagement of the "existential indubitable":
To think, or more exactly, to affirm the metaproblematic is to affirm it
as indubitably real, as something I cannot doubt without contradiction.
We are bere in a zone where it is no longer possible to dissociate the idea
itself and the certainty, or the index of certainty which affects it. For,
this idea is certainty, it is assurance of itself; it is in this degree something
other than, and more than, an idea. (PA, 62)
Thus, Marcel is able to say even of a skepticism as passionate and
sensitive as that of Camus, that it is in the end "extremely
simpleminded," and that Camus "has never reached the stage
of ... second reflection." (MAH, 87) Camus' skepticism, depending
upon the radical distinction between the certitude of the "I
exist" and a "content" I would somehow have to give to it, falls
to the ground, just because that distinction is inadmissable: my
affirmation is assurance of itself.
This "I exist," then, is essentially metaproblematical, and
1
"Existence and Objectivity," appended essay to the Metaphysical Journal, p.
325, and written by hlm in 1925. (Hereafter cited textually as M], E-0).
1
Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic of Life, Dove.r Books, (New York, 1954), p. 8.
3 Cf. for th.is discussion, ME, I, pp. 103-05; RI, pp. 25-26; and MJ, E-0, pp. 320-
25.
IO MARCEL
forms the assurance which was sought: it is myself who exists,
and thus I am the assurance of myself, I am this emphasis which
I give to myself in my affirmation, "I exist." (HV, I5) Perhaps
the best way to express this affirmation-assurance, he writes, is
not as an
I think, not even I live, but I experience (i'eprouve), and here it is neces-
sary to take this word in its maximal indetermination. The German
language is here a great deal more adequate than the French: ich erlebe . ..
to the point where the Ich erlebe is indistinguishable from the Es erlebl in
mir . ... (RI, 26)
But what is the "more" which, Marcel states, this certitude
yields?
We should think here, lie advises, of the situation in which a
child, picking a flower, races up to his mother and exclaims,
"Look, I, I myself and no one else, picked these for you!" (HV,
r3-r4) Or, as in Ray Bradbury's enchanting Dandelion Wine,
the same exuberant sense or awareness of this "I, I myself!," is
pronounced with fresh wonder by Doug, the young ten-year-old
boy: "I'm alive ... I'm really alive! he thought. I never knew it
before, or if I did I don't remember!"
This "hearth-fire" or "passion-filled presence," as Hocking
calls it,1 is precisely what must be focused on. To say, "I exist,"
Marcel insists, is not to pronounce the result of a process of
inference, nor to produce a judgment about some quality I
possess: " In every case I produce myself, in the etymological
sense of the word, that is to say, I put myself forward." (HV, 15)
This emphasis which one gives to himself, this exuberance over
oneself, Marcel later calls "an exclamatory consciousness of
self ... the exclamatory consciousness of existing." 2 (ME, I, 106)
"Existence," in this exclamatory sense, "is not separable from
a certain astonishment," 88) from a certain sacredness and
wonder. (MAH, 46-56, 67-?o; PA, SI) Accordingly, the philoso-
pher seeking to unravel the exigency intrinsic to the human
condition must maintain himself in "wonder" in order to keep
faith with his own task. He must, that is to say, maintain a kind
of fundamental shock, or, in Marcel's own happy phrase, he
i Rocking, op. cit., p. 444.
That this awareness can be lost, obscured, masked, and so on, is certainly true,
but not relevant to the point here. Indeed, Marcel will say that this possibility is
ti al to this consciousness of sel!.
INTRODUCTION II
must acquire and keep "la morsure du reel." (RI, 89) It thus
becomes evident that, in his terms, only "second reflection" is
capable of fulfilling the task of explicating the human condition,
for only it can recover the unity of the "I exist." To take it as an
"object" would be to destroy its unity. Indeed, Marcel believes, to
explicate themeaning of this exclamatory awareness of self fully,
one should say, not ,,j'existe," but "jesi,is manifeste" (ME,l, Io6):
When I say: " I exist," I incontestably aim at something more. Obscure-
ly, I aim at this fact that I am not only /or myself, but that I manifest
it would be necessary to say that I am manifest. The prefix "ex,"
in "exist," in so far as it traces a movement toward the exterior, as it
were a centrifugal tendency, is here of the greatest importance. [exist:
this means that I have the wherewithal to make myself known or recog-
nized, either by another or by myself in so far as I affect for myself a
"borrowed otherness" (une alMrite d'emprunt) .... (RI, 27)
And, he continues, at just this point in the inquiry one recognizes
the source and manifestation of the opacity one set out to ex-
plore: "all of that is not separable from the fact that 'there is
my body'." (RI, 27; ME, I, 106) The inquiry into the human
condition, the conditions for personal existence, and the question-
ing into myself, lead directly to the donne-Pivot of the quest, the
central datum for metaphysics: the mystery of embodiment,
my etre-incarnee. To exist is to manifest oneself as a consciousness
of oneself as embodied, and in this sense to rise up or emerge
outward by means of an altbite d' emprmit.
On the other hand, another theme becomes connected with this
central one. To exist, we noted, is to rise up, to manifest oneself.
But it's clear that if I can in some way tum myself outward in order to
make myself more distinct for others, I can also turn myself toward my
inwardness; and, just that happens from the moment I draw within myself
(je me recueille) . (ME, II, 33)
As Ortega y Gasset points out, while the brute always lives in
estrangement, is "beside" itself, its life thus being "essential
alteraci6n," man, though certainly prey to this "unremitting
disquietude," is essentially different from the brute in that he
can "ensimismarse." 1 Man can, in Marcel's terms, "se reciteillir,"
withdraw into himself and apprehend himself as such .
.i and People (authorized translation from the Spa.nish by Willard Trask),
W. W. Norton (New York, 1957), pp. 15- :zo. This term, the translator notes, means,
literally, "withinoneseli-ness," while "alteraci6n" means "otheration." The former
seems parallel to Marcel's "recueillement," thel atter to his " alterite d'emprunt."
---
12 MARCEL
Marcel is proposing that what we do only from time to time in
this manner, should be adopted rigorously as the method of
inquiry into the self. Pensee pensante is precisely this recueille-
nient, or ensimismamiento; it is the manner in which one appre-
hends himself as incarnate, and thus it discloses to reflection the
fundamental datum of all metaphysics: my body qi1;a mine.
As Marcel de Corte points out, what is essential here is that,
"Pensee pensante is an embodied thought, caught up in a body
and, by means of this body, in Being." 1 And, Marcel contends,
there is no "intelligible retreat in which I could establish myself
outside of or apart from my body." (RI, 31) I, who think on
myself, am myself embodied by my own body, whose essential
sense for me is that it is mine alone. The problem, then, becomes
determining the sense of the "mine," the meaning of "having"
in this case.
Thus, the essential mystery which second reflection discovers
is the axis of all metaphysics, as of all human life: my body qi1;a
mine.
(z) THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM IN MARCEL'S THOUGHT
Historically, Marcel was perhaps the first to discover the
phenomenon of "my body qua mine" as a central datum, to be
investigated for its own sake and in its own terms, in terms of
one's own experience of his body.
In the earliest pages of the Metaphysical journal (on January
16, 1914), Marcel began a series of meditations which led directly
to his first insight into the problem, or metaproblem, of the body.
The specific problem he raised therein concerned the existence
of objects as "outside," "external" to, the mind: what is meant,
he asked, by this "outside?" (MJ, I3) His proposed solution to
this question immediately brought out the metaproblematical
status of the body. To say that an object exists "outside" is to
say, first, that the object is "constructed" as object: "that is to
say," as be stated then, "-and by definition - as independent of
the perceiving subject." (MJ, 14) Nevertheless, the construction
is neither posterior to experience (empiricism) nor anterior
(idealism), but rather "identical and coextensive with it." (MJ,
ibid.) Hence, in the second place, though constructed as "inde-
1 PA, "Introductiollpar Marcel de Corte," p. xs.
INTRODUCTION 13
pendent," "To think a thing as existing is to think oneself as the
perceiver, it is to extend one's experience in such a way that it
comprehends even that which it appeared to leave outside itself."
(MJ, ibid.) Thus, the existence of "outside" objects presupposes
"a relation ... to my thought," and not merely to a thought.
(MJ, ibid.)
Whatever one may think of these journal notes themselves,
what they prompted in Marcel's own thought is highly important.
We cannot attempt to reconstruct what must have occurred to
him in the course of these mediations. It is possible to see,
nevertheless, the question which was crucial to him at the time:
What does "outside" mean ? And, the first suggested solution
above prompted him, it is possible to see, to recognize (in a
quite phenomenological manner), 1
that we can only speak of existence with regard to objects given in an
immediate relation to a consciousness (which is at least posited as possible) .
As we can conceive a multiplicity of ways in which one and the same
object ... might be given to consciousness in an immediate fashion, we
must conceive an infinite series of planes of existence relating to the
possible modes of apprehension. (MJ, 17)
SinGe, Marcel believed, the existence of objects of any kind is
connected essentially to the consciousness of them, the question
immediately arises: In what sense does consciousness itself exist?
And, he wrote, consciousness can be thought as existing only
in the measure in which it is given in an immediate relation either to
itself or to another. And, as soon as we state the problem in this way, we
are on tlie road to a solution. For it is clear that the datum common t-0 my
conscioustiess and to other possible 'consciousnesses is my body. (MJ, 18,
my underlines)
This point, however, raises an even more fundamental
question: What is the relation between my consciousness and
my body? And here, he immediately saw, we are faced with at
least "two absolutely distinct modes of existence" as regards
my body itself. On the one hand, my body is given to me as a
datum in space by means of my sensuous perception of it; ori
the other hand, it is given internally through certain coenesthetic
data:
i Marcel's relation to phenomenology has beell exceilently traced by H. Spiegel-
berg, Tise Phenomenologieal Movamenl: A Hislorical lntrodudion, Volume Two
Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1960), pp. 421-443.
MARCEL
One is by definition objective, that is to say it applies to any con-
sciousness endowed with conditions of perception analogous to ours; the
other is by definition purely individual, Le., bound up with my conscious-
ness. (MJ, 19)
This distinction, as we shall see, later became a principle
feature of Marcel's study of "my body qua mine": it is a dis-
tinction, later, between the body as an object, a physico-chemical
system defineable by means of natural laws; and the body as
mine, as I experience it qua mine.
It is with his recognition of the body qua mine as the ''central
problem," upon which every other problem depends, (MJ, r26)
however, that Marcel is able to go beyond the traditional series
of dualisms stemming from Descartes. In short, the metaproblem
of etre-incarni becomes seen as the central problem for philoso-
phy and the central phenomenon of the human condition, and
on its explication will depend that of the so-called "mind-body"
problem. (MJ, rzs)
(3) METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
THE PROBLEM Or' SYSTEM
A brief word should be added regarding Marcel's method-
ology.
Marcel's journals, especially the early one (r914- 1923), had
originally been intended as the preparation for a systematic
treatise in metaphysics. In some of the passages quoted above,
indeed, it is easy to see this early design. Within a few years,
however, he came to the somewhat melancholy conclusion that
he would never be able to complete this treatise. (Cf. MJ, vii-ix)
For, as soon became apparent to him, the phenomena he was
attempting to focus upon and explicate simply do not admit of
a "systematic" exposition. Since, however, by "system" he means
either the Hegelian, or the Spinozistic, kind, it seems rather
obvious that Marcel is justified in his rejection. As Kierkegaard
had maintained against Hegel, "An existential system cannot
be formulated ... Reality itself is a system - for God; but it
cannot be a system for any existing spirit." l Or, as against the
Spinozistic type of system, Marcel maintains that the concretely
1 Kierkegaard's C011clvding Postscript, translated from the Danish by
David F. Swenson, Princeton U. Press (Princeton, 1944). p. 106.
INTRODUCTION 15
existing individual cannot be deduced from axioms established
s1tb specie aetemitatis.l
Nevertheless, as Hocking rightly sees, these are not the only
meanings of "system": there is also a "system-from-within,"
he points out,2 which, in the end, is nothing other than the
integral unity and order of that about which the thinker thinks.
And, one might almost say, Marcel's otherwise justified hesitancy
regarding "systematic exposition" tends to blind him to the
intrinsic and necessary order of his own work, which we have
outlined above.
It would take us too far afield to explicate this in detail, but
we must at least indicate it in order to bring out his methodology
and its intimate connection with the meta_problem of the body.
The unifying theme of his work, we have already stressed, is the
ontological exigence which is of the essence of man as such: it
is essential to man to seek himself, and thus to be in quest of his
own condition - and, Marcel's own philosophy is precisely an
expression of this inner urgency. Man is a being who exists in
disquietude; he is the exigence to seek resolution to this disquiet,
i.e., he is a quest. This inner demand or call upon the self by itself
is at once the motivating force and the guide of its own existence
as quest. But , as nothing is here pre-determined, the existence of
man is essentially to "be able to ... ," to "be open to ... ," and
thus it is essential that man be able to deny himself, to betray,
obscure, misunderstand, himself, and so on. That is, the essence
of "being free" is that at any moment, one can deny oneself as
free:
lt is of the essence of freedom that it can be exercised by betraying
itself. Nothing outside of us can close the door to despair. The way is open;
one can even say that the structure of the world is such that abso1ute
despair seems to be possible there. (EA, 138)
Thus, the quest for oneseJf, which is the manifestation of the
exigence, is free in so far as it is undertaken with the self-
conscious recognition that it can fail, be betrayed, and the like:
the quest is constituted as a "test" (epreuve) s and thus is always
i Cf. Hocking, op. cit., pp. 439-0.
i Ibid., pp. 46o-61. We would emphasize even more than Hocking that
philosophy manilesls a system, of a certain order.
s Cf. Pan! Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl jaspers, Editions du Temps Present
(Paris, 1947), pp. lII-14.
16 MARCEL
a concrete act which has a fundamental "stake" (enfeu) consti-
tuting it as significant, and thus as free. illtimately, this enfei'
is me myself; I am "at stake" in my actions, and my actions are
free in so far as I recognize this, which means in so far as I
recognize that I can betray myself, deny myself, and so on, in
my acts. (ME, I, u6-17; EA, 129-30) Since "it is essential to
the test to beablenot to recognize itself as such," (RI, 102) the
exigence can become masked to itself, it can fail to see itself as
such, distort its own nature, and so on. This masking takes place,
he believes, primarily by means of what he calls the categories
of the "tout naturet" and the "n'imporle qui." (Cf., e.g., PA, 50)
Taking myself as a "completely natural" creature, that is, as
on the same level as "any other" natural creature, as a con-
figuration of "functions" (vital, psychological, social, and the
like), I become in my own eyes " just like anyone else" - and thus
my exigence to seek myself as such loses its essential nature and
direction, or, as he expresses it, I lose the sense of my own being.
Instead of being directed inward, it leads away from me toward
"Das Man," the "just anyone," and my quest for the sense of
my own life becomes a sort of flight away from me, an inter-
minable "window-shopping" for its own sake. If I am but a
faisceau of functions (PA, 47) then I am like anybody else, and
can know myself in a wholly objectivistic manner; and precisely
thereby, I lose for myself the sense of my own subjectivity as a
being in quest of itself.
At this level of the human condition, the exigence discloses
itself as mere dissatisfacion, curiosity, and uneasiness. But, just
because the exigence is essential, it cannot be completely masked,
and thus man in the "natural" attitude is thrust into despair:
being fundamentally a quest, an urgency, for himself, yet
seeking himself within the "tout nature!" and the "n'importe
qui," he becomes a dissatisfaction in a continual dissatisfying
search for himself, thrust into a sort of carnival of "problems"
which "everyone" has, with "solutions" in principle applicable
to "everyone."
My world, the socio-cultural world into which I am born and
in which I live, conduct my affairs, and die, is itself rooted in the
categories of the "tout nature}" and the "n'importe qui," and
seems even to encourage my desorbitation of myself as "merely
INTRODUCTION
r7
functional"; it itself seems to discredit my genuine urgency to
find myself, by urging me to the belief that, after all, I am
"nothing other than" what "everybody else" is. And, thus, I am
diverted from my quest into a kind of unending search for
"solutions" to "problem," and my own essential mystery is
obscured from me. Modern man, Marcel believes, has lost the
sense of the mysterious; for him, "mysteries" are "old hat" of
a bygone age. Nothing, in such a global situation, seems sacred,
not even my own life:
The fact is that to the average man today, whose inner life tends too
often to be a rather dim affair in any case, technical progress seems the
infallible method by which he can achieve a sort of generalized comfort
... this generalized comfort ... seems the only possible way to make life
tolerable, when life is no longer considered as a divine gift, but rather as a
"dirty joke." The existence of a widely diffused pessimism, at the level
of the sneer and the oath rather than that of sighs and weeping, seems to
me a fundamental given fact about contemporary humanity '. . . a pessi-
mism not so much thought out as retched forth, a sort of physical nausea
at life .... (MAH, 42)
In the face of this wholesale despair, whose presence no more
depends upon self-awareness than a kidney disease upon
the patient's awareness of it,l admits of no refutation on its own
grounds:
In the end, an effective refutation must be impossible here: despair is
irrefutable. There is place here only for a radical option, beyond all
dialectics. (EA. 16o)
That is to say, only a sudden breakthrough, a fiat, can break the
hold of naturalizing modes of thought - that of first reflection.
For, within that sphere, there are no "reasons," no "grounds,"
nor any "persuading evidence" to the contrary. All I can do,
Marcel argues, is opt: being "fed up" with the half-solutions to
irresolvable "problems," having had "too much" of "everybody,"
I have open to me only a radical fiat, " I will not. .. I"
This opting, however, has equally radical consequences, for it
bringsinto play "an ascending dialectic" which "bears at once on
reality and on the being who apprehends it." (EA, 247) 2 That
is to say, the question, "Who am I?" changes its significance,
1
Cf. Kierkegaard, The U11lo Daa.Sk, Doubleday {New York, x943), pp.
154-161.
t Prini, op. cit., pp. 79-82.
I8 MARCEL
becoming now a sort of appeal, an asking which is essentially a
calling-for a response. And, Marcel continues,
Perhaps to the extent that I become conscious of this appeal qua appeal,
I am led to recognize tha.t this appeal is possible only because, within my
O\'ill depths, there is something more inward to me than me myself - and
at the same stroke, the appeal changes its sign. (EA, 181)
Thus, when I recognize my own quest as an appeal, it again
changes its significance, becoming now, Marcel later emphasized,
a response to the appeal, to those depths within me which are
"more inward to my self than me myself": my quest for myself
becomes a response to that very appeal, in the form, fundamental-
ly, of my vocation, my life. (ME, I, I87-zo5; HV, 256-60) My
being, that is to say, is now recognized by me as a " being-
beyond-myself'.: sum is sursum; etre is etre-en-route, or homo viator,
(HV, 8-n) and the exigence which I sense as my innermost
being becomes fully manifest to me as such, as the supreme
moment of this ascending dialectic.
In this way, only schematically indicated here, the "system"
intrinsic to Marcel's work stands out most clearly: it is the same
which is manifest in human life itself. The "philosophical order"
in a philosophy which has as its task the explication of the human
condition can only be the "order" of that condition itself. In
this sense, Marcel speaks of "a logic of freedom," which, he goes
on, is a term not without its difficulties,
But it has the advantage of throwing light on this essential truth, that
philosophical.progress consists in the series of successive steps by which a
freedom, which is seized at first as the simple ability of saying "yes" and
"no," is embodied, or, if one wants, is constituted as a real power by
conferring on itself a content at the heart of which it discovers and recog-
nizes itself. (RI, 40)
Similarly, as Prini points out, the concept of "second re-
flection" is precisely that of an "interpretation liberatrice," or,
of a "logic of freedom," l which, by concentrating on the human
condition in concreto, might well make it possible for man to
come to a recognition of his own essential exigence and mystery.
This type of quest Marcel calls "concrete approaches." (MJ,
viii) Methodologically, it is worked out by means of certain
"categOTies." That is, as Marcel understands this term, what is
1 Cf. Prini, op. ci,., pp. 78-?9.
INTRODUCTION r9
lived by man concretely provides the access to the interpretation
and comprehension of man's concrete condition. More particu-
larly, since the task of his philosophy is to explicate the structures
of concrete, daily existence,l an initial difficulty arises: if, as
Alfred Schutz has shown, 2 man in his everyday, natural attitude
does not make the style of his own existence as such thematic,
then it is necessary to step back from this commitment in order
to make it appear, and thus to explicate it. But, having done
this, one is faced with the serious problem of descriptively
explicating that style of being in its own terms. How is such a
task accomplished?
For Marcel (and for Natanson as well, who has given an
excellent and lucid statement of this whole problem in the work
just cited 3) what is lived in concreto becomes at the level of
philosophical scrutiny a category, an instrument, by means of
which the former can be understood. By descriptively explicating
lived experience as it is in itself, as it is lived (death, joy, hope;
the body; and so on), the philosopher can comprehend the human
condition. Natanson goes on: "The category is made possible
by the experience and then the category makes possible the
interpretation of the experience." 4 Or, as Marcel puts it, speaking
of the categories of lived experience, his procedure consists
"invariably. . . in moving from life up toward thought and
subsequently descending back from thought toward life, in
order to attempt to clarify the latter."* (ME. I, 49)
Thus, such experiences as that of "my body," being "in
situation," being "with others," as well as the fundamental
exigence over oneself, become for Marcel categories by means of
which the human condition in its on-going course and style can
be explicated. That such a task is extraordinarily difficult is
certainly true, but that it is meaningless or impossible is not at
i Cf. Maurice Natanson, "Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature,"
Carolina Quarterly (1959), p. 20: he points out that one m.ust reflectively grasp and
explicate his own style of belngin-reality, his concrete "style of being in the world at
the level of ordinary, commonsense life, so that lhe philosophical characte:c of that
level of experience can be clarified."
2
Cf. Schutz, "Multiple Realities," PPR, Vol. v. No. 4 (June, 1945). pp. 55<r52:
man in the natural attitude makes constant and nonthematic use of a specific
epoche - of doubt: he suspends the doubt that the world and its objects might be
otherwise than they are believed to be.
s Cf. Natanson, <>/J. cit., p. 23.
' Natanson, op. cil., p. 25.
20 MARCEL
all the case. Marcel's own work, along with that of many others,
stands as living t estimony to its possibility, but more, to its
remarkable fruitfulness. As Hocking remarks, in fact , it is "an
aspect of the broadened and heightened empiricism which may
well be, in its completion, the major achievement in epistemology
of this present century." 1
With these preliminary remarks, it is now possible to turn to
Marcel's own study of the body.
1 Hocking, op. cU., p. 441.
CHAPTE R 11
THE THEORY OF THE BODY-QUA-MINE
AS MYSTERY
The quest for an "existential indubitable, " we have seen, locates
one, to be sure, but it is an indubitable of a very strange type:
while the explosive " j 'existe !" (or: "je suis manifeste," "es
erlebt in mir") bursts forth with unmistakable energy, it yet
presehts itself as fundamentally opaque. Being me myself as
embodied by this body which is mine, I am unable to put it over
against me; reflectively observing it, on the other hand, I only
make thematic that very unity itself, with its intrinsic opacity.
What does it mean for this physical organism to be mine? Do I
"have" it like a triangle "bas" three angles? Or is there some
other sense to the "mine" here ? Am I my body? Or, is it rather
the case that " I" and "my body" are, not self-identical, but in
some way " unified?" If they are not the same, but are unified,
what kind of unity is it that combines this physical " stuff" with
what is absolutely opposite t o "stuff," namely, "me," or "mind?"
Such questions, Marcel believes, must motivate a complete
break with what has by now become a traditional way of con-
ceiving consciousness:
Break, accordingly, once and for all with the metaphors which represent
consciousness as a luminous circle around which there would be only
shadows. It is, to the contrary, the sbadow which is at the center. (EA,
15)
This "shadow" is "my body" : Consciousness, being essentially
embodied, is embodied by this specific individual body: my own
animate organism. Hence, at the center of consciousness is a
fundamental night, an opacity which is not transparent to
itself - a mystery in the technical sense of the term,1 that is to
In a footnote to the same passage, written five years later, Marcel notes that he
had a tendency to confuse "opacity" with "mystery," but that nevertheless he
anticipated there what be was later to say regarding mystery. (EA, "15)
22 MARCEL
say, my embodiment. My body qua mine cannot be put over
against me as a specific object ("problem") to be investigated
according to the style of positive science. What the latter in-
vestigates is not at all "my" body as lived by me, but rather "a,"
or "the," body - the body as a particular physico-chemical
system defineable by means of natural scientific laws. "My"
body, to the contrary, is a phenomenon disclosed only to "my"
own experience of this organism. The problem, therefore, is to
explicate this organism in so /ar as it is experienced by me as mine
(and not in so far as it is merely one object among others, reveal-
ing the essentially same anatomical-physiological structures).
There are, in Marcel's diverse studies of the body qua mine,
several distinguishable moments or aspects to this phenomenon.
Although he does not himself delineate these as clearly as one
might wish, it is necessary, I believe, to treat them separately -
recognizing that one unitary phenomenon is being discussed.
Most generally, these moments are: r) the sense of my body's
belonging to me, i.e., the bond between me and my body; and
on this fundamental ground, three further moments: 2) the
meaning of "feeling" or "sensation" (sentir); 3) my body as my
insertion in the world (etre-au--monde); and 4) my body as my
"repere" for all existence. We shall take up each of these in order.
(t) MY BODY QUA MINE
What does it mean for my body to be mine? Does my body
belong to me in the same way in which my cat belongs to me, or
the way in which my typewriter belongs to me?
For my cat to be mine, one might point out, it is necessary
that it either live with me, in my house, or, at least, that it be
lodged at some place where I have decided it shall live. Wherever
it resides, I assume the responsibility for seeing that it is cared
for. More than this, however: it is necessary that there be in
some at least minimal sense a reciprocal relation between my cat
and me. It must manifest in some way the recognition that it
belongs to me (it obeys me and no one else, or, it shows in its
behavior a certain affection toward me which it does not show
in the same way toward others, and so on). Even Salamano, the
remarkable character in Camas' L' et1'anger, "has" a dog; in spite,
or perhaps just because, of their rather strained relations, Sala-
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
23
mano is genuinely grieved when his dog is lost. Is there in this
mode of ownership an analogy to the type of possession that
makes my body mine?
Marcel (ME, I, II2-14) believes that the analogy is a good one,
and in considering it, we can come to see certain limiting cases
beyond which my body would cease to be mine.
In the first place, as with my cat, I have an indisputable claim
on my body: my body belongs to me and to no one else. Even
in the instance of the crudest kind of slavery, Marcel contends,
the slave still retains at least a minimal sense of his body still
being his own, and this sense is perhaps one of the roots of the
type of resentment felt by the slave toward the master. At the
limit, the slave must feel his body to be his own, however
marginally; else, Marcel points out, it would be highly question-
able whether or not we could consider the slave still as human.
This, he states, is the "lower limit." Here, the basic question
must concern, we should point out, the nature of "feeling''
which motivates (phenomenologically) the apprehension of this
body as "mine."
I also, we said, care for my cat; I feed it, see that it has proper
exercise, and so on. Similarly, Marcel says, since my body is mine
and no one else's, I have in the first instance the responsibility
for providing for its subsistence. I must "maintain" my own
body, by feeding, exercising, grooming it, and so on. My body is
mine, in this sense, in so far as I '1ook after" it. The limiting case
here is evidenced by a kind of total asceticism. In so far as I no
longer look after the subsistence and maintenance of my body
at all, it becomes questionable whether or not my body is any
longer experienced by me as mine. The question, again, concerns
the nature of those "feelings" in virtue of which I do experience
my body as mine.
Furthermore, as in the example of my cat, I have an m m ~ t
control of my body. As Husserl pointed out later, my own animate
organism is uniquely singled out, in part, by virtue of the circum-
stance that it is "the only object 'in' which I ',,uze and govern'
immediately, governing particularly in each of its 'organs'." i It
is that by means of which my " I can" is most immediately
1 E. Husserl, Carluian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns, Marti.nus Nijhoff
(The Kague, 196o), p. 97.
24 MARCEL
actualized: wanting to raise the glass to my lips, this volition is
immediately actualized by my body. But here as well, Marcel
recognizes, there is a limiting case, in this instance an "inner"
one: if I should lose all control of my body due to some illness or
injury, it would cease to be my body, n d ~ in a sense, it would
be meaningful to say ''I am no longer myself." (ME, L u4) l
The basic question here will concern the nature of this "acting"
an.d awilling."
The analogy with my cat ceases, however, when it is recognized
that, after all, my cat is external to me, it is spatio-temporally
distinct from me, as my body is not. Nevertheless, Marcel
insists, the question. of possession remains: What does it mean
to have my body? In or.der to answer this question, it is necessary
to raise the more general one: What does it mean to "have"
something whatever? If this can be determined, it will throw
light on the first question.
The senses in which "to have" are used, even legitimately, _are
notoriously plentiful. We can say, for example, "I have an
automobile, a dog, books, children, a wife," and the like; "I have
the feeling that ... "; "I had a miserable time ... "; "I have an
idea of what you are taking about"; "He has the measles";
"They have the right ... ";"the circle has such and such a radius";
"this thing has such and such a quality"; and so on. A catal0gue
of these usages will not help us much, however; no amount of
analysis of "common usages" will yield the essential character-
istics of a phenomen0n. What we must do, Marcel maintains, is
to consider these instances in which ''having is manifestly taken
in the forceful and precise sense .... " (EA, 229) Doing this,
Marcel believes that two such senses can be distinguished: ''having-
as-possession" and "having-as-implication." 2 (EA, 229-30)
1
.As we shall see in Part III, much of the experimental matEirial to which Metleau-
Ponty refers tends to support Marcel's views here - though he never makes use of
such material- especially the phenomena .of agnosia and the "phantom-member"
give credence to these "limiting cases."
2
This distinction, unfortunately, after having been made with the intent of
develoI?ing it into a "Phenomenologie de l'avoir" (the title of the section of Etre et
Avoir to which we are here referring, pp. 223-255), is to all purposes dropped immedi-
ately after he makes it.
Au he says about "l'avoir-implication" is that everything said about "l'avoir
possession" "s'applique entieremeut a l'avoir implication . . . ," (EA, 232) with the
exception. that tile latter does -not seem to exhibit the kind of "puissance" whicll the
former reveals.
TffE BODY-QUA-MINE
25
Since the type of having relevant to the problem of the body
is the former (avoir-Possession), we must restrict outselves to
this. And here, on the basis of Marcel's aClmittedly brief study,
it is possible to delineate three moments or strata in all such
having (Cf., EA, 2I9, and 230-34): I) One can speak of having
only where there is a certain quid related to a certain qui, and
where the latter appears as the center of apprehension and
inherence for the relation; 2) in all having, it is necessary to
speak in terms of a "within" ("dehors") and of a "without"
("dedans"); and 3) all having involves a reference to what is
other qua other.
(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Raving
Having is essentially a relation, between what is had and a
haver. The former, speaking in the widest possible terms, the
quid, presents itself as related to the latter, the qui, in such a
manner that the qui is the center of inberence for the quid. This
is to say that the qui is in some sense transcendent to the quid -
"transcendent" in the neutral sense, descriptive of the circum-
stance that the qui is on a different level or stratum than the
quid, or, more simply, that the haver has the had and not vice
versa (for the moment at least).
This quid-qui relation, however, is itself founded on a more
fundamental relation of having: all having is built on the proto-
typical relation where the qui is none other than me myseU:
Every affirmation bearing on a "having" seems indeed to be based in
some manner on the model of a kind of prototypical situation in which the
qui is nothing other than myself. It seems, indeed, that the having would
be felt in its force, that it takes its value, only from within the "l have."
If a "you have" or a "he has" is possible, this is only in virtue of a sort of
transfer which, moreover, cannot be effectuated without a certain loss.
(EA, 231)
For every "I," the "he has" ("we have," and so on) are all
derivative modes of having, founded on the "I have" and
derived by means of a transfer of sense. This transference is from
It is clear, to be sure, that his real interest in this brief Esguisse is in "l'avoir-
possession," since, he believes, it is this type of having which is really relevant to the
problem o{ my body as possessed by me. Nevertheless, it must be stated, just because
the problem of "haviiig" is so essential to his philosophy (Cf., e.g., MJ, 3r:c), it is
regrettable that he did not see lit to inquire further into having-as-implication. (See
also, MJ, 307-;313; ME, I , no-15; and EA, Part I, passim.)
20 MARCEL
the "I have" to the other modes, moreover, because of the nature
of having itself. To "have" is to "have the power to," in the
sense of "to have the disposal of" : "to have is to be able to
(pouvoir), because it is indeed in a sense to dispose of (disposer
de). Here, we touch on what is most obscure, and most fundamen-
tal, in having." (EA, 2r7-r8) And, Marcel later emphasizes,
The latter is clarified somewhat when one thinks of the relation which
manifestly unites the "having" to the "being able to," at least where
possession is effective and literal. "Be.ing able to," or "having the power
to," is something which I experience by exercising it or by resisting it -
which, after all, is the sa,me thing. (EA, 231)
Thus, the "I have" is fundamental just because "having" is
essentially "having the disposal of," and the latter is funda-
mentally something which I myself experience: I experience my
"being able to . . . " (pouvoir), and this experience founds the
relation of "having" as "having the disposal of."
"Avoir," considered as "pouvoir," then, involves a kind of
"contenir": however, Marcel insists,
and this is central, the containing (le contenu) cannot be defined in
terms of pure spatiality. It seems to me that it always implies the idea of a
potentiality; to contain is to enclose; but, to enclose isto prevent, it is to
resISt, it is to be opposed to what can overflow, be spilled, escape, etc.
(EA, 231)
With this we arrive at a crucial point in the analysis:
through the pouvoir we are able to make out, he contends, at the
heart of avoir a kind of "suppr.essed dynamism" which shows
most clearly the structure of what was called the transcendence
of the qui over the quid. There is an irreversible .movement or
direction (again, however, nonspatial) from the qui toward the
qu,id, which appears as intrinsic or interior to the qui. This
relation which goes from the qui to the guid in the first instance
is revealed, Marcel notes, even in our language:
. The verb "to have" is used passively only in tnost exceptional cases.
Everything happens as if we were in the presence of a sort of irreversible
process going from the qui toward the quid. And, I add that it is not a
question simply of a step accomplished by the subject reflecting or having.
Not at all ; this process appears to be effected by the qui itself, to be inward
to the qui. Here, it is helpful to pause momentarily, for we are approaching
the central point. (EA, 232)
This "central point" to which these reflections carry us,
constitutes the second moment of avoir.
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
(b) The "Within-Without" Relation
The structure of this movement shows that we can speak of a
relation of having only where, in some fashion, it is possible to
speak in terms of the "opposition du dedans et du dehors."
(EA, 232) More particularly, "to have" is "to have to oneself,"
to "keep to oneself" (avoir a soi), and in this sense, "to conceal"
(dissimuler}: the haver, by being in an irreversible relation t0
the had, has the had to himself. He has the book, and in this
sense, he keeps the book to himself; it is his and no one else's.
To " keep to 0neself," that is to say, is to keep to oneself over
against another qua other, who is also capable of having. The
relation reveals, thus, a tension, a "dialectique de l'interiorite,"
most clearly evident in the example of the "secret." The " tension'
of the relation of having a secret appears precisely because
The secret ls a secret only because I keep it, but also, and at the same
time, because I could betray it. This possibility of betrayal or of exposing
it is inherent to it, and toward defining it qua secret. (EA,
233)
To have is thus to have to oneself over against the other qua
other, and thus to be able to disclose what one has, to be able to
dispose of it - witho'14-t, however, actually doing so, since then the
relation of having would disappear. If I let the other "in" on the
secret, my secret is no longer a secret, or at least it has lost much
of its force.
In other words, it is essential to the very structure of having
that there be a ''within" and a "without" which are kept separate
yet together. 'Bhis tension is defined by the disposability of what
is had: "The characteristic of having is to-be-ex.posable." (EA,
233) There is a "within" (me, the haver) and a " without" (it, the
had), which essentially can be shown, disposed of, but which I
must, as haver, keep to myself while keeping as well its character-
istic of being showable to others without giving it to them. The
secret is "showable," but not shown; I can at any moment show
it, but so long as I "have" it in the full sense of the term, I do
not show it, but let others know that I have a secret which I
coiJ.ld reveal, if I chose.
To have, then, is to have in the sense of being able to betray
the had, in the general sense in which what is had would no
longer be ''had" if I let it go (whether it be a secret or a book, an
MARCEL
idea or a wife). This ever-present possibility of disposing of the
had, of showing it, involves, thus, the more covert dialectic
which makes of the had something which I have: my secret, for
example, like the drawings which a painter keeps ever-ready in
his portfolio, is mine, something I have, only in so far as I am
recognized or acknowledged as "the one who has something" by
others. The haver who has the had, has in addition the possibility
of getting rid of it (showing it), which means that the haver has
the had only in so far as he manifests himself as the haver before
the none-havers.
(c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other"
The suppressed dynamism in all having is thusex posed:
through the possibility of betrayal (disposal, being shown),
there is a reference to the other; this reference, however, returns
to its own source, i.e., to the haver, and constitutes him as a
haver. For, after all, the had which this haver bas must be
recognized by the other as had by the haver and not by himself.
The haver most by essence be acknowledged as haver. Thus,
having as such is a suppressed dialectic which maintains itself
in the relation of having as a kind of play before the other.
But, this "other" need not be another man: this "other" may
be myself, in so far as I take myself as the one who has something,
ideas, books, my body, and so on.
In so far as I take myself as having in me, or more precisely, as having
to myself ce.rtain certain attributes, I consider myself
from the pomt of vtew of an Other to which I oppose myself only on
condition of first implicitly identifying m.yself with him .... (EA. 234)
When, for instance, I say to myself that I have certain ideas, I
implicitly mean that my ideas are not those of everyone else,
and this separation of "mine'' from "theirs" is possible only if I
have first of all at least fictively assimilated the other's ideas,
made them mine at least in pretence. Hence, Marcel concludes,
it is essential to having to be a tension between ''l'exteriorite et
l'interiorite."
Just because the "within-without" structure is essential to
having, this inseparability is constituted for the haver as essential-
1 y threatened. For, in so far as what is had is a "without" for a
"within," and is maintained constantly as "without " (that is, as
THE BODY-QUA-MINE 29
"showable," "disposable," and the like). the had is essentially
open to the possibility of being lost (stolen, destroyed, plagiarized,
and so on), and this possibility constitutes what Marcel has
called the tension of having, its suppressed dynamism. This
threat intrinsic to having as such, he believes, reveals itself as
the hold of the other qua other:
Without doubt there is in having a double permanence: of the qui, and
of the qt1id. But this permanence is essentially threatened; ... And this
threat is the hold of the Other qua. Other - which can be the world in
itself - and in the face of which I feel myself so painfully as me. I hug to
myself this thing which may be taken from me; I attempt desperately to
incorporate it to.me, to form with it a unique, indecomposable complex.
Desperately, vainly .... (EA, 236-37)
The domain of having appears thus as that of despair. (Cf.,
RI, 76ff; EA, I49ff; PA, 48ff) For, the fact that the had appears
as essentially exposed to loss, i.e., as threatened, means that the
haver is caught up in a constant anxiety over what he has. He is
forever "on the lookout" for possible dangers to what he has;
and, as often happens, the more one attempts to secure the
relation of having, the more one seeks to "insure" it against just
that threat - which, constituting the had as had, increases in
proportion as the "insurance" increases. In this sense, the haver
seeks to close the gap between himself and what he has, to make
it disappear and thus to achieve a privileged realm of being:
that of the "secure." At the same time, however, in order for
having to continue to be having, it is essential that that threat
remain in full force; and thus, for Marcel, having is the core of
despair. The essence of the quest for "security," Marcel might
well have said, lies in its effort to transcend the domain of having
by means of ... having itself! To bring the relation of having
to an end through having itself is the mark of despair at the level
of "first reflection;" and this is but another way of expressing
the essential nature of prob1ematizing reflection.
However suppressed the essential nature of having may
become, moreover, the haver as such is in some sense aware of
the gap between himself and what he has, and it is only in this
sense that such a phenomenon as "pride in one's possessions"
can be understood. Only in so far as this gap remains, in fact,
Marcel points out, can there be a "play before the other," a
"play" which can be achieved only by having. Thus, while there
/
30
MARCEL
are many levels of the "suppressed dialectics" of having, and
many kinds of having, all these reveal the essential character-
istics indicated.
This despair appears as more acute when we observe that t o
the same degree that the haver becomes thus attached to the
had, the latter exercises a certain power over him. It "reaches
back underground," Marcel says, to the haver and seems to
absorb him - he, the very one who conferred the attachment in
the first place. What promises relief from the anxiety over what
is had, i.e., truly having and thus securing the had, turns out in
the end to be just the opposite, bringing him to despair. Like
;Mrs. Gereth in Henry James' The Spoils of Poynton, the pos-
sessions seem to absorb, to exercise a tyranny over the haver,
a tyranny which this very possessing itself confers on them. Yet
again, as Kierkegaard so clearly saw, even this tyranny is a
futile one, for it can never reach its goal:
The fact that despair does not consume him is so far from being any
comfort to the despairing man that it is precisely the opposite, this
comfort is precisely the torment .... This precisely is the reason why he
despairs - not to say despaired - because he cannot consume himself,
cannot get rid of himself, cannot become nothing. This is the potentiated
formula for despair, the rising ofthefeverin the sickness of the seli.l
But now, we must return to the question of the body: we must
now ask what it would mean for my body to be something which
I have. Unquestionably I can, by means of first reflection, take
my body as something I have in the above senses; and just this
happens, Marcel contends, when I take my body as a "problem"
or as an "object." In this sense, I look upon my body as some-
thing which I use, which I have and by means of which I am able
to manipulate things: I possess my body, and, possessing it,
I possess the things it has. 2 My body would then be an instru-
ment whose use I happen to have, though, all such bodies being
essentially alike, I might just as well have had the use of any
other one. The question thus is: Is my body an instrument ?
An instrument, of whatever particular kind, is essentially a
1
S. J{jerkegaard, TM Si&kness Untci Death, op. cit., p. 151. Cf. EA, p. ISO, where
Marcel agrees wholeheartedly with Kierkegaard's analysis of despair.
2
As William James had expressed it: "What possesses the possessor possesses the
possessed." Principles of Psychology, Volume I , Henry Holt and Co. (New York, 1890),
p. 3 ~ 0
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
3I
means of extending or of strengthening a certain power or ca-
pacity for doing something. The instrument, that is, is intei:posed
between what is acted upon and that which does the acting with
or by means of the instrument (the hammer, for example, is
between me and the board). What does this interposition signify?
One thing can be interposed between two other things, one
term between two other terms, and so on. But, can my body be
thus interposed ... between what and what?
When I say that my body is interposed between me and things, I am
only expressing a pseudo-idea, because what I call me cannot be identified
with a thing or with a term.1 Of course it is possible to say that my body is
interposed between a body A which affects it and a body R on which it
reacts. But in that case what happens to me, to the subject? The subject
seems to withdraw into an indeterminate spheYe from which it contemplates -
without existing for itself - the anonymous play of the universal mechanism.
(MJ, E-0, 332)
In the end, to attempt to consider my body as an instrument
is to become involved in a quicksand of absurdity:
When I make use of any kind of tool, in reality I do no more than
prolong and specialize a way of behaving that already belongs to my body
(whether to my limbs or to my senses) ... Not only is the instrument
relative to:my body- between the instrument and my body there is a deep
community of nature. But given these conditions can I treat the body
itself as an instrument? As soon as we get to grips with the meaning of
this question we discover that we are obliged to imagine a physical soul
furnished with powers and faculties; and the mechanical terms, to which
my body seems reduced, are really only prolongations or transpositions
of1:hese powers or faculties. (MJ, E-0, 333)
If, that is to say, we are to consider my body as an instrument
of which I have the disposal for a period of time, then the same
relation must obtain between me and my body as that between
any instrument and that for which it is an instrument: namely,
a " deep community of nature." They are of the same kind: hence,
I, who have this body as my instrument, must be of the same
kind as my body. Either, then, one considers me as physical, or
the body as spiritual. But, in either case, we land in absurdities
and distort the actual stat e of affairs, where, descriptively, the
body is not "mental" nor the mind "physical."
Hence, either we are condemned to an infinite regression (of
physicalinstrument of a physical instrument, and so on), or else we
L Precisely this interposition was implicit in traditional conceptions of sense
peiceiving, and thus in the various theories of the body implied in such theories.
32
l\IARCEL
stop, quite arbitrarily, along the way and say that the last term in
the series is the instrument of something which is not itself of the
same nature as the instrument which it has and uses. But then the
whole problem simply returns to the one with which we began;
that is, the "way out" of the difficulties simply begs the question.
The problem here, Marcel believes, can be seen and explicated
only in terms of lived experience: in what sense is my body
mine? Taking it as an instrument avoids the whole issue.
A body, certainly, can be considered as an object , since "a"
body is, precisely, no one's (or, anyone's), and hence a possible
instrument, a tool which can be used (as when a master uses his
slave to build his castle). But, if I attempt to take my body as an
instrument, I simply lose the sense, "mine." Accordingly, Marcel
argues, to the degree that I take it as an instrument, I treat it as
not-mine. Qua mine, my body is not an instrument, nor an object
over against which I would be a subject. Taking it as an instru-
ment is the position of most traditional thought, as well as that
of "first reflection"; taking it as mine is the position recovered
by means of "second reflection." In this sense, second reflection
is not a rebuttal of the results of first reflection ; rather it is a
covery of the unity lost by first reflection, it is a recollecting
(recueillement) of the pieces which were scattered by first re-
flection. 'What, however, is here recovered ?
My b0dy qua mine is not something which I have: rather, it is
the prototype of having, it is "the first object, the prototype of
object ... and it seems indeed that we here are at the most secret,
the most profound, core of having. The body is the prototype of
having." (EA, 237) In this sense, Marcel wants to speak of an
"absolute instrument." My body is not itself either an object,
an instrument, nor something had, but is that which in the first
place makes possible any having whatever, any instrument, any
object. (Cf., ME, I , n2- r4; MJ, 248) Am I then in an immediate
relation to my body? Denying that my body is an instrument,
and hence that it is not a tern in an instrumental relation, do I
therefore deny all mediation between my body and me?
To suppose . . . that I can become anything whatever, that is to say,
that I can identify myself with anything wbatever, by the minimum act of
attention implied by an elementary sensation without the intervention of
any media#ion whaJsoever, is to undermine the very foundations of spiritual
life and pulverise the mind into purely successive acts. But I can no longer
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
33
conceive this mediation as being of an instrumental order. I will therefore
call it "sympathetic mediation." (MJ, 246) 1
The problem here is to attempt to get at the experience which
this "sympathetic mediation" describes.
It is evident that, in the first place, Marcel wants to say that
the type of relation which binds me to my body is not of the same
type as that which obtains between two objects or two instru-
ments; that it is not, furthermore, a relation of having. What,
then, is this relation?
While my connection to my body "is in reality the model, not
represented but felt, to which all possession is related," (ME, I,
n3) it is not the case that this connection is itself a manner of
possession.
The .truth .is rather that witliin all possession, of every kind of possession,
there lS as it were a felt kernel, and this nucleus is nothing than the
experience, in itself non-intellectualizable, of the connection by means
of which my body is mine. (ME, I, n3)
But obviously, this does not help us too much, since it is precisely
that "lien" which must be explicated. There is, however, an
important clue in Marcel's statement: the "noyau senti" is, he
says, precisely "the experience ... of the connection by means
of which my body is mine." In so far as my body is "l'avoir-
type," it is experienced as "le pouvoir-type," that it is to say,
as the ensemble of powers. This ensemble, however, is more than
a mere aggregate or collection of abilities; rather, we must say,
"each of its powers is only a specification of this unity itself,"
(ME, I , n5) the unity, namely which is completely sui generis
and which "constitutes my body qua mine." (ME, I, u3-14)
It is, then, this unity which must be focused upon. Negatively,
Marcel states,
. My body is for as much as l do not look at it, as I do not place any
interval ?etween 1t and me, or rather for as much as it is not an object for
me, .but 1n so as I am my body ... To say 1 am my body is to suppress
the interval which, on the other hand, I re-establish if I say that my body
is an instrument. (ME, I, u6)
Furthermore, he goes on, to say that I am my body qua mine is
not to say that I am that body which is an object for others, the
one which others see, touch, and so on. This body, he contends,
li!arcel notes twenty-five years later that he still has not found any better way of
expressing what he has in mind here. We shall have to reconsider this later on.
34
MARCEL
is as much other for me as for them - i.e., it is le corps-objet. When,
therefore, I say that my body is mine, !mean that I am my body,
but only "for as much as I come to recognize this body as not ,
in the last analysis, being assimilable to that object, to an object,
asnotbeingsomething." (ME, I , II6-17) Thus, we must distinguish
from the "corps objet" the "corpssujet." The latter, my body qua
mine, he goes on, is my embodirn.ent, "the situation of a being who
appears t o himself as fundamentally, and not accidentally,
connected to his body." (ME, I , II7) This embodiment is the
fundamental meaning of the "mediation sympathique" of which
Marcel had spoken earlier in his Metaphysical J ournal.
Now, as we have noted earlier, there are certain limits beyond
which my body ceases to be mine - that is to say, beyond which
my body ceases to be experienced by me as my embodiment. The
meaning of these limits can now be stated: "my body qua mine
presents itself to me as felt ; 1 am my body only in so far as I am
a being who feels (im etre sentant)." (ME, I , II7)
In order to determine what Marcel means here by "senti" it is
necessary to go back to his investigations in the Metaphysical
] ot4rnal, the only place where he attempts to penetrate this
phenomenon:
. . . it is essential to disentangle the exact meaning of the ambiguous
formula: " I am my body." It can be seen straight away that my body is
only mim inasmuch as, however confusedly, it is felt. The radical abo.lition
of coenesthesia, supposing it were possible, would mean the destruction of
my body in so far as it is mine. If I am my body this is in so far as I am a
being that feels. It seems to me that we can even be more exact and say
that I am my body in the measure in which uiy attention is brought to
bear on my body first of all, that is to say before my attention can be fixed
on any other object whatsoever. Thus the body would benefit from what I
may be allowed to call an absolute priority.
I only am my body more absolutely than I am anything else because to
be anything else whatsoever I need iirstof all to make use of my body ....
(MJ, 243)
In this central passage we have perhaps the best (albeit the only)
clue to the meaning, for Marcel, of "sentir." For him, as is clear,
it is only in so far as "je sens mon corps" that it is experienced
by me as mine, and the "sentir" here refers to the way in which
my body is given to me in "internal perception," as when I
sensuously perceive myself as tired, hungry, energetic, and so
on. (MJ, 19: here, Marcel says outright that "coenesthetique"
THE BODY- QUA-MINE
35
feelings of internal perception account for my body being experi-
enced by me as individually mine.) Thus, in order to feel anything
else, I must first of all feel my body as mine; in this sense, my
body is given to me as absolutely prior. My body is that by means
of which there are other objects which can be felt. It is this
priority, moreover, which is expressed in the formula that my
body is the prototype of all having (as well as of all instrumental
relations, and of all object relations). Being the absolute condition
in this sense, it cannot itself be at the same level as having
(correlatively, as that of instruments, or of objects in general).
Thus, we can say, my body is mine in so far as it is experienced
by me through the mode of sentir Marcel calls coenesthesique - a
notion which we shall have to examine at a later point. To say
that I am my body, then, is to say that I maintain with my body
the sui generis relation of "mediation sympathique," i.e., of
embodiment. Embodiment, finally, is always being-embodied
(etre-incarnee), which is to say, experienced-embodiment - i.e.,
embodiment is mediated by means of "sentir," a sentir which
is given to me as absolutely prior to everything else.
This analysis is only part of the whole story; on its ground, it
is necessary to delineate three further strata of Marcel's theory
of the body.
(2) THE MEANING OF SENTIR
As the t erm Marcel uses indicates, he is not talking of "feeling"
in the sense in which it is said, in English, that "to feel" is "to
touch"; Marcel does not use the French toucher or tater. Never-
theless, what he has to say as regards sentir in r espect of the body
qua mine has a direct bearing on what one usually understands
by sensuous perception (i.e., so-called "outer perception"). For,
since the sentir of the body-as-mine is fundamental to all other
modes of sentir, what holds for it must hold for the latter as well.
However, it must be emphasized that Marcel, as we shall see
shortly, undertakes no positive theory 0f sensuous perception,
beyond several hints;l his real interest is rather in determining
the essential nature of sentir as such than in developing a detailed
theory of the nature of sensuous perception. That such a theory
l Hints which, incidentally, we shall find more fully developed in the theory of
Merleau-Ponty, although, characteristically, Merleau-Ponty does not mention Marcel.
MARCEL
is at least implied in his work seems evident from the circum-
stance that he develops his views primarily by means of a
penetrating and decisive critique of traditional theories of sensu-
ous perception.
Essentially, all such theories (and, in our day, even the "view"
of commonsense) have the same schema, what Marcel calls the
"message-theory." To sense something is to "receive" certain
data from it; sentir is taken to be a sort of "message" transmitted
from one pole (for example, a flower) to another pole (for ex-
ample, the sensitive membrances of the nose) . Something is
emitted by the one, which then travels or is transmitted under
objectively determinable conditions and is received by the other,
and is there "translated" into the "language" of sensation (in
the case of the flower, into "olfactory language"). In this sense,
we are inclined to conceive the act of feeling as a sort of com-
munication like that between two telegraph poles. (MJ, E-0,
327) To perceive something with the senses is to gather in specific
nformation from, and about, it.
When we use the terms, "toreceive, " "to emit," and so on, we compare
the organism to a pole to which a certain message comes. More precisely,
what is gotten by this pole is not the message itself, but an ensemble of
data which can be transcn"bed with the help of a certain code. The message
in the strict sense, indeed, implies a double transmission, the first being
produced at the point of origin (the sensed object) and the second at the
point oi termination (the sensitive organism) .... (RI. 37)
Whatever modifications there have been among the various
theories, it is this schema which holds for them all.
Now, Marcel contends, this entire mode of interpretation
breaks down in its own terms. In the first place, is it possible to
conceive sensation as a "message" which, on "reception" by the
sensitive pole from the "emitting" pole, is "translated" into the
appropriate " language?" This, he contends, is absurd:
We are dupes of an illusion when we confusedly imagine that the re-
ceptive consciousness translates into sensation something which is initially
given to it as a physical phenomenon., as a disturbance for instance. What,
in fact, is "translation"? To translate is in every case to substitute one
group of data for another group of data. But, the term, "data," requi,res
that we take it rigorously. The shock experienced by the organism or by
its members is in no way a datum; or more precisely, it is a datum for the
obs61'Ve1' who perceives it in a certain manner, but not for the organism who
suffers it. (RI, 37-38)
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
37
For the percipient to be able to translate, it is necessary that he
have before him the set of data to be translated and the set of
data into which the first is to be translated, and this is itself
inconceivable on the grounds of the theory itself - the first set
of data is by definition not at all given to the percipient. And, if
it were, there would ne no need for the translation. If one were
to say that the physical disturbance transmitted by X to Y is
received by Y as an " unconscious," or "non-noticed," datum,
this merely pushes the same problem back a stage: in order to
translate the unconscious or non-noticed datum into a conscious
or noticed one, whatever this might mean, it would be necessary
for the first to be given to the percipient as a datum, be readily
accessible to him, and just this is ruled out by the theory at the
outset. An unsensed message is not a message at all. If it is called
"irreducible" and "unanalysable," then, again, it is not a message
since to be a message is to admit of translation.
This "message-theory," it is clear for Marcel, comes about via
first reflection - in this context, through the assumption that the
act of feeling or sensing is, not an act at all, but passive reception,
and that it occurs by means of a series of terms or objects, and
hence can be interpreted along the lines proper to the sphere of
objects.1 The thing sensed, and the sensation, as well as the
sensing organism, are all equally "objects." From the perspective
of first reflection, such a view is inevitable. For, first reflection
invariably takes the body as an instrument (however "privileged"
it may be thought to be), and for this reason, "it must needs
appear to be interposed between us and objects, and we are
therefore convinced that it mediatizes our apprehension of
objects ... " (MJ, 258) In this way, all sentir appears as funda-
mentally mediatized, conditioned by a series of mediations at the
level of objects. Thus, the transmission of messages (any instru-
mental act at all) is actually a kind of object-mediation.
Io take the body as instrument, however, is to exclude this
body as mine, and hence to exclude the act of feeling as, not
only an act, but as my act - the "fe sens." When the situation of
.i Once again, it should be noted in advance that Marcel's criticism reappears in
almost identical form in both Sartre and Merleau-Pooty. From bis earliest writings,
Marcel never altered this fundamental criticism, and it reappears as such in each of bis
major works.
MARCEL
sentir is apprehended by second reflection, however, Marcel
believes that it becomes necessary,
to recognize that the initial assumption must be placed in doubt, and
certainly not be compared to a message. This is the case for the fundamen-
tal reason, that every "message" supposes a sensation at its base -
precisely in the same manner as any instrument, as we have already seen
aetually presupposes my body as pre-existant to it. (ME, I, n4)
And here, Marcel emphasizes, as soon as we bring my body
back into the sphere of sentir by means of second reflection, we
are forced "to the affirmation of a pure immediate, that is to say
an immediate which by essence is incapable of mediation,"
(MJ, E-0, 329) and thus, of a non-mediatizable immediate.
(ME, I, r25) The act of sentir which inseparably connects me
to my body (the "fe sens") is non-mediatizable precisely because
it is itself the founding stratum of all mediation whatever, it is
the act of feeling beginning from which the feeling of anything
else is made possible, and in this sense it is an Urgefuhl. (M],
247) As such, it is not itself characterizable in the manner
prescribed by the message-theory of first reflection. However,
being non-characterizable does not mean, Marcel points out, that
this primal feeling at the basis of all feeling whatever is indetermi-
nate. It means rather
that the mind when confronting it cannot ad"f'l without contradicti<m the
attitude that is needed for characterizing something. (MJ. E-0, 330)
The body, then, as an Urgefuhl, cannot be regarded in terms
of instrumentalities, messages, and the like. This being the case,
it becomes necessary to alter our very notion of sentir. This
revision takes us over to the third moment of the body-qua-mine.
(3) MY BODY AS P.TRE-A.U-MONDE
If a sensation or feeling is not a communication nor a relation
between two " poles," then Marcel believes, "it must involve the
immediate participation of what we normally call the subject in
a surrounding world from which no veritable frontier separates it."
(MJ, E-0, 331- 32) The initial mistake of the message-theory is
to presuppose such a frontier: on the "outside" is the world, and
on the "inside" is me. But, what meaning "outside" and "inside"
can have, is a question which was rarely, if ever, even posed;
and, if it is asked, amounts to absurdity. Furthermore, on the
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
39
basis of this assumption, it became necessary for that theory to
give an account of how it happens that I, being " inside," and
some object, being "outside," ever could be related to one
another. Since, according to the principle of division, I can
never "get outside my skin," then, in order to be able to sense
such "outside" objects, it must be that they "come to me" -
and the way in which this path is traveled, while variously
conceived (from the eidolon of the Greek Atomists to the "sense-
data" of classical and modern psychology), is always from the
object to the percipient subject. To feel, or sense, is on this view
always to suffer, to receive passively.
But, if the initial assumption is unjustified, especially in its
own terms as Marcel shows, then sentir does not mean "to suffer,"
it is not a "passive reception" of a something supposed to be
"out there" impinging on me who am "in here," but is to the
contrary to participate - that is to say, to receive, but in a quite
different sense:
To receive is to bring into one's home someone from the outside, it is to
introduce him ... to feel is to receive; but it would be necessary immediately
to specify that to receive, here, is to open myself, and consequently to
give myself to, rather than to suffer, an external action. (RI, r22-23)
To receive, in the case of sentir, is to receive in the sense in which
a host receives his guests into his home. It is necessary, that is to
say, to take " reception" and "receptivity" here in terms of a
certain prior willingness, or being able, to make oneself open to
what is to be received. (ME, I, 134) One "receives" by means of
sentir, but only
in relation to a self, who can moreover be the self of another - and I
understand by "self" someone who says, or who is at least supposed to be
able to say, I, positing itself or being posited as I ... Still, it is necessary-
thls is here, even, what is essential - that this self experience as his a
certain domain. (RI, no)
Thus, one senses objects by receiving them into a domain which
is by essence felt as his own, that is to say, only by means of his
body felt (senti) as his own. Only my body senses; "a," or "the,"
body does not feel anything, it is the body of "anybody". To
perceive is always an "I perceive," a "je sens." "One receives in
a room, in a home, strictly, in a garden (dans im 1ardin): not in a
vague place, the countryside or in a forest." (RL, 120) To receive,
in this sense, is for Marcel to participate.
40 MARCEL
And, it is this notion of participation which, he believes, will
allow us to understand the fundamental act of feeling - that it is
an act and not a mere enduring or suffering, an act in the sense
of the "je sens," "a non-objective participation." (ME, I, 130)
It is clear, however, that there are gradations of participation,
ranging from, for example, sharing in a birthday cake, sharing
in a business corporation, to the fundamental mode of partici-
pation which Marcel calls "non-objective," such as when one
" takes part" in an event like the marriage of one's close friend.
In the latter case, one cannot define participation merely in
terms of the number of persons objectively present at the same
time and place. Rather, he argues, the participation depends on
something else, a sort of "idee" -that 01 the marriage, friendship,
or of some social "tause," and the like - which "idea" itself
makes the participation possible, is that in terms of which the
participation emerges. At the level of sentir, however, one cannot
speak of such participation: from the participation which
emerges on the basis of an event, it is necessary to distinguish
one's willingness to participate in it in the first place, that is,
"participation immergee." (ME, I, 130) Before one can take part
in it genuinely, he must have already made himself available
(disponible) or open to such participation. The latter, moreover,
is possible only "on the basis of a certain consensus which, by
definition, can only be felt .... " (ME, I, r32)
This level of sentir is still not that manifested at the level of
the body. It refers, rather, to the kind of bond which unites, for
instance, the farmer to his soil, the shipmaster to the sea, the
artist to his creation, and the like. Thus, to participate in some
undertaking, a task of some sort, with one's whole being, is
possible in this sense only because of, or on the ground of, a
sentiment which is in reality a bond uniting one to his task and
to others who also participate in it. That is, the feeling here is in
fact a coesse, a "Bei-sich-sein," an act of feeling which is perhaps
best rendered in French by "accueillir," or even better, Marcel
adds, by "responsivite." (ME, I , 135) Only in terms of this
responsivity, this coesse, is the undertaking made worthwhile,
and it is a "being-with" without which it would be impossible
to endure the trials, risks, and failures of the undertaking. The
question for us at this point, however, bears on the relation of
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
this "feeling-participation" to the "feeling" uniting me to my
body.
Once we have seen that feeling cannot involve a communi-
cation of a message, but to the contrary that all communication
presupposes feeling, in this sense, it is no longer possible to interpret
feeling in terms of in/onnatio'>i. Feeling is not a "sign" or "symbol,
it does not give us information about the world or about objects
in the world. To the contrary, Marcel states, "To feel is to be
affected in a given manner .... " (MJ, 187) That feeling can be
regarded as a sign giving information, is of course quite true;
but, Marcel emphasizes, what we must note is that this is in
reality a step beyond the immediacy of feeling, it is an inter-
pretation placed on the fact of feeling and an interpretation
which fractures that immediacy. It is, in short, from the pers-
pective of first reflection, from that of the body-as-object, that
feeling appears as a message. (RI, 38-39; MJ , I87-88)
When we, by way of second reflection, recapture that immedi-
acy and original unity, however, we see that to feel is not to
suffer, but rather to act, that it reveals at its center an activity,
a making-of-oneself-open-to ... , a taking upon oneself (assumer),
an accueillir. In short, sentir is participation, and the ground for
this participation is my being-embodied, my embodiment by
this body which is mine. Finally, to be incarnate is to be ex-
posed, or open, to the world, to objects in it; and, in this sense,
to be sensitive to objects is to be present to them, to be "at" them,
to belong to the world by participating in it by means of my body.
This fundamental stratum of sentir Marcel calls my etre-att-
monde. l (RI, 33) To "ex-ist" as an "alterite d'emprunt," then,
is to manifest oneself to the world as embodied by one's own
body, and thus is to be exposed to the world, to its seasons, its
elements, its course and influences. As embodied, not only do I
become able to engage myself in the world by means of bodily
activities; I also and just because of that, open myself to the
world's actions on me. I partake of the world by means of my
fundamental sentir which connects me to my body, and by means
that, to the world itself. In this sense, I can act on the world by
means of my body only because I can also be acted upon by the
i This category, as we shall see in Part lTI, forms the essential stratum of the body
proper for Merleau-Ponty - though he does not refer to Marcel in this connection.
42 MARCEL
world, by its objects. My etre-i1icarnee then, as etre-au-monde,
"must be understood as a participation, not at all as a relation
or communication." (RI, 33)
This brings us to the final moment of the body.
(4) MY BODY AS THE R P ~ R OF EXISTENCE
When Marcel discovered the "exclamatory consciousness of
existing," he believed that he had discovered as well the "repere"
of all existence as such. It is now possible to see why he comes to
this. To say that my body ex-poses me to the world as such is to
say that "my body is in sympathy with things . .. that I am really
attached to and really adhere to all that exists - to the universe
which is my universe and whose center is my body." (MJ, 274)
Thus, he goes on, to say that something exists is to say that I
maintain relations with it which are of the same type as those
that I maintain with my body; that, in other words,
To say that a thing exists is not only to say that it belongs to the same
system as my body (that it is connected to =y body by certain rationally
determinable relations); it is to say that that thing is in some fashion
united to me as my body is united to me. (EA, n)
A thing exists for me, he stated earlier, only if it in some way
is a "prolonging of my body." (MJ, 245) In other words, to think
of a thing as an object, that is as being indifferent to me, as not
taking account of me, is to alter its character as existent for me.
"Existence and Objectivity," as the title of his essay appended
to his Metaphysical J <>t-rnal runs, are mutually exclusive terms.
Thus, to speak of "existence" as an "object," a "datum," as for
instance John Wild does,1 is for Marcel self-contradictory. "In
reality," he points out, "existence and the thing that exists are
obviously inseparable," (MJ, E-0, 321) and the thing which exists
is bound to me in the same type of relation by which I am united
to my body. This relation is preciselythat "participation non objec-
tive," the relation ofsentir, which we have explicated. In this sense,
Marcel can speak of the body as being in sympathy with things,
that my body is thus the center of all exists, and that a thing is or
becomes an "object" only by being disregarded qua existent.
Accordingly, "The first indubitable," Prini points out, "is not
1
"Phenomenology and Metaphysics," in: The Return to Ruison, edited by j obo
Wild, Beary Regnery Co. (New York, .r953), pp. 49-55
THE BODY-QUA-MINE
43
thought as a reflection or doubt, but the presence of my corporeal
sensibility as anterior to doubt itself." 1 And, this presence is at
once the prototype of existence and the "repere" of existence.
Thus, at the center of the universe, my universe, Marcel claims to
discover a fundamentally non-transparent and non-mediatizable
immediate, one which is presupposed by all mediation just because
this immediate is absolute, making all mediation possible. (MJ, 275)
This discovery is the discovery of mystery, of the domain of
the metaproblematic, and makes necessary the
very important distinction between data that are susceptible of forming
the occasion for a problem - that is, objective data- and data on which the
mind must be based so as to state any problem whatsoever ... Sensation
( = the fact of feeling, of participating in a universe which creates me by
affecting me), and the intellectually indefectible bond that unites me with
whatl call my body, are data of this second kind. (MJ, E--0, 338)
To say, accordingly, that I am incarnate in my body qua mine
is to say that in some sense I am my body, or, more moderately,
that it is not true to say that I am not my body, that my body
qua mine is an object or thing. I am my body. This signifies,
Marcel says, that
I am my body only in virtue of mysterious reasons which account for
my continually feeling my body and because this feeling conditions for
me all other feeling ... This feeling seems bound up with real fluctuations
that scarcely seem to me to be capable of bearing on anything save on the
body's potential action, its instrumental value at a given moment. But if
this is so my body is only felt inasmuch as it Me-as-acting: feeling is a
function of acting. (MJ, 26o)
Thus, as Bergson had already pointed out, and as both Mer-
leau-Ponty and Sartre will say later, my body is mine only
because it is "me-as-acting"; and, the world exists only because
it is there for my acting on it, in so far as I am embodied as a
"felt" system of actions for which objects form a "context" of
poles of action. The "feelings" which unite me to my body
are thus a "function of acting"; were it not for the fact that my
body is the most immediate manifestation of my fundamental
"I can," my body would not be experienced by me as mine
In this way, through the four moments of my body-qua-mine,
Marcel believes that he has at least circumscribed the funda-
mental meaning of "my body."
1 Prini, op. cit., p. 42.
CHAPTER Ill
CRITICAL REMARKS
It is most difficult to entertain many serious objections to a
body of thought as fresh and original as Marcel's. Inspired by a
rare intellectual integrity and exigence for truth and clarity, he
unquestionably ranks as one of the major figures in contemporary
philosophy. Because of this, though, those who take it on them-
selves to examine such work in a critical manner, however
constructively, must always, it seems, appear to themselves as
not a little pretentious. On the other hand, just because such a
thinker discloses hitherto unsuspected horizons and dimensions
of our experience, it becomes possible and even necessary for
others to "see for themselves" what has thus been opened up;
and, thus, it becomes possible to accept the invitation to "check"
the philosophical insights with the phenomena themselves. Just
as Descartes invited the critical minds of his day (those who were
willing and able, he states in his Preface to the Meditations, to
set aside their own beliefs and prejudices) to read through with
him the course of his thought, and thereby see for themselves
the legitimacy of his claim to have discovered a new territory,
so, too, Marcel gives us an open invitation to follow along with
him. As Descartes' invitation prompted a voluminous correspon-
dence, so Marcel's work must prompt equally serious consider-
ation.
Unfortunately, however, at least thus far, the real originality
and significance of his philosophical work has not received the
recognition which it merits, especially by Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty. As for the latter, it will soon become apparent how

insights, hardly anythingnew is aa<ioo by either of his younger
contemporaries, particularly as regards the the.body.
As for fhe former, many of Marcel's interpreters have pro-
CRITICAL REMARKS
45
ceeded on the assumption that, being a Catholic (though a
converted one, his conversion taking place after the publication
of the Metaphysical jowrnal, in which much, but not all, of the
ground-work for his later thought was set out}, Marcel's philo-
sophical work is essentially relig!ousi iJL
I submit, j a mis.take, one pointed _9ut by Marcel himsefi when,
in his Lettre-Preface to Pietro Prini's book, he praised M. Prini
for having
the very great merit of going back to the source of all my metaphysical
development, quite beyond all explicit adherence to the Christian reli-
gion .... 1
And, much earlier, Marcel explicitly affirmed that
It is quite possible that the existence of fundamentally Christian data
would, in fact, be required in order to permit the mind to conceive certain
notions which I have attempted to analyze. However, one cannot say,
certainly, that these notions would be dependent on Christian revelation -
Jhese notions do not presuppose it. (PA, 89)
Thus, it is quite necessary to take Marcel at his own word, and
_not to preinterpret such categ_ories as "mystery," "exigenee,"
and the like, as Christian. It would perhaps be better to say just
the reverse: the human condition, while it may be the mundane
source of religion, need not be taken as necessarily motivating
any specific religioU.s views whatever. In fact, Marcel himself
comments at one point that he thinks it quite possible for a non-
Christian to be able to adhere consistently to the essential
features of his philosophy, and even to have come to this on his
own accord. The question regarding the religiousness of his work
is entirely separate from that of its philosophical merit.
On the other hand, not preinterpret Marcel as...an
Qf. wh.atever sort. Here again, we must heed
Ma.reel himself. In same place in his Lettre-Pref ace, he again
praises Prini for havingrefrained from consideiing llls- work--in
"la dangereuse etiquette existentialiste." 2 And, in his important
"Author's Preface to the English Edition" of his Metaphysical
Journal, Marcel states his belief that he has to his satisfaction
disspelled the belief that he is a "Christian existentialist."
1
Prlni, op. cil., p. 7.
2 Idem., Ibid. In a talk, "Religion and-Philosophy," given at The Rice University in
Houston, Texas, on November 4, rg6r, and in a personal conversation with me follow-
ing this lecture, M. Marcel vigorously re.affirmed this point , as well as the necessity
for distinguishing his philosophy from bis religion.
MARCEL
All of these warnings only ..QU.!_ the necessity for con-
wof1f as a strictly philosophical endeavor, and it is
in thi.s_.spjrit that we shall enter_!afu severcil Critical remarkS. We
must keep in mind as well, in the course of these remarks, that
Marcel at no time in his career professes to have worked out
the definitive solutions to any of the "metaproblems" he has
tackled - particularly as regards the body. He even confesses
with not a little reluct-ance that -he-has lefLmosLaLthe-WOrk to
be done by others, claiming only to have opened up the grounds.
Our critical remarks, then, are intended only to fill some of these
gaps, take up some of his hints, and follow out some of his sug-
gestions.
It will, however, be best to leave to the side any and all minor
problems or confusions, and attempt to go straight to the heart
of his inquiry into the body. Our comments, therefore, concern
only what we consider to be the essential theory.
(x) THE RELATION BETWEEN 'FEELING' AND 'ACTING'
Restricting ourselves, then, to the phenomenon, "my body
qua mine,'' there is little doubt what the essential question is for
Marcel: Or, synony-
mously, In virtue of what do I experience my body as mine?
Bergson had recognized the necessity of posing the problem of
the relations of mind and matter in terms of the body. Marcel,
agreeing with this {though he apparently arrived at it inde-
pendently of Bergson), goes a step further: it is not simply a
question of the body, but of etnb-odiment. To talk of "the body as
lived" is to talk of the body embodying me, the one whose
bodyttis.
Although we have been able to delineate four stages of his
analysis, his response to the question is really two-fold: I) on the
one hand, my body is mine, and thus, it embodies me, in virtue
of its being "felt as mine," this "feeling" being described by him
as coenesthetic; 2) on the other, my body is experienced by me
as mine only in so far as it manifests my actions in an immediate
fashion, or by means of "sympathetic mediation." It is, in his
tenns, my body's potential actions, its "potencies," that found
my feeling my body, and thus that found my experiencing of
my body as that which embodies me in the world.
CRITICAL REMARKS
47
when it comes to describing, on the one hand, each of
these phenomena themselVes, -ano on the other, the relation
between them, Marcel seems more inclined to hedge the issues
than to come directly to terms The way be states
them shows this most clearly.
For him, one can only say that if feeling is a function of acting,
then these two are "inseparable." Or, in other terms, "sympa-
thetic mediation" (that between me and my body) is "insepa-
rable" from "instrumental mediation" (that between my body-
as-acting and things-as-acted-upon). (MJ, 247, 258) The former,
we have seen, he calls a "non-mediatizable immediate"; the
latter, on the other hand, is a certain exteriorization of force or
energy. (MJ, 258) Since the former is itself an act, though, we
must distinguish two distinct kinds of acts here: the act by
means of which I grasp my body as mine (i. e., the act which
he calls the "Urgefuhl"), and the exteriorized act, the actual
gearing into the world. He recognizes, however, that it would be
a crucial mistake to interpret these two acts as corresponding to
an "inside" and an "outside." For, as is implied at least in his
analysis, in the first place, just as I cannot sense anything other
titan my body without feeling my body itself (through certain
coenesthesias), so there is no exteriorized act apart from the
fundamental UrgefiiJzl whereby my body is felt as mine. In the
second place, although that is true, my body is felt as mine only
through the act of exteriorizing or emitting a certain force or
energy - the actual gearing into the world with a bodily acting.
But what, after all, is this "inseparability?" Let us grant, for
the moment, that the two phenomena in question are as he
describes them. The question is, are "feeling" and "acting" on
different levels? This would seem to be what Marcel wants to
say when he describes the one (feeling) as a "function" of the
other (acting). On the other hand, when he states that there can
be no "instrumental mediation" without "sympathetic ediation,"
and vice versa, it would be incorrect to say that they are on
different levels. And, if the Urgefuhl is really fundamental for
my apprehension of this body as my body, then in what sense
can he state that this "feeling" is a "function" of "acting?" Is
the relation between these two mediations one of functional
dependency? Finally, is it correct to speak here of "mediations?"
MARCEL
It seems to me that Marcel has confused two very
phenomena. In the first place, t;.kmg these terms in the way in
which Marcel does, if there is no acting without at the same time
feeling, and if there is no feeling without at the same time acting,
cannot beJ aken as a "function,., of the other. That
is, if I can feel my body as mine only in so fat as there is bodily
acting going on, and if this bodily activity could not go on
without my feeling my body as mine - then, it seems to me, we
must speak here of a relation of mutual foundedness. Each of
these is a "function" of the other; an a.rm which I would not
"feel" when it was moved would not be "my "arm, any more
than I would experience as mine an arm which could not be
moved by me.
In the second place, moreover, to interpret this relation (itself
incorrectly described by Marcel) as he does, as "mediating" my
body to me and thereby me to the world and its objects, is to
confuse this phenomenon of mutual foundedness with another,
completely different, phenomenon. The Urge/uhl (whatever may
be its specific nature, and we have not yet turned to this),
whatever else it may do, does not, as Marcel thinks, mediate
my body to me; rather, we must say, it embodies me. Marcel
speaks quite correctly of my itre-incarni as the fundamental
phenomenon here; but he then goes on to say that "feeling''
and "acting" mediate this embodiment, forgetting, apparently,
that embodiment is itself a sui generis type of relation. To say,
in other words, that I experience this body as mine, is to say
that it embodies me immediately.1 There is no room here for
any mediation whatever. Marcel's insistence on this term may
very well be a carry-over from his early, but not completely
successful, struggle with Hegelian idealism.
Now, to say that these two relations, each of which is sui
generis, obtain here, is not to say, as is implied in Marcel's argu-
ment, that there are two acts, the one of "feeling" and the other
of "exteriorization" - and thus, it is incorrect to speak of an
"inseparability.'' Rather, there is only one act, or, rather, there
are two aspects of a single, on-going act; that is to say, the act of
1 See, for example, Husserl, Idem JIU einer reinen
wgiscMn Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Husserliana, Band I V, Marti.nus N1Jhoff (Haag,
1952), pp. 236-47.
-
CRITICAL REMARKS
49
embodinient is a complex, on going affair. On the other hand, just
because we must speak here of an act, that is, of a process, one
which goes on (and goes on, moreover, continuously), we must
say, over and above what has thus far been stated, that em-
bodiment is not an occurrence which is "once done, forever
done." For, it is always possible to become dis-embodied, and
even to become dis-embodied in a partial manner (as, for instance,
by means of a partial paralysis, or artifically by means of an-
esthetization). This indicates, it seems to me, that the fact of
embodiment is descriptively one of animation.: my body is not
just a ''body" (eiti Kerper), but is rather an "animate organism"
(ein Leib). Thus, we can say, to call my body an animate organ-
ism is to say that I am embodied by it by means of a complex
act: this single act reveals (thus far, at least) two components,
feeling and acting, which are related in the relation of niutual
foundedness. The mutual foundedness of feeling and acting,
conversely, or the fact that I always feel my body as mine only
in acting and that in acting I feel my body as mine, is but
another expression for the other aspect of the act of embodiment.
It is in virtue of the mutual foundedness of this feeling and
acting that I experience only this specific animate organism as
mine; but the relation between feeling and acting must not be
confused with the relation of embodiment.
(2) THE MEANING OF BODILY ACTING
Thus far, we have been assuming as given several crucial
phenomena: both the "feeling" and the "acting." Let us now
grant that there is an Urge/fi-hl of some kind (without prejudging
what it might be) and inquire into what Marcel calls "acting,"
namely the exteriorization of a certain force or energy.
We have already suggested briefly that this exteriorization
signifies that my animate organism is given to me as the most
immediate actualization of my volitional activity. As Husserl
expressed it, we saw, my organism is the only object in which I
rnle and gover-n immediately. In this sense, it actualizes my
fundamental "I can." What, we must now ask, is the structure
oi this actualization ? And what does it signify for my organism?
Let us recognize first of all that there is an ambiguity in
Marcel's analysis, one due to his otherwise quite legitimate
50
MARCEL
concern for the "What am I ?" It is not the case that, because
my body is experienced by me as mine, I , this specific person or
ego, grasp what he calls the UrgefuJzl, or even that I can appre-
hend it straightforwardly (and on that basis recognize i t as mine).
I do not say that Marcel argues this way; rather, it seems clear
that he simply takes it for granted. For, in stating that " I feel
my body" as mine, that my body is and so on,
he does not see clearly enough that the most originary conscious-
ness of this body as my animate organism is not at all a spon-
t aneous, active, "Ich-ackt," but is rather a consciousness of it
at an automatic or level.1 That is to say, my organ-
ism is given to me, this concrete person, as having already always
been mine (and thus, for example, I am often astonished over
certain hitherto undiscovered parts of it, or I am often unable
to recognize my hands when I see a picture of them, I find my
recorded voice "str ange," and so on). When I reflectively con-
sider my body as mine, it presents itself as already mine; that is
to say, it has this sense for me. Thus, it seems to me incorrect, or
at least misleading, to say that "I am my body," in whatever
sense. To say this is to confuse the sense or meaning which this
animate organism has for me (namely, "mine"), and the "I"
who recognizes his animate organism as "mine." In other words,
those processes which give this animate organism the sense,
"mine," are not at the same level as those which explicitly
apprehend this animate organism as "mine," those by means
of which it is grasped as "mine": the former are automatic, the
latter spontaneous.
With this clarification, we can now proceed to the phenomenon
of " exteriorization," or, as we prefer to say, of the actualization
of strivings. These go on continuously and in many different
ways throughout the course of my on-going living. And, in the
great majority of cases, I myself neither actively attend to most
of them, nor actively "will" them as such. Concentrating on a
passage in a book, the itchy place on my neck gets scratched
quite automatically, without in the least interrupting the course
of my attention. Walking in the street, my feet quite automatic-
ally push ahead one after the other, while I perchance am busied
in a conversation with my friend. Again, when I advert to my
1 Cf. Husserl, Cart&ian MeditatWrls, op. cit., 38-39.
:
CRITICAL REMARKS
sr
headache, not only does it give itself to my active attendings as
"having been going on all along" (though I was not attending
to it), but also it gives itself with the sense of having been disliked,
having been uncomfortable, and so on, though I was not at the
time actively disliking it .
The distinction between "active" and "automatic" conscious-
ness is not, of course, a rigid one. Described in terms of Bewusst-
seinserlebnisse, some of these show themselves as having an
"ego-quality"; that is, I "live in" some of them, directed toward
their respective objects, while as regards others I am perchance
only marginally aware of their respective objects, and finally,
there are some "in" which I, this person, cannot "live. "1 The
distinction, then, is rather one between two poles of a continuum
than between two sharply distinguished spheres. 2
This distinction holds for the whole sphere of mental activity.
Thus, as Husserl points out, not only are there automatic per-
ceivings (as, when I am perceiving the typewriter, there goes on
an automatic perceiving of the floor beneath my feet, of the
movements of my fingers, and so on), but also there are auto-
matic strivings, likings, dislikings, and so on. s And, among the
automatic intendings it is necessary to distinguish between
"habitual" ways of perceiving, "habitual" attitudes, likes and
dislikes, and the like, and what Husserl calls the sphere of
"primary automaticity." 4 Thus, I may have certain habitual
ways in which I pick up objects which I see (I reach for the book
with my right hand), but the correlation between the tactual
and visual fields is not at the same level. As we shall see, the
phenomenon of exteriorization, of "acting," is fundamentally
encountered in the automatic sphere, and more particularly, it
is descriptively a primarily automatic process.
The point of this all-too-brief discussion is that Marcel ap-
proaches the phenomenon of "acting" at much too high a level:
1
Cf. Husserl, ldeen .ru einer reinen Phdnomenologie und pluinomenologischen
Philosophie, Erstes Buob, M. Niemeyer (Halle a.d.S., i913), 92.
i Cf. Husserl, Formale und Transsend,;uale Logik, M. Niemeyer (Halle a.cl S.,
i929), 3 and 4.
a Cf. Husserl, Erfahru11g und Urteil, Red. und Hrsgn. von L. Landgrebe, Claassen
Verlag (Hamburg, 1954), pp. 73-74
Husserl's term is "Pa.ssivitdJ;" as Prof. Dorion Cairns points out, though, this
does not mean "inert" or "inactive." Hence, the besl translation is "automaticity."
Cf. Carlesian M editaJicms, 38.
MARCEL
"exteriorization" is in the first instance an automatic phenome-
non, such that strivings are actualized immediately by my
organism in an automatic fashion, and only on this basis is it
then possible for me, this concrete person, to advert (zuwenden)
t o my organism and grasp it as ''Me-as-acting," as well as to
develop certain bodily habits, postures, and attitudes.
But there is more to be said here. For, if my body thus gives
itself as the most immediate actualization of my strivings (I
want to pick up my pipe and already my hand moves out and
grasps it), then my body itself has the sense for me of being what
Husserl calls a "Willensorgan". That is to say, my animate
organism is that single body which is movable in a spontaneous
fashion, while all other things can be moved only mediately, that
is, by means of my organism; it is that which produces movements
in other things. In this sense, my organism has the sense of being
a system of "potentialities" or "abilities" by means of which
the automatic, and at a higher level, my spontaneous and active,
strivings are actualized. To the extent that I am embodied by
this body, then, its "powers" (Verm6gm) are my "powers." 1
In short, my organism has the sense "mine," in this respect, in
virtue of the fact that it is automatically constituted (synthesized)
as being that which most immediately actualizes my strivings,
and in particular (though Husserl in this work had not yet
clearly seen this) of automatic strivings.
Thus, the act of embodiment, of the animation of this specific
animate organism, is most immediately accomplished by means
of the actualization of primarily automatic strivings. Hence, we
must say, it is incorrect to say that the Urgef1#,hl is correlated
with "me-as-acting"; the " exteriorization" takes place already,
and fundamentally, at the automatic level, before any " I-
activity" occurs. The relation of mutual foundedness between
the "feeling" and "acting" obtains, then, not between an Ur-
gefultt and the " I, " but rather between the former and certain
automatic processes of consciousness.
In our general conclusions, we shall have to return to this
phenomenon.
L Husserl, Ideen, II, op. cit., p. 152. rt should be noted, though, that here Husserl
had not fully discerned the automaticity of the actualization of strivings. He speaks,
instead, of the "'6ine11 Tell'' as that which h s these "potencies" or "powers." See the
Appendix, p. :a65-66, for the full passage.
CRITI CAL REMARKS
53
(3) THE MEANING OF THE URGEFUHL
However, the above being the case, a further, more basic,
question arises: Granting now that my body is a "Willensorgan,"
what are those "feelings" which arise only by means of my body's
actualization of strivings? For Marcel, we have seen, they are
" coenesthetic," though, again, it must be recognized that he is
as always quite tentative, and only commits himself to this
position several times in his writings. (CF. esp. MJ, 19, and 243)
Elsewhere, he merely describes it as "smtir."
That there are such data is certainly true; but, it seems to me,
there are more fundamental "feelings" which are directly
correlated to the body as a "Willensorgan." Suppose I (to con-
sider an example in the sphere of activity) "will" to close the
door: I set aside whatever I am doing, stand up, cross the room,
and, grasping the door with my hand, swing it shut. Or (to con-
sider an example from automaticity), in the course of my on-
going writing and thinking, "I" reach out and pick up a package
of cigarettes, pull one out, light it and begin to smoke - while
all along continuing my train of thought and perhaps even
writing.
If we examine these "exteriorizations of a certain force" more
carefully, it seems possible to describe their occurrence in more
detail. Willing to close the door, this global volitional conscious-
ness "sets in motion" a whole series of component processes:
laying aside my pen, standing up, walking across the room,
reaching out to grasp the door, swinging my arm ... Similarly,
in automatic strivings, a global volitional consciousness l sets
going a whole series of component processes, all having their
own intrinsic place and significance in the total context of
movement which I called "reaching for my cigarettes."
Looking at any one of these component processes, it presents
itself to reflective observation as a certain "flow" or "pattern"
of movement, essentially connected to the entire context of
movement. More particularly, any one of these actualizations of
striving sets in motion certain patterns of kinaesthetic flows
(Ablaufe).2 Willing to close the door, there is actualized a series
1 Because we call this consciousness "global" does not imply that it is vague or
ambiguous (though it may be); rather, it indicates only that there is a total intention
which_bas component parts.
2
Cf. Husserl, Idem, II, op. ciJ., pp. 56, 128.
54
MARCEL
of kinaesthesias which, as in every case, has an "if-then" style:
"if" my hand is moved (and, with it, "if" its members [fingers]
are moved) in specific ways, "then" my pen will be released and
placed on my desk; "if" other kinaesthesias connected with my
trunk and legs are set in motion, "then" the clair on which I am
sitting moves back and the upright posture is actualized; "if" I
then set in motion strivingly certain locomotive kinaesthesias,
"then" I move across the room; and so on. As is obvious from
our experience, however, we do not have to attend to each phase
of these movements. In other words, this "if-then" style is funda-
mentally automatic, it is the style of experience which conscious-
ness undergoes at every moment, whether or not "I" am actually
engaged in these processes, or whether or not I even can become
so engaged.
The analysis could be detailed much more, showing how each
component pattern of kinaesthesia is constituted as a compenent,
and more particularly, how eaeh be,comes constituted for
consciousness as the actualization of a certain typical kind
of movement (setting in motion such and such kinds of kinaes-
thesias "in" my bead as that which will actualize such and such
types of changes in my visual field, and so on). The point to be
made here, following Husserl's hints in his Ideen, II, though, is
that not only are these kinaesthesias, or kinaesthetic flow-
pattems, functionally correlated with certain W ahrnehmungs-
empfindungen (if I tum my head. in such and such a manner,
then such and such visual "objects" appear)l but also, and more
importantly for our purposes, these kinaesthetic flow-patterns
are themselves; in their correlation with perceptions, experienced
by consciousness, "felt" as Marcel puts it, in the sense of being
urgefuhlt. That is to say, the acflualizauon of strivings in the form
of kinaesthetic flow-patterns (of whatever specific kind, head-
movements, finger-movements, torso-:movements, and the like)
is itself experienced by consciousness as that by means of which it
becomes embodied in that specific "LeibktJrjer" which immediately
actualizes its strivings. by gearing into the world as perceived.
Hence, if we are correct here, it is not at all the case that
coenesthetic data form the Urgefuht for which Marcel seeks as
the fundamental "feeling" in virtue of which my body is experi-
1 Cf. Idun, II, pp. s1-s8, u8.
CRITICAL REMARKS
55
enced as mine. These, if anything, are at a much different ievel
(constitutively) than the kinaesthetic flow-patterns.
We must note, however, that Marcel's analysis of the body as
the "avoir-type" seems to suggest the phenomenon which we are
here pointing out. He maintains that my body is established as
mine by means of a "noyau senti" which, he goes on, is the
"experience. . . of the connection by means of which my body
is mine." (ME, I, u3) This "felt nucleus" establishes my body
as the prototype of all having; "having," in turn, as we have seen,
is "having the power to .... " (pouvoir-type) Thus, this "felt
nucleus" indicates, we may say, that the body as mine is a
unified ensemble of powers or potentiaVities; each particular
"power," in turn (as, for instance, my being able to grasp objects
with my hand), is a particular specification of that unified
context of powers which is my body, (ME, I, 113-n5) that is,
each such power or potency is what it is only within the unified
totality of all my body's potencies. To say, as Marcel does, that
the relation between me and my body is a "sympathetic media-
tion," or that my body is a "non-mediatizable immediate,"
and so on, is, then, to suggest that these organized and unified
potencies (that my body as the "avoir-type" and "poi4voir-type")
are experienced as that which embodies me but which I cannot make
into "objects," in the etymological sense of the term. Seen in this
light, these potencies are indeed "felt," but are not specific types of
coenesthetic data but rather are kinaesthetic flow-patterns which
are experienced or "felt" as that which places me in a world of
objects: they embody me "at" the world by actualizing my
strivings. This, then, is the fundamental signification of what
Marcel calls my "etre-aUrlnonde."
It is not the case, then, that these kinaesthesias are themselves
"objects'' for consciousness; rather, it is by means of them that
consciousness directs itself to "objects" as transcendent to itself;
they are lived, not "looked at." As Husserl points out in the
passages referred to in ldeen, II, the "data" in the various
sensuous fields are given as functionally correlated with the
kinaesthetic flows, in an "if-then" style. Nevertheless, it seems
to me, and I believe this is what Marcel is pointing to (albeit in
a vague way), these kinaesthesias are themselves experienced by
consciousness - such that, as we shall see later on, in every
MARCEL
perceptio1i o/ an "external" object, the orgatiism is always co-
perceived:
in every experience of spatial, corporeal objects, the animate or-
ganism, as the perceptual organ oi the experiencing subject, is co-
perceived "al<mg with it" .... t
Accordingly, not only is my body constituted as a Willensorgan,
as the actualization of automatic strivings, but it becomes
constituted for consciousness (i.e., it acquires the sense) as that
"with" which consciousness perceives, and on that basis, it
becomes that "in" which consciousness "rules and governs im-
mediately.'' My animate organism, thus, is a ''/reibewegtes Sinnes-
organ," both a "Willensorgan" and a "Wahrnehtnungsorgan." 2
To say, then, that I experience my body as mine in so far as
it is "felt" in its exteriorizing of force (Marcel), is to say that my
animate organism ha.S th:e sense "mine," is the experienced
embodiment of consciousness, because it is uniquely singled out s
for my experience as a "freely-moved and -movable organ or
complex of organs'' which at once, and on that basis, actualizes
my strivings and is that by means of which there is a world of
sensuously perceived and perceivable states of affairs.
We have indicated in the preceding pages certain ambiguities
in Marcel's analysis of the body qua mine, and have suggested
that it contains highly suggestive clues which point to a more
detailed explication of this phenomenon. In the sections that
follow, we shall be attempting to determine whether the analyses
of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can take us any further along in
our effort to develop such a detailed theory of embodiment. In
our final conclusions, we shall, of course, have to return to
Marcel and the others in order to state in a more systematic
manner the principle characteristics of this phenomenon which
have been discovered by these thinkers. On that basis we shall
be in a good position to outline systematically a phenomeno-
logical theory of the animate organism.
1
!"en, II, op. cit., p. I4+. This, indeed, explains the mediati:ting role which the
body bas according to Marcel.
Ibid., pp. xs1-s2.
:i Cf. Ca.rwia.ti M edilaiions, op. cit., 4+
PART 11
)
SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE BODY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To understand Sartre's theory of the body, it is necessary to
place it in the context, first of his general ontology and second in
that of his theory of intersubjectivity. In the first place, _as is
well-known, two of the three "ontological dimensions" of the
body- the body-of-the-Other and my body-for-the-Other - make
their appearance, ontologically, only subsequent to the encounter
with the other.l The appearance of the Other as "dans son corps,"
indeed, is itself made possible only in and through my own
"objectite," my own being made an object by the Other's
"look." Making an object of the Other presupposes having been
made an object by him.2
In the second place, Sartre seems to contend that the other,
the first, dimension of the body - my body-for-itself - is as well
subsequent to the encounter with the Other. This would seem
to be the case, on the one hand, in view of the fact that Sartre's
discussion of the body follows his development of the encounter
with the Other. On the other hand, passages like the following
seem to argue as well for this interpretation:
If, therefore, being-looked-at, apprehended in all its purity, is no more
connected to the body of the Other than my consciousness oi being a
consciousness (in the pure effectuation of the cogito) is connected to my
own body - then it is necessary to consider the appearance of certain
objects in the field of my experience (in particular the convergence of the
Other's eyes in my direction) as a pure monition, as the pure occasion for
the realization of my being-looked-at. (EN, 336)
That is to say, the encounter with the Other is, as we shall see
shortly, accomplished ontologically prior to the appearance of
any ontological dimension of the body.
1
L'Etre a le Nianl, Librarie Galliard (Paris, 1943), p. 40s. (Hereafter cited textual-
ly as EN.) Cf. also pp. 335-36.
1
Cf. EN, p. 347. We shall return to these points in the second section of this
chapter. The author is responsible for all translations of Sartre. The original texts of
important passages will be found in the Appendix.
60 SARTRE
Finally, the theory of the Other is .itself but a part of Sartre's
general ontology and cannot be divorced from that. Accordingly,
before we shall able to explicate the theory of the body, we must
consider, though quite briefly, the principle features of his
ontology and of his theory of intersubjectivity.
(x) SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY
The theory of th.is encounter with the Other rests, it seems to
me, on a particular series of oppositions intrinsic to his ontology
and derived from his criticism of the Cartesian cogito: while the
subject-object and object-subject relations are possible, the
subject-subject and object-object relations are impossible. We
shall return to this later in more detail. For the moment, it is
necessary to point out that the possibility and impossibility of
these oppositions rest on a very specific way of regarding "know-
ledge" (a view which, as I hope to show later, is founded on a
transformation of the Cartesian position) :
If I am looked-at, in fact, I have a consciousness of being an object.
But this consciousness can be produced only in and by the existence
of the Other. In this respect, Hegel was right. However, this Other
conscionsness and this Other freedom are never given to me [i.e., there can
be no subject-subject relation] since, if they were, they would be known,
and thus objects, and I would cease to be an object. (EN, 330)
"Knowledge" is defined by the "subject-to-object" relation. As
such, for Sartre, it is subsequent to and founded on the "object-
to-subject" relation (i.e., the Other's making an object of me),
(EN, 347) which is a relation of "being." l
It is therefore necessary to understand Sartre's rejection of the
primacy of "knowledge" in order to explicate meaningfully his
theory of the Other, and therefore his theory of the body. This
rejection is attempted in his famous "Introduction a la Recherche
de l'Etre."
Accepting the Husserlian conception of consciousness as
intentional, Sartre then states, as his point of departure: "If the
essence of the appearance is an 'appearing' (un "paraUre") which
is no longer opposed to any being, there is a legitimate problem
1
"And whenl posit naively tbat it is possible tbat I am (without giving an account
of this) an objective being, I implicitly suppose thereby the exist ence of the t ~
for, bow can T be an object if it is not for a subject? Thus, t he Other is, in the fust
instance, for me the being for whom I am object, that is to say the being by rohom I
acquire my objectivity." (EN, 329)
INTRODUCTION 6r
of the bei1ig of this appearing." (EN, I4) But, he goes on, this
"being of the phenomenon" cannot itself be the "phenomenon
of being''; one cannot pass from the existent to the phenomenon
of being like one passes from "red" to the genus, "redness." On
the one hand, the phenomenon of being cannot be merely one
of an object's properties, since the being of the object is the being
of allits parts eqqally. The phenomenon of being, then, is neither
a particular property of an object, nor is it the genus of which the
being of the phenomenon would be the species. But neither, on
the other hand, can one say that the phenomenon of being is the
essence of the object in question: if by "essence" one means sub-
stantia, then, according to Sartre, it itself would never appear
(since this could be known only by means of attributes) ; if one
means the "meaning" of the object, then, again, it would be
necessary to inquire into the being of this "essence." All one can
say of the object as regards its being is: "it is! " Its only manner
of being is. . . to be. In short, Sartre argues, the existent refers
only to itself, it designates itself as an organized totality of
qualities and determinations. "The existent is a phenomenon;
that is to say, it designates itself as an organized ensemble of
qualities ... Being is simply the condition of all disclosure: it
is 'being-in-order-to disclose' and not 'being-as-disclosed'." *
(EN, rs)
If one were, in the manner of Heidegger, to pass from the ontic
to the ontological, all one would have done is to set the very same
problem back one stage: the phenomenon of being supposedly
reached itself turns out to be but something appearing, something
disclosed, an appearance, "which as such, in turn, requires
a being on the ground of which it could be disclosed." (EN,
ibid.)
With this position, Sartre bas already set the stage for his
criticism of the primacy of knowledge: if, in attempting to make
the phenomenon of being itself appear, all I acquire is, again, the
being of a phenomenon (having its own phenomenon of being as
its condition of appearance) , then it must be that the phenome-
non of being cannot be made an obfect for inspection or reflection.
It cannot be placed with.in knowledge, since knowledge requires
just that distance. In Sartre's terms, the phenomenon of being
is "transphenomenal,'' and since knowledge is only and essential-
62 SARTRE
ly "phenomenonal" 1 (a relation of consciousness to a phenome-
non), being is "more fundamental" than knowledge: " ... The
being of the phenomenon, although coextensive with the phe-
nomenon, must escape the phenomenal condition - which is,
to exist only for as much as it is disclosed- and, consequently, it
overflows and founds the knowledge which one has of it."
(EN, 16) Hence, the being of the appearing is not identical with
the appearing itself. Sartre is not, however, arguing for a sort of
ontological esse est percipi. He rejects this possibility for two
reasons:
(1) As regards the percipere, one can and must always recognize
that every knowledge of something is itself something that is.
Knowledge itself is, and as such "the being of knowledge cannot
be measured by knowledge; it escapes the [condition of the]
'percipi'." (EN, 17) Similarly, if one maintained that being is
revealed in acting, "still it would be necessary to establish the
being of the acting before action." (EN, 17, footnote l) Hence,
Sartre concludes, the being of the percipere must itself be trans-
phenomenal.
This transphenomenal being, neverthless, is the being of the
knowing subject; and, since its mode of being is precisely to-
be-consciousness (since knowing refers to knowledge, which
refers to consciousness), "Consciousness is not a mode of particu-
lar knowledge, called intimate awareness (sens intime) or know-
ledge of self, but rather the dimension of the transphenomenal
being of the subject." (EN, 17) Thus, consciousness is the being
of the subject, and not its being-known; and, knowledge is not
primary, but is grounded on being - consciousness is something
more than a mere knowledge turned back on itself (reflection).
To be a particular knowledge, consciousness must first of all be;
as regards its knowing, we must then say, Sartre argues, that
knowing is the mode of being of conscim,sness.
Now, consciousness, as Husserl had seen, is essentially in-
tentional and positional: it transcends itself in order to reach
an object and is, Sartre's characterization continues, exhausted
therein. That is to say, as Sartre interprets this, it is nothing but
1 In spite of the Kantian tone of this argument, Sartre would, I believe, deny any
parallel between his terms and Kant's "phenomenal.noumenal" distinction, main-
tainiDg that "phenomenal" derives from Husserl What "transphenomenal" can
mean, however, is a difficult question, as we shall see.
INTRODUCTION
this transcendence of itself toward objects. Though not all
consciousness is knowledge, all knowing consciousness can only
be a knowledge of objects. "However," Sartre contends,
the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be
consciousness of its object is that it be a consciousness of itself as being
that knowledge. It is a necessary condition: for if my consciousness were
not a consciousness of being a consciousness of a table, it would then be a
consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. Or, if you
will, it would be a consciousness which would be ignorant of itself, an
unconscious consciousness - which is absurd. It is a sufficient condition:
for my consciousness of being a consciousness of that table suffices in1act for
my being a consciousness of it. That certainly does not suffice to perm.it
me to affum that that table exists in itself - but rather that it exists for
me..1(EN,18)
This consciousness of being consciousness of ... , is not itself
reduceable to an idea of an idea ... , a knowledge of a knowledge
... ; this would merely introduce into consciousness the "subject-
object duality, which is typical of knowledge." (EN, 19) Further-
more, to interpret this type of consciousness as knowledge
involves the dilemma: either we stop arbitrarily at one term in
the series - known, the knower known, the knower known by
the knower, and so on - which is absurd and unjustifiable; or
else we become involved in an infinite regress - which for Sartre
is equally absurd. Thus, "if we want to avoid the regression to
infinity, there must be an immediate, noncognitive relation of
the self to itself." (EN, 19) Consciousness of self is not dual:
every positional consciousness of an object, in Sartre's terms, is
at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself as being
that specific consciousness which it is. This condition of every
consciousness, then, makes it possible for reflection itself to occur:
"there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the
Cartesian cogito." (EN, 20) Descartes' mistake, indeed, Sartre
pointed out in his essay on the transcendental ego,
2
was to have
believed that the ego and the ego cogito are on the same level,
when in truth, at the level of non-positional consciousness, there
is no ego.
However, Sartre continues, it is not that there are two distinct
consciousnesses joined together in some fashion. Rather, every
l Sartre does not attempt to justily or establish this position .here; this task is
reserved for the first few sections of the text.
' The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press (New Yorlt, 1957), cf.. pp. 50-53.
SARTRE
particular consciousness whatever is necessarily a non-positional
consciousness of itself, and thus Sartre elects to use parentheses
to express this ontological fact: consciousness of an object is at
the same time non-positional consciousness (of) itself as being
consciousness of the object. This, in fact, is "the only mode of
existence which is possible fO'T a consciousness of something."
(EN, 20)
Accordingly, if consciousness is in this manner essentially an
intentional directedness to objects and a pre-reflective conscious-
ness (of) itself, the essence of consciousness is to exist in this
double manner: as Sartre will say, consciousness exists itself.
Finally, consciousness as thus conceived exists as an absolute
interiority: it can be limited only by consciousness, and it is
through-and-through a consciousness (of) itself as being conscious-
ness of objects.
(2) The second reason Sartre refuses to accept the Berkeleyian
dictum as applicable to his own ontology stems from the being
of the percipi. Although the being of consciousness has been
uncovered, can consciousness provide the foundation of what
appears to it qua appearance? The percipi refers to the percipiens,
and thence we arrived at the being of consciousness; but what
of the being itself of the appearing: can consciousness provide
this?
The being of the thing perceived is not r educeable to any of
the adumbrations of it, for it (e.g. the table) is perceived in each
of these synthetically connected adumbrations. "The table
exists before consciousness and cannot be assimilated to the
knowledge which is had of it-for otherwise it would be conscious-
ness, that is to say a pure immanence, and it would disappear as
table." (EN, 24) Thus, it is legitimate and necessary, in Sartre's
view, to seek the being of the percipi. Even if it is rel::i.tive to the
percipiens, to the knowing of it, it is still necessary to seek
beyond its " being-known" for its "being."
If, as Sartre claims (but does not, it should be noted, establish),
the being of the percipi is passivity (a "doubly relative phenome-
non" - relative to an activity on the passive thing, and relative
to the existence of the passive thing itself which suffers the
activity}, then consciousness, which.is pure activity, can in no way
act on it, on a passivity, nor can the passive thing genuinely
INTRODUCTION
65
modify or act on consciousness (as, for instance, Descartes had
maintained). Consciousness, Sartre contends, is "complete
activity, all spontaneity. It is precisely because it is a pure
spontaneity, because nothing can get a bite on it, that conscious-
ness cannot act on anything." (EN, 26) Hence, the dictum,
esse est percipi, cannot be correct.
Furthermore, he argues that Husserl's attempt to solve this
problem by introducing passivity into the noesis (in the form of
the non-intentive component of the Erlebnisstrlim, the hyletic
data) is to no avail. Consciousness does not create them, and,
for that matter, it does not even perceive them as such, since
they are forthwith construed (aufgefasst) as appearances of
objects. Consciousness transcends them towards objects: where,
then, do these beings come from? If they are en-soi, then the
identically same problem reappears again: How can a pure
spontaneity act on them? 1
Thus, the problem remains: What is the being of the percipi ?
Being passive, it cannot be relative to the percipiens, for it
exists whether known or not. This being cannot be reduced to
a series of appearences of being; the being of the phenomenon is
not the phenomenon of being.
At this point, Sartre introduces his well-known "ontological
proof" in order to establish the transphenomenal being of the
phenomenon. The clue to this "proof" is precisely the pre-
reflective being of the percipiens.
To say that consciousness is intentional, Sartre believes, means
that either consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object,
or that is by essence a relation to a transcendent being. Sartre
argues that the first possibility destroys itself: subjectivity,
being essentially a pure interiority, all activity and spontaneity,
cannot "part from itself in order to posit a transcendent object,"
in such a way that impressions of it are made into qualities of an
1 Sartre' s dlscussion of this seems to involve a serious ambiguity in the term, "act."
Putting it in terms of activitypassivity, especially in regard to the Hussetlian
analysis of hyletic data, merely confuses the issues. There is no question at all, for
Husserl, of consciousness in some magical fashion acting on (in the sense of effectively
modifying) .hyletic data. Rather, consciousness intentively construes them. 1.e., they
are components of the Erlebni$$lrlim, the non-intentive components. Thus, if " act"
means "intend," there is no problem; and, if "act" means "effectively alter or
modify,'' there is no problem, since Husserl never claims this a n y w a ~ As we sball see,
this is Sartre's own problem, one generated strictly from his own ontology.
66 SARTRE
object. (EN, 27) But if one, with Husserl, nevertheless wishes
to make the being of the phenomenon depend on consciousness,
then the object becomes, not the expected presence (the object
as presented to consciousness "in person"). but rather an absence.
The object is not wholly before consciousness at any one moment,
but is rather only horizonally intended: "the" object (and by
this Sartre seems to mean only sensuously perceivable objects,
a limitation which weighs heavily against his entire discussion
of Husserl - in addition to other points), Sartre seems to argue,
is "present" only horizonally, and hence the "present" intending
of it is an intending of an absence. These intending are thus, he
says, "empty," they are intentive of a "non-being" (i.e. , "the"
object itself), and are thus .intentive of an absence.1
Now, while it is evident that Sartre is quite unfair to the
Husserlian theory of intentionality, Sartre's " ontological proof"
does not depend upon whether Husserl says what Sartre says
Husserl maintains. Rather, it swings on a specific way of inter-
preting and transforming the intentionality of consciousness, on
a specific transformation of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality.
As Maurice Natanson has shown,2 Sartre is most impressed with
the non-egological theory of consciousness developed by Husserl
in the first edition of his Logische Untersuchungen. For Sartre,
this conception is interpreted as "insisting on the cogivenness of
object and consciousness." s Husserl's emphasis on the noematic
Without going int o the matter in detail, it must be pointed out here that Sartre's
treatment of Husserl's theory or intentionality is not a little barbaric: "Pour Husserl,
. . . !'animation du noyau hylet:ique parlesseules intentions qui peuvent trouver leur
remplissement (Erfall1mg) dans cette hyle ne samait suffire A nous faire sortir de la
subjectivite. Les intentions ventablement objectivantes, ce sont Jes intentions vides,
celles qui vlsent par deta !'apparition et subjective la totalite in.finie de la serle d'appa-
rltion presentc et subjective la totaJite infinie de la serie d'apparitions . . Prescntes,
ces impressions - fussent-elles en nombre infini - se fondraient dans le subjectif, c'est
leur absence qui lenr donne l'etre objectiL Ainsi l'etre de l'objet est un pur
(EN, 27-28).
Among other things, It makes no sense, for Husserl, to speak of "empty" Intentions
in this respect, just as il makes no sense to speak of "the" object as an "absence." It
is Sartre's ontology which requires this int erpret ation. For, the object is "present,"
for Husserl, precisely as borizonally predelineated as the object of future perceivings,
or other intendings, of it as the same object. Finally, as we saw, Sartre's treatment of
"hyle" is hardly Husserl's.
2 .M. Natanson, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and Sartre on
Intentionality," The Modem Schoolmari, VoL x:s.x:vii (November, 1959), pp. 1-10.
' Ibid. , p. 3. Natanson's reference is to Sartre, "A Fundamental Idea of the
Phenomenology of Husserl : Int entionality," Situations, I, Gallimard (Paris, 1947),
pp. 31-35.
INTRODUCTION
aspect of the intentional stream, Natanson continues, becomes
transformed by Sartr e into a philosophy of nihilation. For
Sartre, in truth,
. . . consciousness is an irreducible fact which we can characterize
only through metaphors that suggest its thrusting, volatile nature.
Knowing is like exploding; mind is centrifugal; consciousness is a vortex;
awareness is like a combat. Here Sartre is struggling to rid epistemology of
the metaphysical incubus of knowledge as possession. For Sartre, one does
not have knowledge; one bursts out in acts of knowing toward the object
known. Consciousness fires itself toward its mark.
1
The phenomenological theory of intentionality is to begin with,
for Sartre, an existential theory; he never fustifies this, however.
To say, for him, that consciousness is consciousness of something,
is to say that consciousness explodes onto the world, a world
which is hostile and restive to consciousness, but toward which
consciousness is essentially doomed to burst.
2
Hence, when
Sartre writes, in L'Etre et le Neant, that "consciousness is born
carried onto a being which it is not," (EN, 28) we should think
rather of Sartre's transformation of intentionality, than of
Husserl's own theory. Sartre means that consciousness, in its
pre-reflective, non-positional thrust outward, encounters a
being which it is-not, but which it demands as its own sui:port -
and this demand, for Sartre, emerges from the very essence and
being of consciousness as intentive:
Absolute subjectivity can be constituted only in the face of something
disclosed to it, immanence can be defined only in the seizing of something
transcendent to it ... consciousness implies in its being a being which is
not consciousness, a transphenomenal being. (EN, 29)
" Being," thus, gives itself to consciousness as having already
been before the burst of consciousness onto it. Accordingly, for
Sartre, "consciousness is a being such that, in its being, its being is in
question insofar as this being implies a being which is other than it." *
(EN, 29) This is his "ontological proof," and, as is now clear, it
rests on a conception of consciousness as a kind of being whose
destiny is to be shot into the midst of the world - the absolute
Natanson, ibid. Merleau-Ponty, as well, attempts to existentialize 'Husserl's
phenomenology, in much the same manner.
2 Cf. Sartre's SituaJion, I, article, pp. 32-33: "To know is to 'burst forth toward,'
t o wrench onescli away from the sticky gastric intimacy in order to shoot, over there,
beyond the self, towards that which is not sell, over there, close by the tree and yet
outside of it, for it escapes me and repulses me and I can no more lose myself in i t
than it can be diluted in me . .. " (Translat.ion by Mr. Stanley Pullberg.)
68 SARTRE
opposite of consciousness - which is the "support" for this pure
thrusting outward. Thus, as it seems to me, there is a "proof"
here in precisely the same sense in which we would say that a
target is the mark for the arrow, and therefore this "proof"
is hardly a proof at all: the necessity for a being which is abso-
lutely other than consciousness, and with which consciousness
can have absolutely nothing to do, is not at all demonstrated
from the nature of consciousness (as intentional), but is rather
already included in the very conception of intentionality which
Sartre presupposes. If not a petitio principii, this argument is at
least, not an argument, but a simple definition of terms: being is
as Sartre describes it only if one accepts his definition of in-
tentionality.
This d0es not mean that Sartre's ontology must thereby be
rejected. It does mean, though, that the claim for a proof of its
fundamental premises from the phenomena themselves does
not stand. For, as we shall emphasize later on, if "being" is an
"en soi," is "transphenomenal," then, by virtue of the very
essence of intentionality, this is a noematic-objective sense, an
intended status endowed on it by consciousness. Sartre, far from
"correcting" phenomenology (as he claims), departs from it at
the outset.
In any case, it is clear that, on the basis of his interpretation of
intentionality, Sartre will not accept the Husserlian notion of
phenomenological reduction: it is, Sartre believes, a violation
of the principle of intentionality to make of the intended object
a mere irreality. (Cf. EN, 28) This is, he states, to rob it of its
being.I What we must recognize, Sartre argues, is that conscious-
ness in its originary explosion onto being does not constitute it,
but meets, or encounters, it, and thus, "The transphenomenal
being of that which is for consciousness is itself in itself." (EN,
29) Sartre's criticism of Husserl at this point rests on the phe-
nomenon of transcendence, as Sartre understands this: conscious-
ness, being essentially this transcending thrust outward, cannot
be submitted to a "reduction" without losing precisely that
transcendence. In fact, however, what one must say regarding
this criticism is that it reveals all the more Sartre's own funda-
mental assumptions regarding being-in-itself. His efforts to
1 Natanson, qp. cit., pp. 6-1.
INTRODUCTION 69
"correct" Husserl, as Natanson points out, simply miscarry.I
The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness,
says Sartre, simply is; all descriptions of it are so many meta-
phors, which, like Rocquentin's descriptions of the bus-seat, in
La Nausie, "refuse to go and put (themselves) on the thing."
Our words hang helpless in the air: "Things," Rocquentin
exclaims, "are divorced from their names. They are there,
grotesque, headstrong, gigantic, and it seems ridiculous to call
them seats or say anything at all about them: I am in the midst
of things, nameless things."
The en-soi has neither "inside" nor "outside," but is the solid,
the slimy, the packed; it has no otherness, but is full positivity;
thus, all we can say is that en-soi is, and is neither possible nor
impossible: "Being is. Being is in itself. Being is what it is. "2
(EN, 34)
(2) THE THEORY OF THE OTHER
We stated at the beginning of this exposition that Sartre's
theory of "the look" depends upon a particular series of relations
derived from his criticism and interpretation of Descartes'
cogito, ergo sum. Descartes, says Sartre, included too much in this
cogito, for he assumed that the "I" was on the same level as
the "think." The cogito is a reflective operation, a specific
consciousness of a consciousness: I now reflect on and grasp as
apodictic the consciousness which thinks. But this reflection it-
self is not the consciousness reflected on: "Thus the conscious-
ness which says I think is precisely not the consciousness which
thinks. Or rather it is not its own thought which it posits by this
thetic act." a
While the certainty of the cogito is indeed absolute, there are
in iact two consciousnesses involved therein: a reflective
consciousness of, and a consciousness reflected on. Whereas
every consciousness is a consciousness of something, it is not a
thetic consciousness of itself (an explicit positing of itself), bt
rather it is at the same time a non-positional consciousness (of)
1
11'id., pp. 8-9. " ... Sartre's determination lo rescue Husserl from himsell blinds
hiin to the very subjectivity existentialism seeks." (p. 9)
: It would be of great interest to compare this posillon with the ontology of
Pannenides, though this is not the place for iL
3 Sartre, Transundence of the Ego, qp. cit., p. 45.
SARTRE
itself. Hence, the consciousness which thinks has no "!," but is
rather the pure thrust of consciousness to its object; this
consciousness, however, being a consciousness of . .. , is as well
a non-positional consciousness (of) itself, and thus it is, Sartre
says, a sort of cogito - it is, precisely, what he calls a "pre-j
reflective cogito," 1 as we already saw.
Now, if consciousness is thus originarily this explosive upsurge
toward the en-soi, it is itself a nothingness; that is, it is not a
substance, but is rather a pure flux, a pure interiority whose
destiny is to be locked in a continual struggle with what it is not,
the en-soi. The something of which consciousness is conscious, is,
"prior to all comparison, prior to all construction, that which is
present to consciousness as not being consciousness." (EN, 222)
There is, to be sure, a constitutive relation between consciousness
and its objects, but fundamentally this constitution takes place
not as regards these objects, but as regards consciousness:
Th: original relation of presence, as the foundation of knowledge, is
negative. But, as negation comes to the world by the for-itself, and as the
thing is what it is (in the absolute indifference of identity), it cannot
be the thing which posits itself as not being the for-itself. The negation
comes from the for-itself itself ... But by the origin.al negation, it is the
for-itself which constitutes itself as not being the thing. (EN, ibid.)
Every consciousness of something presupposes this negation,
but there are not here two processes. For a consciousness to be
consciousness of something, it must at the same time be a pre-
reflective consciousness (of) itself as being this specific conscious-
ness; but this means, as I understand Sartre, that the pre-
reflective consciousness (of) itself is a consciousness (of) itself as
not-being the object. Thus, the consciousness is complex, but
there are not two separate consciousnesses. If, then, we call the
consciousness of, a "knowing" in the widest sense, we must call
the consciousness (of), a relation of being: it constitutes conscious-
ness as not being the object known. Hence, knowledge is not
primary. Knowing, for Sartre, is intrinsically a subject-to-object
relation, as we saw. We can n9w see that he means that in order
for there even to be a "subject" related to an "object," the
"subject" must first be constituted as not-being the "object,"
and only thereby can the "object" emerge as something standing
before or over against the "subject."
1
Ibid., pp. S)-54.
INTRODUCTION 71
This stratum of being, Sartre argues, is the fundamental
relation" of pour-soi to en-soi: the "first bond" is "a bond of
being." 1 Thus, as regards the relation of ponr-soi to en-soi,
pour-soi is always in the relation of "subject-to-object." Hence,
pour-soi, or consciousness, is always a knowing, in ~ e widest
sense, of en-soi; knowing, that is to say, is for Sartre a mode of
being, precisely that mode of being belonging to the pour-soi:
a presence to a thing as being a consciousness of it, and thus as
not being it.
This signifies that in that type of being which is called knowing, the
only being which one can encounter and which is perpetually there is the
known. The knower is not, he is not able to be apprehended. He is nothing
othe.r than that which brings it about that there is a being-there of the
known, a presence-for; of itseli the known is neither present nor absent, it
simply is. But this presence of the known is presenc;e to nothing, since the
knower is a pure reflection of a non-being. This presence appears, then,
across the total translucency of the knower known, an absolute presence.
(EN, 226)
Beneath thls relation, as the originary bond to being, is the re-
lation of non-being; thus, the originary bond to being is not
positive or affirmative, but rather negative, which falls on the
side of consciousness itself by virtue of its being consciousness
(of) itself.2 With this brief exposition of the meaning of know-
ledge for Sartre, we can now pass on to the explication of the
problem of Others, which we can state only in its essentials in
this study.
To understand this theory, it seems to me that two points
must be kept firmly in mind. First, as N atanson has pointed out,
Sartre's conception of conscience is a bottom a transformation of
the early Hussetlian theory of intentionality. Second, however,
to this we must add that Sartre's ontology is as well derived
from his criticism and subsequent transformation of the Cartesian
dualism. We have outlined his criticism of Descartes' cogito.
The transformation takes place, not only with regard to the
notion of the pre-reflectiye cogito (which involves the acceptance
of Descartes' dualism), but also (and more importantly, for hls
1 "Le lJOursoi est hors de lui dans !'en-sol, puisqu'il se fait defLnir par ce qu'il n'est
pas; le lien premier de l'ensoi aupoursoi est done un lien d'Mre." (EN, 225)
~ Sartre departs fundamentally from Husserl at this point as well: for Kusserl the
fundamental stratum of consciousness is aftimlative; negation is founded on this. Cf.
Husserl, ~ e n zu einer rtinen Pluinomenologie und pl11inomenologischen Philcsophie,
Erstes Buch, M. Niemeyer (Halle a .d.S., 1913), 106, pp. 218-219.
72 SARTRE
theory of Others) with what we would call an intensification of
the Cartesian dualism.
This intensificationhas two sides. On the one hand, by placing
the cogito at the pre-reflective, the pre-cognitive, level, and. by
taking this level of consciousness as the being of consciousness, a
pure flux wJtlch explodes consciousness outward and which
defines it as a nothingness, consciousness becomes conceived as
an unbreakable, irreducible, impenetrable interiority - one which
cannot by its very being act on anything save itselt which cannot
determine anything except consciousness: '' ... consciousness is
consciousness through and through. It can therefore be limited
only by itseli" (EN, 22)
Even Descartes' dualism had "ideas" which bridged the gap
between tile res extensa and the res cogitans - though, to be sure,
only by way of God. But, ior Sartre, consciousness has no such
crutch: being this intentional blast with no " within" and no
"without," consciousness can become entangled with being only
in a "magical" manner, that is, by not-being it. For itself, it
cannot in any manner be or bec.ome en-s.oi. How such an en-
counter could ever take place is, to be sure, the difficulty in
Sartre' s ontology - which, in the end, rests its ease whole and
entire on "the prodigous power of the negative," asHegelhaclsaid.
Unable to establish any sort of "external" (spatial) relations to
en-soi, pour-soi encounters it only by way of an "internal" re-
lation, the only .kind ofrelation possible forit (since it is, precisely
a closed interiority) - the only internal relation, in turn, is
negation. Hence, the immense gulf between the two is radicalized
by Sartre to a point inconceivable for Descartes: the gulf is,
precisely ... nothing, and this is the whole magic of being and
consciousness for Sartre's ontology. Beginning from the cogito,
Sartre widens the separation between being and consciousness,
and by so doing reifies both.
On the other hand, by consciousness in this manner,
becomes, in its being, the radical exclusion of all
objectivity-for-itself: it can in no way, being essentially subject,
become an object for itself:
... Even if I could attempt to make an object of myself, I would already
be me at the heart 0f that object :which I am, andat the very center of that
object I woula have to be the subject who regards it [a.S object] ... (But)
to be object is precise1y not-to-be-me . ... (EN, 298)
..
INTRODUCTION
73
Just in so far as I am subfect, Sartre states, I cannot be object:
"subject" and "object" are radically and mutually exclusive
because, before becoming poles of knowledge, they are two
ontologicallty separate modes of being. And, as we have pointed
out, so far as the pour-soi - en-soi relation is concerne,d, were
this the only type of experience, the pour-soi would forever
remain subject. For even as regards the pour-soi's reflection on
itself (calling into question its own being in so far as it implies a
being which it is-not), this ekstasis is by essence a failure:
The contradiction is ilagrant: in order to be able to apprehend my
transcendence it wotild be n ecessary that I transcend it. However,
precisely, my own transcendence can only transcend; Tam it, I cannot
make use of it in order to constitute it as a transcendence transcended. 1
am condemned perpetually to bemy own nihilati0n. In a word, reflection
is the reflected-on. (EN, 359)
Pour-soi is condemned to be forever subject. Accordingly,
Sartre has transformed the Cartesian cogito into a doctrine
which makes Descartes' ' 'subjectivity'' seem like a naive realism:
consciousness is absolute interiority, and it is this as the radical
exclusion of itself as an object for itself. Whatever else being is,
it is, and consciousness is-not.
It is in this no-man's land of the radical intensification and
rigidification of the Cartesian dualism that Sartre places his
theory of the Other. Although everything said of consciousness
thus far remains true, it is m:vertheless the case, Sartre contends,
that consciousness does experience itself as being-an-object. lf,
nevertheless consciousness is essentially subject (pour-soi), and
if being this essentially excludes its own being-an-object for
itself at the same time, then the decisive question is how it is
possible that consciousness can become an object, can experience
itself as object. Since nothing can determine consciousness except
consciousness, and since it is ontologically impossible for
consciousness ever to be given to itself as an object, then it must
be that another consciousness has emerged and taken this first
consciousness as an object! Finally, this being the case, something
momentous has happened to consciousness: still being unable to
apprehend itself as object, it nevertheless happens that it has
become an object for an Other consciousness. This means then
that a new dimension of being bas emerged for it. Consciousness
-
74
SARTRE
has ceased to be exclusively for-itself and now has become as
well for-Others. This argument seems to be, so far as I can
determine, not only implicitly followed by Sartre (implicitly, for
he never states it as such), but more, necessitated by his very
starting-point (and it is for this reason primarily that we have
occupied ourselves up to now with an explication of that starting-
point). Consider, for instance, the following remark:
But if, precisely, to be object is not-to-be-me, the fact of being an object
for consciousness radically modifies consciousness - not in what it is for
itself, but in its appearance to the Other ... In a word, the /or-itself as for
itself unknowable by the Other. The object which I apprehend under the
name of the Other appears to me under a radically dilf erent form. The
Other ls not /or himself as he appe.ars to me; I do not appear to myself as I
am /or the Other. I am as well incapable of apprehending myself for myself
as I am for the Other, as of apprehending what the Other is for hi,mself
beginning from the Other-object which appears to me ... It is this which
w&shall call their ontological separation. (EN, 298-99)
In other words, it is first of all due to consciousness' experiencing
of itself as an object that the Other makes his appearance; for,
consciousness cannot experience itself as object for itself, and it
cannot be an object for another object I-therefore there must be
an Other consciousness.
The problem thus becomes one of determining the nature of
this modification, ho\v it arises, what it is, and how it affects the
being of consciousness. With respect to the problem of the body,
this discussion is decisive. For, he argues, the relation with the
Other (being one which is of necessity "internal"), and the body
being essentially something "external" ("in space"), the body
of the Other and my own body can emerge only after comiection
with the Other himself has already been established. The distinction
between the Other and myself, Sartre contends against what he
takes to be Husserl's position, is one
which does not come from the exteriority of our bodies, but from the
simple fact that each of us exists m interiority, and that a valid knowledge
of interiority can take place only in interiority - which in principle
prohibits all knowledge of the Other as he knows himself, that is, as he is.
(EN, 290)
2
Again, he continues,
1 " I cannot be an object for an object." (EN, 314)
2
Though a thorough critical analysis of Sartre's theory of the aUer ego would take
us too far afield, it is necessary to indicate at least several points. Fir.a, Sartre's
interpretation of Husserl, in addition to the obvious fact that. be does not present the
/
INTRODUCTION
75
Jn f<Ut, our experience presents us only with living and
individuals; but, fo principle it is neoessary to remark that the Other IS
object for me because he is Other and not because on
occasion of a body-object. Otherwise, we would fall back into the spatial-
izing" illusion .... " (EN, 297) l
As Merleau-Ponty will point out, however, it is unintelligible
how consciousness could ever experience anything other than itself,
much less an Other's look, were it not already embodied, which
means experiencing itself as embodied. Because of this, as we
shall see, Merleau-Ponty justifiably rejects the Sartrean analysis.
Interiority is for Sartre primary; and extemality arises only
after the fundamental encounter with the Other. Since, for him,
"The Other is encountered, and not constituted," (EN, 307) and
since the fundamental stratum of this encounter is being (and not
knowing), then it follows that "I must, to the contrary, establish
myself in -my being and posit the problem of the Other beginning
from my being. In a word, the only certain point of departure is
the interiority of the cogito." (EN, 300) Thus, as we have pointed
out, his theory of Others rests on his implicit transformation and
intensification of the Cartesian dualism.
By starting from the cogito, indeed, Sartre insists that this
means "that each must be able, beginning from his own interior-
ity," and not, he emphasizes, from the body,
to find the being of the Other as a transcendence which the
very being of that in teriori ty. . . The dispersion struggl7 of
ness will remain what they are: we will have sunply discovered this
foundation and genuine domain. (EN, 300)
latter's theory of intersubjectivity in sufficient detail, suffers as well from certain
misunderstandings deriving froin Sartre's own transformations of intentionality and
bis intensification of the Cartesian dualism. To be sure, a full phenomenology of the
phenomenon of intersubjectivity is a chapter still to be but, ev.en !he sketches
of it in Husserl's work, especially in tbe last of his Cartosiat1 Meditations, hardly
permits one to say, with Sartre, that the Other, for Hussccl, is constituted by means
of external relations between bodies. This is far too simplistic. Again, to say that the
Other is not constituted but encountered (EN, '.307) is to misunderstand the meaning
of constitution; to constitute is not. to create, as Sartre seems to think, but to bestow
sense upon by means of intentivo syntheses. We return to this problem in Part TII.
Second, Sartre's theory is itself guilty of ontological "optimism," in the sense in
whlcb be accuses Heidegger. As Alfred Schiltz bas shown, to say that the Other
emerges through my experiencing myseH as object (iri shame) is to assume beforehand
that the Other is aJtu ego. Cf. Schutz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter go," PPR, Vol.
ix, No. 2 (December, 1948), pp. 184- 198.
1 Loe. cit.
SARTRE
By placing the problem at the level of interiority, that is to say,
Sartre believes that we shall have discovered the true ground and
foundation of this contest which is intersubjectivity.
In terms of the foregoing it is possible to determine what a
valid theory of Others must accomplish. (r) There can be no
question of "proving" the existence of Others, precisely because
we are already always with Others. That is, we do not in our
concrete experience conjecture or argue about Others' existence.
Rather we encounter them, they are already there for us, and we
experience onrselves as being-objects for them. "Proof" is a
matter of knowledge, whereas the Other is he whom I affirm,
and the theory of Other has as its task the examination of this
affirmation. . . and only this. (2) The only possible point of
departureforthis examination is the cogito ,for, as we know already,
" ... what we call, for lack of a better way, the Cogito of the
Other's existence, confounds itself with my own Cogito." (EN,
308) I find the Other at the heart of my own interiority. (3) As
we emphasized, the Other, as Other conscicmsness (pour-soi),
cannot be at first an "object" for my consciousness; he arises
as Other only by means of his being "interested" in me, by hls
making an object of me. (4) There is then a reciprocal 1iegative
relation within the two-fold interiority of I and Other, such that
the Other, being he who is not-me, and I being for him a "not-me,"
each of the two terms constitutes itself as such by actively
denying itself as being the Other. Thus the multiplicitly of
Others is a totality on which no "point of view" is possible; to
achieve such a perspective one would have to break out of the
reciprocal negations, and this, even if it were possible, would
simply destroy what is to be observed. Thus, Sartre believes that
there can be no question here of a phenomenological epoche (as
he understands it); the problem of Others is a nonrphenome-
nological one.1
With this problem thus formulated, he goes on to analyze the
'way in which the Other emerges for consciousness. Having
already stated the foundations for this analysis, we need only
summarize here.
Traditional theories, Sartre argues, misfired at the outset by
1 Again, Sartre's interpretation of phenomenology is highly questionable; a full
demonstration of this, though, would require much more than we can here do.
,
INTRODUCTION
77
taking the "subject-to-object" relation as the primary one, one
established by means of the sensuous perception of the Other's
body. This approach misfired, he believes, because it was not
realized that sensuous perception is itself founded on a more
primary relation: the "subject-to-object" relation to the Other
is founded on the Other's making an object of me by way of his
"Look," and this is a relation, not of knowing, but of being. If
the other is he who sees, or can see, me and what I see,
my fundamental connection with the Other-subject must be able to
lead me back to my permanent possibility of being-seen by the Other. It
is in and by the revelation of my being-an-object for the Other that I must
be able to apprehend the presence of his being-a-subject ... (For) I cannot
be an object for an object ... And, moreover, my objectivity cannot itself
be derived, /or me, from the objectivity of the world since, precisely, I
am the one by whom there is a world ... the "being-seen-by-the-Other" is
the trnth of "seeing-the-Other."* (EN, 314)
1
It is fundamentally through sharne that this being-for-Others
emerges. (EN, 275-r6, 348-so) Indeed, it seems to me, this is so
because of the very way in which Sartre sets up the problem,
and not so much perhaps because of the nature of the pheno-
mena themselves. Consciousness, being a pure interiority
which is for-itself and is its own nothingness, suddenly finds
its interiority compromised, disintegrated, robbed of its integrity
by the Other's look. By thus causing my "being-for-Others"
to emerge, the Other's look constitutes the consciousness
"looked-at" to be something - viz. the object-looked-at. This is
to say that the pure transcendence which pour-soi is has itself
become transcended by the Others' transcendence; hence,
pour-soi becomes the being who is looked-at in the mode of
en-soi.:
for the Other, I am seated just like that ink-well is on the table; for.the
Other, I am bent over the key-hole, just as that tree is bent by the wind.
(EN, 320-21)
Losing its interiority from within by the Other's look, conscious-
ness experiences itself as robbed of its own intrinsic integrity,
that is to say, it experiences itself as shamed: it has fallen from
its destined place.
1 This central passage demonstrates concisely our own contentions regarding the
rigidifying of the objeclsubject relations and Sartre's own "optimism." Cf. above
p. 74, footnote 2, and pp. 71-74, etc.
11
SARTRE
Shame is the feeling of original fall - not from the fact that I have
committed such and such a sin, but simply because I have "fallen" into
the world, into the midst of things, and because I need the mediation of
the Other in order to be what I am. (EN, 349)
This "fall" is precisely the fall from nothingness to being-
sometbing-for-the-Other, from interiority to exteriority, to
being-oneself-as-body. Thus the experience of one's own body,
for Sartre, is fundamentally that of nausea.
Accordingly the Other can become an object-for-me only
to my being-an-object-for-the-Other; it is the "second
moment of my relation to the Other," (EN, 347) and is experi-
enced by me as pride:
In a word there are two authentic attitudes: the one by which I recog-
nize the Other as the subject by whom I acquire objectity-that is shame;
the other by which I apprehend myself as the free project by means of
which the Other acquires his being-an-Other - that is pride or the af.fir-
mation of my freedom in the face of the Other-as-object. (EN, 351)
Consciousness, forced to become what is most contrary to its
inmost being, experiences itself than as ashamed. The real force
of Sartre's argument, however, is that by being made an obj ect
consciousness becomes constutited as "in the world"; that is to
say, this encounter causes the embodiment of consciousness to
emerge: pour-soi takes on its body as that which it has-to-be-for-
the-Other. This "self" which the Other's look causes to arise by
bis look, in other words, is "my being-<ndside." (EN, 346) And,
thus, as Sartre stated already in The Transcendence of the Ego,
my body serves as a visible and tangible symbol for the I ;l it
is "the illusory fulfillment of the I-concept."2
Accordingly, the body is subsequent to the encounter with the
Other. It is by means of the Other's look that I acquire spatial-
ity, a an outside, or a "nature." (EN, 321) One cannot say,
furthermore, that "to-be-looked-at" is to apprehend the body
of the Other (e.g. his eyes),
... because his eye is not at first apprehended as a sensible organ of
vision but as the support for the Look ... ill apprehend his Look, I cease
t o perceive his eyes. . . The Other's Loolr hides his eyes, it seems to go
before them .. The point is that to perceive is to look-at, and to apprehend
a Look is not to apprehend the Look as an object in the world ... it is to
become conscious of being-looked-at. (EN, 315-16)
i The Transc.mdence of the Ego, op. cit., p. 90.
2
Ibid., p. 91.
1 "The Look of the Other confers spatiality on me. To apprehend oneseli as looked
at is to apprehend oneseli as a spatialiting-spatialized." (EN, 325).
INTRODUCTION
79
There thus appears t o be an underlying argument to Sartre's
theory, one which he does not state in so many words but which
appears manifest when one reflects critically on the organization
of bis study itself. We may express this argument as follows: (1)
consciousness is essentially an interiority, a subject in its being-
foi:-itself as regards everything else (which is thus "object");
(2) as such, consciousness can be limited only by consciousness;
(3) hence, it cannot be an object for itself, nor for another object;
(4) however, consciousness suddenly experiences its being-an-
object; (5) since an object is possible only for a subject,
since consciousness can be limited only by consciousness, and
since it cannot be an object for itself nor for another object, but
nevertheless experiences itself as an object - there must then be
another consciousness, another subjectivity, which this first
consciousness is not and for whom it is then object; (6) yet, the
interiority of the pour-soi is still preserved - it cannot be an object
for any consciousness, itself or another; (7) therefore, anew mode of
being of consciousness must have emerged: its being-for-Others.
This new mode of being, be it noted, emerges strictly and only
through consciousness' experiencing itself as an object: Here,
that is to say, the "body" is simply taken for granted as spatial
and external, and thus can emerge for consciousness only after
the encounter with the Other. The body is the spatialization and
externalization of consciousness effected by means of the Other's
look. Similarly, the Other's body is his external and spatial
manifestation effected by my dialectically second "look" which
renders him an object.
We have already remarked that this entire argument is
subject to Sartre's own charge against Husserl and Heidegger,
as well as Hegel : it is itself "optimistic" in the sense that it
presupposes the "Other" all along. The view of the body, on the
other hand, seems lmderstandable only on the basis of the
rigidification of the Cartesian dualism which Sartre effects by
means of his criticism and subsequent transformation of the
Cartesian cogito. This transformation, finally, is itself effected
by means of the non-thematic transformation of Husserl's
doctrine of intentionality.1 To be sure, as we shall shortly see,
1 Sartre's notion of "intentionality" seems closer to Bergson's notion of "action"
than to Husserl's " intentionality." Cf. our general conclusions, below pp. 242-49.
Bo SARTRE
consciousness lives its body as for-itself; one mode of its being is
its being-for-itself. Nevertheless, this mode of being arises only
on the basis of the encounter with the Other. Accordingly,
should it tum out that his notions of "intentionality" and
"negation" are unjustified, the analysis of the body will be
severly damaged. This is our belief, the demonstration of which
must await the exposition of the Sartrean analysis of the bopy.
CHAPTER II
THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF
THE BODY
There is an initial difficulty in attempting to study the body,
one which, Sartre states, arises especially for Cartesian philoso-
phy. If one begins by considering the body as a certain neurolo-
gical-physiological complex defined by certain physico-chemical
laws - in short, as a thing on a par with any other physical thing,
although perchance more complicated - and in addition by
considering consciousness as an interiority, then the effort to
connect these two is doomed to failure. For, it is an effort to
unite my consciousness, 1tot with my body, but with the body-of-
the-Other. My own body as it is for me cannot be apprehended in
sensuous perception like other physical things, including the
body of the Other. I do not sense my skeleton, my brain, my
nerve-endings, and the like; and even coenesthetic, proprio-
ceptive, and kinaesthetic data are not apprehended by me as
obfects.
Of course, I come to believe that I, like Others, have the
same sorts of organs and parts; reading textbooks of anatomy,
observing cadavers, and the like, I conclude that I, too, have a
heart like that of the Other, that my body is likewise analyzable
into certain chemical compounds and elements, and so on. But,
Sartre insists, it is important that we be clear as to the order of
our bits of knowledge. And, it is clear I do not experience my
own body as a mere thing among other things in the midst of
the world. When I perchance perceive parts of my body with
other parts, I am another with respect to the parts perceived.
Indeed, as Van Den Berg points out, in one experiment it was
shown that only one out of ten normal persons recognizes his
own hands in a small series of photographs of hands - even when
told that their hands would appear in e3:ch of the pictures. l
t J. H. Van Den Berg, "The Human Body and tbe Slgnificance of Human Move-
ment," PPR, Vol xiii, No. z (December, 1 9 ~ 2 , p. 169.
82 SARTRE
When parts of my own body are objectified by me, they seem
strange, in spite of the fact that my own body is what is experi-
enced by me as most my own.
My body as I live it is not a thing among other things in the
world. And even when I do perceive it, I cannot touch myself
touching, see myself seeing, and so on; in short, I cannot appre-
hend it in the process of its revealing an aspect of the world to
me. "Either it is a thing among things, or it is that by means of
which things are disclosed to me. But it cannot be both at the
same time." (EN, 366) We have to do here with two ontologically
separate beings.
From the point of view of the body-for-me, to touch my leg
is to surpass it towards my possibilities - I touch it, Sartre points
out, in order to pull on my trousers, or in order to cure it, and so
on; and, if I perceive it as an object, then it is no longer my
body-as-lived. In so far as I objectify it, in Sartre's terms, my
possibilities are no longer real, but dead-possibilities ; in other
words, I no longer have to do with m.y body-for-itself. In this
sense, my body presents itself as the means whereby my projects
are actualized in the world; if I attend to my leg in the mode of
the "in order to," it, like the board into which I drive a nail, is
strictly a "pole of action." In neither case is there an "object"
for which I would be "subject" in the Cartesian sense. When I
do objectify my own body, then, its bei,ng is transformed; or
my considering it as an object is a revelation of its being, but
onby its being-for-Others (whether the Other be myself or, per-
chance, a doctor).
Thus, the study of the body must conform to the order of
being: being-for-itself and being-for-Others are genuinely onto-
logical strata of the body and must not be confused as they were
in Cartesian philosophy.
The fact is that being-for-itself must be entirely body and that it must
be entirely consciousness: it cannot be united to a body. In like manner,
being-for-others is entirely body; there is nothing behind the body. But
the body is entirely "psychic." (EN, 368)
In short, in so far as consciousness is for-itself it is its own body;
in so far as it is for-Others it is likewise its own body but now in
a different ontological dimension. Hence, consciousness is an
embodied consciousness from the outset. Nevertheless, as we
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
have seen, the Other is encountered first of all in the pure cogito.
(EN, 308) And, " ... my consciousness of being a consciousness,
in the pure effectuation of the cogito, is not connected to my own
body . ... " (EN, 336; see also, 299-300) Thus so far as the Other
is grasped in a "pure monition' ' (EN, 336), my body is subsequent,
just as is his body, to our originary encounter through my ob-
jectity, my being-an-object for the Other's look. Indeed, Sartre
says explicitly that, " ... the spontaneous and unreflected
consciousness is no longer a consciousness of the body." (EN,
394) The radical shock of encountering the Other is precisely
the "original fall" of consciousness into its body; it can now
no longer "pass by in silence" its own body-for-itself.
Thus, the study of the body is at each point founded on the
encounter with the Other. Sartre delineates three "ontological
dimensions" of the being of the body; we shall consider each of
them in the order prescribed by Sartre himself.
(1:) THE BODY AS BEING-FOR-ITSELF: FACTICITY
Believing that the "mind is easier to know than the body,"
Descartes was led to distinguish in a radical manner between
the domain of mind and that of body. The reflection which
discovers the cogito discovers as well, of course, certain phenome-
na which appear intrinsically connected with the body. These
however are, within the sphere of the cogito, pure facts of
consciousness like any other - they are also "ideas." With this,
Sartre points out, there arises the tendency to "make sign.s of
them, affections of consciousness occasioned by the body .... "
(EN, 368) The consequence of this division and tendency was
thatthe body asit is experienced by consciousness was suppressed,
and the body was taken exclusively as a physical object, or, in
Sartre's terminology, the "body-for-itself" was suppressed in
favor of the "body-for-Others." Having thus separated conscious-
ness and body, there arose the absurd problem of re-uniting
them. In order to recover this lost dimension of the body, how-
ever, one must recover consciousness in its primordial thrust,
pour-soi as being-in-the-world.
The for-itself is by essence a relation to the world; by denying
that it is being it makes there be a world which it is-not, and by
surpassing this negation towards its own possibilities, by its
SARTRE
thrust outward, it reveals the "thises" of the world as instru-
mental-things. This "world" then is essentially in a univocal
relation to consciousness; an "absolute objectivity," even in
physical science, is impossible. There wonld not be things, nor
determinable relations among them, without consciousness; they
are then relative, not to our knowledge (talcing them as such is
the mistake of epistemological relativism and skepticism}, but
rather " ... to our first engagement at the heart of the world ...
Man and the world are relative beings, and the principle of their
being is the relation." (EN, 370) Thus, the theory of relativity
says Sartre refers to being, not to knowledge and thus implies no
epistemological relativism.I As this relatedness is always univocal
things are always "things-at-a-distance-from-me," "oriented-
with-respect-to-my-place"; and thus to be engaged in the world
is precisely to be-there (in that chair, at the store, and so on} - in
short to be embodied as a center, "Here," around which the
world and its things are uni vocally displayed. 2
However, while it is necessary that pour-soi be-there, it is
contingent that it be at all. While it is necessary that it must
always be at some place, that it have some point of view, it is
contingent that it be "here" rather than "over there," involved
in "this" point of view rather than "that" one. This two-fold
contingency which Sartre brings out in connection with the body,
has been emphasized by most so-called "existentialist" philoso-
phy in general, at least since Pascal In his Pe1isees (No. 205},
Pascal wrote:
When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the
eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see,
engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and
which know me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here
rather than there, why now rather than then. Who has put me here? By
whose order and direction have this place and time been allotted to me?
And, he continued (No. 208}:
1
This seems to me a crucially important insight for the refutation of relativism
and skepticism.
1
"The only concrete placement which can be disclosed to me is absolute extension -
that is to say, precisely the one which is defined by my place considered as the center
for which distances are accounted for absolutely, from the object to me without
reciprocity. The only absolute extension is the one which is displayed beginning from
a place which I am absolutely. No other point whatever could be selected as the
absolute center of reference without being involved immediately in universal relativi-
ty." (EN, 571)
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
85
Why is my knowledge limited ? Why my stature? Why my life to one
hundred years rather than to a thousand? What reasonhasnature had for
giving me such, and for choosing this number rather than another in the
infinity of those from which there is no more reason to choose one rather
than another, trying nothing else?
Kierkegaard, in his Repetitions, was later to enunciate the same
contingency:
One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell in what land one
is: I stick my finger into e.xistence - it smells of nothing. Where am I?
Who am T? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What
does this world mean ?
Who is it that lured me into the thing, and now leaves me there? Who
am I? How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not
made acquainted with its manners and customs ... ? And, if I am to be
compelled to take part in it, where is the director? l should like to make a
remark to him.
For Sartre, this two-fold contingency of my being constit utes
the f acticity of the pour-soi, and sets the stage for his analysis of
the body-for-itself - because, he argues, this contingency is
precisely the fundamental stratum of the body-for-itself, i.e.,
the body as it is experienced concrete/ly. Therefore, just like the
interiority of the pour-soi this contingency which is the body-for-
itself cannot be made an obfect: I cannot take up a point of view
on that which is my very point of view on the world unless I
were to have disposal of a second body. But then, to take a point
of view on it a third body would be needed. . . and so on itt
i 'nfinit11,m. I cannot take my body-for-itself as an object just
because I am it. Thus my body-as-lived, in so far as it is my
point of view, is always what is surpassed toward my possibilities.
In so far as I am now involved in seeing my pipe on my desk I
surpass my body (it is not an object for me); i.e., I do not appre-
hend my body except as it is "indicated" by the seen pipe. As we
shall see, finally, when I reflectively apprehend my body it is not
at all my body-as-lived-by-me which is grasped but only my
body in another of its dlmensions, its being-for-Others.
Being involved in the world by means of my body, this world
appears as an order univocally referring back to my placement,
to me as embodied here: the pipe is to m;y left, on the table, next
to the ashtray, and on the tablecloth, and so on. My body then
is the "referred-to" of this order, the center of this univocal
relatedness. But while it is necessary that there be some order, it
is again contingent that it is this rather than that one.
86 SARTRE
Precisely this order, Sartre contends, is the P<>ur-soi as body;
or, it is the body in its being-for-itself. Thus, "the body could
be defined as the contingent form which embraces the necessity of
my contingency." (EN, 37I) The body-for-itself is therefore the
order of the world revealed by its specific placement and involve-
ment. If, for instance, I set out to write a letter it is only by
" forgetting" ("surpassing") my hand, the pen, and so on, that
I carry out my project to write a letter; these are "surpassed''
towards the writing and thus for my body all there is, is the letter-
to-be-written. As Van Den Berg puts it in the article already
cited, it is the physiognomy of objects which reveals the body-for-
itself:
The qualities of the body, its measurements, its ability, its efficiency and
vulnerability can only become apparent when the body itseli is forgotten,
eliminated, passed over in silence for the occupation .. .. for whose sake
the passing is necessary.
It is only the behavior that explains the body; however long I study my
hand, I shall never discover its efficiency. . . . l
Thus, Sartre argues, the body-for-itself cannot be given for
knowledge; it is <>nly as su,rpassed. In this way it is the involvement
of pour-soi in en-soi; it is the individualization of pour-soi.
To clarify these remarks, Sartre turns to an examination of
sensuous perception, or sensuous knowledge. Traditional theories
of sense-knowledge never left the domain of objects in the midst
of the world. It was believed that between a certain mundane
object, called a sense organ, and another mundane obj ect, called
a stimulant, a relation could be established between the Other-as-
object {the one observed by the experimental psychologist) and
the milieu of objectively determined and determinable stimu-
lants. Through experimentation it was lea.med that by acting
upon the Other's sense organs in a predetermined manner a
"modification" was provoked in the Other's consciousness. This
was learned through the meaningful and objective reactions of
the Other:
A physical object - the excitant, a physiological object -the sense organ,
a psychic object - the Other, with objective manifestations of signifi-
cation - language: such are the terms of the objective relationship which
we (as experimental psychologists) wanted to establish. None of these
terms can be permitted to stray outside the world of objects. (EN. 373)
In such experiments (as, for example, one dealing with the visual
1 Van Den Berg, op. cit., p. 170.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
perception of a screen illuminated in varying degrees by the
experimenter), Sartre points out that the relation sought for by
the experimenter at the outset was not at all how tlte screen
appeared to the one being tested, but rather a relation between two
series of objects: those seen by the one being tested during the
experiment and those seen by the experimenter at the same time
{that is, the sense organs of the former):
The illumination of the screen belonged to my world; my eyes as objective
organs to the world of the experimenter. The connection between these
two series thus claims to be like a bridge between two worlds. In no case
could there be a table of correspondence between the subjective and the
objective. (EN, 374)
And, indeed, there is no justification at all to call the sensuous
perceiving of these objects in the laboratory "subjective," nor to
call the objects seen by the experimenter at the same time "ob-
jective." Yet, it has been maintained by psychologists and
philosophers that this objective relation between a sense organ
and a stimulant of it is itself but one side of a wider relation:
between the "objective" (the stimulant-sense organ) and the
"subjective" (the sensation). It is claimed moreover that the
"subjective" is to be defined by the action exercised by the
stimulant through the sense organ. The sense organ is atf ected,
modified, by the stimulant; the modifications of it thus come
from "outside" the organ itself. Since the sensation is the direct
consequence of this affection, sensation itself is said to "come
from outside" (causally, from the stimulant). Indeed, if sensation
somehow arose spontaneously it could have no relation to the
sense organ. But we know that stimulating the sense organ in a
certain prescribed manner "produces" a modification of the organ
in a determinable and predictable way (under strong illumination,
the pupil contracts), and that as a consequence what the Other
experiences visually is directly connected to the objective
stimulant (perhaps the eyes begin to hurt) . "We thus conceive
an objective unity corresponding to the smallest and shortest of
perceptible excitations, and call it sensation." (EN. 376) This
sensation, being a determinable "this,' is conceived as itself part
of the external world ; being itself caused by other objects
(stimulants). it becomes exterior to itself (" extbiorite ti soi-
meme, "), (EN, 376) that is, its raison d'etre lies outside itself.
88 SARTRE
This sensation must, furthermore, "happen" someplace, it must
"be" someplace, and this demands an environment homogeneous
with it and thus exterior as well. This environment in which
sensations happen we call "mind," or even "consciousness," and
it is precisely my own consciousness. In this way there has been
constructed a sort of internal space in which certain sensations
are formed on the occasion of external stimulations; since
sensations are sulfered this internal space is passive. Yet it is
claimed that this mind "lives" and its sensations;
thus life becomes a magical connection established by hypothesis
"between a passive milieu and a passive mode of that milieu."
(EN, 377)
Subjectivity in this view becomes conceived as F. H. Bradley
once put it, on the analogy of a paper bag in which numerous peas
(sensations) are dropped. It is the regularity of these sensations,
finally, which, it is claimed, constitutes "objectivity;" the more
regular, the more credence we give to them, or rather to the ob-
jects which are said to "cause" the sensations.
Such a conception is, despite all its subtlety, a "pure fiction,"
says Sartre, one moreover which is a nest of absurdity. The roots
for this magic are quite as apparent as they are contradictory.
(r) To establish the notion of sensations, a certain naive
realism is necessary ; we assume without question that our
perception as psychologists of Others is valid, as we do our
perception of the Other's sense organs, his reports, and so on.
Underlying this is our assumption that every term in the re-
lations we seek to establish is an object, something by essence
mundane, in the world like stones and figs.
(2) We thus have established that sensation itself is a kind of
object, one which "happens" inside another object. However all
the realism so necessary to the first step now disappears, for it is
now claimed that sensation is a modification of the one who
suffers it and thus is quite private ("subjective") to him, giving
information only about him himself. Thus, before we can learn
of this objectivity-turned-subjectivity he must speak to us and
tell us of it. Others can neither live nor experience his sensations;
"happening" by virtue of a passivity the Other yet is said to
"experience" and "live" them, and thus "living" becomes a
mode of passivity.
!1
J
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 89
(3) Yet, just these " private" affairs are supposed to furnish
the basis of our knowledge of the "external" world. Because of
the very way in which whole procedure was set up, nevertheless,
this basis could never on principle be the f <Fwndation for a real
contact with things (since all one has are his own "sensations").
The objectivism which served as the starting-point falls im-
mediately into the darkest subjectivism while yet desiring and
claiming to be objective.
Either, Sartre argues, one gives up all such notions as "sub-
jectivity," "life," " consciousness," and the like, and sticks to
his objectivistic guns; or he must recognize that
No synthetic grouping whatever can confer the objective quality _on
what is in principle ofthe order of the lived. If there must be perception
of objects in the world it is necessary that we be . from the moment of our
very upsurge, in the presence of the world and ObJects. . .
Sensation - that hybrid notion lying between the sub1ective an.d the
objective, conceived in terms of the object and applied to
the subject, a bastard existence of which one cannot s'.l'y if is fact or
principle- sensation is a pure of the psycholog1s_t. It is
to reject it deliberately from every senous theory concerning the relations
of consciousness and the world. (EN, 378)
Rejecting sensation, however, what becomes of the sense
organs? Even reminding ourselves that we are here at the lev:l
of the body-for-itself, i.e., of the body as it is concretely expen-
enced, one must still say that he sees the green of the book,
touches the roughness of the stone, and so on. If I indeed see the
green, and not the psychologist's "sensation," my senses still
remain: What then is a sense which does not give sensation?
While the seen table is given visually as a thing of such and
such color, shape, in such a position, and so on, and while seeing
is a sort of knowledge of the thing, there is no such givenness nor
knowing of the seeing itself. Even if we supposed a third eye
suspended in front of the usual two, this would be a seeing of a
visible object and not of the seeing itself. The same holds for
every sense. Hence, a sense organ cannot be defined by an
act of apprehension; however much I study my hand, visually or
even with my other hand, my nose, and so on, I shall never
discover its own intrinsic efficiency. Its efficiency is manifested
only in its use - but then, it is necessarily "surprased" and not
apprehended. I am unable, Sartre contends, to learn anything
at all about my seeing itself, my visual point of view on the
90 SARTRE
visible world, by trying to make an object of it. More generally,
my body-as-lived by me cannot become an object for me just
because, so far as I live it, I am it; and, being my body, I cannot
realize the "distance" necessary to make it appear as object over
against me, the subject. The implicit argument here is the same
as Marcel's, and as Merleau-Ponty's, as we shall see: the moment
I attempt to grasp my body-as-lived (or: my seeing as seeing),
the body I succeed in apprehending reflectively is no longer my
body-as-lived, nor is the body I sensuously perceive with other
parts of my body, my body-as-lived, but rather only my body-
as-object, i.e., for Sartre, the body of the Other.
It is necessary to pause briefly in order to point out that this
argument, whatever other merits it may have, ivolves several
intrinsic presuppositions which are neither justified by Sartre,
nor, I hope to show later on, justifiable in principle. First, it is
implicitly assumed by him that the only type of activity which
could possibly suffice to make, e.g., my seeing itself, an object
would be, again, another seeing; but, since I cannot see a seeing
it cannot possibly be made an object. Second, the activity
which does succeed in apprehending my body, reflection, suc-
ceeds only in apprehending an obf ect, not my body-as-lived.
Hence, the body-for-itself cannot become an object for me, the
one whose body it is, if these two assumptions are correct. I t
should be noted in addition that the second of these points
involves what we have already pointed out before: namely, to
say that all reflection succeeds in apprehending is an "object,"
and that this "object" is not the "lived body" (or, in the case of
subjectivity, is not the "subject"), is to reify the meaning of
object beyond any reasonable sense and to ignore the "objective
sense" which this "object" has for me. In short, it is to confuse
"objectifying" with "obfectivating": to attend to some state of
affairs (whatever it may be, and whether reflectively or not) is
not necessarily, as Sartre assumes, to make it into an object
divorced from the subject. Merleau-Ponty, as we will see, falls
into the same confusion. Marcel, on the other hand, by means
of his distinction between kinds of reflection ("first ' and
"second"), seems to recognize this crucial difference. We shall
return to this problem in Sartre later on.
At all events, Sartre proceeds to argue that sense organs are
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 91
defineable by means of the phenomenon of "orientation" : each
of the senses is orien.ted with respect to a specific system of ob-
jects (sight to visible objects, touch to tangible objects, and so
on), and this system is thereby ordered in terms of the sense in
question. Sight, then, would be this particular system, or orderedness
(orientedness), of seen objects. If we say that it is essential to the
formal structure of the visual field that objects stand in the
figure-ground relation, we have to notice also that "the material
connection of a this such and such to the ground is at once
chosen and given." (EN, 380) In so far as I look at the cup rather
than the book beside it, it is chosen; but the cup is given to my
visual perceiving 1in that my choice takes place in terms of an
original of "thises" which manifest the upsurge of
my pour-soi in its facticity. It is necessary that the-cup appear to
me as placed with respect to my body's orientation ("to my
left," ' 'behind the pipe," and the like), but which place it has
is contingent (since it could as well appear to my right):
It is this contingency between the necessity and freedom of my choice
that we call sense. It implies that the object must always appeaY to me all at
once - it is the cube, the inkwell, the cup which I see. But this appearance
always takes place in a particular perspective which expresses its relations
to the ground of the world and to other thises. (EN, 380)
Hence, to be sensuously perceptive of things is, for Sartre, to be
oriented to these thi1igs as "they themselves," but oriented to them
by means of certain appearances (I see the cup "from this side,"
for instance). At the same time, they are oriented and ordered
with respect to the placement of the body. These rules of ap-
pearance are not, however, subjective;
they are rigorously objective and disclose the nature of things. lithe
inkwell hides a part of the table from me this is indicative, not of the
nature of my senses but rather of the nature of the :inkwell and of the light.
(EN, 380)
If, again, an object gets smailer as it recedes into the distance
this is explainable strictly by the objective laws of perspective.
These laws define an objective center of convergence of these
lines of perspective, e.g., of my eye. However, though this center
is located in the very field oriented around it, it is not itself an
object within the structure of the perceptual field in question:
"we are this center." (EN, 38I) That is to say, the center of
92 SARTRE
orientation of the field it defines and orders cannot itself be an
object within the same field: it is that by virtue of which there
is a field.
On the other hand the very structure of the visible world
demands that one cannot see without himself being visible; or
more particularly, the eye cannot see unless it, too, is visible, for
the structure of the world oriented around this center "refers,"
or "indicates," that center. Such a reference could occur only
among objects of the same kind; or, as Marcel has expressed it,
the body must maintain a community of nature with the objects
on which it acts, or which it perceives. Sartre writes:
The intra-mundane references can be made only to objects in the world,
and the seen world perpetually defines a visible object to which its
perspectives and its arrangements refer. This object appears in the midst
of the world and at the same time as the world. It is always given as an
addition to some grouping of objects since it is defined by the orfontation
of these objects; without it there would be no orientation whatever since
all orientations would be equivalent. (EN, 381)
The eye, then, as the organ of visual perception, is not only the
center of the visual field but is as well, qua center, continuously
referred to by the objects oriented with respect to it. Hence it is
itself "in the world" and itself is the world of seen things. Thus
the visual figure-ground relation requires a third structure - the
eye as the center of orientation for the appearance of visual
things as ordered in the figure-ground relation. But just because
this center is the center, defining the visual world and thus being
defined by it, it cannot itself become an object within that world.
In order for this to take place it would itself have to be oriented
with respect to another center. In short the eye would have to
see itself seeing, and this it cannot do; if it could, it would not
be the "center." The eye then is only "indicated," it is the
"referred-to" of visual objects; I cannot see it, since I am it.
Therefore, Sartre emphasizes,
My being-m-the-world, by the very fact that it realizes a world, makes
itself be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world by the
world which it realizes ... My body is everywhere on the world ... My
body is at once coextensive with the world, spread out across things, and
at the same time gathered into this single point which all these things
indicate and which I am without being able to know it. (EN, 381-82)
In other words, to "be-in-a-world" and "to have a body'' are
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
93
synonymous. However, for all this remarkable description, the
one crucial question remains unanalyzed by him: What is the
nature of this "indicating"? More generally, Sartre leaves un-
analyzed the problem of what "orientation" is, phenomeno-
logically, how it operates and what its foundational conditions
are.1 We shall return to this problem later on.
Following from the above Sartre is quick to point out that it
is meaningless to maintain either that sensible objects are given
before, or after, sense organs.
2
Rather, we must say, the two "are
contemporaneous with objects," (EN, 382) just as, for him,
consciousness and world are given simultaneously.a The sense
organs, too, are "in the world," that is, are objects. Hence no
longer to see the book when I close my eyes is precisely to see
my eyelids; no longer to see the table is to see the tablecloth.
Thus any accident to my body (as when I cut my finger) is itself
objective, a relation between objects (the knife and my finger);
to be able to act on objects is to be able to be acted upon by the
same objects, or, as Marcel has put it, to be manifested to the
world by my body is at the same time to be exposed to its
influences. Similarly Sartre notes, to lose one's eyesight is not to
lose objects as visible; rather, objects are still visible, but now
the visual field no longer has any outstandingnesses in it.
Thus it is the upsurge of the pour-soi into the world which at the same
stroke makes the world exist as the totality of things, and the senses exist
as the objective manner in which the qualities of things present them-
selves. (EN, 383)
This being the case, Sartre argues that in order to know and
obfectively to define my stmse organs I must take myself as an object,
and this is ta.ntamount to destroying the wordli1tess of my wor/,d.
Cutting myself off from what I am, from my body-for-itself, I
cut myself off from the world established by means of my body-
for-itself. To objectify my visual sense organs is to cease to live
my world in respect of its visual aspect, it is no longer to "surpass'
1 Jn asimilar way, we encounter this crucial problem in Merleau-Ponty's analysis.
For him, the unity of the senses, as well as the unity of any one sense, takes 1Jlace by
way of the objects of the sense(s} and in virtue of what he calls the "irrtentional arc;"
but what precisely this "arc" is, and how this unification occurs, he simply does not
state. Marcel, on the other hand, never even concerns hi.mself with this problem.
' Tt sbould be noted that Sartre uses "sense" and "sense organ" synonymously.
Thus, he talks equivalently of the eye as a sense organ, and as a sense.
s Cf. above, pp. 65-69.
94 SARTRE
my eyes "in order to" (move to the door, look at the movie, and
so on).
Accordingly, we can say, my body-for-itself is the total system
and center of reference of things; it is "also the instrument and the
goal of our actions." (EN, 383) It is necessary to be cautious in
this regard, however: "my action" is not an object for me, any
more than "my body"; rather, only the action-of-another can
be an object for me. Hence I cannot know my own action, but
only that of the Other (which I know as a "peculiar" instrument,
since it is that instrument which itself handles things, uses tools,
and so on). One cannot say then that I use my body.1 Since the
instrument must be of the same kind and nature as what uses
it (for otherwise he could not use it), and since instruments are
objects-used over against a subject-user, to take my body-for-
itself as something used is to make of it an object - and thus to
lose its being as for-itself. Furthermore, to continue Sartre's
argument, if one says "my body" is an instrument, then I,
who "use" it, must be of the same community of nature as the
instrument; this, though, would be to make me as psychical
reality something physical, spatially located and determinable
in physical terms - and this simply destroys "my body-for-it-
self.'' In the end, the Cartesian dilemma is irresolvable in its own
terms: it loses at the outset just what it seeks to understand.
To clarify this strange state of affairs, Sartre turns to an
analysis of the connections between perception and action.
Objects are what they are
2
only within a nexus of actual and
possible actions on them; i.e., Sartre maintains, "In this sense
perception is in no way distinguished from the practical organ-
ization of existents in the world." (EN, 385) The characteristics
which make a hammer a hammer are disclosed, as Heidegger
had seen, not in a "conceptual" consciousness, but rather in a
"practical-using" consciousness (not by mere "looking," but
by "using"). For only in the latter does the hammer refer to
nails, to the board to be hammered into place, to the ultimate
1
As Marcel had already seen with clarity. Unfortunately, howevec, Sartre seems
not to have been aware of Marcel's analysis of the body; one looks in vain for refer-
ences to Marcel.
2
As and Marcel had already recognized, though, again, Sartre seems to be
unaware of thls, or, at least, he does not acknowledge it.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
95
pi;oject-at-hand - and only as such is the hammer a ham.mer.I
Similarly, the in which I live is not geometrical, not, as
Merleau-Ponty will say, a space of location. Rather, it is a space
of situation, or, in Sartre's term, it is "lwdological" - furrowed
with paths, places, by-ways, routes, locales, ways of going and
coming, of using, doing, and the like. Thus, the world for pour-
soi in its upsurge is constituted as a concatenated texture of
instrumentalities and ways of doing things: acts refer to other
acts; tools to other tools and to ways of using them, to purposes
for which they were made, to other purposes which can be actu-
alized (an ashtray can also serve as a paper-weight, a weapon,
and the like), to Others, and so on. Nevertheless, while perception
and action are thus inseparable, action pro-per is presented as
transcending the perceived sinipliciter towards future efficacies,
while what is perceived in the strict sense presents itself as a
presence (co-presence with my body}, but one which cannot be
fully apprehended "at present" and is thus "full of promises,"
which engages the future by predelineating future possible
perceivings of it as the same. This pure presence of things,
Sartre calls their "being-there."
In this way, the world is conceived as the correlate of my
possible action on it, i.e., the system of possibilities which I am.
As such, for Sartre, the world is the skeleton of my possible
action, the outline which my actions "fill in." Hence, "Per-
ception is naturally surpassed towards action; better, it can be
unfolded only in and by projects of action." (EN, 386) Even
though action is not itself an objectivating (is not "thetic,"
as Sartre puts it), this structurization of the world is objective.
The world as the correlate of my actions is objectively articulated,
it refers to me but also to an infinity of instrumenW complexes
- to my future possible actions, my past actions, to the actions
of Others, and so on. All of this complex, nevertheless, refers to
a center, one which is only indicated by the complex and never
itself grasped as such. Using a hammer, I do not grasp my band
but only the ham.mer hammering the board to be nailed. I use
1 "Objects disclose themselves to us at the heart of a complex of ulensilify wherein
they occupy a determin.ed plat:e. This place is not defined by purely spatial coordi
nates but in relation to the axes of practical reference. 'The glass i s on the self,' which
means that it is necessary to take care not to upset the glass i1 one moves the shelf."
(EN, 385)
96 SARTRE
the hammer to pound the nail. but I do not use my hand to hold
the hammer: my hand is only indicated by the complex. I am not
in the same relation to it as I am to the hammer, for I am my
hand. My band, thus, vanishes in this complex of instrumental-
ities and is now strictly the orientation, the order and meaning,
of the complex. My body is then a tool objectively defined by
the instrumental field referring to it as its own center, but a tool
we cannot use,
since we would then be referred to infinity. We cannot use this instru-
ment; we arc it. It is given to us in no otherwaythan by the instrumental
order of the world, by hodological space ... but it cannot be given to my
action. I do not have to adapt myself to it nor to adapt it to another uten-
si l ; rather it is my very adaptation to u.tensils, the adaptation which I
am. (EN, 388)
Or, more properly speaking, it is the inapprehe1isible given. My
body is as such always the surpassed, the "passed over in silence."
It is thus in the Past, the always-already-surpassed towards
possibilities.
1
Hence, my body-for-itself is at once a point of
view and a point of departure; as such it is the condition for
pour-soi to be what it is not and to not-be what it is and there-
fore for action as a "gearing into the outer world." Accordingly
Birth, the past, contingency, necessity of a point of view, the factual
condition of all possible action on the world - such is the body, this it is
/or me . . . (It is) the necessary condition for tbe existence of a world and
... the contingent realization of this condition. (EN. 3 9 2 ~ 3
Furthermore, in so far as to be is to choose oneself (to choose,
e.g., the way in which one constitutes his disabilities - as "un-
bearable," "unfortunate," "fortunate," "to be hidden from
Others,'' and so on), my inapprehensible body is the necessity
that there be a choice at all -that is to say, the necessity that I do
not exist all at once, but must unfold my existence by means of
my body: thus, my finitude, my embodiment, is the condition
of my freedom.
We can thus see that the "point of view" which is my body
involves a double relation: "a relation with the things on which
it is a point of view and a relation with the observer for whom it
is a point of view." (EN, 394) My body is, so to speak, a "point
1
Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, disputes this placement of the body in the past; il
is rather my presmce-totheworld, my present as embodied. See below, p. 181.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
97
of view on a point of view," or, a "point of view on which no
other point of view is possible." My body as a point of view is
not, therefore, known; thereis no regress of points of view on points
of view. In this sense, Sartre says, we can say that consciousness
exists its boay: the relation between consciousness and its body
is existential - precisely the dimension which was in principle
excluded by traditional philosophy and psychology, yet the only
one wherein the "mind-body" problem can be solved. Sartre
means that my body as existed by my consciousness is a structure
of my consciousness in its non-positional thrust at the world.
In this sense my body is "the neglected, the 'passed by in silence,'
and yet it is what it is: it is nothing other than body, the rest is
nothingness and silence." (EN, 395) For, it is only in so far as
consciousness is embodied that there is even a world.
However, the consciousness of the body is not a direct appre-
hension; rather, it is, he argues, like the consciousness of a sign.
The body is the "surpassed-towards-meaning," but unlike a
physical sign (say, a highway marker), it cannot itself be appre-
hended as such (as one can attend simply to the highway marker
as a mere physical thing and ignore its being a sign). My body is
only "indicated" by things in the world: visible objects "refer"
to it as their center of orientation; auditory objects to the ear,
visible objects to the eye, and so on. Thus there is no conscious-
ness of the body as for-itself, but only a consciousness (of) the
body, and this is a non-thetic consciousness of the manner in
which consciousness is affected. For example, the experience of
physical pain is for consciousness a question of the way in which
consciousness exists its contingency (its being-open to the influ-
ence of its world) spontaneously and non-thetically as a point
of view on the world - being able to affect things consciousness-
as-embodied is open to being affected by these same things. If,
while reading a book, my eyes begin to hurt, we must say that
consciousness exists its eyes as painful; the pain is not a "logical
sign" but rather it is the eyes: it is the eyes-as-pain. Thus the
pain-as-lived is not "in the world" but is rather the "translucent
matter of consciousness," its being-there, its attachment to the
world. If I now reflect on my pain and attempt to apprehend it,
the pain ceases to be lived-pain, and becomes object-pain, an
injury or "illness." With some knowledge of such affairs (if I
98
SARTRE
were a physician) I could constitute it as a "disease," or perhaps
a " lacerated tendon."
Similarly, when I reflectively apprehend my body, it is no
longer my body-as-lived, but rather my body js on a new plane
of existence:
That is to say (my body as object is) the pu,re noematic correlate of a
reflective consciousness. We shall call it the psychic body. It is still not
known in any manner, for the reflection which seeks to apprehend the ill
consciousness is still not cogintive. (EN, 403)
In so far as consciousness lives its body, then, this body-as-
lived is the recapture by consciousness of the en-soi; in so far as
the body is apprehended in reflection, it is projected into the
en-soi. In so far as the body is psychic-body, it is the "matter",
of all psychic phenomena (e.g., reflectively grasped pain, joy,
sadness, and the like), and as such it determines psychic space.
Coenesthetic affectivity is thus the pure, non-positional grasp of a
contingency without color, the pure apprehension of_ self as . e7-
istence in fact. This perpetual grasp by my pour-soi of an insipid
taste - a grasping without distance - which. accompanies me even in my
efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste - this is what we have
elsewhere described under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable
nausea constantly discloses my body to my consciousness .... (EN, 404)
This nausea, Sartre goes on, mustnot be taken metaphorically;
to the contrary, it is precisely the fundamental mode of givenness
of my body as it is for-itself to my consciousness. All that re-
flection reveals to me is my body-as-object, the psychic body,
and never my body-as-lived. Nausea over my body then is the
foundation for all concrete nauseas. Such, for Sartre, is the body-
for-itself.
(2) THE BODY-FOR-OTHERS
The body-for-itself, for Sartre, is a genuinely ontological
dimension of the body. We have also learned that the body
exists for Others. Now, for him,
To study the manner in which my body appears to the Other or the
manner in which the Other's body appears to me amounts to the same
thing. We have established. in fact, that the of my being-for-
the-Other are identical to those of the Other's being-for-me. (EN, 405)
1
1 Schiltz has pointed out that this identification involves a basic "optimism," in
Sartre's sense of the term. Cf. Schiltz, ''Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, vol.
ix, No. 2 (December, 1948), pp. 184-98; and above, pp. 7i-75.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
99
As we saw, the Other is not first given to me by means of his
body; were this so, the I-Other relation would be merely external,
Sartre argues, whereas in fact it is an internal relation - that of
negation. Thus, he argues, "I must apprehend the Other first as
he for whom I exist as object .... " {EN, 405)
The Other-as-object is grasped by me as a transcendence-
transcended, as one among many other instrumentalities. Never-
theless, I apprehend his body as a "peculiar" instrument, for
it is grasped as itself a possible "center" of orientation. In so far
as I apprehend the Other's body as a center, this center is itself
now an object for me. In other words, whereas my body-for-itself
is that "point of view" on which no other point of view is possible
(for me), the Other's body is precisely that "point of view" on
which I can (and do) take a point of view - just as the Other
can (and does) take one on my point of view, whereas I myself
cannot. Thus, in Van Den Berg's example of the mountainer,
when I see him climbing, I see precisely what Jte has to "forget"
for the sake of the task-at-hand: I notice his boots, his reaching
hand, his face straining with effort, and so on. I see his body,
and I see it precisely as the center of bis situation, around which
are centered the mountain, the path, the valley below, and so
on.1 In this sense, I ktww his body as he cannot know it. Since
I encounter the Other first by means of my being-an-object for
him, however, and thus discover his possibility of knowing me,
I now see his sense organs as themselves the means by which he
knows me: I know his senses as themselves means of knowing me,
they are now seen as the "known-as-knowing," transcendences-
transcended by my own looking at him. 2
The Other, that is to say,.is known by me through my senses:
"he is the ensemble of sensible organs which disclose themselves
to my sensible knowledge .... " (EN, 407) The "greatest function"
of the sense organs, for Sartre, is thus to know (as opposed to what
Bergson had maintained, and to what Merleau-Ponty will
maintain). In so far as I apprehend the Other as an ensemble of
sense organs, as a center of orientation indicated by a system of
t Cf. Van Den Berg, op. cit., p. 173.
2 Just the opposite is true for Husserl: by means of the automatic synthesis of
associative transfer of sense, apprcsentative "pairing," the Other's animate organism
is constituted as the intrinsically first Object. Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit.,
SI-SS
IOO SARTRE
instrumental-things surrounding his body, "This Other's body
is given to me as the pore en-soi of his being - an en-soi among
other en-soi, which I surpass toward my possibilities.'' (EN,
409) His body is the pure fact of his presence in my world.
Everything said about my body-for-me applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the Other's body-for-him. His body-for-itself is not
for him an object; he exists his body as nauseous, and this
nausea is not an object for him. But I, who am not this Other,
do not grasp his nausea as it is for him; rather, I fix it, I see it,
I transcend his own contingency, fixing it as a necessity which
he has-to-be. The Other's body as it is for me is thus disclosed
with two contingencies: {I) be could be elsewhere, the instru-
mentalities could be arranged otherwise and thus indicate his
body as a center in a different way; (2.) bis body is, however, here
- but could be elsewhere, and being here as a particular this, he
is for me something objective: a contingent objectivity. But
whereas he is here and could be elsewhere, he must qua body
be somewhere. "It is this which we shall call the necessity for the
Other to be contingent for me." (EN, 409) Thus, while he must
appear to me "here" as a body with a face, arms, legs, and so on,
it is contingent that it be just this face, these arms, these legs,
and the like. What for him is his insipid "taste of himself"
becomes for me the Other's flesh, the pure contingency of his
presence to me. As such, however, apprehending the Other's
body I at the same time apprehend my body non-thematically
as the center of reference indicated by the Other.
Nevertheless, one cannot perceive the Other's body as flesh, like an
isolated object having purely external relations with other thises. That is
so only for the cadaver. The Other's body as flesh is immediately given to
me as the center of reference of a situation which is synthetically organized
around it, and it is inseparable from this situation .... (EN, 410)
1
to say, the body over there, the Other's body, is appre-
hended by me as body-in-situation, defined by the instrumental-
ities surrounding it as their center of orientation. The Other's
body then is precisely that by means of which there is a situation.
"Far from the relation of the body to objects being a problem,
i Cf. the study by Ludwig Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West: An Anthropolo-
gical-CJinical Study," in: May, et al. (editors), Existence, Basic Books (New York,
1958), pp. 237-364, esp. pp. on the body.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS IOI
we never apprehend the body outside of this relation." (EN, 4rr)
Accordingly, the body of the Other is apprehended by me as a
meaningful totaWy. "Meaning," being just a movement of
transcendence (the Other's) transcended (by me), is apprehended
by me in the Other's body, and thus "The body is the totality of
signifying relations to the world. In this sense it is as well defined
with reference to the air it breathes, the water it drinks, the food
it eats. " (EN, 4n)
Accordingly, the body of the Other (synonymously, my body
for the Other) is a synthetic totality. (1) I always apprehend his
body in terms of a total situation which indicates his body as its
center, and thus I perceive his movements within spatio-temporal
limits as meaningfully connected to and indicated by a complex
of and goals. "To perceive the other is to make
known to oneself, by means of the world, what he is." (EN, 4I2) 1
Not only do I perceive his body within a total situation (or
Umwelt), I cannot perceive any member of his body except in
synthetic connection to the totality of his body. Thus, my per-
ception of the body of the Other is radically different from my
perception of things. I never perceive an arm " alongside a body,"
but always "Pierre-who-raises-his-arm" (in order to ... ) ; I
perceive his hand "as a temporal structure of his entire body."
(EN, 412) In short, Pierre-for-me and Pierre-as-body are, says
Sartre, identical:
... To be object-for-the-Other or to-be-body, these two ontological
modalities are translations which are strictly equivalent to the pour-soi's
being-for-the-Other. Thus, the significations do not lead back to a
mysterious psychism: they are this psychism in so far as it is a transcen-
dence-transcended. . . In particular. . . emotional manifestations or,.
more generally, the phenomena improperly called "expression," in no way
indicate to us a hidden affection lived by some psych.ism ... These frowns,
this redness, this stammering, this slight trembling of the hands, these
downcast looks which seem at once timid and threatening - these do not
express anger; they are the anger. (EN, 4r3)
i This insight provides perhaps the closest connections between existential
philosophy and existential psychology. As Buyte.ndijk states: " ... the observable
relations between the animal and his milieu are perceived as a series of processes,
but always as phenomena connected in a signilicative manner to something else ... in
their behavior living beings manifest themselves immedi<Uely as sul>fects. The structure
of behavior, as a. relation o/ lhe subfecl lo his world, is immedi<Uely ovitk11t." Altitudes et
Mouveme11Js: Elude /onclionneJk du mouvement humain, de Brouwer (Paris,
1957), pp. 43 and 47. Cf. also Van Den Berg, The Phern>menokigical 11.f>#oad lo
Psychiatry, Charles C. Thomas (SpriDgfield, i955), esp. pp. 2S-47.
102 SARTRE
But here, Sartre goes on to emphasize, we should always keep
in mind that we always perceive these phenomena in situation -
as a meaningful and synthetic totality referring to the world, to
the past and to the future (as my reaching hand refers to the
glass of wine on the table), to the person as we have known him,
or to similar persons and typical situations, and so on. It is this
synthetic totality which is the anger. "We cannot get away from
that: the 'psychic object' is completely released to perception
and is inconceivable outside of corporal structures.'' (EN, 4r3)
What is " expressed" and what "expresses," as Merleau-Ponty
will say, are here identically the same.
The Other's body, then, is given to me as being what he is.
I apprehend Fred's body as that which Fred surpasses in his
raising his glass to his lips, that is, toward the goal: imbibing.
This present raising of his arm is apprehended by me as intrinsic-
ally referring to the future of this person whose arm it is. Thus,
this present, these movements of body-members, are never
apprehended by me as they are i1i themselves except in the case
of a corpse. The Other is presented to my perception then as a
synthetic ensemble of meaningfully interc0nnected gestures,
body-attitudes, and body-habits such that, for instance, I know
what my friend "feels" like when he wrinkles up his eyes, turns
up the comers of his mouth, pounds the table with his hands,
and so on. Or, I know in a typical manner what this stranger's
raised arm and clenched fist mean within a typically familiar
situation.
In so far as his body is thus a transcendence-transcended,
the Other's body is intrinsically a "pointing-beyond-itself" to its
tasks-at-hand. As such, it is, he contends, the magical object
par excellence, the body which is "more than body." 1 But it
points back, not to a subjectivity (as it does for Husserl), but
rather, for Sartre, to the Other's facticity, to his being an object
for me, an en-soi: a transcend'.ente-t:r:anscended.
(3) THE THTRD ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE BODY
The first dimension of the body is the b0.dy as it is for-itself,
1
The Otber's body can be "magical" only because Sartre bas already reified
"subject" and "object," making the Other's body aa apprehended "en-soi" to begiu
with. This goes together with his radical Cartesianism.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS I03
that is, as it is lived by pour-soi. The second is expressed by the
fact that my body is known and utilized by the Other, it is my
body-for-the-Other, or the Other's body-for-me. In so far as I
am for Others, the Other is revealed to me as the subject for whom
I am obfect: I exist for-myself as a body known by the Other - this
is the third dimension of the body.
My body is not only lived by me, nor merely seen by the Other
as an object; when the Other looks at me, I experience the
revelation of my being-for-the-Other, but I cannot know this. To
the extent that I experience my being-an-object for the Other,
my objectity, I grasp my own facticity: "The shock of the
encounter with the Other is a revelation in emptiness of the
existence of my body - outside, like an en-soi for the Other."
(EN, 419) ln this way, my body gains a new dimettSion to its
being, a depth throughits being lived by me now as the perceptual
"outside" of my intimate "inside."
In Van Den Berg's illustration,1 when the mountaineer
becomes aware that I am.looking at him, he apprehends himself
as an " outside," as looked-at in a way which is impossible for him
to adopt. My body as a point of view becomes one on which
other points of view can be brought to bear, but which I can never
take up as regards my own body-for-itself. My ensemble of senses
is given fo me as apprehended by the Other, and this is a factual
necessity (it is necessary that I appear as a body for the Other,
but it is contingent that I appear in just "this" particular way -
for instance, with dirty fingers at an interview). Thus, Sartre
contends, the being-for-others of my body haunts my body-for-
itself (how my body is apprehended by the Other creeps into the
way in which I live my body), and this dimension constitutes the
third ontological modality of my body:
Thus the relativity of my senses (which I cannot think abstractly
without destroying my world) is at the same time made
present to me by the Other's existence. But it is <!- pure and inapprehen-
sible appresentation. * (EN, 420)
In a similar way my body as the instrument which I am is
revealed as one instrument among others - but I cannot grasp
my bodY, as one among other instruments, just because I am it.
1 Van Den l3erg, "The Human Body and the Significance of Human :t.fovement,"
op. cit., pp. 174-175.
ro4 SARTRE
Thus my world collapses before the Other's look. My body
becomes designated as aliena.ted: I see, perhaps, the doctor's ear,
which indicates my body as what I exist (a point-of-view-
without-a-point-of-view); but now, I apprehend his ear as itself
listening to my heart-beat, and immediately what I live as
indicated by his ear becomes designates as an outside. I experience
myself as an object, hence I am alienated from myself by my
own body. In this sense, as we already emphasized, it is shame
which originarily disclosed the other to me: shame is my ob-
jectity before the Other.I This experience is nothing but "the
metaphysical and horrified apprehension of the existence of my
body for the Other." {EN, 420) In terms of this ontological
dimension, such phenomena as the desire to "get rid of" one's
body, to "become invisible," and the like, become understandable.
The third dimension of the body is the body-for-itself, but
alienated and inapprehensible. The Other, that is to say, ac-
complishes for me what I cannot do for myself: he sees me as I
am "outside." It is by attempting, primarily, by means of language
to see myself as the Other sees me that an analogical identification,
"the analogical assimilation of the Other's body and my body,"
takes place, and no where else.2 For such assimilation to occur,
moreover, it is necessary,
that I have encountered the Other in his objectivating subjectivity since
as an object it is necessary (in order for me to judge the Other's body
as an object similar to my body) that he have been given to me as an
object and that my body have disclosed on its part an object-dimension.
The analogy on the resemblance can never constitute first the body-
object of the Other and the objectivity of my body. To the contrary, these
two objectities must exist previously in order for an analogical principle
to come into play. Here, then, it is language which teaches me what are
t he structures of my body for the Other. (EN, 421-22)
My body-as-object for the Othedslived by me unreflectively;
in r eflection, I -apprehend my body, not as it is lived, but as a
quasi-object , Le., as a "psychic object." 3 But, a purely cognitive
knowing of the body is always a knowing from the point of view
of the Other: it is never my body, but, as Marcel has said, "the,"
1
Cf. above, pp. 77-79.
2
Though Sartre does not mention it, this seems to be a polemic against Husserl's
notion of appresentalional pairing. Cf. above, p. 99, foot.note 2.
a In the Transu,.denu of t11e Ego, Sartre spoke of the Ego as merely one object
among others, like a chair; here, he seems to recognize that there are, indeed, great
differences between mere things and psychie structures.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 105
or "a," body which is an object and hence which is known. In the
same way, when I look at, or observe, certain parts of my body
as objects (touching my head, looking at my knee, and so on),
I adopt the point of view of the Other and thus my body appears
as the body-of-the-Other. (Cf. EN, 425-26)
These are, then, the three ontological dimensions of the body,
three dimensions of its being which, Sartre concludes, are from
the standpoint of awareness chronologically in the same order.
In point of time, I live my body-for-itself, then it is revealed to
me as for-Others, and finally I live my body's being-for-the-
Other as an "outside" which I have-to-be without being it.
It is now necessary to examine Sartre's analysis in some detail.
CHAPTER III
CRITICAL REMARKS
Several of the arguments in Sartre's analysis of the body de-
serve close attention. Briefly, these may be formulated as
follows:
(I) The being of consciousness is not in any of its dimensions
capable of being made into an object by the same consciousness.
Therefore, in so far as the body-for-itself is a structure of the
being of consciousness as for-itself, it cannot be made an object-by
consciousness. Similarly, consciousness can only exist its being a
body-for-Others, and thus it exists for itself as a body known by
Others but not by itself. I do not know my body as such in its
three dimensions, I am it : being it, my body can never become
an object for me.
(2) My body-for-itself, and in particular its system o( sense
organs, are only the "referred-to," the "indicated," of the objects
"oriented" around it as their "centeL" A sense organ therefore,
considered as a member of my body-for-itself, knows nothing of
"sense-data" of any description; rather, it is the center of refer-
ence indicated by the objects peculiar to it.
(3) When consciousness suddenly experiences its own being-
an-object for the Other this shock causes a new dimension of its
being to arise - its being-for-Others-and this, in tum, causes the
emergence of another dimension - my body-for-Others is existed
by me as a body known by Others, I experience my own being-
outside for Others. Therefore what we have to do with here are
genuinely ontological "dimensions" of the body.
(4) Finally, it is Sartre's belief that "To study the way in
which my body appears to the Other or the way in which the
Other's body appears to me amounts to the same thing."
(EN, 405) This, he states, follows from the identity of my being-
for-the-Other and his being-for-me.
CRITICAL REMARKS ro7
It will be necessary to consider each of these central points
separately.
(1) THE APPREHENSION OF THE BODY-FOR-ITSELF
While involved in filling my pipe with tobacco, my fingers, my
hand, my arm, indeed my whole body as it is "lived" by me in
this concrete act, is not apprehended for itself but is rather
"surpassed" toward the specific goal of my action: smoking my
pipe. Were I to reflect on my body (or, were I to look at my
fingers in the attitude of an observer), what I would apprehend
would not be my body as existed by me (my fingers as surpassed
towards the project-at-hand), but only an object, namely, my
body in its being-for-Others.
We pointed out above that this argument reveals several
intrinsic presuppositions which are not themselves examined by
Sartre. (a) The only consciousness which could "apprehend" the
body-as-lived as such would be precisely the non-thematic
"living" ("existing") of the body as surpassed towards projects-
at-hand; a seeing cannot be apprehended by another seeing. And
this requirement, Sartre contends (Marcel and Merleau-Ponty
notwithstanding), is simply impossible to fulfill. If one were to
propose that my living of my body is itself a sort of apprehension
or knowing of it (as does Merleau-Ponty), Sartre would insist that
this "apprehension" is not really apprehension in the strict sense
of cognition, a relation of knowing in which there is a si!-bf ect
over against ati ob1'ect who grasps the body-for-itself in a cognitive
manner. Rather, Sartre contends, there is no apprehension proper
of the body-for-itself just because this dimension of the body
underlies any subject-object dichotomy; it is a dimension of
being, and not a relation of knowledge.
(b) The type of consciousness which does succeed in appre-
hending my body, reflection, apprehends only objects. But my
body-for-itself is not, and cannot become, an object in any way
whatever, since it is that which is surpassed towards objects and
therefore it is that in virtue of which there are obj ects in the first
place. Thus if one were to maintain that there is a sort of re-
flection which makes this dimension of my body accessible as
such (as, for instance, Marcel's "Ptmsee pensante"), Sartre would
merely claim that in so far as the "reflection" recovers the lived
ro8 SARTRE
unity (the body-for-itself), it is no longer reflection in the strict
sense; reflection is by essense a knowing, and as such essentially
involves the subject-object dichotomy. In so far as reflection
involves a reflecting and a reflected-on, the latter is for the
former something other than what it was before the act of re-
flecting (the body-for-itself is not the body-for-Others, and re-
flection succeeds only in apprehending the latter, never the
former).
We can reduce these assumptions to one: if I cannot apprehend
an activity of consciousness while it goes on and in so far as it goes
on, nor a component of consciousness qua pour-soi, then I cannot
apprehend it at all ! Nor, for that matter, will it be possible for
me even to describe this activity as such in its own intrinsic
structure. For to apprehend an activity of consciousness would
mean to take it as an object, and as such it is no longer going on
but has ceased in order for me to apprehendit. I cannot see my
seeing, and if I reflect on my seeing I am no longer seeing but
reflectively grasping an object. I cannot make my body an
object just because I am it. I must cease being my body-for-
itself in order to disclose it, but then I will have disclosed only
its being-an-object and not its being-for-itself. To use the ex-
pressions adopted by Prof. Natanson,1 all I reflectively appre-
hend is the obfectity of my body and never its subfectity; its
subjectity is by essence non-graspable just because it is always
the grasping and never what-is-grasped.
To reflect on my body-as-lived (which is, we saw, a structure
of consciousness) radicalty modifies it qua reflected-on (EN, Ig8).
For , Sartre goes on,
That reflection is a cognition (knowledge) is indubitable; it is endowed
with a positional characteristic, it affirms the consciousness reflected-on.
But every affirmation ... is conditioned by a negation: to affirm this
object is to deny simultaneously that I am this object. To lmow is ro
make otieself other. (EN, 202)
Since, however, the reflection, the reflecting consciousness, is
the consciousness reflected-on, it cannot make itself wholly other,
and thus the effort to know oneself "must lead to a failure, and
precisely this failure is reflection." (EN, 200) Rather than being
knowledge, then, reflection is a r ecognition, the recognition by
1
Natanson, op. cit., cf. above, pp. Io3-07.
CRITICAL REMARKS I09
the reflecting consciousness that it is one with the reflected-on
in the mode of not-being it and a knowledge of the latter as a
psychic object. (Cf. EN, 207-08) Hence Sartre finds it necessary
to distinguish between a "pure reflection" (which is only a
" quasi-connaissance" (EN, 209)) and an "impure reflection"
(which is a knowledge of a psychic object). The reflection on my
body-for-itself modifies it and apprehends my body on a new
dimension of its being, namely, psychic body, the body-as-object,
or the body-for-Others. This modification consists in my body's
taking on, qua reflected-on, a sort of "outside," i. e., a kind of
objectity. In this sense, my body-for-itself disappears and the
psychic body appears as object of the reflecting consciousness.
Now, it seems to me that what this entire position fails to take
into account is that every "object " whatever, to be an object of a
consciousness and thus to be an "intended" object, is a sense-
unity which as such intrinsically points back, not to a facticity
(as Sartre maintains), but rather to the consciousness of it as that
which bestowed this meaning (m the obf ect. Consciousness is pointed
to by its objects as "sense-bestowing." i
That Sartre, in fact, never investigates objects as unities of
sense, while purportedly following out the implications of the
theory of intentionality, demonstrates Sartre's own departure
from this doctrine. To argue that consciousness as intentive to
objects (ultimately, to the world) "demands" a transphenomenal
"support" (the en-soi) , is simply to fail to recognize that this
"transphenomenality," even if there be such an affair, is itself a
sense bestowed on objects (ultimately, the world) by the conscious-
ness of them.
Similarly as regards the body, to say that reflection discloses
only the body-as-obj ect is to ignore the intrinsic characteristic
of this object - that it is a sense-unity, that it has an "objective
sense" which as such can not only be grasped but reflectively
described and explicated as such. Moreover, to identify the body-
as-object with the body-for-Others is to fail to recognize the
intrinsic difference of sense between my body as seen by me and
l It is of the essence of intentionality, Husserl points out, that all objects point
back to the consciousness of them. Cf. E. Husserl, Formale und Transrendentale Logik,
Max Niemeyer (Hall.e, I929), 86, p. 187, and 99, pp. 221:-22. See also, Husserl,
Cartesian Mediuuwns, op. ciJ., 20-22, pp. 46-55. It is already v i d ~ t then, that
Sartre seems to give uf> intentionality and is quite far from "correcting" it.
IIO
SARTRE
my body as seen by the Other (as well as the great difference
between being seen by one Other and being seen by many Others;
between being seen by a total stranger, and being seen by a loved
one; and so on). The explication of the reflectively apprehended
body-for-itself discloses that this "object" has the sense for me,
"my body-as-lived," however true it may or may not be that I
do not at the same time ''live" my body.
The fact that I cannot at the same time and in the same
respect act and reflect on this acting by no means signifies that
the acting reflected-on is no longer the same acting which I
actually performed. Similarly, while it is quite true that I cannot
see my seeing, I can and do reflectively apprehend my seeing
itself as a specific subjectively lived process. Were this not the
case, then absolutely nothing could be said about seeing; Sartre
could describe it neither as "indicated" nor as a "center."
However, this reflecting by no means "alters" or "modifies" the
seeing, such that "seeing as seeing" would be an "inapprehen-
sible." It seems to me, in fact, that Sartre confuses obfectifying
with obfectivating: to make any activity (e.g. seeing) thematic is
by no means to take it as a mere object (in Sartre's sense, as a
Gegenstand, something standing-over-against-me, who am sub-
ject), that is, an en-soi. I may do so, asMarcel saw quite clearly;
but it is not intrinsically necessary that I do so. Indeed, this
discussion brings out Sartre's own bias: he simply identifies
"being-an-object" with "being-in-itself"; he reifies "object"
into an "en-soi"; and this reification, never questioned by him,
runs throughout his work.
I may, of course, reflectively consider my body as a physico-
chemical system defineable by means of physiological-neurolo-
gical laws and reduceable to specific "elements" whose inter-
action takes plaee in ways which are specifiable by those laws.
In this sense, I would reflectively consider my body as, in
Sartre's terms, "for-Others"; it would. be my body as a somatic
unity like any other bodily organism. It is by no means neces-
sarily the case that reflection always .has this as its object; if it
were even Sartre could not describe, as he does, the body-for-
itself. But even when I do so consider my body as an "object,"
the body-object still remains a sense-unity and its sense still
remains precisely "my body," though now taken in its natural
CRITICAL REMARKS rn
aspect. Thus it is not at all the case that, for example, when I go
to the doctor with a broken leg, we are both in the same-relation
to my leg, i.e., that we both equally are observers and in the same
sense. To be sure, I do observe my leg, and so does the doctor;
but it is always "my" leg and not " his" which is oberved by us.
It seems to me that Sartre's analysis of the body, whileitis
undoubtedly a subtle and penetrating study, is infected with a
- blas deriving from liis implicit acceptance of the Cartesian
dualism, an acceptance moreover which does not seem to "be
noticedby him. And, the prime consequence of this is the reifiCation
of"object" and "subject" (it makes no difference in this sense
wlietlier one speaks of rtsubjed-object" or "pour-soi - en-soi").
To be sure, consciousness for Sartre is no longer Descartes' res
cogitans, nor is being the res extensa. Consciousness is not an
absolute self-certainty of knowledge but is now, for Sartre, an
absolute interiority of negation which exists itself as a lack of
being in its temporal ekstases. Being, on the other hand, is now
conceived as a primal stuff, the "viscous," the "packed." "the
solid," and no longer conceived in terms of extension which is
by essence determinable in mathematical formulae. Nevertheless,
the essentially Cartesian position remains: pour-soi and en-soi,
consciousness and world, are co-givens; they are simultaneous
and absolute. For both, consciousness and world are two domains
of being. But whereas Descartes maintained only that the res
extensa and the .,es cogitan.s are distinct as regards their respective
natures, Sartre goes much farther to maintain that pour-soi and
en-soi are radically separate in their being. Pour-soi is-not en-soi;
en-soi is, pour-soi is nothingness. Pour-soi's connection with the
en-soi is to be understood now, not in terms of Descartes' "ideas,"
but in terms of Sartre's version of the intentiveness of conscious-
ness, its bursting-forth onto the world as not-being the world.
And thus, as we have pointed out, the intensification and
reification of the dualism occurs by way of the transformation
of the theory of intentionality.
This transformation of Husserl's theory of intentionality is
already implicit in the very formulation of the ontological
problem in the Introduction to L'Etre et le Neant. To say that
consciousness is consciousness of . .. , he states there, is to say
that it is either constitutive of the being of its object, or that it is
II2 SARTRE
a relation to a transcendent being. Denying the first, Sartre tries
to maintain the second. l
However, it should be noticed that Sartre pre-interprets
"constitution" to mean "creation"; and it is in terms of this pre-
conception of the meaning of constitution that he undertakes to
criticize Husserl's notion of "hyletic data," as well as to state the
alternates (one of which he rejects, maintaining that conscious-
ness cannot create the being of its objects). (Cf. EN, 26) It must
be pointed out, however, that, although Husserl did at times use
the term, "constitution," in this non-,_phenomenotogical sense, it
is by no means the only, nor the most frequent, nor even the
genuinely phenomenological, meaning he wished to use. 2 And,
indeed, in the Formate und Transzendentale Logik,3 Husserl
explicitly states that "constitution" (synonymously, "producing")
does not signify "inventing" or "making" (synonymously,
"creating"). To be sure, nowhere in Husserl's works do we find
a formal definition of "constitution." Nevertheless, as Prof.
Dorion Cairns has abundantly demonstrated, 4 it is still possible
to formulate the genuinely phenomenological concept of consti-
tution, and this concept is in no way Sartre's "creation." 5
In the most general sense of the term constitution signifies the
synthetic structure of the total inte1itional process (the actual and
potential intendings of the object in question as the same ob-
ject); i.e., constitution designates a total process, a synthetic
process through the multiple phases of which one and the same
object is intended as self-identical. The constituting of something
in this sense is, accordingly, not a putting together of elements
to make up a whole, but rather a synthetic union of actual and
potential processes as having a common object.6 All these pro-
i Cf. above, pp. 65-68.
' Prof. Dorion Cairns has made this unmistakably clearin a series of lectures given
from Fall Semester, 1957, through Spring Semester, r959, at the Graduate Faculty of
Political and Social Science in New York City: "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality,
Parts I, II, III, IV."
3 991 pp. 22I-22, esp. 222, lines x-xo.
4 In a special lecture-series on phenomenology, gi:ven from March to May, 1959
6 Allred Schiltz makes a similar mistake, in "Das Problem der transzendentalen
Intersubjektlvltat bei Husserl," Philcst>f>hische Rundschau, 5. Jahrgang, Heft 2
(.1957), pp. 81- xo7, cf. esp. pp. 106-07.
e Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," PhilcsophiGal
Essays in Memory of Edmvnd Husserl, M. Farber (edit.or), Harvard (Cambridge,
1940), pp. 65-84, esp. 66: "To be aware of an obied means that, in the f>Tes1111t experience,
one is awar" of the obiect as being the same as thaJ wmch one was aware of in the past
CRITICAL REMARKS
II3
cesses are united precisely as intending the object as self-identical
throughout a multiplicity of appearances of the object in question
and the synthetic structure of their union is called the constitutioti
of the thing pure/;y as what is intended in and by these intentive
processes. This, then, determines the sense of the constituting as
Leistung. There are, of course, several more narrow senses of
"constitution," but we need not go into these here. All that is
important for our point is that Sartre's transformation of
intentionality, and subsequent criticism of Husserl in terms of
this transformation, is at the outset unjustified.
In the second place, Sartre's interpretation of intentionality
as a "relation" to a transcendent being is not phenomenologically
accurate, nor correct as an interpretation of Husserl. To be sure,
Husserl did at times speak of intentionality as a "Beziehung,"
but he was quick to point out, as Sartre never does, that it is not
a "real" relation - like causality, succession, simultaneity, and
the like. In the first place, Husserl states explicitly that
What is then to be noticed is the circumstance that here we do not speak
of a relation between any sort of psychological event - called a subjectively
lived experience - and another real existent - called object - nor do we speak
of a psychological connection which would take- place between the one and
the other in objective actualitJ). Rather we speak of subjectively lived
experiences purely as regards their essence, or oi pure essenu, and of what
is in&luded in the essence "a priori," in unc<mditicmed necessity.
1
As Husserl put it in his Cartesian Meditations, in the second
place, 2 intentiveness is an intrinsic characteristic or property of
subjective processes (Erlelmisse), and not a relation between a
consciousness and an objective world- which is, in the end, the
only way one can understand Sartre's interpretation of intention-
ality.
Hence, we must say, Sartre's interpretation of intentionality
as a relation to a transcendent being is not only a departure from
Husserl (and far from a "correction" of him, as Sartre claims),
but also precludes from the beginning what he sets out to prove.
To call intenti?nality a relation to a transcendent being pre-
experietice, and as the same as that which one may exfuct to be aware of in a fldtire
e.xperie11ce, as the same that . one may be aware of in an indefinite tiumber of presentative
acts ...
E. Husserl, ldeen u einer reinen Ph411omenologie und phanomenolcgischen
PhilosopAie, Band I, Max Niemeyer (Halle, 1913), 36, p. 64.
! Carnsian Mtditatio11S, op. ci,,, 14, p. 33.
SARTRE
St4'pposes tlzat the terms of this relation are given simt1ltaneoi1sly
and thus Sartre's "proof" of the transphenomenality of being is
quite si,perf/;ilO'tts (and merely diverts one's attention away from
this presupposition).
Furthermore, cm this everything else in Sartre's
presentation flows quite as a matter of course: consciousness
cannot be "constitutive," i.e., "creative," of the being of objects
but, being a pure relating-to, must be the absolute opposite of
the en-soi which is a pure related-to; thus it follows also that the
only possible relation to the en-soi can only be a self-negation on
the part of consciousness. But all of this rests on the assumption,
the unquestioned and quite unjustified presupposition, that
consciousness, which is by essence intentive, is nevertheless an
intending of a being (en-soi) which is transcendent to itself,
which is there whether intended or not. But either, on the one
hand, consciousness is genuinely intentive, through and through,
and the en-soi, if transcendent, is always intended as transcendent
(i.e., is a noematic-objective sense), or, if the en-soi is genuinely
transphenomenal, then consciousness cannot be genuinely
intentive. To try to maintain both is to be involved in a root
contradiction; and just this is the case, we submit, in Sartre's
analysis. Only, the contradiction is concealed by means of his
presupposed transformation of the theory of intentionality and
his intensification of the Cartesian dualism.
It is, in other words, only by means of the reification of "sub-
ject" and "object" that Sartre can maintain that negation is
the fundamental and primordial relation between pour-soi and
en-soi. But if one holds fast to the intentiveness of consciousness,
Husserl points out, it is evident that negation, far from being
primary, is rather a modification of affinnation.1 More particu-
larly, the fundamental stratum of consciousness' intentiveness
is that of "simply believing," or "simply accepting," its objects
(what Husserl calls proto-doxic positionality). The fundamental
tendency of consciousness, that is to say, is simply to accept its
objects, to believe in them simply, and it thus takes some moti-
vation for it to modify this proto-doxic positionality.
Unless there is some reason for consciousness to modalize its
1
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urtei1: Untersuchungen zur Gmealogie Iler Logik, Claassen
Verlag (Hamburg, 2nd Ed., 1954), 21c, pp.
CRITICAL REMARKS ns
positionality, its tendency is simply to accept things "until
further notice." Negation, then, arises only by means of a synthesis
of cancellation (as when, to use Sartre's own example, walking
into the cafe and expecting to find Pierre, I discover instead that
Pierre is not there yet; the expecting is cancelled because it is
n9t fulfilled, or, the proto-doxic intending becomes modalized,
motivated by the failure to be fulfilled: here, as elsewhere,
negation is a specific modification or modalization of the more
fundamental tendency of consciousness). More technically,
negation arises only by means of a synthesis of cancellation
between a presented sense and a transferred sense, when, e.g.
the horizontally predelineated presentation of a specific object
(Pierre) is disconfirmed in the on-going course of the harmonious
experiencing of it (walking into the cafe expecting to find him).
The actualization of protentional intendings of the objects as the
same enter into a synthesis of cancellation (or: negative verifi-
cation) with the protentional intendings of the object in previous
experience of it.
If Sartre had remained faithful to the insight of Husserl, he
might have seen the absurdity of attempting to speak of a "being-
in-itself" which is not i1itended as "in-itself" and relative, there-
fore, to consciousness. I
Now, as regards the problem of the body, it seems evident that
not only can the body-for-itself be made thematic and reflectively
explicated, but also that Sartre has himself done that. He does
in fact, describe the body-for-itself at length; but this is possible
only by means of the specific theoretical act of thematization, or
objectivation, which makes the body-for-itself an "object," a
"theme" for analysis. To say that my body cannot be made an
"object" because I am it, simply obscures the whole problem,
and derives, as I have maintained, from a reification of Cartesian
dualism. Although Sartre attempts to overcome this dualism by
transforming it into an ontological struggle between en-soi and
pour-soi, the consequence is rather an intensification of it. And
the new dualism, however much it has become transformed, is
unjustifiable on phenomenological grounds. That is to say,
however, that it cannot be consistently maintained along with a
1 See, on this point, Husserl, Ideen, I, 47; Formale und TransieniUntale Logik,
102; and Ca.rlaian Medit4'ions, 8.
II6 SARTRE
theory of intentionali"ty. For, as Husserl has shown, every "object"
of consciousness intrinsically refers back to the consciousness of
it as that which bestows its sense as 'an object of this or that kind,
having these and those determinations, qualities, and the like.
And, Husserl points out,
It is to be emphasized that this pointing-back ... is not derived from an
empirical induction on the part of psychological observer ... but is rather,
as is t o be demonstrated in phenomenology, an essential compo11tJt1t of
intetitionality, to be disclosed from its own intrinsic intentional content in
the corresponding (intentively) fulfilling productions. 1
This being so, either one can talk of objects (ultimately, the
world, or en-soi) only as intended; or else he must give up the
claim to phenomenology, and expecially to the theory of in-
tentionality. But if objects are thus considered strictly as in-
tended, then it is not only possible but quite essential to investi-
gate them as such: if the body is experienced by consciousness as
for-itself, then ipso facto it is accessible to phenomenological
explication.
(2) THE BODY AS A CENTER OF REFERENCE
In spite of the difficulties mentioned, Sartre gives an excellent
analysis of the body-as-lived. As Alphonse de Waelhens remarks,
the real difficulties with Sartre's analysis arise when one attempts
to explicate his concrete analyses in terms of his fundamental
ontology.2 By themselves the individual studies seem to be quite
accurate; but in the end they are irreconcilable with the onto-
logical doctrines. Here, too, as regards the phenomenon of the
body this is apparent; in particular, where Sartre departs from
the intentiveness of consciousness in his ontological doctrines,
the analysis of the body as a center of reference of objects dis-
closed by means of it can only be understood as an intentional
analysis. Nevertheless Sartre conducts his ing_aj_ry withoEt ~
reference to intentionality. While he thus seems to recognize
this fundamental characteristi.C'" of consciousness (and of the
body, in so far as it, too, is a structure of consciousness), his
analysis is far from complete.
1 Formale untl Transundenlale Logik, 86, p. r87; cf. also 97, p. u6.
t A. de Waelhens, Une PhUost>f>hie de l'A.mbigwite, Universitaires de Louvain
{19s1J, esp. pp ... -a.
CRITICAL REMARKS II7
The body is what is "indicated" by the system of objects
around it, it is that in terms of which they are ordered in specific
ways. In so far as the body is thus the center of the order, it is
not itself within the field; I cannot take a "point of view" on that
which is my very "point of view" on things. In the same sense,
Husserl speaks of the organism as the "continuous bearer of the
center of orientation . ... " 1
Similarly, each of the senses, Sartre emphasizes, is oriented
with respect to a specific system of objects, and this system
points back to the sense organ as its center. This, for Sartre, is
what it means to be sensuously perceptive of a world. A thing
presents itself visually, e.g., in a harmonious system of adum-
brations of itself, and this system is harmoniously ordered with
other systems of adumbrations ("other things"), the total system
of which refers to the visual organs as center.
The "reference back," for Sartre, is possible only because the
body is itself "in the midst of things," i.e., it is a thing which is
of the same type as the other things ordered around it. Thus, for
the eye to see, it must itself be visible, for the hand to touch, it
must itself be touchable, and so on.
But here, several difficulties arise. Following his analysis,
which, be it noted, remains almost totally within the sphere of
vision, one would have to say that auditory objects refer back
to the ear as their orientational center, and that, for this reference
to take place, the ear must itself be "in the midst of auditory
things." However, unless one minces words, this "being in the
midst of things" must be spelled out, as regards every sensuous
dimension, as Sartre does for vision. That is to say: in order for
the reference of auditory objects back to the auditory sense
organ to occur, the ear must itself be "audible." Similarly, the
same would have to be said of the gustatory and the olfactory
sense organs - if, that is to say, this aspect of Sartre's analysis is
essential
And here it seems that the principle of the analysis is inade-
quate. While it might be maintained that auditory, gustatory,
and olfactory objects refer to their respective senses as their
centers, it seems absurd to go on to say that in order for this
reference to occur, the taste-buds must be "tasteable," the ear
1 Husserl, Tdun, II, op. cit., t8c, p. 6s.
II8 SARTRE
"bearable," the sensitive membranes of the nose "smellable."
And to complicate things further, what must we say as regards
the muscular-visceral sense? While this seems to be connected
to the tactual sense, it does not seem to be subject to the same
descriptions: is there here an orientational center? In what
sense could muscular-visceral sensations (since one can hardly
speak of "objects" in the sense of concrete physical things)
"refer back" . . . and, to what would they refer?
To be sure, the eye as visible is not itself within the field of
visible objects but is rather their center; similarly, the ear cannot
hear itself hearing, the band feel itself feeling, and so on. Never-
theless, Sartre's answer that the senses are each centers of their
respective fields, that they are the "indicated" of each particular
system objects, and that the body as a whole is the synthetic
center of the concatenated systems of objects of the respective
senses - this answer does not seem to be applicable to each of
the senses. And, if it is not applicable to all the senses, can it be
applicable to the body as a synthetic totality ? At best, we must
say, Sartre's analysis is inadequate. We shall have to seek for
some other principle in order to account for the body as a syn-
thetic totality.
Sartre's main point, however, seems to be well-taken: the
senses are each the "centers of reference'' of the systems of
objects relevant to each. And in virtue of this reference the senses
are each synthesized, in themselves, and in respect to each other,
such that the body as a whole becomes synthetically constitu.ted
as the center "O" of a system of coordinates spreading out in
space and time from it.
But what, after all, is this ?" How does it take place?
Furthermore, how does it happen that The body as a whole
becomes synthetically constituted as a totality, and that the
several fields of the senses are in themselves u.nified such that one
automatically sees and hears the same thing, touches the same
thing he smells, and so on? To state that it happens, and to study
the way in which it happens, are two very different matters; and
Sartre simply leaves us with the latter unanalyzed. Thus, for
instance, to say that the eye is the center of the field of visual
objects, and that the latter refers to the eye as the center, by no
means tells us how it happens that the eye, and not the hand, or
CRITICAL REMARKS II9
perchance that tree over there, becomes the center of visible
objects; 1 or, how it happens that in the course of my on-going
experience I must learn that I cannot see sounds, touch sweetness,
or hear shapes.
We do not at this point wish to suggest possible ways of ex-
plicating this "reference." For one thing, Merleau-Ponty, as we
shall see, takes up this problem in some detail; for another, we
shall have to return to it againin our final sections in our attempt
to suggest the phenomenological-constitutive analysis of the
body. It is enough at this time to have pointed out that Sartre's
analysis leaves this problem unasked, much less answered. We
indicate it, then, as one of the basic problems in accounting for
the structured-orderedness of the animate organism.
(3) THE PROBLEM OF 'ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS'
Sartre's analysis of the body is conducted in terms of what he
callS the ' 'ontological Winensions" of the body. To
this theory, accordingly, one must ask what is meant by these
"dimensions." Unfortunately, Sartre leaves this evidently
important matter in almost complete obscu.rity. Beyond a few
indications, his analysis simply passes it by. We must therefore
attempt to interpret his meaning.
We have already seen that when the Other is originarily
encountered this "shock" causes a new "dimension" of the being
of consciousness to emerge - its "being-for-Others." This en-
counter, again, does not in any way involve the body,
2
but
rather occurs within the "pure interiority" of the cogito. s As we
have also seen, everythingin Sartre's theory of the Other and that
of the body seems to indicate that even the body's "being-for-
itself" does not emerge until after the encounter with the Other.
It would thus seem to be the case that we cannot interpret the
"dimensions" of the body as being the same as the "dimensions"
of the pour-soi. (Cf., e.g., EN, 405) While"it is certainly Sartre's
position that, as we saw, the "dimensions" of the body do emerge
1 Piaget, e.g., bas shown t hat this is by no means an innate endowment , but the
result of a complicated history. CL Origins of Intelligenu in Chudre11, International
Universities Press (New York, 19511), pp. 62-a2.
! Contrary to Mrs. Hazel Barnes' interpretation in her " Translator's Introduction"
to Being and NotMng11ess, P.hilosophical Ll'brary (New York, 1956), pp. xl-xlii.
3 Cf., e.g., EN, 290, 297, and 300.
120 SARTRE
in a chronological order, it is not at all certain that the " di-
mensions" of the pour-soi are also chronological.1 Furthermore,
if his statements in The Transcendence of the Ego yield any clues
here, they are in support of our interpretation. There, as we have
already indicated above, it is Sartre's position that the body is a
"visible and tangible symbol for the I"; the ego is itself but an
object for consciousness; thus, the body is doubby removed from
consciousness.
Despite the lack of clarity, nevertheless, the " dimensions" of
the body are in some sense at least analogous to those of the pour-
soi. In neither case can the dimensions be derived from one
another nor reduced to one another. (Cf. EN, 365-67) Thus we
should properly say that, as regards the pour-soi, so, too, the
body "must be simultaneously for-itself and for-others .... "
(EN, 342)
2
The body, then, will simultaneously be different
dimensions, though each of its dimensions emerges chronologic-
ally. Again, although the dimensions of the body are not identi-
cally the same as those of the pour-soi, they emerge as such only
as a consequence of the encounter by pour-soi with the Other.
Finally, like the dimensions of the poar-soi's being, those of the
body are on " two different and incommunicable levels of being;
they irreducible to one another." (EN, 367-68)
In short, it would appear to be the case for Sartre that since
" the body is not what first manifests me to the Other," (EN, 405)
as this would make the fundamental relation to the Other a
purely external one, my being-an-object for the Other is not the
same thing as my body's being-for-Others. Thus, the respective
dimensions of the pour-soi and the body are not the same. The
attempt to understand the meaning of the " dimensions" of the
body in terms of those of the pour-soi proves to be of no avail
The emergence-of the body, in the end, is but one episode in the
ontologically more fundamental encounter with the Other in the
negativeness of pure interiority. (EN, ibid.}
In our presentation of Marcel's conception of the body we saw
that he had recognized much earlier than Sartre that "the notion
1
At best, all one can say is that Sartre's analysis of the encounter with the Other
ls most confusing on th.is point. He constantly couches it in such terms as "before,"
"after," and "hitherto," without ever indicating the meaning of these terms. (Cf.
EN, 340-42)
2 The necessity here is a factual necessity. Cf. EN, 3..
I
CRITlCAL REMARKS I2I
of the body is not at all univocal." 1 Even prior to that, Marcel
had insisted that the body considered as a physical thing, and
the body considered as it is lived by the one whose body it is,
are two irreducibly distinct "modes of existence."
2
Later 011 he
designated the'se as the mode of existence proper to obfects, and
that mode proper to existents. s In general, it would seem that
Sartre's distinction is, if not the same, at least quite similar:
the body's being-for-Others is essentially its being-an-object,
while its being-for-itself is the mode in which it is experienced
by consciousness (consciousness' "being-in-the-midst-of-things'').
However that may be, it seems to us necessary to point out
that though it is certainly possible for me to consider my body as
an object, though my body's existence for Others is not the same
thing as its existence for me, nevertheless my body is not, and
cannot be, "for-Others" in the same sense in which a mere
physical thing is an object, an en-soi. Throughout, in other
words, each of the so-called "ontological dimensions" are es-
sentially "dimensions" of one unitary thing- my body. It would
be absurd to suppose that there are three bodies. But, to speak of
these dimensions as being on different and separate levels of
being is, if not to entertain the notion of three bodies, at least
is to hypostatize the dimensions to the point where it is impossible
to understand how they could be dimensions of one and the same
thing, my body.
By thus reifying the "dimensions" of the body; by analyzing
them as if they were different from the dimensions of the pour-
soi; and by maintaining that whereas the pour-soi is the body-
for-itself, it is-not the body-for-Others; Sartre tends to obscure
the phenomenologically evident circumstance that if we are
entitled-to speak of "modes" or "dimensions" of being we must
always recognize that they are modes, not of the body, but of
the consciousness who is embodied by that specific animate
organism. In short, as Stephan Strasser has emphasized
besouled matter is not at all a wall separating us, but rather a mediator
between you and me ... I grasp the Other immediately ... as embodied
person, because I myself am a body-soul unity ... The relationship' 'I-you"
is not the absolutely first datum ... Before being able t o have a personal
relationtootherhumanpersons,Imyselfmustfirstexistasembodiedperson.
1 Metaphysical journal, op. cit., 1> 12+ (May 7, 1914).
2 Ibid. , p. 19 (January r9, r94).
3 Ilnil., pp. 313- 339 ('"Existence and Objectivity").
122 SARTRE
The primordial problem is the.refore the problem of embodiment.l
To _say that the "dimensions" of the body are radically, onto-
logically separate, is to lose the body as the unitary embodiment
of consciousness (t?-at which is "besouled" by consciousness).
To say that the bemg of the pour-soi is not connected to thE.
being the body of consciousness, is to raise the insuperable
Cartesian problem of how the one being can ever be united with
thC: ?thc:r being. And, to maintain that there is no question of a
uruf1cation of the two, that consciousness is the body (in the
mode of the for-itself), is simply to obscure the central phenome-
non: the body is the "besouled" ("animated") embodiment of
Consciousness is not the body, nor is the body
consciousness, from any point of view; consciousness is embodied
body, "besou1ed" by consciousness, and only
virtue of this embodiment does the world appear to conscious-
ness. "To appear" means to appear to a consciousness and means
that consciousness is embodied in a world by of its
body.
Thus, it seems to us, if we may speak of " dimensions" here
this is. possi_ble only if we recognize they must be the
ways in the of consciousness occurs; or, they
are the ways in which consciousness experiences itself as embodied
lJy its own specific animate <Jrganism - which is "animate" that
is a Leib, and not merely a Kiirper,2 in virtue of
a?iimaticm of it. In this sense it becomes possible to account for
the "things themselves," for the fact that these "dimensions"
are dimensions of one specific animate organism: the various
manners in which consciousness becomes embodied are in-
synthesized by consciousness as its own specific em-
bodiment. The "dimensions," that is to say, must not be reified
as strata of being, but must be seen as intentional structures
implicit in embodiment. The unitary phenomenon intended
intentively constituted, as having different "dimensions"
precisely my own organism considered as my own specific em-
bodiment.
1
Strasser, 1:he Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Duquesne Studies
(Duquesne Uwvers1ty, Pittsburg, 1957), tranSlated from the Dutch, pp. 1
4
7-
4
8.
2
Sartre does not seem to distinguish these.
CRITICAL REMARKS I23
(4) THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER'S BODY-FOR-ME
AND MY BODY-FOR-THE-OTHER '
One of the fundamental weaknesses of Sartre's analysis lies in
his 'oa:Id declaration that my body's being-for-the-Other is
identical with the Other's being-for-me. To be sure, Sartre states
that he has already established this identity, purportedly in the
section on Others.1
However, if one returns to the section on Others, all one finds
is the very explicit statement that the Other-as-object (his being-
for-me), being the second moment in my relations with him,
cannot be the same as my being-a11,-obfect (my being-for-Others))
for him. Indeed, the Other's being-an-object arises out of a sort
of dialectical ferment implicit in my being-an-object for him,
and hence the latter enjoys an ontological priority over the
former. (Cf. EN, 347, 348-50) What has been established, then,
is that the two are not at all -identical; his being-an-object for me
is the dialectical consequence of the movement by which I non-
thetically apprehend my own being-an-object for him, whereas
my being-an-object for him is the root encounter with the Other .
my primordial fall - and thus hardly identical with the former.
Moreover the structure of my being-an-object is hardly identical
with that of his being-for-me, as follows from the ontological
priority of the former: it is through shame that I experience
myself as being-for-him, and my only access to his being-an-
object for me is through the pride of my making an object of him.
But even without the prior analysis of the Other, it is easy to
see that Sartre's claim is absurd in his own terms. These two
modes of being cannot be identical in the strict sense, else they
would be identical, i.e., not two at all. But neither can they be
identical in a very loose sense, that is, similar, such that the
study of one (say, the Other's body-for-me) would suffice to
understand the structures of both.2
1 Sartre does not rehearse the argument, nor even refer to the specific place where
this was purportedly established. I assume be means the section on Others since this
is the first place that "for-Others" Is discussed in detail. '
2 Sartre analyzes the other's body-for-me as the second dimension, and my owu
body-as-known-by-tbeOtber, as the third dimension. But, one could suggest, this
way makes the identification in question superfluous, since, precisely, his bodyfor-
me and my body-for-him have each been studied separately as different dimensions.
But then there would be only two dimensions to the body, since his body-ior-me is
not a structure of my body, but of his.
!
-------------------------------------l'
I24 SARTRE
It is evident that whereas I experience (or, as Sartre prefers to
say, exist) my body's being-for-the-Other, in his own terms I
cannot on principle experience the Other's being-for-me as he
experiences it. In terms of my own experiencing of Others, in
fact, my being-object is first and his being-object is second, and
this is essetitial. I experience my own "being drained of my
subjectivity" and then my "draining of his subjectivity"; but
_ I cannot experience his "draining of my subjectivity" any more
than I can experience his "being drained of subjectivity" by my
look. In order to assert the purported identity of structure and
being, then, one would have to take up a point of view outside
the concrete encounter of one consci0usness with another; one
would have to be an observer of both at the same time. But being
an observer, one would have access neither to the one nor the
other consciousness in their respective for-itselfs. Hence even
on this supposal, one could not assert the identity.
Yet Sartre wants to do just that. Now, this tendency in all of
his analyses, to confuse levels of analysis, to write as if he had
access to just that which he excludes in other places as intrinsic-
ally impossible, is evident from the very beginning of his ontology
in his reification of "subject" and "object." If one seeks to
develop an ontology from the point of view of consciousness (as
Sartre admittedly does), then it is inherently inconsistent to
depart from that point of view. Yet Sartre does just that, for
in no other way could he poSSl'bly maintain that "objects" are
"en-soi" apart from consciousness - an assertion possible only
if one supposed Sartre able to philosophize s1dJ specie aeternitatis.
Similarly, to describe the Other's body-as-object and to take
this as pertaining to my body-as-object, is simply to give up the
initial framework. In short, Sartre's ontology seems consistently
inconsistent; it remains ignorant of its own starting-point.
In a way, it must be said, the supposed identity reveals
Sartre's own "optimism": unless the Other were already Other
for me there could never be any "encounter" with him, as an
Other who looks at me.1 But then one would have to say that in
some sense the Other is for me a subject, and neither simply an
l Cf. Sc.biltz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, Vol. ix, No. 2 (December,
1948), pp. 184-98.
CRITICAL REMARKS 125
object nor a subject for my own being-an-object.1 Only if I
experienced him as a subject, in fact, could I ever apprehend
him as being a "center" of orientation for objects surrounding
bim.2 Only if I apprehended him as subject, again, could I
apprehend him as an "ensemble of sensuous organs which are
disclosed to my sensuous lmowledge." (EN, 407) For, as he had
already established in his description of the body-for-itself, it
is only for a subject that objects are oriented around it; and it
is only a body which is the body of a consciousness that has
sense organs. Hence if I apprehend the Other as a "center" and
as an ensemble of sense organs, I must have already apprehended
him as a subject, as a consciousness embodied in this specific
body. Otherwise the body "over there" would not be an animate
body, sense organs would not be sense organs, but simply objects,
like grapes and trees.
Despite these, and other, difficulties, Sartre's study of the
body is an important and crucial one; it not only realizes a
genuine advance over Marcel's sketchy treatment but also has
proved to be enormously influential on the so-called existential
psychologists and psychiatrists. For Marcel, in fact, just leaves
us with the whole problem and a host of hints and suggestions;
once having discovered the phenomenon, he becomes more
interested in the problem of the "my" than in the structure of
the "body." Sartre, on the other hand, takes up the problem
in detail and attempts to explicate the structures of the body;
but, and this is what we have objected to most of all, his analysis
of the body is couched in terms of an unacceptable ontology. The
intrinsic assumptions of that ontology slip into his otherwise
excellent studies and render them unintelligible in certain parts,
and simply wrong in others.
We have two problems left from .our study of Sartre: the
problem of embodiment; and the problem of the synthesis of the
individual senses and of the senses with each other, and finally
of the whole body as asynthetictotality.Merleau-Ponty's study,
as we will now see, attempts to come to terms with both of these,
but with only partial success.
i Which, since thls is a status wbic.b C concretely liu4, does not satisfy Sartre's list
of subject-Object alternatives: I exist mysell-for-myself-for-others, and the Other is
for this dimension a for-itself! l
2 As Sartre in fact admits I do. Cf. EN, 404-07.

I
PART III
MERLEAU-PONTY'S THEORY OF
THE BODY-PROPER
'
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Unlike Sartre's theory of the body-for-itself in his L'Etre et le
Neant, it is not possible to submit Merleau-Ponty's theory of the
body-proper to a straightforward exposition and interpretation,
following his major work
1
step by step. Over and above the
complexity of the theory itself, Merleau-Ponty's analysis pro-
ceeds on a varity of levels which are not clearly distinguished by
him. Moreover, when Merleau-Ponty makes use of other doctrines
(as, for instance, those of Gestalt psychology,orthoseofHussetl),
he has invariably transformed their meaning and reinterpreted
them in terms of his own fundamental theory, but withoutletting
his readers know of this in advance. In this way, certain funda-
mental notions (such as "form," or "synthesis"), which have
their own specific meanings in the contexts from which he takes
them, are used in a quite different way by him, but with no
indications that this transformation has occurred - and, indeed,
within his own work itself, be does not always use the same term
in the same way. The over-all result of this is an at times quite
confusing amalgam of methods, analyses, and points of view.
To begin with, Merleau-Ponty prefaces his major work with
an outline statement of what he takes to be the fundamental
themes of Husserlian phenomenology - but it is a major task in
itself to determine the implicit and (rarely) explicit criticisms
and transformations of Husserl's phenomenology in which he
engages. Then, the opening sections of his study of perception
present an analysis and criticism of traditional psychological and
physiological conceptions of the nature of sensuous perception -
but, again, one can note already that the point of view which
he adopts for this criticism, that of Gestalt psychology, has over-
1 d.e la Perception, Librairle Gallimard (Paris, 1945), 531 pp.
(Here.aft.er cit ed t extually as PP.)
130
MERLEAU-PONTY
tones which are hardly psychological in their significance. In the
middle sections of the work on the body he continues to discuss,
in a critical manner, traditional psychology and physiology, and
even considers in great detail the important work of Gelb and
Goldstein on brain-injured patients - and, by this point in his
analysis it is quite evident that Merleau-Ponty has altered his
entire style of analysis. The tone of the work, that is to say,
becomes altered, and now takes on an ontological bearing, after
the manner of Sartre and Heidegger. Yet, running throughout
each of the analyses in the book are what we might with j ustifi-
cation call forays into phenomenology - but in the later sections,
even phenomenology comes to be given a quite different sense
from the one which Husserl gave it - and it is always Husserl's
phenomenology that he has in mind when he uses the term.
In short, one must say, there are throughout this work, and,
to a lesser extent, in his earlier one, La Structure du Comporte-
ment, i at l east three distinguishable lines of analysis: I) coupled
with his critical rejection of traditional psychology is an ac-
ceptance of the theory and psychology of "form" (Gestalt
psychology); 2) as the title of his major work shows, on the other
band, Husserlian phenomenology plays a crucial role; 3) but in
the end, as is particularly clear in his transformations of Husserl's
work, it seems that he ultimately seeks to develop an ontology
of human existence.2
It will be necessary, before giving an explication to his theory
of the body, to make some preliminary remarks concerning these
three lines of analysis.
(I) THE PROBLEM OF 'FORM'
Now on the one hand, the place of Gestalt psychology in his
work seems to be at least definable, though it is not necessary to
go into this in detail. It is the discovery of "form" which is for
him of great significance. While he tends to accept the thesis that
1 Structure du Comporlemeni, P. U.F. (Paris, 3rd edition, 1:953), 248 pp.
2 A. de Waelhens, Une Philosophie de L'ambiguiU, Pub. Universitaires de Louvaln
(Louvain, I951). Here, de Waelhens makes this very clear (cf. pp. 384-398). But, like
Merleau-Ponty, be does not bring out the place of phenomenology in the author's
work, nor does he show the transformations and criticisms which Merleau-Ponly
obviously bas performed. De Waelhens, in fact, takes it as evident that phenomeoo
logy leads to an ontology, in Heidegger's sense, but does not attempt to justify this
step any more than docs Mcrleau-Ponty. (Cf. pp. 402-408).
INTRODUCTION
I3I
all sensuous perception is perception of "forms" (i.e., of "wholes"
which are nothing but the systematic and functional inter-
relatedness of parts to parts, and to the "context" thus formed),
it should nonetheless be noted that this conception is trans-
formed by him in two ways. First, taking the "form" as "meaning"
(sens. Cf. PP, 9), he rejects in principle the distinction which, for
instance, Kohler makes, between "the thing as a physical, ol>-ject
and as the experienced whole, corresponding to it, which appears
in the visual iield." l Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes, agreeing with
the suggestion of Kohler to drop the "constancy-hypothesis,"2
that
the psychologists who practice the description of phenomena do not
ordinarily perceive the philosophical bearing of their method. They do not
see that the return to perceptual experience, if this reform is consequential
and radical, condemns all forms of realism ... ; that the genuine failure of
intellectualism is precisely to take for granted the determined universe
of science; that this objection applies a f oYtioYi to psychological. thought
since it places the perceptual consciousness in the midst of an. already
constituted world; and that the criticism of the constancy hypothesis, if
it is carried out to the end, has the significance of a genuine "phenome-
nological reduction". . . Such a psychology has never broken with
naturalism. But at the same time it becomes unfaithful to its own
descriptions. (PP, 58)
Secondly, by a series of steps which we shall attempt to make
explicit later, a "form" is interpreted by him, not just as a
"meaning," but as a "being"; or, one can say, every perceived
object, every "smsible," in so far as it is inseparably connected
to my body (Cf. PP, 59), is a certain expression of what I am and
bow I am. Objects reveal as their fundamental stratum a certain
physiognomy. Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes that perception
reveals objects as beings, beings which pose certain at first only
confused "problems" to my body. They are "invitations" to my
body's possible action on them: s
Without the exploration of my vision or of my hand, and before my
body is synchronized with it, the sensible, what is sensed, is nothing but a
vague solicitation ... Thus a sensible which is going to be sensed poses to
my body a sort of confused problem .... " (PP, 248)
.L W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology, Liverlght (New York, 1929), pp. 228-29.
Q :r.rerlea:u-Ponty takes this point !rom Aron Gurwitscb, Recension du 'Nachw01't zu
meinen Idun,' de Husserl, Deutsche Llttcraturzeitung, 28 February 1932. See also,
GurwitsCh La Thlorie du Champ de la Conscience, Dcsctee de Brouwer (Paris, 1957).
pp. 78-82.
s As Bergson had already said: "The objecls which su"ound my body f'qled the
MERLEAV-PONTY
Every sensible quality, that is to say, "is inserted into a certain
conduct," (PP, 242) and thus my body faces it as a sort of problem
to be resolved by that conduct. (PP, 245)
In short, what was a "perceptual form" for Gestalt psychology
becomes a mode of being: "the sensible not only has a motor and
vital signification but is nothing other than a certain manner of
being-to-the-world (ttre-atHnonde) . ... " (PP, 245-46)
1
Thus it
soon becomes clear that Gestalt psychology (as he calls it,
"psychology of 'form"') becomes transformed under the guiding,
if often misleading, hand of Merleau-Ponty into an ontology of
human existence. As he emphasizes in another place (PP, 250-5r),
to say that I visually perceive objects, that !have a visual field, is
to say I have at my disposal a system of visible beings. These
visible beings, moreover, are there for me as "forms" ("meanings")
in virtue of my very "opening out onto" them by means of my
visual apparatus, and not, he believes, by means of any "consti-
tutive operation" (in Husserl's sense), nor "sense-data" (as in
traditional psychology). The implicit criticism of Husserl leads
us over into our second preliminary remark. First however, since
the point being made here is decisive for straightening out many
of bis concrete analyses, it would be well to re-state it.
Instead of speaking of "sense perception" as an "ability,"
"capacity," or the like, Merleau-Ponty now speaks of a "mode of
access to ... ," a "being-to ... "; rather than speaking of "sense
data," "sense qualities," and the like, he now speaks of "lived
unities," "beings," "meanings," and "poles of action." 2 His
argument seems to be that traditional psychology and philosophy,
whether "empiricist" or "rationalist," considered sense per-
ception primarily as a mode of knowledge, and as such they one
and all presupposed a theory of the nature of sensuous perception,
an essentially objectivistic one s deriving ultimately from the
possibu actio11 of my body on them." Mali.ere et i'IUmoire, P.U.F. (Paris, 54th ed., 1953),
pp. 15- 16.
4 Cf. also, PP, 25, where Merleau-Ponty interprets the unity of the object of
perception as dependent upon this vague solicitation and, corresponding to it, a vague
presentiment of the immanent unity of the object by consciousness. Cf. also Husserl,
Erfahrung und Urteil, Claassen Verlag (Bamburg, 1954), pp. 79-80; and below, foot-
note, 2 p. 160.
1 As we shall see later, this "elre au monde" is the crucial category for his entire
work.
2
Cf. de Waelhens, of>. cit., pp. 39.1-92, and402--08.
a Cf. Gurwitsch's presentation of this problem, Theorie du Champ ... , op. cit.,
Parts I and 11.
INTRODUCTION
I33
Lockean-Cartesian theory of ideas conceived as the bridge
between the res extensa and res cogitans. That is to say, there is
said to be a certain object, X, which perchance emits a certain
series of "waves," perchance "picked up" by a part of the
sensitive surface of another object, an organism; this objective
occurrence then has certain consequences which are explainable,
it is assumed, by means of the law of causality pertaining to
physical objects in general. When the sensitive surface is "stimu-
lated," certain "sense-data" result; corresponding in a one-to-
one correlation to the "local stimulation," certain other, equally
objective (physiological) events occur, transmitting the "infor-
mation" to neurological centers and, ultimately, to the brain,
wherein a "terminal condition" is set up. As a consequence to
this whole story a certain "experience" happens: "smelling a
rose." t But here a foreign agent bas slipped into the supposedly
objective framework: the "sensations," supposedly provoked
into being by the stimulation, are nevertheless said to be "purely
private," i.e., "subjective." This "experience," while "sub-
jective," is said to have been "caused" by the emission of physical
waves of a certain kind; so to speak, the receiving station has
translated the objective data into the data of experience, in this
case, olfactory language.
The theory, however, runs aground through its own as-
sumptions. Metleau-Ponty argues against such a conception that
it involves an unwarranted metaphysical assumption of the first
order: "Nature" is as physics of a Galilean style describes it,
i.e., a system of particles in motion; "mind" or "consciousness,"
on the other hand, is a kind of place in which events of a certain
kind, "sensations," occur - as F. H. Bradley says someplace,
mind is conceived to be a kind of bag into which "data" are
dropped, like beans, and which "in the beginning" is passive and
receptive. To paraphrase Hume, the study of mind turns out to
be a kind of internal Newtonian physics, in tenns of which the
particles which are the "atoms" of the mind (impressions and
ideas) are studied by means of a certain "theory" of gravity
(association).
Since, however, in our concrete experience of the world dis-
1 AU of the philosophers we are studying heiein, as js now clear, share the essen-
tially same critical attitude toward traditional theories of sense perception.
134
MERLEAU-PONTY
closed by means of our senses, we do not sensuously perceive
these "impressions," but rather chairs, roses, other men, and the
like, this psychology must necessarily develop as a "science of
illusion": its effort is to explain why we do not experience what
we should experience if the assumptions of the theory are correct.
In the end, under the impact of Locke's theory of ideas, British
empiricism comes to maintain that what is experienced in
common-sense life is not at all what is "really" experienced: we
naively assume, as Berkely put it, that we see chairs and tables,
but what we "really" see are only our ideas. In sort, traditional
thought, especially traditional psychology and its philosophical
foundation, traditional empiricism, implicitly gives up the
domain of experience vecue, considering this as not what "really"
is (the "really" being defined by what natural science states is
the case) - while yet seeking precisely to account for this experi-
ence.
In all of this, furthermore, there is presupposed a theory of
the nature of the body. In fact, Merleau-Ponty argues (as we
shall see in more detail), every theory of sensuous perception
presupposes a theory of the body. And the more one recognizes
the necessity of accounting for experience vecue in its own terms,
i.e., without natu.rali.zing it,1 the more central does the body
become: for from the point of view of my experience of the world
disclosed to me by means of my senses, to perceive something is
necessarily to be related to it by means of my body. Thus, as
both Scheler and Marcel had already seen, the theory of the body
is the crux of the whole problem of experience vecue. The recog-
nition necessitates, however, a radical change in approach: the
study of the body and of sensuous perception becomes a study of
the mode of being of the body-proper, and the study of "mind"
or "consciousness" becomes the study of "conscience-engagee" or
"conscience-incarnee." The body can no longer be taken as an
exclusively physical thing; rather, it must be seen as the embodi-
ment of mind or consciousness.
This new approach does not, however, relegate physiological
phenomena to, so to speak, second-class citizenship. The point is
1 Cf. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Strict Science," Cross Cu"ents, Vol. vi, No. 3
(Summer, 1956), pp. 230-33.
INTRODUCTION 135
that they can no longer be considered "from outside," that is
"objectively." As de Waelheos states,
We are ... confronted once more with the para.mount problem of every
philosophy of embodiment: to show, not causal or a
but to the contrary how an existential attitude of consciousness constitutes
the signification of a physiological fact.1
The problem, that is to say, is to determine the existential status
of such phenomena, to explicate the "sense" or "meaning" which
they have for conscience-engagee.
2
In this fashion Merleau-Ponty's criticism and transformation
of Gestalt psychology, and his critical rejection of traditional
psychology and philosophy, is on its positive side, the incipient
development of a concrete ontology of human existence.
(2) MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY'
We have noted that Merleau-Ponty is unwilling to accept any
notion of "constitution" at the level of the body-proper. Whether
this is justified, or, indeed whether his attitude toward "form" is
justified or justifiable, is not our problem at this point. Wewant
only to attempt to lay out these various themes in his work so
that our exposition of his theory of the body will be more easily
accomplished.
As we shall see he denies that there is any "synthetic" activity,
at either the "automatic" or "active" level in sensuous per-
ception. (PP, pp. 476-80) "Constitution," as he understands it,
must either be rejected (as a mere reappearance of "intellectual-
isme"), or like "synthesis," understood strictly in terms of his
theory of "etre-au-m01ide." But we must attempt to delineate
the background for this rejection of two of Husserl's central
notions.
His study of perception purports to be a "phenomenology" of
perception; and as we saw, the entire work, which is much more
than a mere theory of perception itself, goes under the flag of a
Hussetlian phenomenology as outlined in his preface. In this
latter, he engages in a brief criticism of the kind of reflection or
reflective analysis practiced, in his terms, by such "intellectual-
istic" philosophers as Descartes and Kant. This kind of analysis,
i. Cf. de Waelhens, <>f>. ,;t., p. 109.
2 Ibid., pp. u3-1+
MERLEA U-PONTY
he states, begins from our experience of the world, then proceeds
to the subject, which it conceives to be the condition for the
possibility of experience and distinct from experience, and then
appeals to a "universal synthesis" as that without which there
would be no experience of a world. (PP, iv) It thus, according
to Merleau-Ponty, departs from experience and substitutes for it
a reconstruction of experience - without realizing that, for better
or for worse, such a substitution thereby must fail to account
for experience itself, in its own terms and for its own sake. On
the analogy of Husserl's critique of psychologism, one might say
that such a reduction or substitution commits the fallacy of
metapsychologism: substituting, or accounting for, the con-
ditioned by the conditions.
Merleau-Ponty charges that such an analysis is, if not a
complete naivete, at least an incomplete analysis, one which
remains ignorant of its own beginnings. It forgets what is for him
the crucial phenomenon:
The world is there before every analysis I can make of it, and it would
be artificial to try to derive it from a series of syntheses which would
reconnect sensations, then the perspectival aspects of the object. Both
sensations and the perspectival aspects of objects are just products of
analysis and must not be conceived before analysis. (PP, iv)
What such a reflective analysis tells us about our experience,
and what we concretely experience is not at all the same state of
affairs. For example, l\'ferleau-Ponty will argue, all such affairs
as "sense qualities," "syntheses," and so on, are not at all
intrinsic t o our lived experience but are r ather strictly products
of the analysis. Synthesis, for instance, is strictly " the counter-
part of my analysis," (PP, 275) and not an intrinsic feature of
perception as lived.
But now there arises for him the very thorny question: If I
cannot apprehend my perceptions-as-lived, my body-as-lived,
space-as-lived, and the like, by means of reflective analysis and
inspection, how can I apprehend them and thus even talk of
them? I s there perhaps another access to this domain?
In the course of this study we have learned that the body is
not an object simpliciter (like coins and figs), that my body-as-
lived by me, whose body it is, is a phenomenon in its own right,
and that it is not possible to consider it at one level only. Now
INTRODUCTION 137
Merleau-Ponty states that, since I live my body, my perception,
and so on, it mt.tst be possible to explicate these as such. Re-
flection must be of such a nature, he stresses, that
its object cannot escape it absolutely, since we have a notion of it only
by means of reflection. It is indeed necessary reflection in some
ner 1 yield the unreflective, because otherwtSe we would have nothin.g
to oppose to it and it would not become a. problem for us. . . is
given and initially true is an open reflection on the unreflective, the
reflective grasp of what is not reflective .... (PP, 412-13)
What is required, that is to say, as opposed to the predominantly
"noetic" reflection of intellectualism, which attempts to make
the world depend upon the synthetic activity of the subject, is
a "noematic reflection," 2 "which remains in the object and
explicates its primordial unity instead of engendering the object.''
(PP, iv) But in so far as my reflection is reflection on what is itself
not a reflection (i. e., the "irreflichi," or what is concretely
"lived"), it cannot ignore itself as being an event within the
same mental life as that which is reflected on. (PP, iv)
This means, for Merleau-Ponty, that my reflection must be
of such a kind that it discovers me, not as a "subject" separate
from my world, nor does it discover the "world" (or more simply,
the "object" of consciousness) as separated from me. Rather, it
reveals me "as an inalienable fact, and it eliminates all kinds of
idealism by discovering me as 'being-to-the-world'," (PP, viii)
as a "subject committed to the world." (PP, v) Similarly, it
discloses the world "as the permanent horizon of all my cogi-
tations and as a dimension with respect to which I never cease to
situate myself." (PP, vii-viii) With Sartre,3 Merleau-Ponty
considers the world and consciousness as co-given, as simultaneous,
for my lived experience. The task of reflection is precisely not
to ignore itself as being an event in a consciousness whose being
is to be-to-the-world; it is to disclose that domain as it is in itself,
or, as it is for lived experience. If we try to separate them, as
Van Den Berg says succinctly, agreeing with Merleau-Ponty,
Then man ceases to be man and the world the world. The worldis no
conglomeration of mere objects to be described in the language of physical
1 Just this "en quelgue manie,.e" Is the problem, as we shall see.
s He thus accepts without question one of of Husserl.
See above, pp. 66-69.
3 Sartre, Situations, I , Gallimard (Paris, 1947), pp. 31-35. See above, Part 11,
Chapter I. pp. scrSo.
MERLE A U-PONTY
science. The world is our home, our habitat,l the materialization of our
subjectivity. Who wants to become acquainted with man, should listen
to the spoken by the thi.!;igs in his existence [i.e., to what things
mean to him]. Who wants to descnbe man should make an analysis of the
"landscape" within which he demonstrates, explains, and reveals him-
self. 2
But what sort of reflection is this ? It is clear what its task is
but how will this subtle and difficult task be carried out? What
is required, to let Merleau-Ponty state the matter, is a kind of
reflection that
apprehends its object in a nascent state such as it appears to the one
who lives it. with the atmosphere of meaning in which it is enclosed, and
which seeks to slip into this atmosphere in order t o relocate behind
dispersed facts and symptoms. the total being of the subject (in 'the case
of a normal person), or the fundamental ailment (in the case of a sick
person). s (PP, 140)
But now when we ask ourselves what sort of reflection this is
how it is accomplished, what its structure is, and so on, we
confronted with a serious confusion. Merleau-Ponty maintains I
can comprehend the body-as-lived only "by performing it myself
and in the degree to which I am a body which raises itself toward
the world."* (PP, 90) It is only by experiencing my body-proper
that I can apprehend it as e%perienced by me. In short, it would
appear that a genuine reflective withdrawal is for Merleau-Ponty
intrinsically unable to grasp my body-as-lived (as Sartre bad
maintained); I know my body-proper only by living it (as Sartre
would deny), and apparently in no other manner.4 Indeed, as
de Waelhens points out, this constitutes one of the major diffi-
culties in Merleau-Ponty's work, since it is decisive for his funda-
mental effort: to write a phenomenology of perception while at
the same time maintaining that one can never leave the domain of
perception. And thus, de Waelhens goes on,
1
Cf. on this, PP, 491; and below, pp. 182-89.
a J. H. Van Den Berg, Tl1e Phemnnenological Approad,to Psychiatry, op. cit., p. 32.
3
Compare wi th this Marcel's notion of pensee pensa11te, above, Part I, Chapter I,
PP 9-72; 14-20. And, in PP, 253: "Radical reflection is the one which reapprehends
me while I am in t lie process of forming and formulating the ideas of subject and
object! it puts play the source of these two ideas; it is not only an operative
refleobon, but again conscious ofHself in its operation."
4
Cf. the interpretations llferleauPonty gives of Husserl's theory of "phenome-
nological reduction" in his essay: "Le philosophe et so11 ombre", Signes, Ubrairle
Galllmard (Paris, 1960), pp. 204-209. This essay is also included in: Edmund Husserl:
r859- r959, Phaenomenologica 4, Ma.rtinus N:ijhoff (Hai;ue, the Netherlands, 1959),
pp. 195- 2:10).
INTRODUCTION
I39
Expressed in other terms. and it is necessary to note this, the funda-
mental thesis of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: all knowledge is rooted in
perception. is itself ambiguous. If it signifies that all human knowledge
originates in the concrete and follows the explication of it, everything said
in his work seems to be established. If on the contrary one understands by
that thesis that in no way whatsoever can we ever leave the immediate
and that to render this immediate concrete explicit means simply to live
it, one cannot doubt that the enterprise of philosophy becomes forthwith
contradictory. Now, that' s an opinion to which the author seems at times
to make concessions. 1
The last statement, however, is not sufficient. For, as we shall
see shortly, not only does Merleau-Ponty "make concessions"
to the thesis that in no sense can we ever leave the immediate
and that to explicate it means simply to live it ; not only does he
adhere to it in his methodological considerations; but, in the end,
it becomes a positive principle of his entire theory. The body-
proper is, for him, the bearer of a "latent" knowledge; perception
is a "hidden science" of the world of perceived things.2
Now, this effort to recast the task and meaning of reflection,
is tantamount to the
resolution to make the world appear such as it is before every reflective
return on ourselves is the ambition to make reflection equal to [the task oi
explicating] the nonreflective life o{ consciousness. (PP. xi),
This position, I submit, is necessitated by prior considerations,
considerations which preinterpret the whole problem. It is, in
fact, only if one maintains to begin with that reflection is not able
t o apprehend this experience that another mode of access to it
seems necessary. Sartre, as we have seen, denies the possibility of
such an access; there is no apprehension of lived experience as
it is for the one who lives it (and thus the whole domain of the
pour-soi is in principle closed to reflective apprehension).
3
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, is not only in disagreement as
regards Sartre's ontology, but also as regards his rejection of the
possibility of apprehension of lived experience. For Merleau-
i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 386.
2 C.f. PP, 250-51, 268-69. And, yet, in his preface, Merleau-Ponty denies that
perception is a connaissance, it is not a "science du monde;" while, in the text, he
goes right on to contend that the body is, "at least as regards the perceived world, the
general instrument of my 'comprehension'." (PP, 272) We shall have to return to this
problem in our conclusions, in Chapter III.
a Both Sartre and MerleauPonty, because of their skepticism regarding the ability
of reflection, i.e., cognitive-theoretical apprehension, of the life of consciousness,
easily open themselves to the charge of inationalism.
140 MERLEAU-PONTY
Ponty, there must be a means of explicating it because, he affirms,
"we live it." Reflection must "in some manner" give us the
unreflected.
However, this "manner" is as magical as Sartre's conception
of the encounter of pour-soi with en-soi: what is to be appre-
hended (e.g. the body-as-lived) is itself the apprehending (the
body-as-lived). This position, however, is a nest of difficulties,
and is necessitated by his presupposed commitment to the thesis
that reflection, as a specific cognitive act of apprehension, is
unable to apprehend lived experience. As we hope to show later
on, the conception of the body as a "latent knowledge" involves
a confusion between the act of apprehending and what is appre-
hended and must be rejected as illegitimate.
For now, we must only point out the fact of confusion. It was
necessary to do this at this point, in order to evaluate Merleau-
Ponty's "phenomenology" and the impact of Husserl on his
thought. We shall have good reason to question both of these,
since Merleau-Ponty apparently wants to deny precisely the core
of phenomenological inquiry, namely, reflective apprehension
and explication of consciousness.
For Merleay-Ponty, the real significance of Husserlian phe-
nomenology lies, on the one hand, in the methodological device
of phenomenological epoche and reduction, and on the other,
in the descriptive concept of intentionality. As regards the first,
it seems strange that Merleau-Ponty wants to accept, and even
to insist on, the theory of reductions. For, one might very well
say, if reflection proper is ruled out as incapable of fulfilling the
task at hand (explicating lived experience), then it would be
absurd to adopt a theory of reduction, because, after all, the
reduction is effectuated precisely to permit a reflective appre-
hension, description, and explication of the domain of lived
experience, consciousness as it is in itself. The phenomenologist
draws back from the natural belief in, or acceptance of, the world,
in order to make this "General Thesis" stand out for his reflective
description and explication.l And, indeed, as Richard Schmitt
has pointed out, one can with good reason "interpret the 'transcen-
dental-phenomenological reduction as a phenomenological de-
scription of the transition from a nonreflective to a reflective
1
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., pp. iB-:zi, 33-37; and Idun, I, p. 94.
INTRODUCTION
attitude, albeit a reflective attitude of a particular kind." J. Thus,
Merleau-Ponty would seem to contradict himself, particularly
in view of the circumstance that, as Husserl has emphasized,
when the epoche is performed the one performing it becomes a
"disinterested on-looker," he suspends the belief or interestedness
which is the mark of the natural attitude.
2
It is just this com-
mitment, however, which Merleau-Ponty believes cannot be
suspended; if one becomes neutral towards it (and this is the
phenomenological attitude), one steps outside it and therefore,
for him, cannot in principle grasp it.
The contradiction disappears, nevertheless, when we take
cognizance of the way Merleau-Ponty attempts to interpret the
phenomenological reduction. In the first place, he insists that
it is necessary to break our familiarity with it [i.e., with the world), and
that this rupture can teach us nothing but the unmotivated surging-forth
of the world. The greatest lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a
complete reduction ... I1 we were the absolute mind the reduction would
not be problematic. But since to the contrary we are "to-the-world,"
committed to it, since even our reflections take place in the temporal
flux which they seek to escape (since they "flow into one another" as
Husserl says), there can be no one thought which embraces all of our
thought. (PP, viii-ix)
Now, few phenomenologists would want to say that a "complete
reduction" is possible, nor do any attempt to make it complete;
hence, I do not see the necessity of the "great lesson." For
Merleau-Ponty, however, there is a "lesson," and this is precisely
that the epocbe "can teach us nothing but the unmotivated
surging-forth of the world." That is to say, just because, for him,
reflection is itself but one expression of my etre-au--monde, it can
hardly be expected to be able to draw back in reflection from
this commitment which it is: a being whose being is to-be-to-the-
wotld can reflect on itself only in so far as that very being-to-the-
world is itself "drawn back" with the reflective withdrawal. As
Sartre had remarked, the pour-soi cannot reflect on itself qu.a
pour-soi, just because it would no longer be pour-soi; being an
interiority closed on itself, nothing, not even itself, can make of
it an object. Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, while denyin_g that
1 Richard Schmitt, "Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction,"
PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 240.
2 Cf. Cartesian Medita.tf<>ns, op. cit., ibid., and Idun, I, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
r42 MERLEA U-PONTY
consciousness is pour-soi, by taking it as etre-au,-monde, never-
theless encounters the same problem: if consciousness really
could withdraw from itself reflectively, and thereby really appre-
hend itself reflectively in its own lived experience, it would no
longer be &re-au-ni01ule, or con.science-engagee. Or, correlatively,
since every activity of consciousness is but another expression of
its own etre-au-tnonde, reflection is itself such an expression;
hence, consciousness cannot reflectively withdraw in order to
consider itself, just because consciousness is just this reflective
withdrawal.
Hence, for Merleau-Ponty, all that reflection can teach us is
that we are unable to reflect on our commitment to the world
just because that reflective withdrawal and apprehension is but
one more expression of that self-same commitment I Thus, it is
quite a matter of course that he goes on to state that the phe-
nomenological reduction is in truth the formula "of an existential
philosophy." (PP, ix) It would be such a formula, we must con-
clude, not on any intrinsic phenomenological grounds, but
because Merleau-Ponty begins with a prior commitment to an
existential philosophy.
As we shall see later on in our critical conclusions, his opposing
of an existential philosophy to an idealistic philosophy is ille-
gitimate in so far as he interprets Husserlian phenomenology as
an idealism in the traditional sense (especially Kantian). Indeed,
at one point, contends that he has discovered
a new mode of analysis - existential analysis - which goes beyond the
classical alternatives of empiricism and intellectualism, of explanation and
reflection. (PP, 158)
But if "existential analysis" is opposed to "reflection," it is
difficult to understand in what sense the phenomenological
reduction could possibly be the formula for an existential phi-
losophy; or, for that matter, how any mode of "analysis" could
be genuine analysis without being reflective by essense.
The cards, however, are on the table: Merleau-Ponty simply
rejects, without stating it, the Husserlian doctrine of epoche but
not on phenomenological grounds. On the other hand, his prior
commitment to existentialism, while it is evidently central to his
entire work, is never itself submitted to any analysis or justifi-
cation. The fact that man is, in his phrase, an etre-au-nionde is
INTRODUCTION
I43
not itself made thematic. Accordingly, it will be come necessary
for us to unravel the multiple meanings of this crucial concept,
and then, after having explicated his theory of the body in detail,
to attempt to state explicitly his conception of existentialism.
This undercurrent, moreover, shows up in the second point
regarding his "phenomenology" - intentionality. The essence
of consciousness is its existence, says Merleau-Ponty, i.e., its
etre-au-monde. Hence, he writes, the phenomenological study
of "essence" is never an end in itself, but only a means, a means
of reaching lived experience however incompletely. (Cf. PP, ix)
The whole effort of "phenomenology," he states, is to describe
and explicate the facticity of the world and of consciousne5s - the
way in which they are concretely lived and experienced.1
Similarly, to say that consciousness is intentional, for Metleau-
Ponty, is to say something about the being of consciousness:
consciousness is intentional, i.e., it "opens out" onto the world,
and thus, "the unity of the world, before being posited by know-
ledge in the act of explicit identification, is lived as 'already
made' or 'already there'." (PP, xii) Whereas Husserl, within the
descriptive-reductive attitude established by means of the phe-
nomenological epoche and reduction, describes intentiveness as
an essential property or characteristic of consciousness,2 Merleau-
Ponty assumes, as a matter of course, that intentiveness is a
mode of being. For Husserl, intentionality is that descriptive
characteristic of any mental process whatever, in virtue of which
any such process must always be described as a consciousness
of . . . ; but for Merleau-Ponty it designates the being of conscious-
ness, the fact that consciousness is etre-au-monde.
This brief indication of Merleau-Ponty's position as regards
phenomenological reflection and the intentiveness of conscious-
ness has, more recently, received even further development by
Merleau-Ponty. In his important contribution to the commemo-
1
Thus, he writes, "The world is not what l think but what I live; I am open to the
world ... but I do not-possess it, it is inexhaustible. 'There ls a world,' or rather, 'there
is tlie world' - I can never give entirely the ground of this constant theme of =Y life.
This facticity of the world is what makes the 'worldliness of the world' ... just as the
facticity of the cogito ls not an imperfection lo It but to the contrary what makes me
certain of my existence." (PP, xii) Thus, for him, the intentionality of ronsciousMSs is
interpreted as the being of consciousness: "je suis ouvert an monde."
a Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 41.
MERLE A U-PONTY
rative volume of essays dedicated to Husserl,
1
Merleau-Ponty
has made it unmistakably clear that he has not departed sub-
stantially from the position he took in his PM1tominologie de la
perception. Indeed, he here engages in several further critical
reinterpretations of Husserl's phenomenology, criticisms de-
veloped by him terms of his careful reading of Husserl's until
recently unpublished Ideen, II.
To cite but several instances in this connection, Merleau-Ponty
calls into question not only the much-discussed issue of the phe-
nomenological reduction {cf. Signes, pp. but as well the
important constitutional analyses Husserl gives to the domain
of pretheoretical consciousness. The main burden of this essay is
to attempt to explore, to re-think with Husserl, certain of the
themes in the Ideen, II, left unexplored by Husserl, themes which
remain "still-not-thought" (der Ungedachte, in Heidegger's
phrase used by Merleau-Ponty) : the body-proper, and inter-
subjectivity (whose fundamental ground he locates in the phe-
nomenon of intercorporeity).
Without entering into the discussions with Merleau-Ponty,
since this is not the place to do so, it is still well to keep them in
mind here in order to draw some general conclusions for assessing
the impact of Husserl on Metleau-Ponty's philosophy. Un-
questionably, Merleau-Ponty, unlike many other thinkers in the
phenomenological movement, was far more impressed by Hus-
serl' s at the time unpublished manuscripts than he was by the
more well-known works published by Husserl. In fact, if his
commemorative essay to Husserl (not to mention his majqr
treatise on perception) is any indication, Merlean-Ponty has
developed his fundamental notions (on the body-proper, "inter-
corporeity," "primordial Generality," being-to-the-world, and
others which we shall presently encounter and later on criticize)
essentially by means of his effort to re-think Husserl's Unge-
daclite in those unpublished manuscripts. Now, while there are
a great many questions which must be raised concerning Mer-
leau-Ponty's extrapolations from these documents,
2
several
points are quite clear.
t Cf. above, footnote 4
1
p. 1J8; further references to this essay v.ill be cited in the
text as (Signes).
t A complete exploration of t his is out of the questio1there, as it would require an
extensive analysis, not only of Merleau-Ponty's illterpretations, but of course of
INTRODUCTION
First, if Merleau-Ponty has transformed a number of Husserlian
concepts (and I hope to show that this has indeed occurred), it
isinhismindalwaysin theinterest of what he considers the best
inspiration of Husserl. His explicit position is unquestionably
phenomenological, but it is one which takes its point of departure
from what he himself sees as implicit in Husserl's unpublished
manuscripts concerning the enormously complex, and complexly
interrelated, dimensions of the pretheoretical life of conscious-
ness. Every concept and analysis articulated by Husserl else-
where (whether it be constitution, synthesis, or intentionality)
is immediately interpreted by Metleau-Ponty from this per-
spective - and very often there is no indication that this sort of
pre-interpretation has occurred.
In the second place, however, as I hope to show later, and de-
spite his professed intentions both in his earlier and in his later
writings, Merleau-Ponty's analyses e informed by much more
than his reading of Husserl. The final of his philosophy,
if I may so express it, i.11 the result, not only of his contact with
Husserlian phenomenological philosophy, but equally, and
perhaps even more, oj his own commitment to an "existential
ontology". Highly original and interesting as it may be, it is my
conviction that this final stance is also his initial one, one to
which he is at the outset committed. Thus, his reading of Husserl's
I dee11t, II is in many instances charged with overtones of meaning
which one scarcely, or only with great imagination, finds in
Husserl's own works. One of the most striking examples of this
is Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the pretheoretical status of
consciousness {the status of automaticity, or as Husserl calls it,
of Passivitiit) as a "primordial Everyone" (Oti primordial, Signes,
p. 221). As Sartre had spoken of the nothingness which alone
separates the pour-soi from en-soi, Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the
thick fog of anonymity which alone separates us from being .... "
(Signes, p. 220) His interest, unlike that of Husserl, and some-
Husserl's own analyses themselves. Prof. Spiegelberg's remarks on this topic are, l
think, quite accurate: Merleau-Ponty attempts "to go beyond Husserl by consciously
e:ottrapolating certain lines, mostly from unpublished te.xts as far as he knows them,
and by playing down others in the pnblished writings." The Phenomenc/Qgi&al
Movement, Vol. ll, p. 517 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1960). As
Spiegelberg also notes in a footnote to this passage, Merleau Ponty very often refers
to passages in the unpublished materials which, just as often, cannot be traced in the
editions recently published in Hussuliana.
MERLE A U-PONTY
what similar to that of Sartre, is essentially to articulate an
existential ontology, that is, a logos oi the ontos of anthropos (if
you will, an onto-anthropology); it is not to develop a thorough
logos of phenomena. Phenomenology in Husserl's sense of a fully
developed explication of the intentiveness of consciousness,
would not be the fundamental discipline at all, but would rather,
for him, be founded on the theory of human-being-in-reality (cf.
Signes, pp. 217-19)
But these discussions lead us too far into issues which cannot
properly be engaged at this point. Suffice it to say here, that
while he is obviously a very careful and original interpretor and
critic of Husserl, he is not an Husserlian phenomenologist. His
"phenomenology" is not so much. that of Husserl as it is peculiar-
ly his own; an "existential phenomenology" whose content we
shall have to explicate and criticize in the following pages.
(3) MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'EXISTENTIALISM'
What, then, does Merleau-Ponty understand by an "ex-
istentialism?" As we shall have to explicate this in more detail
after having dealt with this theory of the body, we shall only
indicate the principle features of it here.
De Waelhens emphasizes that it is actually over against
certain difficulties in the philosophies of Sartre and Heidegger
that Merleau-Ponty's "philosophie de la conscience-engagee"
is bom.
1
As for Heidegger, de Waelhens points out that for Merleau-
Ponty the most damaging criticism one can make of the early
work of Heidegger (which is the only phase important for the
French existentialists), that is, Sein und Zeit, is that the
reader of Heidegger perceives too late that the scrupulous acuteness
displayed by him in his description of the world we pro-ject has shown on
the other side a total neglect of the world which is "always-already-there"
for us ... one does not find in Sein und Zeit thirty lines on the problem of
perception, nor even ten lines on that of the body.
2
As for Sartre, at least two points are raised by Metleau-Ponty.
1 Cf. De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 8. It is quitemdicative that de Waelhens at no time
discusses Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology," nor his important preface to PP. It is
indicative, viz., of the fact that de Waelhens himself accepts without question
Merleau-Ponty's own bias. This is certainly the greatest fault in an otherwise excellent
exposition.
' Ibid., p. 2.
INTRODUCTION
147
First, the conception of pour-soi as a being separated from the
en-soi in the most radical fashion, as we pointed in the section on
Sartre, makes it impossible for Sartre ever to account for
consciousness as a being which is concretely engaged in its world
as Thus, de Waelhens states quite correctly,
the dice are thrown: such a consciousness knows or does not know, but
it cannot know in several manners, nor be related to the en-soi in an
ambiguous fashion.1
In this respect, Merleau-Ponty's notion of "etre-au-monde"
is offered as a via media, the only way in which one can account
for the engagement of consciousness in the world. As de Waelhens
remarks, quite correctly, &re-au-monde is precisely the unity of
conscienc(}-engagee and its milieu - i.e., it is "existence." 2 Thus,
Merleau-Ponty will say, forms the matrix in
which both physical-physiological, and psychical processes are
concretely united, lived as a single current. (PP, 95) It is the
"third term between the psychical and the physiological, between
the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' [of Sartre] ... and that we call
'existence'." (PP, 142, footnote)
Second, as we have shown in detail in Part II, Sartre's concrete
descriptions of the body and sense perception are simply in
contradiction with his ontological principles. s Thus, again, the
primary and decisive problem becomes that of "my body-as-
lived," "my perception-as-lived," - in short, as Marcel had
recognized long before, the fundamental problem is that of
embodiment. 4
Merleau-Ponty, in fact, recognizes that the decisive direction
of his work has always been to understand "the relations between
consciousness and nature, between interiority and exteriority,"
(PP, 489) and thus to undercut the stalemate between idealism
and realism. The way to effect this overthrowing of traditional
philosophy, he believes, is by means of a sort of "'Logos of the
a Ibid., p. 4. For Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, just this "ambiguity" becom.es
central to this theory.
1
Ibid., p. 132.
2 Ibid., pp. 4-8. .
s Cf. above, Paxt I, Chapter II. As we have remarked before, either Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty simply did not know of Marcel (which seems unlikely), or made it a
poi.at oi honor never to refer to his analysis of Lhe body. Furthermore, even de Wael-
hens seems to ignore the evident fact that neither Saxtre's nor Merleau-Pooty's
theories are oomprehensi"ble apart from Marcel's seminal achievements.
MERLEA U-PONTY
esthetic world,' 1 an 'art hidden in the depths of the human
soul','' (PP, 49CHJI) that is, by means of a sort of science of the
lived experience of conscience engagee dans son milieu. According-
ly, Merleau-Ponty affirms,
... the question is always to lmow how I can be open to phenomena
which go beyond me and which nevertheless exist only to the extent that
I apprehend and live them; the question is how the presence to myself
(Urprasenz) which defims me and co'tlditions every alien preseme is at the
same time a "dis.presentation" (Entgegenwartigung) and thusts me outside
myself. ll (PP, 417)
Accordingly, as regards each of these currents of Merleau-
Ponty's work, we find the same underlying motif: the attempt to
apprehend and describe the concrete existence of conscience-
engagee. Or, one might say, it is the latter which unifies what
would otherwise be discordant themes. We have not yet ventured
to evaluate whether or not Merleau-Ponty's position as regards
any of these themes is either justified by him, or justifiable in
principle. This evaluation must be postponed until after we have
explicated his theory of the body.
1 Merleau-Ponty refers here to Husserl's use of "aesthetic," as pertaining to
sensuous experience: For-male und trans:endentale Logik, op. cit., p. 257.
' Merleau-Ponty's term is "de-Presentation," which is untranslatable in English. He
seems to mean that I am a presence to myself but at the same time t am "other" to
myself. In a similar way, Marcel speaks of =Y existing as involving a "borrowed
otherness" (alUriU d'emfmmt). Cf. above, Part I, Chapter I. We return to this in
Chapter III below.
CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF THE BODY
As we indicated, 1 it is possible to see the centrality of the problem
of the body for Merleau-Ponty in another manner. The body
arises as a specific "problem" for him in the course of a critical
exposition of traditional theories of sensuous perception. At
every point in theories of this kind one is necessarily led. to a
theory of the nature of sensuousness in general. In different
terms: traditional theories of sensuous perception were mainly
theories of sensuous knowledge; studies of sense perception were
directed towards the solution of questions concerning the con-
ditions, possibility, and "sources," of knowledge - one of these
"stems" of knowledge (as, for instance, in Locke or Kant) being
sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit).2 Just in so far as this was the case,
however, the nature of sensuousness was simply presupposed,
not itself made thematic; and the presupposition, we have seen,
was that sensuousness is fundamentally passive and receptive. To
sense perceive is simply to suffer, to be receptive, and thus
actually to be modified by the thing perceived in some manner.
And, the theories of perception built on this presupposition
followed the style of it. If to perceive, sensuously to experience a
state of affairs, is to be passive in respect of it, to be receptive of
it, a then the theory of perception is pre-determined: in some
manner the object must "come to the sensitive organism" in order
for sensuous perception to occur. In this way, traditional episte-
mologies developed primarily as theories of the "encapsuled
mind" - mind, being unable to "get outside of itself," must admit
of receptivity in order for it to "know" mundane objects, and
this receptivity was in most cases conceived as a real modification
i. Cf. above, pp. r34-35.
2 See, for example, Kant's K riUk der rein.en Vernunft, Sectioax,-11, p. 33.
a Thus, Kant (Ibid., idem) goes on to say lhe capacity by means of which we are
affected by objects, ie., Sinnlichkeit, ls receptivity (Reseptif/Wil).


150 MERLEAU-PONTY
of the sensuous capacity. The theory of "sense-data," or "impres-
sions" and "ideas," follows of its own accord once the theory of
what it means to be sensuously perceptive of something has been
set down (implicitly or explicitly). And, it is worth noting, the
sense-data theory of perception, in wbatever form it is adopted
bas an ancient and honorable heritage, at least as old as Demo-
critus and Leucippus, and certainly as old as the theory of
eidolon ("images") of Lucretius.
In any case; it seems evident that a very particular conception
of the body is presupposed as well: since sensuousness is always
the body's sensuousness, to take the former aspassive and recep-
tive presupposes that the latter is passive, and really
modified. Of course, the body canlocomote; the point is only that,
in its capacity of sensuousness, it is passive.l Even when, for.
instance, I reach out and touch a table, on the view of the "sense-
data" theory all I have presented to me in the strict sense are
sense-data ("impressions" in the Hu.mean sense) received from
the object and really modifying my body.
Thus, we may say, the theory of sense perception presupposes
a theory of sensuousness, which is itself an implicit theory of the
body. And, indeed, for Merleau-Ponty this is actually the case:
the theory of the body, he contends, is already a theory of
sensuous perception. The point is, for him, that one must begin
with first things first: a theory of the body must be developed
before a fully grounded theory of sense perception can be de-
veloped.
When, for instance, I walk around some physical thing, I
see it as identically the same object, but given to my perception
in a multiplicity of appearances of it (from the left, then the
right, then the other side, and so on)2. I experience it as "the
same," moreover, when I see it, then touch it, smell it, and so on.
This occurs, however, Merleau-Ponty contends, only because I
am all along conscious non-thematically of my body and of its
movements, "and of my body as identical throughout the phases
of this movement." (PP, 235) The object is one and the same
1
Descartes bad already laid out the essential lines of this conception in his RuU.S
/or the Direction of the Mind. (Cf. Rule XU)
1
Cf. Aron Gurwitsclt's excellent article, "La Conception de la conscience chez
Kant et cbez Husserl," Bulletin de la Societi Fro.nfQ.ise de Philosoplsie (s4e Aonu.
No. 2, Avril Juin, 1960), pp. 65-g6, esp. pp. 76-82.
THEORY OF THE BODY rsr
object, seen through a multiplicity of appearances, or it is the
same object which I see and touch, only because my body is
itself one and the same throughout the perceiving of it, and it is
non-thematically experienced by me as such.1 Thus, he states,
The thing and the world are given to me along with the parts of my
body, not by a "natural geometry" but in a living connection comparable
(or rather, identical) to the one which exists among the parts of my body
itself.2
External perception and the perception of the body-proper vary
together because they are two sides of the same act ... It is the replica or
correlate of the synthesis of the body-proper - and it is literally the same
thing to perceive a single ball and to use two fingers as a single organ.
(PP, 237)
Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty concludes, the theory of body
(which resolves into a theory of the corporeal scheme, as we shall
see) is a theory of perception:
All external perception is immediately synonymous to a certain
perception of my body, just as all perception of my bodY. is explicated in
the language of external perception. If now . . . the body is not a trans-
parent object and is not given to us like the circle to the geometer (by its
law of constitution); if .it is an expressive unity which one can learn to
know only by performing it; then this structure imparts itself to the
sensible world. The theory of the corporeal scheme is implicitly a theory
of perception. (PP, 239)
And as we shall see, the body is this "expressive unity," which
can be known only by "living," or performing, it, and this
structure is communicated to the sensory world itself, then
traditional theories of sensuousness will be shown to be false
because they were misled by a fallacious assumption regarding
the nature of the body and of sentir.
We shall have to restrict ourselves to the few comments already
made regarding bot'li the problem of sentir and that of traditional
theories - and thus must ignore much of Merleau-Ponty's
1 It might be pointed out that Mcrleau-Ponty's discussion of the unity of the per-
ceived object and the unity of the body-proper (the corporeal scheme) conceals a
crucial problem: be argues both that the for.mer /Upends upon the latter, and that they
are but two sides of the same act. Is it the case that the perceiving of a thing as
identically the same depends oo (or, is a function of) the noothematic consciousness
of one's:body as identical throughout the phases of the perception? Or:is the syn.thesis
of the body-proper and that of the perceived thing simultaneous? At least, we believe,
this is a problem which is left unclarified by Medeau-Ponty's analysis.
s As Marcel had maintained already: objects "exist" for me only to the extent that
I maintain with them {through my body) the same sort of relation I maintain with my
body. (Cf. above, Part I, Chapter II, p. 42.)
MERLEA U-PONTY
analysis - for, what concerns us is only the theory of the body-
proper.
Merleau-Ponty studies the corps propre in four major ways:
(1) the body as object and the body as lived, (2) the spatiality of
the body, (3) the synthesis of the body-proper, and (4) the body-
proper as the expression of the existence of consciousness. De
Waelhen's exposition follows the order of inquiry set down by
Merleau-Ponty. When one reads either of these works, however,
he is struck by a recurrence of certain fundamental themes,
which seem, moreover, to be genuine "categories" {in the sense
in which Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Natanson use this term).1
We may formulate these as follows: (1) the body-proper is "form-
giving," or "sense-bestowing," and at the same time unifies itself
and objects by means oJ an "intentional arc" which constitutes a
"corporeal scheme," - thus, the body-proper becomes the
instrument of a ge1ieralized and latent "knowledge." (2) My body-
proper is most fundamentally my mode of being-to-the-world, the
way in which my consciousness becomes engagee - thus, my body-
proper is my etre-au-monde. (3) It is, finally, as the "expression"
of my existence that the body-proper is concretely lived by me
and by others - thus, my body-proper is "expression." As a theme
running through each of these categories, there is the fundamental
"ambiguite" of existence as such. It is of the essence of human
corporeal existence, Merleau-Ponty contends, that it is funda-
mentally equivocal, or ambiguous.
By means of these categories it will be possible to give a
coherent and unified explication of the theory of the body.
(x) THE BODY-PROPER AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF 'KNOWLEDGE'
The human organism, considered from the point of view of
the one whose body it is, is not lived as a Gegen,stand (a system of
particles in motion existing partes extra partes and defineable by
means of physiologi(fal and chemical laws). To the contrary, it is,
as it is experienced by the one whose body it is, "a decisive
moment in the genesis of the objective world." (PP, 86) That is to
say, it is that in virtue of which there are objects for me.
Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty insists, the relation between the
body-proper and physical objects cannot be described as a causal
i Cf. Part I, Chapter I, pp. 18-20.
THEORY OF THE BODY r53
relation; if there are affairs like "sensations," these cannot be,
from the perspective of experience-vecue, considered as "causes"
of my perception of things. Rather, they are ob-jects. For the same
reason, "sensations" cannot be considered as "elements" making
up the "stuff" of mental life (as, for instance, Hume had done).
In so far as we restrict ourselves to the sphere of lived experience
(of the body-proper, and not that of the body-object), we know
nothing either of "causes" or of "elements of consciousness. To
make of sensations "elements," really inherent components, of
perceptionis, Merleau-Ponty points out, to commit
What psychologists call the "experience error," that is to say, we
suppose to be in our consciousness of things what we know to be in things ..
There are two manners in which we deceive ourselves concerning quality:
the one is to make of it an element of consciousness. . . the other is to
think that that sense and that object, at the level of the quality, would be
full and determined. And the second error, like the first, derives from the
prejudice of mundaneity (prefuge du monde).l (PP, u)
In other words, the traditional way of treating "sensations"
made of them really intrinsic parts of the mind; and, by so doing,
the qualities or properties of tltings (red, sweet, rough, and so on)
were reduced to elements ef the perception of the thing. The
whiteness of a spot of paint is sensuously seen as being a quality
of the spot itself, which rests on a homogeneous ground. But,
more than this, the spot is perceived as having a color which is
denser than that of the ground (which is seen as continuing
"under" the spot and not as interrupting it). "Each part an-
nounces more than it contains, and this elementary perception is
therefore already charged with a meaning." (PP, 9) The perceptual
"something" is not necessarily, though, given in an unequivocal
fashion; the "object" is not always readily identifiable, but is
most often sensuously perceived as "ambiguous."
Similarly, one cannot simply identify the milieu of behavior
(as it is for lived experience) with that of the physical placement
of behavior (the so-called "geographical surroundings.") The
reactions of the body to its milieu are not complexes of elementary
movements, each "blind" to itself and to the other movements
making up the total. Rather, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes,
J By "le prej uge du monde," Merleau-Ponty means what Husserl has called the
"naturalization of consciousness." C!. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Strict Science.''
Cross Currents, Vol vi, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 230-37.
154 MERLEA U-PONTY
the reactions of an organism are not configurations o{ elementary
movements but gestures endowed with an internal unity. . . Experience
in an organism is not the recording and fixation of certain really accom-
plished movements. It emerges from aptitudes, that is the general power
of responding to situations of a certain type of means of varied reactions
which have only their meaning in common. Reactions are not, therefore, a
succession of events; they have in themselves an "intelligibility." 1
This level of "intelligibility," however, is not yet that of
cognition, of consciousness proper. Rather, he maintains, what
the Gestalt psychologists had called "perceptual form" is in
truth a perceptual "meaning" (sens) and this notion can be
generalized:
there is a. signification of the perceived which is without equivalent in
the universe of the understanding, a perceptual milieu which is still not the
objective world, a perceptual being which is still not determined being.
(PP. 58)
This level of signification, he states, is that of non-thetic ex-
perience, of expbience-vecue, and it is this dimension that must
be explicated in its own terms. It is now possible to turn to the
detailed exposition of the several aspects of the body-proper as a
mode of knowledge.
(a) The Body-Proper as "Sense-Giving"
The relation between the body-proper and objects must be
described as "form-giving;" the body "met en forme" the data
given to it . This activity, he insists, is in evidence even at the
physiological-neurological level.
In fact, he maintains, the great advance of modem physiolo-
1
La Structure du Comf>orleme11t, op. cit., p. 140. And PP, 59: "The movements of
the body-proper are naturally invested with a certain perceptual signification. With
external phenomena, they form a system so well connected that external perception
"takes account" of the displacement of the perceptual organs - finds in them, if not the
explication, at least the motif of changes occurring in the landscape, and thus
it can immediately comprehend them."
Therefore, he ls convinced (PP, 17-18), "itlsinevitab1e that in its general eftort of
objectification science comes to represent the human organism as a physical system
confronted with stimuli themselves defined by their physico-cbemical properties.
And, it seeks on that basis to reconstruct actual perception and to close the cycle of
scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself ls
produced - by founding an objective science of subjectivity. But it is inevitable as well
that this attempt breaks down." The objectification ot subjectivity (of the body-
proper, of perception, and so on) by science fails, that is to say, because i t attempts to
explain concrete lived expe.rience in terms other than those of lived experience, i.e.,
"objectively." In other words, as Husserl emphasized, such a science "naturalizes"
consciousness.
THEORY OF THE BODY
155
gy 1 is just to have surpassed the traditional conception of
"constancy" (and of "local stimulation"), by recognizing that
the neurological system in general functions specifically in an
active manner : it differentiates and organizes sets of sensuous
excitations. Thus, a lesion in the nervous tissue does not, as
should be the case according to traditional theory, destroy the
sensuous contents, but rather it makes the differentiation and
organization of them increasingly difficult and uncertain. This
activity, indeed, now appears as the essential function of the
nervous system:
Thus the excitations of t he same sense differ less by the material
instrument of which it makes use than by the manner in which the rudi-
mentary stimuli are spontaneously organized together. And, that organi-
zation is the decisive factor at the level of sensory "qualities" as it is at
the level of perception. (PP, 89)
What is important, that is to say, is that we recognize a kind
of "spontaneous organization" taking place even at the level of
sensory excitation. Thus one can say, what occurs physiologically
is not so much "another story" from what occurs within experi-
ence-vecue, as it is a state of affairs to be reinterpreted from the
point of view of the latter. Real processes, in this sense, become
significative of something other than themselves, i.e., they are
more than " purely" physiological processes.
This circumstance can be seen, Merleau-Ponty states,
regards the phenomenon of the "phantom-member." (PP, 90-
Io5) While we need not go into bis detailed interpretation of this,
it would be well to point out the essential features of it. When,
for example, a patient's arm has become paralyzed or amputated,
and he yet continues to "experience" pain in it, the physiological
explanation of this situation is usually that there is a simple
suppression or persistance of "inner stimulations" (of intero-
ceptive data). Agnosia, on the other hand, is the "non-recog-
nition" by the patient of the body-member as belonging to
patient's body, i.e., it is the non-recognition of a fragment of the
total "representation" of the body which nevertheless ought to
be given (since the body-member corresponding to the represen-
tation of it is there); and the " phantom-member" is the "recog-
l M:erleau-Ponty refers primarily to the work of]. Stein, Lhermitte, Schilder, and
Menninger-Lerchenthal.
MERLEAU-PONTY
nition" by the patient of a part of the total representation which
ought not to be given (since the corresponding member is not
there).
Traditionally, Merleau-Ponty contends, the phantom-member
was treated psychologically as a particular memory or the
patient was said to "judge" positively (since the arm is ampu-
tated, yet "experienced" by the person, the psychological
explanation of this brought in spe<:ific non-sensuous processes -
judgment, memory, association, and the like). Agnosia, on the
other hand, was explained psychologically as a phenomenon of
forgetting, or of "negative" judgment. Physiologically, the
phantom-member was taken to be the actual presence of a
representation, while agnosia was said to be the actual absence of
a representation; psychologically, to the contrary, the phantom-
member was assumed to be the representation of an actual
presence (an experiencing of what, however, is not present),
while agnosia was taken to be the representation of an actual
absence (an experiencing of what, however, is present). (Cf. PP,
95-g6)
Such explanations become entangled in their own intricacies,
and in the end ignore precisely what is at issue: inf act the patient
whose arm is amputated is far from merely remembering or
judging, just as the patient with agnosia is far from simply
forgetting - and in no case is there any sort of "representation"
here. The latter is a carry-over from the false theory of ideas of
classical empiricism. It is not the case that the patient suffering
from a "phantom-member" experiences some sort of "repre-
sentation;" an absent body-member cannot cause an image of
itself to arise in the mind, and the resort to memory and judgment
is simply an artifice to save the representational theory, and
hardly a correct description of the facts.
The patient expresses his deficiency, Merleau-Ponty contends,
by remaining ambivalent towards it. He remains open, that is to
say, to the types of actions for which this arm would be the key
and center were it still operative. Hence, as de Waelhens points
out, the phenomenon
consists in the fact that the existential pulsation which engages me
towards the objects of my ordinary Umwelt continues to push me on and
appeals to the body capable of conducting me there and of revealing it to
me ... But I "know" beforehand - and do not want to know - that the
THEORY OF THE BODY
I57
mediation cannot be effectuated, that I can no longer open myself to this
world nor can this world offer itseH to me; I "use trickery," I continue to
aim at this world but only in a magical manner.1
In this way, by "shamming," I constitute a "fictive" body,
and this is precisely why the phantom-member is neither a
memory nor a representation of something absent (an "image" of
a nothing), but is rather a "quasi-present": it is, Metleau-Ponty
states, "like the suppressed experience of a former present which
decides not to become past." (PP, IOI) The so-calledinteroceptive
data, then, while quite real,
have sense only through the existential thrust, concretized in the
phantom-member. Inversely, the phantom-member, and the existential
elan of which it is the translation in immediate experience, are real only
in the experience of interoceptive excitations.I!
Accordingly, what emerges from the perspective of the body-
proper is just that physiological phenomena have meaning for the
one whose body it is.
Sensuous excitations are not the "effects" of a de facto situation
"outside" the organism, and which then "cause" the perception
of the state of affairs. Rather, for the perceptual subject (from
whom- alone we can learn about perception), Metleau-Ponty
argues, such excitations reveal the mamier iti which the organism
refers itself spontaneously to objects, the way it mise en fonne its
data spontaneously. Thus, de Waelhe.ns quite correctly observes:
In reality the body is nothing but the manner in which. we gain
access to the world, and at the same time, or correlatively, a certain mode
of appearance oi the world itself ... The body is the ensemble of concrete
conditions under which an existential projecta ctualizes itself and becomes,
by actualizing itself, properly mine.a
Thus Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the organism's function, in
respect of the sensuous excitations, is "to 'conceive' a certain
form of excitation. The 'psychophysical event' is therefore no
longer of the type of 'mundane' causality."* (PP, 89)
This neuro-physiological circwnstance has an important
consequence for the conception of the body-proper. We have
brought out one of the important assumptions of traditional
psychology already - namely, that the body is essentially a
1 De Waelhens, op. cit., pp. n2-13.
1l Ibid., p. ll4
9
Ibid., p. 1:09.
MERLEAU-PONTY
passivity in respect of its sensuousness to objects. Now we have
an additional argument against this view: if the body-proper is
"form-giving," if it endows its objects with a sens, it must be
that it is fundamentally active, spontaneous. Andi one can speak
of sen:se-data being "given" to the body, it is always necessary to
recognize that these "data" are nothing outside of the sense-
bestowing functions of perception. To be sure, one might point
-out, it can nevertheless be quite accurately determined that
certain physical events (light waves) must first occur before t,he
seeing of an illuminated object, and that these waves strike the
appropriate organ sensitive to them thus causing another series
of events to occur (physiological events), such that only then can
seeing take place. Merleau-Ponty, however, would insist that one
can in no way account for "seeing", as a specific way in which
conscience-engagee is related to its visible world, in such a manner.
There is implicit in such a view an unnoticed and unstated
movement back-and-forth between the point of view of an out-
side observer and that of the experiencer himself. But if ene is
consistent, even the latter must itself be "observed," and since
one cannot see the seeing, the "objective" point of view collapses
straight away. And if one stealthily tries to switch points of
view in the middle of the argument (by trying to account for the
seeing in terms of its objective eonditions), he is illegitimately
using double standards.'
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty seems to argue (though not explicit-
ly), for such an ' 'explanation" sense-data are not only assumed
to be the individually given (but never themselves perceived by
the perceiver) but also, all these data are essentially thought to
be on the same level, of the same kind - that is, there is for such
an explanation no difference of any kind between a sensuous
excitation which is attended to or noticed by the perceiver, and
one which is either not noticed by bim, or is simply ignored in
faver of other data. The actual perceptual situation, to the
contrary, is enormously more complicated than such a view can
in principle admit. For the perceiver, in fact, not only are there
no isolated data (which remain self-identical no matter in what
particular sensuous complex they happen to appear) but also
1
Sartre, we have seen, argues in much the sam.e manner: see above, Part II,
pp. 81>-90. Also Marcel, above, Part I , pp. 35-38.
THEORY OF THE .BODY
r59
they are not at all on the same level or of the same kind for: his
experience of them: a "red" attended to has a vastly different
significance than one which is either not noticed, or ignored. By
the same token, a "red" whichis passed over in favor of a "purple'
(but which "red" is nevertheless noticed), is intrinsically different
from one which is simply not noticed at all. The "meaning" which
each has is different in each case, such that one cannot consider
them as being on the same level and of the same kind. Hence, to
attempt to isolate a datum from its milieu is no longer to have the
"same" datum or even the "same" milieu: both, by the very fact of
isolation, have been essentially altered. But since fae original
perceptual milieu is just what must be accounted for, and since
it is the truly individually given, such an explanation miscarries
from the very beginning.
In the second place, every sensible quality, he emphasizes,
not only essentially exists within a specific milieu, but also it is
essentially determined and defined with respect te the particular
"task-at-hand" of the perceiver. What the perceptual situation is
for him, depends upon what he is doing or is planning to do, i.e.,
what his project is.l Perception cannet be divorced from the
concrete situation of the one whose perception it is: to see a red
stop-light when one's wife is about to give birth, and to see the
"objectively same" red stop-light at another time, is not at all
the same thing. . . for the perceiver himself. Every sensible
quality is wbat it is, not only in e s p ~ t to the particular action
being performed on it, then, but also in respect to the milieu in
which it occurs. And, what the milieu is itself depends upon the
particular project-at-hand of the perceiver for whom the milieu
is a milieu. Finally, Merleau-Ponty argues, every such sensible
quality "is inserted into a certain conduct ... (Sensations) give
themselves with a motor physiognomy, they are enclosed with a
vital signification." {PP, 242-43)
So intimate is this relation, for him, that one can even differ-
entiate various bodily postures or attitudes in relation to various
sensory qualities. The corporeal attitude of the body when per-
ceiving blue, rough, heavy, or sweet, thus, Merleau-Ponty
1 Cf. the treatment of "project-at-hand" by Alfred Schiltz in, e.g., "Choosing
Among Projects of Action," PPR, Vol. xii, No. z (December, i:951), pp. i:61-84.
r6o MERLEAU-PONTY
contends, is decidedly different in each case, from the point of
view of lived experience:
before being an objective spectacle the quality admits being
by a type of behavior which inits essence aims at it, and that
is why when my body adopts the (corporeal) attitude of blue I obtain
a quasi-presence of blue ... it is necessary (therefore) to relearn how to
live these colors in the way our body lives them.* (PP, 1
Relearning this, finally, one begins to see that a sensory quality
which is going to be sensed poses to my body a sort of problem,
a vague, confused question, to which, he argues, my body is
called on to respond with a specific corporeal attitude or posture
in order to "solve" it.
Sensible qualities, in other words, before being actually sensed,
are only "a vague solicitation ... Thus a sensible which is going
to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused problem .... "
(PP, 248) 2
The fundamental phenomenon here, Merleau-Ponty believes,
is this "mise en forme," which, we must say, is a sense-bestowing
activity just because every quality is what it is only within a
perceptual milieu determined and defined by the "tasks-at-hand"
of the perceiver. We can no longer even speak of isolated qualities,
of qualities in the subjunctive tense (as they "would be," "before"
or "apart" from perception). Even physiologically, Merleau-
Ponty contends, such qualities are "toujours-deja-13." as
"formed," as "meanings." It may be legitimate to talk of them,
but not where lived experience is concerned. In this sense, to talk
of sensuous qualities "apart from" the concrete perceptual
1
This argument, which at Jirst sight seems rather curious and not a little far-
fetched, becomes more intelligible when one realizes that it is connected with .Merleau-
Ponty's contention that the body itself .is a sort of non-thematic consciousness of
things. Thus, If the "project-at-hand" determines the milieu, this project is most
fundamentally a corporeal project, wbich structures its milieu by means of motor
projects. We return to this later.
2
Husserl, though he does not speak in terms of the body, bad described the same
phenom(lllon in Erfahrung und Urltil, o-p. cit., pp. 79-80: "We say, for example, that
what emerges out of the homogeneous background through its dissimilarity [with the
background] 'falls out' saliently; and that means that it [i.e., the outstanclingness]
displays an affective tendency on the I. The syntheses of coincidence - be it now the
or coinciding in undifferentiatediusion, or the overlapping, in ant agonism
of what 1s not precisely si.m.ilar- have their affective power, solicit the Ego's attention
whether or not the stimulus is followed. Ifa sensuous datum in the field is then grasped
that always occurs on the ground of such an outstandingness." What Merleau-Ponty
describes as a "problem" posed to the body by sensible qualities seems to be just
this "solicitation" of attention. See above, p. E31.
THEORY OF THE BODY r6r
situation is only to talk of prodticts of one's analysis, but never of
lived U?ities, perceptually experienced states of affairs en situation.
Thus, following and going far beyond the Gestalt psychologists,
Metleau-Ponty maintains that "form" is the fundamental
phenomenon in perception:
When Gestalt theory tells us that a figure on a ground is the most
simple sensory datum we can obtain ... that is the very definition o1 the
perceptual phenomenon, that without which a phenomenon cannot be
called perception. (PP, 10)
If one attempts to abstract one of the elements of a "form," not
only does he obtain a different element, but a different "form." 1
Elements are what they are only in the systematic organization in
which they appear as functional components, and the "whole" is
nothing but this functionally connected system of "parts;" as
Aron Gurwitsch has stated:
The integration of a constituent into a whole which possesses the
characteristic of a Form entails the absorption of the constituent into the
structure of the organization of this whole. To be a constituent and, in
this sense, a part of a Form, means to exist in a certain place within the
structure of the whole; and it means to occupy a certain place in the
organization of the Form, a place which can be defined only in reference
to the topography of the contexture. In virtue of its absorption ... the
constituent in question is endowed with a /umtio11al signification in
relation to this con texture.* 2
But, Merleau-Ponty states, it would be a great mistake to
believe that these "forms" exist "in themselves," so to speak "in
nature." "Forms" are only "forms for perception." That is to say,
he maintains, that the form
is not spread out in space, that it does not exist in the manner of a
thing, that it is the idea under which what occurs in several places is
gathered together and summed up. This unity is the unity of perceived
objects.a
It is not the case, therefore, that Merleau-Ponty denies the
existence or even the efficacy of physiological events. His point
t Cf. Structure du Co1nporlet11ent, op. cit., pp. 148-49.
2 Theorie du Cluimp de la. Co11scienco, op. cit., p. IOI. Also, p. Il4= "The constituents
are connected by the coherence of the Form ... they mutually determi11e and condition
one a.nother. They derive from one another and set limits on one another in a complete
reciprocity; the functional signification {of each) ... e:tists only in a system of signi
I ications .... "
a Structure du Comporlement, pp. 155- 56. Cf. also PP, p. good form' is not
actualized because it would be good in itseli in a metaphysical heaven, but it is good
becauseit is realized in our experie.nce."
162 MERLEA U-PONTY
rather seems to be that these events are always events within a
certain milieu of bodily behavior and perceptual situations,
charged with a complexity of meanings (motor, vital, existential,
and perhaps even cognitive). Accordingly, even such elementary
activities as mot or reflexes are never merely blind reactions to a
de facto physical state of affairs "outside" the organism. 1
There is a remarkable parallel to Merleau-Ponty's analysis
(but which is not apparently noticed by him) in that of J ean
Piaget. Piaget has emphasized that every reflex activity requires
two conditions for its functioning: first, the reflex tends to repeat
its activity purely for its own sake (this tendency to repeat being
an intrinsic characteristic of the reflex, defining it as a genuine
"activity," and not a mere reaction which always remains the
same - e.g., sneezing); and second, some milieu which is in some
way "suitable" to this activity, which acts as an "aliment"
to the activity.2 Piaget, however, seems uncertain how to
understand these conditions. On the one hand, he emphasizes
that every reflex "has the tendency" to assimilate "objects" to
its activity - thus, not only does the sucking reflex have the
tendency to repeat itself "for the sake of sucking," but by so
doing, it tends t o incorporate more and more things to its activi ty
(the coverlet, the father's thumb, its own thumb, and so on) ,
and as a consequence of this it tends to begin to differentiate
and recognize objects as "poles of action." These "objects," that
is to say, are strictly and only connected to complexes of activity
and are thus experienced as poles of these complexes. s Thus
Piaget could observe in his first study that even reflex activity
endows its "objects" with a certain, at least minimal, meaning.4
One would think, then, that Piaget had surmounted the
difficulties of what we have called the objectivistic approach.
However, he goes right on to maintain that in order for "objects"
to function as aliments, some "sense-data," external to the
activity, must be pre-given.s This is simply to give up, as we
I Ibid., pp. 47ff.
a J ean Piaget, The Origins of lnteUigenu in Childre11, International Universities
(New York, 1 9 ~ 2 , Chapter I.
a The Cot1slr11ction of Reality fo the Child, Basic Books (New York, rg54), p. 89; also
pp. 8-g, and ro4-05.
' Origins of foltnigtnu, pp. 38-39.
6 Ibid., pp. 390 and 405. See also, Gurwitscb, TMorie du Champ de la Conscienu,
<>/J. ci t., pp. 48- 50.
THEORY OF THE BODY
have seen, the first position; or, rather, it is to become locked in
the irresolvable contradictions intrinsic to traditional psychology.
In this situation, one cannot have it both ways: either one
remains with the sphere of lived experience (in this case, with
objects as they appear to the reflex activity, i.e., as "meanings"
or "poles of action"), or else he drops this and adopts the objective
approach-in which case, however, the reflex as sense-bestowing,
as essentially an activity, remains closed to observation.
The first description by Piaget, however, is illuminating when
we consider Merleau-Ponty's discussion of reflex activity:
In reality the reflexes themselves are never blind processes: they
adjust themselves to a "sense" of the situation, they express our orien-
tation towards a "milieu of behavior" just as much as the action of a
"geographical milieu" on us. They sketch at a distance the structure of the
object without waiting for points of stimulation. It is this global presence
of the situation which gives a sense to partial stimuli and which makes
them count, have value or exist for the organism. The reflex does not
result from objective stimuli, but turns itself toward them; it endows
them with a sense or meaning which they do not have taken individually
and as physical agents, but which they have only as situation. It makes
them be as situation; with thetn, it is in a relation of "knowledge, " that is
to say, it indicates them as that which it is destined to confront. (PP. 94)
The reflex, then, intrinsically predelineates a certain milieu
of possible behavior, before any "stimulation" whatever. It
"sketches beforehand" obj ects as being of a certain kind or type,
which are "meant" ("intended") implicitly as "suitable" to its
own function and purposes. In this sense, even at the reflex level
of the body-proper there is an activity of sense-bestowing going
on.
To say that the body-proper met for1ne, then, is to say that
it bestows sense. In Piaget 's terms, to say that an "object"
becomes assimilated t o a reflex activity, is to say that it becomes
a "pole of action," or "meaning," for that reflex, that it receives
a certain meaning by that very fact of assimilation, and that it is
henceforth what it is only for the scheme of activity.
Thus, finally, the body and its milieu reciprocally relate or
refer to one another. As Merleau-Ponty has maintained, the
body-proper is the decisive moment in the constitution of the
objective world. A serious problem remains from this analysis,
however: in what sense is the body a mode of "connaissance" ?
What does it mean-to suggest that even a reflex is in a "rapport
I
MERLEAU-PONTY
de 'connaissance'" with objects? Before we can answer this
question, several other aspects of the body-proper must be
explicated in some detail.
(b) The "Corporeal Scheme"
This notion, which Merleau-Ponty takes over from psychology
and transforms for his own purposes, is one of the root concepts in
his theory of the body. The body-proper is the decisive moment
in the constitution of the objective world; there are things for me,
that is to say, only by means of my body. My body, nonetheless,
as both Sartre and Marcel had emphasized, is not itself an
"object" in the same sense as those things it discloses by means
of its various sense organs:
In other words, I observe external objects with my body; I handle them,
I inspect them., I walk around them. But as for my body, I do not observe
it itself: in order to do that it would be necessary to have the disposal of a
second body which itself would not be observable. l (PP, 107)
This must not be construed to mean that I do not perceive my
body, but only that it reveals its own type or manner of givenness
to me, one which is peculiar to it. What is this mode of givenness,
and in virtue of what is my body different from ot:..cr objects?
Classical psychology, he observes (PP, 106), had attributed to
the body characteristics which are incompatible with those of an
object-simpliciter, while yet taking the body as an object on the
same level as these other objects. Predominantely, the body was
described as that which constantly accompanies me in every per-
ception; wherever I go, I go only by means of it. It never disap-
pears from my sensory fields. Ii this is so then my body is not at
all a mere "object among other objects": a table is always
presented through certain adumbrations, whether by means of
one sense or several; I always see it, touch it, smell it, and so on,
from a certain perspective. It can, moreover, disappear from my
field of perception; and, it stands over there, spatially located at a
distance from my body, which is here. But, as Sartre had already
recognized, 2 I cannot consider my body "from the outside,"
i It is a question here of the body-proper, the body-as-lived. The fact that r can
observe my body Is irrelevant, since to observe it, I must make use of my body - and
this is itself not observable. Marcel, we saw, first emphasized this point.
2 Cf. L'Etre td le Ntant, op. cit., p. 394. Sartre states there that the body "Is the
instrument which I cannot use by means of another instrument, the point of view on
which I cannot take a point of view." Marcel, we have seen, first discovered this
peculiarity of "my body qua mine."
THEORY OF THE BODY 165
I cannot take up a visual perspective on my seeing, I cannot
touch myself touching, and so on. And, de Waelhens points out,
for Metleau-Ponty,
The permanence of the body is not that of a fixed scene presenting
itself in the world; but rather its permanence is that of a sort of lateral
factor whlch accompanies all points of view, yet which is incapable either
of being eliminated or of being itself defiDed as a point of view. l
It cannot itself become a mere object then, precisely because
it is that by means oi which there are objects. It is neither tangible nor
visible to the extent that it is that which sees and touches. The body is not
therefore a.ny external object at all, which would present only th.e particu-
lar characteristic of always being "there." 2 (PP, :i:o8)
The body's "permanence," therefore, founds the relative perma-
nence of external objects. s
But, one may ask, how do "external" objects become "ex-
ternal," spatially distant from the body? To be sure, as Merleau-
Ponty points out, in order to "see" an object, some distance
must be realized between it and my body4. Consciousness, how-
ever, is literally nowhere, it is non-spatial. How then can any
"distance" be established? In so far as consciousness is embodied
it takes on spatial determinations. Hence, the first question to be
raised concerns the spatiality of the body-proper.
The clue for solving these problems, and for clarifying the
relation between conscience-engagk and its milieu, is for Metleau-
Ponty the phenomenon of the "corporeal scheme." If I reach out
to take up my pipe, the series of movements which take place
1 De Waelhens, op. cit., p. u9.
, Merleau-Ponty refer.; here to the at that time unpublished ldeen, II, issued now
as VoL IV of Husserliana, M. Nijhoff (Haag, 1952) apparently to the following
passage: "While I have the freedom over and against all other things freely to change
my place in.respect to them, and thereby freely to vary the manifold appearance in
which they come to be given to me, it ls not possible for me to place myself at a
distance from my animate organism nor it from me. Correspondingly, the manifold
appearances of my animate organism are limited: I can see certain. body-members
only in a characteristically perspectival shortening, and others (for example, my
bead) are generally unseeable by me. The same animate organism which serves me as
the means of all my perception stands in the way of my perceiving it itseli, and ls a
remarkably, incompletely constituted thing." (159, lines 13-25)
a This s tatement should be referred to that concerning t.he identity of the thing and
the.body. Cf. above, p. 15:i:, footnote 1.
' Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., u6: "That is why man - such as we know him - is
inseparable from a facticity .... " Also, PP, u: "In order lo receive into itself a
signification which truly penetrates it, in order to be integrated into a 'contour'
connected to the whole 'figure' and independent of the 'ground', the point of.sensation
must cease to be an absolute coincidence and consequently cease to be as sensation."
r66 MERLE AU-PO NTY
are not simply juxtaposed beside one another, nor is the pipe 0nly
experienced as "on" the table, "on" the pipe-stand, "next to"
the book, and so on. These spatial relations include intrincisally
the Teference to my body as that by means of which there are
things at all, and hence that by means of which these things ar:e
displayed in definite spatial relations.
Now it is not possible, by means of an "objective" or "geo-
metrical" space, to account for the circumstance that when
my back itches, I "know" precisely "where" the irritation is
(such that, e.g., I can tell another just where to rub). Similarly I
do not need to attend to every movement necessary to put on my
.hat properly; and if a cigarette ash falls on my trousers, I do not
hesitate a moment in knocking it off "where" it landed. The
members of my body-proper reveal a spatiality which is sui
ge1ieris, in terms my various movements seem to be enclosed in
one ano.ther and not at all "beside" one another.I It is in virtue
of the fact that my various organs and members form a system (a
"corporeal scheme"), that I know at any moment of my normal
experience, and know automatically, where they are, and where
they are in relation to other objects around me. Quite without
attending actively to him, I move out of the way of another person
when we chance to meet in the street. The woman wearing a
hat with a long feather in it keeps a proper distance from things
which might brush it; and, as Piaget has observed, 2 the very
young baby is not long in learning to tum toward the left when
hisleft cheek is touched.
It is necessary then to conceive of a lived-space, one which
is constituted and organized in terms of a corporeal scheme,
which is itself constituted by means of bodily movements and
actions in specific situations. At first inspection, this corporeal
scheme seems to be a sort of "global consciousness of my posture
in the inter-sensory world, a 'form' in the sense of Gestalt
psychology." (PP, II6} This "form," however is not a static, but
rather a dynamic, one; that is to say, the corporeal scheme of my
body is a certain posture
which, in the inter-sensory woild, we ado.Pt in v i e ~ of a determinate
1 This is .reminiscent of :Bergson's discu5sion of t he phe.nomenon of "grace." Cf.
.Essai sur les Donnles immtdiates de la Conscie11ce, op. cit., p. 9.
2
Origins of Intelligence, op. cit., e.g. pp. 25-z9.
THEORY OF THE BODY
task. The projection of this task calls forth an attitude of the entire body,
one which is inscribed in it. l
For this reason Merleau-Ponty defines corporeal spatiality, not
as the space of physical location, but rather as a spatiality of
situation. Itis necessary to say, then, that -
if my body can be a "form," and if there can be in front of it priv.ileged
forms on neutral backgrounds, it is in so far as it.is polarized a by its tasks,
in so far as it exists towards them, in so far as it gathers itself together in
order to reach its goal. And, finally, the "corporeal scheme" is a way of
expressing the fact that my body is "to-the-world." * 3 (PP, u7)
From this Merleau-Ponty concludes that it is by means of move-
ments, body-actions, "that the spatiality of the body is es-
tablished, and the analysis of movement proper should permit us
to comprehend both." (PP, ng)
For this analysis he turns to the famous Gelb-Goldstein studies
of brain-injured patients. We may though, for our -purposes,
ignore the details of these studies and concentrate only on what
Merleau-Ponty takes to he thejr central significance for the
theory of the body,_
In this regard, it becomes necessary, he believes (in agreement
with Goldstein), to distinguish between "abstract" and "con-
crete" movements. Even jor the body, that is to say, grasping
(Greifen) is different from showing, or pointing (Zeigen). A
brain-injured patient is incapable of those movements which are
not addressed to, and not called out from, some acftual situation;
his surroundings form only a milieu of manipulanda. He is
incapable of "pretending" or "visualizing" any situation which
is not concretely actual. 4- It is only by breaking down an action
requested by a doctor (e.g., pointing to his forehead) that he can
perform it, and then the action loses all of its usual grace, its
fluidity, ease and immediacy. On the other hand, when a fly
lands on his forehead, the patient immediately swats it without
any hesitation. "Objects," that is to say, are .not just "poles of
action' ' for him, but poles of action only within a specific situation
i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 121.
s The parallel with Piaget's analysis of "objects" as "poles of action" is worth
noting;
a We_ shall returato the phenomenon_ of llre u monde later .
The patient is thus incapable of reali:ting .a "fictive" body, as opposed to the one
suffering from a "phantom-member," or even on.e sufferingirom agnosia.
168 MERLEAU-PONTY
which concretely calls for the particular action in question. (PP,
II9-I6o)
However, as Goldstein bad shown, l it would be plain deception
to believe that the normal person uses the same sorts of oper-
ations as the pathological person; the normal cannot be under-
stood in terms of the pathological. Rather, it is necessary to say
that, having lost certain functions, the pathological person must
substitute other functions. (PP, I23-Z6) He has to make explicit
to himself the movements requested by the doctor, and this is not
the case as regards the normal person. 2
The normal person is able to "tum away" from the present to
the virtual, from the actual to the possible (or the fictive), as
regards his bodily conduct. The brain-injured patient is locked
to the actual, to the "here and now," and thus must replace such
otherwise immediately performed operations with a laborious
process of "deciphering" and subsequent "deduction" of move-
ments and objects. For instance, whereas a normal man can
immediately distinguish a pin-prick on his elbow from one on his
hand, the pathological person must undertake a step-by-step
process of explicit deciphering, locating, and concluding. Thus
the latter's actual field "is limited to what is encountered in an
actual contact, or reconnected to these data by an explicit
deduction." (PP, 127) This is to say then that he is incapable of
"abstract" movement; while quite able to understand the in-
structions of the doctor, they have no "motor significance" for
him.
Accordingly, it can be seen that abstract movements have lost
their "ground." All movements require some ground on which
they "stand out" (abhebm) as these and those specific movements.
The ground of "concrete" movements is just the given, actual
situation along with those parts of the body-proper not directly
involved in the specific movement; the movement, so to speak,
1
Goldstein, Psychologischo Aiialysen hitlnpathologiscluir Falle, Bartl1 (Leipzig;
1920), pp. 167-213. (PP, 125)
2
"We notice that the patient questioned about the position of bis body-members,
or as regards the position of a tactual stimulus, seeks (by means of preparatory
movements) to make of his body an object of actual perception. Questioned about
the form of an object in contact with his body, he seeks to trace It by following the
contour of the object. Nothing would be mare deceptive than to suppose that the
normal person lJSeS the same operations, abbreviated only by habi t. The patient seeks
tbese explicit perceptions only in order to bring about a certain presence of his body
and of the object which is given in the case of the normal person .... " (PP, 125)
THEORY OF THE BODY 169
occurs within a context organized in terms of the complex:
action - acted-on. That of "abstract" movements is, as we saw,
the "fictive" milieu and the "fictive" body-proper which performs
an "as if' ' movement or gesture on the ground of that fictive
complex. (Cf. PP. 129) From this discussion, Merleau-Ponty
concludes that
Movement, understood not as objective movement and displacement in
space, but as a project of movement or "virtual movement," is the foun-
dation of the unity of the senses ... my body is precisely an already
constituted system of equivalences and intersensorial transpositions. The
senses mutually translate one another without any need for an interpreter,
mutually comprehend one another without needing to pass by way of the
idea ... With the notion of corporeal scheme it is not only the unity of the
body which is described in a new manner, but also through this notion
the unity of the senses and the unity of the object. (PP, 271)
The fundamental phenomenon. then, is the corporeal scheme.
c;nstituted by means of th - -hand and carried
out in o y movements. By means of the corporeal scheme,
~ o v e r the body with its organs and members becomes
" unified; but as well, Merleau-Ponty contends, the senses and their
objects become unified in the same way and simultaneously.
When Piaget's child, Laurent, learns to differentiate the thing-
heard from the thing-seen (and thus no longer for example to
attempt to see sounds}, and yet sees and hears the same obfect,
what has happened, Merleau-Ponty contends, is that there has
appeared a certain unification of the body, the senses, and the
objects thereof, and that along with this unification (as its
consequence) there develops a scheme. By this, I believe, we
should understand that certain types of activities become corre-
lated with certain types of objects as "poles of action", and in
terms of this typification at the level of the body-proper, the
body itself (and with it, its objects) becomes unified as a total
syst em, an organic system, i.e., an organism.
And here once again, there seems to me to be another parallel
in analysis with the work of Piaget - which, though not noted by
either of them, is helpful in understanding what Merleau-Ponty
states only schematically. At the psychological level Piaget has
attempted to account for this process in terms of "assimilation"
and "accomodation," and corresponding to these, an "internal
organization" of the global complex: "actjvity - objects-acted-
170 MERLEA U-PONTY
on." From the very beginning of the child's life, Piaget believes,
there is "an historical development such that each episode
depends on preceding episodes and conditions those that follow
in a truly organic evolution. " l This process, not simply of growth,
but of progressive accumulation and augmentation of the activi-
ties of the child, he descnoes as occurring by means of assimi-
lation, accommodation, and internal organization.
As we have already seen, every genuine activity reveals two
fundamental features: (1) it exhibits a sui generis " need" to be
used in order to adapt itself and thus to become crystallized into
a scheme of activity; and (2) it is capable of gradual accommo-
dation to the "objects" encountered through its assimilative
tendencies. 2 Thus, every activity, by the very fact that it tends
to function simply for the sake of functioning, 3 reveals two
further phases: it tends to incorporate an mcreasing number of
objects capable of serving as aliments for its activity,4 that is, it
tends to become generalized. And it tends, because of this gener-
alization, to become recognitory as regards the objects capable of
serving as aliments. s
These three phases of assimilation, however, are but one
process, or tendency, of every activity. The reflex is one func-
tioning totality, and thus it is organized progressively as it
assimilates and accommodates itself to objects. An activity
(whether reflex, or higher level) tends sui generis to grow and
augment, and with this there goes hand in band a progressive
construction of objects and a progressive separation of "subject"
from "object." The "self" and the "world" are co-constituted
simultaneously, in 1an historical process whose movements are
described by Piaget in terms of the functional concepts of assimi-
lation, accommodation, and organization.
But, as well, by means of this complex process, the various
activities become crystallized into "schemes;" these "functions
crystallize in sequential structures," 6 which henceforth serve
1 Origi1is o/ lntellige11ce, op. cit., p. 25.
2 Ibid., p. 29.
' Ibid., PP 32, 42- 43.
Ibid., pp. 34- 35, 43.
5
Ibid. , pp. 35-36.
e Ibid., p. l3S; cf. also, p. 128.
THEORY OF THE BODY
171
to organize and give signification to the particular movements
making up a total activity:
In short, the uniting of accommodation and assimilation presupposes
an organization. Organi.zation exists within each schema o{ assimilation
since ... each one constitutes a real whole, bestowing on each element a
meaning relating to this totality. But there is above all total organization;
that is to say coordination among the various schemata of assimilation.1
Thus, the various schemata themselves become coordinated with
one another; and, in this manner, there arises what Merleau-
Ponty has called the "corporeal scheme." For, the corporeal
scheme - as that in terms of which the spatiality of the body-
proper is instituted, and through this the coordination and
unification of the body's senses and their respective multiple
objects - is nothing other than another expression for the total
organization and coordination of the organs and members of the
body-proper by means of its concrete tasks and movements. In
other words, I submit, what Merleau-Ponty calls the "corporeal
scheme" is what Piaget describes as the " total organization" or
"intercoordination" of the various schemata.
Schemes of activity, then, become constituted as "ways of
doing," "modes of activity," or typical manners of conduct over
against typical kinds of objects. In short, they become sedimented
and the stock of this sedimentation is what Metleau-Ponty calls
the "corporeal scheme."
Thus far, however, the analysis is far from complete. It is one
thing to take note of the "corporeal scheme;" it is quite another
to explicate the process of its formation. Piaget has attempted to
do the latter by means of his functional concepts; but even so, he
confesses that the most crucial phenomenon in all of his analysis,
"assimilation," has not been explicated, believing that such an
explication falls only within the domain of biology. 2 Merleau-
Ponty, however, would hardly agree with this; for, after all, it is
precisely what is most essential. The explication which he himseli
gives, nevertheless, as we shall see, is still not free from diffi-
culties.
1
IlJid., p. 142. There are certain problems with his analysis which we cannot show
in this place.
2
Ibid., p. 46.
172 MERLEAU-PONTY
(c) Tlte "Intentional Arc"
In the course of normal, harmonious experiencing of the milieu
disclosed by means of the body-proper, this milieu is experienced
as the same for each of the organs of the body-proper. Similarly,
the spatiality of objects disclosed by means of, e.g., visual
perception {the pipe is to the left of the ashtray), is also the
spatiality disclosed in tactual perception - for concrete experience.
Although, to be sure, "the domain of touching is not spatial in the
same way as that of seeing," (PP, 257) there is nevertheless a
unification of these spaces into one lived spatiality. (PP, 260)
If the spatiality peculiar to each of the senses did not have
something common in all of them, Merleau-Ponty points out, I
could never reach for the pen which I now see as in the same
place toward which my hand now moves. (PP, 258) This common
ground, he believes, is the fact that body vision and touch (as
well as the other sensory fields) are
means ef access to one and the same world; this world has the pre-
predicative evide.nce of being a single world, such that the equivalence of
the "organs of sense perception" and their analogy is transferred onto
things and can be lived before being conceived." (PP, 1_50)
Thus, every concrete perception and gesture is situated to the
world as a world which is the same for each of the senses, for
each movement, i and which was and will be the same for an
indefinite number of virtual or horizontally c;oordinate gestures
and perceptions:
The fact is that the normal subject has his body not only as a system
of actual positions but also, and by that fact, as an open system with an
infinity of equivalent positions in other orientations. What we have
called the corporeal.scheme is precisely this system of equivalencies, this
immediately given invarient by means of which the different motor tasks
are instantly transposable. That is to say that there is not only an experi-
ence of my body, but more an experience of my body in the world .....
(EP,165)
1
lt must- be pointed out that tbis position is inconsistent with Metleau-Ponty's
later statements regarding the -unification of the world (Cf. PP, and above, pp.
r50-5:i:). Here he maintains that the unification of the sensory "spaces" presupposes
and iS founded on the pre-predicative unity of the world; the various spaces of tbe
different senses become unified into one interc-sensory spatiality only because each of
the senses is " a means of access to one and the same W01'ld . . . " Later oo, however
(Cf. above, pp. he wants to say that the unification of the objects in the
world are unified as identically the same by means of the c<>rporal sche.me; both the
senses and their objects are unified through thls scbeme. Why the spatiality of each
sense should nevertheless require a world already constitued as the same, Merlcau-
Ponty does not tell us. Indeed, it seems t o :me, this is a flat inconsistency in his
argumeat.
THEORY OF THE BODY
173
Now, we have seen that it is by means of the motivity of the
body-proper that this corporeal scheme is instituted, and that
this motivity is first of all a motivjty of corporeal tasks. Thus we
can say, the world evidenced by "antepredicative experience" is
fundamentally the pole of actions on it by the body-proper.
Every movement thus occurs within a milieu of "tools,., particu-
lar " instrumental-things." (PP, 161, footnote) Similarly, the
spatiality of objects is originarily a spatiality of praxis, of
situation, and is thus instituted by the motivity of the body-
proper: the body-proper does not live in space, but rather it lives
space, i.e., "il y habiter." The corporeal scheme is then a scheme of
equivalences of actions and tasks, or, as we have said earlier,
the total organization and coordination of actual and possible
kinds of corporeal activities.
The unity of the body-proper is a unity of a scheme, which,
qua scheme, manifests a common sty.le of bodily actions (Cf. PP,
I75--77): in walking, talking, eating, writing, and so on, there is
manifested a certain typical style of conduct, bodily attitudes,
behavior, and the like, which characterizes this body-praper as
mine and not yours. This typical style olmy body-proper as such,
moreover, "is transferred onto things;" that is, the milieu sur-
rounding my body-proper has a certain physiognomical style
which is founded on the style of my body-proper, on its habitual
style and course such that my milieu (my clothes, my personal
belongings, my books, furniture, rooms, and so on) reveals me.
What occurs even at the physiological level is then repeated
at higher levels: the objects of my milieu are meanings; "the"
world is, even. for bodily conduct, a texture and contexture of
meanings. In short, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, motivity is itself
intentional. (PP, I6o) The fundamental phenomenon is inten-
tionality. Beneath what Goldstein called the "categorial oper-
ation"; beneath what has variously been designated as "the
symbolic function,'' "projection," and so on, is a more fundamental
function: a "central function," which, "before making us see or
know objects makes them exist for us in a more covert manner."
That is, he continues,
the life of consciousness -the life of knowing, of desire or the perceptual
life - is subtended by an "intentional arc" which projects around us our
past, future, our ideology, our moral situation; or r ather which effectuates
r74
MERLEA U-PONTY
our being situated under all oi these relations. It is this intentional arc
which institutes the unity of the senses, that of the senses and the intelli-
gence, that of sensibility and motivity. l (PP, 158)
The unity of the body-proper and of its objects, which is
expressed by the corporeal scheme, is, then, the consequence
of a more general and more fundamental phenomenon: an
"intentional arc" is responsible for all unity whatever. For
Merleau-Ponty, then, there is an intentionality which is not the
intentionality of an "absolute" consciousness, but rather of a
non-thetic consciousness manifested concretely in the body-
proper itself. 2 This intentionality is what accounts for the circum-
stance that the body-proper is experienced as
the ensemble of paths already marked O'ut, of already constituted
powers, the dialectically acquired ground on which a higher level mise en
/ortne is performed, 3
such that the body-proper, like the world non-thetically experi-
enced by it, is an "always-already-there." That is to say, "our
open and personal existence rests on a first basis of acquired and
congealed existence." (PP, 493-94) And this acquired and con-
gealed existence, which is the fundamental stratum of the body-
proper, takes the form of an
organism considered as a pre-personal adherence to the general form
of the world, as an anonymous and general existence ... (it) plays,
beneath my personal life, the role of an in11ate complex. (PP, 99)
It is a manifestation of catiscience-engagee as etre-au-?nonde.
We must proceed with caution in order to unravel this extreme-
ly complex notion of the "intentional arc" since we have practi-
cally no clues from Merleau-Ponty. One thing is clear: he is not
arguing that in every perception there goes on a synthetic
activity of consciousness; it is precisely this view that he wants to
reject. It seems clear, again, that itis Husserl who is the Mte noire.
Husserl had maintained that
if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme foi; my description, I see
in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective
i As this passage indicates, Merleau-Ponty places a great many tasks on this "arc;"
for something so crucial, though, il is strange that.he devotes next to no analysis to it.
We shall return to this phenomenon later.
2 Cf. PP, 61: we shall contest this opposition which be sets up between "absolute"
and "operative."
B St,1tuure du Comportement, <>f>. cit., p. ::186.
THEORY OF THE BODY
I75
unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of manners oi appearing
which belong determinately to it.
These, in this temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of sub-
jective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such
thatin them "one and the same" is intended as appearing.1
The unity of the changing multiplicity of appearances of an
object is a
unity of synthesis . . . a C01i1U1cted11Bss that makes the unity of one conscious-
tzess, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as "the same"
objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes "comti-
tuted." 2
Thus, Husserl concludes, "the" object of consciousness, as
"the same" object experienced from a multiplicity of perceptual
perspectives (and which is likewise also remembered, valued,
judged about, and so on) is "an 'intentional effect' produced by
the synthesis of consciousness." s Accordingly, Husserl insisted
over and again that it is necessary for phenomenology to inquire
into this "synthetic producing," by means of which the objects
of consciousness are "built up" or constituted (aufbaut) as being
identically the same obj ects throughout a multiplicity of ap-
pearances (seeing, t ouching, and smelling a thing; judging that
it is thus and so; liking it; and so on). The life of consciousness,
Husserl emphasizes, is intentional and synthetic; objects, of
whatever kind, acquire the sense for consciousness of being
identically the same (and acquire a multiplicity of other senses
as well: "physical thing;" "mathematical formula;" "valuable;"
and so on) only by virtue of the synthetic intentionality of
consciousness. More particularly, even if we consider one phase of
a visual perception of a tree, here, too, "the" tree is "one and the
same" tree throughout the temporal phases of the perceiving of
it only in virtue of these intentional syntheses of consciousness
by means of which the object of the "just past" phase, that of the
"just-just-past" phase, and so on, are synthetically retained by
the "now" phase as "one and the same" tree.4 This extraordi-
narily complex process, found in even the simplest of sense per-
ceptions, signifies for Husserl that all "objects of experience"
.L Carlesian i'l-feduations, op. cit., p. 39.
2 Ibid., pp . .-42.
a Ibid., p . ..
' Formale und tra11sz:e11de11tale L4gik, <>f>. cit., p. 147.
MERLEAU-PONTY
whatever are specific "products" (Leistungen) of just such in-
tentional syntheses; they are, that is to say, products of a "sense-
genesis" (Sinngenesis). Finally, this "sense-genesis," according to
Husserl,
This wonderful peculiarity, as productive intentionality, belongs
universally to any consciousness whatever. All intentional unities derive
from an intentional genesis, are "constituted" unities; and at all times
one can inquire into the "completed' ' unities - into their constitution,
int o their entire genesis, and of course into their essential form whichis to
be grasped in an eidetic manner. It is this fundamental fact, encompassing
in its universality the whole of intentional life, which determines the genuine
s1mse of intetrtional analysis as the disclcsure of infenti<mal implications -
the analysis by means of which, over against the often completed sense of
unities, their inexplicit sense-moments and "causal" sense-relations are
made to stand out explicitly. l
Now, it is just this view which Merleau-Ponty wants to criticize.
While such "syntheses" may indeed be discovered, for Merleau-
Ponty they are only and strictly products of that very analysis,
phenomenological or not, and not at all intrinsic within lived
experience itself. He seems to feel thatif in my on-going perception
I do not have to " think" the unity of the object, his unity is
already toute f ait, utie fois pour tcn-1-tes.
Similarly, all talk of " qualities," "sensations," and as regards
Husserl particularly, of "hyletic data," is so much deception if
one means that these are concretely lived as such. To this list,
then, he now adds "synthesis" and "constitution" - they are
products of analysis and nothing else.
Adopting the analytic attitude I decompose the perception into
qualities and into sensations, and ... l am obliged to suppose an act of
synthesis which is only the counteq>art of my analysis. My act of per-
ception, considered in its naivity, does not itself effectuate this synthesis;
it benefits from ati already accomplished operation, /r<>m a ge?zeral synthesis
constituted once and /or all. It is that factwhlchl express when I say that I
perceive with my body or with my senses - my body, my senses, being
precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit or sedimented
science. (PP, 275; my emphasis)
By this he means that the body itself has its own intentionality,
such that all perception presupposes as its condition a sort of
"preliminary constitution" (PP, 249) by virtue of which the body
is
1
Ibid., p. 185.
THEORY OF THE BODY
a synergetic system, all the functions of which are taken up again and
connected in the general movement of being-to-the-world, in so far as it is
the congealed form of existence. (PP, 270)
Hence, the unity of the body and its objects is realized by means
of "autochthonous organization," (PP, 270, footnote) which is
the "arc intentionnel" of the body itself. The body-proper, then,
is "already established" as such for all perception.
1
As such every
perception profits from an already accomplished synthesis,
once done forever done.
The body-proper exists as an anonymous and generalized
existence, a kind of sub-structure on which all personal life is
built. Hence, too, the intentionality at work in it cannot be at the
level of cognition, of consciousness 2:
If my consciousness actually constituted the world which it perceives
there would be no distance whatever, nor any possible displacement,
between them. My consciousness would penetrate the perceptual world
even to its most hidden articulations ; intentionality would carry us to the
heart of the object; and at the same stroke the perceived would not have
the density of something present. Consciousness would not lose itself,
would not become caught up, in the perceptual world. (PP, 275)
But, in fact, we do have consciousness of an inexhaustible
object, one not fully apprehended in any one or any number of
perceptions (since sensuously perceivable things are always
presented as "having more to them" than is. strictly presented
at one time), and thus "the" object is never present "all at
once." s It presents itself to the "subject of perception," which
for Merleau-Ponty is the body-proper,
4
as a sort of badly for-
mulated question, a confused problem (PP, 248) with which, in
perception proper, the body "communes," or "is synchronized." s
(PP, 270, 245-246) "The" table is thus never reached by my per-
ception; if it were, it would cease to be what it is, a physical
thing spread out before me with its own peculiar "aseite," its
own unimpeachable presence and depth. (PP, 269-'JO)
Corresponding to this aseite, to this ambiguity which is of
t De Waclhens, op. cit., p. u7.
2 We shall have to raise serious objections to this conception of "non-thematic
intentionality" as being a strictly corporeal intentiveness.
' "The" object ls just the object seen from everywhere, he contends. (PP, 83, 235-
39)
Re stat es explicitly that the body is "le sujet de la perception." (PP, :a6o; a.10
245, 248)
6 Cf., e.g., PP, 246 and 245. We return to this shortly.
MERLEAU-PONTY
the essence of the existence of the thing, there must be on the
side of the perceiver a correlative aseite and ambiguite: this is the
body-proper. ln so far as the body-proper is the subject of
perception, its intentionality is not that of conscioisness:
It is not the epistemological subject who effects the synthesis, it is the
body when it pulls itself from its dispersion, gathers itself together, carries
itself with all of its means towards a single term of its movement, and
when a single intention is conceived in it by the phenomenon of synergy . . .
By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not
effectuated in the transparency of a consciousness and that it takes over
as acquired all the latent lmowledge which my body has of itself. (PP,
269)
Thus, Metleau-Ponty maintains, the body-proper itself is a
"knower;" the body itself "knows" and "comprehends." (Cf. PP,
167, 270, 275) 1 The body, he argues, being "the common texture
of all objects," is the instrument of knowledge of these objects.
(PP, 272) And, in so far as this "knowledge" is "latent," "habi-
tual," and "sedimented," perception always "takes place in an
atmosphere of generality and presents itself to us as anonymous.
I cannot say," he continues,
that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say that I under-
stand a book . .. My perception, seen even from within, expresses a given
situation: I see blue because I am sensible to colors ... if I were to translate
the perceptual experience exactly, I would have to say that it is perceived
in me and not that I perceive .. . Betweenmy perception and me there is
always the density of something originaYily acqui1'ed which prevents my
experience from being clear for itself ... the I who sees or the I who hears
is in some manner a specialized I, familiar with only a portion of being ...
(PP, 24g-50)
This anonymity is essential, he claims, just because every
sensation, being strictly the first, last, and only one of its kind,
is both a birth and a death - it is lost at the moment of its occur-
rence. Correlatively, the subject who experiences it, begins and
ends with it - and, as he can neither precede nor survive himself,
Merleau-Ponty claims, sensation appears to him as always in a
milieu of generality.2
1 CL de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 140-41.
a CL PP, 249-SO; this is almost verbatim. I must conless that this argument
escapes me. He will later contend that it is the temporality of "l'intentionnalite
oi>Uant" which constitutes the continuum of experience and the identity of the selL
But how generality emerges is, so far as I can see, completely obscure. We return to
t his in Chapter Ill, below.
THEORY OF THE BODY
I79
The point of this argument, it seems, is that the intentionalite
opbante which forms the fundamental stratum of the body-
proper as an already-acquired "complex inne,' is strictly and
exclusively a tem;poral one:
My body takes possession of time, it exists a past and a future for a
present; it is not a thing; it makes time instead of undergoing it. But
every act of fixation [of a segment of time] must be repeated for otherwise
it falls into the unconscious ... The hold it gives us on a segment of time,
the synthesis which it effectuates, are themselves temporal phenomena,
themselves flow away and can subsist only as re-apprehended in new
act which itself is temporal ... The one who in sensory exploration gives
a past to the present and orients it to a future is not the I considered as an
autonomous subject; it is me in so far as I have a body and in so far as I
can "look at" something. (PP, 277)
Because of this "temporal" synthesis, then, perception is
always in the world of the "Anyone." For, he insists, just like
the object of the momentary present, my consciousness of it
passes away and is thus obliterated. Both are t emporal phenome-
na. There is no such thing as an "absolute subject," a "pure"
pour-sen; rather, in the concreteness of perception, there is only
the generality and anonymity of the body-proper synthesized by
means of temporal syntheses which connect the moments of its
perception and action. I
The "intentional arc," then, is a temporal synthesis. But this
synthesis, he says later on, is not at all what Husserl described
as "synthesis of identification." 2 For Merleau-Ponty there are no
such syntheses of sensuous contents, but rather only syntheses of
transition. (Cf. PP, 480, 484) Hence, as far as sensuously perceiva-
ble and perceived states of affairs are concerned, all one can say
is that they are, by essence, "toufours-difa-ltl." And finally, the
body-proper can be "un acquis," because it is unified by means of
temporal syntheses of transition taking place in a milieu of
generality and anonymity, and expressable only in the imper-
sonal.
Nevertheless, one must say, this "lived temporality" of the
body-proper is still not the ground of its being; at the root of
every-thing, for him, is ttre-au-monde. For just as the body is that
1 lfow he can then maintain that "le corps propre" is yet "le mi411," Is a problem
central to this argument. We shall return to itlater.
I CL Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., x7-18.
180 MERLEAU-PONTY
which puts me to-the-world, so, too, it puts me t o ~ p c e and to-
time. That is to say:
In so far as T have a body, and I act by means of it in the world, space
and time are not f<' me a sum of juxtaposed points, not beforehand
moreover an infinity of relations whose synthesis my consciousness would
perform and wherein my body would be implicated. I am not "in" space
and "in" time; I am at space and at time; my body applies itself to them
and embraces them. The fullness of this hold measures that of my existen-
ce .... (PP, r64)
Accordingly, it is necessary to turn now to this root .
(2) THE BODY-PROPER AS P:rRE-AU-MONDE
We have seen that each of the senses is itself a disclosure of
a certain milieu of objects (Cf. PP, 250-51), and in this sense each
bas its own characteristic spatiality. (PP, 255) These spatialities
and these senses nevertheless present us with a single object in a
single space, each opens out onto a common, intersensory world.
(PP, 261, 279) This diversity and unity of the senses, however,
"are truths of the same rank" (PP, 256) Accordingly, as de
Waelbens states,
If my existence is by nature close beside things, it must approach them
in as many ways as these things manifest themselves to my existence, and
be capable oi passing entirely into each. But inversely, if these modes of
presence present a single thing, it is necessary as well t hat these diverse
modalities of apprehension lead over into one another and that existence,
if it immerses itselfinto each, cannot lose itself in any one of these modes
of presence of the thing. 1
That is to say, the unity and the diversity of the senses (and
thus of the body and its objects) are at the same level, just be-
cause they become differentiated and unified on a common
gr01.md. (Cf. PP, ISO, 26o) Each sense, then, implicates the entire
body, refers simultaneously to all the other senses, and thus is
intrinsically intersensory. It is only by breaking up this lived
unity and simultaneous diversity that the diverse senses of one
body, and correlatively diverse "sense qualities" of one object,
appear - and thus these are strictly artificial, products of the
analysis. (PP, 278).
There is, therefore, "an 'originary stratum' of feeling which is
anterior to the division of the senses;" (PP, 262) and on this
l De Waelhens, op. cil., p. xn.
T H EORY OF THE BODY
r8r
ground, the diverse senses " lead over into one another." (PP,
265) This "originary stratum" (couche originaire), the intentional
arc which founds all unity, Merleau-Ponty has argued, is temporal.
Indeed, he states, "subjectivity, at the level of perception, is
nothing other than temporality." (PP, 276) This is to say that the
body-proper exists itself as an ek-stasis: to perceive a thing is not
to perform a series of syntheses but rather to encounter it, to
come before it by means of one's sensory fields, to manifest
O"neself to it as a presence to him in virtue of his bodily presence to
it - in so far as my body inhabits time (as it inhabits space and
the world), it lives itself as present. " In the same way as it is
necessarily 'here.' the body exists necessarily 'now.' It can never
become ' past. '" 1 When I visually perceive a thing, as de Wael-
hens puts it, " this regarding is a presence or a present because its
unfolding supposes and promises the mobilization of all the
potencies of the body." 2
In short, the intentionality of the body-proper is essentially its
temporality; and its temporality is its being: phenomenology, as
Merleau-Ponty understands it, gives way to ontology. In so far as
consciousness is always and essentially conscience-engagee, its
being is always and essentially etre-au-monde; and, its etre-au-
monde is its engagement, its opening-out-onto-the-world, that is,
its etre-corps.
My body-proper, then, manifests me to the world, puts me at
the world, by means of my various senses - which themselves
must now be conceived as modes of access to the various spheres
of being accessible to them. The interiority which Descartes and
others had taken as the essence of mind or consciousness, and
which Sartre had reaffirmed in his ontology, is shown to be quite
erroneous, for it fails to recognize the fundamental dimension of
human-reality: its etre-au-monde. To be perceptive of a world
is not only to be open to it; it is to be opened out onto it, to be at it.
To act on the world is to disclose the world as a contexture of
possible ways-to-be, possible ways in which consciousness is to-the-
world. In this way, the body-proper becomes
1
Cf. above, p. 96: MerleauPonty contests Sartre's placement of the body in the
past; for tbe former, the body is the fundamental locus of IJrea.u nionda as presence.
2 De Waelbens, op. c., p. 181.
182
MERLEA U- PONTY
a way of getting to the world and to its objects, a "practico-gnosia"
which must be as original and perhaps as
ongmary. My body has or comprehends 1ts world without having to pass
through "representations," without being made subordinate to a "sym-
bolic" or "objectivating function.' ' (PP, r64)
If my body-proper can have before it objects as poles of action,
and if it is itself polarized by its actions, this is because, Merleau-
Ponty writes,
it exists toward them, because it gathers itse!I together on them in order
to achieve its goal, and the "corporeal scheme" is ultimately a manner of
expressing the fact that my body is to the world. (PP, 117)
Talcing this as our clue, we shall be able to explicate the full
meaning of etre-au-monde,1 the central and decisive part of
Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body.
To begin with, it seems evident from what we have already
explicated that the phrase must be taken in both its figurative
and its literalmeanings. Figuratively, it signifies "to belong to,"
as when one says, "Ces livres sont a vous": "These books belong
to you." Thus the phrase, "mon corps est au monde," means in
this sense, "my body belongs to the world." As well, however, the
phrase means literally, "to be at the world;" it is a denial of the
encapsulment of the mind, either epistemologically or ontologi-
cally. The latter can be understood only after the former, the
figurative, sense is clearly before us. Recognizing the danger of
overinterpreting Merleau-Ponty, it seems to us that each of these
senses reveals three subordinate senses; by drawing out these
and showing relevant textual passages we shall be able to come
to an understanding of this crucial concept.
(a) The Body as "Belonging-To" the World
I. IN THE FIRST PLACE, to " belong-to" the world is not to "be
possessed by" the world; the world does not have me, I have it,2
that is, I go out toward it:
I h_ave the world as an uncompleted individual by means of my body
(considered as a potency of this world), and I have the position of objects
by means of my body's position (or inversely the position of my body by

1
Characteristically, Medeau-Ponty undertakes no explication or the meaning or
his fundamental concepts: Hre-au-monde is the most glaring example, since it is the
most fundamental concept of bis work.
2
It must be noted that Merleau-Ponty uses "having" in the sense in which Marcel
uses "being," and vice versa. CL PP, 203, footnote.
THEORY OF TKE BODY
means of that of objects) ... in a real implication and because my body is
a movement toward the world - the world, point d'appui of my body.
(PP, 402)
Thus, the relation of "having" is one of implication, in one sense
of involvement: to say that "I have a world," is to say that " I
really am implicated in it," that I am caught up in it by being
embodied in it, that I belong to the world in the sense in which
a piece of clay belongs to the movements of a sculptor's hands,
or the startled expression of my friend belongs to my excited
words. That is to say, "The body is our general means of having a
world." (PP, 171) There would be no world, no concrete objects,
if consciousness were not conscience-engagee, and to be engagee is
to be conscience-incarnee. But, to be embodied, and thus to be
sensuously perceptive of objects, and to be able to act on them,
is to belong to the world in the sense of being engaged in a body
which places me at things themselves, with no intermediary, no
"representatives" or "representations" of them. There is no room
here for any epistemological or ontological entrepreneur.
2. SECOND, then, being of the same community of nature as
the world, the body-proper is "at home" therein, it inhabits the
world, it dwells therein (y habiter). The body is the "common
texture of all objects." (PP, 272) To be-to-the-world, in this
sense, is to be "at home" in it, or synonymously, to be fat1iiliar
with it, by means of the body-proper. Thus, he writes that
sensations, or perceived objects, are at first recognized only
blindly by means of my body's familiarity with them:
The sensation of blue .. . is doubtless intentionar,1 that is to say that it
does not rest in itself like a thing, that it aims toward and signifies outside
of itself. But the term toward which it aims is recognized only blindly by
means of the familiarity of my body with it. It is not constituted in full
clarity but reconstituted or reapprehended by a knowledge which remains
latent and which leaves to the sensation its opacity and its ecceity. (PP,
247)
This "familiarity" is a familiarity which derives from a "pre-
liminary constitution," (PP, 249) in the sense that objects,
the world, are lived by my body as "toujours-deja-Ia." This
latent knowledge of the world forms the ground for all personal
l This is absurd, in the Hussetlian sense of intentionality: sensations (hyletic data)
are not themselves intentive, but non-intentive; they do not intend anything.
Merleau-Ponty, however, conceiving operative intentionality as corporeal intention-
ality, must maintain this. We return to this at a later point.
MERLEAU-PON'FY
existence. In so far as my body is itself thus a knowledge of the
world, it is "at home" in it and "familiar" withit.
Similarly, to belong to the world is to inhabit it, to dwell
therein. It is only because I inhabit it, moreover, and thereby
"let the world be" as a Boden, ground, that it becomes possible
to trace out movements, directions, and locations in it. (Cf. PP,
49r) Again, Merleau-Ponty writes that when I perceive the blue
of the sky, my regard "goes over to it and inhabits it (as) a milieu
of a certain vital vibration whichmy body adopts .... " (PP, 248)
In these terms, it becomes clear why he adopts the position
he does regarding the phenomenological reduction:
To see the world and to seize it as a paradox, it is necessary to break our
familiarity with it, and ... this ru.pture can teach us nothing but the
unmotivated surging-fo.rth of the world. The greatest lesson of the re-
duction is the impossibility of a complete reduction. 1 (PP, viii)
The reduction, as he sees it, seeks to make possible a reflection
on consciousness and the world, a reflective withdrawal from the
engagement and commitment to the world. Since I exist only as
incarnee, however, this withdrawal is not completely possible. All
it teaches us is the "unmotivated surging-forth of the world," i.e.,
our root "being-at-home-in," or "being-familiar-with," the
world. To belong-to-the-world is to inhabit it as a being who is
already familiar with it, its typical course and style, because he
is embodied in a body which is "at home" therein.
3. ACCORDINGLY, to be a conscience-engagee is to "be-at" the
world, "it is to communicate inwardly with the world, the body
and other embodied selves - to be with them rather than to be
beside them .... " (PP, n3) To perceive the world as that which
I have and in which I dwell, is to commune with it. My body-
proper, as the "sujet de la sensation et perception," he maintains,
is neither a thinker who notices a quality, nor an inert milieu which
would be affected or modified by the quality. My body is a potency which
co-originates (co-nat) with a certain milieu of existence, or is synchronized
with it. (PP, 245)
In this sense, Marcel -was on the right track when he wrote in
his journals that sensation is a sort of "participation," that "my
body is in sympathy with things," and that "things exist for me ...
1
We can now see in what his transformation of the reduction consists: it is inter-
preted by way of bis ontology of etre-au-monde. Cf. above, pp. qo-43.
THEORY OF THE BODY
r 85
as prolongations of my body."
1
For Merleau-Ponty, too,
"sensation is literally a communion." (PP, 246) The body as the
mode of my being-to-the-world participates in things by means of
its various senses. In this way, to belong to the world is to have
the world as a "real implication," such that the body-proper as
the "subject of perception" synchronizes and co-originates with
things:
If qualities [of objects] radiate around themselves a certain mode of
existence ... it is because the sensing subject does not posit them as
objects but sympathizes with them, makes them his own and finds in
them his momentary law. (PP, 247)
The world as the primordial unity and "point d'appui" of all our
projects and perceptions is the "home'' of consciousness:
The world such as we have tried to show it ... is no longer the visible
unfolding of a constituting Thought, nor is it a fortuitous assemblage of
parts; nor, correctly understood, is it the operation of a directive Thought
on an indifferent matter, but rather the native land of all rationality.
(PP, 492)
Thus, etre--au--monde signifies "to belong to the world" in the
multiple sense that the body-proper, being of the same com-
munity of nature as the world, inhabits the world, is "with"
things and not alongside them, is familiar with them, and
communes or sympathizes with them in the various modes of
perception. It is with them because they are poles of action for it,
i.e., significations: "What is sensed gives to me what I have
loaned to it, it is from it that I have taken what I loan." (PP,
248) The world is my "home" just because I am embodied in a
body by means of which I dwell therein.
(b) The Body as "Being-To" the World
Not only does the body "belong-to" the world; it also "is to-the-
world." Here again, we can delineate several strata.
r. THE BODY-PROPER, he has said, is presented as a certain
power (puissance) of this world. In other words, the system of
objects in the world is oriented as a system or context for the
body (as the center of this orientation as both Sartre and Husserl
have said), in terms of the body's actual and possible action on
1
Metaphysical journal, op. cit., pp. 258, 274, and a8L Merleau-Ponty, however,
again does not refer to Marcel.
186 MERLEA U-PONTY
these things: things are "poles of action," he states, "at my
disposition," and the body is itself "polarized" by its tasks. To
see a table with a chair beside it is to have these objects at the
disposal of my regard (PP, 250-51), i.e., to see them as "able
to be used," "able to be moved about," or even more simply,
"able to be looked at," as Piaget has observed in respect of
small children. Thus, Merleau-Ponty contends,
It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body -
and this is not mysterious si:nce it is our body (considered as a potency of
such and such regions of the world) which already raises itseli towards
objects to be apprehended and which perceives them .... l (PP, 123)
Consciousness, as embodied, is thus originarily of the order of
the " I can," and not of the "I think":
Consciousness is not originarily an "I th.ink that," but an "I can" . ...
(PP, 160)
Being a system of motor or perceptual pot encies, our body is not an
object for an "I think": it is an ensemble of lived significations. . . . (PP,
179)
Thus, to be-to-the-world by means of the body-proper is to be
embodied as an " I can;" and this is so because the body-proper is
itself "un puissance d' un certain monde." The "fe peux" is
essentially connected to the world by means of the "il peut"
which is the body's "puissance." Tu its intimate connectedness
with the world (PP, 168) then, the body-proper forms "a system
open onto the world,' and is thus the correlate of this world -
but a correlate which is defined strictly in terms of acting -
acted-on - such that,
The movements of the body-proper are naturally invested with a certain
perceptual signification, they form with external phenomena a system so
well connected that external perception "takes aocount" of the dis-
placement of the perceptual organs .... (PP, 59)
Etre-au-monde is therefore a unity of consciousness as embo-
.died and the milieu within which, or better, "at" which, it acts
and is acted upon.2 This unity he calls "existence." (PP, 144)
1
He continues: "In concrete movement, the patie.nt has neither a thetic conscious-
ness of the stimulus, nor a thetic consciousness of the reaction; simply, he is his body
and his body is the potency of a certain world." (PP, 124)
In spite of this posi tion, however, be goes right on.to claim that just this "familiarity"
and "communion'' with things is what has become severed in brain-injuries. (PP, 153)
This seems to be quite inconsistent; for what, after all, is so-called "concrete move-
)
THEORY OF THE BODY
2
. Bur while conscience--incarnee is this system open onto the
world, that by means of which there is a world at all for con-
sciousness, its body-proper is not just a single entity. Or, rather,
we must say that the body-proper, being itself a unity in diversity,
reveals the world as a unity in diversity, reveals the world in
respect of the dimensions which correspond to the variousmanners
in which the body-proper manifests itself: vision discloses
visual beings, touch tactual beings, and so on. Not only this,
however: for, the phenomenon of synesthesis reveals the body as a
synergetic system. As Merleau-Ponty points out , by virtue of the
fact that each sensory field opens out onto an intersensory
world (PP, 261, 279). they "commune" with one another as they
do with objects:
The senses lead over int o one another by opening themselves up to the
structure of the thing. One sees the rigidity and fragility of the gla.sS and
when it is broken with a crystal sound, this sound is carried by the visible
glass ... The form of objects is not their geometrical contour: it has a
certain relation with their own nature and speaks to all of our senses at
the same time as to sight. . . . In the swaying of a branch from which a
bird has just flown, one reads its flexibility or its elasticity, and it is in
this way that a branch of an apple tree and one of a birch tree are immedi-
ately distinguished.
1
(PP, 265)
The senses are thus modes of access to one and the same world,
and the body-proper, as the synergetic unity of these senses, is a
being-to-the-world disclosed by; its diverse modes of access.
2
"To
be a body is to be connected to a certain world ... , " (PP, IJ3) and
to be connected in multiple ways at the level of the " je peux."
3
Accordingly, it is necessary to recast our usual conception of the
fundamental stratum of the body. It is not the case, Merleau-
Ponty argues against Husserl, that sense-contents are construed
(aufgefasst) as adumbrations of objects. This notion (Auftassung,
and correlatively that of A uff assungsinhalt), he argues,
ment" except this fundamental familiarity with actual milieux?
e De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 132. Before t his, de Waelhens points out that "being
to-the-world is above all a t aking of an attitude which, measured at the level oC
theoretical consciousness, remains h.eavy witb ambiguities. It is clear as well that
being-to-the-world in its effective and spontaneous course implies a 'usage' of the
body .... " (Ib1d., p. 125)
1 CL also de Waclhens, <>f>. cit., p. 177.
2 Cf. de Waelhens, op. ciJ.; and PP, r so, and r61: "Consciousness is a being-at-the-
thing by the intermediary of the body."
a De Waelhens, p. 139.
r88 MERLEA U-PONTY
masks the organic relation of the subject and of his world, the active
transcendence of consciousness, 1 the movement by means of which it
thrusts itself into a thing and a world by =eans of its organs and its
instruments. (PP, 178)
What we must apprehend is the body-proper as it is cencretely
and actually lived by consciousness in its on-going bodily gearing
into the world. To be embodied, as Marcel has emphasized,2 is in
some sense to exteriorize oneself, or, as Merleau-Ponty put it,
being present to myself is at the same time a "de-presentation" of
oneself. (PP, 4I7) Accordingly, it is necessary to conceive the
body-proper, conscience-engagee, as an etre-au-motide: conscious-
ness, as embodied, is at the world, and its organs and members
serve as "moyens d'access" to that world:
It is necessary for us to conceive [perceptual] perspectives and the
point of view (of the body-proper] as our insertion in the individual
world, s and perception, no longer as a constitution of the true object, but
as our inherence to things. (PP, 403}
3. To 'BE-To' THINGS, thus, is se ramasser toward them, to
exist toward them in a manner which precedes essentially all
thematization, categorization, and predication. This, we saw, is
true even at the level of reflex activity; indeed, it is precisely
this "pre-ob-jective view which is what we call being-to-the-world
.. . . "(PP, 94)
This "vue preobjective," Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, is a kind
of "opening to the world," (PP, 136) by means of which I
participate in it, commune with things among which I dwell Not
only, then, am I, qua embodied, with things, but also they com-
mune with me, are with me - for they are precisely at once inex-
hatlstible, having their own proper ecceity, and they are signifi-
cations for me endowed by means of my embodied activity on and
with them. Just this stratum, he believes, forms the matrix for
both realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism; and,
concretely, for the physical and the psychical domains - and
thus it is the solution to the Cartesian problem of the unity of
1
He later says (PP, 478) that this relation is that whieh Heidegger describes as
"transcendence."
Ct. Metaphysical ]oumal, op. cit., 258-60, and above, Part I, Chapter II, pp. 38-
41, and 43.
3
Bow the world can be at one and the same time an individual and yet a milieu of
anonymity and generality for my perceptual experience of it is a problem 1.ferleau-
Ponty does not even pose.
THEORY OF THE BODY 189
the body and the soul. Being-to-the-world is a kind of "aire
vitale," which is the domain of lived experience. The unity of
body and soul is not a problem of bringing together two utterly
different domains of being; rather, the unity is concretely and
constantly lived. In other words,
The analysis of the body-proper and perception has disclosed to us a
relation to the object, a signification more profou,nd than the former (Le.,
synthesis) ...
I do not actually perform the synthesis on the object, I come before it
with my sense>ry fields, my perceptual field, and finally with a typical style of
all possible being, a universal montage with respect to the world. At the hearl
e>f the S'l'bject himself we disCQVer, therefore, the presenu of the world ... We
find again under the active or thetic intentionality, and as its condition
of possibility, an operative intentie>nality, already at work before every
thesis or every judgment, a "Logos of the esthetic world," an "art hidden
in the depths of the human soul" - and which, like all art, can be known
only in its results. (PP, 490-41, my emphasis)
To be-to-the-world is to be plunged to things by means of an
"intentionnalite operante ;" to be open to things as the dwelling-
places of all perception and action, and ultimately of all ration-
ality; to be participant in the typical coarse and style of the
world by inhabiting the world as one familiar with its ways and
by-ways; to be with things as poles of action polarizing conscious-
ness as their embodied correlate - to be an existent at the world:
Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing can solicit
my attention but to the contrary because I am straight away outside of
me and open to the world ... from the single i:a.ct that we are to-the-world.
(PP, 520)
(c) The Body as Temporalit6-engagee.
We have seen that, for Metleau-Ponty, the unification of the
body-proper is a temporal one; temporality is fundamental both
for consciousness and for the body. We can now see more clearly
why this is so. Obviously, though, a full exposition of his theory
of temporality is impossible here. We must, nevertheless, make it
clear what he means when he writes, "My body takes possession
of time." (PP, 277)
Following Husserl's explication of inner time consciousness,
1
Merleau-Ponty maintains that it is in my "field of presence" that
I have the originary contact with time. This "field," however, is
1 As we sballsee later, this must be qualified.
Igo MERLE A U-PONTY
meant in a broad sense: it is in the present that the past is re-
tained and the future predelineated; thus the "field of presence
in the broad sense" bas a double horizon (is, as William James
had said, a "saddle-back") and it is only within this field, and in
terms of it, that there is a consciousness of what is to come and
what has passed (more specifically, what is just-to-come, and
what is just-past but still remains within my grasp). I Accordingly,
Merleau-Ponty states,
Everything returns me therefore to the field of presence as to the
originary experie.nce wherein time and its dimensions appear "in person,"
without any interposed distance and with a final evidence. It is there that
we see a future sliding into the present and then to the past. (PP, 475-76)
Now, this flux of lived temporality, he emphasizes, is the time
in which my tasks are carried out, in which perception oecurs.
But in so far as we consider the present in a narrower sense, as
what is at any moment strictly "now," it is not the case that my
actions and their objects are explicitly posited as "present" 2 in a
series of "nows." Accordingly, the present which manifests itself
in my concrete actions, or rather, my actions which manifest
themselves as "present" reveal an intentionality all their own,
one which goes on beneath all active, thetic intendings (as
Merleau-Ponty understands this, ie., as "I-activities"):
Beneath the "active intentionality" which is the thetic consciousness
of an object ... it is necessary for us to recognize an "operative" in-
tentionality (/ungierende Int811tio11alitiit) which makes the former possible
and which is what Heidegger calls transcendence. My present moves
beyond itself towards a future and a recent past, and touches them there
where they are - in the past, in the future, themselves. (PP, .178)
It is in my "field of presence" then that all my actions take
place; that is to say, however, that since my body-proper is that
by means of which there is a world for me, it is that by means of
which the world is "present" to me. Since consciousness is
always engaged, and since this engagement is the body-proper,
There is time for me only because I am situated therein; that is to say,
because I discover myself as already engaged in it; because not all being is
given to me in person; and finally, beca11se only a sector of being is so
1
Merleau-Ponty refers here to the "noch-im-Griff-behalten" of Husserl: Erfahrung
und Urteil, 23a and 23b.
9
"The present itseli (in the narrow sense) is not posited. . . I reckon with the
surroundings rather than perceive objects; I depend on my instruments, I am k> my
task rather than before it." (PP, 476)
THEORY OF THE BODY IgI
close to me that it does not even form a picture before me and I cannot
see it, as I cannot see my face. There is time for me because I have a
present ... None of the dimensions of time can be deduced from the
others. But the present (in the broad sense . .. ) has, nevertheless, a
privileged status because it is the zone where being and consciousness
coincide. (PP, 484-85)
Thus, we can say, to be-to-the-world is to be present to the
world, or to be a presence to the world. My presence to the world
or to be a presence to the world. My presence to the world is
effectuated by my body-proper; hence, the latter itself reveals its
own temporality, which is precisely the flux of its own "inten-
tionnalite operante." Every perception, every movement,
every action, "takes account of" the flux of its own intentionality
its own temporality; it is in virtue of syntheses of transition that
movements and actions are "fluid." 1 In this way, the "ek-stases"
of temporality, the projecting by consciousness into its own past
and future, are concretely realized in a "certain existential
rhythm - abduction and adduction," {PP, 247) which defines
the structure and movement of perception and action. To
perceive an object is to engage oneself in it (se plonger en lui) by
means of his body-proper in a movement which, being an
operative intentionality, goes on in a "champ de presence."
But if the body-proper thus has its own temporality it is
necessary to recognize that its fundamental mode of being is that
of an "acquis":
What is alone true is that our open and personal existence rests on a
primary basis of acquired and congealed existence. But it o ~ d not be
otherwise if we are temporality, since the dialectic of the acqUU"ed and of
the future is constitutive of time. (PP, 493-94)
When "I" become aware of myself and of my world, I find just
this "existence acquise et figee": my body and my world are
given to me as " toujours-deja-la" for me, going on before I took
cognizance of them or actively attended to them.
To be-to-the-world (or: to belong-to-the-world), then, reveals
1 "Ateacbinstantof a movement, the preceding instant is not ignored but it s ~ it
were joined in the present, and present perception consists in sum in reapprehending
(by depending on the actual position) the series of previous positions which mutually
enclose one another. But the immanent position is also enclosed in the present, and
by means of it those which will come up to the end of the movement." (PP, 164) As
we have already had occasion to remark, Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of.movement
(and especially this one) are quite close to Bergson's descriptions ot "graceful"
movements.
192 MERLEAU-PONTY
itself as the absolutely fundamental stratum of consciousness;
and, since consciousness is by essence engagee, an ttre-au-nionde is
its etre-corps.
(3) THE BODY-PROPER AS 'EXPRESSION''
We can now see quite clearly, I believe, in what sense Merleau-
Ponty means that the body-proper is the "expression" of the
existence of consciousness (and thus we can be much briefer in
our exposition).
(a) The Body as Sexual Beitig
Taking now as our clue the results we have achieved in our
previous explication, we can say that, like all other structures
and functions of the body-proper (perceiving, moving, acting,
using, and so on), sexuality is itself a mode of being of the person
in question:
If the sexual history of a man provides the key to his life, this is because
his manner of being as regards the world -that is to say, as regards time
and other men- is projected into his sexuality. (PP, 185)
But the matter is not quite so simple; for, he asks, does all exis-
tence have a sexual signification, or does every sexual phenome-
non have an existential signification? A straightforward answer
to either question cannot be given, for we cannot reduce one to
the other.
For one thing, Merleau-Ponty points out, we cannot ignore
biological structure; human existence as thus far described is
never indifferent to the rhythms of biological existence. The
body's "need" for ingestion, respiration, sleep, and the like; the
periodical changes and transformations in body-structure, which
require one to maintain his body (having haircuts, wearing
glasses, using crutches, washing and grooming, and the like) -
and similar necessities, all have their bearing on the structures
and functions of human existence. Similarly, sexuality is inte-
grated in concreto with the stream of lived experiences. As Buy-
tendijk has emphasized, "it is especially important to realize
that man is in this world with his body and that the body itself is
a situation . . .. " 1 And, he continues, the body discloses itself as
1
F. J. ]. Buytendijk, "Femininity and E'.'Cistential Psychology," Perspectives in
Pemmality (edited by David and von Bracken), New York (1957), p. 200.
T HEORY OF THE BODY 193
meaningful in its attitudes, gestures, and actions, all of which
are inseparably connected to and made possible by the biological
structure of the body. Thus, Buytendijk believes, one can, by
studying these 'bodily attitudes and postures, come to an under-
standing of the distinctively "feminine" and "masculine"
Umwelten.
1
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty insists that
Sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the passage-ways, the
instruments or manifestations of personal existence: the latter takes and
gathers them into itself in their given and anonymous existence. (PP, 186)
To be, for consciousness, as we have seen, is to be embodied.But
to be embodied is to be embodied with a certain sex, and the
sexuality of the body-proper manifests itself in a variety of
manners. It is, we must say, one mode in which consciousness
"lives" or "exists" itself concretely. Thus, in some manner at
least, sexuality "expresses" one's existence, and one's existence
"expresses" his sexuality.
The crucial problem is thus the manner in which the body-
proper "expresses" existence. Therelation between "expression"
and "what is expressed," Merleau-Ponty argues, is not like that
of shoulder-braid to military rank, or that of a house-number to
the house. As regards the body-proper, the thing signified is not
merely indicated by a sign. In the above examples, he the
sign points to something else which is, though signified, not itself
presented, but only appresented: the house is not itself "in" the
sign, but only indicated by it. Whereas in the case of the body-
proper's signifying existence, not only does the "sign" indicate
its "signification,"
it is inhabited by its signification; in a certain manner the is
what is signified, like a portrait is the quasi-presence of the absent Pierre
.... (PP, 188)
But, he goes on, we must say even more: not only is the
signification embodied in the sign, but
ii the body can symbolize existence this is because the body actualizes
(realiser) it and is the actuality (aclualite) of it. (PP, 191-92)
The body-proper, that is to say, is the possibility for my existence
t Tliid., pp. 204-08; cf. also Buytendt]x's work, L!Uituda eJ Mouomenls, op. cil.
r94
MERLEAU-PONTY
to relax, become passive and anonymous (as when, for example, I
pause during a busy day and close my eyes, "withdrawing," so to
speak, from my engagement in the world) ; at the same time, it is
the possibility for me to "eA'Pand" into life, become immersed in
various activities.
The body-proper expresses my existence, then, like speech
expresses thought, (PP, r93) but in an originary way:
Prior to the conventional means oi expression - which manifest
my thought to others only because significations for each sign are already
given to both them and we, and which in this sense do not realize a
genuine communication - it is necessary indeed ... to recognize a pri-
mordial operation of signification in which the expressed does not exist
apart from the expression, and in which signs themselves lead outside of
their meanings. (PP, 193)
Hence, my bo<;ly is not something external to my existence, but
is the concrete actualization of it; it is, then, both the "expression
and the "expressed."
But existence, on this view, presupposes the body-proper,
just as the body-proper presupposes existence. Similarly, sexua-
lity cannot be reduced to existence, nor can existence be reduced
to sexuality. This fundamental ambiguity can be illustrated in
concrete cases. In the phenomena of masochism and sadism, for
example,1 or of the dialectics of master and slave, the effort
by the masochist is to be made an object before the eyes of the
other, but also in bis own eyes; with the sadist, it is to make the
other into an object, to attempt to appropriate his subjectivity
and thus to master him in.his own eyes, that is, to be recognized
by him as his master. Both, however, meet an impasse: for, as
regards the sadist, by making the other into an object (to be
controlled and manipulated at will), but who must nevertheless
be a genuine subject (if the master is to gain the recognition he
seeks), he will have missed precisely what he set out to gain - the
moment the other is enslaved he ceases to be capable of giving
the master the recognition sought for, the slave becomes one
whose judgment (being a "mere slave") is unworthy. In short, the
slave is no longer a free self-consciousness and it is precisely as
free that he could have given the recognition.
The case is precisely analogous, Merleau-Ponty contends,
1 Our e.xpositlon of this, like Merleau-Ponty's own analysis, does not purport to be
thorough.
THEORY OF THE BODY
as regards sexual desire. What one seeks to possess in sexual
desire is not a mere body, but an animate organism, an embodied
person. Love, desire, and the like, are understandable, he argues,
only if one grasps the "metaphysical" structure of the body-
proper: that it is "at once an object for others and a subject for
me." (PP. r95) This peculiarity, he contends, exists at the level
of lived experience and is the concrete manifestation of the essen-
tial structure of all existence as such: ambigiiity. That body over
there is at once a woman herself and not herself; her sex at once
presents me with her, and she as embodied presents me with her
sex.
To treat sexuality as a dialectic of lived experience, as "the
tension of one existence toward another existence who denies
the first yet without which it cannot maintain itself,"* (PP, r95)
is to recognize that it is by essence equivocal, ambiguous. That is,
it
hides itself from itself under a mask of generality, it attempts ceaselessly
to escape from the tension and drama which it institutes ... It is constant-
ly present as an atmosphere. . . Sexuality is diffused in images which
retain only certain typical relations from it, only a certain effective
physiognomy ... Considered as such, that is, as an ambiguous atmosphere,
sexuality is coextensive with life. In other words, the equivocal is essential
to human existence, and everything which we live or think always has
several meanings. (PP, 196-<)7)
Existence, being thus indeterminate in itself, at once manifests
(expresses) itself in the body-proper as sexuality, and is mani-
fested (expressed) by the sexuality of the body. Only because of
this is it then possible for instance for my friend to be able to
"tell" how I feel by looking at my gestures, postures, facial
expressions, listening to the "sound" of my voice, and so on.
My boredom is the weary aspect of my mouth and eyes; my
arms are exasperated; my flushed face is my shame- but the "is"
here is not the "is" of identity. Rather, my gest,wres embody my
anger like I myself am embodied by my body-proper. Similarly, my
male body is my sexuality, in the sense that it embodies my
sexuality, like my body embodies, or is the actualization of, my
existence. This constant "tension" between my body's being my
embodiment and its being that object which manifests me to
others, is. then, essential to my existence as man: to be hnman
is fundamentally to be locked in an irrevocable ambiguity which
r96 MERLE A U-PONTY
has its source in the root facticity of embodiment, that is, the
body-proper. I
(b) The Body as "Expression"
As Scheler has shown, I do not experience another's anger
or joy, boredom or sadness, as a "psychic state" hidden behind
the gestures of these, which would be only the external accompa'-
niments of these states and accidental to them: "It is in the
blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy." 2 There is no
"inferring" (in the strict sense) by me from something presented
(crinkled lines on an object in my visual field) to something not
presented (joy of my friend); rather, the other himself is there for
me, his body is already an animate organism, embodying his
psychical life. As Buytendijk has pointed out, approving von.
Weizsacker's assertion that "Life appears wherever something
moves itself, therefore through intuited subjectivity (angeschaute
Subfektivitiit)," a
It is important to note that subjectivity is "perceived." The idea
commonly spread around of a subjectivity "supposed" by the analogy
between the movement of another man or of the animal, and our own
iS perfectly false. We do not only have the power of
reco&111Z1llg a function, but beyond that we can apprehend it as a
ment proper possessing a signification (as an animal or human function)'.
By that, we perceive man and animals as "subjects" or as centers of
knowledge and tendencies. 4
Unless others were already other men for my concrete experience,
they would be simply physical objects, though p.erchance of a
peculiar sort, and there would be no intrinsic difference between
men and puppets, animals and mere things.
The fact is, Merleau-Ponty argues (in agreement with Scheler
and Buytendijk), that the movements of the other's body are
themselves seen by me in the first instance as gestures - which is
1
"Why is our body for us the mirror of our existence, If not because it is a natural I
a. given existential current, sucb that we never know whether tJ1e forces which
bear belong to it or to us - or rather, because they are never entirely the body's nor
ours." {PP, 199)
2
MaxScheler, The Nature of Sympathy, Yale University Press (New Haven, 1954),
p. IO.
s V. von Weizsacker, Der Gestaltkreis: ThuirU einn- Einheit von Walmsehmen und
Bewq,en, Leipzig, 1943, p. 167. (Quoted by Bnytendijk, AUitude$ tt Mouvmsent, Of>.
eit., p. 59) .
. ' Bnytendijk, AUitutks et Mouve111ent, ofJ. p. 59. Buytendijk, it is clear, flatly
r ejects Sartre's position that I do not apprehend the Other as "subject."
THEORY OF THE BODY
I97
to say, as meaningful, embodying significations of a determinate
sort (though perhaps the specific meaning a gesture has may be
difficult to grasp, or even impossible, or though he may deceive
me, it is nevertheless experienced by me as endowed with meaning
of some kind- else it could be neither "deceitful'' nor "difficult'').
(Cf. PP, 220-2r) We experience body postures and movements as
meaningful, for otherwise neither differences in specific meaning
nor deceit in meaning could be possible:
The meanings of gestures is not given but understood, that is to say,
apprehended by an act of the observer ... O:>mmunication or the compre-
hension of gestures is obtained by means of the reciprocity of my inten-
tions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and the intentions which
can be read in the Other's conduct. Everything happens as if the Other's
intention inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body.
The gesture which I witness delineates in outline an intentional object.
This object becomes actual, and it is fully understood when the powers of
my body adjust themselves to it and regrasp it. (PP, 215-16)
In this way, my body-proper functions as a sort of implicit
knowledge of the world, as we saw, and the gesture of the other
is presented as a sort of question, an "invitation," to my body.
Thus, once again, we discover the fundamental structure of
etre-au-monde: I am brought face-to-face with my world, with
others as themselves embodied, by means of my body. They are
already there for me as significations which, as such, refer me
back to my body as a synergetic system of "intentionnalite
operante."
It is by means of my body that I comprehend the Other, as it is by
means of my body that I perceive "things." The meaning of a gesture
thus "understood" is not "hidden behind" it, but is fused in with the
structure of the world which the gesture delineates and which 1 reappre-
hend for my part; this meaning is spread out over the gesture itself ...
(PP, 216--17)
Thus, Merleau-Ponty concludes, with the appearance of man
in nature, nature is forthwith transformed; it never-recovers
from tbis decisive shock, man's incessant and essential activity of
giving meaning to the world:
The problem of the world - and, beginning with that concerning the
body-proper - consists in the factthat everything dwells therein.
CHAPTER III
CRITICAL REMARKS
With a theory as complex and intricate as Merleau-Ponty's, one
has the feeling that any critical remarks he might venture will
appear either too sweeping, or too trivial to matter much one
way or the other. We have attempted thus far to brave one
torrent - explicating the theory itself - only to encounter an-
other, more difficult one.
For in reconsidering the course of our exposition, it seems
more and more evident that Merleau-Ponty's intent is not, as
one would believe both from the title of his major work and the
preface to it, to develop a phenomenology of the body and
perception, but rather an ontology of expbience-vic11,e, the funda-
mental concept of which is etre-aUr-monde. The analysis of the
body is central to this effort, and is in itself a remarkable
achievement.
In spite of this accomplishment, however, I for my part
rerlliun unconvinced by liiS study, not only in its details, but as
re ard.S its eneratiVe conception, the grounds of his theory.
Despite the abundant an g y m eres g ma ena.l which he
marshals in support of and supplemation to the central thesis -
that the theoretical study of perception and of the body can be
conducted while yet remaining within expirience-vecue - this
thesis, and the manner in which it is worked out in concepts
which are not themselves made thematic and justified, is not
without its serious difficulties. My critical remarks, therefore,
will concern, not the specific details of his theory {though we
shall have to reconsider some of these), but the basic conception
itself. We must attempt to reconsider certain principal features
of this theory over against the phenomena it purports to render
intelligible. These criticisms fall into several clusters: the problems
of methodology, those pertaining to the phenomenological themes
CRITICAL REMARKS r99
of the theory, and those relevant to his "existentialism." As
regards the latter, we must attempt to state in a concise and
faithful manner the positive direction and significance of his
work. The first two points are mainly negative in their import.
fJ1) METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ::\
I have made it a point in the introductory sections of this Part
to bring out a certain confusion regarding the apprehension
of the domain of lived experience, and have stated that this
confusion leads to a confusion in the doctrinal content of his
theory. It is now necessary to substantiate this claim further.
Merleau-Ponty claims there is a mode of analysis which cuts
beneath the traditional stalemate between ob]ectivistic em-
piricism and intellectualistic idealism.I This "new" mode of
analysis, "existential analysis," has as its paramount task the
apprehension and descriptive explication of lived experience
from withi11. (the body-as-lived, perception-as-lived, lived-spatial-
ity, lived-temporality, and so on). Thus it seeks to develop, at
the level of theoretical thoi,ght (theoria; for, after all, a philosophi-
cal work is a product of cognition) what is lived concretely at the
practical-acting-existing level (that of praxis). Philosophy, for
him, is experience transmuted in thought, as it is for Marcel
as well as for Hegel.
We must however examine the unstated steps of his method-
ology. Merleau-Ponty insists, on the one hand, that just because
we actually "live" our bodies and our perception of other persons,
perceived objects, and the like, it must be possible to apprehend
these and state them explicitly. It must be possible for reflection
to p what is not itself reflective but o y s
lived - the irre ec ii. ut he con en as well thatitis one thing
to live (e.g., to live oni?s perception of a chair). and quite a differ-
ent thing to question oneself about this chair-perceiving. The
latter however, he contends, breaks up, "pulverizes," the
"natural unity" of the first; when I reflectively question myself
about my lived experience, I invariably ignore its intrinsic unity.
1 Merleao- Ponty rarely discusses any specific philosophers in detail; by the first,
though, he usually means British Empiricism, and especially tqe psychology founded
on it and natural science; the second usually refers to Kant, and to certain aspects of
Husserl. His interpretation in the latter cases are highly questionable.
200 MERLEAU-PONTY
(PP, 261-62, e.g.) As a consequence of my reflecting, I can talk
about "sensation," "sense qualities," "syntheses," and so on,
but these are never lived by my perception - they are rather
strictly "products of analysis." (PP, 275, and passim.)
In the face of this situation, the inevitable question arises: How
can one apprehend that which must be able to be apprehended,
but yet not by reflection? Merleau-Ponty would never maintain
that straightforward sense perception is capable of apprehending
lived experience from within. Is there perhaps another kind of
reflection, as Marcel had believed ? The way in which Merleau-
Ponty describes the task of "existential" analysis, one would be
inclined to respond to the last question in the affirmative -
and this inclination seems to be supported by his partial accep-
tance of the phenomenological reducti9n. We found, however,
that even though he contends that an at least incomplete re-
duction is possible, his real contention is that the apprehension
of is not only made possible by lived experience,
but is to be condttcted by means of lived experience.
His central point regarding the reduction is that all it can
teach us is the "unmotivated surging-forth of the world," that
"the world is there before all analysis I can make of it, " and there-
fore that every effort to "derive it from a series of syntheses" 1
is doomed to miss the very phenomenon in question (since all
that is acquired by such an analysis, he claims, are the conditions
for the poSSl'bility of experience, but not experience itself). Let
us reconsider briefly this "reduction."
In performing the phenomenologica1 reduction (we may ignore
here the otherwise important distinction between psychological
and transcendental-phenomenological reductions), the phenome-
nologist attempts to make thematic the natural doxo-thetic
positing and acceptance of the world and its objects (things,
other men, institutions, oneself, and so on) by consciousness as
actually existent, spatio-temporally independent and self-sub-
sistent. He draws back, so to speak, from this engagement, or
in Husserl's phrase, the "General Thesis ot the Natural Attitude"
intrinsic to naturally living consciousness as regards its objects
and itself as also actually existent in a real, common world -
l Merleau-Ponty insists without any demonstration that both Kant and Husserl
indulge in this effort.
CRITICAL REMARKS 201
and with this "refraining" (epoche}, or neutralization, be attempts
to explicate the multiple Erlebnisse going on in that conscious-
ness as intentive processes having their own specific objects as
correlates in the strict sense. The reflective attitude thus es- ,... _ J _,
tablished is "radi " however and thus distinct from "merel (
nafural" reflection, just it no longer participates in the
doxo-thetic positing and acceptance of the real world by the
consciousness on which he now reflects. It is "ra.Q!__cal," because
the phenomenologist seeks to make thematic what is essentially
taken for granted by the natural attitude. It is "radical" because,
making this "general thesis" itself thematic, he now can consid'e;
the subjectively lived processes of consciousness (Bewusstseins-
erlebnisse) strictly as they present themselves "in person" to
reflection, as processes essentially intentive to objects of various
sorts. It is "r;gdical," finally, it takes these intended
objects strictly as intended, intended or "meant" precisely through
the processes intt:nding them straightforwardly-not as they would
offer themselves to some reflective analysis. The "objects,"
that is, are the objects of the processes being reflected on, and
not the objects of the reflective consciousness.
There is thus opened an essentially two-sided descriptive
analysis: a descriptive explication of strictly as
lJ&eant jintended) 1Yy consciousness (as unities of sense for the
consciousness intending them), and a description of the
intentive processes themselves strictly as intentive to the objects
of these processes. In every single process, moreover, there is
horizonally predelineated a total background or context of all
objects: the world itself, as a spatio-temporal endlessness within
which these processes themselves go on as intentive to objects
in the world. Thus, Husserl points out,
when the phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is
left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness,
and as its correlate, on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as
meant.1
This entire procedure, it must be emphasized, has disclosed
objects, and the world as such, purely as meant by the conscious-
ness of them. Qua meant, qua sense unities for consciousness,
these objects (and the world) can be investigated as they are for
1 Cartuia11 MeditaU<ms, op. cit., p. 37. 11
II
11

202 MERLEA U-PONTY
the consciousness which means (intends) them; that is to say,
they are revealed as strict correlates of the consciousnesses of
them. As such (as intended), they have as their essential character-
istic a referral back (zuruckweisen) to the consciousness of them.1
Now, the phenomenologist does not adopt merely a single
method, but rather he makes use of a whole battery of methods.
In the _Erst place, his fundamental method is an original intu-
ition, or equivalently, an original perceiving (in the broad sense).
of mental life as itself presented simultaneously with the grasping
thereof - that is, as "it-itself presented in person." Seeking to
develop a fundamental logos of the phenome1ton, a science in the
genuine sense, he must seek to bring to self-presentedness the
affairs about which he phenomenologizes. R<!-ther than accept
second-hand evidence for the affairs in question, that is, he seeks
to "go and see for himself" - he seeks, that is to say, an original
intuiting of the affairs.
his method is explicative: it is an original intuitive
explicating or unfolding of mental life in respect of its structures.
In this sense he seeks to draw out or make explicit what is taken
for granted by consciousness in its natural attitude.
method is descri!tive. Exclusively on the basis of
tne first and second methods, he seeks to make descriptive
judgments about mental life itself, its evident structures, and
interrelations. His first task, thus, is to describe mental life, to
explicate its structures, and this can be done only on the basis of
an original intuiting, an original self-presentedness, of mental
life as it-itself.
E2.J!rth, however, this means that his method must be re-
flective, or a reflective perceiving; for, the mode of givenness
(Gegebenheitsweise) peculiar to mental phenomena is reflective
givenness. It must be so, if the method is to be an absolutely
original perceiving rather than an apperceiving of mental life.
Finally, the phenomenologist's -method is red1tetive, in a
psychologico-phenomenological or transcendental sense, and on
this basis the method becomes an original noetic and noematic
reflective explication and description - that is, a descriptive
explication of mental life in respect of its intentiveness to objects
1
Formale 1md transrende11tak Logi k, op. cit., pp. 187, 22r-22; M editaJ.ions
pp. 46-sS; Idun, I, p. 94.
CRITI CAL REMARKS '203
and in respect of the really intrinsic parts, qualities, structures,
and interrelations of mental life itself.
This by no means exhausts the battery of phenomenological
methods (for instance, we have not even mentioned constitutional
analysis and regressive inquiry) . It will permit us, however, t o
evaluate Merleau-Ponty's statement of the reduction and the
task of reflection.
Doing this, it becomes evident, on the_one 1;iand, that
fact gives thetneocy of reductions, and on the other, that a
serioiiS in his work results. First for him, the world
"iS"filWays-already-there," before all analysis; analysis can only,
therefore, render this explicit. However, he at no time recognizes
in this regard that if the world is indeed "tout fait," the world
is meant as " tout fait ." This does not mean that consciousness
"creates" the world, but rather that the world has this intended
status for consciousness; it is a "sense" bestowed on it by con-
sciousness, and therefore must be investigated according to its
sense-genesis, that is, according to its essential z1,,,ruckweisen to
consciousness.
Second, make a _ElthE
confusion between the reflective co1isciousness and the conscious-
ness wh'-.i'Ch is reflected-on (the one which "lives" itsobject; its
body, its world, and so on). When he writes that the task of
reflection is to " take its object in the nascent state, as it appears
to the one who lives it, with the atmosphere of sense with which
it is then enclosed, and to seek to slip into this atmosphere" ;
(PP, 140) that, in addition, I can comprehend and apprehend
my body-as-lived only "by executing it myself," by living my
body, me, tbe one who seeks to explicate it ; (PP, 90) that,
finally, only a noematic reflection, one "which remains in the
object and explicates its primordial unity instead of engendering
it"; (PP, iv) -with these descriptions of reflection, that is to say,
Merleau-Ponty identifies the reflective consciousness with the
consciousness reflected-on. Or, at the very least , to insist that
reflection should itself "live" in the processes and objects re-
flected on, is simply to confuse the two, and thereby to miss the
true sense and task of reflection, and particularly phenomeno-
logical reflection. For, as Husserl emphasizes,
204 MERLEAU-PONTY
The proper task of reflection, however, is net to rep.eat the original process
but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it. . . Precisely
thereby an experiential knowing (which is at first descriptive) becomes
possible, that experiental knowing (Erfahrungswissen) to which we owe all
conceivable cognizance (Kem1tnis) and cognition (Erkenntnis) of our
intentional living.1
Furthermore, contrary to what Merleau-Ponty contends, such
a reflective apprehension in no way alters ("pulverizes'') the
consciousness reflected-on nor the objects of the latter conscious-
ness; rather, it takes cognizance of what the latter is, as intentive
to objects, and of objects as intended. It explicates what can be
found in the processes reflected on in a purely descriptive
manner.
Accordingly, it must be said, Merleau-Ponty simply gives up,
to 'begin With, the phenomenologicartheory of"Teductions-:-His
contention that the latter.isin.truth.a..formula..for...a.n...existentiar:.-
ism, then, does n9t hold up simply is not the phenome-
n_Q!.ogical he is then talking about. His rejection
of "n'O"etic" reflection (in favor of "noematic reflection") has a
heavy price: as we shall see shortly, he can no longer consistently
maintain a genuine theory of intentionality. This should indicate
to us, in other words, !}lat there is a fundamental rift running
throu bout his work: the effort to conduct a henomenolo "cal
study of perception an at e same time to reject precisely what
such a study possible. (De Waelhens, as we saw in Chapter
I of this Part, takes this rift as the essential problem in Merleau-
Ponty's entire work.)
(2) THE THEORY OF THE BODY AS "KNOWLEDGE'
Merleau-Ponty wants to say that perceived objects are senses,
meanings, and he even goes so far at one point to maintain that
perceived objects are "forms" ("senses") only for our experience
of them.2 However, he goes right on to maintain that these
"forms," even as "poles of action," are given to my experience
of them as existents (beings) which "pre-exist" my conscjousness
of. them: they are, as the world itself is, "toujonrs-deja-fa,"
"toujours-deja-fait ." They do, of course, have a reference back
1
Carlesian. Meditatums, op. cit., p. 3-l And ,we contend Mcrleau-Ponty sees the
task of reflection as having o! necessity to repeal tlte twocess refueled on, thus confusing
reflection with the process itsell.
I Cf. above, pp. r30--3S
CRITI CAL REMARKS 205
to the activities for which they are poles. But this reference is
itself a reference to another "deja-etabli": the body-proper as
"un acquis," a "tout fait" which is "constitue une fois pour
tontes." Hence, consciousness Jives itself as engagee in a sort of
double "deja-fait" - and, apparently, this indicates for him the
fundamental ambiguity to all existence. If we rehearse his
argument briefly, we shall be able to see more clearly the several
errors he commits.
First of all, following from his discussion of reflection, he is led
of necessity (as we saw in our introduction) to seek another means
than reflection for apprehending lived experience. He claims to
find this new access in lived experience itself: the body-proper,
perception itself, are a "latent science of the world," an "habitual
knowledge" (he speaks of them as both "savoir" and "conna.is-
sance"). (PP, 269, 275, and passim.) Second, he goes on, just in
so far as the world, on the one hand, and the body-proper, on
the other, are toufours-deja-ta, always-already-acquired struc-
tures, and just in so far as the and perception are thereby
an implicit knowledge of the world as itself "deja-fait," - therefore,
he concludes, the basic connection between them is one of ano-
nymity, generality, typicality, and implicit familiarity. The
becomes this way, that is to say, becomes an already-acqurred-
acquisition, by virtue of its corporeal scheme; the corporeal
scheme, in tum, is realized by means of the intentional arc; and,
finally, the intentional arc makes of the body "un acquis"
because it is fundamentally an "intentionnalite -
:which is itself a temporal flux of syntheses of transition$.
That, in barest outline, is what he takes as the phenome-
nological structure of the body as latent knowledge. Let us start
from the top and work down, considering each thesis in turn.
(a) First Thesis: The Body is a Latent Knowledge
Having seen that his position regarding reflection is a funda-
mental confusion of reflective consciousness with the conscious-
ness reflected-on, we have at least gained some grounds for
considering this thesis. He wants ta maintain that the body itself
has jts awn type Qf intentionality, in virtue of which it functioD._
science'' of the world disclosed by means of the
itself. Living the body, I am able tolearn what it
.-- -
206
MERLEA U-PONTY
Now if, as we maintain is evident, reflection on my mental life
as it is in itself is possible, then the thesis that my body itself
provides me access to lived experience by functioning as a know-
ledge is wholly unnecessary, and il true, hardly essential to the
theoretical enterprise. But, is the thesis correct?
If we reflect on the phenomenon itself, attending to it purely
as it gives itself to us, it is necessary to point out that Merleau-
Ponty, like Bergson before him, is quite incorrect ; or, at least,
he confuses two very different phenomena. As we saw, Merleau-
Ponty calls the domain of lived experience that of "conscience
non-thetique. "
1
But, on the other hand, it is clear from his own
analyses that he seeks to connect the perceived world as "lived,"
not with consciousness, but rather with the body, to corporeality.
Thus, he maintains that the unity of material things is due to
the unity of the body, established by means of the corporeal
scheme; that to have a body is to have a "universal montage"
of the world as an intersensory unity; that the body provides a
"logic of the world"; and that the body provides the instrument
for my "comprehension" and apprehension of the world.2
"L'intentionnalite operante," in fact, is for him a kind of corpore-
al intentionality, completely different from what he choses to
call "l'intentionnalite d'acte.''
However, it is necessary to emphasize that this sort of argu-
ment is an outright confusion (or, illegitimate identification) of
consciousness with the body, of the body with non-thematizing
consciousness. In fact, as Prof. Gurwitsch has indicated
I
speaking, it is .IC.SS a question of coipOreal existence itself (as a
than of. the spe<:ific consciousness which we have of corporeal
Certainly, is not necessarily a thematizing
- a and expbc1t consciousness of the body - and
we readily agree with M. Merleau-Ponty that "there are ... several
manners for consciousness to be consciousness." (PP, 144) But it is
necessary to emphasize that a pre-predicative, pre-positional, and
non-thematizmg consciousness is a consciousness all the same. a
To speak of "experience-vecue," indeed, is to speak of the manner
1
Merleau-Ponty's use of this term is quite inaccurate, taken over from Sartre and
not from Husserl. For, Husserl maintains I, pp. 213-19), every consciousness is
"positional," i.e., "thetic;" only, some are "automatic" and others are "active"
non.sis "nonthetic." '
Cf. PP, pp. 237!!, 269fl, 27S-76, 350-sx, andpassim.
s Gurwitsch, Theorie du Champ tk la C011Science, p. 245.
CRITI CAL REMARKS 207
in which consciousness at a certain level of its activity experiences
(or, better, intends) its objects, its own body, indeed even itself,
as living straightforwardly in these and those processes as directed
toward their specific objects. To talk as if the body were itself a
"knowled e," whether implicit or confuse the
descriptively evi n s1 nation.
We cannot say, then, that the body "knows" anything, even
broadest possible sense of the term. For. in the first place,
if it were a "knowledge." it would not be at the level of non-
thematizing experience of the world, since "knowing" is
a an active attending to and explicating
--ortileQbject(s) "known," a formulating of judgments based upon
the active attending and the actively attended-to objects. And
all such activities (grasping, explicating, relating, even at the
level of sensuous perception), as Husserl has shown, are "Ich-
Akte."
1
In_ the second place, even non-thematizing consciousness is, as
Gurwitsch emphasizes, "a consciousness all the same." To be
sure, it is not as yet an activity in the strict sense, a process lived-
in by the Ego; but this by no means suggests that the body
has its own peculiar brand of intentionality.
In the third place, he maintains, on the one hand, that the body
is essentially that by means of which there are objects in the world,
and on the other, that the body itself is a "knowing" of these
same objects. But, if the first part of this claim is the case, then
the body would be consciousness, since consciousness, qua
intentive, is that by means of which there are objects of any sort
whatever, and is at the same time that which "knows" these
objects. If the latter is the case, if the body is that which knows,
then consciousness, as regards the objects which the body would
purportedly "know," would become superfluous.
Finally, taking the body as a "knower" necessitates taking it
as a "subject," a "self," and there results, on the one hand, a
doubling of "subjects" - precisely what Merleau-Ponty deplores
.in traditional philosophy - and on the other, it becomes im-
possible to account for the descriptively evident fact that the
body has as its essential sense that it is "my" body. Descriptively
1 Cf. Er/al:Yung 1mdUrteil, op. cit., 17; these are the lowest levels of ego-activity.
See also Idun, I, t>f>, cit., us.
208 MERLEAU-PONTY
speaking, it is "I myself" who perceive. and I do so bymeans oi__
my body; it is hardly the case that my body is a subject who
perceives.:... Even grantirig that there is a difference between T
see the purple cow" and "/chose to become a painter," this by
no means suggests that the body is the subject of the first, and
/ "I" that of the second. The identification of conscious
body, whjch is his assertion, his un1ustified claim, is descriE_tivel_y
absurd and fails to account for th nomena.
ccordingly, this first thesis does not hold up.
(b) Second Thesis: The body is "Tout Etabli"; Therefore, Per-
ception by Means of the Body-Proper Requires Neither Synthesis
nor Constitution
In so far as perception is lived, he contends, it reveals no
"synthesis"; it is only when I adopt an analytic attitude toward
my perception that "I am obliged to suppose an act of synthesis."
This synthesis, however, is only the "counterpart of my analysis,"
and not a really intrinsic component of my perception itself. My
perception, that is, "benefits from- an already accomplished
operation, from a general synthesis constituted once and for all."
(PP, 275) This is so, be argues, because my body is a generalized
knowledge of the world.
What is this synthesis to which Merleau-Ponty objects? An
illustration will clarify the problem. Suppose I now look at the
ashtray lying on my desk before me; I see it now from this side,
now from that, and so on through an indefinite number of visual
appearances. Although I see the ashtray from only one aspect or
adumbration at any one time, "the" ashtray itself is what is
presented to me. I see, that is to say, one identical ashtray from
a multiplicity of perspectives on it, through a multiplicity of
"adumbrations" or "appearances" of it. Or, again: seeing the
ashtray, I now reach out and touch it; taking it in my hand, I
strike it first with a pencil, then with a metal pen, then with my
finger; I also bring it close to me and smell of it, and perchance
also run my tongue over its edge. Here, again, the "it" is experi-
enced as the same throughout. It is not the case that I am
presented with a series of different ashtrays (one corresponding
to each appearance), bnt rather "the" ashtray itself, one and
identically the same, presents itself to me through a multiplicity
CRITICAL REMARKS 209
of sensuous appearances. Again, I may perchance pick up the
ashtray and use it as a paper-weight; in another situation, it may
serve me as a weapon; or, more usually, quite without thinking
about it, I simply use it as that which it is: a receptacle for
tobacco ashes. As before, nevertheless, this ashtray which I
"use" is given to me as identically the same ashtray which I see,
touch, smell, judge about, and so on. Finally, though much more
could be said, I can call my wife over to the desk and ask her to
look at the ashtray, perhaps in order to point out a chipped edge,
or that it needs to be emptied, and so on. In the same way as
before, this ashtray, in spite of the fact that her perception and
her use of it is not and cannot be mine, is experienced by both of
us as one and the same.
Now throughout all of this, there is going on, necessarily and
continuously and automatically, a series of "syntheses": the
object is synthesized by consciousness as one and the same object
experienced through a multiplicitly of appearances of it (merely
sensuous appearances, as well as instrumental ones). These
syntheses, analyzed in great detail by Husserl in each of his
works, are of different kinds, and go on at different-levels of my
experience. Most fundamentally, however, every perception of a
sensuously perceived state of affairs (and universally, every
consciousness of any object whatever) takes place by means of
and on the ground of what Husserl calls "syntheses of identifi-
cation" - which go on automatically and continuously and
without which no object of any consciousness whatever would
ever be "the same" object (from perspective to perspective, from
one sensuous contact to another, from one mode of consciousness
to another, from one moment of consciousness to another, and
so on.)1
But regarding any one mental process, it is necessary to recog-
nize that there is a complexity in it, a whole series of "syntheses"
going on continuously and automatically. To give an example
of this complexity, not. only is the ashtray synthetically identified
as "one and the same" ashtray experienced by consciousness in
a variety of manners, but it is also the case that these syntheses
of identification are at the same time syntheses of differentiation.
l Cf. Cartesian Meditations, pp. 4r-44, e.g.
2IO MERLEAU-PONTY
That is t@ say, "identification" does not mean here that each
perception of the ashtray is in some manner constituted as one
perception happening all at one time in the life of consciousness;
rather, the varieus perceptions are themselves intentively
retained by consciousness as different perceptions (and perhaps
of different aspects of the thingL but of one and the same objeGt.
They are.discrete, being constituted by consciousness as different
presentations of an identical object. Thus, descriptively speaking,
I can, perhaps, "return'.' to one perspective on the ashtray (say,
seeing it from the bottom aspect) and notice that what I had
taken as a chip in the glass was not a chip, but the way the l.jght
flashed on the glass. This is possible, Husserl points eut, only
because every synthesis of identification of objects is at the same
time a synthesis of differentiation of the perceptions of it as
discrete.
We have not even scratched the surface of the genuine com-
plexity of any single phase of any one mental process, much less
mental life as a but it is sufficient for our purposes here
to have delineated syntheses of identification. Merleau-Ponty,
however, denies precisely what we have described as automatic-
ally going on in every perception whatever. The "unity" of the
object, he argues, is realized only by means of the <::orporeal
scheme of the body; once the latter is realized, all objects are
forthwith experienced as unities, and there is no need to argue
for any other syntheses. Perceived objects are experienced at
the level of corporeality as unities; "synthesis," on the other
hand, is for him an activity of consciousness proper, i.e., an
"activity" in the strict sense: discrete, step-by-step syntheses
effected by the
Aside from Merleau-Ponty's contention being descriptively
incorrect, it seems to me evident that he makes several errors,
and in general glosses over the genuine complexity of each and
every concrete mental process. First, it makes no sense whatever
to call synthesis a "product of analysis"; in the sense in which
we have used the term, these syntheses are the very texture of the
experience of consciousness, that because of which experience at
any level is what it is. The difficulty, it seems te me, is that
Metleau-Ponty pre-interprets intentionality as being of two
distinct kinds, one an "intentionnalite operante," the other an
CRITlCAL REMARKS 2II
"intentionnalite d'acte." But, Merleau-Ponty does not stop with
just this: for, he also pre-interprets the latter as "the one per-
taining to our judgments and our active positings, the only one
of which the Critique of Pure Reason had spoken." (PP, xiii)
"Thetic, or active, intentionality," according to Merlea:d.-
Ponty, is or involves syntheses of a kind already diseovered by
Kant.
"Every consciou.sness is consciousness of something," but that is
not new. Kant had shown, in the "Refutation ofldealism," that internal
perception is impossible without external perception. He had shown,
moreover, that the world, as a connection of phenomena, is anticipated in
the consciousness of my unity, is the means for me to realize myself as a
conscioisness. (PP, xii)
Let us be clear about the issues. Merleau-Ponty is maintaining:
( r) that there are actually two distinct kinds of intentiveness, one
being "operative" and pertaining to the body'-proper, the other
"active or thetic" and pertaining to consciousness itself; and (2)
that the latter type can already be found in Kant, especially in
the refutation of what Kant calls "material Idealism." If we
first consider the second claim, we shall be in a better position to
examine the first claim.
Kant's problem in the section to which Merleau-Ponty refers
is essentially to refute the problematic type of material idealism
represented by Descartes (Berkeley's "dogmatic" ideal.ism
having already been refuted, Kant believes, in his Transcendental
Aesthetic). This idealism claims that the existence of objects in
space is doubtful and indemonstrable. The refutation must
therefore consist in showing, Kant states (B 275), " ... that we
have experience, and not merely imagination, of outer things;
and this be achieved otherwise than by demonstrating
that even om inner experience (the Cartesian indubitable), is
possible only on the assumption of outer experience.'' The
question for us here is not whether Kant's position involves any
inconsistencies, not whether be succeeds, or not, but whether one
can say with justification that this position approaches the
Husserlian conception of active, intentive syntheses.
Kant's refutation consists in showing that the consciousness
of my own determination in time (my existence as determined
in time) is possible only mediatety; that is, it is only through a
2I2 MERLEAU-PONTY
consciousness of "outer objects" that I can obtain a conscious-
ness of the determination of my existence in time. (B 276-277)
I cannot have a consciousness of my existence itself, but only a
representation of it. And, he goes on, in order for there to be even
this inner experience, "in addition to the thought of something
existing, we Iequire also intuition, and in. this case inner intu-
ition, in respect of which, that is to say, of time, the subject must
be determined, for which determination outer objects are indis-
pensable .... " (B 277) Thus, since all representations (including
those of my own determination in time) require something
permanent distinct from them and in relation to which these
representations may be determined, Kant concludes that the
condition for the possibility of inner sense is the actual existence
of external things themselves, and not mere representations of
them.
Restricting ourselves to our particular problem, it is first
of all necessary to point out h ~ t Merleau-Ponty at no time tries
to support his claim that Kant already had discovered the
intentionality of consciousness. Certainly it would be quite
hopeless to attempt any simple and direct comparison of Kant
with Husserl, for though they both often use the same terms they
do not, as Professor Gurwitsch has clearly shown,1 speak of the
same things. Nevertheless, a brief examination of both is here
necessary in order to demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty's claim
is quite unjustifiable.
When Kant speaks of "outer intuition" of externally existing
things as the condition for the possibility of "inner intuition," he
is by no means saying that (in the oversimplified formula which
Merleau-Ponty uses) "every consciousness is a consciousness of
something." For Kant, it must be remembered, all sense per-
ception is essentially passive receptivity: sensibility (Sinnlich-
keit) has the faculty of receptivity, specifically, the faculty to be
receptive to the action of objects, the result of which is called
sensation. To this extent, Kant shares the same conception of
1
Aron Gurwitsch, ~ a Conception de la conscience cbe Kant et chez. Husserl,"
Bulletm de la Societe francaise de Philosophic, 54e Annee, No. 2 (Avril-Juin, 1960;
Seance du 25 Avril 1959), -pp. 66-96; see especially pp. 70-74 . .Professor Gurwitsch's
analysis here shows unmistakably that Kant, like Hume and Descartes ;has a certain.
"nostalgia" for phenomenology, but by no means did he actually disco'ver intention-
ality.
CRITICAL REMARKS 213
sense perception (which to Husserl was an unjustifiable bias l)
as Descartes and Locke. To perceive a so-called "external" thing
(that things should be designated as either "outer' ' or "inner"
is itself a consequence of this theory of ideas, and not phenome-
nological inspection of things themselves) is first of all passively
to receive sensations from it. The thing itself is not given as a
sense datum; rather, the very notion of externally existing
things is a notion which must be supplied, not by sense, but by
thought. When Kant says that inner intuition is possible only
by means ot outer intuition, he is saying that the condition for
my consciousness of my existence as determined in time is that
I, threugh my outer receptivity, have received sense data whose
very existence makes necessary the assumption of a "thing in
itself" of which my intuitions are mere representations. In no
case, then, is he saying that my consciousness of an object is a
consciousness of that object iii itself, precisely and only in so far
as it presents itself to my consciousness. In short, the profound
difference between Kant and Husserl is the theory of intention-
ality. While Kant may have had certain foreshadowings of this
theory, one can claim that he actually discovered and developed
it only at the expense of ignoring the Kantian development of
the "theory of ideas" in his Transcendental Aesthetic.
By the same token, the theory of intentionality - the full
explication of which is phenomenology, for Husserl - is the
decisive difference between the two philosophers on the question
of "synthesis." As Professor Gurwitsch has emphasized in the
same article, the point to be realized here is not merely that
while Kant discusses (in connection with the objectification of
sensory data) but one synthesis (the synthesis of pure transcen-
dental apperception), Husserl analyzes essentially two kinds
(the passive - a better term is "automatic" - and the active).
Beyond that, what Kant himself meant by the synthesis of pure
transcendental apperception is fundamentally different from
what Husserl meant by synthesis, whether active or passive.
For Kant, sense data are received under the conditions of the
pure forms of sensibility, space and time. The activity which
the understanding performs on these data (or more exactly,
i See H. Spiegelberg, The Phe1wmenolcgical Movem11nJ: A Historical Introduction,
Martinus Nijhofi (The Hague, Netherlands), Volume I, p. z84.
MERLEAU-PONTY
which it performs on the temporal relations between and among
these data) is a unification. This synthetic unification of data
received simultaneously or in succession consists in ratifying or
confirming (or not) their temporal relations, of certifying them
under the heading of law; and then, the relations become ob-
jective.1
For Husserl, to the contrary, consciousness does not "con-
struct" or "unify" (in the sense of "put together") sense data.
Consciousness does not manufacture anything, nor does it impose
a priori forms on materials provided by passive reception of
sense data.
2
Expressed most briefly, "synthesis" for Husserl is
always and necessarily intentive synthesis. To say that an object,
for example, a physical thing, is "constituted" as being such and
such, is to say that it is presented to consciousness in a series
of acts or mental processes as having a certain noematic-obfective
sense (say, "red, round and hard"), a sense which it acquires for
consciousness due to the synthetic organization of these acts
through which the object is presented. To synthesize is to actu-
alize a certain sense; acts of consciousness become synthesized
together in systematically organized groups and concatenations,
and through these organized groups of acts the object in question
is presented to consciousness as being thus and so - that is, as
having a certain noematic sense. Consciousness and noematic
sense are thus inseparable: "there is no act of consciousness
which would not be the actualization of a sense.'' a Thus, the
Husserlian theory of intentionality is a correlational theory of
consciousness.
The Kantian synthesis, to the contrary (whether it be the
synthesis of imagination, apprehension, or transcendental
apperception), can-in no way be considered as "sense-bestowing."
It unifies, puts together, confirms and certifies; it even, for that
matter, adds something to perception which can never in principle
be experienced: the Ding an sich. The Kantian theory of
consciousness, therefore, as Professor Gurwitsch insists, is
essentially functionalistic or activistic: "the life of the under-
standing consists in an action, a single action, always the same.
1 Gurwitscb, ibid., pp. 75, 87.
2 Spiegelberg, <>f>. cit., p. tu.
s Gutwitscb, op. cit., p. 87.
CRITICAL REMARKS 215
The pure transcendental apperception fuses with its action, it
is only its articulated action." 1 And, that action is, not to
bestow sense, but rather to unify, confirm and certify the sense
data received in temporal relations.
In sum, the Kantian notion of synthesis is made necessary
by his conception of the nature of intuition, for only if one
assumes that intuition is the passive reception of dispersed and
scattered sensations does it become necessary to conceive of a
way to unify and organize these data in order to construct an
_objective world. The Husserlian notion of synthesis does not
begin with that theory of perception (indeed, the development
of intentionality has the effect of undermining it), it is not to be
understood in the context of a functionalistic conception of
consciousness, but to the contrary is irrevocably bound up with
the theory of intentionality. Thus, while it would certainly be
too much to say that Kant's philosophy is totally opposed to
that of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's contention must be rejected.
But, this assumption regarding '1'intentionnalite d'acte" has
its serious consequences for his conception of the other kind of
intentionality. In the first place, he does not anywhere attempt
to establish that there are two kinds of .intentionality. But even
assuming that there are for the moment, and making certain
assumptions regarding the "active" one, he makes certain other
assumptions regarding the other, that of the body. We have
already pointed out in this respect that he conceives this in-
tentionality, illegitimately, as corporeal. Doing this, he glosses
over the crucial fact that though all consciousness is intentive,
it is not at alt the case that all consciousness is "active." Similarly,
to say that some consciousnesses go on automatically in no way
argues for an absence of syntheses.
If, in fact, I reflect on any on phase of mental life, attempting
to disclose its complexity (and not, of course, attempting to
substitute the "conditions" for the "conditioned," as Merleau-
Ponty would have it), I see straight away, in part, that there are
many processes going on in which the ego (me, this person; not
me, the reflective observer, who in any case does not live in the
processes being observed, but, precisely, observes them) does not
engage itself, in which he does not at the moment live, whose
1 Gurwitscb, ibid., pp. 75-76.
2I6 MERLEA U-PONTY
objects do not occupy him. I can see, moreover, that there are
some processes in which he as ego ca1inot live. For instance, as
Husserl points out,l the consciousness of inner time (of the
Ertebnisstrom} is in principle an automatic consciousness; the
automatic retention of past phases of the same mental life always
goes on, even during the phases of an active recollecting, just as
the automatic protention of future _phases of the same mental
life goes on even during the phases of an active expecting. Thus,
for instance, while I was a moment ago busied with the ashtray
(perceivingly, actionally, or however), there was going on a
number of other intentional processes as well, in which I was not
engaged: a consciousness of the floor beneath my feet; an audi-
tory consciousness of the radio program, and at the same,
perhaps, a disliking of it, or a willitlg to stop work for a time in
order to attend to it. Before I actively advert and attend to a
headache, there was going on all along an automatic awareness
of it, with, perhaps, an automatic disliking of it - and so on
throughout the whole range of mental life. In fact, moreover,
all my active consciousnesses stand out from a background of such
automatic processes, and are made possible by them: it is only
because the headache was automatically intended as "bother-
some," "irritating," and so on, that I now can and do advert to
it, perhaps dislikingly. As Husserl emphasizes,
anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a
passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything
built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation . . . in the
synthesis of passive experience.a
All activity, all active processes in. the strict sense, presuppose
automatic processes, which "give beforehand" (vorgeben) s the
object or objects in question.
Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty is quite wrong to maintain that
"synthesis" and "constitution" are "products of analysis," just
as he is wrong to contend that " constitutive consciousness"
is purely active. That the body, and that sensuously perceived
states of affairs in general, are concretely experienced by con-
' Cf. Formal# u11d transze11de11tale Logik, 3-4. We shall return to this phenomenon
later on.
2 Cartesian M editalwns, op. cit., p. 78.
a Erfaltrung und Urteil, op. cit., IHI, and 63.
CRITICAL REMARKS 2I7
sciousness as "toujours-deja-la," is quite true; but that this
argues for the absence of syntheses (and the presence of a
"generalized and anonymous knowledge" of the world by the
body-proper) is quite wrong. If, in fact, the body is constituted
as a "sy:nergetic system," unified by means of a "corporeal
scheme," the fundamental problem is to trace out the ways in
which this unification occurs, and then to study the way in
which it is concretely experienced by consciousness. As Aron
Gurwitsch has emphasized,
The problems of constitution arise not only as regards the simple
material things in Nature, cultural objects, ideal objects of every sort
(such as numbers) ... but also as regards our own body and own corporeal
existence. In holding to the principles established by Husserl regarding
these, we maintain that constitutional problems must be formulated
and treated exclusively in terms of consciousness, be it positional or be it
pre-positional. l
Merleau-Ponty, in sum, does not see that there are certain
characteristics of consciousness which are descriptively universal,
which pertain to any consciousness whatever. We have tried to
place in evidence only a slight sampling of these (specifically,
those discussed or implied through Merleau-Ponty's analysis),
and have seen that at least these are disclosed in any conscious-
ness whatever. Thus, for instance, in the automatic conscious-
ness of the headache, it is clear that, even though I, the person
whose headache it is, am not aware of it right now, in order for
there even to be a "this headache," there must be going on
automatically a series of syntheses of identification and differ-
entiation. While busied with the ashtray, the automatic conscious-
ness of the radio program to which I am not attending right now
is nevertheless automatically constituted for my active ad-
vertance to it as one and identically the same radio program
throughout the duration of the automatic consciousness of it;
and, indeed, should I advert to it, it has the sense for me of being
the same program now as it was before I actively adverted to it.
Accordingly, we must say, Merleau-Ponty, by assuming
without question that (r) there are two kinds of intentionality,
(2) that these are essentially different in kind, (3) that "l'in-
tentionnalite d'acte" is Kantian, and (4) that "l'intentionnalite
1 Tlseorie du Champ de la Conscimce, op. cit., p. 245. In our general conclusions, we
shall attempt to outline this constitution.
218 MERLEAU-PONTY
operante" is without syntheses - by assuming these, he has
simply given up the essential features of the intentionality of
consciousness. But it is not a mere matter of his disagreeing
with the Husserlian description of intentiveness; rather, as we
have tried to point out, his own conception is, when confronted
with the phenomena to be described, quite in error, and his
assumptions unwarranted.
There are, however, several other problems intrinsic to his
theory of the body-proper.
(c) Third Thesis: Tlte Body as an Ambiguity. Perception Takes
Place in a Milieu of Generality and Anonymity; Tltis Expresses
the Ambiguity Which is of the Essence of Existence in General
All perception, he contends, "takes place in an atmosphere of
generality and is given to us as anonymous," (PP, 249) just
because it is by means of my body that all perception occurs.
I perceive with my senses, i.e., with my body-proper, and my
body-proper exists as a "deja etabli" in virtue of the fact that
it manifests its own specific kind of intentionality. Being realized
as something already established once and for all, he argues, it is
established as anonymous, generalized, and my body's con-
nection with its world is likewise realized as anonymous and
generalized. Thus, he argues, in a passage which is central for
his position,
I cannot say that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say
that I understand a book ... My perception, viewed even from within,
expresses a given situation. . . Such that if I want to translate the per-
ceptual experience exactly I must say that "it is perceived in me" and not
that "I perceive". . . I have no more consciousness of being the true
subject of my sensation than of my birth. or my death ... I know that one
is born and one dies, but I cannot know my birth and my death. Every
sensation, being strictly the first, the last and the only one of its kind, is a
birth and a death. The subject who experiences it begins and ends with i.t;
and as it can neither precede nor survive itself, the sensation necessarily
appears to itself in a milieu of generality. Sensation comes .from outside of
myself, it emerges from a sensibility which has preceded and which will
survive it - like my birth and my death belong to an anonymous nativity
and mortality. (PP, 249-50)
There is, he continues in the same vein, a "life' of my eyes, a
"life" of my hands, of my body-proper itself, and each of these is
a sort of "natural 'I'." Each perception interests and occupies,
CRITICAL REMARKS 2I9
not me myself, the "I" who chooses, thinks, wills, values, and
so on, but "un autre moi qui a deja pris parti pour le monde" -
this "other 'I'," my body-proper, is thus a sort of "acquis origi-
naire" interposed between me and sensations, and because of
this. I am, as embodied, locked in an irrevocable ambiguity,
anonymity, and generality as regards my own existence and the
world disclosed to me by means of my body. This, in other words,
is the facticity of the subject.
Such is Merleau-Ponty's position. In the first place, to argue
that each sensation is unique and non-repeatable is one thing.
But to go on and claim that "the subject" who senses this sen-
sation is born and dies with it, and that therefore, since the sen-
sation is (if it is) immersed in a "milieu de generalite," so is the
subject - to argue in this fashion is simply to beg the question.
Whether or not a sensation is anonymous in no way implies that
the subject who perceives that sensation is for that reason
anonymous as well. Whether or not the sensation appearing to
the "subject" appears in a "milieu de generalite," in no way
means that this subject begins and ends with that sensation.
Merleau-Ponty concludes that the subject of perception is anony-
mous (begins and ends with the sensed sensation) from .the
premise that the subject begins and ends with the sensed sen-
sation (is anonymous).
Now, in the second place, as has been pointed out, the device
resorted to by him to account for this facticity - intentionality
conceived as corporeal - is completely unacceptable. The body
is not an animate organism because it is itself an intentionality (or
even a "natural 'I '"), but rather because it is the body of a specific
consciousness. To take it as somehow an existence all on its own,
is simply to gloss over this, that consciousness, at whatever
level, is consciousness all the same, and that it itself intends its
own animate organism as its own, and not at all as being a
"natural 'I'." No matter how many quotation-marks one places
around the "I," one can never make the body a subject in the
strict sense. Several other difficulties emerge from these con-
siderations.
Why is it the case that I cannot say that "I see the blue of the
sky," but only that
11
it is seen in me," or that "one sees it?" Who
does the seeing? For Merleau-Ponty, it is a "Moi nature!,"
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . 1 1
220 MERLEA U-PONTY
namely, my eyes; more correctly, not "my," but rather "one's,"
eyes, the eyes belonging to the body-proper: it sees the sky, since,
he argues, it is the "sujet de la perception." This being the case,
how does it happen that this seeing, when reflectively apprehend-
ed, discloses the sense that it is "my seeing?" How does "my"
perception, and more importantly, "my" body, become "mine?"
If the existence of the body-properis truly anonymous, then why
is not my body experienced by me as yours? If perception is
truly generalized, then how does it happen that every perception
is nevertheless necessarily unique, individual? What makes my
body mine, experienced as mine? In virtue of what do I experi-
ence my perceivings and activities as mine? - If, that is to say,
the body-proper is truly both anonymous and generalized? For
whom, in truth, is the body-proper anonymous?
To put the problem positively, Metleau-Ponty, by assuming
that the body has its own type of intentionality, is of necessity
led to posit that the body is itself a self, that it is itself a "sujet."
The very problem, however, is in what sense the body can experi-
ence anything, in the strict sense of being self-aware of itself as
experiencing this or that, much less itself. And, if the body is
thus a self, rather, a whole series of selves, then Merleau-Ponty
must account for a whole series of syntheses! First, it must be
shown how all these selves become unified as belonging intrinsic-
ally to one "self," the body-proper. Second, and equally difficult,
it must be shown how this synthetically unified "self" becomes
experienced by consciousness as belonging to that consciousness.
Over and above these syntheses, it must be shown how the
various sensory fields, sensory organs, body-members, and so on,
are synthetically unified into a specific corporeal scheme which
expresses my own peculiar habits and typicalities. Since the
synthesis of the body into a specific organic system, an animate
organism, is hardly the same thing as the synthesis of a series of
"subjects" (being a subject is not the same thing as being an
animate organism), Merleau-Ponty has doubled the problems.
But, on top of all of this, 11e has nothing to say as regards these
various unifications, except what we have been able to draw
out regarding the intentional arc.
Merleau-Ponty has not attended to his own argument, it
seems to me. If we were to assume that the body has its own
CRITICAL REMARKS 22I
intentiveness, and that it is a "self," then how in the world
could it ever be "anonymous?" The very self-reflexiveness of
the intentional relation would make it absurd to maintain that
the body-proper is anonymous. But, and this shows his point,
he argues that the body is anonymous for me, this person who
chooses, decides, and the like; I experience my body as anony-
mous. If this is so, however, then there seems to me to be no
grounds whatever to argue that my body is mine, since, qua
anonymous, it might just as well be yours, or more correctly, it
could be anyone's. This being so, I can no more talk of this body
as mine than I could say that it is a body-proper; to call it a
"body-proper" means that it is the body-as-lived, or as-experi-
enced, and this means, experienced by me. But, if the body-proper
is experienced by me, is that which places me "at" the world,
then it must be experienced by me as mine.
On the other hand, as we have seen, it is not the case that
the body-proper has its own intentionality. By assuming that it
does, Merleau-Ponty glosses over a highly important point: the
body itself discloses itself to my experience as to my reflection
as being mine, belonging (in some sense) to me, the one who
"lives" it. It discloses itself as such, as Marcel has seen, in virtue
of certain phenomenologically describable processes going on
continuously and without which it would cease to be experienced
by me as mine. Thus, by assuming illegitimately that the body is
a self, Merleau-Ponty not only begs the question, but creates an
absurd problem, which moreover he does not even attempt to
answer. Contrary to de Waelhens' remark,1 I submit that
Merleau-Ponty has not at all clearly recognized the problems
involved in the phenomenon, "my body qua mine," but has
rather begged the entire question with his conception of the body
as "anonymous" and "generalized."
'What both Merleau-Ponty (PP, 175- 77) and de Waelhens
point out, that in all corporeal attitudes and activities there is
manifested a common style which makes my actions recognizable
as mine - this is quite correct. But, the typicality of this style
is hardly an anonymity, any more than it is a generality: the
i Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 8, and 109-10. The remark is to the effect that
Merleaa-Ponty, as opposed to Sartre (Marcel is not even mentioned), accounts for tbe
body qua mine.
222 MERLE A U-PONTY
typical is not yet the general, and certainly not the anonymous.
From this quite correct recognition, then, to Merleau-Ponty's
final position, is a leap concealing a nest of irresovable difficulties.
Over and above these, there is another difficulty immlved in
this thesis. Why should it "necessarily" be the case that per-
ception takes place in a milieu of generality? Even if it were
true that, like each sensation, the subject who experiences it
begins and ends with it, can neither precede nor survive it -
even if this were the case (and this is highly questionable), does
it follow that perception of sensations must occur in a milieu of
generality? What permits such a conclusion? The 0bvfous
problem is that the meaning of "generality" is left completely
vague, unanalyzed and unclarified as to its meaning.
And, I must confess, his argument escapes me. It may be, on
the one hand, that his point is that, by means of the temporal
flux of all perception and of all corporeal activity in general (in
virtue of which they become sedimented as typicalities), the
body-proper becomes constituted .,une fois pour toutes" as a
complex of habits, typicalities, in the sense of acquiring typiGal
and usual ways of doing, seeing, touching, assuming postures,
and so on. Again, however, the typical is not the same thing as
the general. Moreover, how this complex sedimentation can occur
by means of temporal flux which, for him, is essentially a series
of syntheses of transition, Merleau-Ponty simply does not tell us.
Over and above these, however, supposing that sedi:mentati0n
does occur, and ignoring for the moment how it occurs, does it
follow from this, i.e., from the fact of crystallizationof corporeal
activities into schemes of activity, that perception goes on in a
milieu of generality? An habitually familiar milieu is not the
same thing as a generalized milieu.
In short, that "generality" means "typicality," or that
"anonymity" signifies "habitual," is not true. And, that the
evident process of sedimentation signifies that consciousness, as
habituated to certain corporeal ty_piealities (of posture, conduct,
perception, and the like), is anonymous and given to itself as
generalized, is, I submit, but another ingenious way to smuggle
in by the backdoor what evident inspection of the matters them-
selves will not admit by the front. That, on my first reflection on
myself, I find myself as "ilready living," as embodied in a body
CRITIC.AL REMARKS 223
which has already developed habits, and so on, may be quite
true; but that this signifies that these typicalities are anony-
mities for me, generalities, or even ambiguities, is but another
hidden assumption to be discarded straight off. It seems to me,
in fact, that this argument is motivated, not from phenome-
nologically evident grounds, but rather by an already fashioned
cloak of theory in terms of which objects are called in, in absentia,
for an at best partial fitting, then announced as evident. As we
shall see later on, in fact, his starting-point predetermines every-
thing else he discusses.
Another possible interpretation of "generality" presents itself.
When, in a concrete sensuous perception of a state of affairs, I
visually perceive the blue sky, what I normally experience is not
at all "this" unique, individual blue, but rather "blue of a
certain kind." That is to say, instead of maintaining that Mer-
leau-Ponty c0nfuses "generality" with ''typicality," it may well
be that he means by the former what we understand by the latter.
Even so, however, it by no means follows that all perception is
perception of "types." As Alfred Schutz has emphasized, follow-
ing Husserl, in my everyday living I usually experience objects
as more or less determinate types, against a background or
horizon of equally typically ancihabitually familiar objects. They
stand out from this ilnquestioned (but always questionable)
background for my activities as "what they are," in terms of my
particular pro1'ects-at-hand, more particularly in terms of my
particular relevancies prevailing ~ the time. Thus, the back-
ground from which they stand out is structured in terms of these
same relevancies - the background is "backgr0und" because it
is at the moment irrelevant to my prevailing project-at-hand.
l3ut this is by no means always or necessarily the case:
I may take the typically apperceived object as an exemplar of the
g ~ n e r l type and allow myself to be led to this concept of the type, but I
do not need by any means to think of the concrete dog as an exemplar
of the general concept of "dog."
1
i A. Schiltz, "Common-Sense and Sdentilic Interpretation of Human Action,"
PPR, Vol. xiv, No. I (September, 1953), p. 5; also, pp. 3-6. Cf. also his excellent
article, "Symbol, Reality and Society," s,,mbols and Society (edited by Lyman
Bcysan t:t al), 14.th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion
(New York, 955), pp. :i5:z-54. And, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy,"
PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, x959), pp. i:47-65.
----------------------------------------' ............... ____________________________
224 MERLEAU-PONTY
I may be interested, that is to say, only in this dog, Rover, for
his own sake. In my concrete experience, thus, it is my particular
"interests," what is relevant to me at the time, which determines
what objects shall be individual and which shall be typical in
any one situation.
If by a "milieu of generality," then, Merleau-Ponty means
that objects disclosed by means of sensuous perception are
experienced as "objects of certain types," we must agree with
him. But, this by no means signifies either that all perception
occurs in such a milieu, nor that no perception can be called an
"I perceive." As Husserl has shown, in fact, not all sensuous
perception is at the same level: it is JlOssible to ignore some object
sollicits to itself; or, one can advert to it, grasp
and then explicate and relate it as regards other objects, all
ID a sensuous manner. These, however, are necessarily "IcJv-Akte"
- the lowest levels of ego-activity, to be sure, but still not explicit
predicative activity. And, as Schutz emphasizes, what specific
objects, or determinations or qualities of objects,
I attend to ID any particular perceptual situation, depends upon
what my interests are, on what is relevant to my project-at-
band. Hence, it is sometimes necessary to say, "ie percois"; and,
therefore, it is not the case that all perception occurs in terms of
typicalities - even if this is what Metleau-Ponty means by
"generality and anonymity."
(d) Fou,rth Thesis: The Body-Proper Becomes "deja etabli" by
Means of a Corporeal Scheme Constituted "wne /ois pour toittes"
by Means of an Intentional Arc, That is, by Means of tlie Temporal
Flux of Operative Intentionality
It is primarily by means of the body's motivity, we saw, that
the corporeal scheme is constituted. This motivity, moreover,
does this because it is intentional; it reveals an operative in-
tentionality which, by means of the intentional arc, effects a
sedimentation of corporeal activities, crystallizing them into
"schemes," and generally, into a corporeal scheme. Once consti-
tuted, it is always constituted.
Now the fundamental question throughout this theory is: How
does such a corporeal scheme become constituted for conscious-
ness? The fundamental question, that is, concerns the ultimate
CRITICAL REMARKS 225
meaning of this "operative intentionality," how it effects a
sedimentation leading to the body's being experienced as a
"synergetic system."
The flux of intentional processes is a temporal flow or move-
ment. As Merleau-Ponty contends, if we consider any moment,
"A," it is, as present, a "field" ; i.e., it discloses itself as retentive
of phases of the same flux "before" ("past") the present phase,
and as protentive to phases still to come. We can diagram this
complexity, ignoring the objects of these temporal phases for
the moment, according to Husserl's time-lectures:
ERRATA
p. 225, line-block 1, for Husserl read Husserl; as expanded by D. Cairns.
ibidem, line 18, for a11tomatic read acti1e.
RICHARD M. ZANER
The Problem of Embodimetll
(Phaenomenologica 17)
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964
1 r -
a "synthesis of transition." For, the former, he believes (quite
wrongly, as we saw), is strictly "automatic.''
In order to have the problem clearly before us, it will be
helpful to outline a few points in Husserl's analysis of inner-
time consciousness. First, though, we should reemphasize the
224 MERLEA U-PONTY
I .may be interested, that is to say, only in this dog, Rover, for
his own sake. In my concrete experience, thus, it is my particular
"interests,'' what is relevant tome at the time, which determines
what objects shall be individual and which shall be typical in
any one situation.
If by a "milieu of generality," then, Merleau-Ponty means
that disclosed by means of sensuous perception are
"objects of certain types," we must agree with
him. But, this by no means signifies either that au perception
occurs in such a milieu, nor that no perceotion can be called an
u1 CU.LIJVre-dl acuv1ut::s, 1.:ry:stCl.l.llZmg mem mi:o
"schemes," and generally, into a corporeal scheme. Once consti-
tuted, it is always constituted.
Now the fundamental question throughout this theory is: How
does such a corporeal scheme become constituted for conscious-
ness? The fundamental question, that is, concerns the ultimate
CRITICAL REMARKS 225
meaning of this "operative intentionality," how it effects a
sedimentation leading to the body's being experienced as a
"synergetic system."
The flux of intentional processes is a temporal flow or move-
ment. As Merleau-Ponty contends, if we consider any moment,
"A," it is, as present, a "field"; i.e., it discloses itself as retentive
of phases of the same flux "before" ("past") the present phase,
and as protentive to phases still to come. We can diagram this
complexity, ignoring the objects of these temporal phases for
the moment, according to Husserl's time-lectures:
J:.
protentional
...
', c-1
(Husserl)
impressional Etc.
retentional
A B C
2.
(Merleau-Ponty)
Reproducing this (No. 2) quite inaccurately, Merleau-Ponty
states that when we move from t1 (A) to t2 (B), at which time
(a "now-phase" occurring after that at ti) A is retained now as
a former "now-phase," the fact that A' (A as retained at B, i.e.,
t
2
) is retained now as the same A as before (only now retained as
past) is not due to a "synthesis of identification," but rather to
a "synthesis of transition." For, the former, he believes (quite
wrongly, as we saw), is strictly "automatic."
In order to have the problem clearly before us, it will be
helpful to outline a few points in Husserl's analysis of inner-
time consciousness. First, though, we should reemphasize the
226 MERLEAU-PONTY
fact that Merleau-Ponty's use of "intentional synthesis," and
especially "synthesis of identification," is unjustifiably narrow,
and clearly incorrect as regards Husserl's own analyses. What
Merleau-Ponty understands by "synthesis of identification," in
fact, is only one kind of identification, namely, the explicit, active
objectivating identification, i.e., the "I identify" (the cat I now
see with the cat I saw yesterday, for instance).
Husserl has established, to the contrary, that the syntheses
occurring in the temporal flux of consciousness, those which
account for the retentiveness and protentiveness of the phases of
this flux, are of necessity automatic. In any now-phase of the
Erlebnisstrom, there is an automatic retentive intending of
phases past of itself, and an automatic protentive intending of
phases future to itself. If we refer to Husserl's own diagram of
internal time, this complexity stands out clearly:
Considering phase B at t2 as the "now-phase," it is clear that it is at
once "impressional," "retentional," .and "protentional." The
phase, A (t1) is retained automatically at phase B as a. .was
an impressional consciousness with its own complexity: 1_t is retamed
"now" as a phase which was itself retentional and protentional; among
the phases protended at A is the present phase, B, which was protended
(B- 1) as a phase which will be retentive of A. Similarly, at phase B,
just-just-past phase, Z (to) is now retained directly (Z2) as a phase which
was itself similarly complex and which pretended future phases, among
them the present phase B (B-2) and the just-past phase A (A-
1
) which is
also retained at B (Al). Moreover, since phase A is also retained at B, and
since phase A is retained as itseliretentive to Z (Zl), phase Z is retained at
B both directly (Z2) and by means of phase A (Zl through Al from A).
Now, phase Z is retained at B as being the same phase Z which is
directly retained and which is retained through retained phase A. There
are not, i.e., two "Z's," but rather only one. At the same time, however,
phases A and Z are retained at B, not as constituting a single whole, but
rather as dilferent phases of the samemental life.
In short, at any phase of the temporal flux, we have an identi/yi11g and
diflerentiating sy1lthesis which goes on automatically and continuously:
each phase is identified_ with itself and at the same time differentiated
from all other phases of itself as different. Hence, each phase is auto-
matically retained with its own specific complexity, as itself retentively
and protentively intentive to other phases of the same temporal flux; and
thus, among those phases protended by the past phase is the pres7nt
phase, and the past phase is now retained as a phase which was protentive
to the present phase as a phase which will have been retentive to it. The
same complexity pertains as well to all protentive intending.
We have, of course, simplified enormously; specifically, we have
CRITICAL REMARKS 227
completely ignored the fact that every temporal phase of
consciousness is a consciousness of objects, and that, in addition
to the complex retentive-protentive-impressional structure of
the temporal flux, the objects of each of these phases are them-
selves synthetically identified with themselves and differentiated
from one another as objects of the respective phases. Moreover,
we have ignored the even more complicated time-structure of
active consciousness (e.g., explicit recollection). Our brief indi-
cation, though, is sufficient for us to establish several crucial
points regarding Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of internal time.
At any now-phase, Merleau-Ponty contends, referring to his
own diagram (which is quite different from Husserl's),
What is given to me is A seen transparently through A', then this
ensemble through A" and so on, just as I see the pebble itself through t he
depths of water which flow over it. (PP, 478)
This a travers de, or "transparence," he believes, is effected by
means of a "synthesis of transition." (PP, 480) In ot her words,
the consciousness of internal time is not a consciousness of a
discrete appearance of a particular phase, A, but rather
a single phenomenon of flow. Time is the unique movement which
expresses itself in all of its parts like a gesture encompasses all the muscu-
lar contractions necessary for it to be realized. (PP, 479)
Now, what Merleau-Ponty describes as the synthesis of
transition, it seems to me, is an attempt to describe the noetic
aspect of inner-time consciousness, that is, the characteristic of
the temporal flux as being a temporal continuum taking place
within the same mental life.1 Consciousness experiences itself as
a unitarily enduring flux, then, if our interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty is correct, by virtue of the fact that the particular phases
of this flux flow into one another like the various components of
a gesture flow int9 one another constituting a whole; or, con-
versely, the flux of inner time is a single movement which takes
into itself its various components. In other words, it seems to me
evident that what Merleau-Ponty describes as the consciousness
of inner time is precisely what Bergson had called a "qualitative
multiplicity."
i It should be noted that here Merleau-Ponty goes counter to his own expressed
intentions, viz. to give a noematic description of lived experience.
____________________________ ... a ..... _.._._ ____________________ _.
228 MERLE A U-P 0 NTY
But if we are correct in this interpretation, it must be pointed
out that the notion of "synthesis of transition" conceals more
than it reveals. If it is a description of the constitution of the
flux-character of the internal time of mental life, then this
synthesis is not at all single, but multiple; or, perhaps better, the
synthesis of transition by virtue of which the various phases of
mental life are connected to form a temporal continuum pre-
supposes two more fundamental syntheses.
If, in fact, each phase of the flux were not simultaneously
retentively and protentively intentive to phases other than itself
as identical with themselves and dilf erent from the present one, there
could not be any transition from one phase to another phase, since
unless each phase were intentively consituted as self-identical
and as different from all other phases of the same mental life,
there would be no "one" nor "another" phase much less a
" transition" from "one" to "another." But this means that
syntheses of identification and differentiation are essential to
inner time, for without them there would be neither a transition
nor, for that matter, any "flux."
To call the stream of consciousness a "stream," or " flux,"
is to say much more than that there occur a multiplicitly of
transitions: in the first place, it is to say that the phases of this
stream are related to one another as "earlier" and "later". In the
second place, it is to say that these temporal determinations are
constant, that is, that if a phase occurs "before" another, the
relation of "earlier" is maintained no matter how "past" the
phases become: if A happens before B, it will always be "earlier"
than B. In the third place, it is to say that every phase maintains
a constantly changing relation to the present phase, becoming
present, then just-past, then further past, and so on. And, thus, it
is clear that syntheses of identification and differentiation are
essential to inner time: Merleau-Ponty's "synthesis of tran-
sition," even if one interprets it as noetic, presupposes these two
more fundamental automatic syntheses.
There is a second difficulty with Merleau-Ponty's description
of inner time, one which quite possible may have been based on
his inaccurate reproduction of tbe time diagram. At any one
phase, he contends, what is immediately given is not A", which
I would then take as an adumbration of A', and this in tum as an
CRITICAL REMARKS
229
adumbration of A itself; that is, I do not move from adumbration
to the thing itself (A). Rather, at C, I have A itself, seen through
the adumbrations A' and A" which A itself casts off:
If the adumbrations (A.bschattungen) A' and A" appear to me as adum-
brations of A, this is not because they all participate in an ideal unity
which would be their common ground (raison). It is because I have,
through or by means of them, the point A itself, in its unimpeachable
incliviclnality, founded once and for all by its passage into the present
and because I see the adumbrations A', A" , spring up from it .... (PP,
478)
Now, on the one hand, if this were a correct account, then,
once A were past, I could never remember A itself apart from
any Abschattungen of it. And this, it seems to me, entails a re-
appearance of the old, unwarranted Vorstellungstheorie which
Merleau-Ponty quite justifiably criticizes elsewhere: the A itself
is past and all that is present are a series of Abshattungen by
means of which A itself is given to me. To be sure, he contends
that I have A itself by means of its adumbrations; but never-
theless, instead of describing this "having of A" as a retentional
consciousness of A, he states that there are "in" the present
certain adumbrations of A. Notwithstanding his claim to have
A itself, then, his theory entails a form of the "theory of ideas."
On the other hand, he does not at all give an account of the very
point at issue: in virtue of what does it happen that at CI can
remember not only A, but also A', and yet there are not two A's,
but only one?
The difficulty with Merleau-Ponty's substitute theory is that
he insists on talking of Abschattu1igen here, when this is quite out
of place. It is not that A' and A" are Absckattu1igen of A, lmt
rather that they are all A itself, ln1.t seen at different times. Or more
correctly, when A itself was present, there was an impressional
consciousness of it, but as it recedes into the past it is retained in
each succeeding phase, not by means of adumbrations "in" the
present phase, but is retained strictly as it itself, but now re-
tentively modified. Thus, for instance, when I saw the chair
yesterday, and then look at it again today, my present perception
of it is not an Abschattwng of the chair I saw yesterday; rather,
my impressional consciousness of the chair now is at the same
time a retentional consciousness of the same chair as I saw it
yesterday, as well as a simultaneous protentive intending. of
230 MERLEAU-PONTY
future possible perceivings of the chair as the same chair now
seen and retained ... and much more, which we ignore here.
If my perception of the chair were really analogous to a per-
ceiving of a rock at the bottom of a pool, then "the" chair would
never be seen except in the past; my present perception of it
would be only a perception of one of the "waves" in the pool
the chair, but not thechairitself: I cannot, tempo-
rally, swim to the bottom of the pool. And, I submit, this is
absurd.
What there is in the present phase of a consciousness of the
chair now-perceived, is not an "adumbration" of a past seen
chair, but rather a retentive intending of it as seen before, and
a synthesis of identification of the chair as seen before and now
retained as seen before, and the chair as now seen - and simul-
taneously, a synthesis of differentiation of the two perceivings
of the same object as different, or as occurring in different phases
of the temporal flux.
Finally, Merleau-Ponty can in no way account for the process
of by means of "synthesis of transition." Simple
transition cannot account for progressive accumulation. For the
latter to occur, in fact, not only must the flux be transitional
but there must be a consciousness of t he flux in all its full
plexity, as we have outlined it above. By failing to notice that
the synthesis of transition presupposes syntheses of identification
and differentiation at the automatic level, Merleau-Ponty is in no
position to notice another fundamental type of synthesis.
If these syntheses of identification and differentiation go on
automatically throughout the course of mental life, there then
occurs as well what Husserl calls a " universal transference of
,, al th
sense, or, we can so say, e "synthesisof associativepairing."1
Without being able here to enter into all the details of this
synthesis (which, like those of identification and differentiation
constitutes a universal principle of all mental life as such), we
nevertheless indicate it by means of an example. Suppose I now
have in my visual field two Abgeliobenheiten, a black spherical-
like thing and a black square-like thing. I begin by perceiving
the first, then move my regard over to the other:
1
Cartesian Mul.ita.tions, op. cit., 39 and 5L
CRITI CAL REMARKS 23r
E- ---- ----Jll>
(2) y (l)
Automatically, and universally throughout the range of mental
life, there occurs a transference of sense: looking at the black
circle before looking at the black square, consciousness auto-
matically and immediately transfers the sense of the first to the
second. But, in this example, the transferred sense ("black,
spherical-like, visually perceived thing") is not completely
harmonious with the now-presented sense " (black, square-like,
visually perceived thing"). If they were, a synthesis of identifi-
cation would automatically occur (with, of course, a synthesis of
differentiation at the same time). But, part of the transferred
sense conflicts with the presented sense, while another component
transfers readily (they are both "black" and "visually perceived
things"). Thus, there occurs a certain "overlaying" of sense,
constituting the two as a "pair"; and, Husserl points out,
As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a
mutual transfer of sense - that is to say: an apperception of each accor-
ding to the sense of the other, so far as moments of sense actualized in
what is experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of
"different." 1
Moreover, with the annulment of the sense "circle," when
transferred to the "square," and with the annulment of the sense
"square" when transferred back to the "circle," there is forth-
with constituted a new sense for each: the "circle" now acquires
the sense, "not-square," and the "square" acquires the sense,
"not-circular. " Only in this way, which Husserl calls the transfer
of sense with the consciousness of "different," are the two consti-
tuted as a "pair" of a particular kind.
What Husserl has discovered, it seems to me, is precisely the
way in which sedimentation occurs, first automatically and then
1
Ibid., p. n:3.
232 MERLEAU-PONTY
actively. Suppose there goes on, now, in the mental life of a very
young infant, a global perceiving of a rattle. As Piaget 1 has
pointed out, the infant at first seeks not simply to see the rattle,
but to see its noise, to grasp the noise and perchance the color. In
Husserlian terms, once a particular process with its object occurs,
henceforth every other process and object acquires the sense of
the first (by way of transfer of sense). As Piaget expressed it, the
tendency of reflex and other activity is to assimilate the whole
universe to its activity. But it cannot; hence, it must accommo-
date itself to it; and this double process involves of necessity
a process of internal organization. In Husserlian terms, which, of
course, are not precisely equivalent to Piaget's, the transferred
sense, "seeable" (as regards the noise) conflicts with the presented
sense; and, as a consequence, in the on-going course of the
infant's experience the two eventually become constituted as
"different" (but "similar," precisely in respect to their seeming
to occur "at the same place and time," being sensuous qualities,
and so on).
There thus occurs, after a series of failures to transfer sense,
a synthesis of dissimilarity in respect of the qualities in question
(what is "seeable" and what is "audible"). In virtue of this,
these consequences of the transfer of sense (whatever harmoni-
ously carries over and whatever is annaled, in respect of sense),
is automaticalby carried over into subsequent experience. For
instance, when the infant sees "red" at one time and touches the
"object" which is red, henceforth all "red" objects acquire the
sense, "touchable". He then, suppose, sees the red of an electric
heater and reaches out to touch it. . . and gets burned: here
the transferred sense, "touchable" (like all other such reds
pefore this), is abruptly annuled. Henceforth, "red" objects will,
at least, be approached with a good deal of caution in respect of
the sense, "touchable." Or, in a reverse case: there can occur
transfers of sense in the past, such that past perceived objects
can undergo an alteratipn in sense for consciousness: when the
infant touches the "red" heater, other "red" objects can acquire
the sense, "don't touch," even those seen and touched in.the
past. There is a sense, then, in which the past has its own style
1
There is here a close parallel lo Husserl which should be can:ied further, though
we cannot do it here.
CRITI CAL REMARKS
233
of change: e.g., finding a quicker way to do some task, past
attempts to do it acquire the sense, " I could have done it quicker
if .... "
Now, although we have not fully circumscribed this universal
principle, it is clear, I think, that just this automatic synthesis
of associative pairing accounts for the phenomenon of sedi-
mentation - if we remember that it is founded on the more
fundamental syntheses of identification and differentiation. And,
just because Merleau-Ponty completely ignores, nor does not see
it, he in no way can account for what even he takes as essential
to all consciousness. His effort to account for by
means of "syntheses of transition" is not so much a complete
failure (since, in a sense such syntheses do occur), as it is wholly
inadequate, presupposing just those syntheses which fully and
descriptively give this account.
It now remains, after our critical appraisal of the central
theses of his theory, to attempt to state what, fundamentally,
Merleau-Ponty has attempted to achieve.
(3) THE MEANING OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'EXISTENTIALISM'
Throughout the course of this exposition and criticism, we
have maintained that Merleau-Ponty has "prior commitments"
which to a considerable extent color his theory, particularly in
respect of bis interpretations and practice of phenomenonlogy.
We have not yet engaged in an explicit discussion of this problem.
It is proper to do so now, in this concluding section.
The genuine force, I submit, as well as the fundamental di-
rection, of his theory of the body (and, indeed, of his whole
philosophy), lies in his effort to present a concrete ontology of
human existence - an "existentialism." It would seem that he
would agree with de Waelhens, when the latter writes,
But beyond phenomenology's disclosure and analysis of the structures
furnished by perception, one can and must inquire into the mode of being
of these structures, of the beings which embody them, and of the being
(man) who lives them. Phenomenological reflection reaches its completion
in ontology .1
i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 391. If this means that the mode of being of some
phenomenon can be investigated "in itself", apart from its being inJendeil, then
pbenomenology is simply discarded, not completed, by ontology. If intentionality is
still maintained, then ontology can only be phenomenological ontology. In both cases,
de Waelhens is wrong.
234 MERLEAU-PONTY
As regards the problem of the body, we have seen how he
accomplishes this transition. Nevertheless, I submit, for Merleau-
Ponty the transition is not at all from phenomenology to onto-
logy; rather, he begins and ends witlt an onrology, and everything
else is seen from this perspective.l
We can state with some justification that the genuine "ex-
istential" problem in his work is the following: having seen that
all "existence personnelle" is founded on a stratum of "e:icistence
figee et pre-personnelle," how am I, this individual person or self,
related to this stratum and to the world disclosed by means of it?
His fundamental quest, that is, seems to me to concern the
significances which "my body," "my perception," "my life,"
" my existence," and so on, hold for me, what they signify as
regards my-Self, my experience of and relation to myself. We
must seek to justify this claim.
The best clue for our interpretation is given in the concluding
pages of the section, in his major work, on "Autrni et le Monde
Humain," where he writes,
The problem concerning the existential modality of the social here
rejoins all the problems of transcendance. "Whether it is a matter concer-
ning my body, the natural world, the past, birth or death, the question
is always to know how I can be open to phenomena which go beyond me
and which nevertheless exist only to the extent that I apprehend and live
them; the question is how the preseme to nvyself (Urpriisenz) which defines
me atul conditions every alien presence is at the same time a "dis-presentation"
(Etitgegenwiirligtmg) a1ul thrusts me outside myself. (PP, P 7)
Merleau-Ponty at his best never speaks of "consciousness," but
of me-myself, my experience. The "existential" problem, that is
to say, is for Merleau-Ponty preeminently that of developing an
anthropology, a logos of man; but not "man" in the abstract,
defined either siib specie aeternitatis or by means of species and
genera. Man, for Merleau-Ponty and the rest of the existentialists,
must be investigated according to his essence, according to what
it means to be mci, to be human. But man, being that peciluar
etant who is simultaneously an object in the world among other
objects (some of which are also "other men"), and a subject for
whom the world is the world; and, being that etant who at the
same time (being a "subject" for whom there is a world at all) is
1
e ~ the author's, "Existentialism as a Logos of Man: The case of Merleau-Ponty,"
Memornu (XIII International Congress of Philosophy, Universidad Autonoma de
Mexico, 1963), La Probkma tkl Hombre, Vol Ill.
CRITICAL REMARKS
235
aware of himself as both object and subject in the world - as
such, man is an unimpeachably unique, individual, historical
etant. Namely, he is himself, he is "this" man, he is individual and
historical by essence. Accordingly, the logos of man, existential-
ism, seeks to disclose the essence of man in his own "concreteness,
as an individual, historical etant, whose essence is his existence.
For Merleau-Ponty, in fact ,
The central phenomenon, which founds at once my subjectivity and
my transoendance .. . , consists in the circumstance that I am given to
myself. I am given, that is to say that I find myself already situated and
engaged in a ph]'Sical and social world - I am given to myself, that is to say
that this situation is never concealed from me; it is never around me as a
necessity which is strange and alien to me; and, I am never effectively
closed within it like an object in a bottle. (PP, 413)
Here, Merleau-Ponty re-emphasizes his rejection of the tra-
ditional theory of the mind as a closed interiority, and also, it
should be noted, his rejection of Sartre's conception of pour-soi
as an absolute interiority. I am, that is to say, a being who is,
in his being, thrust into a world which is for me "toujours-deja-
la" because I am a being who is incarne by a body which is like-
wise "toujours-deja-la" for me, this person. My being, thus. is to
be-to-the-world, being-to-the-world by means of a structured
organism (my body) which, being of the same kind as the world,
engages me in the very stuff, the very texture of the world;
which places me "at " the world, dans le milieu des choses. My
being, therefore, is to be-embodied-to-the-world and, by experi-
encing this fundamental thrust, t o be a presense-a-moi.-minie.
To be engage presupposes a consciousness of that engagement: I
am a presence-to-the-world ("dis-presentation") by means of
being a presence-to-myself (Urprasenz), for if I were unaware of
my engagement, it would not be for me. In other words, I am at
once "to-myself" and "to-the-world."
This reflexiveness of my relation to myself and to the world,
to my body and to the things disclosed by means of it, derives
from the fundamental essence of my subjectivity itself: temporal-
i ty. In virtue of the fact that the Erlebnisstr6m is itself reflexive,
that is, is a "champ de presence" which fixes itself as present
because it retentively intends a past as protentive of itself and
protentively intends a future as retentive of itself - in virtue of
this complex self-intentiveness,
MERLEA U-PONTY
It is essential to time to be not only effective time or time which flow
or but also time which knows itself (se satt), because the explosio:
or spbtting apart (dihiscence) of the present toward a future is the arche-
type of the 1'elati<>n of the self to itself and outlines an interiority or an
ipseity (Selbstheit). (PP. 487)
But, this very reflexiveness, he contends, can be understood
only if we dismiss all notions of subjectivity as a sort of primal
"stuff" or "substance," of the subject as a mere a priori condition
of possibility. And, indeed, the peculiar self-reflexiveness of
temporality . (its self-intentiveness) discloses to us that no non-
egological theory of consciousness can be correct.1 Rather, he
maintains, it is necessary to say that
, Time is ti;iat is to say, th.e temporal dimensions ... all express a
smgle bursting a smgle which is subjectivity itself. It is necessary
to understand time as sub1ect and the subject time. (PP, 482-83)
This self-reflexive intentiveness of temporality, being consti-
tutive of a cham,p de presence, moreover, is a sort of "bursting"
("eclatement") or "thrust" ("poussee"). That is to say, the
fundamental being of subjectivity is that it is an "ekstasis," a
standing-out-from--itself-to . .. , a "de-presentation" of itself while
at the same time being a presence to itself. Thus, he argues,
We are thus always led to a conception of the subject as an ek-stasis
and to a active transcendance between the subject and
_The world JS mseparable from the subject, but from a subject who
IS nothing other than a project to the world. And, the subject is inseparable
the world, but from a world which he himself projects. Tlie subject
IS-to-the-world, and the world remains "subjective" since its texture and
its articulations are sketched out by the subject's movement of transcen-
dance. (PP, 491-92)
Accordingly, because of the self-reflexiveness of the temporally
"ek-sisting" subject, "We hold time entirely, and we are present
to ourselves because we are present to the world." (PP, 485)
As we have seen, to complete this interpretation, this tempo-
rality is itself possible only because, he contends, the subject is
engage, because he is an etre-att-monde; that is, because he is to-
the-world by being embodied therein. The body-as-lived by this
l This is one of the much-debated topics in phenomenology. Cf. Sartre's The
of the Ego, op. cit., directed against Husserl; Gurwitscb, "A Non-
Egologtcal Consciousness," PPR, Veil. I (March, 1941), pp. 325- 38; and
The Empmcal and Transcendental Ego," in: For Roman Ingarden: Nine
E1says 1n Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, :i960, pp. '42-S3, esp. 48-50.
CRITICAL REMARKS 237
consci1mce-e-ngagee. then. becomes the decisive moment in the
constitution of the objective world, just because there would be
no world, no being, if he were not embodied by a body which
discloses the world because it inhabits the world. Etre-au-monde,
therefore, necessitates etre--iticarne; or, etre-incarne makes etre-
au-monde possible. In short, the self-reflexiveness of the temporally
ek-sisting subject is a projecting, a trans-cending, to the world only
because he is an embodied being who as such "belongs" to
the world because he "dwells therein."
In this manner, I believe, it is possible to see quite clearly the
justification for my contention that Merleau-Ponty's funda-
mental position and starting-point, his "prior commitment,"
is an "existentialism" of the style just outlined. This position lies
at the root of his entire study, and it forms the texture and
framework within which all of his interpretations of phenome-
nology, of traditional psychology, and of Gestalt psychology
are woven. As well, it is the fundamental setting for all his
concrete analyses of perception, of the body, space, time, Others,
and so on. For him, one might say, a problem is philosophical
only in so far as it in some way involves the question concerning
man - just as, for Marcel, anthropology forms the fundamental
task of philosophy. In short, phenomenology, Gestalt-psychology,
and the rest, are not so much seen as genuine disciplines in their
own right and in their own terms, but rather as a collection of
tools for carrying out a preconceived existentialism; phenome-
nology, in the end, is a crutch which is soon discarded.
It is unfortunately the case, nevertheless, that despite the
preeminence of this style of existentialism, Merleau-Ponty rarely
engages in an explicit discussion and formulation of it, for
purposes of clarification, much less justification. It is evident, I
believe, that this is the point towards which everything else
leads and derives its significance. Indeed, I am convinced that
the clarification of the themes entangled in his works, and their
root in his existentialism, is crucial enough to stand by itself,
apart from our criticisms.
We can now see with full clarity, however, the really central
difficulty in his entire study. What justifies this existentialism
itself? What justifies, moreover, the interpretation of phenome-
nological principles and methods, concepts and terms, in this
MERLEAU-PONTY
"existential" manner? As regards the body, what justifies the
interpretation of phenomenologically explicated structures as
revelations of "being?" What, in the end, justifies the attempt
to maintain the theory of intentionality while at the same time
maintaining that "being" can be considered apart from "being
intended?"
With Merleau-Ponty, it is clear, not only are such questions
not answered, they are not even raised. And, I submit, the
"raison" for this fundamental oversight is also understandable,
if not justifiable: far from going to an existential ontology from
phenomenology, as de Waelhens suggests, Merleau-Ponty begins
and ends with his existentialism. It is, so to speak, constantly in
his back-pocket, constantly present without being made overt;
its principles are the gloves with which he shakes hands, the
colored glasses through which the world is viewed. And, just in
so far as he never raises up these principles themselves and
submits them to inspection, he violates his own statement of
the essential nature of philosophy, that the philosopher is always
"un perpetuel."
EPILOGUE
(1) The decision to treat the theories of the body presented by
Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was neither hasty nor arbi-
trary. For, despite the many important differences among their
respective theories (and even more, in their philosophies), it has
become apparent that there are several striking, indeed -funda-
mental, similarities among them. To preface our concluding
remarks, then, it seems advisable to state explicitly these
common grounds before we attempt to delineate the significance
and direction of our study as a whole.
To begin with, it seems to be characteristic of each of these
philosophers that they are at war with certain predominant
trends of traditional philosophy. More particularly, one of the
basic roots of most modern philosophy, the dualisms of mind and
body and between appearance and reality, is subjected to a
wholesale rejection - or, at the very least, to critical re-evaluation.
To a considerable extent, the effort to overcome, or perhaps to
undercut, these dualisms is the motive force behind their various
works. And, although I have tried to show that Sartre's dualism,
the dialectics of en-soi and pour-soi, is but a neo-Cartesianism, it
must nevertheless be acknowledged that his work is an explicit
attempt to surmount the Cartesian dualism while still retaining
the genuine insights which led to that opposition between mind
and body in the first place.
Each of the theories we have studied marshals essentially
the same arguments against the "message-theory" of sense-
perception; each, again, critically rejects the traditional theory of
sense-data; each, finally, rejects the implicit conception of the
body as a passivity or a receptivity, and tries to establish the
body as fundamentally active. Expressed in different terms, each
of these philosophers seeks to establish the phenomenal experi-
EPILOGUE
ence of the animate organism as a legitimate, and indeed a
decisive, philosophical issue. This attempt to view the body-
proper as a phenomenon - precisely and only as it presents itself
to the one whose body-proper it is - necessitates re-conceiving
the so-called mind-body problem in new terms.
This new framework, I have suggested, is that of the body-as-
experienced, or more correctly, the phenomenon of embodiment
(etre-incarne). In this sense, one might well suggest that each of
these thinkers is not so much rejecting Descartes' meditations
on the problem as he is addressing himself to what Descartes
himself had recognized: the peculiar circumstance that, though
my mind is not like my body, nor my body like my mind,
nevertheless I am not "in" my body like a boatman is "in" his
boat. Each thinker, that is to say, is actively accepting Descartes'
invitation, enunciated in his Preface to the Meditations, to
mediate along with Descartes in his effort to establish a foun-
dational certitude.
Over and above a shared discontent with traditional philoso-
phy, however, each bas recognized and focused on the phenome-
non of the animate organism as a genuinely unique and philo-
sophically crucial one. The body-proper is the matrix of concrete
human existence ; it is the "center of action," that which places
me "at" or "in" the midst of things; it is that "by means of
which" there is a "world" at all for me; it is that which at once
is my presence to the world, and is the world's presence to me. As
such, my body-proper at once ex-poses me to my UmweU and
opens up my UmweU to me as a complex concatenation of possible
ways of acting, doing, and being. In short, "objects" in the
world - whether they be simple objects of perceiving or objects of
a more complex sort - are discovered as "poles of action,"
correlates of my bodily activity on them, as Piaget had emphasized.
Objects in the world, in so far as they are for me only in virtue of
my being embodied in the midst of them by my body-proper,
are thus disclosed as essentially connected to my possible bodily
action on and with them. If my body-proper is my means of
having a world and of acting within it, on objects, and with
objects, "the" world and its objects are, then, strictly the
correlates of that consciousness of them.
This common style of analysis reveals yet another basic
EPILOGUE
characteristic. Focusing upon the body-proper, these thinkers
have each claimed to have discovered, or at least to have re-
discovered amidst the debris of traditional philosophy and with
the radically new perspective on the animate organism, the
core phenomenon of philosophy as such: la condition humaine,
human subjectivity, or perhaps best expressed, man's being-in-
reality. The concrete analysis of the body-proper, in other words,
opens up the possibility of investigating human being as such -
not, perhaps, for the first time, but at least in a distinctively new
fashion, disclosing new dimensions to man's concrete being -
and thus makes it possible to comprehend the human condition in
its actual concreteness and existential complexity. From this
perspective, it becomes apparent that the human condition is
fundamentally an ontological phenomenon, a phenomenon of
being. And thus, as Merleau-Ponty has seen, all the various
"aspects" or "activities" of man (that he is a perceiving, knowing,
acting being; that he is a social, biological, economic creature;
and so on) must now of essential necessity be conceived as
moments of his being: "knowing," as Sartre has put it, is a mode
of being of pour-soi; "perceiving," as Merleau-Ponty expressed it,
is a mode of man's being-to-the-world.
In this respect, each of these thinkers is concerned with the
discovery and explication of man's being-in-reality and, as
Maurice N atanson bas emphasized, it is this fundamental
direction more than anything else which permits us to treat each
of these :thinkers within the covers of a single work. If, that is to
say, it is still legitimate to speak of "existentialism" it is because
of this fundamental concern and orientation toward being-in-
reality .J. In an even wider sense, so as not to distort Sartre's
stated :intention to write a phenomenological ontology, they
each seek to gain access to the foundational relatedness of
man's being to other beings and to Being as such.
This quest, then, in each of their works turns toward sub-
jectivity, or consciousness, or, as with Marcel, the human self.
And here we have seen that each of them is struck by a peculiar
CL M. Natanson, "Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature," Carolina
Quarterly (i:959), pp. x7-30, esp. p. r9: "What I take to be.central and decisive for all
existentialist philosophy is a concern for what I wish to call man's being in reality."
Cf. also bis article, "Being-lnReallty," PPR, vol. xx, no. 2 (Dec., i:959), pp. 23r--i37.
EPILOGUE
characteristic of human being, one so fundamental that for each
it is considered as the very essence of human-reality: for man, to
be is always and essentially to be aware of him.self as such, to be
able to withdraw into himself and put himself into question.!
Or, as Marcel has expressed it, man is that being whose being
is to be in quest of itself: man is homo vial.or. Without any doubt,
it seems to me, this is the core meaning of such basic concepts
as Marcel's "mystery," Sartre's "pour-soi," and Merleau-Ponty's
"etre-au-monde." To be man is to be at once an object in a world
among other objects (some of which are other men, and other
animate creatures as well} ; a sub-ject with respect to which the
world and its objects are objects and world; and, as subject,
to be reflexively self-cognizant of himself as both object and
subject in a world wherein there are other beings who are
themselves subjects and objects in precisely the same sense (i.e.,
alter egos).
On the grounds of this compounded reflexivity of the prime
"subject-matter" of philosophy, philosophy becomes "experience
transmuted in thought." It itself becomes revealed as a self-
reflexive enterprise, seeking to disclose its own roots, its own
essence, its own justification. The philosopher, as Merleau-Ponty
states, must be a "perpetual beginner." Thus, philosophy faces
the unique situation of being a self-reflexive inquiry into a self-
reflexive being, man: hence, the often rather disconcerting
dialectical tangles so characteristic of these thinkers' works.
Kierkegaard's remarkable foresight proves to be the fountain-
head of existential philosophy: Truth is Subjectivity and Sub-
jectivity is Truth.
(2) These remarks indicate several other points which we
cannot fully explore in this work, but which unquestionably
deserve careful attention. In the first place, whereas we have
pointed out the indebtedness of Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's
theories to the work of Husserl (as well as their abuses of Hus-
serl's work), it remains for us to explore the possibilities of con-
structing a phenomenology of the animate organism on the
1 Ortega y Gasset agrees with this as well, which he calls man's eii.simismamie11to,
literally, "within-one's-selfness." Cf. Man and People, W. W. Norton (New York,
1957). pp. 16-18.
EPILOGUE
243
basis of our critical examination of these theories. Before I at-
tempt to outline this possibility, however, it seems to me ad-
visable to point out another direction in which our study is
necessarily led: to the early, quite remarkable, work of Henri
Bergson.
Although neither Marcel, Sartre nor Merleau-Ponty has
apparently noted this, it was Bergson who first saw, with great
insight, the genuine significance and peculiarity of the body, and
the necessity of re-formulating the question of the relations
between mind and body in terms of an analysis of the human
body.
It is well known that Bergson himself was already becoming
aware of the deep-rooted and antagonistic dualism of traditional
philosophy. Indeed, in his Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la
Conscience (published in I888}, it would seem that he was already
cognizant to some extent of the difficulties implicit in the Carte-
sian dualism of substances, the res extensa and the res cogitans.
Once one accepts such a dualism, be is faced with the insoluable
problem of establishing the principle of connection between
these two essentially different substances, and he must either
reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind, in order to solve this
insoluable _problem:
... It could be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties which
certain philosophical problems raise do not come from the attempt to
juxtapose in space the phenomena which in no way occupy space ...
When an illegitimate translation from the unextended to the extended,
from quality into quantity, has inserted the contradiction at the very
heart of the question posed, is it astonishing that the contradiction is follDd
in the solutions which one gives? (Essai, vii)
This dualism is in reality, as Bergson studies it, an entire
series of dualisms, between quality and quantity, time and space,
the "deep self" and the "outer self," freedom and determinism.
Fundamentally, however, they are all but different expressions
of that between exteriority and interiority - that is, the Cartesian
dualism. Though he is aware of the many difficulties implicit in
this dualism, Bergson (in the Essai) nevertheless seems to accept
it as valid, and goes on to conceive exteriority and interiority as
in combat with one another. And even more, from the side of
interiority it has historically been a losing battle: exteriority
EPILOGUE
usurps interiority, space usurps time (which then becomes
"spatialized time"), and so on. Idealists and realists, materialists
and spiritualists, rationalists and empiricists - all, Bergson
believes, have in fact been guilty of identically the same error:
externalizing interiority, quantifying quality, objectifying the
non-objectifiable, in an interminable antagonism.
In his Essai, nevertheless, Bergson does not attempt to deny
or reject the dualism, but rather to rediscover the side of sub-
jectivity for its own sake. The psychical, or subjectivity, he
maintains, is in essence one heterogeneous, qualitative multiplici-
ty, each component of which is essentially unique, non-repeatable,
and, being a component in such a flux or duree, has its own
essential functional place within that "whole," interpenetrating
other components, being interpenetrated by them together and
individually, and all of them constituting the whole. In short,
Bergson here discovers, although in terms of the very framework
he seeks to overcome, the phenomenon of context, or, as the
Gestalt psychologists were to say later, of /orm.
In his second, genuinely decisive work, Matiere et Memoire,1
Bergson seeks to overcome this antagonism of his Essai.
Through a remarkably conceived theory of matter and of
memory, he seeks to find a "mi-<:hemin" between idealism and
realism, admitting on the first page that he now explicitly
accepts that dualism which he never questioned in his Essai.
However, it is in a secondary thesis in the first chapter of
M at-iere et M emoire that we find an argument which is crucial for
the three philosophers of this study. We will ignore, then, the
otherwise novel theses of the book in order to concentrate on this
other thesis concerning the body.
With what one might call a rather desparate effort to undercut
the traditional dualism between idealism and realism, while yet
keeping its framework of analysis, Bergson, wanting to affu"m
"the reality of mind, the reality of matter, and attempt to deter-
mine the relation between them," (MM, r) develops a concepti0n
of "matter" as
an ensemble of "images." And, by "image," we understand a certain ex-
istence which is more than what the idealist calls a representation, but less
1 et Memoire, Presses Univeisitairesde France (Paris, Cinquantequatrieme
Edition, 1953), hereafter cited in the text as MM.
EPILOGUE
245
than what the realist calls a thing - an existence situated midway be-
tween the "thing" and the "representation." (MM, I)
This conception, he believes, coincides with what commonsense
implicitly takes to be the case:
For commonsense, the object exists in itself and, oil the other hand the
object is in itself pictured as we perceive it : it is an image, but an
which exists in itself. (MM, 2)
With this conception, which we need not consider for its own
sake here,
1
Bergson attempts to cut away with one stroke the
underbrush of confusion and excess within the idealist-realist
feud, and to re-establish the relations between l' esprit and la
matiere. In thP course of his inquiry, however, he encounters
a peculiarity - precisely the one which henceforth plays such an
important role in the discussions of the body after him. If, he
argues, all matter whatever consists in an ensemble of images
then
there is one such image which cuts across all others in that I know it
not only from without by means of perceptions, but also from within by
affections: tbisis my body. (MM, n)
This "image" has peculiar characteristics. On the one hand it
seems capable, not simply of 1'eactions to stimuli, but of genuine
actions, that is to say, of a certain spontaneity as regards objects.
It acts in the face of what could hardly be simply called "sen-
sations;" rather, it acts on and reacts to full-bodied objects, to
objects as "dangerous" or "promising," "suspicious" or "bene-
ficial," and SO OD.
At least this "image," "my body," then, is singled out from
the universe of "images" as that by means of which something
new is added to the universe, something not merely the result of
a causal chain - i.e., the spontaneously articulated actions of my
body. (MM, I2, 57, 66) On the other hand, though, and in spite
of its focal position in the universe of matter, the body, he
believes, is itself only a part of the universe. Thus, he argues
against former psychology and physiology, "It is the brain which
1
:;:ter. up this terminology, Bergson then goes on to use "l'image"
and ob3et mterchangeably. In a way, it might be suggested, bad be not insisted on
speaking of "l'image" as "une existence," and bad he taken it instead as "un sens"
his descriptions of things as images would have been quite close to Husserl's
of "pbenomenon."
EPILOGUE
is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the
brain." (MM, 13) Indeed, if one made the brain (or the body itself)
the condition of the "image totale," he would be involved in an
absurdity, just because of that part-whole relation.
- "But if," Bergson continues, "my body is an object capable
of exercising a real and new action on the objects which surround
it, it must occupy in respect of them a privileged situation."
(MM, 14- 15) In that my body is a "centre d'action" for objects,
changing their mutual relations, working on them, and so on,
these objects must themselves be what Merleau-Ponty later will
call "poles of action." That is to say, by being able "to exercise a
real influence on other images, and thus to be able to choose
between several materially possible steps," Bergson concludes, in
a way strikingly similar to what Merleau-Ponty argues later, that
It is indeed necessary that these images in some manner outline (on the
side which they tum toward my body) the part which my body can taJi:e
from them ... (the objects) are organized according to the increasmg or
decreasing powers of my body. The objects which sHrround my body reflect
the possible action of my body on them. (MM, 15-16)
Hence, while matter is the ensemble of images, the perception of
matter becomes, for Bergson, precisely "these same images
related to the possible action of a certain determinate image, my
body." (MM, 17)
With this new perspective, Bergson returns to his criticism of
traditional philosophy, charging that for both realism and idea-
lism, "to perceive signifies above all to know." (MM, 21) Against
this assumption, Bergson now contends, as will each of the
philosophers we have studied, that perception is tiot in the service
of knowledge (or even, more generally, it does not merely or
primarily yield information about the world's material structure);
rather, it is in the service of action. That is to say, perceived
objects are what the body does or can do to them, just because the
body itself is "un centre d' action'':
... we have considered the body as a kind of center from which the
action that surrounding objects exercise on it is reflected on these same ob-
jects: external perception is just this reflection ... Perception ... measures
our possible action on things and by that, inversely, the possible
action of things on us. (MM, 51; also, 35, 74-75, 9 9
Hence, the greater the body's potential action, the larger will be
the field which perception includes, and thus objects in the field of
EPILOGUE
247
perception are experienced as "dangerous" or "beneficial"
inversely to what we might call their actional distance from the
body: the closer the objects the greater the danger or promise
which they present to the body, and thus the body's virtual
action tends more to be actualized in real action. (MM, 57)
As he emphasizes, "The acti4ality of our perception therefore
consists in its activity." (MM, 71)
Now, despite the rather surprising absence of reference to
Bergson's analyses of the body,1 even by Marcel who in other
respects seems to admire Bergson, it seems to me that the very
least which must be said is that Bergson's theory, while obviously
sketchy, is a decisive precursor of these later theories. While it
seems obvious that Bergson couched his conception of the body
in the very framework he had set out to destroy (the dualism),
while he tries to base his analysis on a dated, though for all. that
quite novel, physiology, and while he sets his problems in contexts
which do more to conceal than to reveal his meaning - despite
these circumstances, he nevertheless acieved genuinely original
and profound insights which cannot but have left their mark on
subsequent philosophy, especially in France.
On the one hand, it was Bergson whose work was one of the
first to come to grips with the insuperable difficulties of previous
thought. It was Bergson who called attention to the "privileged
situation" of the body as regards the concrete relations of
consciousness to objects. But beyond that, Bergson leaves little
room for doubt as regards his fundamental point: the "privilege"
which the body enjoys in a consequence of its "peculiarity" as one
"image" among others, that is, that it is concretely experienced
in a double manner by the one whose body it is, "externally" and
"internally." As we shall see, Husserl's own analyses as well take
this double manner of givenness of the animate organism as
decisive. This circumstance, however, Bergson is quick to recog-
nize, is unique. Considering this peculiarity, and recognizing that
my own body is capable of exerting a "real influence" on objects
in the world, Bergson recognizes immediately what Marcel,
1
The only exception, to my knowledge, is Merleau-Ponty's rather cryptic footnote
to the effect that "the body remains for him {Bergson) what we have called the ob
jective body ... " (PP, 93) Such a view, unsupported by Merleau-Ponty, is indeed
unsupportable. What Bergson analyzes Is precisely, I submit, what Merleau-Ponty
calls the "body-proper."
EPILOGUE
Sartre and Metleau-Ponty were later to stress as central: my
body can effect this influence on objects only in so far as it can be
influenced by them. From this insight, Bergson quite correctly
generalizes (again foreshadowing a basic point in these later
theories): the fundamental relations between my body and
surrounding objects is to be conceived in terms of my body's
actual and possible action on them and their action on my body.
Thus perception as well, being a "power" of my body, one of the
modes of my body's action in and on surrounding objects, must
be conceived as fundamentally what I would call actional: to
perceive is to act, not in the sense of effecting a real alteration on
objects (though perception is a necessary condition even for that),
but in the sense that to perceive is to reflect the possible action of
objects on my body and conversely the possible action of my
body on them. Objects are not fu:st of all complexes of physical
entities called atoms, nor is perception the reception of sense-
data caused by the physical motions of these affairs. Objects, for
my experience of them by means of my body, are essentially
connected to my body's action on them, they are "poles of
action."
Nevertheless, Bergson did not fully recognize the real signifi-
cance of his analysis. For, with this conception he has already in
fact undermined the dualism be sought to overcome: to consider
objects as strict poles of action, and my body as actional, is
tantamount to maintaining that objects in the world and
consciousness as embodied are inseparable, that they are strict
correlates of one another, and that, therefore, one must always
consider objects strictly as correlates of the consciousness of
them, and consciousness as the strict correlate to its objects. This
then implies that objects are strictly "meant," or "intended" as
such by consciousness. In other words, bad Bergson pressed the
point to the utmost, it seems to me that his argument is tanta-
mount to the effectuation of a phenomenological reduction - in a
sense precisely analogous to what Aron Gurwitsch argued regar-
ding Kohler's rejection of the constancy-hypothesis.
1
A more complete analysis must obviously be undertaken in
order to determine more accurately the bearing of Bergson's
work on later philosophy, especially on subsequent theories of
1 See above, Part ill, Chapter I, footnote 2, p. 131.
EPILOGUE
249
the body like those studied herein. Without being able to do that
here, I hope only to have initiated such a study, to have es-
tablished the necessity and the justification for it.
(3) It now remains for us to show in what sense it is possible to
outline the principle steps in a systematic phenomenology of the
animate organism - perhaps the decisive direction in which our
study leads.
Viewing our study as a whole, several positive insights into the
phenomenon seems to have been achieved. In the first place it is
clear that the object of study is an extremely for
what we must focus upon here is the concrete experience by
consciousness of its own animate organism. In other words, we
have as our phenomenon a continuously on-going act, that of
embodiment. It is not the case that embodiment is something
which is "once done, forever done." Rather, the animate organism,
in so far as it is experienced concretely by consciousness, is the
continuously on-going embodying of the flux of mental life: In
this sense, the organism can at times (for instance, in moments of
clumsiness, or when one is sleepy or anesthetized) fail to embody
consciousness more or less; at other times (as in moments of "well-
being," when one has "control" over his body, and so forth), it
seems to be my body, more fully actualizing my fundamental "I
can." One specific "object" is in the on-going course of experience
uniquely singled out for consciousness (and at higher levels, for
me, this man) as having thenoematic-objective sense, "my body."
In order to account for experiencing of this organism as, in
Bergson's terms, "privileged" and "peculiar," it is necessary to
explicate phenomenologically this process of "singling out" which
gives to that organism its sense of being the embodiment of that
consciousness whose organism it is. In this sense, to speak of
"my body qua mine" (Marcel), the "body-for-itself" (Sartre), or
the "body-proper" (Merleau-Ponty), is to speak of the pheno-
menon of embodiment.
Second, as each of these thinkers have seen, this "singling out"
on the basis of some kind of "feeling" (sentir).
To "feel" objects in the world, or more generally, in order to
perceive them at all, I must qua perceiver "feel" my own body.
This feeling, in turn, as Merleau-Ponty states the matter, is a
EPILOGUE
function of the motivity of the body-proper; or, to use Marcel's
terms, my body is mine only in so far as it is "me-as-acting."
Third, the disclosure of the motivity of the body-proper
reveals that the body-proper is a certain ensemble of "powers"
or "potencies" (p0tJ.voirs, frtlissances). In this sense, my body is
for me the most immediate actualization of my " I can" (more
fundamentally, of the automatic strivings of consciousness).
Fourth, my body is the primal condition for the existence of
the objective, physico-cultural world (it is, as Marcel says, the
"landmark" of all existence), in the sense that it is the "that by
means of which" there is a world and objects in the first place.
My body, as Sartre stresses, is the orientational center, o: in
terms of which the world and its multiple objects are structured
and organized. _
Finally, my body-proper is a synthetically organized system of
organs, having multiple fields of sensation (visual, tactual,
auditory, and so forth) each of which has its own intrinsic
organization and its own specific functional place in the total
system of the body-proper.
To develop a systematic phenomenology of the animate or-
ganism, however, it is obviously not sufficient merely to enumer-
ate characteristics. It is necessary as well to determine the
relations among the component senses of this complex phenome-
non. Specifically, it must be established which of these com-
ponents are more fundamental ("founding") and which are
higher level components ("founded"). I shall attempt only to
outline such an analysis, to suggest the principle components of
the phenomenon in question, following the brief and scattered
analyses given by Husserl.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, it seems to me that we may
distinguish four moments of the complex noematic-objective
sense, "animate organism": 1 it is, as Husserl expresses it, the
bearer of the orientational point, 0, with respect to which other
objects are organized in the spatio-temporal surrounding world;
the body is as well a certain "organ of perception" (Walmieh-
mungsorgan); it is, in the third place, that on and in which my
fields of sensation are spread out (Sinnesorgan); and, finally,
it is that which most immediately actualizes the automatic
l Cf. Cartesian MuWaticms, op. cU., p. 97.
EPILOGUE
strivings of consciousness, and at higher levels, that which
actualizes my willings (Willensorgan).
My body-proper acquires these senses for consciousness on
the basis of a complex process which continuously and auto-
matically goes on throughout the life of consciousness: that of
embodiment. As such this "sense-constitution" is not, contrary to
Merleau-Ponty, something "once done, forever done." Rather,
as we have seen, my body-proper can and sometimes does fail to
embody consciousness. Thus, the crucial phenomenon for us to
trace out systematically is that process of "singling out" in virtue
of which, in the normal constitution of the body-proper, this
animate organism is experienced as the embodiment of my
consciousness.
The problem as posed, then, reveals the way in which a
solution must be sought. If, as is experientially evident (evident,
that is to say, on the basis of reflectively observing the phenome-
non itself, as it-itself "in person''),1 thi$ organism presents itself
to me as my animate organism, then we must take this noemati-
obj ective sense as our "clue" (Leitfaden) to those Bewusstseinser-
lebnisse in virtue of which the phenomenon is experienced origi-
na/,iter:
Necessarily the point of departure is the object given "straight-
forwardly" at the particular time. From it reflection 2 goes back to the
mode of consciousness at that time and to the potential modes of con-
sciousness includedhorizonally in that mode, then to those in which the
object might be otherwise intended as the same, within the unity (ulti-
mately) o[ a possible conscious life, all the possibilities of which are
included in the "ego." 3
As regards the phenomenon of my animate organism, however,
we face a peculiar difficulty, only hinted at in our discussion of
Marcel. Here we do not have an object-simpliciter. Rather, as
Husserl indicates in one place, when I, the phenomenological
observer, objectivate (for my descriptive purposes) the pheno-
menon in question I see straightaway that my animate organism
is
l CL Cartesian Meditati<ms, op. cit., pp. n-18, for the systematic treatment of
Evidem.
I Always, we must i:emember, such reflection is reflection within the phenomeno
logical reduction.
a Ibid., p. 50; cf. also, pp. 51-53.
252 EPILOGUE
reflexively related to itself. That becomes possible because I "can"
perceive one hand "by means of" the other, an eye by means of a hand,
and so forth - a procedure in which the functioning organ become a
11
Object and tlie Object a fwnctio11i11g organ. And it is the same in the case of
my generally possible original dealing-with Nature and with my animate
organism - which therefore is reflexively related to itself also in j>Tactice.1
In short, this phenomenon is unusual just because, not only is it
experienced by consciousness as its own animate organism, but
in that very experiencing itself it is intended as being reflexively
related to itself in a double manner: sense-perceptively, and in
practice and action.
This, then, is the clue which must be investigated both as
regards its own intrinsic structure (statically) and as regards its
own sense-genesis (genetically, in the phenomenological sense.2)
The static analysis would reveal the relations of foundedness
(Fundierwng) which obtain among the multiple strata of the
objective sense which the animate organism has for consciousness.
The genetic analysis, on the other hand, has for its task the
descriptive explication of those synthetic processes of conscious-
ness (identifying, differentiating, and associative transfers of
sense) a which "motivate" consciousness' experience of its
animate organism as uniquely its own organism.
We have already initiated a static analysis by distinguishing
among the four primary strata of sense belonging to the animate
organism. We must now attempt to explicate the founding and
founded strata. Before undertaking such an analysis, however,
we must point out that we here are ignoring the higher levels of
sense of the organism: first, the sense it has as a cultural object
of a complex kind (with its complexity of sense, as, for instance, a
coordinated organ in athletic contests, as an object which can
serve as the subject-matt er of sculpture, painting, photography,
and so on, i.e., as an art object), and second, its sense as an
intersubjective object (or, in Sartre's terms, the body as being-
for-others, and one's experience of his own body-proper as it is
experienced by others - shyness, pride, masochism, as disgusting,
pleasing, and the like).4
I Ibid., p. 97.
s Cf. Cartesian M ediiations, pp. 77-80.
a Cf. above, Part 111, Chapter ill, pp.
4 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, Meditations lV and V.
EPILOGUE
253
If we now abstractively isolate these strata of sense, the
animate organism still has a complex objective sense for conscious-
ness - namely, those strata we have already delineated above.
The problem now is to determine which of the remaining strata
are founded and which are founding. The organism, that is to say,
even when one abstractively isolates the cultural and intersubjec-
tive senses, still has the sense of being a synthetically constituted
system of organs by means of which objects in the surrounding
field are given to the correlatively abstractively isolated noetic
stratum of consciousness.
In the on-going course of its harmonious experiencing of the
world at this level, which has the sense for it, "spatio-temporally
existent world," consciousness intends its own organism as that
by means of which there are sensuously perceivable and practico-
instrumental things within that world. More particularly, by
means of its own organism, consciousness experiences some
particular milieu as struct ured in terms of its own particular
projects-at-hand which are actualized by means of its bodily
activities, and as organized around and oriented to its own
organism as the "center" of this milieu. Not only do "actions" (in
the broad sense) issue from "here and now," but also the per-
ceived things are oriented, and refer back, to this same "here
and now" which is the animate organism embodying the conscious-
ness for whom the milieu is milieu. Thus, my animate organism
has the sense of being the bearer of an orientational point, "O,"
from which spatio-temporal coordinates organize and structure
t he milieu.
This sense becomes constituted on the basis of a number of
processes whose exact nature is extremely difficult to describe.
In the first place, my animate organism functions as this single
Null-point only as the consequence of a continuously on-going
series of automatic syntheses in virtue of which it is continuously
experienced as a corporeal system of body-members,-components,
and-organs, each of which can also function as a relative null-
point for specific purposes and with regard to specific objects.
My hand, with which I grasp and feel within my "manipulatory
sphere" 1 is itself an orientational point relative to that which is
1
We borrow t his apt phrase from Alfred Sch(itz, "Symbol, Reality and Society," in:
L. l3ryson, et al (editors), Symbols and Society, 14th Symposium of the Conference on
Science, Philosophy and Religion, Harper Bros. (New York, t955), pp. :xs4--s6.
254
EPILOGUE
grasped and handled. Similarly, my eyes are experienced by me
as the zero-point for the visual field. My head itself functions as a
zeropoint, not only for the visual, but for auditory and gustatory
data as well (I tum my head "in order to" hear the music more
clearly), and so forth. Each of these, however, are themselves
relative to a fundamental ground or zero-point (a Boden or
Urpunkt), which is my body-proper - which itself seems to be
relativized as a Boden with respect to an Urboden, namely, the
Earth, or at least, some place on which the body-proper stands or
rests (the floor of an aircraft, the basket of a helium-filled
balloon, or perchance, the Moon). There is thus constituted with
respect to the constitution of my animate organism as my
absolute "here," a "near-sphere," and, "over there," beyond my
immediate manipulatory reach, a "far-sphere," and so on into
overlapping zones of actual, potential, and restorable reach.1
In order, however, for an organ to function as a zero-point
(or, in order for the body-proper to function as a systematically
interrelated context of zero-points whose totality is itself a zero-
point), it must be constituted first as an organ, as a perceptual
organ. The eye is, as Sartre expresses it, the center of the visual
field only in so far as the eye is sensuously perceptive of visual
objects which are then organized around it as their center.
Thus, the body-proper as the bearer of the orientational point,
0, is a stratum of sense which is founded on the stratum, body-
proper as my organ of perception (Wahmehmtmgsorgan). Certain
kinds of sensuous data, moreover, can occur only at very restricted
places on my body-proper: visual data are sensuously perceived
only by the eye, auditory data by the ear, and so forth. Whereas,
the tactual-muscular-visceral organs are literally spread out over
the entire body-proper. Yet, in spite of this multiplicity of data,
the variation of localization of these data, and the multiplicity of
zero-points, this animate organism is experienced as one synthetic
corporeal system and "center," as a sort of "synergetic" system
in virtue of which data of the most diverse kinds are synthetically
unified and intended by consciousness as pertaining, or belonging,
to one identical. state of affairs: I see a red ball, touch it, taste
it, smell it, strike it and hear it- the "it" being intended through-
1 Ibid., Idem.
EPILOGUE
255
out as one and the same object, by means of one and the same
organism. In this sense, my organism is automatically constituted
as one, single W ahrnehmungsorgan, by means of continuously
on-going but automatic syntheses of corporeal unification, which,
moreover, are of different kinds: identification, differentiation,
and associative sense-transfer. And, it is by means of these
syntheses that objects can beintendedasself-identicalthrougbout
a multiplicity of changes of appearance.
Tu order to trace back the constitution of this Leibk6rper as a
W alirtieltmungsorgan, it would be necessary to take it as the clue
pointing back to those syntheses which unify it, which connect
the various sensuous organs and members into one corporeal
system. This task calls for an abstractive is0lation of each of
these fields as to their respective sense-strata, for only thereby
would it be possible to see how, from the sense-strata of each
field, the occurs a synthesis of unification, itself made up of more
fundamental syntheses.
Once this abstractive isolation has been effectuated, it be-
comes possible, first of all, to show how each field is constituted
in itself as a self-identical sensuous field functioning as a center,
0, for a milieu of data disclosed by means of it, and second, to
show how the several fields become constituted by consciousness
as one corporeal system.
In this manner, the organism acquires the sense of being a
Sinnesorgan: that "on" and "in" which the various fields of
sensation are "spread out." My animate organism, that is to say,
becomes singled out from all other objects in the surrounding
world
namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely
an animate organism: the sole Object ... to which, in accordance with
experience, I ascribe fields of sensation (belonging to it, however, in
different manners - a field o! tactual sensations, a field o! warmth and
coldness, and so forth) .. . . l
My org-an.ism is thus constituted, Husserl points out, as the
"bearer of locaUzed sensations":
All the sensations which are r o ~ h t about have their localization, that
is to say they are distinguished by means of their respective places on the
animate organism on which they appear, and they belong to it phenome-
EPILOGUE
nally. The organism is thus originarily constituted in .a double manner:
on the one hand, it is a physical thing, matter, having its extension in
which its real properties adhere (color, smoothness, roughness, warmth
and other such material properties); on the other hand, I find on it, and I
sense "on" and "in" it: warmth on the back of my hand, cold in my foot,
touch-sensations on my fingertips. I sense spread out over wider expanses
of my organism's flesh the push and pull of clothes .... 1
These "Empfindwngen" are by no means what traditional
philosophy and psychology understood by "sense-data." Rather,
Husserl points out, they are "live-bodily events" (Leibesv01'-
kommnisse} and not "physical events" (physisches V orkommnisse}.
They are events which occur as components within a specific
context of bodily activity, and thus (as we shall see shortly} are
always functionally correlated to specific types of bodily feelings
of motion (kinaesthesias,Husserl calls them). Thus, for instance,
laying my hand on the table I tactually sense a certain
rigidness, coldness, roughness, and so on, but only as one com-
ponent of a total context of bodily activity; these "data" occur
as functionally correlated with the kinaesthesias in play here
(called, "moving my hand across the table"}. All "sensations" of
that kind are Liebesvorkommnisse, and occur in functional
correlation with bodily activity (as both Metleau-Ponty and
Marcel emphasize}. And, which is the point here, these sensations
of objects are presented as localized "in" and "on" my organism
(in our example, my hand - and not " in" my neck, "on" my
knee, and so forth}. In other words, Husserl continues,
The localized sensations are not properties of the animate organism as
physical thing, but on the other hand are the properties of the thing
"animate organism" - more particularly, actional properties, properties
of the organism's activity. They appear if the organism is touched,
pressed, burned, and so forth, and they appear there where it is and in
the time when it is. They continue to occur only under circumstances, so
long as the contact lasts. 1
My organism, then, is constituted for my experience as that
"on" and "in" which fields of sensation are spread out, as the
bearer of localized fields of sensation. As such, it is a corporeal
system or context of localized fields. The animate organism in
this sense is a Sinnesorgan, a sensuous organ. As with its other
two component senses thus far indicated, so, too, a further task is
1 Ideen, 11, op. cit., pp. 145-46.
2
Ibid., p. 146.
EPILOGUE
257
here predelineated: the effort to describe and explicate the
intentional unification of the various localized fields into the one,
contextually unified Sinnesorgan, my animate organism.
Perhaps the most crucial phenomenon which appears after
these abstractive isolations is that of the functional correlation
of certain sensuous data (which Husserl calls "hyletic" data) and
the kinaesthetic data already mentioned. Each sensory field
reveals itself as complex, and in a double manner. On the one
hand, every sensuous content whatever is given as functionally
correlated with certain typical patterns of kinaesthetic data -
that is, it reveals a certain "if/then" style. " If" I set in motion
certain kinds of kinaesthesias (say, "opening my mouth," along
with other types, "raising my hand," and so on, moreover in a
very particular manner and order), "then" certain sensuous
contents will be actualized (say, tasting sweetness, pulpiness, and
the like, correlated with "apples"}. But, on the other hand, and
just because of this functional correlation, the organism is itself
co-experienced (co-intended} simultaneously with the sensuous
perception of a content: every sensuous perception, to speak at a
higher level, necessarily involves a co-perception of the organism
itself as that with which I perceive and that by means of which
what is perceived is perceived.
Now, at the most fundamental level of this constitution, that
is to say, at the deepest level of foundedness, it seems to me that
the phenomenon of embodiment takes place by means of these
kinaesthetic flow-patterns. The temporal flux of consciousness,
that is to say, is actualized fundamentally by means of these
flow-patterns; inversely, they are the most immediate actuali-
zation of the temporal flux - the actualization, that is to say, of
the flux of consciousness in its animate organism. And here, it
seems to me, furthermore, this organism by which this flux is
embodied, actualized in a "here and now," is uniquely singled
out as the most immediate field of the actualization of aut0matic
volitional processes, automatic strivings or tendencies.I And it is
in virtue of this that my animate organism acquires the sense of
being a "Wi'llensorgan." 2
1
Cf. Erfahrung und. Urleil, <>f>. cit., t7-2t.
2
Perhaps the best illustrations of tbis automaticity of actualized strivings are
to be found in the minute observatioos of infants by Piaget, though they are made by
EPILOGUE
On this ground, several decisive constitutions take place.
These kinaesthetic flow-patterns are "freie Bewegimgen," that
is to say, on-going automatic actualizations of automatic
strivings on the part of the consciousness whose organism it is.
And, thus, the organism becomes constituted as a Witlensorgan.
In the second place, this one organism is uniquely singled out
for consciousness as that "on" and "in" which fields of sensation
are spread out and synthetically unified in functional correlation
to patterns of kinaesthetic flows.
1
Thus, this animate organismis
constituted for consciousness as being the condition, the "that by
means of which" sensuous contents are disclosed; the organism
acquires the sense of being that by means of which the conscious-
ness whose organism it is, is "in" a world. This animate organism
is that which effectuates the self-mundanization of conscious-
ness. 2
On the basis of this complex sense-bestowing, this animate
organism enters into certain types of relations with its milieu,
relations of succession, simultaneity, and more important, of
causality.a Put most generally, the de facto regularities in_
appearances of things in the milieu constituted as "the same" for
each sensuous field (by means of the automatic syntheses already
mentioned), these regularities of appearance become constituted
as regularities of self-identical things, happening "under circum-
stances" (Umstiinde) which are essentiilly connected to this ani-
mate organism's actual and potential action "on" or " to" these
things. Already at the automatic levels, "things" are experienced
by consciousness, not as isolated fragments unrelated to one
another, but rather as self-identical unities happening in a regu-
lar fashion, undergoing change and alteration, and maintaining
regularities with other unities and with the organism itself. Thus,
for instance, the visual perceiving of a variation in color in the
him with other purposes in mind, and thus he does not mention this point. His
observations, in addition, point up in an empirical manner remarkably parallel to
Husserl's eidetic analyses, the fact that this, and every other, sense which this
organism has for me is in truth an acquisition, a genesis, and not at all "given" to
begin with.
1 Cf. Carlesia1iJ\feditations, p. 97i and Idem, II, <>f>. cit., p. 56.
2 Idun, II, p. 65.
a But not causality in the sense used by natural science; cf. Maurice Natanson,
"Causality as a Structure of the Ube1isUJelt," journal of E:rmeuial Psychiatry, Vol. I,
No. 3 (Fall, 1960), pp. 346-66. [t Is a question of "lived causality," the way in which
the regularities.of the world, the body, and objects are concretely lived.
EPILOGU E
visual field is constituted as "happening under circumstances":
perhance the light in my room grows dim, the sun goes behind a
cloud, or another object casts its shadow over the thing in
question. All along, the thing which varies in respect of its color-
moment is given in a series of color-appearances which, at this
level, are construed (aufgefasst) by consciousness as variations of
one identical thing whose appearances are functionally correlated
with the organism as the "center'' of the visual field.1 Thus
throughout all thing-variations, the organism is itself co-intended
as self-identical:
The system of causality in which the animate organism is involved in
normal apperception is of such a kind that the organism still Yemains in
the frame of a typical <identity throughout all the alterations which it
experiences. The alterations of the organism as a system of perceptual
are free bodily movements, and the organs can voluntarily return
agam to the same fundamental position. They do not alter in such a way
that. their. tfl?ically .modified: they can always perform
preclSely similar a.Iterations m precisely similar ways, namely, as regards
the constitution of outer experiences .... 2
Having thus acquired the complex sense of being the "Trager
der Orientierungsptmkte Null," a Wahrnehtnwngsorgan, a Sinnes-
orgatt as the system of sensory fields (and thereby the "center"
as well for all relations to sensuous things), and a Willensorgan
actualizing the free strivings which set in motion the kinaesthe-
sias with which the appearances of things are functionally
correlated - this animate organism becomes constituted as
"unigue" among all other bodies and organisms in its milieu:
One animate organism is thereby -uniquely singled out for me in a
remarkable manner, and therewith one animate creature, and especially
one before all others. It is my animate organism, and accordingly I
am smgled out for myself before all other objeets of experience; "I," in
the usual empirical sense of the term, i.e., "I, this man to whom this
organism, my organism, belongs." My organism is the oxtly one in which
I experience in an absolutely immediate manner, the embodiment of a
psychic life (viz., a sensing, objectivating, feeling, and so forth, which is
my own life, or which is "expressed" in corporeal form, in changing
corporeal, animate events). This occurs in such a way that I at once
perceive not only the thing, animate organism, and its corporeal conduct,
1 Cf. ldeen, II, pp. 62-63.
1
Ibid., p. 68. And, .he continues, '"Sensibility here however has a relation to what
is Objective: I must be able to experience, precisely in a manner stillness as
stillness, what is unaltered as -unaltered, and therein all the senses tunction
han:noniously together." CL also, itnd., pp. 74-75.
26o EPILOGUE
but also at the same time my psychic life; and, finally, both of these at
once: the self-embodying of the latter (the psychic life} in the former (my
organism), and the self-exJ>ressing of the one in the other. 1
Thus, on the basis of this double constitution, or better, of the
constitution of this animate organism as reflexively related to
itself, this organism embodies and thereby "expresses" the
consciousness whose organism it is. Hence, all my bodily move-
ments (leiblichen Bewegungen) are experienced by me as at
once rorporeal (and thus corporeally determinate and determi-
nable by means of physiological laws) and as a subjectively lived
"!ch bewege," which itself embodies (beseelt) this corporeal
movement.
2
The animate organism appearing to me presents itself uninterruptedly-
and the change of its modes of appearance presents itself - as bearing
concealedly s in itself this or that Psyche, as an exteriority which here has
within it originaliter the interiority which "expresses" itself therein. Both
present themselves inseparably in coincidence ....
4
.::t<: In brief, this animate organism becomes constituted for me
as mine in such a way that, as Metleau-Ponty had seen, it at once
is me, and expresses me: it is at once the self-embodiment of my
psychic life, and the self-expressiveness of my psychic life. Thus,
we can say, the problem of the experience of the body is the
problem of embodiment, and this problem, as Stephan Strasser
emphasizes, is fundamentat. From the lowest levels of inner-
time consciousness, consciousness is embodied: first of all, by its
kinaesthetic flow-patterns, then, bythe syntheses of identification,
differentiation, and transfer of sense and unification, which
constitute the various sensory fields as self-identical and different
from one another, and then constitute this organism as one
single orientational point, . . . and so on. The phenomenology of
the animate organism is, accordingly, the descriptive-explicative
analysis of the on-going a11,tomatic embodiment of
l Husserl, E rste Philosophi6 (I9a3/:z4)
1
Zweiter Tell, Martinus Nijhoff, Husserliana
Band Vill (Haag, 1959), pp: 60-61.
a Formale tra1is1mulentale Logik, op. cit., p. 213.
' There seems to me to be some question here, whether one can speak of the psychic
life embodied by an organism as "concealed" (geborgen).
' Philosophie, II, op. cit., p. 61. "So," he continues, "in einem erfahrenden
Blick die Hand und in ihrcr Bewegung die doppelseitige psycboph ysische Bewegmig
die spezifisch letl>liche Bewegung." (loc. cit.)
5 The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Duquesne University (Pitts
burgh, 1957), pp. 142-50.
EPILOGUE
261
conscicnmiess by one organism singled out as peculiarly "its" own,
and, at higher levels, graspable by me as "my own."
As Husserl bad seen as early as I, if we attempt to
make clear to ourselves how consciousness, which is itself abso-
lute in respect to the world, can take on the character of trans-
cendence, can become mundane,
We see, accordingly, that it can do so by means of a certain partici-
pation in transcendence in the first, originary sense - which is manifestly
the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experimental
relation t o the animate organism does consciousness become actually
human and animal, and only thereby does it acquire a place in the space
of Nature and in the time of Nature . . .. t
Precisely this "Erlahrungsbeziehung zum Leibe" is the entire
problem of this study.
1
Idun, I, op. cit., p. 103. The significance of the relation of the body to the consti-
tution of Others and thereby to the common social world is also indicated here.
APPENDIX
Following are the important quotations which have been translated
into English in the text of this work.
Page
4
4
5
9
IO
Re/eYence
PA, 54
PA, 54
PA, 56--57
PA, 62
RI, 26
est-ii? qu'est-ce que l 'etre? Mais sur
ces problemes je ne puis porter ma reflexion
sans voir se creuser sous mes pas un nouvel
abime: moi qui interroge sur l'etre, puis-je
etre assure que je suis?
Qui suis-je, moi qui questionne sur l'etre ?
Quelle qualite ai-je pour proc6der ces
investigations? Si je ne suis pas, comment
esperai-je les vois aboutir? En admettant
meme que je sois, comment puis-je etre
assure que je suis?
On pourrait dire en un langage inevitable-
ment approximatif que mon interrogation
sur l'etre presuppose une affirmation oi:l je
serais en quelque maniere passif, et dont fe
seYais le siege plut-Ot que fe n' en serais le S1tjet.
Mais cecin'est qu' une limite, et que je ne puis
realiser sans contradiction. Je m'oriente done
vers la position ou la reconnaissance d'une
participation qui possMe une realite de
sujet; cette participation ne peut, par
definition meme, etre objet de pensee; elle
ne saurait faire fonction de solution, mais
figure au dela. du monde des problemes: elle
est meta-problematique.
penser OU plus exactement affirmer le meta-
problematique, c'est l'affirmer comme in-
dubitablement reel, comme quel<:J.ue chose
dont je ne puis douter sans contradiction.
Nous sommes ici dans une zone ou ii n'est
plus possible de dissocier l'idee elle-meme
et la certitude ou l'indice de certitude qui
l'affecte. Car cette idee est certitude, elle
est assurance de soi, elle est dans cette
mesure autre chose et plus qu'une idee.
ie pense, non pas meme fe vis, mais
Page Re/eYence
II RI, 27
I8 EA, 181
I8 RI, 40
19 ME, I, 49
2I EA, 15
APPENDIX
et i1 nous faut prendre ici ce mot dans son
indetermination maxima. La langue alle-
mande est ici beaucoup plus adequate que la
nOtre: ich eYlebe .. . a un point oil ce Ich erlebe
ne se distingue pas de Es erlebt in mir . . . .
Lorsque je dis: j'existe, je vise incontes-
tablement quelque chose de plus; je vise
obscurement ce fait que je ne suis pas
seulement pour moi, mais que je me mani-
feste - il vaudrait mieux dire que je suis
maniieste; le prefixe ex, dans exister, en
tant qu'il traduit un mouvement vers
l'e>..-terieur, et comme une tendance centri-
fuge, est ici de la plus grande importance.
]'existe: cela veut dire j'ai de quoi nie faire
connattre ou reconnaitre soit par autrui, soit
par en tant que j'affecte pour moi
une alterite d'emprunt. ...
11 est de !'essence de la liberte de pouvoir
s'e.xercer en se trahissant. Rien d'exterieur
a nous ne peut fermer la porte au desespoir.
Lavoie est ouverte; on peut encore dire que
la structure du monde est telle que 1e deses-
poir absolu y paratt possible.
peut-etre dans le mesure ou je prends
conscience de cet a,ppel en tant gu'appel, suis-
je amene a reconnaltre que cet appel n'est
possible que parce qu'au fond de moi il y a
quelque chose de plus interieur a moi-meme
que moi-meme - et du meme coup l'appel
change de signe.
mais elle a l'avantage de mettre en lumiere
cette verite essentielle que le progres philo-
sopb.ique consiste dans l'ensemble des
dem.arches successives par lesquelles une
liberte, qui se saisit d'abord comme simple
pouvoir du oui et du non, s'incame, ou, si
l'on veut, se constitue comme puissance
reelle en se conferant a elle-meme un contenu
au sein duquel elle se decouvre et se recon-
nait.
invariablement ... a remonter de la vie vers
la pensee et ulterieurement a Jfedescendre de
la pensee vers la vie pour tenter d'eclairer
celle-ci.
Rompre, par consequent, une fois pour
toutes avec les metaphores qui representent
la conscience comme un cercle lumineux
a.utour duquel il n'y aurait pour elle que
t enebres. C'est, au contraire, l'ombre qui est
au centre.
Page
25
26
28
33
33
Reference
EA, 23y
EA, 231
EA, 231
EA, 234
EA, 236-37
ME, I, n3
ME, I, II6
APPENDIX
Toute affu:mation portant sur un avoir
semble bien etre batie en q11elque sorte sur le
modele d'une sorte de position prototype oil
le qui n'est auire que tnoi-meme. Il semble
bien que l'avoir ne soit senti dans sa force,
qu' il ne prenne sa valeur qu'a l'interieur du
j'ai. Si uniu as OUllD il a est possible, ce n' est
qu'en vertu d'une sorte de transfert qui
d'ailleurs ne peut jamais s'effectuer sans
une certaine deperdition.
Ceci s'eclaire dans une certaine mesure si
l'on songe a la relation qui unit manifeste-
ment l'avoir au pouvoir, tout au moins la ou
la possession est effective et litterale. Le
pouvoir est quelque chose que j 'eprouve en
l'exeryant ou en y resistant, ce qui apres tout
revient au mE!me.
et ceci est capital, que le contenu lui-mE!me
ne se laisse pas definir en termes de pure
spatialite. II me parait qu'il implique
tourjours l'idee d'une potentialite; contenir,
c'est enclore; mais enclore c'est emp&:her,
c'est resister, c'est s'opposer ace que quelque
chose se repande, se deverse, s'echappe, etc.
En tant que je me conyois moi-meme comme
a.yant en moi OU plus precisement a moi
certains caracteres, certains apanages, je me
considere du point du vue d'un autre auquel
je ne m'oppose qu'a condition de m'etre
d'abord implicitement identifie a lui ....
Sans doute il ya dans l'avoir une double per-
manence: permanence du qui, permanence
du q"id; mais cette permanence est par
essence menacee; elle se veut, ou du moins
elle se voudrait; et elle s'echa.ppe a elle-meme.
Et cette menace, c'est la prise de l'autre en
tant qu'autre, l'autre qlli peut etre le monde
en lui-meme, et en face duquel je me sens si
douloureusement moi; je serre contre moi
cette chose qui va m'etre arracMe peut-etre,
je tente desesperement de me l'incorporer,
de former avec elle un complexe unique,
indecomposable. Desesperement, vaine-
ment ....
Le verite est bien plutOt qu'a l'interieur de
toute possession, de tout mode de possession
i1 y a comme un noya11 senti, et ce noyau
n'est autre que !'experience, en elle-meme
non intellectualisable, du lien par lequel
mon corps est mien.
Mon corps est mien pour autant que je ne le
Page Ref ere11ce
36 RI, 37
39 RI, 122-23
39 RI, 120
52 ldeen II, 152
APPENDIX
regarde pas, que je ne mets pas entre lui
et moi d'intervalle ou encore pour autant
qu' il n'est pas objet pour moi, mais que je
suis mon corps. . . Dire je suis mon corps
c'est supprimer l'intervalle que je retablis
au contraire si je dis que mon corps est mon
instr1Jment.
Quand nous employons les tennes recepteur,
emetteur, etc. , nous assimilons l'organism.e
a un poste auquel parvient uncertain messa-
ge. Plus exactement, ce qui est capte par ce
poste, ce n'est pas le message lui-meme,
c'est un ensemble de donnees transcriptfbles
a la faveur d'un certain code. Le message au
sens strict implique meme une double trans-
mission, le premiere operation se produisant
au depart, la seconde a l'arrivee; peu
importe d'ailleurs les modalitees materielles
infiniment variables qu'elle comporte.
nous sommes dupes d'une illusion lorsque
nous imaginons confusement que la con-
science receptive vient traduire en sensation
quelque chose qui lui est donne initialement
comme phenomene physique, comme ebran-
lement par exemple. Q'est-ce en effet que
traduire? c'est dans tousles cas substituer un
groupe de donnees a un autre groupe de
donnees. Mais ce terme de donnees demande a
!tre pris ici a la rigueur. Le choc eprouve par
l'organisme ou par telle de ses parties n'est
aucunement donne; ou plus exactement il est
une donnee pour l'observateur qlli le peryoit
d'une certaine maniere, non pour l 'organisme
qui le subit.
Recevoir, c'est admettre chez soi quelqu'un
du dehors, c'est l'introduire ... sentir, c'est
recevoir; rnais il faudra aussitOt specifier que
recevoir, ici, c'est m'ouvrir, et par o n s e ~
quent me donner, bien plut6t que ce n'est
subir une action exterieure.
par rapport a un soi qui peut d'ailleurs etre
le soi d'autrui et j'entends par soi quelqu'un
qui dit ou qui est au moins cense pouvoir dire
moi, se poser au etre pose comme moi ..
Encore faut-il - et c'estm6me ici l'essentiel -
que ce soi eprouve comme sien un certain
domaine.
efosige Objekt, das fur den Willen meines
reinen Ich unmittelbar spontan beweglich ist
und Mittel, um eine mittelbare sponta.ne
Bewegung anderer Dinge zu erzeugen ...
266
Page Reference
56 ldeen II, 144
59 EN, 336
60 EN, 330
60 EN, 329
61 EN, 15
62 EN, 16
APPENDlX
(Das Ich) hat das "Vermogen" ("ich kann")
diesen Leib, bzw. die Organe, in die er sich
gliedert, frei zu bewegen, und mittels ihrer
eine Aussenwelt wahrzuriehmen.
bei aller Erfabrung von ranmdinglichen
Objekten der Leib als Wah.mehmungsorgan
des erlahrenden Subjektes "mit dabei ist" . ..
Si done l'etre-regarde, degage dans toute sa
purete, n'est lie au corps d'autrui plus que
ma conscience d'6tre conscience, dans la
pure realisation du cogito, n'est liee a mon
propre corps, il faut considerer l'apparition de
certains objets dans le champ demon experi-
ence, en particulier la confergence des yeux
d'autrui dans ma direction, comme une pure
monition, comme l'occasion pure de realiser
mon etre-regardi ....
Si l'on me regarde, en effet, j'ai conscience
d'etre objet. Mais cette conscience ne peut se
produire que dans et par l'existence de l'autre.
En cela Hegel avait raison. Setilement, cette
autre conscience et cette autre h'berte ne me
sont jamais donnks, puisque, si elles l'etaient,
elles seraient connues, done objets et que je
cesserais d'etre objet.
Et lorsque je pose natvement qu'il est possi-
ble que je sois, sans m'en rendre compte, un
etre objectif, je suppose implicitement par Ia
meme !'existence d' autrui, car comment
serais-je obj et si ce n'est pour un sujet? Ainsi
autrui est d' abord pour moi l'etre pour qui je
suis objet, c'est-a-dire l'etre par qui je gagne
mon objectite.
L'existant est phenomene, c'est-a-dire qu'il
se designe lui-meme comme ensemble organi-
sl! de qualites ... L'etre est simplement la
condition de tout dl!voilement: il est etre-
pour-devoiler et non etre devoile ....
... l'etre du phenomene, quoique coextensif
au phenomene, doit l!chapper a la condition
pbl!noml!nale - qui est de n'exister que pour
autant qu'on se revele - et que, par conse-
quent, il deborde et Ionde la connaissance
qu'on en prend.
la condition necessaire et suffisante pour
qu'une conscience soit oonnaissante de son
objet, c'est qu'elle soit conscience d'elle-
m6me comme etant cette connais.sance. C'est
une condition necessaire: si ma conscience
n'etait pas conscience d'etre conscience de
table, elle serait done conscience de cette
Page Reference
65 EN, 26
67 EN, 29
70 EN, 222
7i EN, 226
73 EN, 359
APPENDIX
table sans avoir conscience de l'etre ou, si l'on
veut, une conscience qui s'ignorerait soi-
m6me, u.ne conscience inconsciente - ce qui
est absurde. C'est une condition suffisante:
il suffit qui j'aie conscience d 'avoir conscience
de cette table pour que j'en aie en effet
conscience. Cela ne suffir certes pas pour me
permettre d'affirmer que cette table existe e11
soi - mais bien qu'elle existe pour moi.
tout activite, toute spontaneite. C'est precise-
ment parce qu'elle est spontanl!ite pure,
parce que rien ne peut mordre sur elle, que la
conscience ne peut agir sur rien.
La subjectivite absolue ne peut se constituer
qu'en face d'un revele, l'immanence ne peut
se deiinir que dans la saisie d'un transcen-
dant ... la conscience implique da.ns son etre
un etre non conscient et transphenomenal.
la conscience est un ttre pour lequel il est dans
son Atre question de son ttre en tant que cet Atre
impliqtte tm itre a1dre que lui.
Le rapport originel de presence, comme
fondement de la connaissance, est negatif.
Mais comme la negation vient au monde par
le pour-soi et que la chose est ce qu'elle
est, dans !'indifference absolue de l'identite,
ce ne peut etre la chose qui se pose comme
n'etant pas le pour-soi. La negation vient du
pour-soi lui-meme. . . Mais par la negation
originelle, c'est le pour-soi qui se constitue
comme n'etant pas la chose.
Ce qui signifie que dans ce type d'etre qu' on
appelle le connaitre, le seul ttre qu'on puisse
rencontrer et qui est perpetuellement la, c'est
le connu. Le connaissant n'est pas, il n'est
pas saisissable. II n'est rien d'autre que ce
qui fait qu'il y a un etre-la du connu, une
presence - car de 1ui-meme le connu n'est
ni present ni absent, il est simplement. Mais
cette presence du connu est presence a rien,
pu:isque le connaissant est pur reflet d' un
n'etre pas, elle para.it done, a travers la
translucidite total edu connaissant connu,
presence absolue.
... si meme je :pouvais tenter de me faire
objet, deja je serais moi au coeurdecetobjet
que je suis et du centre meme de cet objet
j'aurais a etre le sujet qui le regarde ...
(Mais) precisement etre objet c'est n'etre-pas-
moi ....
La contradiction est ilagrante: pour pouvoir
270
Page Reference
92 EN, 38x
92 EN, 381-82
96 EN, 388
96 EN. 392-g3
APPENDIX
spective particuliere qui traduise ses relations
au fond de monde et aux autres ceci.
Les references intra-mondaines ne peuvent
se faire qu'a des objets du monde et le monde
vu definit perpetuellement un objet visible
auquel renvoient ses perspectives et ses
dispositions. Cet objet apparalt au milieu de
monde et en meme temps que le monde; il
est toujours donne par surcrolt avec n'ilnpor-
te quel groupement d' objets, puisqu'il est
defini par l'orientation de ces objets: sans
lui, il n'y anrait aucune orientation, puisque
toutes les orientations seraient equivalentes.
mon etre-dans-lemonde, par le seul fait
qu'il realise un monde, se fait indiquer a lui-
meme comme un etre-au-m.ilieu-du-monde
par le monde qu'il realise ... mon corps est
partout sur le monde ... Mon corps est a la
fois coextensif au monde, epandu tout a
travers les choses et, a la fois, ramasse en ce
seul point qu'elles indiquent toutes et que je
suis, sans pouvoir le connattre.
Ainsi, c'est le surgissement du pour-soi dans
le monde qui fait exister du meme coup le
monde com.me totalite des choses et les sens
com.me la maniere objective dont les qualites
des choses se presentent.
puisque nous serions renvoyes a l'infini. Cet
instrument, nous ne l'employons pas, nous
le sommes. Il ne nous est pas donne autre-
ment que par l'ordre utensile du monde, par
l'espace hodologique ... mais il ne saurait
etre donne a mon action: je n'ai pas a m'y
adapter Di a y adapter un autre outil, mais
il est mon adaptation roeme aux outils,
!'adaptation que je suis.
Naissance, passe, contingence, necessite d'un
point de vue, condition de fait de toute
action possible sur le monde; tel est Je c()f'ps,
tel il est pour moi ... (C'est) condition neces-
saire de !'existence d'un monde et. .. realisa-
tion contingente de cette condition.
L'affectivite coenesthesique est alors pm:e
saisie non-positionnelle d'une contingence
sans couleur, pure apprehension de soi com.me
existence de fait. Cette saisie perpetuelle par
mon pour-soi d'un gollt fade et sans distance
qui m'accompagne jusque dans mes efforts
pour m'en delivrer et qui est mon goiit, c'est
ce que nous avons decnt ailleurs sous le nom
de Nausk. Une nausee discrete et insuimon-
Page Refereme
98 EN. 405
IOO EN, 410
IOI EN. 413
io3 EN, 4 20
104 EN, 421- 22
APPENDIX 27I
table reve!e perpetuellement mon corps a ma
conscience ....
,11 revient au meme d'etudier la fayon dont
m(m corps apparait a autrui OU celle dont
le corps d'autrui m'apparait. Nous avons
etabli, en effet, que les structures de mon
etre-pom:-autrui sont identiques a celles de
l'etre d'autru.i pour moi.
Mais, de meme, on ne sau.rait percevoir le
corps d'autrui comme chair a titre d'objet
isole ayant avec les autres ceci de pures
relations d'exteriorite. Ceci n'est vrai que
pour le cadavre. Le corps d'autrui com.me
chair m'est immediatement donne com.me
centre de reference d'une situation qui s'or-
ganise synthetiquement autour de lui etil est
inseparable de cette situation ....
... etre objet-pour-autrui OU etre-corps, ces
deuxmodalites ontologiques sont traductions
rigoureusement equivalentes de l'etre-pour-
autrui du pour-soi. Ainsi, les significations
ne renvoient-elles pas a un psychisme
mysterieux: elles sont ce psychisme, en tant
qu'il est transcendance-transcendee ... En
particulier ... manifestations emotionnelles
ou, d'une fayon plus generale, les phenomenes
improprement appeles d'expression ne nous
indiquent nullement une affection cachee et
vecue par quelque psychisme ... ces fronce-
ments de sourcils, cette rougeur, ce begaie-
ment, ce leger tremblement des mains, ces
regards en dessous qui semblent a la fois
timides et menayants n 'expriment pas la cole-
re, ils sont la colere.
Ainsi, la relativite de mes sens, que je ne puis
penser abstraitement sans detruire m(m
monde, est en meme temps perpetuellement
presentifiee a moi par }'existence de l'autre;
mais c'est une pure et insaisissable appresen-
tation.
que j 'aie rencontre autrui dans sa subjectivite
objectivante, puis comme objet; il faut, pour
que je juge le corps d'autrui com.me objet
semblable a mon corps, qu'il m'ait ete
donne comme objet et que mon corps m'ait
devoile de son cote une dimension-objet.
J amais l'analogie ou la ressemblance ne peut
constituer d'abord l' objet-corps d'autrui et
l'objectivite de mon corps; mais au contraire,
ces deux objectites doivent exister prealable-
ment pour qu' un principe analogique puisse
272
Page
I08
Il3
II6
Refereme
EN, 202
Ideen zu einer rei-
nen Phanomenclo-
gie und phiinomeno-
logischen Ph11oso-
phie, Band I, 64
Formate und trans-
zendentale Logjk,
187
PP, 58
PP, iv
APPENDIX
j oner. lei donc;c' est le la.ngage qui m 'apprend
les structu11es pour autrui de mon corps.
La reflexion est une conncssance, ce}a n'est
pas douteux, elle est pourvue d'un caFactere
positionnel; elle a.ff:inne la conscience refte-
cllie. Mais toute affirmation ... est condition-
-nee par une negation: affirmer cet objet, c'est
nier simultanement que je sois cet objet.
Connaitre, c'est se faire autre.
Wohl zu beachten ist dabei, dass hier nicht
die Rede ist von einer Be,eiehung zwischen.
irgendeinem psychologischen V orkommnis -
genannt Erlebnis - und einem anderen realen
Dasein - genannt Gegenstand - oder von einer
psychologischen Verkniip/ung, die in obf ektiver
Wirklichkeit zwischen dem einen und a.nderen
statthli.tte. Vielmehr ist von fulebnissen rein
ihrem Wesen nach, bzw. von rein.en Wesen
die Rede und von dem, was in den Wesen,
" a priori," in unbedingter N otwendigkeit be-
schlossen ist.
Es ist zu betonen, dass clieses Zuriickverwei-
sen nicht abgeleitet ist aus eine.r indi4ctiven
EmpiYie des psychologischen Beobachters ...
sondern. es ist, wie in der Phanomenologie zu
zeigen ist, ein W esensbestand deY Intentionali-
tat; aus ihremeigenenintentionalen Gehaltin
den entsprechenden Erftillungsleistungen zu
enthiillen.
les psycbologues qui pratiquent la description
des phenomenes n 'aper9oivent pas d 'ordinajre
la -portee philosophique de leur methode. DS
ne voient pas que le retour a l'expenence
perceptive, si cette reforme est consequente
et radicale, condamne toutes les form.es de
realisme ... que le veritable defaut de l'intel-
lectualisme est justement de prendre pour
donne l'univers determine de la science, que
ce reproche s'applique a fortiori a la pensee
psychologique, puisqu' elle place la consGience
perceptive au :milieu d' un monde tout iait,
et que la critique de l'hypothese de constance
si elle est conduite jusqu'au bout, prend la
valeur d 'une veritable "reduction phenome-
nologique" ... elle n 'a jamais rompu avec le
naturalisme. Mais du meme coup elle devient
infidele a ses propre descriptions.
Le monde est Ia avant toute analyse que je
puisse en faire et il serait artificiel de ~
faire deriver d'une serie de syntheses qui
relieraien't les sensations, puis les aspects
Page
137
139
I39
Reference
PP, 412-I3
PP, 253
PP,90
Une philosophie de
l' ambigu'ite, 386
PP, xi
PP, viii-ix
APPENDIX
273
perspectifs de l'objet, alors que les unes et
les autres sont justement des produits de
l'analyse et ne doivent}las etre realises avant
elle.
son objet ne peut pas lui echapper absolument
puisque nous n'en avons ,notion que par elle.
11 faut bien que la reflexion donne en quelque
maniere l'irreflechi, car, autrement, nous
n' aurions rien a lui opposer et elle ne devien-
drait pas probleme pour nous ... Ce qui est
donne et vrai initialement, c'est une reflexion
ouverte sur l'irreflechi, le reprise reflexive de
l' irreflechi ....
prend son objet a l'etat naissa.nt, tel qu'il
apparait a celui qui le vit, avec !'atmosphere
de sens dont il est alors enveloppe, et qui
cherche a se glisser dans cette atmosphere,
pour retrouver, demere les faits et les
sympte>mes disperses, l'etre total du sujet,
s'il s'agit d'un normal, le trouble fondamen-
tal, s'il s'agit d'un malade.
La reflexion radicale est celle qui me ressaisit
pendant que je suis en train de former et de
formuler l'idee du sujet et oelle de l'objet,
elle met au jour la source de ces deux idees,
elle est reflexion non seulement opera.nte,
mais encore consciente d'elle-meme clans son.
operation.
en l'accomplissant moi-meme et clans la
mesure ou je suis un corps qui se leve vers le
monde.
Autrement dit, el it fallait s'y attendre, la
these fondamentale de la philosophie de
Medeau-Ponty: toute connaissance s'enra-
cine dans Ja perception, est elle-meme ambi-
gue. Si elle signifie que toute connaissance
liwnaine s'origine clans le concret et en
poursuit l'explicatition, tout ce qui a ete dit
dans ce livre nous parait l'etablir. Si, au
contraire, on veut entendre par la qu'en
aucun sens nous ne sortons jamais de l'imme-
diat et qu'expliciter cet immecliat revient
simplement a le vivre, on ne peut douter que
l'entreprise du philosophe ne devienne aussi-
t6t contradictoire. Or c'est une opinion a
laquelle l'auteur semble parfois faire des
concessions.
resolution de faire apparaitre le monde tel
qu'il est avant tout retom: sur nous-memes,
c'est !'ambition d'egaler la reflexion a la
vie irreflechie de la conscience.
il faut rompre notre familiarite avec lui
274
Page RtJ/erence
143
PP, xii
PP, 417
151 PP, 237
PP, 239
APPENDIX
[i.e., wifu the world], et que cette rupture
ne peut rien nous apprendre que le jaillisse-
ment immotive du monde. Le plus grand
enseignement de la reduction est l'impos-
sibilite d'une reduction complete ... Si nous
etions l'esprit absolu, la reduction ne se.rait
pas problematique. Mais puisque au contraire
nous som.mes au monde, puisque meme nos
reflexions prennent place dans le flux
tempo rel qu' elles cherchent a capter (puisqu, -
elles sich einstr6men com.me dit Husserl), il
n'y a pas de pensee qui embrasse toute
notre pensee.
Le monde est non pas ce que je pense,
mais ce que je vis, je suis ouvert au monde ...
mais je ne le possede pas. il est inepuisable.
"Il ya n monde, " ou plut6t "ii ya lemon-
de," de cette these constante de ma vie je ne
puis jamais rendre entierement raison. Cette
facticite du monde est ce qui fait la W eltlich-
keit der Welt .. . com.me la factiticite du
cogito n'est pas une imperfection en Jui,
mais au contraire ce qui me rend certain de
mon existence .
. . . la question est toujou.rs de savoir com-
ment je peu:x etre ouv-ert a des phenomenes
qui me depassent et qui, cependant, n'exis-
tent que dans la mesure ou je les reprends et
les vis, comment la presence a moi-mlme
(Urprii.senz) qui me de/init et c01ulitionne tortte
presence etrangere est en mhne temps de-pre-
set1tation (Entgegenwartigtmg) et me jette liars
de tnoi.
La chose et le monde me sont donnes avec !es
parties de mon corps. non par un "geometrie
naturelle," mais dans une connexion vivante
comparable OU plutQt identique a Celle qui
existe entre les parties de mon corps lui-me-
me.
La perception exterieure et la perception
du corps propre varient ensemble parce
qu'elles sontles deuxiaces d'un meme acte ...
La synthese du corps propre, elle en est la
replique OU: le COITelatif et c'est ti. la lettre la
meme ch0se de percevoir une seule bille et de
disposer des deux doigts comme d'un organe
unique.
Toute perception exterieure est immediate-
ment synonyme d'une certaine perception de
mon_ corps comme toute perception de mon
corps s'explicite dans la langage de la per-
i54
157
157
157
160
La structure du
comporteme11t, 140
Une philoso-phie de
l'ambiguiee, n2-13
Une philoso-phie de
l' ambiguite, 114
U11.e philoso-phie de
l'ambiguite, 109
PP, 89
PP, 245
APPENDIX
275
ception exteneure. Si maintenant, ... le corps
n'est pas un objet transparent et ne nous est
pas donne comme le cercle au geometre par
sa loi de constitution, s'il est u:ne unite ex-
pressive qu'on ne peut apprendre a connaitre
qu' en l'assumant, cette structure va se com-
muniquer au monde seilSl"ble. La theorie du
schema corporel est implicitement une theo.rie
de la perception.
!es reactions d'un organisme ne sont pas des
edifices de mouvements elementaires, mais
des gestes doues d'une unite interieure ...
L'experience dans un organisme n'est pas
l'enregistrement et la fixation de certains
mouvements reellement accomplis: elle
monte des aptitudes, c'est-a-dire le pouvoir
general de repondre a des situations d'un
certain type par des reactions variees qui
n'ont de commun que le sens. Les reactions
ne sontdonc ;pas une suite d'evenements, elles
portent en elles-memes une "intelligibilite."
consiste en ceci qie la pulsation existentielle
qui m' engage vers Jes objets de mon Um-
welt orclinaire, continue de me pousser et fait
appel au corps susceptible de m'y conduire
et de me le reveler. . . Mais comme je "sais"
desormais - et ne veux pas savoir - que la
mediation ne pourra plus s'effectuer, que je
ne puis plus m'ouvrir ace monde nice monde
s'offrir a moi, je "ruse," je continue de le
vise.r mais seulement de maniere magique.
n'ont de sens que par la pulsionexistentielle,
concretisee dans le membre-fantOme. Inver-
sement le membre-fantOme et l'elan existen-
tiel dont il est la traduction dans l'experience
immediate, ne puisent de realite que dans
l'epreuve des excitations interoceptives.
En realite, le corps n'est rien d'autre que le
maniere m!me dont nous accedons aumonde,
et, en m ~ m temps ou correlativement, un
certain mode d'apparition du monde lui-me-
me ... Le corps est ]'ensemble des conditions
concretes sous lesquelles un projet existentiel
s'actualise et defient, en s'actualisent,
proprement mien.
de "concevoir" une certaine forme d'excita-
tion. L'"evenement psychophysique" n'est
done plus du type de la causalite "mondaine."
Ainsi avant d'etre un spectacle objectif la
qualite se laisse reconnaitre par un type de
comportement qui la vise clans son essence
161
161
Refet-ence
APPENDIX
et c'est J>Ou:rquoi des que mon corps adopte
!'attitude du bleu j'obtiens une
ce du bleu ... il faut (done) a
vivre ces couleurs comme les vit notre corps.
Thiorie du champ L'integration d'un constituant dans une
de la conscience, 101 totalite qui la caractere d'une Fonne,
entraine l'absorption du constituant dans la
structure de l'organisation de cette totalite.
Etre un constituant et. dans ce sens, une
partie d'une Forme, signifie exister a une
certain place 3.l'interieur de la structure de la
totalite, et occuper un certain lieu dans
l'organisation de la Forme, un lieu qui ne
peut etre defini qu'en reference avec la
topographie de la contexture. En vertu de
son absorption_ ... le constituant en question
est doue d'une signification fonctionnelle par
rapport a cette contexture.
TMorie du champ Les constituants sont lies par la coherence
de la conscience, u4 de Forme ... ils se aeterminenl et se conditi011r
nent mutuellement. Ils derivent les uns des
aut-res et s'assignent les uns aufres, dans
1' reciprociti complete, la signification
foncti onnelle .. . chacun n'existe que dans un
de significations . ...
PP, 94 En les r6flexes ewc-m6mes oe sont
jamais des processus aveugles: ils s'ajustent a
un "sens" de 1a situation, ils expriment notre
orientation vers un "milieu de comporte-
ment" tout autant que J'action du "milieu
geographique" sur nous. Ils dessinent a dis-
tance 1a strncture de l'objet sans en attendre
les stimulations ponctuelles. C'est cette
presence globale de la situation qui donne un
sens aux stimuli partiels et qui les fait
compter, valoir ou exister pour l'organisme.
Le r6flexe ne resulte pas des stimuli objectifs,
il se retoume vers eux, il les investit d'un
sens qu'ils n'oat pas pris un a un et comme
agents physiques, qu'ils ont seulement
comme situation. Il les fait 6tre comme
situation, il est avec eux dans un rapport de
"connaissance," c'est-a-dire qu'il les indique
comme ce qu'ilest destine a affronter.
PP, 107 En d'autre termes, j'observe les objets
ext6rieurs avec mon corps, je !es manie,
je les .inspecte, j'en fais le tour, mais quant a
mon corps je ne !'observe pas lui-m6me: il
faudrait, pour pouvoir le faire, disposer d'un
second corps qui lui-m6me ne serait pas ob-
servable.
Page
165
i66

Reference
Une philosophie de
l' ambiguite, u9
PP, 108
Ideen, II, 159
Une pliilosophie de
l'ambiguiU, 121
PP, II7
PP, 125
APPENDIX
277
la permanence du corps n'est pas celle d'un
spectacle immuable s'offrant dans le monde,
mais celle d' une sorte de facteur lateral qui
accompagne tousles points de vue, san etre
capable ni de s'6liminer ni de se de:finir soi-
meme comme point de vue.
.. . c'est qu' il est ce par quoiil ya des objets.
Il n'est ni tangible ni visible dans 1a :mesure
ou il est ce qui voit et ce qui touche. Le
corps n'est done pas l'un quelconque des
objets ext6rieurs, qui offrirait seulement
cette d'6tre toujours Ia.
Wahrend ich alien anderen Dingen gegeniiber
die Freiheit habe, meine Stellung zu ihnen
beliebig zu wechseln und damit zugleich die
Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten, in denen
sie mir zur Gegebenheit kommen, peliebig
zu variieren, habe ich nicht die Moglichkeit,
mich von meinem Leibe oder ihn von mir zu
entfernen, und dem entsprechend s.ind die
Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten des Leibes
in bestimmter Weise beschriinkt: gewisse
kann ich nur in eigentiimlichen
perspektivischen Verkiirzung sehen, und
andere (z.B. der Kopf) sind iiberhaupt fiir
mich unsichtbar. Derselbe Leib, der mir
als Mittel aller Wahmehmung dient, steht
mir bei der Wahrnehmung seiner selbst im
Wege und ist ein merkwiirdig unvollkommen
konstitniertes Ding.
qoe, dans le monde intersensoriel, nous
prenons en vue d'une tache determinee. Le
projet de cette tiche suscite une attitude
d'ensemble du corps, attitude qui s'inscrit
en lui.
si mon corps peut etre une "forme" et s'il
peut y avoir devant lui des figures privile-
giees sur des fonds indifferents, c'est en tant
qu'il est polarise par ses tiches, qu'il existe
vers elles, qu 'ii se ramasse sur lui-meme pour
atteindre son but, et le "schema corpore1"
est finalement une maniere d'exprimer que
mon corps est au monde.
Nous constatons que le malade interroge sur
la position de ses membres ou sur celle d'un
stimulus tactile cberche, par des mouvements
preparatoires, a faire de son corps un objet
de perception actuelle; interroge sur la fonne
d'un objet au contact de son corps, ii cherche
a la tracer lui-meme en suivant le contour de
l'objet. Rien ne serait plus trompeur que de
Page
1
74
Reference
PP, 271
PP, 150
PP, 165
PP, 158
La structure de com-
porteme11t, 286
APPENDIX
supposer chezle-normalles memes operations,
abregres seulementpar l'habitnde. Le malade
ne recherche ces perceptions explicites que
pour suppleer une certain presence du corps
et de l 'objet qui est donnee chez le normal ....
Le mouvement, compris non pas comme
mouvement objectii et deplacement dans
l'espace, mais comme projet de mouvement
ou "mouvement v:irluel" est le fondement de
l'unite des sens ... mon corps est justeme.nt
un systeme tout 1ait d'equivalences et de
transpositions intersensorielles. Les sens se
traduisent l'un l'antre sans avoir besoin
d'un interprete, se comprennent l'un l'autre
sans avoir a passer par l'idee ... Avec le
notion de schema corporel, ce n'est pas
seulement ]' unite du corps qui est decrite
d'une maniere neuve, c'est aussi, a travers
elle, l'unite des sens et !'unite de l'objet.
moyend'acces a unm6me rmmde, c'est qu'il a
l'evidence antepredicative d'un monde uni
que, de sorte que !'equivalence des "organes
des sens" et leur analogie se lit sur Jes choses
et peutetrevecue avant d'6tre o n ~ e
C'est que le sujet normal a son corps non
seulement comme systeme de positions
actuelles, mais encore et par 13. meme comme
systeme ouvert d'une infinite de positions
equivalentes dans d'autre orientations. Ce
que nous avons appele le schema corporel est
justement ce systeme d'equivalences, cet
invariant immediatement donne par lequel
les diHerentes taches matrices sont instanta-
nement transposables. C'est dire qu'il n'est
pas seulement une experience de mon corps
mais encore une experience de mon corps
dans le monde ....
la vie de la conscience - vie connaissante,
vie du desir ou vie perceptive - est sous-
tendue par un "arc intentionnel" qui projette
autour de nous notre passe, notre avenir,
notre milieu humain, notre situation physi-
que, notre situation ideologique, notre
situation morale, ou plutflt qui fait que nous
soyons situes sous tous ces rapports. C'est
cet arc intentionnel qui fait !'unite des sens,
celle des sens et de !'intelligence, celle de la
sensibilite et de la motricite.
!'ensemble de chem.ins deja traces, de
pouvoirs deja constitues, le sol dialectique
Page
1
74
..
Reference
PP,99
Formale und trans-
zendenlale Logik,
l:85
PP, 275
PP, 270
PP, 275
APPENDIX
279
acquis sur lequel s'opere une mise en fonne
superieure,
organisme, comme adhesion prepersonelle a
la forme generale du monde, comme existence
anonyme et generale ... (il) joue, au-dessous
de ma vie personnelle, le role d'un c6mplexe
inni.
Diese wundersame Eigenheit gehort zur
Universalitii.t des Bewusstseins iiberhaupt
als leistender Intentionalitii.t. Alie intentio-
nalen Einheiten sind aus einer intentionalen
Genesis, sind "konstituierte" Einheiten, und
liberal! ka.nn man die "fertigen" Einheiten
nach ihrer Konstitution, nachihrer gesamten
Genesis befragen und zwar nach deren
eidetisch zu iassender Wesensform. Diese
fundamentale Tatsache, in ihrer Universali-
ti:it das gesamte intentionale Leben umspan-
nend, ist es, die den eigentlichen Sinn der
fotentionalen Analyse bestimmt als E nthullung
der intmtionalen Implikationen, mit denen,
gegeniiber dem offen fertigen Sinn der Ein-
beiten, ihre verborgenen Sinnesmomente und
"kausalen" Sinnesbeziehungen hervortreten.
Prenant !'attitude analytique, je decompose
la perception en qualites et en sensations
et ... je suis oblige de supposer un acte de
synthese qui n'est que la contre-partie de
mon analyse. Mon acte de perception, pris
dans sa naivete, n'effectue pas lui-meme cette
synthese, il profite d'un travail deja fai t, d'tme
synthese genirale ccmsti tuu une f ois p<nt1' toi'-
tes, c'est ce que j'exprime en disant que je
perc;ois avec mon corps ou avec mes sens,
mon corps, mes sens etant justement ce
savoir habituel du monde, cette science
implicite OU sed.imentee. (my emphasis)
un systeme synergique dont toutes les
fonctions soot reprises et liees dans le
mouvement general de l'etre au monde,
en tant qu' il est la figure figee de l'e.xistence.
Si ma conscience constituait actuellement
le monde qu'elle perc;oit, il n'y aurait d'elle
a lui aucune distance et entre eux aucun
decalage possible, elle le penetrerait jusque
dans ses articulations les plus secretes,
l'intentionnalite nous transporte.rait au
coeur de l'objet, et du meme coup le per-;:u
n' aurait pas l'epaisseur d'un present, la
conscience ne se perdrait pas, ne s'engluerait
pas en tuL
280
179
180
Reference
PP, 269
PP, 249-50
PP, 277
APPENDIX
Ce n'est pas le sujet epistemologique qui
effectue la synthese, c'est le corps quaod
il s'anache a sa dispersion, se rassemble.
se porte par tous les moyens vers un terme
unique de son mouvement, et quaod une
intention unique se en lui par le
pbenomene de synergie. . . En disant que
cette intentionnalite n'est pas une pensee,
nous voulons dire qu'elle ne s'effectue pas
dans la transparence d'une conscience et
qu'elle prend pour acquis tout le savoir
latent qu'a mon corps de lui-meme.
que je vois le bleu du ciel au sens oil je dis
que je comprends unlivre .... Ma perception,
meme vue del'interieur, exprime unesituation
donnee: je vois du bleu parce que j e suis sensi-
ble aux couleurs ... si je voulais traduire exac-
tement l'experience perceptive, je devrais dire
qu'on perc;:oit en moi et non pas que je
. . . Entre ma sensation et moi, il y a
toujoursl'epaisseur d'un acq"is originafre qui
empeche mon experience d'etre claire pour
elle-meme ... le moi qui voit ou le moi qui
entend est en quelque sorte un moi specialise,
familier d'un seul secteur de l'etre ....
Mon corps prend possession du temps, il fait
exister un passe etun avenir pour un present,
il n'est pas une chose, il fait le temps au
lieu. de la subir. Mais tout acte de fixation
doit etre renouvele, sans quoi il tombe a
l'inconscience ... La prise qu'il nous donne
sur un segment de temps, la synthese qu'il
effectue soot elles-memes des phenomenes
temporels, s'ecoulent et ne peuvent subsister
que ressaisies dans un nouvel acte lui-meme
temporel. . . Celui qui, dans l'exploration
sensorielle, donne un passe au present et
l'oriente vers un avenir, ce n'est pas moi
co=e sujet autonome, c'est moi en tant
qu j'ai uncorps et que je sais "regarder."
En tant que j'ai un corps et que j'agis a
travers lui dans le monde, l'espace et le
temps ne soot pas pour moi une sornme de
points juxtaposes, pas davaotage
une infinite de relations dont ma conscience
opererait la syntMse et ou elle impliquerait
mon corps; je ne suis pas dans l'espace et
le temps; je suis a l'espace et au temps,
mon corps s'applique a eux et Jes embrasse.
L'ampleur de cette prise mesure celle demon
existence . ...
Page
1 80
1Bz
Re/erena
Une philosophie de
l'ambiguite, n9
PP, u7
PP, 402
PP, 247
PP, viii
PP, II3
PP, 245
APPENDIX
28I
Si mon existence est par nature aupres des
choses, elle doit les approcher d' autant de
manieres que celles-ci se manifestent a elle et
etre capable de passer tout entiere en chacu-
ne. Mais, inversement, si ces modes de pre-
sence ofirent une chose unique, il faut aussi
que ces diverses modalites d'apprehension
communiquent entre elles et que !'existence,
si elle se plonge en chacune, ne se noie
pourtant en aucune.
une maniere d'acceder au monde et a l'objet,
une "praktognosie" qui doit etre reconnu
comme originale et peut-etre comme origi-
naire. Mon corps a son monde ou comprend
son monde sans avoir a passer par des
"representations." sans se subordooner a une
"Ionction symbolique" ou "objectivante."
il existe vers elles, qu'il se ramasse sur lui-
meme pour atteindre son but, et le "schema
corporel" est finalement une maniere d'ex-
primer que mon corps est au monde.
]' ai le monde comme individu inacheve a
tra vers mon corps com.me puissance de ce
monde, et j'ai la position des objets par
celle de mon corps ou inversement la posi-
tion de mon corps par celle des objets ... dans
une implication reelle, et parce qae mon
corps est mouvement vers le monde, le
monde, point d' appui demon corps.
La sensation de bleu ... est sans doute
intentionnelle, c'est-a-dire qn'elle ne r epose
pas en soi com.me une chose, qu'elle vise et
signifie au-dela d'elle meme. Mais le terme
qu'elle vise n'est reconnu qu'aveuglement
par la familiarite de mon corps avec lui, il
n'est pas constitue en pleine clarte, il est
reconstitue ou repris par un savoir qui reste
latent et qui lui laisse son opacite et son
ecceite.
pour voir le monde et le saisir comme
paradoxe, i1 faut rompre notre fa.miliarite
avec lui, et ... cette rupture ne peut rien
nous appreodre que le jaillissementimmotive
du monde. Le plus grand enseignement de la
reduction est l'impossibilite d' une reduction
complete.
c'est communiquer interieurement avec le
monde, le corps et les autres, etre avec eux
au lieu d'etre a cOte d'eux ....
n'est ni un penseur qui note une qualite, ni
un milieu inerte qui seraJt affecte on modiiie
Page Re/erence
185 PP, 247
185 PP, 492
186 PP, IZ3
187 PP, 265
188 PP, 403
189 PP, 49o--g1
APPENDIX
par elle, il est une puissance qui co-natt a
uncertain milieu d'existence ou se synchro-
nise a vec lui
Si les rayonnent autour d'elles un
certain mode d' existence ... c'est parce que
le sujet sentant ne les pose pas comme des
objets, mais sympathise avec elles, les fait
siennes et trouve en elles sa loi momentanee.
Le monde tel que nous avons essaye de le
montrer ... n'est plus le deploiement visible
d'une Pensee constituante, ni un assemblage
fortuit de parties, ni, bien entendu, !'ope-
ration d'une Fensee directrice sur une ma-
tiere indifferente, mais la patrie de toute
rationn.alite.
Ce n'est jamais notre corps objectif que n0us
mouvons, mais notre corps phenomenal,
et cela sans mystere, puisque c'est not;re
corps deja, comme puissance de telles et
telles regions du monde, qui se levait vers
les objets a saisir et qui les percevait ....
Les sens communiquent entre ewe en s'ou-
vrant a la structure de la chose. On voit la
rigidite et la fragilite du verre et, quand il
se brise avec un son cristallin, ce son est por-
te par le verre visible ... La forme des objets
n'en est pas le contour geometrique: elle a
un certain rapport avec leur nature propre
et parle a tous nos sens en meme temps
qu'a la vue ... Dans le mouvement de la
branche qu'un oiseau vient de quitter, on lit
sa flexibilite ou son elasticite, et c'est ainsi
qu' une branche de pommier et une brancbe
de bouleau se distinguent immediatement.
n nous faut concevoir les perspectives et le
point de vue comme notre insertion dans le
monde-individu, et la perception, non plus
com.me une constitution de l'objet vrai, ma.is
comme notre inherence aux choses.
L'analyse du corps propre et de la percep-
tion nous a revele un rapport a l'objet, une
signification plus profonde que celle-la (i.e.
syntbese) ... je n'en opere pas actuellement
la syn.these, je viens au-devant d' elle avec mes
champs sensoriels, mon champ percepti/, et
/inalement avec tme typique de tout l' Ire pos-
sible, tin montage universel a Z'egard du monde.
Ai' creux du sufet lui-meme, nous decoiwrions
done la presence du monde . .. Nous retrou-
vions sous l'inteutionnalite d'acte 011 the-
tique, et comme sa condition de possibilite,
Page Re/ereme
189 PP, 520
Y91 PP, 493-94
193 PP, 186
193 PP, 188
194 PP, 193
APPENDIX
une i'nUntionnaliti opbante, deja a l'reuvre
avant toute these ou tont jugement, un
"Logos du monde esthetiqne," un "art
cache dans !es profoodeurs de l'ame hu-
maine," et qui, comme tout art, ne se con-
nait que dans ses (my emphasis)
Rien ne me determine du dehors, non que
rien oe me sollicite, mais au contra.ire parce
que je suis d'embleehorsde moi et ouvert au
moode. . . de seul fait que nous sommes au
monde.
... au-d.essous de l'"inteotionnalite d'acte"
qui est la conscience thetique d'un objet ...
il nous faut reconnaitre une intentionnalite
"operante" (/ungierende l'nUntionaliti.it), qui
rend possible la premiere et qui est ce que
Heidegger appelle transcendance. Mon pre-
sent se depasse vers un aveoir et vers un
passe prochains et les touche Ia ou ils soot,
dans le passe, dans l'avenir eux-memes.
D n'y a de temps pour moi que parce que
j'y suis situe, c'est-a-dire parce que je m'y
decouvre deja engage, qui tout l'etre ne
m'est pas donne en personne, 'et enfin. parce
qu'un secteur de l'Mre m'est si proche qu'il
ne fait pas meme tableau devant moi et que
je ne pewc pas le voir, comme je ne peux pas
voir moo visage. D y a du temps pour moi
parce que j'ai un ... Aucune des di-
mensions du temps ne pent etre deduite des
autres. Mais le present (au sens large ... ) a
cependant un privilege parce qu'il est la
zone ou l'etre et la conscience coincident.
Ce qui est vrai seulement, c'est qne notre
existence ouverte et personnelle repose sur
une premiere assise d'existence acquise et
figee. Mais il ne saurait en etre autrement si
nous somme temporalite, puisque la dialec-
tique de l'acquis et de l'avenir est constitu-
tive du temps.
la vue, l'ouie, la sexualite, le corps ne sont
pas seulement les points de passage, les in-
struments ou les manifestations de !'exis-
tence personnelle: elle reprend et recueille
en elle l eur existence donnee et anonyme.
il est habite par elle, il est d'une certaine
maniere ce qu'il signifie, comme un p9rtrait
est la quasi presence de Pierre absent ...
En de des moyens d'expression conven-
tionnels, qui ne manifestent a autrui ma
pensee que parce que deja chez moi comme
Page
195
195
197
Reference
PP, 195
PP, 196-97
Attitudes et mouve-
ment, 59
PP, 215-16
APPENDIX
chez lui sont donnres, pour chaque signe, des
significations, et qui en ce sens ne realisent
pas une communication veritable, il faut
bien. . . reconnattre une operation primor-
diale de signification ou l'exprime n'existe
pas a part !'expression et OU les signes eux-
memes induisent au dehors leurs sens.
la tension d' une existence vers une autre
existence qui 1a nie et sans laquelle pourtant
elle ne se soutient pas.
se cache a elle-meme sous un masque de
generalite, elle tente sans cesse d'echapper
a la tension et au drame qu'elle institue ...
Elle y est consta.mment presents comme une
atmosphere. . . La sexualite se diffuse en
images quine retiennent d'elle que certaines
relations typiques, qu'une certaine physio-
nomie affective. . . Prise ainsi, c' est-a-dire
comme atmosphere am:bigue, la sexualite
est coextensive a la vie. Autrement dit,
l'equivoque est essentielle a !'existence hu-
maine, et tout ce que nous vivons ou pen-
sons a toujours plusieurs sens.
Il est important de noter que la subjectivite
est "perirue." L'idee communement repan-
due d' une subjectivite "supposee" par l'ana-
logie entre le mouvement d'autrui ou de
!'animal et notre propre mouvement est
done parfaitement fausse. Nous n'avons pas
seulement le pouvoir de reconnattre une
fonction, nous pouvons en outre la saisir
comme un mouvement propre ayant une
signification (com.me fonction animate ou
humaine). Par la nous pere4Vons Jes hommes
et les animaux com.me des "sujets" ou com-
me des centres de connaissanoes et de ten-
dances.
Le sens des gestes n'est pas donne ma.is
compris, c'est-a-dire ressaisi par un acte du
spectateur. . . La commup.ication ou la
comprehension des gestes s'obtient par la
reciprocite de mes intentions et des gestes
d'autrui, de mes gestes et des intentions li-
sibles dans la conduite d'autrui. Tout se
passe comme si l'intention d'autrui babitait
mon corps ou comme si mes intentions habi-
taient le sien. Le geste dont je suis la temoin
dessine en pointille un objet intentionnel.
Cet objet devient actuel et il est pleinement
compris lorsque les pouvoirs de mon corps
s'ajustent a lui et le recouvrent.
Page Reference
r97 'PP, 215-16
197 PP, 216-17
206 Thiorie du champ
de la conscience, 245
2II PP, xii
2 r7 Theorie du champ
de la conscience, 245
218 PP, 24g-50
APPENDIX
285
C'est par mon corps que je comprends
autrui, comme c'est par mon corps que je
peryois des "choses." Le sens du geste ainsi
"compris" n'est pas derriere lui, il se oonfond
avec la structure du monde que la geste
dessine et que je reprends a mon compte, il
s'etale sur le geste lui-meme ...
Le probleme du monde, et pour commencer
celui du corps propre, consiste en ceci que
tout y demeure.
A l)roprement parler, il s'agit moins de
!'existence corporelle elle-meme en tant que
une realite, que de la conscience specifique
que nous en avons. Certes, cette conscience
n'est pas necessairement une conscience
thematisante, positionnelle, et explicite; et
nous convenons tres volontiers avec M.
Merleay-Ponty de ce qu'"il ya ... plusieurs
manieres pour la conscience d ~ t r e cons-
science." (PP, 144)
Mais il nous faut souligner qu'une conscience
ante-preclicative, prepositionnelle, et non-
thllmatisante, est u1ie conscience tout de
nifime.
"Toute conscience est conscience de quelque
chose," cela n'est pas nouveau. Kant a
montre, clans le Refutation de l'Idialisme,
que la perception interieure est impossible
sans perception exterieure, que le monde,
comme connexion des phenomenes, est anti-
cipe clans la conscience de mon unite, est le
moyen pour moi de me realiser comme
conscience.
les problemes de constitution se posent non
seulement a propos des simples choses ma-
terielles de la nature, des objets culturels,
des objets ideaux de toute sorte, tels que les
nombres, . . . mais aussi a propos de notre
corps propre et de notre existence cotporelle.
En nous en tenant aux principes etablis par
Husserl, nous soutenons que Jes problemes
constitutifs doivent ~ t r e formuMs et traites
exclusivement en terme de copscience, soit
positioneUe, soit pre-positionnelle.
Jene peux pas dire que je vois le bleu du ciel
au sens oil je clis que je comprends un li-
vre. . . Ma perception, m ~ m e vue de l'inte-
rieur, exprime une situation donnee ...
De sorte que, s.i je voulais traduire exacte-
ment !'experience perceptive, je devrais dire
qu'on peryoit en moi et non pas que je per-
286
Page
227 PP, 479
zz9 PP, 478
z35 PP, 413
APPENDIX
90is ... je n'ai pas plus conscience le
vrai sujet de nia sensation que de ma nais-
sance ou de ma mort ... je sais qu'on natt et
qu'on meurt, je ne puis connattre ma nais-
sanc.e et ma mort. Chaque sensation, etant
a la riguem: la premiere, le derniere et la
seule de son espece, est one naissance et une
mort. Le sujet qui en a l'experienc.e com-
mence et finit avec elle, et com.me il ne peut
se preceder ni se survivre, la sensation
s 'apparait a elle-meme dans
un milieu de genera.lite, elle vient d'en det;a
de moi-meme, elle releve d'une sensibilite
qui l'a precedee et qui lui survivra, com.me
ma naissance et ma mort appartiennent a
une natalite et a une mortalite anonymes.
un seul phenomene d'ecoulement. Le temps
est l'unique mouvement qui convient a soi-
mi!me dans toutes ses parties, com.me un
geste enveloppe toutes les contractions
musculaires qui sont necessaires pour Le rea-
liser.
Siles Abschattungen A' et A" m'apparaissent
comme Abschattrmgen de A, ce n'est pas
parce qu'elles participent toutes a une unite
ideale qui serait leur raison commune. C'est
parce que j'ai a travers elles le point A lui-
meme dans son individualite irrecusable,
fondee une fois pour toutes par son passage
clans le present, et que je vois jaillir de lui
les Abschatfangen A', A", ...
Le pMnomene central, qui fonde a la fois
ma subjectivite et ma transcendance ... ,
consiste en ceci que je suis donne a moi-
meme. ]e s1tis don11e, c'est-a-dire que je me
trouve deja situe et engage dans un monde
physique et social - f e suis donne a moi-mlme,
c'est-a-dire que cette situation ne m'est ja-
mais dissumulee, elle n'est jamais autour de
moicomme une necessite etrangere, et je n'y
suis jamais effectivement enferme comme
un objet dans une boite.
il est essentiel au temps de n'i!tre pas seule-
ment temp effectif ou qui s'ecoule, mais en-
core temps qui se sait, car l'explosion ou la
dehiscence du present vers un avenir est
l'arcMtype du rapport de soi a soi et dessine
une intenorite ou une ipseite (Selbstheit).
le temps est quelqu'un, c'est-a-dire que !es
dimensions temporelles . . . expriment toutes
un seul eclatement ou une seule poussee qui
Page Reference
APPENDIX
est la subjectivite elle-meme. II 1aut com-
prende le temps comme sujet et le sujet
comme temps.
236 PP, 491-<)2 nous sommes ainsi toujour.; amenes a une
conception du sujet comme ek-stase et a un
rapport de transcendance active entre le
sajet et le monde. Le monde est .inseparable
du sujet, mais d'un sujet qui n'est Iien que
pro jet du monde, et le sujet est .inseparable
du monde, mais d'un monde qu'il projette
lui-meme. Le sujet est etre-au-monde et le
monde reste "subjectif" puisque sa texture
et ses articulations sont dessinees par le
mouvement de transcendance du sujet.
246 .MM, 15-16 ii taut bien que ces images dessinent en quel-
que maniere, sur la face qu'elles tournent
vers mon corps, le parti que mon corps pour-
rait tirer d'elles ... (Les objets) s'ordonnent
selon les paissances croissantes ou decrois-
santes de mon corps. Les objets qui entourent
mon corps reflichissent l' action possible de
mon corps sur eux.
246 MM. 17 CIJS mimes images rapportees a l'aclion pos-
sible d'une certaine image determinee, mon
corps.
246 MM, 57 ... nous avons le corps comme une
espece de c.entre d'ou se reflechit, sur les ob-
jets environnants, !'action que ces objets
exercent sur lui: en cette reflexion consiste
la perception e:rleneure. . . La percep-
tion . . . mesure notre action possible sur les
choses et par la, inversement, l'action pos-
sible des choses sur nous.
255 ldeen, II, 145-146 Alie die bewirkten Empfindungen haben
ihre Lokalisati<m, d.h. sie unterscheiden sich
durch die Stellen der erscheinenden Leib-
lichkeit und gehOren pb.anomenal zu ihr.
Der Leib konstituiert sich also urspriinglich
auf doppelte Weise: einerseits ist er phy-
sisches Ding, Materie, er hat seine Exten-
sion, in die seine realen Eigenschaften, die
Farbigkeit, Glatte, Ha.rte, Wanne und was
dergleichen materielle Eigenschaften mehr
sind, eingehen; andererseits finde ich auf
ihm, und empfinde ich "auf" ihm und "in"
ihm: die Wanne auf dem Handriicken, die
Kalte in den Ftissen, die Beriihrungsempfin-
dungen an den Fingerspitzen. Im empfinde
ausgebreitet tiber die Flii.chen weiter Leibes-
strecken den Druck und Zug der Kleider ...
256 Ideen, II, 146 Die lokalisierten Empfindungen sind nicht
288
F'age l?e/erence
259 ldeen, II, 68
259 ldeen, II, 68
259 Erste F'hilosophie,
6o-6I
APPENDIX
Eigenschaften des Leibes als physischen
Dinges, aber andererseits sind sie Eigen-
schaften des Dinges Leib, und zwar Wir-
Jrungseigenschaften. Sie treten auf, wenn der
Leib beriih:rt, gedriickt, gestochen, etc. wird,
und treten da auf, wo er es wi.rd, und in der
Zeit, wanner es wi.rd; sie dauern nur unter
Umstanden noch lange nach der Beriih-
rung fort.
Das System der Kausalitat, in welches der
Leib in der normalen Apperzeption ver-
flochten ist, ist von einer Art, dass der Leib
bei alien Veriinderungen, die er erfii.hrt,
doch im Rahmen einer typischen Identitat
verbleibt. Die Veranderungen des Leibes als
eines Systems von Wahrnehmungsorganen
sind /reie Leibesbewegungen, und die Or-
gane konnen willkiirlich wieder in dieselbe
Grundstellung zuriickkehren; sie andern
sich dabei nicht so, dass die Empfindlichkeit
sich typisch moclifiziert: sie kt)nnen immer
des Gleiche leisten, immer in gleicher Weise
namlich fiir die Konstitution von ausseren
Erfahrungen ...
"Empfindlichkeit" bat hier aber Beziehung
auf Objektives: ich muss eben in normaler
Weise Ruhe als Ruhe, Unveriinderung als
Unveranderung erfassen konnen, und darin
miissen alle Sinne zusammenstjmmen.
Ein Leib ist dabei in merkwiirdiger Weise
fiir mich bevorzugt, und somit ein animali-
sches Wesen, und speziell ein Mensch, vor
allen anderen. Es ist mein Leib, und dem-
gemass bin ich fiir mich vor allen Erfah-
rungsgegenstanden ausgezeichnet, Ich im
gewohnlichen empirischen Wortsinn, d.h.
Ich dieser Mensch, dem dieser Leib, mein
Leib, zugehOrt. Mein Leib ist der einzige, an
dem ich die Verleiblichung eines Seelens-
lebens, namlich eines Empfindens, Vorstel-
lens, Fiihlens, usw., das mein eigenes Leben
ist, oder das sich in leiblicher Gestalt, in
wechselnden leiblichdinglicben Vorkomm-
nissen "ausdriickt," in absolut unmittel-
bai:er Weise erfahre, derart dass icb in eins
nicht nur das Ding Leib und sein dinglicbes
Gebaben wahrnehme, sondern zugleich mein
psychisches Leben, und endlich beides eben
in eins: das Sich-verleiblichen des letzteren
im ersteren, das Sich-aosdriicken des einen
im anderen.
F'age
26o
Reference
Erste Philosophie,
II, 61
ldeen, I, 103
APPENDIX 289
Zug um Zug gibt sich der mir erscheinende
Leib - und gibt sich der Wandel seiner Er-
scheinungsweisen - als dieses oder jenes
Psychische in sich geborgen tragend, als
Ausserlichkeit, die hier noch die Innerlich-
keit, die sich darin "ausdriickt," originaliter
in sich hat. Beides gibt sich ungetrennt, in
Deckung ...
Wir seben sogleich, dass es das nur kann
durch eine gewisse Teilnahme an der Tran-
szendenz im ersten, originaren Sinn, und das
ist offenbar die Transzendenz der =ateriel-
len Natur. Nur durch die Erfahrungsbezie-
hung zum Leibe wi.rd Bewusstsein zum real
menschlichen und tierischen, und nur da-
durch gewinnt es Stellung i.m Raum der Na-
tur und in der Zeit der Natur ...