****Asia Pivot DA

**1NC
Asia is focus of foreign policy pivot now but doubts are growing about the US
commitment to rebalancing
Lobe 13
Jim, chief of the Washington bureau of Inter Press Service, J.D Berkley, U.S. Rebalancing to Asia/Pacific Still a Priority, March-
3, http://www.lobelog.com/u-s-rebalancing-to-asiapacific-still-a-priority/ ///cmf
Amidst growing tensions with North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China, the White House Monday insisted
that its re-balancing toward the Asia/Pacific remained on track and that Washington is
fully committed to its allies there, especially Japan and South Korea. In a major policy address to the Asia
Society in New York City, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon offered an overview of U.S. strategy in the
region, stressing that the re-balancing sometimes referred to as the pivot will be comprehensive,
focusing at least as much attention on Washingtons economic role there as its
military posture. While much of the speech echoed previous administration policy statements, Donilon, President
Barack Obamas closest foreign policy aide, also announced new U.S. sanctions against the Foreign Trade Bank of North
Korea, a step that some analysts said could make trade by third countries with Pyongyang more difficult. But he suggested in
the clearest terms to date that Washington would respond to any aggressive move by Pyongyang with military force. North
Koreas claims may be hyperbolic but as to the policy of the United States, there should be no doubt: we will draw upon the
full range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to us and to our allies by North Korea, he
declared. He also called on China to deepen its military-to-military dialogue with the U.S. and
to take serious steps to end the hacking of U.S. government and private-business computer networks a practice which he
said has become a key point of concern and discussion with China at all levels of our governments. His remarks on
the latter subject, which included a call for the two countries to hold a direct dialogue to
establish acceptable norms of behaviour in cyberspace, marked the first time a top-ranking U.S. official has
accused China by name of carrying out such attacks many of which, according to a recent New York Times investigation,
have been launched by a Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) unit based in a 12-story Shanghai office tower. Beijing has
strongly denied it is responsible. (T)his is not solely a national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government, he
said. Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about the serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft of
confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on an
unprecedented scale. The international community cannot afford to tolerate such activity from any country. Donilons
speech came amidst threats and counter-threats between North and South Korea in the wake of last months underground
nuclear test by Pyongyang, the inauguration of the Souths new president, Park Geun-hye, and Mondays launch of a major
joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise which purportedly provoked the Norths announcement to renounce the 60-year-
old armistice and disconnect its hotline with Seoul. The rapid build-up in tensions between the two Koreas has reportedly
spurred growing demands within the South to consider developing a nuclear weapon itself, just as renewed tensions between
Beijing and Tokyo over a group of islands in the East China Sea has provoked a somewhat similar reaction in Japan. The
hawkish reactions in both Seoul and Tokyo where doubts are growing about whether
Washington can actually follow through on its military re-balancing when the Pentagon budget
appears headed for decline are clearly of concern to the Obama administration. Donilon went out of his
way to reaffirm its goal of moving 60 percent of the U.S. naval fleet to the Asia-Pacific by 2020 and expanding radar and
missile defence systems to protect U.S. allies from the dangerous, destabilising behaviour of North Korea. In these
difficult fiscal times, I know that some have questioned whether this rebalance is sustainable, he said. But make no
mistake: President Obama has clearly stated that we will maintain our security presence and
engagement in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to reassuring Tokyo and Seoul, Mondays speech also
appeared intended in part to dispel any doubts about the regions priority in its global
strategy, particularly given Secretary of State John Kerrys choice to make Europe and the Middle
East the site of his maiden overseas tour and Obamas decision to make his first second-term trip also to the
Middle East. There have been a number of people in the region looking at Kerrys trip and
saying maybe theyre looking to re-balance the re-balance, noted Alan Romberg, the head of East Asia
programmes at the Stimson Center here.
Plan trades offa credible pivot requires downgrading other geopolitical
concerns
Manyin 12
Mark et al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing' towards asia,"
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
The Administrations rebalancing toward Asia and the Pacific comes in the midst of profound
changes in global economic, political, and security relationships. The breadth of issues is as
great as at any time in recent history, encompassing security relations, economics and trade, the U.S. ability to compete
and create jobs in the face of ever-stiffer global competition, global financial stability, and even fundamental questions
about political and economic models, given the rise of China and other emerging economies. In the context of
such global challenges, a revitalized focus on Asia potentially reflects the Administrations
willingness to make far-reaching strategic choices, involving judgments that explicitly
downgrade concerns about some challenges to U.S. security, while elevating others. Whether the
Administration has set the right priorities, whether its perceptions of global trends are sufficiently hedged,
and whether the risks it is willing to countenance are appropriate, all are critical matters for Members of Congress to
consider.
Commitment to Asian security key to shore up perceptions of declining
credibility
Kapila 6/19
Subhash, PhD in Strategic Studies, South China Sea Conflicts Ignited United States Pivot To Asia Pacific Analysis,
http://www.albanytribune.com/19062013-south-china-sea-conflicts-ignited-united-states-pivot-to-asia-pacific-analysis/ ///cmf
There is a nagging fear in South East Asian capitals on the intensity and longevity of the
US strategic pivot to Asia fearing that both as a result of the US traditional China Hedging Strategy and also
because of domestic budget cuts in defence spending, the US commitment to South China Sea security
may be a transient phase. How would the United States assure South East Asian countries
of its resolve to contain China within its national boundaries and not let it spill its military adventurism in South
China Sea region and in South East Asia as a whole? The United States needs to remember how China muscled into South
East Asia in the last decade or so when the region lay neglected by the United States. The United States could let South East
Asia remain in benign neglect because during that period Chinas military and naval build-up levis were still maturing. In
2013 Chinas military and naval build-up has reached alarming levels and consequently China has already put the United
States on notice that at least in the Western Pacific wherein lies the South China Sea conflictual region is located, China is no
longer a military push-over or subject to US political and military coercion. The United States can no longer
persist in following its traditional China Hedging Strategy and Risk Aversion Strategy
towards China. Persisting in doing so could end up in denting United States image of a
credible strategic partner in Asian capitals and endanger its continued embedment in Asia.
South China Sea conflicts stood ignited by Chinas military brinkmanship and Chinas military adventurism to which the
United States responded by its strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. In 2013 a higher call now awaits the United States in
checkmating Chinas military adventurism by shedding ambiguity from its South China Sea policies. The United States
needs to take advantage of the Asian strategic polarisation which the China-generated South China Sea conflicts have
brought in its wake in favour of the United States. Robert Kaplan, the noted US Author and expert on strategic affairs has
wisely observed that: Just as German soil constituted the military frontline of the Cold War, the waters of the South China
Sea may constitute the military frontlines in the coming decades. Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacy
and economics but the South China Sea could show what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like United States,
it is your call now.
Credibility key to hegprevents emboldened adversaries and scared allies
Tunc 8
Hakan, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq, Orbis Volume 52 Issue 4
2008
Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actors past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior.
In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a countrys reputation
involves resolve.5 Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military
confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.6 According to Shiping Tang, this
concern frequently amounts to a cult of reputation among foreign policy makers, which he defines as a belief system
holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead ones
adversaries or allies to underestimate ones resolve in the next crisis.7 Of particular importance to
the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of
the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a
theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a
countrys reputation and thus embolden the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to
their cause.8 Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who
maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and
resolve.9 According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries
and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and
irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less
supportive. This logic has had two general consequences for Americas use of force abroad: First, exhibiting
resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the
mere perception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force
against every adversary.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in
several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States
appeared questionable to some.11 Second, reputational concerns made it difficult for the
United States to withdraw from a theater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although the
logic was also evident during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s.12 As is well-documented by historians, both the Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations took reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an
honorable exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson and
Nixon, an honorable exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam (much like independent, anti-communist South
Korea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in the conflict, particularly by the North Vietnamese
govern- ment. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices.13
Decline causes great power warsAmerican retrenchment collapse current
restraints
Zhang and Shi 11 *Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Currently on leave
from Graduate School in Economic and Political Development, Lin Shi, MA from Columbia in International Affairs, also serves as an
independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank
Americas decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-
conflict-and-rivalry/
This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears
to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess
and its economy remains the worlds largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that
separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and
the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict
regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the
US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have
bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to
mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will
the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is
more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts
or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in
military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century Americas emergence as a regional
power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century,
accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion
that Britain rules the waves. Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western
Hemispheres security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of
law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property
rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal
opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets,
liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries
have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative
relations. However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines? Given that Americas authority,
although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as
well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly
detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return
to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore,
multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional
organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum
left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political
and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised and, well, less free and major
powers would compete for supremacy . Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a
zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western
European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international
regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one
where great power wars re-emerge , the liberal international system is supplanted by
an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation
barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US
primacy.

***Uniqueness
2NC Yes PivotAllies Reassured
US committed to pivot nowallies reassured in squo despite budget cuts
Dilanian 6/1
Ken, Hagel: Cuts won't halt Asia pivot, The Baltimore Sun, lexis /// cmf
Chuck Hagel emerged from combat in the Vietnam War with two Purple Hearts and "a sense of how important it would be
for America to engage wisely in Asia," as he put it to top defense officials gathered here. Now, more than a year
after President Barack Obama pledged to refocus America's security strategy toward Asia,
Hagel is using his first visit to the region as defense chief to reassure allies that the so-called
pivot won't be derailed by Pentagon budget cuts or competing demands from the civil war
in Syria, the nuclear stalemate with Iran and other high-priority issues. "The United States
military is not only shifting more of its assets to the Pacific, we are using these assets in
new ways to enhance our posture and partnerships," Hagel said at a regional security forum Saturday.
Although Hagel didn't say it, his weekend visit also is intended to convince anxious allies that the
administration isn't ignoring their concerns about China's recent military buildup and
increasingly assertive foreign policy. He hopes to bolster defense ties to traditional allies
such as Japan and the Philippines and cement support for new partners, including Vietnam. The regional shifts
have added tension as Obama prepares to meet the new Chinese president, Xi Jinping, at a private estate in Rancho Mirage,
Calif., next week, their first summit since Xi took office in March. The White House hopes to persuade Xi to help rein in
North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile tests, to control what U.S. officials call pervasive cyberspying and digital theft by
China, and to avoid aggressive moves in disputed shoals and islands in the South China Sea and near Japan that could
destabilize regional peace. Hagel had no formal bilateral talks scheduled with Chinese officials on the sidelines of the
Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual security conference, although an informal session is planned. As in the past, Beijing sent a
midlevel delegation headed by a military official, not its defense minister, to show its unhappiness with Washington's plans to
boost its military presence in the region. With no new deployments or policies to announce, Hagel was left to tout
developments begun under his predecessor, Leon Panetta, including sending 250 Marines to northern Australia and a littoral
combat ship to Singapore. Hagel is set to visit the ship, the USS Freedom, on Sunday. The Pentagon plans to assign 60
percent of its naval fleet to the western Pacific by 2020, up from 50 percent now. But the mandatory federal sequestration
budget cuts have forced the Pentagon to trim about $40 billion in spending this fiscal year, and that has affected some
training efforts and ship movements in Asia. The Air Force 374th Airlift Wing, based at Yokota Air Base in Japan, for
example, has reduced flying time by 25 percent and canceled participation in a joint exercise in Thailand, officials said. A
report by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service in March said the budget cuts could make the pivot untenable.
"Plans to restructure U.S. military deployments in Asia may run up against more restrictive budget constraints," it warned.
But in his speech, Hagel said budget pressures wouldn't undermine the emphasis on Asia. "It
would be unwise and shortsighted to conclude ... that our commitment to the rebalance
cannot be sustained," he said. Hagel became the latest senior U.S. official to accuse China of launching cyberattacks
on U.S. industry and defense systems, a charge Beijing has repeatedly denied. According to recent news reports, China's
cyberspies have obtained data on two dozen U.S. weapon systems, including the combat ship that Hagel plans to tour. Hagel
provided no new details, but he said U.S. officials had expressed concerns to Beijing "about the growing threat of
cyberintrusions, some of which appear to be tied to the Chinese government and military." He praised the establishment of a
U.S.-China cyberworking group and said China's new defense minister, Gen. Chang Wanquan, would visit the Pentagon this
year. U.S. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in April. Hagel is scheduled to fly
from Singapore to Brussels on Monday to attend a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers.
Cyberwarfare will be a top agenda item at the NATO conference, he said.
2NC UniquenessPivot Now
Obama administration focusing all foreign policy tools on Asianothing
expected to disrupt that attention
Stearns 4/11
Scott, VOAs State Department correspondent, North Korea, 'Asia Pivot', Tops Kerry's Agenda,
http://www.voanews.com/content/north-korea-asia-pivot-tops-kerrys-agenda/1639121.html /// cmf
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry makes his first trip to Asia later this week, where he will
be talking about North Korea and a more active U.S. military and diplomatic presence in the
region. On Asia, President Obama's second term starts where his first left off --boosting
military, diplomatic, and commercial assets in the region as part of a so-called "Asia Pivot."
Ahead of his first trip to Asia as secretary of state, John Kerry compared U.S. goals for the region to those of North Korea.
"We want to see a peaceful community of nations trading with each other, working to improve the lives of their citizens; and
that is in direct contrast to the North, which maintains gulags, has thousands of political prisoners, treats people in the most
inhumane way, and now starves their people in order to build nuclear weapons," Kerry stated. With so much at stake
- and needing China's help with North Korea - American University professor Pek Koon Heng sees no
change in Washington's Asia engagement. "The whole bundle of issues about trade and defense and security
and political cooperation and global issues, China more than any other country is who the U.S. has to work with. So I don't
see the Americans taking their eyes off the ball in the second Obama administration," she
said.
US shifting foreign policy attention fully to Asia
Logan 13
Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8
/// cmf
Slowly, Washington policy elites have come back around to the position that the most
consequential international-political changes are taking place in Asia. On an October 2011 trip to
Asia, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta remarked that Washington was at a turning point away
from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific and that this shift will entail a strategic
rebalancing.6 Similarly, a recent article by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that the future
of geopolitics will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States should be
right at the center of the action.7 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt
Campbell says that one of the most important challenges for U.S. foreign policy is to effect a
transition from the immediate and vexing challenges of the Middle East to the long-term and deeply consequential issues
in Asia.8
2NC AT Link Non-unique
The Asia Pivot is the priority over Latin America now
Bryant 12
Dane Bryant, 9/28/12, World Politics Review, "Chavez or not, it's time to rethink the US-Venezuela relationship,"
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship
Over the past four years, the Obama administration has been preoccupied, both militarily and
diplomatically, with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan and the shifting dynamics of the post-Arab
Spring Middle East. More recently, the Asia pivot has become the lodestar of U.S. strategic
planning . As a result, Latin America has not received the attention it warrants, at a time when
the region is undergoing rapid changes.
There has been no change in Latin American policy, the aff is that
transformation
Branigan et al 2012 (Tania Branigan in Beijing, Jason Burke in Delhi, David Smith in Johannesburg, Jonathan Watts in
Rio de Janeiro, Ian Traynor in Brussels; Obama's first term: pivot to Asia and tweaks to Latin America; Oct 21;
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/21/obama-foreign-policy-pivots-asia; kdf)
Obama has tweaked rather than transformed US policy towards Latin America, despite the
increased influence and integration of a region that is growing economically and becoming more dependent on China.
Aside from a slight relaxation of the embargo on Cuba in 2009, the White House has
largely continued the approach of previous administrations by putting a priority on the
(losing) battle against narcotics trafficking. Promises to put more emphasis on
reducing US demand as well as Latin American supply have failed to produce
results : drug use and murder rates are both rising.
**AT Thumpers**
2NC AT Thumpers Generic
Asia is Obamas top priority
Gerges 13
Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle East
Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-
east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf
Another point that must be stressed is that the Middle East is not a priority on the Obama
foreign policy agenda. The Administration has shifted its foreign policy and economic
priorities to Asia where Obama and his aides believe that Americas future lies. The Obama administration
has reduced its commitments in the non-oil producing Arab states and has relied on its
regional and European allies to shoulder the burden and responsibilities of maintaining western
influence. Although Obamas rhetoric had given the impression of heightened US
involvement and commitment to the region, his actual foreign policy priorities lie
elsewhere the rising powers in the Pacific Ocean. But as often happens, before the end of Obamas first
term in the White House, the major popular uprisings witnessed in the Arab world forced him to become more involved in
the region against his own will.
Kerry reaffirmed US commitment to Asiadebunked doubts about other
priorities
Hookway 7/1
James and Natasha Brereton-Fukui, Kerry Affirms Renewed Focus on Asia Ties,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323297504578578772762356056.html /// cmf
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, BruneiU.S. Secretary of State John Kerry sought to reassure Southeast
Asian leaders on Monday that America is committed to deepening its relationship with the
region, despite fears that Washington's foreign-policy agenda was returning to the Middle
East. Some Asian diplomats have privately expressed worries that U.S. budget cuts and Mr. Kerry's
own growing focus on Syria and reviving the stalled peace process between Israeli and
Palestinian leaders is weakening Washington's push to rebalance its foreign policy toward
Asia's booming economies. At the same time, China has launched a charm offensive with the strategically important
countries of Southeast Asia, potentially undermining America's momentum, analysts say, by agreeing to discussions on how
to best resolve territorial conflicts in the energy-rich South China Sea and offering to upgrade its trade relationship with the
10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc. "Let me be crystal clear," Mr. Kerry said at a security
forum here. "I know some people wonder whether the second term of the Obama administration and a new
secretary of state are going to continue on the path that we are on. And the answer I say to all of
you is 'yes,' and not just 'yes': We hope to increase the effort." To emphasize the point, Mr. Kerry told
a news conference afterward that he and foreign ministers from South Korea, China and Japan had agreed that North Korea
must take concrete steps to unwind its nuclear-weapons program before reviving multiparty talks on breaking North Korea's
international isolation. "All of us, all four of us, are absolutely united and absolutely firm in our insistence that the future
with respect to North Korea must include denuclearization," he said. Under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has stepped
up its diplomatic and commercial involvement in Asia after a decade focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a stark statement of intent during an earlier Asean meeting in Vietnam, declaring that
America was back in the region as a Pacific power. Mr. Obama has dabbled in similar rhetoric, telling
Australian lawmakers in 2011 that the U.S. is "all in" on Asia. Since then, Washington has from time
to time infuriated China by declaring America's interest in seeing a peaceful resolution to conflicting territorial claims in the
South China Seawhich Beijing views as U.S. encroachmentwhile U.S. forces have gradually stepped up their military
relationship with old allies, such as the Philippines, and new partners like Vietnam. Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del
Rosario said in an interview Monday that his country is reviewing how to provide U.S. forces with more access to the
country's military bases. But since Mr. Kerry succeeded Mrs. Clinton as secretary of state, he has at times appeared more
interested in addressing issues in the Middle East. Mr. Kerry arrived in Brunei a day behind schedule after four days of
negotiations in the Mideast over the Palestinian issue. Earlier this year, he pulled out of a planned trip to Indonesia, Southeast
Asia's largest economy and most populous nation. Cuts in Pentagon spending are also threatening to delay Washington's
military and economic pivot of its resources to Asia. Across-the-board federal budget reductions known as the sequester
required the Defense Department to cut spending by as much as $41 billion in the fiscal year to the end of September, and
further cuts could follow. "The U.S. may have lost some of its traction, some of the momentum built up by Hillary Clinton,
and it's not really offering anything new," said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in
Singapore. Mr. Kerry singled out maritime security in the shipping lanes of the South China
Sea as a policy priority. The waters are claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam and the Philippines, among
others, occasionally sparking armed confrontations. "What happens here matters to the United States and it also matters to
everybody else, it matters to the global community," Mr. Kerry said. He was careful to stress that the U.S.'s interest in the
region wasn't designed to "contain" or "counterbalance" any one countrya thinly veiled reference to China, whose own
influence continues to grow.
2NC AT Syria Thumper
Arming of Syrian rebels not perceived as a major foreign policy commitment
The Economist 6/22
Barack Obamas tentative step, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21579851-americas-decision-send-more-
arms-rebels-no-means-guaranteed /// cmf
It was in that spirit of caution that the administration announced on June 13th that, for the first time, it
would give weapons and other forms of lethal military kit to the rebels. Though the move met with
bluster from Mr Assads ally, Russiaand wary enthusiasm from Syrian rebel commandersit was not a giant
step. American officials have given scant detail, but it is thought that the CIA will co-ordinate the
supply of light arms to the rebels. In an interview with PBS television on June 17th, Mr Obama derided the idea
that heavier weapons, such as anti-tank or anti-helicopter rockets and missiles, could swiftly tip the balance of power away
from the Assad regime. The new weaponry will be channelled through the Supreme Military Command, a Western-backed
rebel body headed by Selim Idriss, a general who defected from Mr Assads forces, and whose connections to moderate
groups America has been testing with supplies of food and medicine. Americas programme, likely to be based in Jordan, on
Syrias southern border, may in effect amount to a beefing up of a Saudi operation there, which already involves the CIA in
training vetted rebels. The official explanation for the decision to start arming the opposition rests on a recent assessment by
American intelligence agencies, after weeks of investigations, that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including
the nerve agent sarin, in several small-scale attacks on the opposition, killing as many as 150 people. However, Obama aides
have also linked the new policy to a deteriorating situation on the ground in Syria in recent weeks, as the regime enjoyed
greater success on the battlefield, in part thanks to help from Iran and Hizbullah, Lebanons Shia party-cum-militia, which
the United States regards as a terrorist outfit. A question-mark hangs over what America hopes to achieve. Washington
sources say thathaving warned Syria publicly that the systematic use of chemical weapons would cross a red line and
force America to change its policyMr Obama had to do something, on the grounds that superpowers do not bluff. In
addition, advocates of arming the opposition have long argued that America may gain leverage by sending its own weaponry
down supply-lines already filled with aid from Gulf Arab countries and Turkey. But without supplying anti-aircraft weapons,
America is unlikely to give a boost to the rebels of the magnitude that Hizbullah gifted the regime when it helped Mr Assads
army to capture the rebel stronghold of Qusayr on June 5th. Some reckon it is even too late to achieve the more modest goals
of bringing the fissiparous rebel groups under a single command structure and marginalising more extreme elements, in
particular the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. Once a group has seen its fortunes fall, it is hard to resuscitate it. Take, for
example, Shuhada Suria (Martyrs of Syria). Just a year ago this group, which operates in the north-west province of Idleb and
whose leader sits on the Supreme Military Command, was a leading fighting force. But it has faltered in part because funding
has shrivelled, prompting defections to stronger groups, usually more Islamist ones. One rebel commander moans that the
stinginess of foreign supplies of arms has been like giving us injections just often enough to stop us from being killed off.
America must stomach some arms falling into the wrong hands, too. Gulf-purchased Croatian weapons delivered to the rebels
earlier this year led to gains in the south, which were reversed when supplies abruptly stopped, apparently after some were
spotted in the hands of unsavoury groups including the Yarmouk Martyrs, an Islamist lot that abducted four UN peacekeepers
in May. Private donations from such places as Kuwait, usually to Salafist groups, continue to bolster the sort of militias that
give the rebelsin Western eyesa bad name. A policy that fuels but does not change the dynamics of the war is the worst
of all worlds, says Emile Hokayem, an analyst based in Bahrain for a London-based think-tank, the International Institute
for Strategic Studies. Rebel commanders hope that Americas shift includes a green light for Saudi Arabia to provide them
with man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADs)hitherto vetoed by America. That may be a forlorn hope. Mr
Obama noted this month that some of the most effective opposition fighters are no friends
of America, so that arming them willy-nilly is hardly in Americas long-term interests.
2NC AT Middle East Thumper
Middle East is not a foreign policy priorityno material proof, only rhetoric
Gerges 13
Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle East
Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-
east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf
Another point that must be stressed is that the Middle East is not a priority on the Obama
foreign policy agenda. The Administration has shifted its foreign policy and economic
priorities to Asia where Obama and his aides believe that Americas future lies. The Obama administration
has reduced its commitments in the non-oil producing Arab states and has relied on its
regional and European allies to shoulder the burden and responsibilities of maintaining western
influence. Although Obamas rhetoric had given the impression of heightened US
involvement and commitment to the region, his actual foreign policy priorities lie
elsewhere the rising powers in the Pacific Ocean. But as often happens, before the end of Obamas first
term in the White House, the major popular uprisings witnessed in the Arab world forced him to become more involved in
the region against his own will.
2NC AT Israel Peace Process Thumper
Obama not spending political capital on the peace processno hint at future
plans either
Gerges 13
Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle East
Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-
east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf
For example, after his initial attempt to help broker a Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Obama
has taken a cautious stance. Netanyahus opposition has frustrated Obamas quest. Instead of challenging
Netanyahu and exerting more pressure on him to accept a sensible solution, Obama let the
Israeli Prime Minister off the hook. Obama squarely lost the first and final round because he was
unwilling to spend more political capital at home. He recognized the costs to his domestic and foreign
policy agenda and cut his losses. Given Obamas worldview and his priorities, it is doubtful if the US president
will make another major drive to broker a peace settlement between the Palestinians and
Israelis. Just a few days ago, Obama reportedly bemoaned Netanyahus decision to build more settlements on occupied
Palestinian lands. He reportedly called Netanyahu a coward because of his failure to meet the Palestinians halfway, adding
that he expected Netanyahu to continue his reckless ways. In his second term in office, Obama will most likely
avoid pursuing efforts to broker a peace settlement because he does not see conditions ripe to do so. What
this means is that the US president does not seem to be inclined to exert pressure on Israel
Americas strategic client in the region.
2NC AT Africa Thumper
Africa is not a prioritythe renewed interest is just a reaffirmation of
existing programs and commitments
Galvez 6/30
Rick, International Relations MA graduate of Syracuse University's Maxwell School, Obama Africa Trip: Bush Was Better For
Africa Than the Guy Accused Of Being Born in Kenya, http://www.policymic.com/articles/51549/obama-africa-trip-bush-was-
better-for-africa-than-the-guy-accused-of-being-born-in-kenya /// cmf
Obama, in contrast, has done little outside of a 2009 visit to Ghana when he offered words and not much
else. He has Kenyans in a "small uproar" because he will not be visiting, which is representative of his larger stance or
more aptly, non-stance on the region. The itinerary of this "guilt trip," as some have called it, is a miss; it neglects the
biggest regional powers in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Additionally, the most successful USAID
development programs Feed the Future and the Global Health Initiative are simply incarnations of
previous administration's programs and are not limited to Africa in particular. The Commerce
Department's "Doing Business in Africa" campaign has produced minimal results, along with USAID attempts at bolstering
trade. The larger point is that African development is simply not a priority for Obama. This
is, to a certain extent, understandable. He's had a lot on his plate. Between economic crises, war, and scandal,
Obama has had to prioritize, leaving Africa on the back-burner. Many argue that this is not
necessarily a bad thing; Obama should be focusing on domestic crises and shoring up security at home before spending time
on security around the world which has minimal impact on America.
***Links
LinkBag of Goods (Dip Cap)
Latin American engagement and Asia pivot are zero-sum
Anderson and Grewell 2k1
(Terry, Professor of Economics at Montana State University, Bishop J., Research Associate at the Political Economy Research Center,
From Local to Global Property, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2 Chi. J. Intl L. 427, Fall, Lexis)
Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of
goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs
it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.
Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as
the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and
more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources
necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic
currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic
efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been
opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing
vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." 40
LinkGeneric Regional Focus Tradeoff
Focusing on one region trades off with another engagement with Latin
America can undermine the credibility of the Asia Pivot
Mark Manyin et al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'
towards asia," http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
Increasing the relative importance of the Asia-Pacific in U.S. policy could conceivably
diminish U.S. capabilities in other regions. In particular, in an era of constrained U.S. defense resources, an increased U.S. military emphasis on
the Asia-Pacific region might result in a reduction in U.S. military presence or capacity in other parts of the world, which in turn could increase risks for the United States in those other regions.
While the United States does not want to reduce its commitments in the Middle East, for instance, forces similar to those needed in Asia are also required there. High priority capabilities in both
regions include short- and medium-range missile defense, rotational naval deployments and air attack forces, and rapid-reaction ground forces. Such forces may be
strained by simultaneous demands in both regions. The high-profile manner in which the Pacific Pivot initiatives
have been unveiledthrough a series of Presidential and Cabinet-level trips, announcements, speeches, and articlesappears to have been designed to call as much attention to them as possible.
(See Selected Documents and Speeches.) Part of the reason for this may have been to demonstrate to regional players the depth of the Administrations commitment and resolve. This
approach also carries the potential costs and risks. For example, the high profile that Obama Administration officials
have given to the initiative could lead leaders in other regions to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the
United States is disengaging, thereby eroding U.S. global influence. Even the use of the term pivot, which has persisted despite the Administrations later
substitution of the term rebalancing, could signal the changeability of U.S. policy priorities.23 For instance, when the Obama Administration first came to office, it sometimes appeared to put the
U.S.-China relationship at the center of its Asia strategy. If that ever was Administration policy, such an approach has been abandoned. Also, if the United States
pivots once, it can pivot again , perhaps if a successor administration adopts a different set of
priorities. 24The depth of the Obama Administrations rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region also
may be called into question as time goes on. As yet, it does not appear that the Administration has translated its pronouncements into an across-
the-government plan to implement the new elements of the strategy. The Administrations budget request for FY2013 sends ambiguous signals. On the one hand, the proposed budget includes a 5%
decrease for East Asia and Pacific (EAP) bilateral assistance programs below projected spending levels for FY2012. On the other hand, compared to some other aid regions, funding for EAP
remains relatively stable. Overall assistance funding to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan), for example, is to fall by 18%, according to the FY2013 budget request.25
Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to the initiative has undoubtedly raised the potential costs to the United States if it or successor administrations fail to follow
through on public pledges. Chinese analysts have already expressed skepticism about the U.S. ability to
follow through on the pivot, given U.S. economic difficulties and the continuing turmoil in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other
areas.26 If such predictions come to pass, U.S. influence may fall farther and faster due to
the Obama Administrations high profile announcements.
LinkGeneric Tradeoff
The US is moving away from the West to focus on the pivot, plan reverses the
trend
Carament and Palamar 2012 (David and Simon; Canada Grapples with Asia Dilemma; Feb 10;
thediplomat.com/2012/02/10/canada-grapples-with-asia-dilemma/comment-page-1/?all=true; kdf)
First and foremost, a broader policy agenda must grapple with the military and strategic aspects of China's tremendous
economic success and the U.S. reaction. Much ink has been spilt and hands have been wrung over Chinas military build-up.
However, with the announcement of the new American Strategic Guidance document, it seems as if the United States
is ready to pivot away from the North Atlantic and Near East and towards the Pacific basin, where
Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, and others have welcomed them as a balance to China. The Strategic Guidance
document has China in mind, as it calls for U.S. armed forces that are lighter on the ground, and that emphasize sea and air
assets, Special Forces, and exotic technology. This Asia pivot is further affected by what one former
U.S. State Department official described as a declining appetite in Washington to own
the worlds problems. The United States may still continue to intervene in failed states, civil wars, and disaster
zones, but their commitment may be more limited, their footprint smaller, and the expectations of their allies
(including Canada), greater. In an age of austerity, the Obama administration has prioritized seeking
continued dominance in the Pacific basin at a cost to power projection elsewhere.
LinkSpending Tradeoff
Asia pivot is zero-sum with new spending on other US interests
Kelly 12
Robert, professor of political science at Pusan National University, Senior Analyst as Wikistrat, Why the U.S. wont pivot to Asia
anytime soon, March-29, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/29/why-america-wont-pivot-to-asia-anytime-soon/ /// cmf
America obviously needs to spend less, and money which could fund domestic entitlements is going to
defense instead. The opportunity cost of buying aircraft carriers to semi-contain China is
cutting Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Those programs, plus Defense, comprise around 70% of
the U.S. budget, making the pivot a classic guns vs. butter trade-off. Americas debt exceeds ten trillion
dollars and its deficit a trillion. Bush borrowed hugely, and the Great Recession worsened the red ink. Given Chinas
enormity, a U.S. build-up in the region could cost massive sums that just arent there
anymore. The average American voter will see that domestic entitlements are suffering to fund the continuing post-9/11
U.S. military expansion. It is unlikely Americans will choose guns over butter (aircraft carriers instead of checks for
grandma) in the medium-term.
Resources are finiteplan causes tradeoff
Klinger 2013
(Bruce; Increasing Risk of North Korean Tactical Attack on South Korea: What US Needs to do; Mar 30;
www.eurasiareview.com/30032013-increasing-risk-of-north-korean-tactical-attack-on-south-korea-what-u-s-needs-to-do/; kdf)
But friends and enemies are questioning U.S. ability to deliver on its security promises. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter traveled to Asia in mid-March to address rising allied concerns that massive
cuts to the U.S. defense budget have weakened President Obamas Asia Pivot strategy and
U.S. military capabilities. Carters reassurances were at odds, however, with earlier Pentagon statements of the devastating impact of sequestration, including Carters
own March 12 speech that the cuts could reduce the naval ship and aircraft operations in the Pacific region by one-third, force four carrier air wings to stop flying, and
leave gaps in the availability of Marine Amphibious Ready Groups.[11] Even prior to sequestration, the Obama Administrations bold
rhetoric on its Asia Pivot strategy was not backed with sufficient resources. Claims of the
U.S. being back in Asia were undermined by a budget-driven defense strategy that left
the military shortchanged and U.S. credibility and resolve in doubt.
LinkEconomic Engagement Generic
Economic engagement with the Asia-Pacific region is key to the Asia Pivot
Mark Manyin et al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'
towards asia," http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
Economics and trade are both causes of and instruments for the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific.
Historical trends and most future projections indicate that the greater Asia-Pacific region is rising in importance in the
global economy and world trade.55 The region has been actively pursuing greater economic integration at a pace exceeding
that of other parts of the globe. As shown in The Economic Rise of Asia, the Asia-Pacific region has become more vital
to the global and U.S. economies as well. Accordingly, the Obama Administration has increased the
U.S. focus on economic and trade relations in the Asia-Pacific. Among other motivations, the region
plays a crucial role in President Obamas National Export Initiative. Four of the ten emerging export markets targeted in the
2011 National Export Strategy China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are part of the Asia-Pacific region.56 Additionally,
heightened U.S. economic engagement for instance, through participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) FTA talks demonstrate that the United States wishes to remain a major force in the
regions economic and geopolitical dynamics.
Latin American economic engagement and Asia pivot engagement are zero-
sum
Anderson and Grewell 2k1
(Terry, Professor of Economics at Montana State University, Bishop J., Research Associate at the Political Economy Research Center,
From Local to Global Property, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2 Chi. J. Intl L. 427, Fall, Lexis)
Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of
goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs
it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.
Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as
the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and
more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources
necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic
currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic
efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been
opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing
vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." 40
LinkMexico
Economic engagement with Mexico ruins the pivot
Taylor 2012 (Guy; Obama looks to Asia as trade markets beckon south; Nov 12;
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/12/obama-looks-to-asia-as-trade-markets-beckon-south/?page=all; kdf)
President Obamas postelection trip to Southeast Asia presages a greater second-term focus on that region,
but some foreign-policy analysts say that shouldnt distract from the need to build better
alliances with U.S. neighbors, which could be key to restoring the nations sluggish economy. Nowhere is that
more apparent than Mexico, whose president-elect, Enrique Pena Nieto, is scheduled to visit Washington this month and has
signaled an openness to deeper cooperation, including in the energy sector. I think the Obama
administration is focused on the Asia pivot , said Andrew Selee, who heads the Mexico Institute at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. But if things in Mexico get
exciting, we may see a pivot toward the Western Hemisphere, which has much more
tangible consequences. One of our greatest paths to making the U.S. economy more dynamic is
to tie it much more closely to the Mexican and Canadian economies in terms of innovation and
manufacturing, Mr. Selee said. This will make the U.S. much more competitive globally.
LinkLatin America Focus Generic
The plan is a major adjustment in foreign policyjeopardizes the pivot
Haibin 6/23
(Niu [Research Fellow, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies]; Latin America's Rising Status in the Sino-US Relationship;
www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/latin-americas-rising-status-in-the-sino-us-relationship/; kdf)
For the Obama administration's second term, it is a major policy adjustment rather than a policy
continuation to focus on Latin America. Since 9/11, counter-terrorism efforts, the international financial crisis,
and the pivot to Asia have occupied the majority of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Subsequently, Latin America has been an
overlooked region for more than a decade. The Obama administrations first term tried to improve its relationship with the
region, but faced setbacks because of its policies on Cuba, immigration and anti-drug issues. Instead, the regional approach
must be shifted to a bilateral, country-by-country approach. There Obama administrations policy shift in Latin America can
be explained by two factors: the rediscovered importance of Latin America to the United States economic recovery and
Latin Americas position as a promising region could allow US engagement to make visible achievements. First, in the 2012
presidential debates, Republican candidate Mitt Romney criticized Obama's Latin American policy and
treated the Latin American economy as an alternative to China, arguing to strengthen US
trade with the region. This argument obviously had an impact on Obamas second term agenda and Latin American
policy. Second, following the same logic of its pivot to the Asia Pacific, Latin America is a
stable and promising region the U.S. cant afford to overlook. Achievements in US relations with
Latin America will also help Democrats win future presidential elections considering the increasing influence of Latinos in
domestic politics. In regards to President Xis Latin American policy, it is more a continuation than an adjustment of policy.
In the past decade, the Sino-Latin American relationship has witnessed a golden period of development. China is the second
largest trading partner for Latin America; its demand for raw materials and primary products has both improved Latin
American countries terms of trade and contributed to the regions better performance in dealing with the recent international
financial crisis. Additionally, President Xi has worked to deepen the ties by addressing potential challenges, strengthening
this promising relationship. China raised its strategic partnerships with Peru and Mexico to comprehensive strategic ones.
Mutual investment, financial cooperation and open trade are being paid more attention from the Chinese side. One aim of
Chinas recent diplomacy is to establish a Sino-Latin American Dialogue Forum, which has received positive supports from
Brazil, Mexico, and other countries within the region. Now, it is necessary to understand how this
strengthening interest by the US and China in Latin America could impact the Sino-US
relationship as well as Latin America as a whole. From a geopolitical perspective, both sides have
some arguments to dilute each others influence globally. However, policy influence of such arguments
is very limited. It is natural for both world powers diplomatic agendas to intersect. One noteworthy argument from Chinese
side is that China should enhance its engagement with regions outside of Asia as the US pivot to the Asia Pacific attempts to
contain China. This argument should be interpreted to explore the diplomatic space available for China as a global power
rather than to counter US hegemony. Also, China needs to understand the recent intensive American engagement with Latin
America by following the same logic. In fact, both countries demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-oriented
approach during their recent engagements with Latin America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's visit to
Mexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to import tequila. Similar review was also given to
President Obamas visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This is a
good posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China. Ultimately, Latin
American countries benefit from cooperation with the worlds two largest markets. Although both countries are
trying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in Latin
America. At the bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogues
on Latin American affairs since 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and prevent
miscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the US
government holds a positive attitude to Chinas increasing ties with Latin America despite some very conservative and
suspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both Chinas permanent observer status in the Organization
of American States and Chinas membership at the Inter-American Development Bank.
LinkMilitary Assistance
Causes tradeoffs that wreck the budget
Jack Spencer 11, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation, 6/22/11, Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-research
With multiple wars ongoing, traditional threats looming, and new ones emerging, the U.S. Armed
Forces are already under tremendous stress. So introducing a new assignment that
needlessly bleeds scarce resources away from core missions to advance a political agenda is
untenable . Yet this is exactly what the Obama Administration is doing by ordering the military to lead a green
revolution.
The White House is pushing the idea that the alternative energy industry would get the kick start it needs if the military will just
commit to using them. But the assumptions behind this argument are flawed, and the strategy would increase
demands on the military budget while harming national security. Congress should put a stop to it
right away.
Budget tradeoffs undermine the U.S. pivot to Asianuclear war
Colby 11 Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of
Defenses Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10,
2011, Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire, The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-
empire/2/?print=yes
But the pendulum shouldnt be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasnt been
overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure,
what the late William Odom called the United States liberal empire that includes a substantial military
presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital
component of US security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensual
cooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc
defending the liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system
is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to
become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Koreas violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as
well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyangs development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover,
brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a
prospect that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China and especially its rapid and
opaque military build-up combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United
States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western
Pacific is the development of Beijings anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic
missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets.
While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing
power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to
undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II.
Even if China says today it wont exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?
Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be
coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained
military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the United States must increase its
involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the
western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will
also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under
the US security umbrella. This wont be cheap, for these requirements cant be met simply by incremental
additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech
capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic
developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape
that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-
eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national
interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute
to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true,
the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can
scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests
in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the
United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in
making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure,
leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be
counted on to look out for US interests. We need to focus on making the right interventions, not
forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious
security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East. This isnt to say that the United States should
be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected
to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing terrorist attacks
against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as
opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the regions societies. These more concrete objectives can be
better met by the more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however,
it means a shift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific
region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its
societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, is
where the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that
Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. In light of US
budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in security related money to be cut as part of the debt
ceiling deal, its doubly important that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks
shoring up the US position in the most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It will also require
restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that dont touch so directly on the
future of US security and prosperity. As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention
as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the liberal empire that we
have constructed and maintained since World War II. Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly
distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing
the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those
who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more are
directly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategic
developments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in
Washington. We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander our power in
unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be
so wasted.
LinkUS/China Relations
Strong U.S.-China relations are key to sustaining the Asia Pivot
Mark Manyin et al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'
towards asia," http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
The Obama Administration can be said to have adopted a two-pronged approach to China:
reaffirming and strengthening cooperative ties while simultaneously establishing a strong and
credible American presence across Asia to encourage constructive Chinese behavior and to provide
confidence to regional leaders who wish to resist potential Chinese regional hegemony. In the Administrations early
statements about the pivot toward the Asia Pacific, it often seemed that the second prong was
more prominent. However, before a February 2012 White House meeting with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping,
who is anticipated to replace Hu Jintao as president later this year, President Obama sought to restore a balance
between the two prongs, stating that for the United States to strengthen relationships in the region, boost trade
and commerce, and be a strong and effective partner with the Asia Pacific region ... it is absolutely vital that we
have a strong relationship with China. Seeking to reassure China, Obama also said he has always
emphasized that we welcome Chinas peaceful rise, that we believe that a strong and prosperous China is one that can help
to bring stability and prosperity to the region and to the world.48 At an official level, China has so far
responded relatively cautiously to the U.S. shift in regional emphasis. In remarks during his February 2012
U.S. trip, Vice President Xi said, China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in promoting peace, stability
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, while, At the same time, we hope the United States will respect the interests and
concerns of China and other countries in this region.49 Also notable is wording in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabaos annual
report to Chinas parliament, delivered on March 5, 2012, stating that, peace, development, and cooperation remain the
underlying trends of the times, and overall the situation is favorable for Chinas peaceful development. That official
Chinese assessment of the international environment facing China was similar to the assessment contained in the Premiers
2011 report, suggesting that, so far at least, China does not consider the U.S. announcement of the rebalancing to Asia to
have significantly eroded Chinas external environment.50
[insert plan hurts relations with China]
***Impacts
ImpactGlobal Economy
Effective Asia pivot key to the global economy
Richard N. Haass 11, former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is President of the Council on Foreign
Relations, November 14, 2011, Re-Orienting America, online: http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/re-orienting-
america/p26490
Something akin to this mistake has befallen American foreign policy. The United States has become preoccupied
with the Middle East in certain ways, the wrong Orient and has not paid adequate attention to East
Asia and the Pacific, where much of the twenty-first century's history will be written. The good news is that
this focus is shifting. Indeed, a quiet transformation is taking place in American foreign
policy, one that is as significant as it is overdue. The US has rediscovered Asia. "Rediscovered" is the
operative word here. Asia was one of the two principal theaters of World War II, and again shared centrality with Europe
during the Cold War. Indeed, the period's two greatest conflicts the wars in Korea and Vietnam were fought on the Asian
mainland. But, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Asia receded from American interest. In
the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the US trained much of its attention on Europe. American policymakers focused
primarily on enlarging NATO to encompass many of the former Warsaw Pact countries, and on contending with the post-
Yugoslav wars. The second phase of the post-Cold War era began with the 9/11 terror attacks. What followed was a decade
of US focus on terrorism and the large-scale commitment of American military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. The two
conflicts have claimed more than 6,000 American lives, cost more than $1 trillion, and consumed countless hours for two
presidents and their senior staff. But now this phase of American foreign policy is ending. President Barack Obama has
announced that US armed forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Afghanistan, US force levels have peaked and are
declining; the only questions concern the pace of withdrawal and the size and role of any residual US military presence after
2014. This is not to argue that the Middle East is irrelevant or that the US should ignore it. On the contrary, it is still home to
massive oil and gas reserves. It is a part of the world where terrorists are active and conflicts have been common. Iran is
moving ever closer to developing nuclear weapons; if it does, others may well follow suit. And it is a region now
experiencing what could prove to be historic domestic political upheavals. There is also the unique American tie to Israel.
Nevertheless, there are grounds for the US doing less in the greater Middle East than it has in
recent years: the weakening of al-Qaeda; the poor prospects for peacemaking efforts; and,
above all, the mounting evidence that, by any measure, massive nation-building initiatives are not
yielding returns commensurate with the investments. At the same time, there are strong arguments for
greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. With its large populations and fast-growing
economies , it is difficult to exaggerate the region's economic importance. American companies
export more than $300 billion in goods and services to countries in the region each year. Meanwhile, Asian countries
are a critical source of investment for the US economy. Maintaining regional stability is
thus critical for US (and global) economic success . The US has multiple alliance
obligations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand which are needed, in part, to
deter North Korean aggression. Moreover, US policy must create an environment in which a
rising China is never tempted to use its growing power coercively within or outside the
region. For this reason, recent US efforts to strengthen ties with India and several Southeast Asian countries make good
sense. The US is right to shift its focus from the Middle East to the Far East . The good
news is that this conclusion seems to be shared across the US political spectrum. Mitt Romney, the
likely Republican nominee for president, pledges to increase the rate of shipbuilding a commitment linked to an increased
US presence in the Pacific. And US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks of America pivoting away from the greater
Middle East: "The world's strategic and economic center of gravity is shifting east, and we are focusing more on the Asia-
Pacific region." Regardless of whether the twenty-first century will be another "American century," it is certain that it will
be an Asian and Pacific century. It is both natural and sensible that the US be central to whatever evolves from that fact.

Failed Asia pivot collapses hegrisks miscal
Macgregor 2012
Douglas A. Mcgregor, contributor and is executive vice president of Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC, retired Army colonel, decorated
combat veteran and the author of four books on military affairs, 10/26, Affording the Pacific Pivot,
http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/
In the turbulent decade leading up to the outbreak of World War I, Winston Churchill, Britains First Lord of the Admiralty,
urged Britains national leadership to concentrate British naval power in the Atlantic and the North Sea where Germanys
rapidly expanding high seas fleet seemed determined to challenge British naval supremacy. Churchill reasoned, It would be
very foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt. If we win the big battle in the decisive theater, we can put everything else
straight afterwards. If we lose it, there will not be any afterwards. On the precipice of sequestration and with the survival of
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid at stake, Churchills strategic rationale is instructive, particularly
for leaders in Washington, D.C., who advocate a U.S. military buildup in the Pacific. When
Churchill made the case for concentrating the British fleet in the Atlantic, he was
practicing economy of force, a time honored principle in British military affairs. In 1902, in the midst of a financial
crisis brought on, in part, by the Boer War, London had already turned to Japan for military assistance in blocking Russian
expansion in the Far East. By 1911, the Russian threat had disappeared beneath the waters of the Tsushima Strait, but the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty still allowed the withdrawal of British naval and ground forces from Asia, facilitating the
concentration of British military power in the Atlantic. The result was a debilitating blockade Germany
could not overcome throughout the First World War.Like the British at the beginning of the 20th Century,
Washington suffers from a case of Imperial Overstretch. Washington needs a new national security
strategy, one designed to halt the dissipation of American military resources around the world
and to concentrate it wherever it is needed. For the moment, the point of concentration is Asia,
where Chinas assertiveness opens the door to the kind of instability and potential for
strategic miscalculation that is eerily similar to the crises and conflicts that preceded the
outbreak of World War I in Europe.
ImpactUS-China War/Asia Stability
Credible commitment key to prevent China war and maintain Asian stability
Rudd 13
Kevin, Member of the Australian Parliament, Beyond the Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations Feb 26,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/beyond-the-pivot-a-new-road-map-for-u-s-chinese-relations/ ///cmf
Debate about the future of U.S.-Chinese relations is currently being driven by a more assertive
Chinese foreign and security policy over the last decade, the region's reaction to this, and Washington's
response -- the "pivot," or "rebalance," to Asia. The Obama administration's renewed focus on the strategic
significance of Asia has been entirely appropriate. Without such a move, there was a
danger that China, with its hard-line, realist view of international relations, would conclude that an
economically exhausted United States was losing its staying power in the Pacific. But now
that it is clear that the United States will remain in Asia for the long haul, the time has come for both Washington and Beijing
to take stock, look ahead, and reach some long-term conclusions as to what sort of world they want to see beyond the
barricades. Asia's central tasks in the decades ahead are avoiding a major confrontation
between the United States and China and preserving the strategic stability that has
underpinned regional prosperity. These tasks are difficult but doable. They will require both parties
to understand each other thoroughly, to act calmly despite multiple provocations, and to manage the domestic
and regional forces that threaten to pull them apart. This, in turn, will require a deeper and more
institutionalized relationship -- one anchored in a strategic framework that accepts the reality of
competition, the importance of cooperation, and the fact that these are not mutually exclusive propositions. Such a new
approach, furthermore, should be given practical effect through a structured agenda driven by regular direct meetings
between the two countries' leaders.
ImpactAsia Stability
Obamas attention and continued pursuit of engagement and presence in Asia
key to credible pivot and stability
Munoz 13
Carlos, Donilon: US remains 'all in' on shift to Asia, March-11, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/287377-
donilon-us-remains-all-in-on-shift-to-asia-#ixzz2YD4zH0FP ///cmf
The Obama administration remains fully committed to seeing though the Pentagon's proposed
strategic shift from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region, a top White
House official said this week. "President Obama has been clear about the future that the United
States seeks . . . when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is 'all in,'" National Security
Adviser Thomas Donilon said during a speech at the Asia Society in New York on Monday. President Obama announced
the strategic shift to Asia last February, as part of the administration's realignment of national security priorities for a post-
Afghanistan and post-Iraq world. However, the recent rise of Islamic extremists groups in North and West Africa have
prompted some inside the beltway to question whether a strategic shift to the Pacific is the right move. On Monday, Donilon
pushed back on such assertions, arguing Asia's influence on the world stage will only increase in the coming years.
According to Donilon, nearly half of all economic growth and subsequent global politicall influence will emanate from
regional Pacific powers over the next five years. That growth, he added, "is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are
reshaping the region" including Chinas ascent as a world power, North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and
India's expanding influence in South Asia and beyond. "These changes are unfolding at a time when Asias economic,
diplomatic and political rules of the road are still taking shape," he added. "The stakes for people on both sides of the Pacific
are profound." Recognizing that sea change of global influence based in the Asia-Pacific region, the Obama
administration has taken great strides to solidify the United States' position in that corner of
the world, according to Donilon. "Perhaps most telling [of] this rebalance is reflected in the most
valuable commodity in Washington, the Presidents time ," he said. The Obama administration
officials have held bilateral talks with each regional partner in the Pacific, as well as fully participated in the multilateral
summits held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Specifically, the White House has engaged "at an
unprecedented pace" with Washington's counterparts in China, holding formal and informal talks with Beijing on a slew of
regional security issued, according to Donilon. "The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China. We
do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation," Donilon said,
reiterating the administration's line on the Asian powerhouse. "There is nothing preordained about such an
outcome," he said regarding a possible boiling over of tensions between Washington and
Beijing. China took a step forward toward that burgeoning relationship with the United States, backing Washington on
new United Nations sanctions against North Korea's nuclear program. In response, Pyongyang on Monday officially
nullified the 1953 armistice deal with the United States that ended the Korean War. Since North and South Korea are still
technically at war, it remains to be seen if the decision will result in conflict breaking out on the peninsula. However
tensions continue over Beijing's continued efforts to launch cyberattacks against American government and commercial
networks. In February, security firm Mandiant released a report on Chinese cyberwarfare capabilities, claiming elite military
unit of Chinese hackers have been working to break into U.S. networks from their headquarters in Shanghai. Weeks after
the Mandiant report, Senate intelligence committee chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said classified intelligence
documents supported the claims made by the security firm. Despite those reports, Donilon said the United States
continued cooperation with Beijing and its influence in Asia is and will be key to
maintaining stability among the regional Pacific powers. "The regions success . . .
and the United States security and prosperity in the 21st century, still depend on the presence
and engagement of the United States in Asia," he said. " We are a resident Pacific power, resilient and
indispensable."
Asian instability escalates to global nuclear war
Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, 2K
(Jonathan S., Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts, 3-10, Knight Ridder/Tribune News)
Accessed on LexisNexis 12-29-09
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and
Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could
destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and
China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the
kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an
uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes
as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings
Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations
with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the
region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all
will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S.
troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would
instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked
South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a
conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and
demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization
has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _
indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with
Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
ImpactAllied Prolif
Asia pivot key to assure allies and prevent adventurism and prolif
Greitens 13
Sheena Chestnut Greitens, U.S.-China Relations and Americas Alliances in Asia june-13,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/11-us-china-relations-asia-alliances-greitens /// cmf
Less fear and more trust are indeed likely to contribute to a constructive U.S.-China relationship. But the principal
foreign policy challenge facing the United States in Asia today is not the creation of strategic trust
between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, or between the United States and China. It is the challenge of alliance
management : to reassure Americas allies without emboldening them toward
unnecessary adventurism, and to use those alliances to deter potential adversaries without
provoking them into spirals of conflict. Wise and steady management of U.S. alliances in
Asia will make Americas interests and commitments clear, and help shape the level of
conflict or cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship for years to come.
Allied prolif causes nuclear war
Lee 93
Steven Lee, Professor, Ethics, Hobart and Smith College, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, 1993, p. 299.
First, nuclear war could result from the behavior of other states, especially those that had
formerly seen themselves as receiving protection from the nation's opponent under the
nuclear umbrella. Some of theses states might well seek to acquire nuclear weapons, or to
enlarge their arsenals if they were already nuclear powers, in order to provide better protection of their own against the
opponent. Were such armament to occur, the uncertainties on all sides may make major nuclear war
more likely that it was prior to the nation's unilateral nuclear disarmament.
ImpactAllied Prolif Extension
Commitment to Asian security key to shore up perceptions of declining
credibility
Kapila 6/19
Subhash, PhD in Strategic Studies, South China Sea Conflicts Ignited United States Pivot To Asia Pacific Analysis,
http://www.albanytribune.com/19062013-south-china-sea-conflicts-ignited-united-states-pivot-to-asia-pacific-analysis/ ///cmf
There is a nagging fear in South East Asian capitals on the intensity and longevity of the
US strategic pivot to Asia fearing that both as a result of the US traditional China Hedging Strategy and also
because of domestic budget cuts in defence spending, the US commitment to South China Sea security
may be a transient phase. How would the United States assure South East Asian countries
of its resolve to contain China within its national boundaries and not let it spill its military adventurism in South
China Sea region and in South East Asia as a whole? The United States needs to remember how China muscled into South
East Asia in the last decade or so when the region lay neglected by the United States. The United States could let South East
Asia remain in benign neglect because during that period Chinas military and naval build-up levis were still maturing. In
2013 Chinas military and naval build-up has reached alarming levels and consequently China has already put the United
States on notice that at least in the Western Pacific wherein lies the South China Sea conflictual region is located, China is no
longer a military push-over or subject to US political and military coercion. The United States can no longer
persist in following its traditional China Hedging Strategy and Risk Aversion Strategy
towards China. Persisting in doing so could end up in denting United States image of a
credible strategic partner in Asian capitals and endanger its continued embedment in Asia.
South China Sea conflicts stood ignited by Chinas military brinkmanship and Chinas military adventurism to which the
United States responded by its strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. In 2013 a higher call now awaits the United States in
checkmating Chinas military adventurism by shedding ambiguity from its South China Sea policies. The United States
needs to take advantage of the Asian strategic polarisation which the China-generated South China Sea conflicts have
brought in its wake in favour of the United States. Robert Kaplan, the noted US Author and expert on strategic affairs has
wisely observed that: Just as German soil constituted the military frontline of the Cold War, the waters of the South China
Sea may constitute the military frontlines in the coming decades. Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacy
and economics but the South China Sea could show what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like United States,
it is your call now.
ImpactIndo-China War
The Asia Pivot will encourage stronger relations between India and China,
preventing future conflict between the two countries
Franz-Stefan Gady, (military analyst and world affairs commentator), 3/18/13, Huffington Post, "consequences of obama's asia
pivot," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-gady/obama-china-india_b_2853600.html
In the kaleidoscopic world of power politics in Asia, the United States' pivot to that region may yield the
unintentional consequences of fostering closer strategic ties between the two Asian giants --
China and India -- which could result in a strategic alliance ostensibly hostile to Western interests in the region.
Analysts will be quick to point out that the 'all weather friendship' between the two countries,
has hit a natural ceiling due to the strategic competition between the (re)emerging powers. For example, China is
deepening its ties with Pakistan militarily (both countries signed a military cooperation agreement in September 2012),
provides nuclear support, and has finally taken over management of the port of Gwadar on Pakistan's Makran coast. India on
the other hand is trying to counter China's influence in Asia by fostering closer ties with the countries of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially in the field of naval cooperation, which adversely affects China's position in
the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Both countries' increasing energy demands also put the two giants on a collision
course. Yet, a 'diplomatic revolution' may be in the making should the United States decide
to overplay its hand during President Obama's second term. The United States assigns a key role to India in
its turn towards Asia, which in almost its entirety is aimed at balancing China's influence in the region. Nevertheless, as
India's former Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, points out: "India is already distancing itself from the pivot by the notable
friendly discourse towards China." The reasons for this are complex, yet they are in large part based on the gradual waning of
U.S. influence in the region and the fact that geographical proximity between India and China mandates some sort of
rapprochement for the sake of both countries' economic development. The original 'diplomatic revolution' occurred in 1756
on the eve of the Seven Year's War between France and the Austrian Empire. In a reversal of alliances, Austria abandoned its
long-term ally, Great Britain, for its most formidable continental rival, France, thereby breaking with its traditional foreign
policy doctrine. The principal reason was Austria's gradual realization that Britain, primarily a sea power, could or would not
adequately be able to support its ally militarily in a new European war. Great Britain's real diplomatic ambitions were
overseas. The Austro-French alliance was in many ways counterproductive and an unhappy experience for both countries.
Because of their divergent interests and continuing rivalry, both parties paralyzed each other, and they could not effectively
cooperate during the Seven Years War (1756-1763). Dr. Marco Cesa in his book "Allies Yet Rivals - International Politics in
18th Century Europe" referred to the Austro-French alliance as a "deadlocked alliance," in which both parties decided to
"preserve their union, since their alliance gave each a means with which to control the other, and also because without such
an alliance they would probably have ended up fighting each other." Paul W. Schroeder called this a "pact for management
and mutual restraint of one's partner, not for capability aggregation and aggrandizement." Similar to Austria's realization in
1756, India may think that she is better off seeking closer ties to a continental military power and a
neighbor, rather than an Asia Pacific sea power such as the United States, which may not have the stomach to
compete with China's power projection capabilities on mainland Asia. However, should China and India move closer
together, the result in all likelihood will be a form of a deadlocked alliance in which both countries, similar to Austria and
France, will be at loggerheads with each other. Yet, there are very good strategic reasons for both
countries to move closer. As D.S. Rajan points out: "Beijing and New Delhi share the same views on two key
factors forming the basis for partnership -- multilateralism and economic cooperation." Both are interested in peace in their
respective peripheries and a 'peaceful rise.' Both depend on each other for economic development. For example, 80 percent of
China's total oil import passes in proximity to India's southern coast through the straits of Malacca. More importantly in the
short run are China's deteriorating relations with Japan and the United States' grand strategy for Asia during President
Obama's second term, both of which will weigh heavy on Beijing's motivation to create a Indo-Sino alliance. Already in
2005, China and India have formed a "strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity" and held various
bilateral discussions on their future strategic partnership. In January 2013, during the fifth annual Indo-Sino defense dialogue
both countries agreed to resume joint military exercises. There are a host of issues that could undermine
closer Indo-Sino relations in the years to come such as unresolved border issues, China-
Pakistan relations, energy security, cyber-espionage, Tibet, India's eastward expansion of
its economic ties and Myamar just to name a few examples, where both countries' interests are at variance. For
the sake of stability, the United States should encourage closer Indo-China
ties . Austria and France were at peace between 1756 to 1792, not a small achievement given the
volatility of European power politics at the time. Once the alliance dissolved in 1792 both countries
were involved in a life and death struggle, which lasted until 1815. Closer Indo-Sino ties
mean a more stable Asian security environment based on mutual restraint, and - because of the inherent
nature of a deadlocked alliance -- little growth of both Indian and Chinese power.
Sino-Indian war is the highest risk for nuclear conflict.
Sullivan 10 research fellow @ AEI
Tim Sullivan, research fellow and program manager at the American Enterprise Institutes Centre for Defence Studies. The next
nuclear arms race. Pakistan Observer. 9/29/10. Lexis.
India and Pakistan are the two countries most likely to engage in nuclear war or so goes the common wisdom. Yet if recent
events are any indication, the worlds most vigorous nuclear competition may well erupt between
Asias two giants: India and China. Both countries already house significant and growing
arsenals. China is estimated to have approximately 450 warheads; India, roughly 100.
Though intensifying as of late, Sino-Indian nuclear competition has a long history: Indias
pursuit of a weapons program in the 1960s was triggered in part by Chinas initial nuclear
tests, and the two have eyed one anothers arsenals with mounting concern ever since. The
competition intensified in 2007, when China began to upgrade missile facilities near Tibet,
placing targets in northern India within range of its forces. Yet the stakes have been raised
yet again in recent months. Indian defence minister A.K. Antony announced last month that the military will soon
incorporate into its arsenal a new intermediate-range missile, the Agni-III, which is capable of reaching all of Chinas major
cities. Delhi is also reportedly considering redeploying survivable, medium-range Agni-IIs to its northeastern border. And
just last month, India shifted a squadron of Su-30MKI fighters to a base just 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indian
border. An Indian Air Force official told Defence News these nuclear-armed planes could operate deep within China with
mid-flight refueling. For its part, China continues to enhance the quality, quantity and delivery
systems of its nuclear forces. The Pentagon reported last month that the Peoples Liberation
Army has replaced older, vulnerable ballistic missiles deployed in Western China with
modern, survivable ones; this transition has taken place over the last four years. Chinas Hainan Island naval base
houses new, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and affords those boats easy access to the Indian Ocean. Chinas
military is also developing a new, longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile which
will allow its subs to strike targets throughout India from the secure confines of the South
China Sea. No single event has stoked this rise in tensions. China, already concerned about
Indias growing strength and its desire to play a greater role in Asia, is even less enthused about the
burgeoning strategic partnership between Delhi and Washington. While Beijing has learned to live with American forces on
its eastern periphery, the possibility of an intimate US-India military relationship has generated fears of encirclement. The
ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute, as well as Indias position astride Chinas key maritime shipping lanes, has made the
prospect of a Washington-Delhi axis appear particularly troubling. India likewise feels encircled by Chinas so-called string of
pearls: a series of Chinese-built, ostensibly commercial port facilities in the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.
Beijings military ties to Pakistan, interference in the Kashmir dispute and references to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state, as
Southern Tibet have done little to reassure New Delhi of Chinese intentions. The rapid growth of Chinas conventional
military might in recent years: between 2000 and 2009, Chinas military spending more than tripled: and the lack of clarity as
to its intentions, has spurred India to pursue its own military modernization. These shifts in Indias and Chinas
nuclear force postures thus represent only the latest and most serious efforts to constrain
and convey dissatisfaction with the others perceived regional ambitions. But they are more
troubling than conventional redeployments. There is a point at which efforts to enhance
deterrence can foster an arms race. Any attempt on the part of China to increase its own
defenses necessarily weakens, or is perceived to weaken, the security of India, thus
spurring further defence build-ups; the opposite is true as well. Shifts in nuclear force
posture can be particularly disruptive, and have been known to precipitate crises. Upon the
discovery of Soviet efforts to deploy missiles to Cuba in 1962, for example, the US responded militarily with a naval
quarantine of the island, bringing Washington and Moscow as close as they have ever come to a nuclear war. Finally, the
redeployments of Indias and Chinas nuclear forces suggest that there is deep-seated and growing discord between the two
Asian giants. This is troubling news for a region whose future peace and prosperity depends heavily on continued comity
between Delhi and Beijing. It is only a matter of time before the China-India military competition begins to affect
neighboring states. Chinas nuclear force modernization, for instance, stands to threaten not only India, but also Korea, Japan
and other US partners in Asia. A dramatic defence build-up in India, meanwhile, will no doubt leave Pakistan feeling less
secure. Tensions are unlikely to ease any time soon. The two countries appear much closer to the brink of
an all-out arms race than they do to any resolution of their differences. While each profits from the
others economic growth, it is that very growth: which finances military modernization and which is so dependent on
potentially vulnerable overseas trade: that creates the conditions for heightened insecurity.
ImpactNorth Korea War
North Korean aggression on the brinksmall conflicts will escalate to all out
nuclear waronly completing the pivot solves
Klingner 13
Bruce, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation, The U.S. and Its Allies Need a Strong Defense,
March-11, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/11/will-south-korea-and-japan-take-the-nuclear-route/us-and-its-allies-
need-strong-military-to-deter-north-korean-threat ///cmf
So much for basketball diplomacy. Self-appointed ambassador Dennis Rodmans trip to Pyongyang didnt keep
his new B.F.F., North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, from threatening a pre-emptive nuclear
strike that would turn Washington into a sea of flames. Rodmans trip can be written off as
narcissistic self-promotion. But Kims bombastic rhetoric shouldnt be dismissed so easily. Pyongyangs two deadly
acts of war against South Korea in 2010 and its long history of terrorist acts show the regime
often follows through on its threats. A nuclear attack on the United States or full-scale invasion of South Korea
remains highly unlikely, however, as either would ensure North Koreas destruction. But it is only a matter of time
before the regime launches another tactical-level attack on the South. There is now a
greater risk of miscalculation and escalation, due to new leaders in both Koreas. Kim Jong-un
lacks experience and may stumble across red lines that his predecessors would have known not to cross. Moreover, he may
be emboldened by North Koreas new nuclear muscle and the knowledge that neither Washington nor
Seoul ever responded to previous attacks. Newly inaugurated South Korean President Park Geun-hye criticized
her countrys past passivity and vowed to hit back hard and exponentially in case of
another attack. The danger is that even a low-level retaliation could escalate into an all-out
conflict . As a U.S. general on the peninsula warned, Before you start even a limited response, you better be prepared to
go all-in. Since repeated diplomatic efforts have failed to curb North Koreas reckless behavior, the United States
and its allies need strong military forces to protect themselves. Unfortunately, President Obamas Asia
Pivot was, itself, little more than rhetoric. Not a single unit will pivot from Afghanistan, Iraq or Europe into the
Pacific. And massive defense budget cuts undermine U.S. military capabilities and credibility.
2NC AT Institutions/Democ Check China Rise
Liberal institutions dont check great powersUS and recent China
aggression empirically prove
Logan 13
Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8
/// cmf
Optimists place too much faith in international institutions, too much faith in the idea that
economic growth in China will necessarily lead to democratization there, and too much faith in
the idea that a demo- cratic China necessarily would be at peace with American military domination of Asia. As a general
proposition, optimists tend to elide the zero-sum tradeoffs inherent to military issues, ignoring for the most part the question
of U.S. military policy in Asia. This leaves one of the most important questions about the future of American foreign policy
in Asia outside their analysis. As Columbias Richard Betts writes in a stinging critique, John Ikenberry . . . says nothing
about what U.S. military policy should be in [East Asia], dismisses the whole dimension of analysis with the fac- ile
assumption that mutual nuclear deterrence precludes major war, and asserts with breathtaking confidence that war-driven
change has been abolished as a historical process.32 Powerful states tend not to rely on other states or
international institutions to provide security for them. Even states with benign motives
today may pose threats tomorrow, and international institutions matter only in so far
as they can enforce the rules they write. The United States regularly defies international
institutions when it believes they do not serve U.S. interests, whether the topic is attacking Kosovo or Iraq, avoiding
actions to try to prevent climate change, re- solving the Israel-Palestine conflict, or any number of other issues. Should China
continue to grow more powerful, international institutions are likely to have a similar effect on
Beijing as they have had on Washington: not much . States prefer to rely on their own capabilities and
to exert control over their security environment. Also, as their power grows, states tend to expand their
definition of their interests and use their power to pursue them. American policymakers
ignore or downplay these realities, implying instead that China is a free rider on U.S.
promotion of global- ization and international trade. Secretary of State Clinton almost made it sound as
though the Chinese should send Washington a thank you note: Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered
as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain.33 But just as the
United States today chooses to sus- tain the open and rules-based system, so too can it exclude China from that system or vio-
late its own rules if it so chooses. What Ameri- can analysts see as Chinese free riding, many
Chinese view as dangerous vulnerability to the whims of U.S. policymakers. Recent
months have indicated that growing Chinese power has generated hardening Chinese
territorial demands, and a greater desire to pursue them. During that time, China has reiterated its claims
to nearly all of the South China Sea, in at least partial contravention of both the sta- tus quo and maritime law. It has
established a new military garrison on Yongxing, one of the islands there, it has engaged in a naval standoff with the
Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, and Chinas efforts to fend off criticism precluded even a joint statement at the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the first time in the organizations his- tory it has failed to do so.34
2NC AT China War Turn
Only a risk of China retaliation if the pivot isn't completely credible
rhetoric, resources, and diplomatic capital must all be directed at Asia
Lieberthal 11
Kenneth, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, The American Pivot to Asia, Dec-21,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia?page=0,4 ///cmf
A tougher line may in fact produce more constructive Chinese behavior if it convinces
Beijing that America retains the capacity to lead in Asia over the long run and is willing to encourage
China's ongoing development so long as that does not produce behavior that challenges America's overall position or vital
interests in the region. China's leaders are, after all, very pragmatic. They are unlikely to "take on"
the United States if America has adopted a strategically coherent Asia strategy that is widely
respected and viewed as credible in the region. Rhetoric and diplomacy, after all, can shape
perceptions and expectations and thus are important determinants of foreign-policy
outcomes. But over time credibility is crucial, and credibility requires demonstrably having the
resources and capabilities to implement the overall strategy over the long run.
2NC AT China Relations Turn
The pivot bolsters relations
Statis 13
(G. Michael [Prof of Political Science and IR @ Southern Utah U]; Imperial Restoration;
www.old.li.suu.edu/library/circulation/Stathis/StathisImperialRestoration.pdf; kdf)
On the one hand, there is the China that appears put out that American foreign policy tends to be overly aggressive, if not
hostile to Beijing.72 In this vein, Hillary Clinton was not all that popular in Beijing. But then as recent headlines hold, China
should not be regarded as friendly either.73 In this case there needs be a stern but engaged policy.74 For over two decades
the United States has embraced a positive policy of trade and engagement with regular
balancing, meaning that now and again issues have had to be addressed, Chinas
massive bilateral trade surplus with the United States and Beijings accumulation of
dollar-denominated assets are thus worrisome for reasons that transcend economics.75 Thus
a significant part of Obamas Asia Pivot is an attempt to improve relations with China by
encouraging her to be more open to being an equal player in the global economy, but also
note this policy included a movement of American naval strength to Asia.76
***AFF Answers
***Uniqueness
2AC No PivotSyria
Pivot away from Middle East impossibleSyria guarantees huge security
role
Hunter 5/5
Robert, former US ambassador to NATO and Director of West European Affairs and Director of Middle East Affairs, President
Obama: Keep Your Nerve on Syria, may-5, http://www.lobelog.com/president-obama-keep-your-nerve-on-syria/ /// cmf
Then a final dilemma: the US desire to pivot to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy
and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the
winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear
program. With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the
region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East
anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these
dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.
2AC Link Non-Unique
Link is non-uniqueObama already heavily focused and engaged in Latin
America
Andrews 6/9
Anna, former ambassador to Costa Rica, interview conducted by David Boddiger, U.S. ambassador in Costa Rica wraps up term this
week, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/U.S.-ambassador-in-Costa-Rica-wraps-up-term-this-week_Sunday-June-09-
2013 ///cmf
President Obamas visit to Costa Rica in early May was pretty significant in that many Central
Americans felt they were being ignored by his administration. Does his visit indicate a renewed
commitment to or interest in the region? I am aware that there are those who have questioned whether
President Obama was committed to Latin America. What I think is evident from the presidents visit here is
it gave us a chance to really look more carefully at the presidents commitment to Latin
America, and what I found is that President Obama in 2009, on one of his first trips outside the U.S., went to the
Summit of the Americas. At that summit, he outlined his vision for a new partnership with Latin
America and a commitment to partner for the benefit of all the people of the Americas.
What weve seen between the time that Obama went to the first Summit of the Americas to his visit here in Costa Rica is that
the president has visited the Latin American region six times in five years, and that early in his
second administration, one of the first trips hes taken is to come back to the region and reiterate his continued
support. The investments we have been making in Latin America and Central America in the areas
of security, trade and education are really significant. I think often times we dont have time to gather the facts and,
therefore, we make conclusions based on less than the full information. But I think that if you look at the
presidents early commitment, his vision, and the investments we have been making, I think
it makes his visit to Costa Rica, rather than coming back to or renewing, its really a continuation and a
highlighting of the presidents commitment to this region.
***Thumpers
2AC Middle East Generic Thumper
Despite rhetoric of pivoting to Asia, Middle East conflicts will keep the US
embroiled there
Burns 7/5
Nicholas, GlobalPost senior foreign affairs columnist, is professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at the
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Why Egypt matters to the US, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-
blogs/commentary/why-egypt-matters-to-united-states ///cmf
Washington cannot focus its energies on all 22 Arab states simultaneously, and Egypt should be the
overwhelming priority. That is one reason why staying involved in Egypt, making a substantial increase in American
economic aid, and resolving to make a much greater effort to support democratic forces there is so important. Second, this
weeks events in Egypt also remind us, once again, of the continued importance of the Middle East to American interests.
The Obama administration announced in 2011 a major shift in American foreign policy toward
Asia. It was widely understood to be a pivot from our decades-long involvement in the
turbulent Middle East to a priority focus on Asia, with a rising China challenging us for global power. The
instinct that Asia will be the most important region for American engagement in this century is not wrong. It is just
premature. Events in Egypt and the continued challenges of the bloody civil war in Syria, the long-standing
Israeli-Palestinian struggle, and a recalcitrant Iran mean the US will be more occupied on a
daily basis with the problems of the Middle East than any other region for at least the rest
of the decade and probably well beyond. Americas vital interests are still very much on the line there. The
regions poverty, instability, energy resources, growing Shia-Sunni divide and
revolutionary ferment all point to a continuing American preoccupation. Any dream of a
sharp shift of American attention away from the Middle East is illusory.
1AR Syria Thumper
Obama focusing all diplomatic capital and military resources on Syrialoss
of credibility non-unique
-Tanks credibility
Cooke 6/23
Shamus, Syria Is Becoming Obama's Iraq, http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/17160-syria-is-becoming-obamas-iraq ///cmf
In perfect Bush-like fashion, President Obama has invented a bogus pretense for military intervention in yet another Middle
East country. The presidents claim that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons - and thus crossed Obamas
imaginary red line - will likely fool very few Americans, who already distrust their president after the massive NSA spying
scandal. Obama has officially started down a path that inevitably leads to full-scale war. At this
point the Obama administration thinks it has already invested too much military, financial,
and diplomatic capital into the Syrian conflict to turn back, and each step forward brings
the U.S. closer to a direct military intervention. Much like Obamas spying program, few Americans knew
that the United States was already involved, neck deep, with the mass killings occurring in Syria. For example, Obama has
been directly arming the Syrian rebels for well over a year. The New York Times broke the story that the Obama
administration has - through the CIA - been illegally trafficking thousands of tons of guns to the rebels from the dictatorships
of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. If not for these Obama-trafficked guns, thousands of deaths would have been prevented and the
Syrian conflict over. But even after the gun trafficking story broke, the mainstream media largely ignored it, and continued
reporting that the U.S. has only been supplying the Syrian rebels with non-lethal aid, a meaningless term in a war setting,
since all military aid directly assists in the business of killing. The U.S. media also buried the truth behind the ridiculous
chemical weapons claims by the Obama administration, which, like Bushs WMDs, are based on absolutely no evidence.
Having learned nothing from Iraq, the U.S. media again shamelessly regurgitates the facts as spoon-fed to them by the
government, no questions asked. In reality, however, a number of independent chemical weapons experts have publicly
spoken out against Obamas accusations. The U.S. media also refuses to ask: on what authority does the United States have
to determine the usage of chemical weapons in other countries? This is the job of the UN. What has the UN said on the
matter? Top UN rights investigator Carla del Ponte said: According to the testimonies we have gathered, the [Syrian]
rebels have used chemical weapons, making use of sarin gas. Again, the rebels have used chemical weapons, not the
Syrian government, according to the UN representative. Many analysts have pointed out the obvious fact that the Syrian
government would have zero military or political motive to use chemical weapons, especially when they have access to much
more effective conventional weapons. Obamas Bush-like lies are too familiar to the American public, who overwhelmingly
do not support military intervention in Syria, or giving direct military aide to the Syrian rebels. What has the UN said on
giving military aid to the rebels? UN chief Ban Ki-moon has called the Obamas decision a bad idea and not helpful.
This is because pouring arms into any country where there is a conflict only increases the bloodshed and risks turning the
conflict into a broader catastrophe. But like Bush, Obama is ignoring the UN, and theres a logic to his madness. Obama
has invested too much of his foreign policy credibility in Syria. His administration has been the
backbone of the Syrian rebels from the beginning, having handpicked a group of rich Syrian exiles and molded them into
Obamas officially recognized government of Syria, while pressuring other nations to also recognize these nobodies as the
legitimate Syrian government. Assads iron grip on power is a humiliation to these diplomatic
efforts of Obama, and has thus weakened the prestige and power of U.S. foreign
policy abroad.
1AR Israel Peace Process Thumper
Obama administration focusing and investing diplomacy in peace process
Stearns 6/27
Scott, VOAs State Department correspondent, Kerry: Israeli, Palestinian Leaders Tested in Peace Process,
http://www.voanews.com/content/Kerry-says-israeli-palestinian-leaders-teste-in-peace-process/1690395.html ///cmf
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry says Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas are both being tested politically in pursuit of a two-state peace
solution. Kerry is in the region for talks with both men, his fifth visit in as many months.
Continuing his shuttle diplomacy, Kerry says Netanyahu and Abbas share "a serious commitment of purpose" in the face of
considerable political challenges to Mideast peace. "The politics of both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas
have both been tested, as they always are in this part of the world," said Kerry. Kerry is making getting Israelis
and Palestinians back to talks a priority . It is the fifth time in as many months that he
has visited the region. Since Kerry began the diplomatic push, more conservative members of
Netanyahu's ruling coalition have pronounced the two-state solution dead. Abbas is under pressure to show results for his
non-violent approach, having accepted his newly-appointed prime minister's resignation after just three weeks in office. But
Kerry said both men are skilled political veterans who believe the peace process "is more important to their countries than
some of their current political challenges may make it seem." "President Abbas has been at this a long time. He has been
motivated by the desire to try to create his country, to give the Palestinians their homeland, to define it, and to be able to meet
the needs of his people," Kerry said. As Israel's second-longest serving prime minister, Netanyahu knows what is at stake,
Kerry said. "He understands how volatile the region is, what the complications and threats are to Israel, the downsides of
failure. And I think he understands that this is a serious moment," the secretary said. Kerry said the Obama
administration is determined to keep working toward Mideast peace, but it is up to Abbas
and Netanyahu to make the hard choices. "In the end, they will have to make key decisions about whether or whether not
they're prepared to proceed forward based on the understandings that we hope we could reach," he said. After meeting with
Netanyahu in Jerusalem Thursday, Kerry meets here in Jordan with Abbas Friday.
2AC Africa Thumper
Recent commitment to sustained engagement in African energy thumps the
DA
Goldman 7/1
Julianna, Obama plans $7bn African energy venture, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2013/07/01/obama-plans-7bn-
african-energy-venture ///cmf
US PRESIDENT Barack Obama has plans for an initiative to enhance access to electricity across
Africa by tapping the continents vast energy resources and attracting international investment. The US
administration said the $7bn venture, called Power Africa, will complement an additional $9bn in
private funds to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the White House more than
two-thirds of the population is without electricity. Mr Obama unveiled the energy programme at the University of Cape
Town on Sunday night. "Were looking to provide support and partnership so the lights can turn on and stay on," said Gayle
Smith, National Security Council senior director for development and democracy. Mr Obama arrived in Cape
Town on Sunday morning on the second leg of a trip to Africa where he has been promoting
trade and investment, pledging sustained US engagement and underscoring the importance of
democratic values to economic growth. The failing health of former president Nelson Mandela has weighed heavily on the
trip and Mr Obama has spent his time, especially in the South African icons home country, invoking his legacy as a model
for the continents leaders to earn international respect and credibility. Mr Obama visited Robben Island, a landmark in
Madibas life and the antiapartheid movement. Robert F Kennedy delivered his Ripple of Hope speech in 1966 at Cape Town
University, shortly after Mr Mandela was jailed. "It is from numberless diverse acts of courage and belief that human history
is shaped," Mr Kennedy said at the time. "Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or
strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope," said the senator, then a US presidential candidate. "And
crossing each other from a million different centres of energy and daring those ripples build a current which can sweep down
the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance." Mr Obama also visited a community centre that focuses on HIV/AIDS
prevention with Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu. "The types of countries that are part of Power Africa, for instance, are
the ones who are doing the right things on governance," said deputy National Security Council director Ben Rhodes. "If
were going to get investment from international development banks, from private-sector partners, they need to have the
predictability that comes with the rule of law and governance." The venture will begin in six countries
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania to add more than 10,000MW of cleaner, more efficient electricity-
generation capacity and will increase electricity access to at least 20-million new households and commercial entities,
according to the US. General Electric is among the companies that have contributed to the $9bn in private-sector funding for
the programmes first phase and has committed to help bring 5,000MW of new energy to Tanzania and Ghana. "We are in a
situation where poverty is being conquered on this continent at a speed that is unprecedented," said Ms Smith. "Its much
more targeted assistance from us than in the past." Sundays announcement follows criticism that Mr Obamas engagement
with sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind that of his predecessors Bill Clinton and George W Bush, creating an opening for
countries such as China to tap the regions resources. Mr Bush, who took US spending on Africa to new levels, made a six-
country visit in 2008 and a three-country stop in 2011 after he left the White House. His Africa legacy includes the US
Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Pepfar), a $15bn commitment to prevent and treat AIDS infections, credited
with saving or extending millions of lives on the continent. Mr Clinton signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, an
important trade agreement with countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Mr Obama was largely occupied in his first term with the
US financial crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a foreign policy pivot towards Asia. A year ago, he issued a
policy directive on sub-Saharan Africa calling for expanded economic growth and pressing
for stronger democratic institutions. Mr Obama will travel to Tanzania on Monday for the last stop of his tour
and to the countrys fast-growing Dar es Salaam to convene a roundtable of company executives and promote investments in
electrification projects.
1AR Africa Thumper
Africa will dominate US foreign policy in the coming years
Goodmar 7/2
Sarah Obama's Africa Trip: A Renewed Commitment to US-African Relations, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/obamas-africa-
trip-renewed-commitment-us-african-relations ///cmf
President Obamas speech at the University of Cape Town on June 30 was a highlight of his
anticipated trip to Africa, demonstrating a renewed commitment to US-African
relations on the part of the administration. His speech formed a narrative of progress and hope for the
future, acknowledging the strides that the countries of Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania have made in democratization,
while also making a point to ensure security in Central Africa. His mention of Sudan, South Sudan, and
the Congo demonstrate a commitment to addressing mass atrocities in the region, while acknowledging the urgings of
democracys greatest assetits people: "We can't force a solution on to the region. The peoples of the region have to stand
up and say that enough, its time to move forward in a different way. President Obamas trip to Africa, though
highlighting and applauding democratic nations and institutions, emphasized the attention that must be paid
to push for peace in the Sudans, Congo and areas where the Lords Resistance Army operates. He stated, These
efforts have to lead to lasting peace, not just words on a paper or promises that fade away. Peace between and within Sudan
and South Sudan, so that these governments get on with the work of investing in their deeply impoverished peoples. Peace in
the Congo with nations keeping their commitments, so rights are at last claimed by the people of this war-torn country, and
women and children no longer live in fear. His acknowledgement of coalitions in the region that are working to stabilize an
increasingly volatile environment heed the work of neighboring African countries seeking to bring peace and security to the
region. His trip, premised on the growth of African trade, democracy building, and youth participation has centered on the
importance of grassroots participation in African progress - from President Obamas visit to a South African community
health center to a food security event in Dakar, Senegal. However, his emphasis on the importance of transparent institutions
was a focal point of his speech. While he applauded burgeoning democracies and rapidly growing economies in Africa, he
also recognized the fragility and unevenness of this progress, and the dire security and human rights situations of many
African nations: From Congo to Sudan, conflicts fester -- robbing men, women and children of the lives that they deserve.
In too many countries, the actions of thugs and warlords; and drug cartels and human traffickers hold back the promise of
Africa, enslaving others for their own purposes. His reference to Central Africa reflects his administration's commitment to
condemn and address mass atrocities in the region, consistent with recent changes to his foreign policy team, most notably
Susan Rices ascendance as National Security Advisor and Samantha Powers nomination to U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. During the last leg of his trip, President Obama responded to a recent U.N. group of experts report that confirmed
Rwanda and Congos support of armed rebel group M23 at a news conference in Tanzania: The countries surrounding the
Congo, they've got to make a commitment to stop funding armed groups that are encroaching on territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Congo. He concluded by emphasizing his inability to force a solution onto the region, saying that peace must
be reached at the grassroots, and praised Tanzanias positive contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping force in
Congo, or MONUSCO. The speech signals an effort to alter the status quo of U.S.-African
relationsfrom responding to pleas for aid and assistance to holistic partnerships with
African nationsby addressing systemic oppression on the environmental, economic, social, and
educational levels. President Obama announced plans to convene a summit in the United States next year, with heads
of state from sub-Saharan Africa called to help launch a new chapter in U.S.-African relations. In addressing popular
criticism against the U.S. for meddling in foreign affairs, he asserted that the administration would only assist and support
an African infrastructure made up of transparent institutions: America will make no apology for supporting African efforts
to end conflict and stand up for human dignity.

***Link
2AC AT Regional Focus Trades-off
The US can focus on more than one region at a time
Michael Green, 11/21/11, Foreign Policy, "Dizzy yet? the pros and cons of the asia pivot,"
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/21/dizzy_yet_the_pros_and_cons_of_the_asia_pivot
In addition, the "pivot" spin makes the United States look like a spastic superpower that
swings around focusing on only one region at a time. During the Cold War, the United
States managed a grand strategy that was global in scope with skill; are we not capable of
doing so today, when our freedom of maneuver and our relative power are in fact greater? It
is unbecoming of a global power; unnerving for our European allies (whose support we also need to manage China's
ascendance); and carries the unfortunate connotation that we may "pivot" again based on a new, reductionist, one-region-at-a-
time concept of grand strategy.
***Impact
**Defense**
2AC Decline Inevitable
Failure in Syria already tanking US credibility and hegemonySnowden
conflict proves
Cooke 7/1
Shamus, Global Research, How Edward Snowden and Syria Will Change Obamas Foreign Policy,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-edward-snowden-and-syria-will-change-obamas-foreign-policy/5341269 ///cmf
When the NSA spying scandal broke, so did the illusion that President Obama was significantly different than his
predecessor, Bush Jr. Obamas meticulously crafted image was specifically created as an alternative to Bush: Obama
campaigned as a peace candidate who loved civil liberties and wanted to work with the UN instead of unilaterally launching
wars. But now that the president has been fully exposed as an aspiring Bush III, will he retreat back into the sheeps clothing
he wore as candidate Obama? Or will he shed any remaining pretense and fully adopt Bushs international recklessness? The
answer is that both are likely true: Obama will continue to perform his stale routine as a pragmatist while in reality acting
out an even more dangerous foreign policy than Bush. This is because Edward Snowden, Russia, and Syrias
President Bashar al-Assad have backed President Obama into a corner; all have exposed
major weaknesses in the foreign power of the United States, and Obama will not allow himself and
more importantly U.S. national [corporate] interests to appear weak while Iran, Russia and China are rising
economically and/or politically. This dynamic will inevitably lead Obama to a more aggressive
foreign policy, more Middle East wars, and more dangerous confrontations with Iran,
Russia, and China. Obama has never been so vulnerable to his domestic right wing, which has been successfully
skewering him for the Snowden affair. The presidents I dont care attitude is obviously an act, and is only further
provoking his right-wing attackers, a good example of which comes from the Heritage Foundation: [China and
Russia's] unwillingness to extradite[Edward Snowden] is just the latest example of the
waning of American global power and influence courtesy of Team ObamaThe big question, naturally, is:
With perceptions of [the United States] plummeting power quite plausible, who might be
the next to take pleasure in challenging our [U.S.] interests? This is not just the opinion of a right-
wing pundit, but of the entire U.S. political establishment, Democrat and Republican alike. One need only remember that
during the Obama-Romney debate on foreign policy in the last election, there was very little debating and much agreement
on the need for U.S. power to be projected abroad. To be fair to Obama, the right wing has been too hard on him for his
weak foreign policy, since in reality Obama has acted incredibly hawkish internationally; the U.S. media simply did their
best to hide his actions from criticism, as did the Republicans who he worked with in tandem. For example, in Latin America
Obama backed a military coup in Honduras against an elected government, and later backed a coup in Paraguay and funneled
cash to the far right wing in Venezuela to undermine the Chavez government, while maintaining the cold war era embargo
against Cuba. Consequently, Latin America now equates Obamas foreign policy with Bushs. The U.S. Republicans were in
complete agreement with these policies of Obama. The Middle East is another example of Obama already acting the
scoundrel. His Bush-like surge tactic in Afghanistan extended a pointless war against the Taliban with whom he is now
trying in vain to negotiate an honorable peace; Obama broke international law in Libya when he bombed the nation into
regime change; in Syria Obama is continuing to escalate a devastating war by funneling even more guns and cash to a rebel
group dominated by Islamic extremists, again without UN approval. Never mind his shameless support of Israels criminal
policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and his strong alliance with the Persian Gulf Monarchy dictatorships of Saudi
Arabia and Qatar. Up until now Obama has been able to implement these Bush-like policies with a nice guy label. But nice
will no longer do the international situation has changed. Edward Snowden and Syrias president have
humiliated President Obama on key issues, and Obama must now bare his teeth, lest other nations exploit his
weakness. Syria, for example, is crucially important to Obama because he has invested massive
U.S. diplomatic capital in assembling a Bush-like coalition of the willing to topple the Syrian president, and if
Obama fails in his attempt at regime change his coalition of lackeys will not follow the
U.S.s lead in future endeavors, and may look instead to follow Iran or Russia. With each step
deeper into the Syrian morass Obama will find himself unable to retreat; and at this point a step backwards
would significantly diminish U.S. power in the Middle East. When Obama said, Assad
must go, he committed U.S. involvement to ensure that it happens. More importantly, if Syria is able
to defend itself from the U.S.-backed rebels or possibly a direct U.S. invasion other countries
will no longer be scared into submission to accept U.S. foreign policy. This is crucial because as
U.S. economic power wanes, its military becomes the foreign policy tactic of choice. Obama would like his Syrian
intervention to be as politically painless as Bill Clintons destruction of Yugoslavia, or Obamas destruction of Libya. But
Obamas rebels are being crushed on the battle field, requiring that Obama become increasingly invested in directly toppling
the Syrian president; Obamas rebels are now to be directly armed with more sophisticated weaponry from the U.S., which
will be funneled to them by the increasing amounts of U.S. troops on the Syria-Jordan border who are training the rebels, and
where a sophisticated U.S. anti-aircraft missile system has been added for defense. Obama has already drawn up
plans for an innocent sounding no fly zone, which in reality equals direct military
invasion. Obama now feels that he cannot back down in Syria, lest Russia and Iran advance.
Geopolitics has reached a crescendo in the Middle East and the wider world, where one
wrong step can equal a broader regional or even world war. The ongoing global economic crisis is
pushing U.S. corporations to demand that their political parties Democrats and Republicans act more boldly
abroad to acquire new markets/consumers for corporate products, new vehicles for investment, and new sources of cheap raw
materials and labor. Russia and China have similar aspirations. Barely into his second term Obamas corporate backers are
demanding he bare his fangs and quit acting the lamb U.S. national interests are at stake! In doing so Obama will expose
the true nature of the U.S. two-party system, and thus funnel political activity into the streets and/or the creation of a new,
mass party of working people to challenge the decrepit political status quo. The first black president was the last great hope
of the American two-party system. His failure will herald a new era in U.S. politics.
Asia Prolif Inev
Asian prolif inevitableeven a credible Asia pivot isnt enough to assuage
allies fears
Karl 13
David, president of the Asia Strategy Initiative and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, U.S. Strategic
Credibility in Asia: An Update, April-1, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/01/u-s-strategic-credibility-in-asia-an-update/ ///cmf
In a post two weeks ago, I argued that the Obama administration confronts a serious credibility gap in
Asia and cited as one example the small but growing number of influential South Koreans calling for
their country to develop its own nuclear weapons because of renewed doubts about
Washingtons commitment to South Koreas security. This specific problem involves what is known in
strategic policy circles as extended deterrence that is, the convincing projection of U.S. nuclear deterrence power over
far-flung allies confronted with menacing enemies. Extended deterrence entails a two-fold challenge: Dissuading hostile
states from taking offensive action while also persuading allies that there is no need to bolster their security through nuclear
proliferation. Washington spent a great deal of treasure and psychic energy during the Cold War coming to grips with these
problems, mainly in Europe as it tried to reassure NATO countries that America had their back even as Soviet nuclear forces
grew in size and capacity. To a much lesser extent the problems of extended deterrence were also at work in East Asia during
the Cold War. But they are now cropping up again as the regional security order becomes more complex. This can be seen
most clearly in the drama now playing out with North Korea. The United States has responded to Pyongyangs increasing
bellicosity in a way straight out of the Cold War playbook: 1.) by beefing up missile defense capabilities in Alaska; and 2.)
sending nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers on practice runs over the Korean peninsula. As illustrated in a Pentagon
press conference following the bomber runs, the intended audience for these moves is not just Pyongyang. General Martin E.
Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a point of emphasizing: The reaction to the B-2 that were most
concerned about is not necessarily the reaction it might elicit in North Korea, but rather among our Japanese and Korean
allies. Those exercises are mostly to assure our allies that they can count on us to be prepared and to help them deter
conflict. As the mission was being announced in an official statement, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was also on the
phone with his South Korean counterpart, reaffirming the United States unwavering commitment to defend the South.
Regardless of how the current North Korean crisis ends or the Obama administrations success in
dealing with the broader credibility problems of its Asia pivot, Washingtons challenges
with extended deterrence will only grow in the years ahead as nuclear proliferation expands in
the region and what some (here and here) are calling the Second Nuclear Age takes more concrete shape.
No Japan Prolif
Timeframe for Japanese prolif is yearsno tech or materials
Logan 13
Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8
/// cmf
Importantly, however, the time it would take Japan, for example, to go nuclear, is almost certainly
longer than the conventional wisdom, which has generally hovered around six months.120
There is little indication that Japan has prepared for such a rapid timeframe. Not only
would Japan need to produce weapons-grade fissile material, but a significant amount more work
would need to be done in developing delivery systems. A number of size- able technical
hurdles would put Japans time- frame in the realm of years, not months, to be- come a bona
fide nuclear-weapons state.121 If Washington were to insist that Japan carry a heavier share of the burden for
providing for its own defense, Tokyo may look into how it would overcome these hurdles.122
AT China Rise Bad
Liberal institutions and domestic politics ensure peaceful China rise
Logan 13
Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8
/// cmf
Two logics underpin the theory of the optimists, both borrowed from the liberal school of international relations.11 First is
liberal institutionalist logic, which holds that Chinas political and military behavior can be
constrained in a web of international institutions. These would allow it to rise into the
existing international orderwhich was shaped by the institutions created un- der American leadership after World
War IIand prevent China from transforming the rules that govern the order.12 For liberal
institutionalists, it is hard to understand why China would have any problems with the status quo. They wonder
why, given that China has made huge strides forward in terms of prosperity and even influence
under the existing order, it would bother to try changing it.13 Liberal institutionalists see
international politics as tightly constrained by international institutions and laws, and argue, as
Princetons G. John Ikenberry does, that while the United States cannot thwart Chinas rise, it can help ensure that Chinas
power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century,
rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future.14 Optimists argue
that China can be con- strained because the expansive and cross- cutting network of international
institutions promotes positive-sum outcomes and renders the American-dominated order
hard to overturn and easy to join.15 If Washington plays its cards correctly, Iken- berry writes,
it can make the liberal order so expansive and institutionalized that China will have no choice but to join and
operate within it.16 The second liberal logic holds that states international behavior is
induced by the domestic political structures within them.17 In this view, to the extent that China has
foreign policy objectives that conflict with American interests, these exist because of Chinas undemocratic domestic politics.
Accordingly, the argument goes, if China democratized, China could continue to rise while
resigning itself to U.S. preponderance. Advocates of this view place less emphasis on international
institutions. For them, the question is whether Chinas domestic politi cal system can be transformed from one-party rule
toward democracy. If it can, there is less reason to fear that Chinas international am- bitions will grow dangerously
expansive. This theory is popular in Washington, where policy is based in part on the belief that continued economic growth
will help transform Chinas political system in a democratic direction. If all goes according to plan, economic
growth in China will produce a growing middle class, which should then demand greater
political rights. These demands are expected to generate more democratic politics.18 Then, these
increasingly democratic politics are supposed to plug into a crude version of democratic
peace theory, in which the domestic institutions of democratic countries prevent them from going to war (or presumably,
in this case, even engaging in serious security competition) with other democracies. What both schools of liberalism agree
on is that there is no iron law that growing Chinese power will create a zero-sum security
tradeoff between China and the United States and its allies. This represents the central disagreement
between the optimists and pessimists.
AT China War
China doesnt have the military capabilities to start a conflict
Logan 13
Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8
/// cmf
The broader problem with U.S. China policy is that it takes as a given that a more powerful and activist
China would be bad for U.S. national security, but no one has detailed precisely how. The American
Enterprise Institutes Dan Blumenthal and his coauthors write that China is a threat to the United
States because its ambitions threaten Americas Asian allies, raise questions about the credibility of U.S. alliance pledges,
and imperil the U.S. military strategy that underpins its global primacy.84 It is telling how prominently alliances figure in
this formulation, but Blumenthals logic is backward. The United States should form alliances
with countries when it needs to fight a common enemy. It shouldnt litter the globe with
alliance commitments during peacetime, and then threaten war for the sake of those
alliances. In the modern era, Washingtons alliances exist pri- marily to defend the allies and the credibility of other
alliances, not the United States. At the bottom of realist theories of international relations, such as Mearsheimers, is the
prospect of being conquered or otherwise losing political sovereignty. Just as it is terrifically difficult to envision the United
States conquering China today, it is similarly difficult to imagine China conquering the United States,
given the Pacific Ocean and the massive American nuclear arsenal. Even Chinese naval
dominance over a good chunk of the Pacific seems like a fantasy for the foresee- able future.
Currently the PLA is struggling to acquire the ability to control its near seas. Its highly touted first
aircraft carrier is, in the apt phrasing of one analyst, a piece of junk,85 and China is decades from
having a bona fide blue-water navy, let alone one that could challenge the United States. Of
course, a number of smaller problems are more likely. A much more powerful China could attempt to use its
navy to exclude the United States from engaging in commerce with states in Asia. If it could overwhelm neighboring states,
China could hold hostage the sea lanes in Asia to extract concessions from other states in the region. But it bears asking
how likely those scenarios are, especially considering the sizable costs China would
incur to achieve such results.
AT Solves Credibility
Asia pivot bad for credibilityforces us into conflict or be seen as a paper
tiger
Raine and Miere 13
Sarah and Christian, Transatlantic Fellow @ the German Marshall Fund and Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security
@ IISS, Chapter Four: The US in the South China Sea, Adelphi Series, 53:436-437, 151-178, Taylor and Francis /// cmf
Another further constraint on US engagement is the limit on alliance-building in Southeast Asia
demanded by US national interests beyond the South China Sea. As Germany and the UK manoeuvred before the First World
War to construct alliances designed to deter conflict, the dominoes of commitments engendered ended up
actually helping to fan the flames of war.34 The danger for the US is that it ends up creating
expectations it may not want to meet, taking on actual or perceived commitments that force it
towards a crossroads it might otherwise seek to avoid: the decision to stand by an ally or
partner on principle and risk an escalation on a matter not of fundamental national interest, or to be seen to
have their bluff called, thereby bringing into question the core credibility of US commitments
in the region. This is particularly the case with regard to the Philippines, with whom the US has a Mutual Defence
Agreement, certainly applicable to the Western Pacific but questionably applicable to the South China Sea. As the
Philippines sent its US-donated cutter to arrest Chinese fisher- men off Scarborough Reef in April 2012, the US had a
delicate balance to strike in the support it proffered. A 2+2 meeting in May between the foreign and defence ministers of
the two coun- tries stressed Washingtons strategic ambiguity on the issue: while reaffirming the 1951 San Francisco Treaty,
US diplomats also highlighted their countrys neutrality on the South China Sea sovereignty disputes. Whilst Secretary of
State Clinton therefore explicitly stated that the US would protect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, she notably
neglected to mention whether the defence treaty extended to disputed areas of the sea. The message sent was clear in its
equivocality and is similar to the US position on Taiwan: while the US will help the Philippines develop its military and will
protect undisputed Philippine territory, it cannot afford to provide a carte blanche for defending disputed areas claimed by the
Philippines.
**Offense**
Asia Pivot BadGlobal Arms Race
Asia pivot triggers global arms race and war
Klare 13
Michael, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, The Cold War redux?, Jun-3,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/World/WOR-01-030613.html /// cmf
In March, Russia agreed to sell 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role combat jets and four Lada-class
diesel submarines to China on the eve of newly installed President Xi Jinping's first official visit to Moscow.
Although details of the sale have yet to be worked out, observers say that it will represent the most significant transfer of
Russian weaponry to China in a decade. The Su-35, a fourth-generation stealth fighter, is superior to any plane now in
China's arsenal, while the Lada is a more advanced, quieter version of the Kilo-class sub it already possesses. Together, the
two systems will provide the Chinese with a substantial boost in combat quality. For anyone who has followed Asian
security affairs over the past few years, it is hard to view this deal as anything but a reaction to the
Barack Obama administration's new Asian strategy, its "pivot" to the Pacific. As announced by President
Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament in November 2011, it involves beefing-up the already strong US
air and naval presence in the western Pacific - in, that is, waters off China - along with increased US
arms aid to American allies like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Not surprisingly,
China has responded by bolstering its own naval capabilities, announcing plans for the acquisition of a
second aircraft carrier (its first began operational testing in late 2012) and the procurement of advanced arms
from Russia to fill gaps in its defense structure. This, in turn, is bound to increase the pressure on
Washington from Japan, Taiwan, and other allies to provide yet more weaponry, triggering
a classic Cold-War-style arms race in the region. On the eve of Secretary of State John Kerry's June
24 visit to India, that country's press was full of reports and rumors about upcoming US military sales. Andrew Shapiro,
assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, was widely quoted as saying that, in addition to sales already in the
pipeline, "we think there's going to be billions of dollars more in the next couple of years." In his comments, Shapiro referred
to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who, he said, was heading up an arms sales initiative, "which we think is
making some good progress and will, hopefully, lead to an even greater pace of additional defense trade with India". To
some degree, of course, this can be viewed as a continuation of weapons sales as a domestic economic motor, since US
weapons companies have long sought access to India's vast arms market. But such sales now clearly play another role as
well: to lubricate the US drive to incorporate India into the arc of powers encircling China as part of the Obama
administration's new Asia-Pacific strategy. Toward this end, as Deputy Secretary of State William Burns explained back in
2011, "Our two countries launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific to ensure that the world's two largest democracies
pursue strategies that reinforce one another." Arms transfers are seen by the leaders of both countries as a vital tool in the
"containment" of China (though all parties are careful to avoid that old Cold War term). So watch for Kerry to pursue new
arms agreements while in New Delhi. Repeating History These are just some examples of recent arms deals (or
ones under discussion) that suggest a fresh willingness on the part of the major powers to use
weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition. The reappearance of
such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of Cold War-like rivalries. Even if senior
leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are not talking about resurrecting some 21st-century version of the Cold War,
anyone with a sense of history can see that they are headed down a grim, well-trodden path
toward crisis and confrontation. What gives this an added touch of irony is that leading arms suppliers
and recipients, including the United States, recently voted in the UN General Assembly to approve the Arms Trade Treaty,
which was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although the treaty has
many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation, it represents the
first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales. "This treaty won't solve the
problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias," said Anna MacDonald, the
head of arms control for Oxfam International and an ardent treaty supporter. "It will help to reduce armed violence. It will
help to reduce conflict." This may be the hope, but such expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers,
led by the US and Russia, once again come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in areas of
strategic importance. Far from bringing peace and stability - as the proponents of such transactions invariably
claim - each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step closer to a
new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails. Are
we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don't learn from history are destined to repeat it?
Asia Pivot BadChina War
Continued pursuit of China containment policy triggers US-Sino war
Yang 13
Yoa, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University and editor of China Economic Quarterly, Americas
pivot to Asia will provoke China, Feb-12, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/02/12/americas-pivot-to-asia-will-provoke-
china/#ixzz2XuEFkpjX /// cmf
One of the purposes of the pivot is presumably to hedge Chinas military encroachment on its
neighbours. It should be noted, though, that the growth of Chinas military spending has been largely a result of its
economic growth. Military spending is measured in nominal terms and the nominal size of Chinas economy has been
growing by double-digit rates. To the average Chinese, the US is once again showing its nature as a hegemon that wields its
power wherever it likes to, reinforcing the long-held Chinese view that being backward is to invite bullies. If the pivot
has any effect on China, it must be that it has pushed Beijing to accelerate its military build-up.
Americans like to say that the pivot is a response to Chinas more aggressive claims on some of the islands and reefs in the
South China and East China Seas. Informed Chinese would not agree with this view. But regardless of the sequence of the
events, the result presented to the world is that the American pivot has escalated tensions in the region.
It has been taken as an encouragement by Chinas neighbours; in the meantime, it has forced
China to take more assertive actions. The more constructive part of the pivot should have been the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. But even on this count, the US has caused more suspicion than goodwill in China. The TPP was designed
for like-minded countries to form, in President Barack Obamas words, a platinum free-trade agreement for the Asia-
Pacific region. It was the result of both Americas agony with the ineffectiveness of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
forum and the White Houses political strategy to please those on both the right and the left it expands free trade, so
Republicans are happy; but it also requires member countries to meet labour, environmental and even human rights
standards, so Democrats are happy. To most Chinese, however, the TPP is one of Americas intentional moves to exclude
China. For one thing, there is no way for China to meet its conditions in the medium term. For another, the TPP will not bring
significant gains to the US, precisely because China, the USs largest trading partner in the region, is not going to join. More
importantly, China was not part of the design process. To China, the TPP is a club set up solely on American will; China can
knock on the door, but can be rejected. Ten years ago, when China applied to join the World Trade Organisation, this would
not be a problem. Today, China feels differently: it has become reluctant to accept something if it does not feel ownership. In
a sense, all Chinese history since the mid-1800s has involved China trying to become as equal
as other world powers. Today, Chinas leaders and the Chinese people are increasingly feeling
that point is coming. Yet the existing powers, noticeably, the US and EU, may have different ideas
about equality. To them, China will only be treated as one of us after China is fully
transformed politically and socially. This discrepancy of beliefs will be a major source of
tension between China and existing powers in the coming years.
Only the pivot risks conflict between the US and China it stirs up nationalist
fervor and breaks down economic interdependence
John Glaser, 6/24/13, The Washington Times, "The asia pivot: making an enemy of china,"
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/john-glaser-intelligence-foreign-policy-world/2013/jun/24/asia-pivot-making-
enemy-china/
But there is one aspect of Obamas bellicose foreign policy so far removed from the al-Qaeda threat that he has been unable
to conjure it: the so-called Asia Pivot. The rebalancing to East Asia is a confrontational policy that involves
surging American military and naval presence throughout the region in the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Guam,
South Korea, Singapore, etc. and boosting support to Chinas neighboring rivals. Washington has been refurbishing old
WWII military bases in the region and building new ones in order to lay the groundwork for an air-sea battle with China.
Weve even deployed surveillance drones near Chinas borders. One wonders how might America react to such gestures in
her backyard. What villainous offense has China committed against American security? Are they
supporting terrorists? Have they threatened us with military attack? Are they amassing weapons of mass destruction pointed
at Washington? No, nothing like that. Obama hasnt been able to invoke a monster to destroy in
China because there isnt one. Chinas mere existence as a rising economic and military power is its major
transgression. China threatens not the security of Americans, but the hegemony of Washington. The Asia Pivot harks back to
a time when imperial powers didnt have to justify military expansionism with tall tales of impending attacks on the
homeland. It more resembles the famed Great Game in which the British Empire fought with the Russian Empire for
strategic supremacy in Central Asia. According to Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, writing in Foreign Affairs,
China is the only country widely seen as a possible threat to U.S. predominance. Indeed, Chinas rise has led to fears that the
country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day supplant the United States as a global hegemon. They add that
America is the most intrusive outside actor in Chinas internal affairs, the guarantor of the status
quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of
many of Chinas neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing international legal regimes. The U.S.
could cut its defense budget in half tomorrow and still outspend China on its military. But
that hasnt calmed the Obama administration into easing his approach. This comes with
serious risks. Already by 2011, the Center for Strategic International Studies identified in a report the unintended
consequences that could come with Obamas stern posture in Asia. The report predicted a shift in Chinese foreign policy
based on the new leaderships judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent Chinas reemergence as a
great power. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in
China that will increase pressure on Chinas incoming leadership to stand up to the United
States, the report added. Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the
bolstering of Americas military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic
guidelines. Or, in the words of former Chinese diplomat Jia Xiudong: Dont treat China as an enemy.
Otherwise you end up with an enemy in China. The economic interdependence between
the U.S. and China has risen to unprecedented levels, and thats a good thing. Left to their own
devices, Americans and Chinese would continue to engage in peaceful, mutually beneficial trade. Only Washington,
going abroad in search of monsters to destroy, could turn that into a casus belli .
Continuing to contain China risks confrontationdomestic pressures
escalate quickly
Glaser 13
Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia @ CSIS, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, Pivot to Asia:
Prepare for Unintended Consequences, April-13, http://csis.org/publication/pivot-asia-prepare-unintended-consequences ///cmf
The Obama administrations initial policy in 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a G2 condominium that would make
decisions over the heads of others. Those concerns were unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted the U.S. approach
as weakness, which, along with Chinas economic success and Americas struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that
manifested itself in a series of intimidating actions in Chinas neighborhood. Subsequent entreaties by regional states to
counterbalance China increased U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the U.S. Asia pivot has
prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about
intensified U.S.-China strategic competition. In the run-up to the leadership transition that will take place at
Chinas 18th Party Congress this fall, Beijing is inwardly focused and unlikely to act on its fears. However, 2013 could
see a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leaderships judgment that it must
respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent Chinas reemergence as a great power.
Signs of a potential harsh reaction are already detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has
triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on
Chinas incoming leadership to stand up to the United States. Nationalistic voices are calling
for military countermeasures to the bolstering of Americas military posture in the region and the new U.S.
defense strategic guidelines. For example, an article published in Chinas Global Times, a jingoistic newspaper owned by the
Communist Party mouthpiece Peoples Daily, called for China to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities. Deng
Xiaopings guideline to keep a low profile in the international arena, designed more than two
decades ago to cope with uncertainty produced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is increasingly seen by Chinas
elite and public as irrelevant and even harmful to the task of defending Chinese ever-expanding core
interests. Some voices are calling for closer alignment with Moscow and promoting the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) as a new pole in the international arena to strengthen the emerging powers against the West. Xi
Jinping, who will assume the helm as Chinas new leader later this year, will be under pressure from many
domestic constituencies to more forcefully defend Chinese interests in the international arena.
Seeking to quickly consolidate his power and enhance the legitimacy of the Communist
Party, Xi and his newly installed Politburo Standing Committee colleagues may be more willing than their
predecessors to test drive a policy that is more confrontational.
US-China war goes nuclear
Johnson 1
Chalmers, The Nation, May 14, Wilson OmniFile: Full Text Select
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists
know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the
overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US
warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most
dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in
Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the
United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the
United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the
world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily
escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any
Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no
deterrent effect.