US vs.

Guinto (Consti1)
En Banc

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts:
In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground
that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its
contracting officer James F. Shaw
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T.
Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents
who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering
Area which was not included in the invitation to bid
The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners
Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint,
explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club
concession
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below
to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation
Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to
the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a
suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction
On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in
the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used
in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was
immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that
the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official
capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought
them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the
beginning

On the third suit:
Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers
of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the
charge
He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners,
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of
laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement
The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their
official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its
consent
Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases
Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had
come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners
(except USA)
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and
unleashed dogs on them
Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and
were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the
United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune
from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of
their official functions
Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered
Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of
America without its consent
In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting
within their official functions.
Holding and Ratio:
1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated
by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot
plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.
2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The
restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract
with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
(However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their
official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.
4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry
must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity
the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.