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[G.R. No. L-17714. May 31, 1922. ]

In the matter of the estate of Jesus de Leon. IGNACIA DIAZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANA
DE LEON, Opponent-Appellee.

Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros and Jose Lopez Vito for Appellant.

Francisco A. Delgado , Powell & Hill and Padilla & Trenas for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

WILLS; REVOCATION; "ANIMO REVOCANDI." According to the statute governing the subject
in this jurisdiction the destruction animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in itself, a sufficient
revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.) The original will herein presented for probate
having destroyed animo revocandi, cannot be declared the will and last testament of the testator.

[G.R. No. 26317. January 29, 1927.]

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA
MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

Nicanor Tavora for Appellant.

Jose Rivera for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS, CANCELLATION OF; PRESUMPTION. The law does not require any evidence of
the revocation or cancellation of the will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to
prove the cancellation or revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has
taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator.




[G.R. No. 76464. February 29, 1988.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO
AND FELINO MALOTO,Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; REVOCATION THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF
DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical act of
destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by
another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it
goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus
revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by
the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS. For a judgment to be a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former
judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is,
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. There is yet, strictly
speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Malotos will is concerned.
The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the
intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be
construed to be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the
decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably
so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the
probate of the contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the
presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something
which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is
predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no identity
between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it
may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that
the petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Malotos will.
Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be
sustained.

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VI. CODICILS AND INCORPORATIONS BY REFERENCE

VII. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION

MOLO VS. MOLO
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced
heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were
his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the
1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed
to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again
the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended
that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively
nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was
not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the
will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent
relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

A. REVOCATION BY PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
DIAZ VS. DE LEON
Diaz vs De Leon

FACTS:
Jesus De Leon executed a will, it was allegedly revoked by him.
Petitioner Diaz denied the same.
The opposition alleged that the testator revoked the same by destroying it and by executing
a new will.
Among the evidence submitted by the oppositors is that the testator asked that the first will
be returned to him. Upon its return, he ordered his servant to tear the same.
o This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect.
After some time, the testator was asked by Dr. Mapa about the will and he exclaimed that he
destroyed the same.

ISSUE: Whether the will was revoked by testator?

RULING: YES!!!
According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with
animo revocandi constitutes in itself a sufficient revocation.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious
to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact was disclosed by the
testators own statement to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he
was confined.
So the original will cannot now be probated.

GAGO VS. MAMUYAC
[G.R. No. 26317. January 29, 1927.]
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA
MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for Appellant.
Jose Rivera for Appellees.
Facts:
This action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who
died on Jan 2, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union.
On July 27, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament.
In the month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will.
The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana
Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union).
On November 22, 1923 After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said
will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal upon the ground that the deceased had on the
April 16, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On February 21, 1925, the present action was commenced.
Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said will of the April 16, 1919.
To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina
Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging:
(a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac;
(b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and
(c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Honorable Anastasio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the respective parties, denied
the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920.

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Issue: Whether or not the will had been revoked and cancelled?

Ruling:

With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that the will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to. be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that
such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from
evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption
is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The
same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any
other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to
the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator
Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced
to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to
establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents,
the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in
which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of
cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of
wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper
testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities
and requirements of the law, the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear
that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo v.
Casquijo, G.R. No. 26063.) 1

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for
probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

MALOTO VS. CA
Maloto vs CA

- In 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews (petitioners and
respondents)
- Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a will, the heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, wherein they divided the estate equally
- 1n 1967, a former associate of Adrianas counsel discovered a discovered a document
dated January 3, 1940 and purporting to be the last will and testament of the decedent (copy of the
will, not the original).
- The will has the effect of giving much bigger and more valuable shares to two of the heirs.
The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties.
- Eventually, the heirs who were supposedly entitled to bigger share in the estate together
with the named devisees and legatees filed for petition for probate of the will
- During trial, it was alleged that the will was burned by the househelp under the instruction of
the deceased.

Issue: Whether there was valid revocation of the will (see Art. 830)

Held: No.

Animus revokandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice.
Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of the will.
The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express
direction.
The testimony of the two witnesses in favor of the revocation of the will appear inconclusive
- The document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not established to be the will of
Adriana;
- The burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana;
- And that the burning was done in the Adrianas presence.

B. REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILLS

1. DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION

DIAZ VS. DE LEON
In the mater of the estate of Jesus de Leon.
IGNACIA DIAZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DE LEON, opponent-appellee.

FACTS :
The only question raised in this case is whether or to the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was
revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the
testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the
former.

HELD:

The Court found that the second will (Exhibit 1) executed by the deceased is not cloth with all the
necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo
revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.
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From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution of
the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to
the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and
before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr.
Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious
to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the
testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he
was confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot
now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgement is affirmed with costs
against the petitioner.

2. FALSE CAUSE
C. REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS