The article discusses the impossibility of a Paretian liberal system where individual preferences are in conflict and cannot all be maximized at the same time. It argues that while liberalism focuses on maximizing individual preferences, situations will arise where social choices will disappoint some individuals and there is no social arrangement that can make everyone better off at the same time. The author concludes that some liberal principles may come into conflict with Pareto optimality and that liberal ideals of maximizing individual preferences are impossible to achieve in all circumstances.
The article discusses the impossibility of a Paretian liberal system where individual preferences are in conflict and cannot all be maximized at the same time. It argues that while liberalism focuses on maximizing individual preferences, situations will arise where social choices will disappoint some individuals and there is no social arrangement that can make everyone better off at the same time. The author concludes that some liberal principles may come into conflict with Pareto optimality and that liberal ideals of maximizing individual preferences are impossible to achieve in all circumstances.
The article discusses the impossibility of a Paretian liberal system where individual preferences are in conflict and cannot all be maximized at the same time. It argues that while liberalism focuses on maximizing individual preferences, situations will arise where social choices will disappoint some individuals and there is no social arrangement that can make everyone better off at the same time. The author concludes that some liberal principles may come into conflict with Pareto optimality and that liberal ideals of maximizing individual preferences are impossible to achieve in all circumstances.
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Sen, Amartya Kumar. 1970. The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of Political Economy 78(1): 152-157. Published Version http://www.jstor.org/stable/1829633 Accessed July 3, 2014 12:26:26 PM EDT Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3612779 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn- 3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA