LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 (G.R. NO.

192935, 07 DECEMBER 2010)

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, AND REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. AND DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. NO. 193036, 07
THIS CASE IS ABOUT THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com under the category RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
DOCTRINE: WHEN A TRUTH COMMISSION IS CREATED TO INVESTIGATE ANOMALIES OF A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATION
IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 WAS ISSUED BY PRESIDENT NOYNOY AQUINO TO INVESTIGATE REPORTED CASES OF
GRAFT AND CORRUPTION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
ISSUE: IS THIS LEGAL?
RULING:
NO. IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION IS BUT JUST A MEMBER OF
A CLASS, THAT IS, A CLASS OF PAST ADMINISTRATIONS. IT IS NOT A CLASS OF ITS OWN. NOT TO INCLUDE PAST
ADMINISTRATIONS SIMILARLY SITUATED CONSTITUTES ARBITRARINESS WHICH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CANNOT SANCTION.
The ruling of the Court:
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration
[1][87]
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and
secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to
as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of
justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports
of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier
administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure
solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
[2][88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the
previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.
[3][89]
The reason given is specious. It is without
doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.
[4][90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports invol ving the earlier administrations
were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no
longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous
administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).
[5][91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a
centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC,
to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be
struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
[6][92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered
view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be
circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
[7][93]
Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
[8][94]
While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation
of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To
exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the
subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,
[9][95]
it was written: A rather limited
number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender,
political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of
first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.
[10][96]
Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter
be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.
[11][97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.
[12][98]

Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach.
[13][99]
It
has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because
it happens to be incomplete.
[14][100]
In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a
law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step
process.
[15][101]
With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme
simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.
[16][102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and
intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be
noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the invest igative
commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.
[17][103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only
confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
[18][104]
The OSG points to
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the
PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would
be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If
he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that
the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.
[19][105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,
[20][106]
that the PCGG Charter
(composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid
of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a
cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally
mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising
undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating
fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it
seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of
being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile
grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many
times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
[21][107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply
making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution.
And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation
and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter
how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.
[22][108]
The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply
let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap it s
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
[23][109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.
Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most
interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of
men.
[24][110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No.
1
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the
Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid f rom the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination,
series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it
would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-
vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is
clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial chal lenge is
allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative
acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such
statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the
heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is
dismissed for lacking merit.

ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the
key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights
of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important
element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of
the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood
from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive
right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so
classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petiti oner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberati on on
S.B. No.733
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by
the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for
its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished i n a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY TEVES

G.R. No. 176579, promulgated June 28, 2011

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by
the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific
Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment
management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3
percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners
in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.

II. THE ISSUE

Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, or in the instant case, to the total common
shares of PLDT.]

Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public
utilities, to wit:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or
for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation
or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election
of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both
common and non-voting preferred shares [of PLDT].

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or
manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares,
preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any
control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. xxx.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However,
if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.


Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned capital required in the Constitution. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with
the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is considered as non-Philippine national[s].


To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-
voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-
important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term capital. Let us assume that a corporation
has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of
share having a par value of one peso (P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term capital, such corporation would be
considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of publi c utilities since the overwhelming majority, or
more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.

In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the election of directors, even if
they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the publ ic
utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and
hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the
clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State
policy of an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in the present case.


[O]nly holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors [of PLDT], meaning only common shareholders
exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not
have any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDTs Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting rights for all
purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.

It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In
fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only
66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos
hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over
PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly
mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share,
whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the
preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably
shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating
the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.

The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with
60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the States grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed
fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT
common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership
of a public utility.

In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of
PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o franchise, certificat e,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized
under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.

To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to
vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares,
constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by
Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares
have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT
and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution.

Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock market value of P2,328.00
per share, while PLDT preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per share have a current stock market value ranging from
only P10.92 to P11.06 per share, is a glaring confirmation by the market that control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the
common shares, not with the preferred shares.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the
Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term capital in determining the extent of
allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must
also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the
government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing]
persons.
1[3][3]

This petition for review on certiorari
2[4][4]
filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
3[5][5]
challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision
4[6][6]
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo
5[7][7]
filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation
6[8][8]
(Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita)
located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore
(Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking
from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that













he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the
subdivision.
7[9][9]


Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
8[10][10]
The
supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.