15.

Ombudsman v Masing (2008)

FACTS:Respondents Florita A. Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School, and
JocelynA. Tayactac, an office clerk in the same school, were administratively charged before the Office
of theOmbudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to
accountfor public funds.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction overthem. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall
exercise the samethrough a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4670, otherwise known as the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
The motion was denied. Ombudsman rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing andTayactac
guilty. Masing was dismissed from service while Tayactac was suspended for 6 months.On appeal, CA
reversed.Meanwhile, Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Ombudsman for charges
of oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or
mentalincapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.Ombudsman found Masing guilty as
charged and ordered her suspension for six (6) months without pay.On appeal, CA also
reversed.Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus Motion
toIntervene and for Reconsideration. CA denied the on the grounds that (1) intervention is not
properbecause it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention,
even if permissible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.Hence, appeal before SC.
The 2 cases were consolidated.
ISSUE: 1. WON Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration?
2. WON Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees?

HELD: 1. YES.In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, we recognized the standing of the Civil Service
Commission(CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding
Dacoycoy guilty.Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to
the CA, it became the party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which seriously prejudices
the civil service system.
However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the CA for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsmans
motions for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the interest of speedy justice.
2. YES.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is
explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution
delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. The enumeration of these powers is
non-exclusive.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, giving the Office
such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution. In fine, the
manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and
employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction
therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all
administrative complaints.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive
disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the
other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770
was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its
meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in
conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees,
with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress
and the Judiciary.

16. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence
that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance
to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the
implementation of said law.
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-
President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by
Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate,
violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD: No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision
of law unconstitutional.
CJ punos opinion:
I now come to section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail.-
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than
three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail
may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:
(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the necessary standards to guide the
COMELEC in identifying the countries where voting by mail may be allowed, viz: (1) the countries must
have a mailing system which is fairly developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists
a technically established identification that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and (3) where the
system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their enforcement. Our
Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident
that it cannot be subject to review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight
power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In
the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the
means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, they
should not be interfered with.[238] Thus:
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to
evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must
not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of
the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this court to review the acts
of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases. We are
not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases.
17. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS VS BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
FACTS; COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS
is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine
Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should
not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the
vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model
attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year
detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier
within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual
report which accompanied the order to show cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report
asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No.2307 relied on by said board as authority for such
requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on
the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and
unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of clerical
work
ISSUE: w/n it is constitutional to require the petitioner to pass a detailed report to the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands.
Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely
relates to the execution of the law.
HELD: The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its
authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every
public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in
such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from
public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall
follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive
discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public
utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is
valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the
facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to
require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It
would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.
The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the
general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the
application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making
orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce
Act),
Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail
what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance
of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so
conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision
complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall
proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is
left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained
as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act
upon.The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such
Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has
not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the
nformation which the board wants.