French language. Merleau-Ponty (French philosopher) published this book in 1945. Departing from Sartre, he wrote: "As for the subject of sensation, (man) need not be a pure nothingness with no terrestrial weight. That
would be necessary only if, like constituting consciousness, he had
to be simultaneously omnipresent, coextensive with being, and in
process of thinking universal truth. But the spectacle perceived does
not partake of pure being. Taken exactly as I see it, it is a moment of
my individual history, and since sensation is a reconstitution, it pre-
supposes in me sediments left behind by some previous constitution,
so that I am, as a sentient subject, a repository stocked with natural
powers at which I am the first to be filled with wonder. I am not,
therefore, in Hegel's phrase, 'a hole in being', but a hollow, a fold,
which has been made and which can be unmade."
French language. Merleau-Ponty (French philosopher) published this book in 1945. Departing from Sartre, he wrote: "As for the subject of sensation, (man) need not be a pure nothingness with no terrestrial weight. That
would be necessary only if, like constituting consciousness, he had
to be simultaneously omnipresent, coextensive with being, and in
process of thinking universal truth. But the spectacle perceived does
not partake of pure being. Taken exactly as I see it, it is a moment of
my individual history, and since sensation is a reconstitution, it pre-
supposes in me sediments left behind by some previous constitution,
so that I am, as a sentient subject, a repository stocked with natural
powers at which I am the first to be filled with wonder. I am not,
therefore, in Hegel's phrase, 'a hole in being', but a hollow, a fold,
which has been made and which can be unmade."
French language. Merleau-Ponty (French philosopher) published this book in 1945. Departing from Sartre, he wrote: "As for the subject of sensation, (man) need not be a pure nothingness with no terrestrial weight. That
would be necessary only if, like constituting consciousness, he had
to be simultaneously omnipresent, coextensive with being, and in
process of thinking universal truth. But the spectacle perceived does
not partake of pure being. Taken exactly as I see it, it is a moment of
my individual history, and since sensation is a reconstitution, it pre-
supposes in me sediments left behind by some previous constitution,
so that I am, as a sentient subject, a repository stocked with natural
powers at which I am the first to be filled with wonder. I am not,
therefore, in Hegel's phrase, 'a hole in being', but a hollow, a fold,
which has been made and which can be unmade."
Le Léviathan de Hobbes - Des causes de la génération et de la définition d'une République (Commentaire): Comprendre la philosophie avec lePetitPhilosophe.fr