Venezuela Oil Neg

Case
AT: Venezuela Energy Advantage
Venezuela expanding
Venezuela is increasing oil production --- foreign companies investing now.
AVN 6-14-13 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Venezuela to Increase Oil Production to
3.25m BPD in 2013, Press-Venezuelan Embassy to the US, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/06/14/venezuela-to-
increase-oil-production-to-3-25m-bpd-in-2013/)
Venezuelan Oil and Mining Minister Rafael Ramirez said Thursday that according to projections, the production capacity of
Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) will reach 3.25 million barrels per day by late 2013. In statements to the media,
he said that this is an increase of 250,000 barrels over the previous year, and is thanks to new
developments in the Orinoco Oil Belt, the site of the worlds largest certified oil reserves. Ramirez
referred to efforts that are under way to increase oil output levels. 1,000 wells are being drilled annually, with 200
drills, hundreds of miles of pipeline are being installed to build in this period of government [2013-2019] a capability that will double the
current one, he said, to reach 6 million barrels per day in 2019. We are focused on meeting our goals because it is a
stage of volumetric expansion of the production capacity, which is in compliance with the timelines stipulated for the
*Orinoco Oil+ Belt, he said. Ramirez said that the government has implemented efforts in recent weeks to meet the projected goals for oil
extraction and has signed cooperation agreements with strategic partners and secured financing. Last month, PDVSA and Chevron signed a $2
billion line of credit to increase production at Petroboscan from 107,000 barrels to 127,000 barrels per day. Also, the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) initialed an agreement with PDVSA for $4 billion to increase production at Petrosinovensa from 140,000 to
160,000 barrels per day by the end of this year. The disbursement of this funding will be paid by the end of the year, the resources will come
in this year, Ramirez said. The French and American company Schlumberger also signed a cooperation
agreement with PDVSA that involves increasing service provision related to oil exploration and
production . Meanwhile, Russias Rosnieft and PDVSA created a new joint venture called
PetroVictoria and agreed to a loan of $1.5 billion.
Venezuela is set to increase oil production capacity by 2014, according to the government. The worlds
largest crude oil reserves are found in the country, estimated at around 297,700million barrels.
Venezuela is planning a substantial oil production increase for 2014.
Nelson 5-3-13 (George, Venezuela: Oil and Natural Gas Production Set To Increase, The Argentina
Independent, http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromlatinamerica/venezuela-oil-and-
natural-gas-production-set-to-increase/)
The Venezuelan minister of petroleum and mining, Rafael Ramrez, said that US$25 billion is to be
invested in the oil sector in a bid to increase mining and production capacity. Our goal is to produce
four million barrels per day, said Ramirez during a meeting with the National Oil Chamber, in the Sucre State, in the northeast of
the country. The country is currently producing three million barrels a day, although present capacity stands at a
potential 3.7 million barrels per day. In the early 1980s Venezuela was producing 1,600,000 barrels of oil a day,
this is nothing compared to what we can do today, said the minister while also stating the governments plan to increase
natural gas production. Increasing production to six million barrels per day for 2019 is an objective that requires a comprehensive investment
plan, according to Ramirez. We will do in seven years what has been done in the last 60 with regards to oil production in Venezuela.
Government critics have long blamed mismanagement under Hugo Chvez for falling oil production in
Venezuela in recent years.

Oil not k2 Venezuelan economy
Venezuelan economy is not tied to oil prices --- the problem is currency overvaluation.
Weisbrot 10 (Mark, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. Ph.D. in
economics from the University of Michigan, Venezuelas Recovery Depends on Economic Policy, Center for
Economic and Policy Research, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/venezuelas-
recovery-depends-on-economic-policy/)
The constraint that developing countries face in pursuing expansionary fiscal policy during a recession is that they must maintain an adequate
level of foreign exchange to avoid a balance of payments crisis. This is different from the United States, which can pay for its imports in its own
currency. Venezuela ran a huge current account surplus in 2008 meaning that it was accumulating dollars. When oil
prices plunged, this surplus quickly collapsed into a deficit but only for six months. The government
dipped into its international reserves in order pay for imports. But it did not need to let the economy
shrink . It could have dipped further into reserves, since these have remained sizeable, reduced
capital flight, or even borrowed internationally as much as necessary. Venezuela foreign public debt is
quite low, just 11 percent of GDP, and its total pubic debt is only 20 percent of GDP (as compared to about 100 percent of GDP in
the U.S.). Remember, the government does not need foreign currency for the stimulus itself; it only needs enough to cover its imports in a
growing economy (as opposed to a shrinking economy, in which imports also fall), and to maintain adequate reserves. All this is
important because it shows that the growth of Venezuelas economy is not so directly tied to oil
prices as most people think it is. The government has the capability to maintain steady growth as oil
prices fluctuate , especially when it has such a low level of public debt and a relatively high level of
international reserves. The other major economic problem faced by Venezuela over the last 7 years has been its overvalued currency.
In 2003 the government fixed the exchange rate at 1600 (now re-denominated as 1.6 bolivares) per dollar. It was devalued twice, to 2.15 in
2005, where it remained until January of this year. The problem is that Venezuelas currency has grown
increasingly overvalued at this fixed rate. Venezuelas inflation has been much higher than that of its trading partners (it has
averaged 21 percent annually over the last 7 years). This means that if the nominal exchange rate is held fixed, the currency appreciates in real
terms. Assuming that the currency was not overvalued when it was originally fixed, it would have to have fallen to about 5.13 to the dollar by
the beginning of this year, in order to keep the same real exchange rate. At the fixed exchange rate, it was probably more than 130
percent overvalued. An overvalued exchange rate makes Venezuelas exports expensive in foreign
markets and its imports artificially cheap. This makes it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for
Venezuela to diversify its economy away from oil and in fact the country has not done so during the past 7 years. On
January 9 the government devalued the currency to 4.3 bolivares per dollar, for most imports. At the same time, a higher rate of 2.6 per dollar
was established for sectors deemed essential, which include food, education, science and technology, health, machinery and equipment, family
remittances and transfers to students living abroad. The devaluation brings the exchange rate much closer to a competitive level. But it
probably has farther to go, and unfortunately as inflation continues at high rates, the currencys overvaluation in real terms will increase
rapidly. The inflation itself is a secondary problem; at 25.1 percent for 2009 (down from 30.9 percent the prior year), it needs to be lowered.
But it is not that far over the boundary of 20 percent that much of the macroeconomic research sees as reducing growth (although there is a
wide range of disagreement on this among economists). Venezuela would probably be better off with a more flexible
but still managed exchange rate regime, keeping its capital controls but maintaining a competitive exchange rate so that the
economy can diversify away from oil. This would at least allow for the possibility of pursuing an economic
development strategy, something that after decades of neoliberalism is still pretty much absent among governments in the
western hemisphere.
Theres less demand for oil from the top Venezuelan customers --- diversification key.
Monge 3-12-13 (Carlos, Head of Citizen Monitoring and Promotion of Participation and then Head of
Communications for Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, Oil in Post-Chvez Venezuela, Revenue Watch Institute,
http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/oil-post-ch%C3%A1vez-venezuela)
In the short termassuming Maduro is electedthe new administration will probably maintain
Chvezs oil policies, as it will need to secure the loyalty of the popular sectors and sustain its regional
geopolitical alliances. But the mid and long term, certain critical issues will need to be addressed. One
is that of economic diversification. The sustainability of Venezuelas oil nationalism critically depends
on the continuity of U.S. and China demand. But the U.S. needs less imported oil because it is
increasing its domestic energy supplies, and Chinese demand has decreased due to lower levels of
growth . In this scenario, heavy dependence on oil exports can lead to too much exposure to short-
term price volatility, which may lead to long-term decline .

China solves
China solves --- drilling and investing in Venezuela now.
Simon 4-29-13 (Franois, China in Venezuela: loans for oil, The Dragons Tail,
http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/china-in-venezuela-loans-for-oil/)
Indeed, China is Venezuelas biggest creditor. Venezuelas difficult economic situation (growth of 6%, high inflation at 20%,
budget deficit at 20%, growing public debt at 50% of GDP in 2012) means that it cannot easily borrow from global capital markets to pay for
Chavez expensive social programs. Beijing and Caracas established a Joint Investment Fund in 2007 with an initial
investment of $4 billion by China and $2 billion by Venezuela later boosted to a total of $12 billion in 2009. This fund is mainly used
for investment in infrastructure, energy and agricultural projects. A study of Latin America funding by China in 2012
by Trufts University confirms another advantage of Chinese lending over the West as seen in Algeria: banks do not impose any policy condition
on borrowing governments and generally have low environmental guidelines. These tied loans do however require equipment purchase and
oil sales. For example the China Development Bank lent $500 million to PDVSA to buy machinery and
equipment for oil drilling with contracts mostly awarded to Chinese-owned companies . Thereby,
China serves as an alternative to international banks for financing with low rate loans, while securing access to
Venezuelas oil at a fixed low price and creating business opportunities. Beijing has lent $46,5 billion since 2008,
which represents over half of the loans the country has received (95% are loans-for-oil). Thus Venezuela is becoming oil-debt dependent which
is naturally a great advantage for Chinese state-owned companies in trade deal and contract negotiations. In the Chavez era, China has
invested heavily in raw material. First and foremost in oil: China imports about 10% of its global oil imports from
Venezuela 600 000 barrels per day in 2013 aiming to reach 1 000 000/day in 2015. Of these, 270 000 barrels/day are to repay debts, for a
price sometimes as low as $5/barrel according to wikileaks. Chinese state-owned companies have also been awarded
many prospecting, drilling and refining contracts offshore and especially in the vast Orinoco belt.
Sinopec and CNPC both have established joint ventures to exploit reserves and build refineries in the
Junin area while CITIC (China Internatioal Trust and Investment Corporation) and Sinohydro agreed to build condominiums in the Junin
and Carabobo areas. China has also invested heavily in Venezuelan mining. Aside from contracts to build industrial condominiums and 33 000
homes in the belt, CITIC has also been awarded a joint ventures in 2012 to explore the Las Cristinas gold and copper mine in Bolivar state, which
is one the worlds most important gold reserves. Chavez nationalised the gold industry in 2011, in effect expropriating Canadian Crystallex
from the mine, who is still at the moment seeking compensation with the help of the World Bank. This is a good example of the shift from
Western to Chinese investors and especially to CITIC which is one of Venezuelas Chinese creditors. Furthermore, like with PDVSA, Venezuelas
stade-owned mining company CVG (Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana) agreed in 2010 with WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel Corp Chinas 3rd
steel company) on fixing long-term iron ore under the market prices compared to other South American competitors (such as Brazils Vale).
This shows Chinas ability to negotiate cheaper raw material and secure new important contracts after years of
domination by the US and other Western powers.

Chinas investing in Venezuelan oil in the status quo.
Zhu 10 (Chen, CNPC, Venezuela Sign Oil Deal, Caixin Online, 4-19-10, http://english.caixin.com/2010-04-
19/100136697.html)
China's leading oil company China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) signed an agreement with
Venezuela state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela to develop an oil block in the Orinoco Belt,
Eastern Venezuela. Under the contract, the companies will set up a joint venture to develop the Junin 4
block of the Orinoco Belt for 25 years. The project production capacity is expected to reach 2.9 billion
barrels. The Junin 4 block covers an area of 325 kilometers, with estimated reserve of 8.7 billion barrels. The project's annual
production capacity may reach 20 million tons. Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said on April 16 that CNPC will have
to pay the Venezuelan government as much as US$1 billion to access the reserves. The signing ceremony was held in Venezuela's capital,
Caracas, on April 17, with the attendance of President Hugo Chvez. China and Venezuela also signed a long term
financing agreement in which China agreed to extend US$ 20 billion in loans to Venezuela with a
term of 10 years . CNPC and Petroleos de Venezuela signed oil supply contracts as the guarantee of the loan.
Impact Defense
A2 Venezuelan Instability

Short term instability is inevitable long term stability will arise
Puchi 13 [June 25, 2013. Leopoldo Puchi is an opposition political scientist and ex general secretary of the MAS.
Article translated by Tamara Pearson. Venezuelan Government: Stability in Instability Venezuelanalysis.
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9764]
Different signs indicate that the government of Nicolas Maduro is tending to stabilise itself and consolidate
itself, after the initial turbulence that followed the close electoral results and the lack of acceptance of the
numbers emitted by the National Electoral Council by part of the opposition. Of course, the points of tension are numerous in Venezuelan
society and without a doubt it will be like this for many years: social demands, like those of the university teachers; disagreements with
Colombia and the United States over geopolitical divergences; economic problems, due to the reduced productivity of Venezuelan companies;
grave deficiencies in public services; etc. Situations and conflicts that will exist for a long time, with the current
government or with a different one. For the rest, there is no defined social hegemony, but rather an
equilibrium of forces. The big picture is one of stability within instability . The push for power
continues to define the agenda, which is making different analysts think, regarding the government and the opposition, that we
could be facing an imminent collision. Important sectors of the opposition arent willing to accept this dead calm,
that they consider exasperating, for long. There are disturbing facts that point in this direction, such as the presence of paramilitary groups, not
just in border areas, but also in the countrys interior, as was shown in the recent arrests of various members in Portuguesa state, and the
serious indicators that show their presence in the areas around Caracas. At the same time, sectors close to Chavismo seem to be
impatient because they feel that the revolution could freeze, or dissolve into less rebellious forms. Now
then, when violent plans are talked about, its not acceptable to put all of the opposition into the same boat. Nobody images that, for
example, the candidates of the MUD in different regions, are actively committed to a strategy of this type. Its what they are least
concerned with right now, when there is an electoral contest coming up, and their councillor candidates arent defined, nor is there
consensus around various mayoral candidates. Even then though, the Venezuelan opposition is complex and its not just
made up of this or that party, but rather there are important radicalised factors with a lot of influence
and decision making power as well. Everything indicates that these groups have taken our neighbour, Colombia, as a logistical
platform for acting on Venezuela, given the belligerence of ex-President Alvaro Uribe and the geopolitical differences between the two
countries, which would facilitate such actions, even if Juan Manuel Santos isnt directly involved. Because of these circumstances, different
analysts warn of the possibility that the country is on the point of a conflict without remedy. Maybe
they are exaggerating, maybe they are right. But without a doubt, we have to be on the alert.
A2 Economic Instability

Venezuelan economic instability inevitable
Lees 13 [April 15, 2013. Kevin Lees is an attorney in Washington, D.C., and the editor of the comparative politics
blog, Suffragio.org. Venezuela's Controversial Election Results Are Only the Start of Its Troubles The New
Republic. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112920/venezuela-elections-2013-close-results-are-
defeat-chavismo#]
Meanwhile, the more acute economic problems continue, and may well accelerate, given that government
policy for the past six months has been designed merely to get Maduro to the finish line of Sunday's election.
Venezuela remains one of the few countries that still sets an official currency, and it devalued the bolvar in February by nearly
one-third of its value to 6.3 bolvares to the dollar. Only chumps pay that, though. Not even the government pays it anymore, in fact. In a move
to get more dollars into the hands of Venezuelan importers, the government last month created a new auction system
for dispersing dollars, and although it hasn't released the price, it's reported that the government paid a rate of between 10 to 15
bolvares per dollar, making it a sort of second unofficial devaluation. There's a floating rate for dollars, and it's
rumored to be up to three or four times the official rate. No one openly discusses it because that's technically illegal, but any number
of Twitter accounts announce the going market rateone favorite, until March, stated the price of "fresh avocados," and another stated the
price of "green lettuce." The "green lettuce" people actually got into the scam of trading dollars themselves, until they disappeared in March,
their racket exposed as a Ponzi scheme. It also makes changing U.S. dollarsor euros or Canadian dollarsinto local currency quite an
adventure, and it's one of the reasons why a tropical paradise that boasts the highest waterfall in the world is one of the world's least friendly
tourist destinations. But it's even more tragic for a country where day-to-day life has grown increasingly
dependent upon imports for basic staples, even fresh produce and refined oil products. Keeping the
official rate so high has been a way for the government to subsidize dollarsthe cheapest dollars went to the
insiders who won the auctions and who could sell the dollars on the black market for a quick profit. So as demand for imports rise,
the dollar system has exacerbated shortages in supermarkets, which have become more
commonplace. In the short run, the devaluations have been great for the government in two regards. First, they
get more bolvares in the treasury as the official rate slowly moves toward the market rate. But it also reduces the
country's growing public debtthe International Monetary Fund estimates Venezuela's debt (including the debts of PDVSA, the
state-owned oil company) at around 51 percent of GDP. In the run-up to last year's presidential election, Chvez ran a budget deficit of up to 17
percent of GDP, much of it financed by China. But China's now starting to balk at lending more to Venezuela, and it's
widely believed that the devaluation followed China's decision to cut off Venezuela's credit. But despite the immediate gains, devaluation
looks like a painful long-run solution. The inflation rate, which was already high (22 percent last year), is
expected to get even worse. During the campaign, both Maduro and Capriles promised to raise the minimum
wage by 40 percent, which could raise prices even more, threatening to cause inflation to spiral out of
control.

Venezuela says no
Chinas drilling now --- Maduro will continue anti-American policies.
Wallis 4-15-13 (Daniel, Senior Correspondent @ Reuters, Venezuela's PDVSA to keep funding socialist
programs under Maduro, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-venezuela-election-oil-
idUSBRE93E0B520130415)
(Reuters) - Nicolas Maduro's win in Venezuela's presidential election means state oil company PDVSA will
continue funding the government's socialist policies while increasingly relying on deals with China and
Russia. The late Hugo Chavez picked Maduro, a 50-year-old former bus driver, to continue his self-declared revolution in
the OPEC country where he nationalized most of the oil industry during his polarizing 14-year rule. That put Venezuela's
crude reserves, the world's biggest, at the service of Chavez's power base among the poor majority. Maduro, who narrowly won the
presidential election on Sunday with 50.7 percent of votes, now takes office on a pledge to push forward his late boss's plan. His opposition
rival, Henrique Capriles, refused to recognize the result and demanded a recount, although the National Electoral Council said Maduro's victory
was "irreversible". Maduro can be expected to increase oil sales to political allies, especially China, at the
expense of the United States , the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan crude, while taking on more debt from those partners.
Chavez turned PDVSA into the financial motor of his self-styled revolution, funding everything from sports and cultural events to free health
clinics and home-building programs. Critics say that stopped the company from focusing on its main priorities, leading to the neglect of older
oil fields and new projects alike, and fomenting a culture in which technocrats were replaced by political appointees. Chavez sharply
increased fuel sales to China amid years of ideological tensions with the United States, turning Beijing
into his government's biggest single source of foreign funding. Venezuela now sends China about
430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment for loans
totaling $36 billion. And the biggest Chinese energy company, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a
key part of Venezuela's ambitious efforts to tap its vast Orinoco extra heavy crude belt , one of the
planet's largest mostly-untapped hydrocarbon reserves.

Chavez kicked foreign oil companies out of Venezuela, and things wont change under
Maduro.
Chazan 3-6-13 (Guy, FT energy correspondent, Venezuela oil sector limited by obligations, Financial Times,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcb7c4de-866f-11e2-ad73-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Yb9ipX1K)
But Hugo Chvezs ascent to the presidency in 1999 changed all that. He nationalised the oil industry, forcing foreign oil
companies to cede majority control of their projects to PDVSA , the state-owned oil group.
ExxonMobil had its assets expropriated after it refused to play ball. Many experienced engineers fled into self-
imposed exile after a crippling strike at PDVSA in 2002. PDVSA has been hollowed out. It bankrolls many social programmes, leaving little cash
to spare for investment in its core areas of exploration and production. It also has to subsidise domestic petrol, which sells for 8 cents a gallon,
and to supply oil at knock-down rates to Venezuelas allies, including Cuba. Venezuelas oil output has stagnated as a result.
The country produced 3.5m barrels a day in 1998, but that dropped to about 2.5m b/d last year. Production could rise significantly if the
country were able to harness the reserves of extra heavy oil that lie just a few hundred metres underground in the Orinoco Belt. The
government has a number of projects to develop the resource, with partners such as Chinas CNPC and Gazprom of Russia, but these have been
slow to get off the ground. Few think the situation will change much under Nicolas Maduro, who is expected to win
the upcoming election. The cash demands on PDVSA will remain high, and there is little chance of a more
investor-friendly approach. But even if the opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski wins, the outlook for the oil sector is
unlikely to significantly improve in the near term, says the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy.

Democracy Turn
Plan kills democracy
Legitimizing Maduros rule by unconditionally offering aid undercuts Venezuelan
democracy.
Christy 6-13-13 (Patrick, Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee Manfred Wrner fellow
by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012, U.S. Overtures to
Maduro Hurt Venezuelas Democratic Opposition, US News World Report,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-
hurt-venezuelas-opposition)
For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is
a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition
lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime
face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States
grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government , that could give further cover to
the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. The Obama administration's
overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations.
And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by Mara Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of
Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's
illegitimate hold on power. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Given The Current Deficit Crisis, Should Foreign Aid Be Cut?] Rather
than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to
Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be
detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards.
Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals especially those related
to institutional corruption could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting
relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protg's
ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain
and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with
Maduro.
The Venezuelan oil sector bolsters autocratic rule --- suppresses dissent.
Urgelles 10 (Thaelman, writer and polemicist born and raised in Caracas, Venezuela, moved to New York City to
study an M.A. in Politics at NYU, The Price of Venezuelan Oil? Democracy, PolicyMic,
http://www.policymic.com/articles/1523/the-price-of-venezuelan-oil-democracy)
The Price of Venezuelan Oil? Democracy Venezuela has inherited from its colonial past a feature that has
handicapped its economic development as well as its free institutions : rentierism. Rentierism, or what is
called in Spanish rentismo, refers to an economy that depends too much on government spending because
the government maintains a monopoly that permits it to be independent from tax revenues, and
hence from its population. The Empire of Charles I of Spain financed all of its costly foreign and interior policy with gold brought over
from the Americas. Over time, this led to inflation, further feudalization of Spanish society, and a weak commercial balance dependent on
imports from England, the Italian republics and the Netherlands. Today, President Hugo Chavezs Venezuela works in a strikingly similar
fashion. His so-called Socialism of the 21st Century has been a long campaign to expropriate and take over
the private businesses of Venezuelas weak bourgeoisie. He has utilized gigantic oil revenues in order
to finance the government without the need for tax revenues or the private sector. Chavez has
systematically expropriated agricultural land from the hands of private producers (some of them very
efficient) in a crusade to give the land to the peasants. He has propagated a myth using socialist rhetoric in which the government must
redistribute the countrys land in order to protect landless peasants from being exploited by greedy landlords. This narrative feeds off a 19th
century vision of Venezuelan society where most of the land was monopolized by military and oligarchic landlords that no longer exists
now that the country has become a mainly oil producing economy. This was a process that began decades ago with Venezuelas oil industry, but
Chavez has taken it to its ultimate extreme, resulting in the destruction Venezuelas capacity to feed itself by decimating the
countrys agricultural sector. As a result, Venezuela now depends more than ever on foreign imports, especially from Colombia and Argentina,
and the average Venezuelan depends on imported food purchased with oil revenues. High government spending has led to the highest inflation
in Latin America and the almost complete demise of national production. Contrary to common sense, Chavezs officials defend this policy as the
primary establisher of national autarchy. Venezuelas catastrophic economic situation doesnt end with the agricultural sector. Chavez has
expropriated other important branches of national industry, like steel and aluminum, sugar, electricity, and the biggest telephone corporation,
which has followed these companies into bankruptcy. His socialist ideology has resulted in an economy that depends
more than ever on oil prices. Chavez's strategy to have a tight control of the only real source of
wealth in the country makes complete sense if he plans to rule for life. It has made him the
indisputable, strongest and wealthiest politician in Venezuela, by leaving the private sector
subservient to the central government and the civil society weak and demoralized in front of an all-
pervasive civil bureaucracy. Venezuelas woes fit the pattern of other oil-rich countries which have
also become rentier economies controlled by repressive regimes. These governments use oil wealth to
bolster their popularity by buying off important segments of the population with social programs, as
well as suppressing dissent , which is exactly what Chavez has been doing for more than a decade now.
Spills over

Venezuelan regime trends are modeled throughout Latin America --- 2009 term limit
controversy proves.
Padgett 9 (Tim, TIMEs Miami & Latin America bureau chief, What Chvez Win Means for Latin American
Democracy, TIME World, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1879742,00.html)
When President Hugo Chvez first asked Venezuelans to eliminate presidential term limits in December 2007,
they told him no. But on Sunday, as if resigned to the idea that he would keep on asking until he got the answer he wanted, voters said
yes. Venezuela's second constitutional referendum in 14 months was approved by a resounding 54% to 45% margin, allowing Chvez to run for
a third six-year term in 2012 and perhaps others after that. Standing on the balcony of the Miraflores presidential palace to declare victory
Sunday night in his trademark red shirt, the socialist firebrand shouted: "Today we opened wide the gates of the future!" Chvez may well have
opened another kind of gate. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, it was the norm in Latin America
to limit presidents to one term, a safeguard against the lifetime rule so many caudillos had set up for
themselves in the past. As democracy gained a stronger foothold on the continent, many countries
voted to allow their leaders a second stint in office. (See TIME's Pictures of the Week.) The elimination of term
limits in Venezuela could firmly establish a trend that, according to those who oppose such restrictions, will strengthen
democracy by allowing voters to decide how long a popular leader can stick around. Term-limit proponents, however, say Chvez's triumph
will only carry the region back to its authoritarian past . "What Venezuelan voters decide is their business," says John
Walsh, a senior associate at the Washington Office on Latin America, an independent think tank. "But a threshold does seem to
have been crossed." In neighboring Colombia, supporters of conservative President Alvaro Uribe,
whose second and constitutionally final term ends next year, are pushing for an amendment that
would let him run again. Just as Chavistas insist Chvez is the only man who can carry through the sweeping populist reforms he
began a decade ago, many Colombians feel only Uribe can safeguard the economic revival and improved security he's brought to South
America's most war-torn country. Uribe so far has played it coy, neither declaring he wants another term nor denying it. Pundits say they'd be
shocked if, after watching Chvez gain the opportunity, he doesn't fight for the same treatment. (See pictures of Colombia's guerilla army.)
Across the Andes in Ecuador, a constitutional referendum last year gave leftist President Rafael Correa the chance to govern until 2017. Correa
first won in 2006; Ecuador's new constitution allows him to run for a four-year term in a special election this year, and then another in 2013.
Bolivia's leftist President, Evo Morales, who was elected in 2005, won a similar reform in a referendum last month. The question now is
whether both leaders will eventually follow their ally Chavez's lead and seek the right to run for re-election indefinitely. Elsewhere, political
watchers are waiting to see if Argentina's President Cristina Fernandez, along with her predecessor and husband, Nestor Kirchner, will try to get
term limits relaxed as well. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is another. Unless Venezuela's political landscape changes
dramatically in four years, Chvez seems certain to win the next presidential election in 2012. His latest
victory is a body blow to the country's struggling opposition, which scored some impressive wins in last year's regional elections but seemed to
have lost the drive that helped it stun Chvez in the 2007 plebiscite. Opposition leaders caught Chvez napping in that election he failed to
get enough of his base to the polls but this time it was their supporters who didn't show up. The Sunday vote had a 32% abstention rate, and
election watchers assume most of the no-show was on the opposition side. Much of that can simply be attributed to voter fatigue: the
referendum was the third national election for Venezuelans since December 2007.
Impact - Environment
Latin American democracy solves the environment
Callejas 10 (Danny, Professor of Economics at the Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia, Democracy
and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008,
November)
Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The theory suggests that democracy
sustains and encourages freedom of speech, freedom of press, political participation and social
awareness. These elements provide a conduit for social demands. As urban population and income
grow, citizens increase their demand for higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment
of new policies and regulations that incentive individuals and firms may lead to a reduction in
pollution, environmental degradation and deforestation; therefore, leading to a higher level of
environmental quality. This study analyzed 19 Latin America countries for the period 1995-2008. A panel data system of equations
estimates suggest that a 10% increase in democracy may reduce CO2 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60% in Latin America. Similarly, a 10% increase in education may reduce emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These
results suggest that democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality.
Extinction
Takacs 96 (David, Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)
"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary
species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the
evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life:
if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only
answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity
keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of
biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian
roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of
species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains
heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of
the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in
which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a
thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.""
Impact - Prolif
Democratic backsliding in Latin America causes regional proliferation and nuclear
conflict
Schulz 2k (Donald Schulz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University,
March 2000, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub31.pdf)
A second major interest is the promotion of democracy. At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral concern. For
much of its history, the United States was perfectly comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, so long as they did not threaten
higher priority interests like regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But that is no longer the case. U.S. values have changed; democracy
has been elevated to the status of an "important" interest. In part, this has been because American leaders have gained a
greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a source of political stability. Governments that are
popularly elected and respect human rights and the rule of law are less dangerous to both their
citizens and their neighbors. Nations which are substantively democratic tend not to go to war with
one another. They are also less vulnerable to the threat of internal war provoked, in part, by
government violence and illegality.(5) In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply
value preferences, but are increasingly bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example:
The restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable
relationship in Mercosur have contributed in no small degree to their decisions to foresake the
development of nuclear weapons. Perceptions of threat have declined, and perceptions of the
benefits of cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progress on a range of security issues from
border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternarcotics, and the combat of organized crime. CONTINUES Until
recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian
military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing
nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership
transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their
nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each othermost
notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the
International Atomic Energy Agencyand have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain
about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . the military application of Brazils nuclear and space
programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints
present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element,
therefore, in determining the applications of Brazils nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in
political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazils nuclear program towards peaceful
purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian
supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of
the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are
civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Perus Fujimori comes
immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra
I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included,
Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry
already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power
via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which
could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic
resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money.
(Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first p1ace.) In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism,
imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems.
That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One
obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this,
moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the
regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of foreign intervention. Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor
de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a new
Vietnam if developed countries tried to internationalize the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese
combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.57 Since then, of
course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amaazonthe threat
to the regions ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.have not
disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic
groupingsin particular, MERCOSURcontinues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries.
Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-
military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere.
Key to stop global prolif
Beamont and Rubinsky 12 (Paul D. Beamont and Thomas Rubinsky, International Law and Policy
Institute, An Introduction to the Issue of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,
December, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1851)
As the world continues to grapple with the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, the
experience of Latin America and the Caribbean in creating the Tlatelolco regime remains important.
One should be careful not to generalise to much from the experience of one disarmament regime in a region almost unique in its absence of
serious armed conflict[128] Nonetheless, the Tlatelolco experience does provide some lessons that that advocates of nuclear disarmament
would be wise to heed. The Latin American NWFZ demonstrates quite clearly the wisdom in creating a treaty with the long game in mind. The
flexible entry-into force-requirements allowed the Treaty to gain vital impetus at its inception while it also kept the more reluctant countries
tied to the treatys principles. Together with its flexible amendment procedure, this allowed it to pick up momentum when favourable changes
in geopolitics and domestic conditions permitted it. Using this formula the Treaty of Tlatelolco created the first nuclear-
weapon-free zone in the inhabited world, and has successfully expanded to include every state in the
region. With the successful product of ingenuity, dedication and above all patience, Latin Americas NWFZ has consolidated
the regions reputation for peaceful co-operation. The Treatys permanent secretariat, OPANAL, is active in both
building regional consensus and in enhancing the regions presence in international organizations. While it remains to
be seen how future disarmament efforts will unfold, Latin American states are well positioned to play a significant
role in the continuing efforts aimed at reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
New prolif ensures widespread nuclear conflict --- asymmetries
Lyon 9 Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, A delicate issue,
Asias nuclear future, December, online
Deterrence relationships in Asia wont look like EastWest deterrence. They wont be
relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many
asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a
spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured retaliation; and
sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities. The smaller arsenals of Asia and the
absence of severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear
deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon
states extending deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappas propositions contain a picture of what a more proliferated
Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained:
an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a nuclear chaos model of unrestrained proliferation and mushrooming nuclear
dangers. An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappas more reassuring view, we shouldnt understate
the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set
of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the
relatively constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and
ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125).
Some factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that
nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great powers tend to get along reasonably well
with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes
from the earlier nuclear era. But other factors imply a period of looming change:
geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-
tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing ; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the
American arsenal is ageing; and the USs position of primacy is increasingly contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that
dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has
not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only proliferation in the post-NPT
age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence, though, its
exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isnt yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. Its one
of those uncertainties that define Australias shifting strategic environment. Its not too hard to imagine an order thats more
competitive than the one we see now. The managed system of deterrence The second approach to thinking about the Asian
nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walkers two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the
managed system of deterrence and the managed system of abstinence. What might those systems look like in Asia? In
Walkers model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly
sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and
the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding
agreements. (Walker 2007:436) It isnt obvious that those core aspects of the managed
system are all central features of Asian nuclear relationships. Perhaps most importantly, it
isnt obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in asymmetric relationships. Within the US,
theres been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt to reconceptualise how nuclear
relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic
contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: In asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may
not only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it (Adler 2009:103). Some of the
problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to
test stronger players threatsas part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over
recent centuries, in which weaker players have often prevailed against stronger
opponents.3 If we were to look at the case study of the IndiaPakistan nuclear relationshipwhich is grounded in an
enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not typical of the broader nuclear relationships in Asiaits a moot point whether
Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the deterrence policies of India. Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan
doesnt even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as
an equaliser against Indias larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed
against it. That would imply, more broadly, that increasing strategic rivalries across Asia could be
accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider
range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian strategic environment,
nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well become less tolerable.
Furthermore, we need to think about how we might codify deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War days, the MAD
doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the
competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important stabilisers of the broader
nuclear relationship, but to what extent can they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible
to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and verifying) limitations on weapons numbers
would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals are of uneven size, and
when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on secrecy about
the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability of their
arsenals.
Nuclear war
Cimbala 10 - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8)
A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and
proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear
weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation
strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and
counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of
accidental or inadvertent nuclear war . It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of
protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control
systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might
permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized
launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to
misinterpret the others defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus
triggering a mistaken preemption.
AT: Economy Impact
No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data
Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October
2012, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-
Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead
states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global
economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the
disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise,
however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global Peace Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from
the 2012 report is that The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.38
Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis as have military
expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any
increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers
Brubaker concludes, the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion
that might have been expected.40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains
unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily
due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of
other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great
Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One
financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is contained, however.
Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great
Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II and
not even worse must be regarded as fortunate.42
Global economic governance institutions guarantee resiliency
Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October
2012, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-
Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
Prior to 2008, numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance.
Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a G-Zero world. This paper takes a closer look at
the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic picture. Despite initial shocks that
were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly
and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic
governance has displayed surprising resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well
in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where
governance has either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked. Misperceptions about global economic
governance persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies and because the efficiency of past
periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains an open
question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international regimes, and the
resilience of economic ideas might have played.

**Misc --- Their evidence
The plan decreases oil prices by flooding the market with supply --- that kills the
economy.
Rodrguez et al., aff author, 2012 (Pedro L. Rodrguez is a member of the digital media team at Cohn &
Wolfe, a global
public relations within the WPP Group, and studies emerging social and digital trends, Jos R. Morales & Francisco
J. Monaldi are contributors to the center for global development, Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in
Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?, Center for Global Development, 09/2012,
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426486_file_Rodriguez_et_al_Venezuela_OTC_FINAL.pdf)
After peaking at US$ 126 in July 2008, oil prices collapsed as a result of the financial crisis, reaching a
trough of US$ 31 by December 2008. The economy briskly followed, growing by less than 1% in the
first quarter of 2009, thereafter displaying negative growth for six consecutive quarters.

Russias investing in the status quo --- and only opposition to Maduro leads to foreign
investment, proves Maduro says no.
Zhdannikov, 3-8-13 (Dmitry Zhdannikov, writer for reuters, Venezuela could boost oil output in 5-7 years:
Lukoil, Reuters, http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/08/venezuela-could-boost-oil-output-in-5-7-years-
lukoil/?__lsa=a77a-19ab)
In my opinion in the next 5-7 years it is possible to really grow oil production in Venezuela, said
Andrei Kuzyayev, vice president and head of foreign projects at LUKOIL, Russias second largest crude
producer, which is active in the Latin American country. But you need a quiet situation, stability in
contracts and a good situation for investment, Kuzyayev told Reuters on Friday. The socialist leaders
death is unlikely to have a big impact on Venezuelas oil sector in the short term, with key projects
expected to stay on track if his preferred successor wins elections due to be called in the next 30 days.
An opposition victory could eventually lead to an increase in foreign investment , but analysts said
this could take years. Venezuela, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) is a top-four supplier to the United States and an increasingly important oil source for China. In
2011, it overtook Saudi Arabia as the country with the worlds biggest crude reserves. LUKOIL is
developing heavy oil in Venezuelas Orinoco basin as part of the Junin 6 consortium led by Russian
state oil major Rosneft.

Politics Links
Politics Links
NEG House Republicans support current efforts to push Venezuela out of oil markets
the plan reverses this trend.

Robert Campbell, 3-07-2013, a Reuters Oil Market Analyst and Columnist, education @ McMaster
University and McGill University, COLUMN-Shale, Iran sanctions push Venezuelan oil to Asia: Campbell, http://en-
maktoob.news.yahoo.com/column-shale-iran-sanctions-push-venezuelan-oil-asia-152812475.html

Texas wildcatters and Iran hawks in the U.S. Congress are helping Venezuela get out of the U.S. oil
market, one of the most cherished dreams of its late President Hugo Chavez. While there is a certain irony to the fact that these two
groups of people, most of whom it is safe to say are not friendly to Chavez's left-wing ideals, it underscores the
true nature of the shifts in the U.S. oil market due to the shale revolution. Ignoring the impact of an anti-
government strike that shut down the Venezuelan oil industry in early 2003, U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude fell to a more
than 20-year low in February as American refineries only bought the heaviest, most difficult to process Venezuelan oil, forgoing lighter
grades. A superabundance of light and very light crude oil has forced the complex refineries of the U.S. Gulf Coast to scour the globe for heavy
crude to keep their cokers running. Thus imports of heavy Kuwaiti oil have risen sharply even as armchair policy theorists predict
"energy independence" will end U.S. purchases of Middle Eastern crude.
NEG Investment in Venezuelan oil is unpopular in Congress GOP mistrust.

Jose de Crdoba1 and Sara Muoz2, 1-11-2013, Latin American Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst,
Massachusetts, School of Journalism @ Columbia University, NY, reporter at the Wall Street Journal
1
,
reporter at the Wall Street Journal, no I refuse to make a Linkedin account to find this persons quals,
sorry
2
, Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to
forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential
successor to Mr. Chvez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's
pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to
open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open
up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-
trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't
going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With
Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more
willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chvez, who expanded state control over parts of
the oil sector. Another stumbling block to improved relations could be U.S. allegations of high-level
involvement by the Chvez government in drug trafficking. The U.S. has put seven top current and former Venezuelan officials on a
Treasury blacklist for their alleged drug and arms dealing links to Colombian guerrillas based in Venezuela. Those links were exposed in
2008 after the Colombian military captured computers used by a guerrilla leader killed on a cross
border raid in Ecuador.

NEG Republicans dont like the plan they see Venezuela as a security threat.

Dane Bryant, 9-28-2012, management consultant and freelance writer with an interest in geopolitical
strategy, writer for World Politics Review, Chvez or Not, It's Time to Rethink the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship

Nonetheless, the White House has remained consistent when it comes to Venezuela, stating publicly that it
does not consider Chvezs regime a threat to vital U.S. national security interests and identifying bilateral
cooperation on issues of mutual interest as the goal of current policy. The Republican establishment has identified
the lack of engagement with Latin America as a weak spot in Obamas foreign policy record, in particular criticizing the
president for allowing Chvez, an outspoken opponent of American interests, to strengthen his foothold in the region at the expense of the
United States. Conservative think tanks repeatedly point to Chvezs anti-American worldview, Venezuelas
alliances with Iran, Syria and Cuba, and the provision of safe havens for documented terrorist
organizations, such as Colombias FARC guerrillas, as examples of the grave security risks associated with the status
quo. There is some merit to both sides views. The Obama administrations stated policy of working with Venezuela on
pragmatic issues, such as counternarcotics and trade, has been viable in the short term. But GOP leaders are right
to note that deeper involvement is needed to address the legitimate security risks and democratic
challenges posed by the current governments policies. In fact, it will take an approach based on elements of both these
arguments to bolster U.S. influence in South Americas largest oil-producing country.

NEG The plan attracts backlash from both Democrats and Republicans Congress
empirically pushes for isolation of Venezuelan oil, not engagement.

Eva Golinger, 7-04-2011, writer for Geopolitical Weekly, ANALYSIS: US to Act Against Venezuela?
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/analysis-us-to-act-against-venezuela-4405/

The US government has been increasing aggressive actions against the Chavez administration in an attempt to
isolate the major petroleum producing nation and aid in ousting the Venezuelan President. During a hearing last Friday,
June 24, in the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives regarding Sanctionable Activities in Venezuela, democrats
and republicans requested the Obama administration take more aggressive actions against the government of Hugo
Chavez. The head of the Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Western Hemisphere, Connie Mack, a Florida Republican, branded
the Venezuelan government terrorist , saying its time to act to contain the dangerous influence of
Hugo Chavez and his relations with Iran. Mack is known for his rabid anti-Chavez stance. But however obsessed he may seem
with the Venezuelan President, the republican congressman does have influence in the legislature due to his high
ranking in the Foreign Relations Committee. His efforts, along with those of the head of the Foreign Relations Committee,
Florida republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, convinced the White House to impose sanctions against
Venezuelas state oil company, P etroleos d e V enezuela SA (PDVSA) last May 24. Mack has said that his only objective this
year is get Hugo Chavez.

NEG Congress hates Venezuela Snowden scandal.

Aglaia Berlutti, 7-09-2013, witch by birth (no srsly doe), writer for the website Spanish Global Voices,
Venezuela's President Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/07/09/venezuelas-president-offers-asylum-to-
edward-snowden-and-controversy-erupts/

The president of Venezuela, Nicols Maduro, offered humanitarian asylum to Edward Snowden, former contractor at the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA) who leaked classified information about mass surveillance programs in the
United S tates and the Great Britain. Snowden, charged with espionage and property theft by the United States government, is currently on
Russian territory, where he is attempting to avoid extradition to American soil. Maduro's offer comes at a complicated
diplomatic moment: UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) demanded an apology from Europe due to the incident suffered by
Evo Morales, during which various countries closed their airspace to the Bolivian leader based on suspicions that he was transporting Snowden.
In events leading up to the military parade that celebrated 202 years since the signing of the Venezuelan declaration of independence on
Friday, July 5, President Maduro stated *es+ that, As leader of the State and Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, I have
decided to offer humanitarian asylum to the American young man, Snowden. Maduro explained that Venezuela is offering the
measure to Snowden to protect him from the persecution that has been unleashed from the most
powerful empire in the world against a young man who has told the truth. A day later, the Venezuelan
president confirmed his intention via Twitter (@NicolasMaduro) [es]: @NicolasMaduro: Ratifico el espritu humanitario de conceder el asilo al
joven estadounidense Snowden para protegerlo de la persecucin mundial del imperio. @NicolasMaduro: I confirm the humanitarian spirit of
granting asylum to Snowden, the young American, to protect him from the empire's global persecution. President Maduro had mentioned the
possibility of welcoming Snowden on various occasions, but this is the first time he has done it openly and directly. Despite the controversy, the
United States government declined to make comments regarding the Venezuelan president's offer. According to Reuters [es], the White house
has not released an opinion on the issue and referred questions to the country's Department of Justice. Nevertheless, on Sunday, July 7, a
group of U.S. Congress members established their position on Snowden's possible political asylum,
stating that: Whatever country offers asylum to Edward Snowden, who leaked data from the National Security
Agency's (NSA) surveillance program, will set itself against the United S tates. The announcement [es] appears to be a
direct response to statements made by Venezuela and Bolivia to grant the humanitarian measure to the
former U.S. contractor.

NEG Plans massively unpopular GOP wants to isolate, not engage.

Bernardo lvarez Herrera, 12-07-2010, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, degree in political
science from the Universidad Central de Venezuela, masters degree in development studies from the
University of Sussex in England, The Tea Partys Vendetta, http://venezuela-us.org/2010/12/08/the-tea-partys-vendetta/

But if certain members of Congress think they can drive a wedge among the countries of the region, they
are mistaken. Latin American countries have been expanding their ties with one another including a recent rapprochement between
Venezuela and Colombia and there is a deepening consensus that their differences should be worked out in an atmosphere of mutual
respect. (The inaugural co-chairs of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, a regional organization set to be founded in 2011,
are Chile and Venezuela, two countries that dont see eye to eye on everything, but are willing to cooperate.) For instance, even though the
United States opposed Cubas entry to the Organization of American States, the group last year approved its readmittance. If Washington,
instead of accepting this new reality, relies on antagonistic foreign-policy dogma to placate local constituencies, it will only lose in regional and
global influence. Now is an especially inopportune time for the United States to alienate its southern neighbors. Latin American countries are
gaining in confidence and increasing their political and economic connections with the rest of the world, both regionally through organizations
like UNASUR and bilaterally with countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Its not just Latin America that needs the United States
anymore; increasingly, the United States needs Latin America. Unfortunately, Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are hard-line
ideologues. Given that she once called for Fidel Castros assassination, its no surprise that Ros-Lehtinen is an anti-Cuba hawk. But she
has in recent years also become more aggressive toward Venezuela. This year, for example, she made unsubstantiated
accusations against Venezuela for serving as a conduit between the rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and al Qaeda.
In a March 11 interview with the Council of the Americas, Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of U.S. Southern Command, debunked those claims in no
uncertain terms: I dont see any evidence of terrorist activity within Latin America or the Caribbean from outside of the region. Even more
disturbing was Ros-Lehtinens meeting with Venezuelan terrorist Ral Daz in Miami several months ago. Daz had just arrived in the United
States after escaping prison in Venezuela, where he was serving a sentence for participating in the 2003 bombings of the Spanish and
Colombian consulates in Caracas. It is troubling that Ros-Lehtinen would think it appropriate to use the powers of her office to extend
legitimacy to a violent criminal simply because he opposes Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez. (Venezuela has yet to receive any answers on
how Daz could have been granted a visa to enter the United States in the first place.) Ros-Lehtinen has also remained conspicuously quiet on
Luis Posada Carriles, a Venezuelan-Cuban dual national wanted in Venezuela for the 1973 bombing of a Cuban civilian airliner that left 73
innocent people dead. Posada snuck into the United States in 2005 after years of clandestine operations in Central America and Cuba, many for
the CIA. He now lives in South Florida awaiting the start of a postponed trial on immigration-related charges. Venezuelas repeated requests for
extradition have remained unanswered. But in terms of anti-Venezuelan enmity, Ros-Lehtinen is outdone by Mack, who, though newer to the
House, has quickly established himself as the Republicans go-to hard liner on Chvez. He has called Chvez a sworn
enemy of the United States and more recently called on Obama to deal with the inherent threat that Chvez poses to our nation and the
region. More shockingly, though, Mack has twice introduced resolutions to have Venezuela added to the U.S.
State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move supported by Ros-Lehtinen. Just recently, I received letters
from a number of the 37 right-wing congressmen supporting Macks most recent attempt. Seeing as most have never shown any interest in
Venezuela, it is clear that extremists within the Republican caucus have made my country a political priority. If Venezuela does indeed end up
on the terrorism list, it would amount to the imposition of a Cuba-like embargo on the country. Commerce and oil would be disrupted, and
even cursory financial and economic transactions would be made prohibitively expensive. It would also put the large U.S.-Venezuelan
commercial relationship the countries trade with one another from January through September of this year totaled nearly $31 billion in
jeopardy. And it would serve as more evidence that some policymakers in Washington use the terrorist label as a cudgel against their political
foes. It should come as no surprise that a 2008 report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adamantly warned against
manipulating the terrorism list in that way, stating that policymakers must be wary of the implications of poorly thought-out sanctions which
might isolate the United States. Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are not alone in advocating for a Cold War-era stance
toward Latin America. In fact, theyre being educated and enabled by a chorus of similarly hard-line former
Bush administration officials. Chief among them are Otto Reich and Roger Noriega, both of whom served as
assistant secretaries of state for Western Hemisphere affairs under Bush. Reich has a long track record of using the battle over Cuba to
determine U.S. policy toward the entire region, while Noriega honed his skills as a foreign-policy aide to late Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and
currently works at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute. Most recently on this very website Noriega has been claiming
that Venezuela is working with Iran on a nuclear-weapons program, a claim so outlandish that the only prominent
public figures who repeated it were John Bolton (another hard-line Bush administration official) in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times and
Jackson Diehl, the deputy editor of the Washington Posts editorial pages and a crusader against anything that has to do with Chvez. (Recently
released cables from U.S. embassies in Latin America admit that these charges are likely baseless, as a Post article put it.) In a recent op-ed,
Noriega also called Chvez the deadly kingpin of a criminal regime. It might be easy to call Noriega and Reich out-of-touch extremists,
but their views now hold great er sway on Capitol Hill and at many Washington think tanks. For example, a Nov. 17 conference in
Washington, organized by the Interamerican Institute for Democracy and called Danger in the Andes, was a forum for outlandish views to be
exchanged by ostensibly serious policy analysts. The guests of honor at the conference? Ros-Lehtinen and Mack, of course. Now that the
Republicans are no longer marginalized in Congress, dogma threatens to totally trump the greater U.S.
national interest. That would be terrible for Americans, and their neighbors to the south. The remaining
pragmatists in Washington should do everything in their power to prevent it.

Maduro Cred DA
1NC Shell

Maduro is in power and barely has a grip on the opposition fragile balance
Gratius and Romero 5/13/13 [Susanne Gratius is a senior researcher at FRIDE. Carlos A. Romero is
a lecturer in Political Science at the Central University of Venezuela. Venezuelas international
projection post-Chvez FRIDE: A Eruopean Thinktank for Global Action.
www.fride.org/descarga/PB157Venezuela.pdf ]
Venezuelas presidential elections, held on 14 April 2013, have laid the foundations for the post-Chvez era.
Nicols Maduro won over his opponent Henrique Capriles by a narrow margin of 1.5 per cent of votes, but the
opposition has still not recognised the results. A recent violent clash between both sides in the National
Assembly has highlighted the countrys tense domestic situation. President Nicols Maduro is in a fragile
position and whether he will be able to remain in power until the end of his term in 2019 will depend on
his ability to form alliances and on how he handles relations with the opposition. Domestic instability
also leads to uncertainties regarding the international projection of Chavism. First, due to a lack of clear
leadership and reduced external support; and second, given a potential radicalisation of the official discourse. In
addition, post-election tensions with Spain and diplomatic spats with the United States suggest that relations with two
of Venezuelas important partners are likely to become more difficult. Meanwhile, close relations will continue with Cuba
and other members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), as well as with
China, Iran and Russia.

Any olive branches to the US make Maduro vastly unpopular
Kraul 13 *April 15, 2013. Chris Kraul is a special correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. Tight election in
Venezuela complicates Nicolas Maduro's plans Los Angeles Times.
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/15/world/la-fg-venezuela-maduro-20130416/2]
Nicolas Maduro's narrow victory in an election to serve out the late Hugo Chavez's presidential term in Venezuela will
complicate tackling major issues on his agenda: fixing a crumbling economy, addressing violent crime
and restoring relations with the United States. The election results, coming amid allegations by rival Henrique Capriles of
widespread voting abuses, will make governing this polarized country even more difficult because Maduro will lack the broader public support
enjoyed by his colorful predecessor, analysts said Monday. Maduro won Sunday by 1.5 percentage points; Chavez never triumphed in his four
presidential elections by less than 10 percentage points, margins that strengthened the socialist's claim of a popular mandate for his "Bolivarian
revolution." Maduro, at one point leading Capriles in preelection polls by double digits, can make no such claims. "The revolution almost
slipped through Maduro's fingers," said political scientist Luis Salamanca, who described Sunday's result as "an electoral victory but political
rout.... He can't govern with confrontations and insults as his mentor did. He won't be able to manage the country that way." In addition to
undercutting Maduro's hope of wielding unchallenged authority, the close race could weaken his support inside the
Chavismo movement, Salamanca said. Chavez managed, with charisma and no small amount of effort, to hold together his following's
many interest groups. For the less popular Maduro, a step toward austerity could lose him support among
the poor, and an olive branch offered to the United States could cause the far left to turn on him. All
this comes as decisive measures are needed to plug holes in an economy fast taking on water. Last year,
the government spent about 40% more than it received in revenue, in part on welfare programs and election-year giveaways. As a percentage
of economic output, its tide of red ink is worse than that facing economically troubled Greece, Spain and Portugal, said Francisco Ibarra, an
economist with the Econometrica consulting firm in Caracas, the capital. "The Chavistas didn't invent poor economic
management in Venezuela; they have just made it two or three times worse," said Ibarra, and a day of
reckoning may be approaching. Despite a windfall in oil sales, the government's coffers are depleted by external and domestic giveaways,
including $6 billion a year in discounted oil to Chavez's longtime ally Cuba. Domestic subsidies of gasoline prices a tankful can cost motorists
as little as 25 cents are popular, if not assumed as a right by Venezuelans. But they cost the government as much as $3 billion a year.
"Building roads in Nicaragua, hospitals in Uruguay and paying the salaries of mayors in Bolivia diverts money badly needed in Venezuela," Ibarra
said. Oil production, the main source of the government's largesse, is in a downward glide because of lack of investment. There have been two
devaluations of the nation's currency in 2013, and the inflation rate is expected to exceed 30% this year. A serious move to combat
Venezuela's spiraling violent crime the homicide rate has quadrupled since 1999 may force Maduro to divert
government spending away from welfare programs and toward providing more resources and
manpower for law enforcement. But reducing social spending carries enormous risks for a socialist
government whose generosity is its selling point. The risk of fracturing his socialist base could also
make it more difficult for Maduro to repair relations with the United States, a move he has said he
wants to make. Well-placed sources say Maduro wants to get out from under the U.S. designation of
Venezuela as a haven for drug traffickers and as being too amenable to nations such as Iran that the
Americans view as state sponsors of terrorism. Maduro reacted favorably to U.S. overtures in November when he was
telephoned by Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson. The first step along the path an exchange of counter-narcotics information
was in the works before the ailing Chavez, who died March 5 after a years-long battle with cancer, abruptly canceled the process, sources said.
Failure to maintain the Chavismo movement creates a power vacuum and an
unprecedented political crisis
Moya-Ocampos 13 [March 8, 2013. Diego Moya-Ocampos is a senior political risk analyst for Venezuela for
IHS Global Insight and IHS Janes. He previously worked as a lawyer for a private firm in Venezuela advising
government agencies and private businesses on constitutional, regulatory and environmental issues, and as Chief
Secretary at the Venezuelan Attorney-Generals Office. Chvez Death Leaves a Power Vacuum in Venezuela
http://www.americasquarterly.org/chavez-death-leaves-power-vacuum-venezuela]
Chvez' death is a game changer in Venezuelan politics and will shake up the political order. Chavismo will now try to consolidate under
Maduro, who will run in the next presidential election as the PSUV candidate. Henrique Capriles, representing the coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democratica
(Coaltion of Democractic UnityMUD), likely will run in opposition. Maduro is expected to develop a strong Chvez-like
nationalist leftist discourse in the days to come, supporting new expropriations and promoting anti-United States and
anti-opposition rhetoric. According to a poll by private pollster Hinterlaces, released on February 17, Maduro boasted 50 percent of voter support
compared to Capriles 36 percent. Maduro will probably win the election, although Chvez absence could increase the opposition's prospects if shortages of food,
medicine and other basic goods continue to intensify in Venezuela.Chvez' absence creates a power vacuum that will be hard
to fill and could generate an unprecedented political crisis should Maduro fail to maintain the
Chavismo movement . If Maduro cannot coalesce the different Chavista civilian and military factions,
the military might intervene in the government, threatening Venezuela's political stability. The Chvez
movement was closely associated with his personality, but so far the different Chavista factions seem to be gathering behind Maduro. Yet, new political
actors from the Chavista opposition and military sectors could emerge to play a key role in the days to come.
Against the backdrop of political polarization, lack of judicial independence and a national assembly subordinate to the executive branch, the armed forces could
assume a behind-the-scenes role as constitutional police, seeking to guarantee the democratic process and prevent political instability. Such direct or
indirect military intervention could affect democratic governance in Venezuela and alter the power
balance among civilian political actors. Isolated unrest and clashes between pro-government and opposition supporters could occur but they
would not threaten political stability.

Venezuelan instability causes a litany of impacts.
Max G. Manwaring, 10-xx-2005, holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is
a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including
the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles,
chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American security affairs. He is also the editor or
co-editor of El Salvador at War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M.A. in Political
Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Venezuelas Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian
Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf
Chvez understands all this. He understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political change.
Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do ones will. This caudillo
will tailor his campaign to his adversaries political and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. And this is the basis of
Chvezs instruction to the Venezuelan armed forces (at the 1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War in
2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change from conventional to peoples war.61 The Issue of State Failure. President Chvez also
understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing
the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding
ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed
massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds,
whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as
Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder,
kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and
persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment
and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons
systems and WMD , genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these
actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and
conflict. 62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed
propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives.
Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring 23 about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American
socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state
and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and
willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically
on selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption,
disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state.
Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social
injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed
states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The
tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability.
As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states,
narco-states , or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that
Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the
longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and
their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65







2NC UQ

Maduro is in a tight situation needs support of Cabello
Lees 13 [April 15, 2013. Kevin Lees is an attorney in Washington, D.C., and the editor of the comparative politics
blog, Suffragio.org. Venezuela's Controversial Election Results Are Only the Start of Its Troubles The New
Republic. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112920/venezuela-elections-2013-close-results-are-
defeat-chavismo#]
Politically speaking, however, it's another story. Maduro, it's safe to say, is no Chvez. A former Caracas bus driver, Maduro was a loyal
Chvez lieutenant from the beginning of the proclaimed Bolivarian revolution, and he served as Chvez's dutiful foreign minister for six years
prior to his elevation to the vice presidency last December. But the skills that allowed Maduro to remain in the top echelons of Chavismo didn't
lend themselves to leading a compelling campaign. His win owes more to the Chavista electoral machine, coercive
mobilization tactics, a largely state-dominated media, and the resources that come from a decade of blurring the lines
among Venezuela's governing United Socialist Party (PSUV), PDVSA, and the government. Maduro was undeniably a lackluster
candidate, and he wrapped himself in the legacy, and in some cases, the actual godhead, of Chvezone plucky website
tracked how many times Maduro has mentioned Chvez during the campaign (over 7,200). After saying that the United States may have caused
Chvez's terminal cancer, Maduro claimed earlier this month that a little bird spoke to him to tell him that the ghost of Chvez had blessed
Maduro's campaign. If campaigning proved hard, governing will prove even more difficult. The country,
which was already virulently polarized, is now even more so, with basically half of the country behind
Capriles, and still convinced he won yesterday's vote. Moreover, Maduro won't have any little birds to chirp out
solutions at Miraflores, the presidential palace. Not only does Maduro have a charisma deficit compared to Chvez,
but he won't have the magical ability to spend his way out of political trouble. Despite some vague bromides
about fighting corruption, he will be hard pressed to stand up to the ossified interests in his own party and to
longtime Chavista heavyweights who have long controlled the levers of economic policymaking in
VenezuelaNational Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, Energy Minister Rafael Ramrez, and Finance Minister Jorge
Giordani, all of whom are expected to remain in their positions in the Maduro administration. Ironically, Maduro's narrow victory
means that he'll have even less power to effect any real change in strategy unless Cabello, Ramrez, and
Giordani want real change, too.

The opposition is gaining strength Maduro needs to remain in control to prevent a
disastrous scenario
Cheney 5/8/13 [Catherine Cheney is World Politics Review's Trend Lines Reporter. Venezuela's Opposition in
a Favorable Position Amid Political Instability World Politics Review.
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3304]
Since Nicolas Maduros narrow victory over opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski in Venezuelas
presidential election last month, tensions have escalated in the country, most recently with rival marches in the
streets. Last week, lawmakers engaged in a fistfight in the Legislative Assembly, in an altercation underscoring Venezuelas
political uncertainty following the death of former President Hugo Chavez. Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue, called Maduros inability to keep order striking. A lot of his rhetoric and a lot of his actions reflect a kind of flailing about, Shifter
said of Maduro, explaining that while he is trying to just keep this government on course and have it settle
down, its not settling down. Chavez had a unique ability to preserve political stability, Shifter said, explaining that Maduro does
not have the skills nor command the loyalty Chavez did. Meanwhile, Capriles is trying to sustain the unity
of the opposition in the face of what seems to be almost an implosion of the government, Shifter said.
Capriles must strike a balance between being prepared for the possibility that the Maduro
government might fall, while also demonstrating restraint given the risk of violence. You just have
this sense of tremendous disorder within the government, and that helps Capriles, Shifter said. His
challenge, of course, is how to figure out in a smart way how to keep the opposition together and
have them show restraint and patience until the right moment. Demanding the recount and pressing the
government at every turn makes a lot of sense, Shifter said. At the same time, *Capriles+ clearly doesn't want to be part of what could be a
violent scenario. While Capriles may have some legitimacy, Shifter said the dispute between Maduro and Capriles is a might versus right
situation. The forces are aligned against Capriles in the sense that the government controls all the institutions and the military is on their side
and the media is on their side and the oil company on their side, Shifter said, referring to PDVSA, the national energy company. Shifter once
thought the Maduro victory meant Capriles would fade from the headlines, but he told Trend Lines he has revised this view. The forces
are moving in a direction that is more favorable to the opposition than the government, Shifter said, noting
that the unraveling of the government is a mobilizing factor for the opposition. Shifter said Capriles, who also lost
a previous presidential vote in October 2012, has worked to build bridges with more moderate figures in the Chavista camp. But it remains to
be seen whether he can keep hard-liners within his own opposition camp in check, Shifter said. He also emphasized how, even as the dynamics
in Venezuela point to spreading chaos and disorder, the rest of Latin America is keeping quiet. The recount that the electoral council agreed to
has not been a serious process, and Capriles has called them on it, and he has very little support from around the region for this, Shifter said,
adding that even when opposition figures were bloodied in congress last week, regional silence about
Venezuelas domestic politics continued. Economic relationships with countries that depend on Venezuela for oil may be part
of the reason for this inaction, Shifter explained. The deterioration is pretty dramatic. If it gets worse, at what point
does it become a real issue for the rest of the region? Shifter said. He said the most interesting question to him is at what
point other Latin American governments will break their silence to avoid a disastrous scenario.

Maduro needs to show credibility to maintain power over the Chavistas on the left
Mills 5/29/13 [Frederick B. Mills is a Senior Research Fellow at the Council On Hemispheric Affairs and
Professor of Philosophy at Bowie State University. THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE CONSTITUENT POWER
OF THE CHAVISTA BASE AFTER THE APRIL 14, 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
http://www.coha.org/the-bolivarian-revolution-and-the-constituent-power-of-the-chavista-base-after-the-april-
14-2013-presidential-elections/]
President Maduro, though identifying himself as the son of Chvez during the election campaign, must now
define himself in relation to constituent power. One of Maduros first trials with regard to dual power is the handling of the
shortage and rising prices of certain basic food items. Basically, for the short term, Maduro responded to the shortage by enforcing laws against
hoarding and by expediting food imports from Brazil and other producer countries. He has also met with the president of Empresas Polar and
other domestic business executives to negotiate increases in the production and distribution of food and other goods. Further aiding local
businesses, he has decided to allow price controls to be partially lifted and to ease access to foreign currency. Maduros negotiations
with big business did not go over so well with some of the Chavistas on the left who have begun to
mobilize in the barrios against rising food prices and the hoarding of supplies. In some cases, organizers
with bullhorns rallied in the market places of some of the barrios and questioned why the president
sits down with the business sector and makes decisions about the food situation, without first
sufficiently consulting the voceros (spokespersons) of the base. Source: El Diario de Caracas This critique of
Maduro from within the barrios, from within the revolutionary strongholds, has not necessarily translated into opposition to
Maduro; but it does show the independence and political initiative of some of these popular forces. During a
street governance meeting last week, Maduro responded to a woman who voiced a complaint on behalf of a local communal council from Los
Teques, that her position was very radical. Roland Denis, Venezuelan revolutionary organizer and writer, offers this reflection: The problems
that we are going through, being immersed in a revolutionary process, is that within the concrete social spaces, the revolution often shows
itself as clear bureaucratic despotism. Nicols [Maduro] was told off very clearly recently in Los Teques, and he attacked the complainant, a
phenomenon that largely explains the emerging crisis. But this also has a reason for being which goes beyond the bureaucracy. The problem is
the concrete relationship between territorial realities and revolutionary construction as such. Popular power and revolutionary acts will
continue being fiction while within these territories an other power isnt affirmed. A power that brings about the new world and gets rid of
the old one. Its not just a republic that needs to be re-founded, as we announced in 1998 (its not an issue of
constitutions, laws, new government now), in this case real territories that make up that republic have to be re-
founded. Ones that are able to create hope and collective passion with the strength to overcome any collective disillusionment and the
consequent reactionary regression. We need, then, a territorial strategy that area by area, the peoples self governed other republic can
arise.*13+ The other power that Denis seeks to affirm is the constituent power of the relatively autonomous popular forces that Ciccariello-
Maher has referred to as part of the dual power. Maduro is reaching out to this other power in a number of ways.
Ministers of the administration are meeting with communities around the country in a process called street governance; and on May 22,
Maduro called for a national assembly of the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP) to meet in June. This coalition of more than 35,000 organizations
represents the broad spectrum of social organizations, leftist political parties, and community associations that have historically embodied the
Bolivarian Revolution. Maduro describes the GPP as a union in diversityin order to build the revolutions new legitimacy, to build a stable
majority. *14+ Maduro is moving to re-cement the relationship between constituent and constituted
power that was so masterfully managed by Chvez. Closing Ranks within Constituent Power: Countering the Threat of
Fascism Dual power does not guarantee an inevitable victory of the Bolivarian Revolution, because revolutionaries within the state, in the
workplaces, and in the barrios face contested economic, social, and political space. Also, in the April 14 election, the opposition made some
significant electoral gains; it is likely then, that some of the formerly Chavista electoral base cast its votes for the
MUD candidate, Henrique Capriles. This slippage in the traditional Chavista electoral base points to an
insight articulated well by Ciccariello-Maherwhile the informal and unemployed sectors have
suffered the most in economic downturns, some can be swayed to solutions offered not only by the
left, but also by the right, depending on which side appears more likely to deliver the basic necessities
of life. [15] While organizers in the barrios are facing the challenge of keeping the faith within their neighborhoods, Roland Denis sends a
clear message about the role of the state in similarly resisting a slide into proto-fascism: That if they dont want to be the main
people responsible if this thing drowns in fascism and domination by the most parasitic castes of the
bourgeoisie, they need to assume that their politics [go] beyond global commitments with sectors of
national business or internal balancing between power factionsthey need to break from this
situation, if they dont, they throw in the towel with their decorous and populist management. [16]
Source: La Voz Denis is critically but authentically reaching out to the Maduro administration to remain attentive to the other power. With
municipal elections coming up, it is exigent upon Chavistas inside and outside of government to
mobilize the base and stop the hemorrhaging of electoral support if they want to win local elections.
But there is nothing like food shortages, rising food prices, devaluation of the currency, public insecurity, and political conflict to stoke unrest.
The opposition is focusing attention on these circumstances to drive home their arguments for greater
efficiency, less social spending, and a less regulated market, as means for improving the nations
economy. Up to now, Maduro has managed the political and security challenges posed by the post-
election period reasonably well. But he faces a new challenge, as the narrow margin of victory reflects some loss of support from
the base, the further erosion of which the Bolivarian Revolution can ill afford. As Ciccariello-Maher points out, the constituent power of the
barrios has demonstrated its enduring revolutionary potential ever since the 1989 caracazo. Today, as organizers in the barrios
wage an ideological struggle within their own ranks to prevent disaffection with the democratic
socialist alternative to neoliberal rule, Maduro moves to prevent any serious breach between his
administration and the constituent power driving the revolution.

After the election Maduro is in power but is barely holding on
Guillermoprieto 13 [May 8, 2013. Alma Guillermoprieto is a Mexican journalist who has written extensively
about Latin America for the British and American press. Chavismo After Chvez The New York Review of Books.
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/may/08/chavismo-after-chavez/]
What Venezuelans may remember most about last months presidential campaign is the moment right at the start, when Nicols Maduro
Moros, the late Hugo Chvezs chosen successor, told a television audience that the supreme comandante had come
back to him in the shape of a little bird and, chirping, urged him on to victory. There was also the time he
promised that an ancient Indian curse would fall on those who voted for the opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski, and the rallies
at which Maduro, seeking to give substance to the slogan Chvez lives! produced a hapless little man, or boy, who was indeed the spitting
image of the departed comandante. There was the sight of the hulking and excruciatingly self-conscious Maduroby some accounts a sober
and thoughtful man in private lifetrying to channel the spirit of the man he now calls father by singing, dancing, and even rapping in front
of equally embarrassed crowds. For three weeks Venezuelans watched Maduro on television and attended his
rallies, probably giggled and possibly waited for the candidate to articulate a program to solve the dreadful
problems Hugo Chvez left in his wake: one of the highest murder rates in the world; a community health system largely staffed
by Cuban doctors in exchange for Venezuelan oil, which has led to the slow neglect of Venezuelan hospitals and an exodus of Venezuelan
doctors (Cuban doctors abroad earn around $400 USD a month, Venezuelan doctors demand considerably more); a collapsing agricultural
sector; inflation at more than 25 percent; crumbling infrastructure; constant blackoutsthe list is long. Instead, Maduro continued to rail
against those who would vote for Capriles. From one moment to the next it wasnt so funny anymore: Madurothe loyal, circumspect, good-
natured former foreign minister Madurohad gone on the campaign trail with the full backing of the chavista
state, chavista judicial system, chavista electoral oversight committee, and chavista coffers. Everyone,
possibly including Capriles himself, expected him to win an easy victory. Yet on April 14, according to the officially impartial but unashamedly
chavista electoral council, Maduro scraped out a tiny victory of just 50.66 percent to Capriless 49.07 percent. Or perhaps
he lost. The government has lied so much and so shamelessly to Venezuelansmost notably about the nature and severity of the cancer that
killed Chvezthat it was hard to take the victory announcement on faith. It was, in any event, hardly a triumph: If the official count is correct,
Maduro managed to lose some ten percent of the electorate in barely three weeks. At midnight the exhausted but vehement
Capriles demanded a recount. And then chavismo collapsed into a scary collective insanity . In a leaked
video the minister of housing could be seen snarling at employees that he would fire anyone expressing opinions against Maduro. The new
presidents former and possibly future rival for power, congressional leader Diosdado Cabello, tried to whip the
opposition into line by announcing publicly that any member of the the Asamblea Nacional, Venezuelas single-
chamber parliament, who failed to recognize Maduros victory would not be given the floor. A few days
later he amended that statement to say that any asambleista who refuses to recognize Maduro and is therefore not allowed to speak would not
be working, and would consequently lose the months salary. A campaign started the day after the election to accuse
members of the opposition of inciting violence. The word went out that nine people had been killed by opposition members
on election day, and several voting stations set on fire. (There had in fact been angry confrontations between supporters of both sides, but the
government has yet to provide evidence of politically-related arson or homicides in addition to the average of nine people who are murdered
every day in Caracas.) In any event, the new epithet for Capriles and his followers is murderers, a serious
charge and a political mistake, considering that they represent half of the electorate. Last week, Iris Varela, a
long-time Chvez protg known for her flame-red hair and fiery temper (she is called Little Match) went on television to denounce Capriles.
She called him an inciter to riot, a murderer, and a drug addict whose pokey-outy eyes full of hate (ojos puyuos llenos de odio) were the
result of hallucinogen intake. Capriles has not been accused of any crime, but Varela told him that she had a jail-cell waiting for him. And I
assure you that nothing will happen to you in that cellnot like those jails we inherited from the bourgeoisie. This, from a woman who
supervises a notorious jail system in which hundreds of prisoners were killed in the course of vendettas, riots, and fires last year. On April 28,
retired Brigadier General Antonio Rivero, formerly director of the chavista emergency disaster relief program and now a member of the
opposition, was called in by an old acquaintance, Miguel Rodrguez Torres, Maduros government minister, for a chat. I want to hear your side
of things, Rodrguez reportedly told Rivero. Upon his arrival at his former classmates office, Rivero was told instead that he was under arrest
on vague charges of incitement to riot on election day. He has been on hunger strike ever since. A seedy and amateurish propaganda video
purports to show unidentified university studentsstudents have made up a significant part of the opposition to Chvezdiscussing with a
gringo how much money they are willing to accept for acts of political sabotage. The gringo in question, who is in fact not mentioned at all by
the olive-green-wearing students in the video, would be Timothy Hallet Tracy, a US citizen who was in Caracas making a documentary film,
and who is still being denied consular access. (Asked about Tracy on his visit to Costa Rica last weekend, Barack Obama called the charges
ridiculous, leading to further denunciations from the Maduro government.)

2NC Link

Maduro needs to continue being anti-American to maintain credibility and control
over Chavistas
OReilly 13 *April 17, 2013. Andrew OReilly is a writer/producer at Fox News Latino. U.S.-Venezuelan
Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim Fox News Latino.
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-
maduro-experts-claim/]
In 2009, Chvez led a successful push for a constitutional referendum that abolished term limits for the offices of President, state governors,
mayors and congress members. The previous provision established a three-term limit for deputies and a two-term limit for the other offices,
but with the 2009 referendum, Chvez or any other leader could ostensibly stay in power indefinitely. Maduro does not have the
charm or power to hold the Chavista movement together nor make Venezuelans forget about the
problems plaguing their nation. If Sundays vote is any indication, Venezuela is torn between Chvezs legacy
and a dismal future, with the official results giving Maduro 51 percent of the vote to challenger Henrique
Capriles 49 percent although opposition sources showed Capriles winning by more than 300,000 votes.
Chvez could overcome the detractors because he was viewed as a national hero, Maduro doesnt
have that , said Larry Birns with the Council for Hemispheric Affairs. To maintain his credibility
within the Chavista movement and fend off opponents from within his own party , Maduro needs to
maintain his opposition to the U.S. and continue to paint Americans as imperialist intruders , experts said.
Hes got to worry about the opponents that will pose a threat to his rule, Birns said. These are difficult
times for Maduro and no one knows how the scenario will play out. For its part, the United States is not
in better shape when it comes to its relations with Venezuela or other Latin American nations. Diplomatic
disputes with Venezuela and touchy relations with neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador have led to a schism
between the United States and the countries in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. Hershberg said that the
Obama administration's refusal to accept the official results of Venezuela's election will not only anger
Maduro, but could be viewed as hypocritical in the light of the scandal surrounding the uncounted votes during the 2000 U.S. presidential
election that saw George W. Bush defeat Al Gore. The U.S. has a long history of political involvement both overtly and covertly in elections
throughout Latin America. For the Americans to say this only 12 years after Bush. V. Gore is remarkable, he said. "Latin America looked at the
U.S. and said that the U.S. will never again be able to tell us how to conduct our elections. This makes them look absurd, he added, about the
State Departments refusal to recognize the election of Maduro. The State Department said it was "difficult to understand" why the commission
certified ruling party candidate Nicols Maduro as the winner in the absence of a recount, which challenger Henrique Capriles is demanding. It
also condemned the post-election violence that has killed at least seven people and injured 61. In a televised
broadcast Tuesday, Justice Minister Nestor Reverol accused Capriles of numerous crimes, including insurrection and civil disobedience. Maduro
blamed Capriles personally. "You are responsible for the dead we are mourning," he said, calling Capriles "the defeated candidate."
Government officials have been alleging since Monday that Capriles is plotting a coup, and President-
elect Maduro announced that he was prohibiting an opposition march scheduled for Wednesday in the capital. On
Tuesday Capriles' supporters protested in cities including Merida and Maracay.
Current US failure to recognize Maduro gives him legitimacy the plan reverses this
trend
Alastair Baverstock, 5-17-2013, contributor to the Christian Science Monitor, Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on
Washington's recognition, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-
recognition
Meanwhile, other countries in the region were quick to congratulate Maduro on his victory. In fact, the new
leader spent last week on a whistle-stop tour of friendly regional governments including Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in an attempt to secure
his leadership status. Things havent been going well for Maduro since the election, says Smilde. his recent touring
of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy . Following the hotly contested election, which
many Venezuelans believe was stolen by a socialist government fearing the loss of power, country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought
protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Although officially victorious,
Maduros slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chvez defeated the same opponent last October left the new
premier with little mandate to govern. A lot of Venezuelans seem to think that a close election is not
a valid election, so this leaves room for Maduros critics to question it, says Mark Weisbrot of the Center for
Economic and Policy research, an independent think-tank in Washington. Mr. Weisbrot says he thinks the US is trying to take
advantage of this situation. Far from putting a dent in Maduros credibility, other observers believe that
continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose
supporters have come to expect belligerence towards las imperialistas. In many ways John Kerry is
doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him, says Jones. The USs refusal to cooperate plays into the
socialists broader narrative that the US is conspiring to defeat Venezuelas revolution.

If Maduro doesnt make decisions similar to those Chavez would make, he will be
overthrown
Byrne 13 *April 10, 2013. Rick Byrne is a correspondent for Thomson Reuters. Among Chavistas, support for
Maduro not unconditional Global Post. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130410/among-
chavistas-support-maduro-not-unconditional]
A truck barreled through a Caracas market with loudspeakers playing a campaign song of acting President Nicolas Maduro, with a Caribbean
beat and the chorus "Chavez I swear, my vote is for Maduro." Many residents, fishmongers and fruit salesmen along the crowded blue-
collar neighborhood of Petare have pledged to follow Hugo Chavez's wishes and vote for Maduro in Sunday's presidential
election. But most warn that Maduro will not get a free pass if he fails to follow the fallen leftist
leader's self-styled socialist revolution , a set of oil-funded health, education and food programs for
the poor. "I will vote for Maduro. But if he doesn't follow Chavez's legacy, we will remove him, " said Jean Carlos
Chavez, a burly 28-year-old fruit salesman selling mangos under a bridge next to stalls with posters of Maduro. "I like him as a man.
He will do well. But he must show who Maduro is ," he said. The fruit salesman and others cited the constitution, which states that
a referendum to recall the president can be held after the first three years of a mandate with the
signatures of 20 percent of voters. Kelvin Gomez, 38, who was selling fish covered in ice, pointed to different shopkeepers who
planned to vote for opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who lost to Chavez in last October's election. "We are all friends here," the longtime
Chavez supporter said, despite the deeply divided country that the late president left behind. "It looks like Maduro will win by a small margin.
He has shown a lot of weaknesses." Riding a wave of sympathy following Chavez's death on March 5, Maduro -- a former bus driver with a thick
mustache who rose to foreign minister and vice president under Chavez -- is enjoying double-digit leads in opinion polls against Capriles. But
the turbocharged Chavez is a tough act to follow. Driven by his charisma and popular social programs,
the firebrand leader enjoyed an immense following in his 14 years in power, trouncing opponents in every
election. Before heading to Cuba for a final round of cancer surgery that proved futile, Chavez urged Venezuelans to vote for Maduro if was
incapacitated, saying his protege was up to the task. " It won't be easy to manage because whatever decision
Maduro makes, he will have a group who will say that Chavez would have done it differently ," German
Campos, director of the polling firm Consultores 30.11, told AFP. "He will have to build his own way of relating with
society, build his own style," he said. Despite his popularity, the late leader left a slew of problems, including a soaring
murder rate and a fragile economy marked by high inflation, a huge debt and basic food shortages.

To face growing internal pressure Maduro must shift the blame on the US
Negroponte 13 [April 12, 2013. Diana Villiers Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution's Latin America Initiative. Contribution to In Venezuela, Will 'Chavismo' Last Without Hugo Chavez? by
Larisa Epatko. PBS Newshour. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/venezuelas-
chavismo.html]
"Chavismo" is based on the theory that an intrinsic relationship exists between the state and the
citizen through the person of Hugo Chavez: he is both state and citizen. The state remains dedicated to advance the
interests of its citizens and citizens commit to advancing the interests of the state. With the death of Hugo Chavez, who can provide the means
to ensure this interlocking relationship between state and citizen? Vice President Maduro inherited Chavez's mantle and he
understands the philosophy of Chavismo. With plentiful resources, Maduro could continue the
intrinsic relationship. But without those resources -- current economic problems will decrease
disposable state expenditures -- Maduro will have to borrow money. Who will bankroll him? The Chinese National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) seeks to maintain the flow of Venezuelan crude and the stability of the Venezuelan government. Would the
CNPC be willing to renegotiate its loans to ensure that both continued oil production and political stability continue? Probably. However, CNPC
may impose limitations on Maduro's use of that "borrowed money". Maduro will have to accept a degree of austerity and
further Chinese management and manpower in the Chinese housing, agriculture and energy projects. The nature of this "new
reality" may be difficult for the Venezuelans to accept. We should, therefore, expect Maduro to face
growing domestic restlessness as he fails to deliver the promises of Chavismo. Maduro will seek to
shift the blame onto others, including the United States . I anticipate deteriorating relations with
Washington and raucous calls for the Bolivarian Alliance , known by its Spanish acronym ALBA , to
intensify its anti-Yankee rhetoric . U.S. companies may find increasing restrictions on their activities, if not court cases such as the
Chevron case in Ecuador. In the end, without sufficient resources ALBA will wither and Maduro will be a one-term president.

Engaging with the US would anger Chavistas who brought him to power political
instability
Shifter 6/24/13 [Michael Shifter is president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C. A Bolivarian
Dream Deferred Foreign Policy. http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338]
Then, of course, there's the elephant in the room. For the United States, Venezuela is a matter of concern because of
both the erosion of democratic safeguards and the heightened risks of chaos. Barack Obama's administration has
stuck to its position in supporting Capriles's call for a full recount of the disputed election, and so far it has held off from recognizing Maduro's
victory. At the same time, Washington remains open to engaging with Caracas. During his first visit to Latin America as secretary of state this
month, John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elas Jaua at the OAS meeting in Guatemala and discussed restoring ambassadorial
relations, which have been suspended since 2010. Although the meeting was sharply criticized by some in the United States for legitimizing the
Maduro government, the opposition itself viewed the meeting as "positive" and hopes that over time increased cooperation might help relieve
Venezuela's severe predicament . It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the
short term, Maduro will have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric. For
political survival, he needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the
presidency . Whatever happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering
problems at home. Chvez left a country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like Maduro who has so
far been able to fend off criticism from his neighbors but is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological
movement that Chvez was able to cobble together in his glory days. Regardless of whether Maduro can
placate the rest of Latin America with his bluster and oil riches, his own country's stunning decay
raises questions about how much longer his poor imitation of Chvez can carry him.

Maduro cannot pursue ties with the United States without backlash -- political
instability
Shifter 5/3/13 [Michael Shifter is President of the Inter-American Dialogue. What Does the Future Hold for
U.S.-Venezuela Relations? Answering questions by Inter-American Dialogues Latin America Advisor.
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297]
The prospects for improved relations between the United States and Venezuela under the Maduro
administration now appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric directed at Washington has been notably
tough and aggressive, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base . Arresting a U.S. citizen and
accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chvez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental
problems. Lacking Chvez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded
by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out
of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while
others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for
example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition
lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in
his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive
measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence-
-no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already
recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality.

To maintain legitimacy Maduro cant be friendly to the US
Metzker 6/17/13 [Jared Metzker is a writer for the Inter Press Service. Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend
U.S.-Venezuela Relations Inter Press Service. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-
mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/]
Following Chavezs death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as
vitriolic in his posturing vis--vis the United States. According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered conflicting signals. Maduro has so far shifted in his
position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one, Shifter told IPS. The
new presidents waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks
the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from
the lower classes. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of
his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavezs own former political
base. Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez,
more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuelas parliament and whose supporters believe he was the
rightful heir to the presidency. Maduros legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the
reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to emulate his predecessor and
makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the
issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high
inflation.

Maduro must be anti-American to get support from the inner Chavista circle
Walser 13 [March 18, 2013. Ray Walser is a veteran Foreign Service officer and a Senior Policy Analyst
specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation. Beware of Venezuelas Paranoid Anti-Americanism
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/18/beware-of-venezuelas-paranoid-anti-americanism/]
Two weeks after the death of President Hugo Chavez from cancer, Venezuelas interim chief and Chavista presidential candidate Nicolas
Maduro is increasingly resorting to wild, paranoid, anti-American outbursts in an effort to convince
Venezuelans he has the machismo needed to fill El Commandantes boots. Following initial claims that the U.S. or
others had killed Chavez, Maduro followed up on March 13 by saying he intends to form a scientific commission to review the facts of the 58-
year-old leaders death. We have the intuition that our commander Chavez was poisoned by dark forces that wanted him out of the way,
Maduro told an audience on March 12. Such a commission, however, will have to collect its evidence from a corpse that was inadequately
preserved and may be too decomposed for the embalming Maduro had initially promised. The war of words between Maduro and opposition
presidential candidate Henrique Capriles also continues to heat up. Maduro and company want to undercut Capriles by
making Venezuelans believe that Capriles enjoys official backing from the U.S. Such attacks will only worsen in
advance of the April 14 presidential elections. On March 17, Maduro went further, saying that the U.S. is now preparing a desperate plot to kill
Capriles. I call on President ObamaRoger Noriega, Otto Reich [both conservative, former State Department officials], officials at the
Pentagon and at the CIA are behind a plan to assassinate the right-wing presidential candidate to create chaos. Attacks on the U.S.
are integral to the strategy of Maduro and the inner Chavista circle. Their current course aims to
inflame the nationalistic militancy of Chavezs followers. It is a calculated effort to distract Venezuelan
voters from grave violations of the constitutional order and stark domestic challengesinflation,
fiscal deficits, devaluations, crime, and increasing food shortagesthat have worsened since Maduro
took de facto control of the government in early December 2012. Governability and stability in Venezuela before and after the
elections could become a major challenge. The Miami Heralds veteran Venezuela watcher Andres Oppenheimer suggests that the April 14
elections will be neither fair nor genuinely free. Maduros wild accusations also lower expectations for swift
improvement in relations with the U.S. The limited leverage that the U.S. still poses over Venezuela resides in its commercial,
financial, and energy links and in the frayed democratic consensus in the inter-American community. Like it or not, the Obama Administration
finds itself drawn into Venezuelas growing crisis of governability caused by the increasingly irresponsible behavior of Chavez knock-offs like
Maduro.

Maduro needs to maintain control in order to prevent being overthrown
Groll 13 [May 20, 2013. Elias Groll is an editorial assistant at Foreign Policy. Chvez propagandist in leaked
recording: 'We are in a sea of shit, my friend'
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/20/leaked_recording_of_chavez_propagandist_and_cuba
n_intel_officer_reveals_deep_divisi]
Prior to being selected by Chvez as his heir apparent, Maduro engaged in a bitter power struggle with
Cabello, and if Silva's account is correct, a great deal of tension remains between the two men. At one point, Silva,
who might be described as the country's de facto propaganda minister, says that " Maduro is obligated to follow the path of
el Comandante and is obligated to put Diosdado Cabello against the wall, " a statement that is difficult to read as
anything other than a suggestion to put Cabello before a firing squad. But it's not entirely clear that Silva trusts Maduro either. "I am afraid,
Palacios, that Nicols ... is feeling manipulated by Cilia [his wife]," Silva tells the Cuban officer. "This is a continent of caudillos [strongmen], my
friend, and the woman has to stay in the shade." Silva then compares Maduro's tendency to appear in public alongside his wife and to kiss her
to the worst tendencies of an American poltician. "This isn't a North American campaign," he says. "This is a Latin American campaign."
Elsewhere in the conversation, Silva wonders why Chvez didn't make a tape recording of his decision to anoint Maduro as his successor.
Although Chvez used the armed forces to consolidate his power, according to Silva, the army is now
divided, with some factions in favor of staging a coup . According to Silva, Maduro has managed to alienate
Diego Molero, the country's defense minister, whom Silva describes as an "operator" and a "commando." The strained
relationship resulted in rumors circulating in Caracas that Molero was about to launch a coup
attempt , leading Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, to dispatch Silva via intermediaries to find out if the rumours were true. They were not. But
for the man charged with selling the idea of the Bolivarian Revolution to the Venezuelan people, Silva speaks like a man who has become
disillusioned with what has become of the government. He describes rampant corruption and officials dipping into public funds for their
personal benefit. "We are in a sea of shit, my friend, and we have not yet realized it, Palacios," Silva says. Despite the explosive nature of the
conversation between Silva and Palacios -- never mind the crazy fact that he is having in-depth conversations with Cuban intelligence agents in
the first place -- it is far from clear what repercussions this recording will have on the ground in Venezuela. Writing at Caracas Chronicles, Juan
Nagel makes a compelling case that this recording may strip some of the revolutionary veneer off Maduro: The important thing to keep in mind
is that we are not the target audience for this recording. Yes, we all knew that Cabello was a crook, Maduro a
nincompoop, Silva a marxist Cuban mole, Rangel an evil power broker, and Flores a scheming Lady
Macbeth. But the important thing is that rank-and-file chavistas didnt. Up until now, they have
been immune from these facts because of the messenger. Either way, take a moment to revel in the
sweet irony of the fact that Chvez's favorite propagandist is now responsible for providing the most
stinging critique to date of the Maduro government.

2NC Stability Impact


Continued Anti-Americanism is key to sustain unity and prevent Venezuelan instability
Maduro credibility key to prevent opposition lash-out, power grabs and total chaos.
James Bosworth, 3-05-2013, freelance writer and consultant working on Latin American politics, security,
economics and technology issues, Three upcoming power struggles in Venezuela,
http://www.bloggingsbyboz.com/2013/03/three-upcoming-power-struggles-in.html
With the death of former President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela faces three upcoming power struggles. Chavistas vs Chavistas.
Potential undemocratic power grabs from Chavistas and the military represent a big ger initial
stability threat in the transition than the opposition. De facto President Maduro's recent speeches indicate that he
believes there are significant divisions among the factions of the Chavistas. Maduro urged, even begged, for
unity among government supporters on the civilian and military side as the former president was in his final hours of life. He attempted
to unite Chavistas against a common threat from the opposition and the US , weaving some ridiculous conspiracy
theories in the process. In his final months of life, Chavez attempted to consolidate control, reduce the influence of the military, and ensure
that Maduro would carry his legacy. With the former president out of the picture now, the military and civilians who dislike
Maduro will be looking for openings. Maduro's first job is to maintain power and fight off challenges
from his alleged allies. Chavistas vs the opposition. Once the Chavistas figure out their own power struggle, they then
face the opposition to determine who controls the country in the near term. There are likely to be elections within 30
days, in which the government has an advantage but cannot feel completely certain of victory. In the less likely
event that elections are postponed or restricted, the opposition will certainly find other ways to push for a democratic transition. This
struggle is one that the Chavistas will probably enjoy, one final victory over their enemies for the
comandante and a validation of his time in office. The opposition will walk on eggshells, campaigning against the Chavistas
while giving the former president some respect in the period of morning.

Critics of Maduro from his own party are gaining influence and could overthrow
Maduro, ending in tragedy
Guillermoprieto 13 [May 8, 2013. Alma Guillermoprieto is a Mexican journalist who has written extensively
about Latin America for the British and American press. Chavismo After Chvez The New York Review of Books.
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/may/08/chavismo-after-chavez/]
On April 30, the president of congress and Maduros great rival for chavista favor, Diosdado Cabello, looked on complacently while some fairly
thuggish-looking congressmen beat up their opposition colleagues. Opposition leader Mara Corina Machado, a true burguesa, had her nose
broken, another asambleista was hospitalized briefly after being thrown down a set of stairs, a third was beaten black and blue. It is easy to
imagine panicky chavistas, faced with a possible sudden loss of power, resorting to any number of
tricks, schemes, and intimidations to stay in place . There is a lot of money involved, aside from
everything else: the new rich created by chavismo, the boliburguesianicknamed by the opposition because Chvez
baptized everything he ran in honor of his hero, Simn Bolvarfly in private jets and wheel about Caracas in Mercedes,
clad in designer clothes and privilege. But it is harder to think that Nicols Maduro, a former union activist and
foreign minister, a conciliator by vocation, is presiding over the scary nonsense his subordinates are engaging in.
Nor can he believe that the seven million people who failed to vote for him are fascistas or really belong to the oligarchy or bourgeoisie, all
three terms being used interchangeably, and sometimes in the same sentence. While his political base crumbles , Maduro
inaugurates theaters, attends circus performances, wears olive-green military-style shirts with ever-
broader epaulets even though he never served in the army, and denounces coup and assassination
plots against him. The one he denounced most recently was orchestrated, he claimed while offering
no evidence, by former president of Colombia lvaro Uribe, a right-winger whose popularity among his own domestic
constituents remains far greater than that of the man he loathed, Hugo Chvez. But lvaro Uribe has bigger fish to fry, like running a docile
candidate in Colombias next presidential elections, while the Venezuelan opposition, after years spent sulking, has
finally produced an effective politician, and would have little reason to plot against a man so bent on
overthrowing himself . But perhaps the plots and coups Maduro seems obsessed with are coming
not from outside his party but from within . The growing tumult and disorder is so extreme , so
clearly provoked, and so destructive that one must at least consider the possibility that it is being
encouraged by defeated chavista rivals now smelling wounded prey, or from those sectors of the
military who have never welcomed the Cuban presence in Venezuela, or both. La unidad, la unidad, Chvez kept
repeating during his final broadcast, urging his multifarious movement to stay together. He knew he was dying, and was trying to make fast his
legacy, but he understood where the danger lay. As it happens, a very good way to judge a political leader is by what he leaves behind, and so
far the tumult and mismanagement in Venezuela does not speak in Chvezs favor. Instead, it seems as if
recent Venezuelan history, often so farcical, were attempting to replay itself, and ending up as tragedy
instead.

Maduros presence stabilizes Venezuela allowing the opposition to gain influence
breeds instability.
Aram Aharonian, 7-04-2013, Venezuela activist, translated by Tamara Pearson, a journalist for Venezuela
Analysis, Venezuela Becomes Stable and Governable Thanks to a Solid Social Base, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9802
Venezuela Becomes Stable and Governable Thanks to a Solid Social Base Beyond the real serious problems, the
induced crisis, publicised on a large scale by the Venezuelan private media, and above all, by the foreign media, there are currently various
signs that indicate that the government of Nicolas Maduro is leaning towards stabilising and
consolidating itself. This, after an initial moment of turbulence that has lead to many, and not just members of the
opposition, to proposing old and many times failed neoliberal formulas and also to demanding that its time to administrate and correct,
forgetting altogether the socialist path. However, Bolivarian economists insist that this first Chavista government, presided
over by Maduro, must have a political economy that radically differentiates itself from the monetarist, neoliberal, pro-capitalist focus-
practices which point to recovering the equilibrium, good practices, and competition at the cost of reducing spending on
wages, reductions in productive activities, loss of economic sovereignty, unemployment, and dwr55w5eeterioration of social indicators. Some
people (the most dogmatic ones?) talk about rightwing-isation and the presence in Caracas of some advisers linked to European social
democracy is missed. Those advisors who dont recognise [Venezuelan] idiosyncrasies and vernacular culture, are
determined to promote models that have already been frustratingly tried and to stop a radicalisation of the model. No one doubts that there
are multiple and diverse points of tension here in Venezuela, and that they range from wage demands (above all from the middle class sectors)
and social demands, to geopolitical disagreements with Colombia and the United States. Obviously, the conflicts wont disappear with the
Maduro government, and even less so with a rightwing administration which throws away all the advances achieved in the last decade. The
economist Simon Zuniga indicates that the difficult economic situation and the vacillation within the highest (and new) government have
prevented a series of gradual but urgent measures from coming into effect until now, in order to confront the principle short term economic
and financial problems, among them the inflationary rise and the alarming deceleration of the GDP. Add to this the fact that both negative
symptoms have something in common; the exchange rate attack. Real economic sectors, national and international, have had successes in the
implementing of an agenda that aims to broaden the gap between the official exchange rate (6.3 Bolivars to the dollar) and the parallel rate
(over 30), applying media based pressure in order to oblige the government to devaluate, as it effectively did in February. Its essential to
immediately disarm this destabilisation strategy which threatens to consolidate a picture of stagflation (blockage by inflation), he indicates.
The concerning thing is that important sectors of the opposition dont seem to be willing to accept a calmness
for very long, which they consider exasperating. These factors in struggle for the reconquering of power, continue, unfortunately,
to seek support for a coup. And in the meantime, they continue to play at destabilisation. Further, there are
paramilitary groups beyond the border areas (there were arrests in Portuguesa state and their presence was even denounced in the areas
around Caracas). The Venezuelan opposition is complex and its not just made up of this or that party, but rather there are
important radicalised factors with a lot of influence and decision making power as well. Everything indicates
that these groups have taken our neighbour, Colombia, as a logistical platform for acting on Venezuela, given the belligerence of ex-President
Alvaro Uribe and the geopolitical differences between the two countries, which would facilitate such actions, said the opposition political
scientist Leopoldo Puchi. There were various meetings held to plan the Venezuelan destabilisation , between
Uribe and the opposition, headed by Henrique Capriles Radonski, who continues to accumulate famous sayings, such as this one: To have a
homeland is to have money to go to the supermarket. Whats more, a conversation (made public by the government) between the ultra-
rightwing legislator Maria Corina Machado and the representative of the 2D movement, German Carrera Damas, made it clear that the
rightwing is seeking help from the US government and its agencies in order to carry out a coup dtat. According to the conversation, Ramon
Guillermo Aveledo, spokesperson of the opposition United Democratic Table (MUD), asked officials of the State Department to speed up, via all
possible means, including the Putsch option [translator: a reference to a manoeuvre by the Nazis in Munich in 1923] the fall of the Bolivarian
Revolution and to end with the Chavismo control. Maduro and governability Maduro has managed to negotiate through a
series of difficulties, which means an important increase in the levels of governability. The president,
who has tried to lead a campaign against insecurity [crime] and corruption, has managed to respond to the charging
opposition. He has tried to respond to the pressures from social and union sectors, and he has
prevented , above all, the street from overheating. He is constantly present all over the country, with his street government,
and he has also managed to dialogue with opposition sectors (the business ones among them).

2NC Econ Impact

Loss of Maduro credibility destabilizes Venezuela and collapses the economy on the
brink
Gojun 13 [April 16, 2013. Pan Gojun is a writer for Xinhua. The Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency
of the People's Republic of China and the biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China.
Venezuela's new government faces serious challenges http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-
04/16/content_28554475.htm]
Maduro won Sunday's presidential elections with 50.66 percent of the counted votes, according to the official tally, while opposition challenger
Henrique Capriles garnered 49.07 percent. The slender margin led to Capriles refusing to concede defeat. If the controversy leads to
protests, Maduro's reign will be jeopardized and the national economy and social wellbeing will be
dealt a heavy blow to. In recent years, serious political confrontations have taken place between the
government and the opposition, with anti-government demonstrations and strikes by workers and
students occurring frequently. Chavez, a former soldier, controlled the situation and maintained stability with his great charisma
and the loyalty of the armed forces. Although Maduro, a former bus driver and union leader, has inherited
Chavez's political legacy and promised to continue down his predecessor's socialist path, it remains
to be seen whether he has the same prestige and influence over the military and can maintain
stability . Local political observers said, if the ruling party and the opposition cannot be reconciled after the
election, political unrest will continue . If that happens, Maduro's government will be imperiled, and
the national economy and lives of Venezuelans will be severely affected. To maintain political stability,
Maduro's government will have to make concessions to the opposition by amending laws, reforming
government institutions, and improving social and economic policies, observers said.

Venezuelan economic stability is key to Brazils economy and manufacturing sector.
Peter Murphy1, Brian Winter2 and Anthony Boadle3, 5-09-2013, Correspondent at Thomson Reuters
1
, Chief
Correspondent, Brazil at Thomson Reuters, education @ UT-Austin, previously a Foreign Editor at USA
TODAY, Correspondent at Thomson Reuters
2
, Senior Political Correspondent Brazil at Thomson Reuters,
previously a News editor at Thomson Reuters, Bureau chief in Havana, Cuba at Reuters, Latin American
affairs correspondent, Washington at Reuters, Senior correspondent, Ottawa at Reuters, Senior
Correspondent, Chile at Reuters, Bureau chief in Santiago, Chile at United Press International,
Correspondent, Rio de Janeiro at United Press International, News editor at The Daily Journal, Caracas
3
,
Venezuela's Maduro gets firm Brazilian backing, trade, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-brazil-venezuela-maduro-
idUSBRE94900520130510
While almost every nation in the Americas has recognized Maduro's election as Chavez's successor following
the leftist leader's death from cancer in March, the region's nations are anxious to avoid Venezuela sinking into
chaos. Brazil has a commercial stake in the political and economic stability of its neighbor to the north:
Venezuela is the second largest market after Argentina for Brazilian manufactured goods. Industrial goods
make up two-thirds of Brazilian exports to the Venezuelan market, handing Brazil a sizeable surplus in
its trade with Venezuela that has expanded seven-fold in the last decade to $6 billion last year.

Brazil recession destabilizes Latin America and hurts US economy.
Michael Bailey1 and Heinz Stecher2, 6-11-2012, representative for Oxfam International, humanitarian
group1, writer for Oxfam2, The Brazilian economic crisis, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/brazil-cn.htm
Brazil's recession will reduce demand for the exports of other Latin American countries and the
devaluation will put pressure on their currencies; Argentina, which also has close economic ties with Europe, is the neighbouring
domino. A generalized slump in Latin America is on the cards, with major consequences for creditors,
exporters and investors in the industrialized countries; this deepens fears of a global recession finally
reaching European and North American shores. 2. What went wrong? To make sense of today's malaise, we have to look back to the
1980s, when Brazil and other Latin American countries faced stagnation , high inflation, weak currencies and
debt crises. The import - substitution growth strategy had reached its last gasp, since no government had been prepared to expand its domestic market
through redistributive measures, and sheltered, uncompetitive industries could not hold their own abroad. Early IMF stabilization programmes,
which were designed from an orthodox monetarist standpoint and prioritized debt solvency through fiscal austerity, signally failed to stop inflation or generate
growth - indeed, they created hardship for many in the region. Later prescriptions, which evolved into the "Washington consensus" on how
to run an economy, combined more sophisticated anti-inflation policies with a growth strategy based on market liberalization, that is, privatization, trade
liberalization, opening up to foreign capital and the euphemistically dubbed "flexibilization of labour".

Economic decline leads to global nuclear war
Royal, 10 [2010, Jedediah Royal is the Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S.
Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. By Goldsmith and Brauer,
p. 213-215]
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political
science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence
behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable
contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-
eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin.
1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively,
even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for
conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global
economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers,
although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade'
is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He
argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade
relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy
resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to
those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or
because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between
economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a
strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of
economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce
each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to
external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory"
suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996),
DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force
are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency
towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has
provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United S tates, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic
scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political
science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national
levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-
security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link
economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those
mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of
global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created
by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

--- Maduro Solves Econ

Maduro economic reforms solve the Venezuelan economy
Mallett-Outtrim 13 [April 26, 2013. Ryan Mallett-Outtrim is a writer for Venezuelanalysis. Maduro plans
Economic Reform, Reform of Currency Exchange, and Special Economic Zones in Venezuela
http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/26/maduro-plans-economic-reform-reform-of-currency-exchange-and-
special-economic-zones-in-venezuela/]
In a meeting with business leaders in Zulia state, Maduro indicated that changes to current currency controls are
needed not only to overcome the parallel dollar, but also address a backlog of currency exchange
applications. According to Maduro, there are pending applications for currency exchanges at the government rate dating back to 2011.
He also invited the private sector to work more with the government to contribute to the
development of the productive forces and the countrys economy, and announced plans to create
Special Economic Zones in some regions. These zones would be granted special tax conditions, as well as
other incentives to encourage foreign investment. Although he gave few details, Maduro indicated that they
would be modeled on those that developed during Chinas trade liberalisation of the 1980s. Maduro
stated that more details will be announced soon, and Finance Minister Nelson Merentes will hold a series of meetings with
business leaders across the country from 2 May. The meetings will focus on issues related to currency exchange,
though Maduro also stated that the government will prioritise tackling inflation. We are in a
transition process towards building a socialist economic model that merits the promotion of a special
plan of a productive economic revolution, and that includes the participation of different sectors, he
said. Maduro described the private sector as having the financial and political freedom to participate in
an economic revolution to raise productivity and self sustainability. We have a strong and powerful
domestic market with purchasing capacity, because we have a population with job security, good
income and strong wagesNow we need a production system to respond to this, he said.




2NC Cabello Drugs/FARC Impact

Venezuelas effectively combatting drug trafficking now but a Cabello presidency
makes corruption and FARC expansion likely.
Movimiento Latido Patria, 9-25-2012, writer for MLP, a news website, the text of the article was translated
from Spanish using Google Translate minor edits were made, as they mistranslated Cabello as Hair
which has been changed back, Los vnculos de Cabello con el narcotrfico,
http://www.movimientolatidopatria.org/2012/09/25/los-vinculos-de-cabello-con-el-narcotrafico/
Cabellos links to drug trafficking Our beloved Commander Hugo Chavez has made every effort to keep the
drug problem - and the violence and corruption that come with that - outside our country. But this
success will continue when he leaves us to go to heaven? If Diosdado Cabello succeeds our beloved President, it
is unlikely. Cabello has established links with the FARC and drug trafficking for years. And the recent
allegations made by a Venezuelan judge confirm that, indeed, Cabello has established connections with
drug dealers. On the fateful day when our Commander dies, how will continue our Bolivarian Revolution Cabello with a president who
is facing charges of being a drug dealer? His whole agenda is in danger before they even take up office. Watch the
video below. - See more at:

Venezuela is a key area for staging FARC operations preventative action solves.
Jeremy McDermott, 12-12-2011, writer for InSight Crime, Research analysis and investigations on
organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela: Key to the Future of the FARC,
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/venezuela-key-to-the-future-of-the-farc
The defeat of the FARC , and the capture or killing of its new commander-in-chief, alias "Timochenko," will be
extremely difficult without the active collaboration of Venezuela. Twitter Facebook Linkedin Google + Email Print Both
the rebel group's commander-in-chief Rodrigo Londoo, alias "Timochenko," and his second-in-command, Luciano
Marin Arango, alias "Ivan Marquez," often reside in Venezuela. The two men are known to move in and out of the
country; in Timochenko's case from the Colombian province of Norte De Santander, and for Ivan Marquez, from La Guajira and Cesar. They
are probably the last two commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who can hold together
the rebel group, preventing its fragmentation and the criminalization of some sections which would likely result. For three
of the FARC's seven fighting divisions or "blocs," Venezuela is essential for logistics, weapons,
munitions, medical support and as a rest and recuperation area. Ivan Marquez's Caribbean Bloc, with some 250
fighters, has almost all its presence along the border, or actually in Venezuelan territory. Timochenko's Magdalena Medio Bloc, which has
around 800 fighters, depends on a lifeline into Venezuela for its survival. The Eastern Bloc, with up to 4,000 fighters, relies heavily on
Venezuela for its finances, and for direct supplies. Both the Magdalena Medio and Eastern Blocs rely on drug
trafficking as a principal source of income. While part of this comes from selling coca base to the new generation paramilitary
groups within Colombia, much of their foreign currency comes from moving cocaine into Venezuela. It is no
coincidence that Timochenko, and his second-in-command, Felix Antonio Muoz, alias "Pastor Alape," are both wanted by the U.S. on drug
trafficking charges. Without this pipeline into Venezuela, it is unlikely that the three FARC Blocs along the frontier
would be able to finance themselves.

The FARC is the backbone of the black market nuclear trade spreads to nuclear
terror and leads to an attack on the US
MacDonald 8 (Brad MacDonald, staff writer for the Trumpet, Is Chvez Helping Terrorists Go Nuclear? 5/2008,
http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=5036.0.104.0)
That seizure marked the first time radioactive material has been linked to FARC. It raises some critical questions: Why is
FARC in the major league of black-market uranium trade? Where did it get the uranium? And what was it planning on
doing with it? So far, the most plausible explanation is that FARC planned to sell the uranium to raise money, since joint
American-Colombian eradication efforts against FARCs cocaine crops and operations are eating into its cash flow. Thats reasonable, though in
reality the material was nearly worthless. But who would be interested in purchasing uranium, and how deep do FARCs
connections with that entity run? Matthew Bunn, senior research associate with Harvards Project on Managing the Atom, said he found it
interesting that a very professional terrorist organization like farc, with a good deal of experience in smuggling,
apparently was interested in getting involved in buying and selling nuclear material for money. That suggests that
someone who had serious nuclear material (unlike this material) and needed to move it from one country to another might have been able to
make use of the FARCs capabilities (Foreign Policy, March 28; emphasis mine throughout). Black-market activities are
inherently dangerous, but few are more so than the illegal trade of nuclear materials and technology. The
nature of the underground trade in uranium, particularly when it involves covert enrichment and construction of a nuclear weapon (the
ultimate weapon of mass destruction), requires above all a rare willingness to risk everything for the cause, as well as expansive expertise and
vast resources. The point is, 66 pounds of uranium didnt accidentally fall into farcs lap. FARC is clearlyalthough we dont know to what
extentinvolved in the international black-market trade of nuclear material. Thats alarming when you
consider the known members of the black-market nuclear trade! Clearly, this seizure raises more questions than it answers. While
many find assurance in the lack of answers, this is a naive approach. The truth is, these questions are extremely disconcertingespecially when
considered against the growth of the South American terrorist network. Mountains of evidence have arisen in recent years showing that
South America is a hideout and breeding ground for the worlds most dangerous terrorist
organizations , including al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. Pockets of South Americaincluding areas in
Venezuela , Bolivia and Ecuador, all of which have governments hostile to the U.S.have become launching pads from
which the worlds most venomous anti-American entities, particularly radical Islam, could strike the United
S tates. Now we learn that uranium is being illegally traded in the region. Even the weakest imagination ought to be able to conjure images
of what the consequences for America could be!

Terrorism causes extinction
Ayson, 10 [Robert, professor of strategic studies and director of the center for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects, Online+
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the
country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the
nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should
ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the
global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the
sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the
Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons
states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there
is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated
entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor
nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily
separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear
terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between
two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist
groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state
possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic
nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were
considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear
proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to
depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state
nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States,
it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought
into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most
obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just
as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest
themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or
discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from
Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear
laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might
not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while
the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in
tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a
wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the
explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the
nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete
surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully
responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as
well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps
Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be
definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism
occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a
time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders
not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem
to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed
conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a
distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present
time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in
Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the
United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise
domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of
the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil mightalso raise
the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in
the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S.
president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage
of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of
reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to
use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a
devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed
earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming
attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on
the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret
such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of
influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a
judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere
such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing
interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms
in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself
unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act
of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that
following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would
extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside
the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one,
where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in
others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its
right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect
that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a
major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and
China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if
Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of
pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If
Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the
responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more
serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of
nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the
response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for
a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing
for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If
Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the
question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from
such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader
of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If
some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be
informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear
warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use
taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow would place its nuclear forces very
visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the
group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be
keen to support Russias use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional
sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would
Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear
terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let
this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked
country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare
they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a
tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

--- Cabello Drugs I/L

Concessions to the opposition erode Maduros credibility and allow for a takeover by
Cabello.
Irenea Renuncio, 6-19-2013, Senior Associate, Intelligence & Analysis, London, Venezuela: strategic risk outlook
for 2013, http://news.riskadvisory.net/index.php/2013/06/venezuela-strategic-risk-outlook-for-2013/
While we believe that Maduro and Cabello are likely to continue governing in an informal power sharing
agreement for the remainder of the year, it is unclear at this point if this arrangement is sustainable in the longer
term, particularly as hardship protests appear likely to continue and put pressure on the relationship. Protests
could weaken Maduros authority and upset the balance of power between the two men. Currently
there is no firm evidence to suggest that Maduro could be ousted from power before the December
elections and we think such a scenario is unlikely on current indications. Rather, Cabello and Maduro seem likely to
cooperate to maintain their positions and privileges under the current system, with both leaders forced to support each
other despite their differences. However, Maduros prospects after the elections seem much less certain , making
the next six months a critical window for him to start delivering on economic policy and bringing improved security to the country. Constrained
by a power sharing agreement and having inherited a highly dysfunctional economy and political system, Maduros ability to deliver is very
limited. It seems unlikely that even with a dramatic reform program he will be able to deliver results quickly. In the meantime, opposition
protests seem almost certain to continue over the following months. These are most likely to intensify in October and November ahead of the
December municipal elections, which are likely to be a test of Maduros leadership. With the opposition calling for a mass turnout at the polls,
the next local election is most likely to result in renewed unrest in the countrys main cities, especially if socio-economic hardship continues.
Regardless of outcome, the municipal elections will not unseat Maduro, but potentially sweeping gains by the opposition
could seriously erode his standing in Chavismo and open the door to an internal challenge by Cabello.
Although the longer-term direction of Chavismo is difficult to forecast with any reliability, on current indications the current government
appears to lack the cohesion or popular support to navigate a range of different economic and political challenges during Maduros six-year
mandate, so we expect a restive end to the year.

Cabello will attempt a takeover he feels entitled to the presidency and has the
means to gain influence.
Alma Guillermoprieto, 6-03-2013, a Mexican journalist who has written extensively about Latin America
for the British and American press, Chavismo: The Crack Up? http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/jun/03/venezuela-
chavismo-silvas-secrets/
With this, Diosdado Cabello, aged fifty, current president of Venezuelas national legislative body, the Asamblea Nacional, slopes on the
stage. He is a former army lieutenant, former conspirator with Chvez in their failed coup attempt of
1992, former governor of the state of Miranda (which he lost to opposition candidate Henrique Capriles in 2008), defeated rival for the post
of Chvezs dauphin, and the man Silva refers to as that very great son of a whore. In the conversation with the Cuban agent, Silva is accusing
Diosdado Cabello of immense, hardly conceivable corruption, conspiring constantly against Maduro from
within the chavista state, and possibly plotting a coup. Remember that in a previous report I said that Diosdados
sources of financing had to be cut off? Silva asks, before listing the numerous sources of Cabellos allegedly vast fortune
and dangerous power. These include, Silva says, the currency exchange supervisory body and the port
authoritythe latter in the hands of Diosdados brother, Jose David Cabellothe military and civilian intelligence services
and the national police, as well as civilian high government officials. It has apparently become common for
businessmen favored by the government to bring in gigantic authorized dollar loans from abroad and then sell the currency on the black
market at two or three times the official exchange rate. Silva explains how one of Chvezs most trusted and reputable advisors has intervened
to stop an investigation into this sort of money-trafficking by other government officials, apparently Cabello allies. We are immersed in a
sea of shit, compadre, and we havent realized it yet, Silva laments. But his ultimate concern is Diosdado Cabellos hold on a significant
proportion of the officer corps, and the possibility that Cabello has understood that he doesnt need the presidency to control the state in
Venezuela. Theyre going to create shortages. Theyre going to create various messes simultaneously, Palacios. Theyre going to
create conditions so thatthe whole administration becomes ungovernable so that two years down the line they can call for
(Maduros) repeal. In the regime created by Hugo Chvezs highly personalistic approach to governmentwhat in Latin America is
called caudillismothe problem isnt so much Maduros lack of popularity but his lack of institutional backing. The new president came up in
the world as a militant in a small radical left-wing party and later as a union activist. Before he was elevated to the vice-presidency by Chvez he
spent six years as foreign minister. He has no political base of his own. In contrast, Diosdado Cabello has been a leader of the
chavista umbrella party and its organizaciones populares, in addition to his ascendancy over all the
intelligence agencies and much of the officer corps. And he is an army man: he held the rank of lieutenant before
he was evicted from the army after the coup attempt that brought Chvez to public attention in 1992. It is not surprising that he
would have seen himself as Hugo Chvezs natural successor, but the comandante took to his grave
the reasons why he didnt agree with that choice.


Cabellos got connections with the military and FARC.
Dr. Carlos E. Ponce, 1-09-2012, elected general coordinator of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for
Democracy, co-editor of the political magazine Nueva Politica, lecturer in several US and Latin
American Universities, member of the Steering Committee of the World Movement for Democracy and
the ISC of the Community of Democracies, Carlos Ponce: Chavezs Narco-Tyranny and Accomplices,
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/09/carlos-ponce-accomplices-to-americas-narco-tyranny/#ixzz2YeilnzXl
What happens when a president appoints as Minister of Defense a General who has been included in several international
terrorist lists as well as been placed on the U.S. Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)
list for his connection with drug cartels? It would be safe to assume that the president himself is an active player illicit drug
and terrorism activities. This is the case in Venezuela, where Hugo Chvez appointed General in Chief Henry Rangel Silva to be the new
Minister of Defense. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Rangel Silva and six other current (and former) high level Venezuelan
government officials for allegedly assisting narcotics trafficking by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia ( FARC ). Further making this case, President Chvez secured the election of another suspect of connections with
drug trafficking, former Vice President and Miranda State governor Captain Diosdado Cabello. Cabello is a former
military official who was involved with Chvezs conspiracies starting with the guerilla group Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement and
some says that he is the key element in the connection among the military and illegal business. His new
position as the president of the parliament gives more power to the corrupt military faction of Chvezs movement in
the country. Cabellos position at the head of Chvezs United Socialist Party (PSUV) cements the military takeover. Unfortunately, the bad
news does not stop here. This week the Iranian dictator Mahmud Ahmadinejad is visiting Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador to strengthen the economic, political, energy and military
brotherhood with Latin America, in particular with the Bolivarian countries in the region. Hugo
Chvez has been an active promoter of Iran in Latin America and other regional leaders due to receive Ahmadinejad, such as Nicaraguas Daniel
Ortega and Ecuador's Rafael Correa, have a similar ideological-authoritarian stance to Chvez. Despite fewer resources than Chvez, they can
assist Mr. Chvez in his attempts to triangulate Irans banking, commercial and energy operations worldwide to counter effect the imminent
international economic sanctions against Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei regime.


2NC Russia Relations Impact

Maduro is key to Venezuela Russia relations
Agencia EFE 13 *July 2, 2013. Maduro reaffirms Venezuela's alliance with Russia Global Post.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130702/maduro-reaffirms-venezuelas-alliance-
russia#15]
Moscow- Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro showed here Tuesday that he plans to pick up where late predecessor
Hugo Chavez left off in relations with Russia. Hugo Chavez generated a great respect and love for
Russia. We have inherited that love, Maduro said during a meeting at the Kremlin with Russian President
Vladimir Putin. We have come to confirm our desire to reinforce and expand the strategic alliance with
Russia, the Venezuelan leader said. During the last decade we have forged a map of cooperation in various areas.
We move forward on the energy front, that is, oil and gas, and in provision of equipment for the
petroleum sector, Maduro said. The new presidents first visit to Moscow included the signing of an
accord between Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Russian counterpart Rosneft to carry out
joint projects in the Andean nation. Russian utility Inter RAO EES also reached an accord with PDVSA to build a power plant in
Venezuela. Putin said he and Maduro reaffirmed their common position to pursue the course of
strategic cooperation in all ambits. The Russian also praised Maduro for firmly taking the baton from Chavez, who died in
March after a long battle with cancer, and praised the late Venezuelan head of state as a great and sincere friend
of Russia, a strong and valiant man. Maduro took time during his visit to attend a ceremony in northwest Moscow to mark the
re-naming of a street in Chavezs honor. Chavez, who traveled to Russia on nine occasions, sought to institutionalize bilateral economic
cooperation and bought billions of dollars worth of arms and military equipment from Moscow. Venezuela turned to Russia after
the United States cut off sales of military materiel to Caracas, including spare parts for the F-16s combat planes
Washington sold the Andean nation in the 1980s.

Ending Venezuelan cooperation seriously hurts the Russian economy.
Anthony Rinna, 3-09-2013, writer for Center for World Conflict and Peace (CWCP), an independent, non-
partisan think tank, formed in January 2011 by Dr. Brad Nelson and Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman, experts on
international politics, security, and policymaking, Russias Uncertain Position in post-Chvez Venezuela,
http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-in-post.html
The domestic and regional implications of the death of Hugo Chvez are numerous and wide-ranging, but unique to Venezuela is the
reverberations the death of its leader will have in faraway Russia and Eastern Europe. With the passing of El
Comandante," its possible that Russias geopolitical influence in Latin America may weaken and that its arms
exports will decline, directly affecting Russias economic growth . Much of this depends on who succeeds Chvez and
what sort of relationship his successor pursues with Russia. In the 21st century, Russia has had a tendency in its foreign policy to pursue
relations with smaller, less powerful, but in many cases very central, states in regions around the world (i.e. Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the
Middle East, etc.) in an effort to increase its own role in the so-called multi-polar world. While Russias major ally in Latin America is actually
Brazil, Russia has found Venezuela to be a willing partner in supporting Russias own foreign policy, with Venezuela even going so far as to
(hypocritically) recognize South Ossetias declaration of independence from Georgia while opposing Kosovos independence from Serbia
because of the bad precedent it would set. Venezuelan vice president Nicols Maduro said that "the unipolar world is
collapsing and finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a
multipolar world." Russias ties with Venezuela as its Latin American partner was a perfect match - Chvez was an
outspoken critic of the United States and his country controlled vast reserves of energy, which gave Russia an excellent
opportunity to exert its influence in the country and counter American power in the region, namely, by combining mutual
feelings on U.S. influence abroad with the capacity to develop Venezuelas energy industry. Venezuela was billed as a
regional leader for Latin America. For while Chvezs leftist administration was one of several that proliferated throughout the region, his had
been by far the most vocal (it is not uncommon, in fact, for Latin American governments to be relatively aligned on the right-left spectrum, with
rightist governments predominating in the 1970s and 80s). Chvez carefully developed relations with Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of
Ecuador and the two most recent Argentine administrations, that of the late Nestor Kirchner and his wife Crisitina Fernndez (who succeeded
her late husband in 2007). His flamboyant anti-American rhetoric was occasionally balanced out by Brazils center-left president Incio Lula da
Silva and Lulas successor, Dilma Rousseff. Nevertheless, Venezuela provided a beacon through which Russia was
able to exert geopolitical influence in a region far beyond its periphery. One of the biggest areas of
cooperation between Russia and Venezuela is the energy sector, a fact recently underscored by Vladimir Putins
decision to send Igor Sechin, CEO of Russias state owned oil company Rosneft, as a special presidential envoy to Hugo Chvezs funeral.
Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of crude oil in the world, but the oil is in need of a more
intense refinement process than most other crude supplies around the world. Russia has the technological capabilities
Venezuela needs to refine its heavy crude, and Russian energy companies are active in several aspects of the Venezuelan energy industry.
Russian companies plan to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela by 2019 and multiply energy output fourfold in an attempt to expand cooperation
to offshore areas and oil services, according to Reuters. Sechin has said Rosneft will finance production with loans from Russian banks and
credit lines from international banks. Because the Venezuelan economy is currently in shambles, it is highly likely that the Russian-
Venezuelan energy cooperation will continue, with the possibility that if a government friendlier to
the United S tates should take power, existing contracts with Russian companies would continue, but that American
companies would be invited to participate in new ventures. The situation in Venezuela may actually effect Russias
energy relations with one of its Eastern European neighbors- Belarus. Belarus has had a rather unique relationship with Russia, and is part of a
union state with Russia. Yet since 2007, the one thorn in the side of Belarus-Russia relations has been energy, mainly because of a dispute
which emerged when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning Russian gas transported through Belarus and selling it at world market prices (Belarus
had enjoyed Russian gas at a discounted price). When Russia refused to meet Belarusian quotas for energy imports, Belarus turned to
Venezuela for energy imports starting in 2010, with energy shipped via tankers from Venezuela to the Ukrainian port of Odessa, then up to
Belarus through a pipeline. Belarus has sought 23 million tons of oil from Russia for 2013, but Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has
stated that if Russia will only sell Belarus up to 18 million tons (as it has stated) and it will import energy from Venezuela and Azerbaijan. Yet if
Venezuela for any reason suspends its sales of energy to Belarus, this may give Russia more leverage over Belarus as it (Belarus) will have lost a
valuable supplier of alternative energy. This situation seems unlikely since Venezuela can only benefit from the influx of cash, but is still an
example of how far reaching the implications of the upcoming transfer of power in Venezuela really are. After energy, Russias most
valuable export is armaments and military hardware. Chvez constantly feared a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, and had been
engaged in a long-standing dispute with neighboring Colombia over the presence of U.S. troops in Colombia (these U.S. troops including most
notably the U.S.s lite Special Forces, whose purpose is to assist with counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency). This, in principle, was the
basis for his decision to enter into contractual agreements with Russia regarding arms sales. Venezuela is the second-largest
customer for Russian military hardware (after India), and as Russias economy is famously lacking in
diversity of exports outside of energy, a willing market for arms is greatly welcomed (a situation only
enhanced by the instability in another major importer of Russian arms- Syria). In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a
possible arms race between Colombia and Venezuela. Since 2006, the gross income for Russian military sales abroad has doubled, and Russian
arms sales are now almost exclusively handled through state-owned company Rosoboronexport. Chvezs death, however, could reduce
Russias client relationship with Venezuela in the arms industry, depending on how the succession plays out. It would
be easy to assume that Nicols Maduro, Venezuelas vice president, would succeed the late Chvez, yet Venezuelas opposition is relatively
strong. The Venezuelan economy, despite the strength of the countrys crude reserves, is not entirely healthy, and if the
Venezuelan opposition ends up in power they may decide that it is not economically viable to have such
contracts arms with Russia. Viachelav Nikonov, deputy chair of the Russian Parliaments committee on foreign affairs, has stated
that he does not believe a new Venezuelan administration would be able to opt out of currently existing contracts, but future contracts may not
be pursued. Given the fragile state of Venezuelas economy, Russia will most likely remain a major player in Venezuelas foreign relations,
because even if the opposition were somehow to come to power, Russian participation in the countrys energy sector is still largely necessary
for it to be able to produce energy in adequate amounts and at sufficient levels of refinement. Yet Russia may lose a large part
of its customer base in the armaments industry, and if a right-wing administration comes to power, or at least a Chvez lieutenant who
seeks to improve relations with the United States, Russia may also find itself with less of a partner in the geopolitical
arena of countering U.S. influence in Latin America.

Russian econ collapse causes nuke war.
Filger 9 Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, Russian Economy Faces Disastrous
Free Fall Contraction http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356
In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is
rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former
Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their
nations history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russias economic crisis will
endanger the nations political stability , achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the
Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of
their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly.
Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and
executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where
economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an
outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis . There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant
then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia
remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and
capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself
into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval . It just may be possible that U.S. President
Barack Obamas national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in
Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence
community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the
United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia,
security forces responsible for guarding the nations nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a
time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist
organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how
secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain ? It may be that the financial impact of
the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence .


2NC A2: Maduro Bad

Maduro is vulnerable, but is the best option for the country
Alexander 13 [April 15, 2013. Harriet Alexander is a Foreign Affairs Reporter for the Sunday Telegraph. After
An Incredibly Close Election, New Venezuelan President's Dream May Become A Nightmare Business Insider.
http://www.businessinsider.com/venezuelan-election-why-nicolas-maduros-dream-may-become-a-nightmare-
2013-4]
In his first rally for the presidency of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro claimed that his predecessor Hugo Chavez came to him in a dream. Launching
his campaign from Chavez's house in the town of Barinas, a tearful Mr Maduro claimed that the firebrand ruler who died in March was
reincarnated as a bird and flew over his head, blessing the campaign and promising victory. On Sunday the "prophecy" from beyond the grave
came true, with Mr Maduro winning the election and in theory governing the country until January 1919. But the dream of victory could yet
become a nightmare for the children of Chavez, Venezuela's charismatic ruler who dominated the country from 1999 until his death last month.
Far from leaving a stable, peaceful nation for his followers, Chavez's legacy is that of a deeply divided and rudderless country. Mr Maduro,
50, won the election by the slimmest of margins, gaining 50.7 per cent of the vote. His challenger Henrique Capriles, the 40-
year-old governor of Miranda state, won 49.1 per cent a difference of just 235,000 votes in this country of 29 million. Mr Capriles refused
to recognise the result and said his team had a list of 3,000 voting irregularities, ranging from gunshots being fired at polling stations to the
illegal reopening of voting centres after they had officially closed. "I didn't fight against a candidate today, but against the whole abuse of
power," he said, demanding a recount. "Mr Maduro, the loser was you ... This system is collapsing, it's like a castle of sand
touch it and it falls." Mr Maduro said he would accept a full recount, even as he insisted his victory was clean and dedicated it to
Chavez. The election board said Maduro's win was "irreversible" and gave no indication of when it might carry out an audit. "We've had a fair,
legal and constitutional triumph," Mr Maduro told a victory rally. "To those who didn't vote for us, I call for unity. We are going to work
together for the security and economy of this country." Yet creating that secure and economically-successful country will be an immense
challenge. Whereas Hugo Chavez was a former paratrooper who could count on the doggedly-loyal support of the army they even rescued
him when Right-wing rivals staged an aborted coup in 2002 Mr Maduro does not have that guarantee. "I think Maduro has an
enormous problem, he doesn't understand the military world," said Roco San Miguel, head of Citizen
Control, a Venezuela non-profit that tracks military issues. He told the Wall Street Journal : "Without Chvez, who is going to
sit on top of this military hierarchy that has co-opted public administration?" Nearly half of Venezuela's 23 states
have a former military officer as governor, while a quarter of the cabinet is currently composed of members of the armed forces. The army
also controls the ports an influential role in a country where currency controls have created shortages
and a thriving black market. "The president commanded the country like a barracks," said retired army Gen. Ral Salazar, who was
Chavez's defence minister during his first year in office in 1999, but eventually broke with him. Mr Maduro "will have to win over
the military and be attentive to them if he wants to stay in power ." Mr Maduro's main rival is
Diosdado Cabello a former army officer with powerful friends in the military and the dynamic
between them is key to the stability or otherwise of the government. Many expected Mr Cabello, a colleague of
Chavez from the military academy who took part in Chavez's 1992 failed coup attempt, to be named as successor rather than the plodding Mr
Maduro. Mr Cabello, who is the head of the National Assembly, has pledged to respect Chavez's
decision. But he is also known to harbour his own strong political ambitions, and commented cryptically on
Twitter that "these results require deep self-criticism." Another key challenge for the newly-elected president is the
economy. Inflation is rampant and the economy is slowing, hampered by Byzantine currency controls and one of the
world's worst crime rates. The country was ranked 165th out of 176 in Transparency International's corruption index, and businesses have been
scared off by the Chavez regime's policy of nationalisations. And yet despite the political, economic and social
headaches, the result could be seen as the best outcome for Venezuela . The opposition has been enormously
strengthened, with Sunday's close-fought battle in stark contrast to Chavez's 11 per cent victory over Mr Capriles in October's election. Mr
Maduro will also have realised that reliance on the ghost of Chavez will not be enough: he needs to
actively improve the life of Venezuelans nationwide, and try to reunite the riven country. The
country still has the world's largest oil reserves, and Chavez's memory still resonates just enough to
keep his project alive. But Venezuelans everywhere will be hoping that Mr Maduro can now draw on
more than dreamy visions of victory.


Maduro solves the Venezuelan economy, corruption, and poverty
Robertson 13 [April 19, 2013. Ewan Robertson is a writer, journalist and activist based in Venezuela.
Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro Sworn in, Promises "a Revolution of the Revolution"
http://venezuelanalysis.com/print/8703]
Maduros speech also focused on working with various sectors of Venezuelan society, including those who
voted against him. Fellow countryman or countrywoman ... who for some reason voted against the candidate of the nation, I stretch out my
hand to you. We guarantee peace in this country, he said. Maduro set out his vision of governance for the coming
period, looking to reinvigorate the Bolivarian Revolution after his narrow electoral victory. This approach was termed a
revolution of the revolution, with Maduro looking to tackle problems which have cost the
government support. These include pledges to reduce crime, improve government efficiency and
crack down on corruption . On the economy, Maduro said he would work to raise production while
tackling shortages and economic sabotage . The Venezuelan president also set the ambitious aim of
zero poverty in Venezuela by 2019, to be pursued through continuing government social programs
and other anti-poverty mechanisms. Finally, Maduro committed to a democratic revolution by
working to promote community councils and communes and move towards a socialist mode of living. He assured this
could not be done by the government, but rather by the people. The inauguration coincides with the 203rd anniversary of Venezuelas
independence, with Maduro participating in a military parade through in the Heroes Avenue in Caracas.

Neg turns corruption Cabellos more corrupt than Maduro
hes the Dick Cheney of Venezuela turns case.
Kevin Lees, 6-04-2013, [Qualifications needed] , Its Diosdado Cabellos world, the rest of Venezuela is just living in it,
http://suffragio.org/2013/06/04/its-diosdado-cabellos-world-the-rest-of-venezuela-is-just-living-in-it/
Cabello (yes, his full name translates from the Spanish into English as God-given hair) has been a Chvez supporter since Chvezs 1992
coup attempt, but his career really took off a decade later, when he became Chvezs interior minister and his infrastructure minister. He was
the governor of Miranda state from 2004 to 2008. Since 2011, he has been the vice president of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
(PSUV, or United Socialist Party of Venezuela) and since January 2012, he has been the speaker of the Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly).
His brother, Jos David Cabello, heads Venezuelas revenue collection agency. A master of the intricate chavista bureaucracy,
think of Diosdado in part as the Venezuelan Dick Cheney the octopus with tentacles in every
corner. Theres a strong argument that under Venezuelas constitution, Cabello (and not Maduro) should have become Venezuelas acting
president following Chvezs March 2013 death. But Maduro quite clearly had Chvezs endorsement and Cabello certainly must have approved
of the decision to install Maduro with immediate effect in March. Its pretty clear why Cabellos reputation for corruption
would have made him an absolutely horrible choice to lead chavismo into the April election, especially in
light of his 2008 loss of the Miranda gubernatorial election to Capriles. Among the inner circle of chavistas, Cabello is
widely seen as the most corrupt , given that he and his family have developed conspicuous wealth over the years under Chvez.
Unlike Maduro and former vice president Elas Jaua, he does not have incredibly strong links to Cubas leadership,
though he does have ties to the military. More than Maduro, Jaua or Giordani, hes seen as a pragmatic fixer , not
an ideologue committed to bolivarian revolutionary sentiments. So Maduro, despite his weaknesses, was still
probably the most likely candidate to be successful in the April election.



Saudi Oil DA
UQ --- Oil prices high
1NC
Oil prices at 2013 high --- Middle East and US jobs report.
Otter 7-5-13 (Jack, Oil Prices Hit High For the Year, Energy Stocks Up, Barrons Stocks to Watch,
http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/07/05/oil-prices-hit-high-for-the-year-energy-stocks-up/)
Oil prices hit a 2013 high today, driven higher by fears of unrest in the Middle East as well as evidence
that the U.S. economy does, indeed have a pulse. Energy stocks, on the whole, moved higher. The Energy Select Sector SPDR
(XLE) was up nearly 1% shortly before the market close. Oil futures closed above $103, up almost 2% on the day and 7% on the
week. The military coup in Egypt has raised fears of a supply disruption. There was more turmoil today and reports of
shots fired in a confrontation between supporters of recently ousted president Mohammed Morsi and those who opposed his rule. In
domestic news, the Labor Department announced that the U.S. economy added 195,000 jobs in June,
beating expectations and adding evidence that the recovery may be picking up steam. Better growth
could push oil prices higher. Even while the August futures contract increased, prices at the pump are falling, as inventories rise.
The average price per gallon is $3.47 according to AAA, down 5% in less than a month.
2NC
Oil prices up --- US supply drop.
Fahey 7-3-13 (Jonathan, AP Energy writer, Oil: Price above $101 on U.S. supply drop, Egypt,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Oil_Price_above_101_on_US_supply_drop_Egypt/20130703_49_0_NEW
YOR287288?subj=298)
NEW YORK The price of oil rose to its highest level in 14 months on concerns about possible disruptions to
Middle East supplies and signs of an increase in U.S. demand for fuel. U.S. benchmark oil gained $1.64 to $101.24, its
highest close since May 3, 2012. Brent crude, which is used to price oil used by many U.S. refineries to make gasoline, rose $1.76 to finish at
$105.76. Two events propelled the price of oil above $100 a barrel for the first time since the middle of September: unrest in Egypt, and a big
drop in U.S. oil supplies. Traders were worried that political upheaval in Egypt could slow the flow of oil from the Middle East to world
markets. Embattled Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi vowed not to give in to protesters' demands for his resignation. But the head of
Egypt's military announced late Wednesday night local time that Morsi will be replaced and new elections will be held. Egypt is not an oil
producer but it control of one of the world's busiest shipping lanes gives it a crucial role in maintaining global energy supplies. The Middle East
accounts for about a quarter of the world's crude oil output, or 23 million barrels per day. About 2 million barrels of that, or 2.2 percent of
world demand, are transported daily through the Suez Canal, which links the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. Much of that oil is headed to
Europe, but a supply drop anywhere in the world leads to higher prices everywhere. "Markets tend to advance sharply on uncertainty and will
often price in a worst case scenario. This appears to be the case with the unfolding situation in Egypt," wrote Jim Ritterbusch, president of
energy consultancy Ritterbusch and Associates, in a note to clients. Some analysts suggested market reaction to the political crisis in Egypt was
exaggerated. "If there is one thing that the military has control of in Egypt it is the Suez Canal. We therefore do not see a significant risk for
free passage on the waterway," said Olivier Jakob of Petromatrix in Switzerland. In the U.S., the Energy Department reported
Wednesday that crude supplies fell by 10.3 million barrels from the previous week, more than three
times the drop that analysts had expected. The drop was likely the result of reduced supplies from
Canada because of a temporary pipeline shutdown there, as well as increased demand from a BP
refinery that restarted in Indiana. Gasoline supplies fell as well, while analysts expected an increase.
The drop in oil and gas supplies could be an indication that U.S. demand is rising. The rising price of oil could end what has been a streak of 21
days of lower U.S. retail gasoline prices. The average U.S. pump price fell less than a penny Wednesday to $3.48 per gallon. Analysts do not
think the spike in oil prices will lead to sharply higher gasoline prices, though, because U.S. crude supplies remain high and refineries are turning
out plenty of gasoline. U.S. commodities markets are closed Thursday for the July Fourth holiday.
Oil prices are at 2013 high --- Egypt.
Smith 7-5-13 (John, CNN Money reporter,Oil prices at 2013 high above $103 a barrel, CNN Money,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/05/investing/oil-prices-egypt/)
U.S. oil futures for the August contract rose $1.98, or nearly 2%, to settle at $103.22 a barrel. That's the highest
closing price since May 2, 2012, when oil settled at $105.22 per barrel. The Egyptian army seized control of the
government Wednesday amid violent protests, deposing the country's first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsy of the
Muslim Brotherhood. On Friday, the African Union announced that it was suspending Egypt. Egypt produces a negligible amount of oil. But
the Suez Canal, which passes through the north African nation, is a major thoroughfare for oil shipping that links the
Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. "I think most folks don't believe that violence in Egypt is
going to cause a shutdown of the Suez Canal," said Tom Kloza, chief oil analyst for Gasbuddy.com. But he also said that military coups make
traders nervous about energy supply, prompting them to buy oil and drive up prices. Oil was on the rise even before the Egyptian coup. Oil
prices have climbed more than 8% in the last month , driven by economic growth. Brent crude, the
benchmark for oil prices in Europe, rose $1.67, or 1.6%, to $107.43 a barrel.

Oil prices high --- uncertainty over Egyptian situation.
Reuters 7-6-13 (Reuters, Supply concerns send oil prices soaring above $ 107 per barrel, Arab News,
http://www.arabnews.com/news/457157)
NEW YORK: Brent crude oil prices were trading above $ 107 per barrel for the first time in three months
yesterday, underpinned by political unrest in Egypt that continued to fuel concerns of oil supply disruptions in the Middle East. US crude
oil prices maintained a 14-month high, supported by data showing US employers added more jobs
than expected in June, as other commodity prices sank. The news pushed the US dollar to a near three-year high against a basket of
currencies, which can lead to lower oil prices. Commodities priced in dollars become more expensive for holders of other currencies as the
dollar strengthens. But the crude oil market interpreted the data as a positive, said Matt Smith, commodity analyst at Schneider Electric in
Louisville, Kentucky "because it means we're going to see a stronger economy." Still, crude oil in other currencies is becoming more expensive
and "will provide headwinds at some point," Smith added. The positive data fueled investor fear that the US Federal Reserve may taper its
stimulus program. That coupled with recent reports of weaker economic data out of China caused other commodities prices to collapse. Gold
lost 3 percent and copper was down more than 2 percent. Brent crude oil for August delivery LCOc1 was last trading $ 1.80 per barrel higher at
$ 107.34 by 11:52 a.m. EDT (1552 GMT) after hitting a high of $ 107.40 a barrel. Front-month US crude oil futures CLc1 were up $1.63 per
barrel to $ 102.87 a barrel after hitting a high of $ 102.92. The Egyptian military took control of the nation on
Wednesday. So far, ports and shipping through the Suez Canal have been operating normally, two
shipping sources and a canal official said. The Middle East pumps a third of the world's oil and the Suez Canal and Suez-
Mediterranean pipeline were responsible for transiting some 2.2 million barrels per day of oil into the Mediterranean Sea in 2011, according to
U.S. government data. Libya's largest export terminal was shut late on Thursday. Port guards locked the gate over salary complaints,
preventing workers from continuing operations. Investors remained on edge and were pricing in risk of Mideast supply disruptions should
conflict spread to other regional nations, analysts said. The Egyptian uncertainty added to existing supply worries. Almost all physical crude
grades consumed by Europe are now short including Russian, Iraqi, Libyan and African grades. North Sea supplies, which underpin the Brent
contract, are expected to be extremely low in the coming months when main grade Forties output is reduced due to maintenance in August.
The spread between the Brent oil contracts of August and September LCOQ3-U3 widened to 79 cents, the highest in nearly five months.
Strong employment figures from the United States underpinned futures but support from the data
could be short lived. US job growth increased more than expected in June, which could draw the Federal Reserve closer to scaling back
its massive monetary stimulus later this year, which would sap liquidity and drag on commodity prices. Employers added 195,000 new jobs to
their payrolls last month, the Labor Department said yesterday, while the unemployment rate held steady at 7.6 percent as more people
entered the work force. The closely watched spread between global benchmark Brent crude oil and US West Texas Intermediate CL- had
widened to $ 5.17 per barrel and was last trading around $ 4.50. Brent's premium to WTI crude at one point on Wednesday narrowed to
$3.09, the weakest since December 2010.

Oil prices high --- US jobs on the rise.
AP 7-5-13 (Associated Press, Oil Price Climbs After Strong US Jobs Report, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=199063522)
NEW YORK (AP) The price of oil marched higher Friday with a positive report on U.S. hiring and ongoing
concerns about the crisis in Egypt. Benchmark crude for August delivery rose $1.98, or 2 percent, to finish at
$103.22 per barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. That's the highest closing price since May 2, 2012.
Following the ouster of Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi on Wednesday, his supporters began a series of protests and attacks Friday. The
military opened fire as hundreds of protesters marched on a headquarters of the Republican Guard Egypt is not an oil-producer, but its control
of the Suez Canal, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, gives it a crucial role in maintaining global energy supplies. For now supplies are
moving freely through the canal. U.S. employers added a robust 195,000 jobs in June and many more in April and May
than previously thought. The job growth suggests a stronger economy and makes it more likely the Federal Reserve will slow
its bond purchases before year's end. Those bond purchases have supported the economy by helping keep long-term interest rates low. That
in turn has given a boost to investments such as stocks and oil. At the pump, the national average for a gallon of gas stayed at $3.48 for the
third straight day. That's down 14 cents from a month ago and 14 cents higher than a year ago. Brent crude, which is used to set prices for
crude oils used by many U.S. refineries, rose $2.18, or 2.1 percent, to end at $107.72 per barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London.
UQ --- Saudi economy high
Saudi economy is solid now --- high oil prices.
Arab News 7-2-13 (Saudi Arabias economy remains robust in May, Jeddah: Arab News,
http://www.arabnews.com/news/456771)
Saudi Arabias economy was robust in May. Indicators of consumer spending maintained solid
growth in May leading to record highs for both cash withdrawals and point of sale transactions, according to a report by Jadwa Investment.
The report said annual growth in bank lending to the private sector remained solid in May, though the
additional credit issued during the month slowed compared with previous month. Bank holding of treasury bills pushed bank lending to the
public sector higher. Bank deposits rose for the third consecutive month in May, pushing the year-on-year growth to its highest level since
June 2009. Bank excess deposits at SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) remained high while loan-to-deposit ratio was broadly unchanged
in May, giving scope for further lending growth. The Jadwa report said Saudi Arabias year-on-year inflation in May
slowed to its lowest since December 2012 owing to a fall in the core index while food and rents remained high. The Kingdoms
nonoil exports and imports maintained their positive trend for the third consecutive month. Petrochemical exports were the highest this year,
though it remains lower than a year ago. Brent crude prices moved within a small range of $ 100-$ 105 per
barrel for the third consecutive month in June. Potential monetary policy adjustment in the US is expected to have a
temporary impact on oil prices, the report added. The dollar strengthened in June against most advanced currencies
owing to potential impact of scaling back monetary policy stimulus by the US Fed. A shift to slower growth in
China and the outlook for higher interest rate in the US have also put pressure on emerging market currencies. The Tadawul All-Share Index
(TASI) maintained its upward trend during June, despite recent global equity markets turbulence and heightening regional political tensions.
Average volumes improved to SR 6.3 billion up from SR 5.5 billion in May, the Jadwa report said. Only four of the fifteen sectors were up in
June. Real estate development and banks were the best performing sectors, benefiting from positive domestic economic outlook. The new
Capital Market Authority (CMA) regulation introduced last month continued to push speculative sectors down.

Saudi economy projected to be solid --- banks and petrochemical companies.
Reuters 7-4-13 (Reuters Finance, Solid Q2 Earnings Seen For Saudi Banks, Petrochemicals, Gulf News Saudi
Arabia, http://gulfbusiness.com/2013/07/solid-q2-earnings-seen-for-saudi-banks-
petrochemicals/#.UdoUn1Md5dU)
Solid second-quarter earnings among Saudi Arabian banks and petrochemical companies may give
the countrys stock market a boost in the second half of this year, analysts believe. Those two sectors
together account for over half of the markets capitalisation, so they are key for the performance of the bourse . The markets
main index is up 11.9 per cent year-to-date, far underperforming rises of over 30 per cent by other Gulf markets such as Dubai and Kuwait.
Saudi bank shares have slightly outperformed other sectors; the banking index is up 15.2 per cent year-to-date. But banks earnings growth has
been dampened by low interest rate margins and, to a lesser extent, by payment problems at some of their construction company clients. Late
last year the government began imposing fees on companies that hired more foreign workers than locals, in an effort to reduce unemployment
among Saudi nationals. Construction firms have been among the hardest hit by the policy as their hiring costs have increased. Contractors are
complaining of labour issues and this is affecting their ability to service debts, said Asim Bukhtiar, head of research at Riyad Capital. Saudi
banks may have to take loan loss provisions for their exposure to construction firms in their second-quarter earnings, which will be announced
in the next few weeks. However, other factors are working in favour of the banks. Bank lending to the private
sector surged 16.5 per cent from a year earlier in May, the fastest pace since February 2009, after a 16
per cent increase in the previous month, central bank data shows. Riyad Capital estimates the banking sectors net income will rise seven per
cent from a year earlier for the second quarter, with Bank Aljazira posting growth of 19 per cent and Saudi British Bank a rise of five per cent.
Profits may start to climb faster if, as many expect, U.S. interest rates rise over the next year or two as the U.S.
Federal Reserve scales back its stimulus policy. Because of Saudi Arabias currency peg to the dollar, Saudi lending rates would be likely to rise
too, though with a lag; this could expand banks profit margins on their loans. Saudi Arabias NCB Capital estimated in a research note that a
small increase of just 0.1 percentage point in net interest margins for the ten banks it monitored would boost their
net income by 4.6 per cent, leading to a 10.1 per cent increase in 2013 earnings. PETROCHEMICALS Meanwhile,
export-focused petrochemical shares have been performing poorly mainly because of uncertainty about the global economy; the
petrochemical sectors index is up just 3.9 per cent year-to-date. But many companies have succeeded in improving their
profit margins while additions to production capacity in recent months should push up sales volumes,
offsetting a drop in product prices during the second quarter. Im expecting good numbers for second quarter
because margins should be higher, said Iyad Ghulam, petrochemical analyst at NCB Capital. Weve increased our price targets by an average
of six per cent and remain overweight in some companies. Upside is lower than before (because of a recent rally by the shares) but overall,
sentiment is positive . Saudi Arabia provides ultra-cheap natural gas to its petrochemical firms, giving
them a competitive edge against global firms. Investors have been concerned that this subsidy could be scaled back in 2013 but there has been
no official statement to that effect, so analysts now believe companies will continue to enjoy that cost advantage for the time being. Concern
about the global economy may continue to affect Saudi petrochemical stocks for some time. Kuwait-based NBK Capital said it was
neutral on the sector for that reason. Chinas credit crunch as well as the potential tapering of the Feds quantitative easing programme
present some near-term downside risk to major chemical product prices, it said. Nevertheless, it forecast five per cent quarter-on-quarter
and 30 per cent year-on-year growth in second-quarter earnings for six Saudi petrochemical firms which it
covers. Shares in Saudi Basic Industries Corp, the worlds largest chemical producer, closed at 92.25 riyals on Wednesday. NBK Capital says fair
value for the stock is 106.50 riyals, while NCB Capital has a price target of 121.50 riyals.
AT: US Production N/U
Current US production is balanced by the growing demand for oil --- the plan tips us
over the scale.
Laskoski 12 (Gregg, Increase in U.S. Oil Production Won't Lower Gas Prices, US News On Energy, 10-24-12,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/on-energy/2012/10/24/increase-in-us-oil-production-wont-lower-gas-
prices)
AP reports that the United States is on track for a 7 percent increase in oil production this year to an average
of 10.9 million barrels per day. And the U.S. Department of Energy is forecasting that U.S. production of crude and other liquid hydrocarbons
will average 11.4 million barrels per day in 2013. AP says that would be a new record and would fall just below Saudi Arabia's
output of 11.6 million barrels per day. [See a collection of political cartoons on gas prices.] More bullish forecasts come from Citibank, whose
analysts say U.S. oil production could reach 13 to 15 million barrels per day by 2020. Buthere comes the rain on the parade
the United States is still expected to continue to import plenty of oil in the years ahead because
we're consuming 18.7 million barrels per day. Regrettably, AP reminds us that the increase in production
hasn't translated into cheaper gasoline and it's not likely to, either. They say U.S. gas prices are expected to
remain relatively high because of growing demand for oil in China, India, and other developing
nations. We've already been down this road and obviously it's frustrating to learn that we might produce more oil than Saudi Arabia and we
still can't catch a break. It's critical to remember that U.S. oil production is inherently tied to global oil
production and the delicate balance that is created by the see-saw of peaks in increased oil
production driven by higher global crude oil prices, and valleys that slow down production when
crude prices fall too low.

Link --- global prices

1NC
An increase in Venezuelan oil production through foreign investors leads to global
collapse in prices.
Rodriguez 4-19-13 (Alejandro Urrutia, editor of the annual publication Mexico Oil and Gas review, Effects of
Hugo Chavezs Death on Global Oil, Global Conflict Analysis, http://globalconflictanalysis.com/2013/04/effects-of-
hugo-chavezs-death-on-global-oil-markets/)
The first and most important issue is the future of the oil market in Venezuela. In 2010 OPEC claimed Venezuelas Orinoco Oil Belt contained
tar sand deposits equivalent to around 300 billion barrels of oil enough to fulfill current world demand for 10 years. But even though
Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world, Hugo Chavezs dependence on PDVSA left the NOC
with just US$11 billion 9% of its income to fund future operations (compared to Pemexs 17% and Brazils Petrobras
29%). This trend, which is not expected to change despite the death of Chavez, is of great concern to
the US and other oil exporting and importing countries because it could have strong implications on
global oil prices. This is the case because despite the fact that Chavez has passed away, Chavismo is still alive; therefore, many
analysts believe that his policy of depending on oil revenues to foster social programs at home and abroad will continue, leading to a
continuation of a decrease in Venezuelas oil production. If this is case as is expected global oil supply would decrease
and oil prices would increase because demand would not change. This decline could have a negative impact on
American and Western economies, since there would be less supply. This is a great opportunity for Mexico to step up its production and fill in
the vacuum left by PDVSAs decline because the US and other Western nations will need to import oil, and since the US is currently seeking to
become energy independent in a North American context, Mexico must capitalize on Venezuelas continuous expected decline. However,
this potential opportunity for Pemex and the Mexican oil and gas industry depends on the political future of Venezuela which is expected to
hold elections in the next 30 days. Whatever the outcome, if the newly elected Venezuelan president decides to open
up the market and allow the return of foreign companies such as Exxon-Mobil and ConocoPhillips,
the potential for oil production increase would rise, leading to a higher global oil supply and lower oil
prices . This could have a potential negative effect on Mexicos oil exports since potential oil companies could start focusing on Venezuela,
even though PDVSA is not going to be turned around overnight and many energy analysts believe the political transition will most probably lead
to similar style of government.

2NC
Unleashing Venezuelas massive oil reserves leads to collapse of global prices --- 2002
coup proves.
White and Rowley 3-10-13 (Garry and Emma, Death of Hugo Chavez propels Venezuelan oil production
into the spotlight, The Telegraph, http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/death-hugo-chavez-propels-venezuelan-
160233918.html)
Perhaps Hugo Chavezs biggest mistake was expelling foreign oil companies in 2007. The move by the late firebrand Venezuelan leader also
erased from his country the skills required for exploiting the countrys vast oil reserves. He should have let them stay and taxed the companies
heavily. However, oil executives should pause for thought before they book a flight to Caracas following Mr Chavezs death last week.
Venezuela has the largest known oil reserves in the world, but oil output has slumped by almost a third because of Mr Chavezs nationalisation
of the industry. At the end of 2011, the country held 17.9pc of the worlds known oil reserves, compared with 16.1pc in Saudi Arabia and 11pc
in Canada, according to BPs statistical review of world energy. However, it only represented 3.5pc of global production compared with 13.2pc
in Saudi Arabia. It is likely that oil output could rise, should there be an easing of the countrys antagonism to foreign investors. Some
believe this could lead to a fall in the oil price and a consequent boost to the global economy. The death of Hugo
Chavez may see oil prices fall as they did during the 2002 coup , Gerard Lane, an oil analyst at Shore Capital, said.
With greater foreign investment it is foreseeable that the 30pc fall in Venezuelan oil production could
be reversed. Indeed the scale of potential oil output is enough combined with on-going shale oil production growth in
the USA, suggesting that oil prices could fall. However, such a scenario is unlikely just yet. Venezuelas massive oil
reserves will not be unleashed on global oil markets anytime soon , while the near-term impact on prices will be
limited, Ole Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank, noted. The state oil company PDVSA has increasingly been handing over its
income to fund various government programmes, leaving it with negative cash flows for the past five years, Mr Hansen added. The result of
this has been a lack of investments as old fields matured and new ones were not explored, hence the drop in output. Mr Hansen believes
reforms and the re-introduction of foreign investment will not happen overnight, possibly not for a few years. But once it does another
source of increased supply will further help to alleviate some of the worries about future supply not keeping up with an increase in demand,
especially from emerging economies, Mr Hansen said. Should production eventually rise, which seems likely, the main loser is likely to be
Canada. Venezuela positioned its oil industry away from the US to the more friendly nationals of China and Russia. Oil exports to the US are
about 900,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), down from a high of 1.4m boepd in 1998. This has benefited Canada, which has seen
exports to the US double. Venezuelas oil is of the heavy crude variety, which is also what the Canadians produce around Alberta, Mr Hansen
noted. Companies operating in Alberta will be able to export their know-how, which is good for the companies. However, this may be less so
for the overall economics around Alberta, with Venezuelan heavy crude being much cheaper to extract. However, the Canadian need not
worry that the Venezuelans will get their act together quickly. This seems unlikely to happen for some time. Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS-PB -
news) managed to sum up the consensus view, saying that Mr Chavezs death should have limited impact on the nations oil production in the
short term while a change of leadership may foster longer-term investment and boost output. Venezuela needs foreign oil
companies to boost this output. Once it accepts this, and invites the oil majors to use their skills,
global oil prices should see some relief.
Venezuelan production of oil leads to oil price drop --- perception-based effect proven
by 2002 coup.
Blas 12 (Javier, commodities editor for the Financial Times, The Venezuelan solution for oil prices, Financial
Times Commodities, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3eba56e2-0c83-11e2-a776-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2YPaSmV7S)
Is Venezuela the answer to high oil prices? For the first time since Hugo Chvez won the presidential
elections in 1998, the answer is a maybe as opposition candidate Henrique Capriles gains popular support. The 40-year-old
centre-left candidate is neck and neck with the leftist leader in some polls ahead of the countrys poll on Sunday. If Mr Capriles wins,
Venezuelan production could rise significantly, which could have a bearish influence on the oil
market for the first time in 15 years. The importance of Venezuelan politics in the oil market cannot
be overestimated. Oil prices tumbled nearly 9 per cent over two days in April 2002 after Mr Chvez
was briefly deposed in a coup dtat as traders bet the opposition would boost production. But after
the leftist leader returned to power, oil prices quickly rose. The elections on October 7 may not have an immediate
impact but could still signal an important change in global oil supplies and prices. Under Mr Chvez, Venezuelas oil production dropped from
3.2m barrels a day in late 2008 to 2.5m b/d in September this year. Mr Capriles could change the trend. Mr Chvez is hoping for a fourth term
that would extend his presidency until 2018. But Mr Capriles, a young left-of-centre politician, has surprised many in Latin America with his
formidable popular support. He managed to gather several thousand people last Sunday for the closing of his electoral campaign in central
Caracas the traditional backdrop of Mr Chvezs political rallies. Mr Chvez has promised to boost oil output to 6m b/d over the next two
decades by developing the ultra-heavy crude oil from the Orinoco Belt. But after antagonising almost every international oil company, he is
unlikely to deliver as he continues to divert money to his favoured social causes and allies such as Cuba. If the leftist leader wins another
presidential term, Caracas will remain a factor behind strong crude prices. Mr Capriles has also promised to boost production to 6m b/d. But
he has far more credibility in the energy industry and market and has promised in his first 100-day political manifesto to create new alliances
between public and private sectors to explore and produce oil projects. The business-friendly law graduate has pointed to Brazils oil industry
as example. The plan to double Venezuelas oil production is not so outlandish as it sounds as the country
holds giant reserves of low-quality, tar-like crude, similar to those found in Canada. The so-called Apertura Petrolera programme
of the 1990s, which was cancelled by Mr Chvez, had also aimed to boost production to 6m b/d and transform the state-owned Petrleos de
Venezuela, or PDVSA, into one of the worlds largest producers. A victorious Mr Capriles is unlikely to revive Apertura Petrolera but would
more likely encourage joint ventures between PDVSA and international oil companies to boost oil production. There is a catch a victory of
the opposition could trigger a revolt from Mr Chvezs supporters, who control PDVSA and the military. In that scenario, Venezuela oil
production could tumble, as it did during an opposition-led oil strike in 2002-03. China has extended roughly $30bn in loans to Venezuela
backed by oil production. The election could bring an explosive mix of oil and geopolitics.
Further discovery of oil in Venezuela leads to global price drop --- immense oil
reserves.
Partirdge 12 (Matthew, PhD at the London School of Economics, How a Venezuelan Spring could push down
oil prices, MoneyWeek, http://moneyweek.com/hugo-chavez-venezuelan-elections-and-oil-prices-20900/)
Its all about the long run Even if Chavez goes in October, there will be little short-term impact on oil prices. When he leaves office,
the state firm PDVSA is also likely to be sued over the seizure of assets in 2008 and 2009, delaying any investment. Foreign firms are likely to
hold back until the political situation has calmed down. However, the ability of a free Venezuela to lower oil prices in
the long run is huge. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) thinks that Venezuela has the second
largest levels of proven reserves in the world. Oil cartel Opec even claims that it could have more
crude oil than Saudi Arabia. A committed private sector player could even find the huge amount of
sea oil that is not currently viable. This would bring the total amount up to 513 billion barrels. Clearly,
this isnt a story that will have an instant impact on investors. But in the long run, Venezuela could be a game-changer for
oil prices . Well be keeping a close eye on it and watching for potential opportunities.
Link --- Saudi Arabia

Venezuelan oil directly trades off with Saudi exports to the US --- proven by past
tensions.
Elass and Jaffe 11 (Jareer, Energy Consultant Rice University, Amy, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies
Rice University, Iraqi Oil Potential and Implications for Global Market Markets and OPEC Politics, James A. Baker
III Institute for Public Policy @ Rice University, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-
IraqFutureElassJaffe-072611.pdf)
Saudi Arabias response to Venezuelas ambitious campaign to increase oil productive capacity from 2.8
million b/d in 1991 to 7 million b/d by 2010 may serve as a warning to those Iraqi politicians who are willing to assert that Iraq
should raise output to 10 or 12 million b/d and even to take on the global oil swing producer role. Saudi Arabia,
concerned with the long-range implications of Venezuelas market expansion on the kingdoms
ability to maintain its sales to the United States , increased production. 55 Venezuela never reached its 7 million b/d target.
In 1997, as Caracas reached about 3.7 million b/d of production and overtook Riyadh as the United States largest
supplier, the Saudi government began high level negotiations with the Venezuelan government and
quietly tried to pressure Venezuela into compliance with the countrys OPEC quota of 2.3 million b/d.
The Venezuelans ignored the Saudi efforts and persisted in their all-out production policy, continuing to ratchet up output and flaunting what
they were doing against the Saudi pressure. 56 As a consequence, Saudi Arabia turned on its own taps, raising its
production from slightly above its 8 million b/d quota in September 1996 to 8.5 million b/d for virtually all of 1997. 57
The Saudi intention was to bring down prices as a way of punishing Caracas and inducing Venezuela to
cooperate. The Saudis succeeded more than they could have wished. The combined overproduction of the two
countries turned out to be about exactly the amount of extra oil inventory that built up in the world, some 400 million barrels, and with it a
price collapse from $27 (West Texas Intermediate crude benchmark) in the spring of 1997 to $1 0 in the winter of 1998 - 1999. The
disciplining of Venezuela has had obvious consequences, including helping to induce a change in the regime in
Venezuela, a radical reduction of Venezuelan upstream capital expenditures, and a withering of the countrys own production capacity to under
2.4 million b/d currently. The lesson many inside OPEC have drawn from the Venezuelan price war was that Riyadh will act to make sure that no
fellow OPEC countries will gain the financial or oil capacity wherewithal to threaten the kingdom.
I/L --- Prices k2 Saudi stability

1NC
Saudi Arabia requires sustained high prices to prevent social unrest at home.
Carey 12 (Glenn, reporter for Bloomberg, The Saudis Need Those High Oil Prices, 2-23-12, Bloomberg
BusinessWeek, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-02-23/the-saudis-need-those-high-oil-prices)
The world last year watched to see if Saudi Arabia would suffer the same instability that swept away other regimes in the Middle East. The
question now is whether the worlds largest oil supplier needs to raise prices to sustain ramped-up spending intended to calm its citizens.
Higher prices would be bad news for Western governments, which need affordable oil to nurture their economic recoveries. The Saudis
rarely spell out exactly what they are thinking on the topic, but there are signs their strategy has
changed, and they are increasingly willing to raise prices . Still, they seem not inclined to let prices go sky-high. A year
ago Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi said oil at $70 to $80 a barrel was fair. Then on Nov. 21, Al-Naimi said he was very happy
with current crude prices; on that day oil traded close to $98 a barrel . Prices are now around $106 a barrel. The
evolving price targets have everything to do with the Saudis budget needs in response to the Arab Spring,
says Robin Mills, an analyst at Manaar Energy Consulting in Dubai. In February 2011, King Abdullah returned home from medical treatment
in the U.S. to announce a spending plan that would quiet the restive parts of the Saudi population . By the
end of 2011s first quarter the kingdom had allocated $130 billion in additional spending to build homes and combat youth unemployment.
Government spending increased 28 percent last year to 804 billion riyals ($214 billion), while government revenue
surged 51 percent, to 1.1 trillion riyals, according to Ministry of Finance Data. The spending has achieved its political
purpose : The House of Sauds eight-decade rule survived unscathed as Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi
were toppled, despite sporadic protests in the Shiite areas of Saudi Arabias Eastern Province. The Saudi economy expanded 6.8 percent in
2011, central bank data show. Government employees were even awarded two months in bonus pay last
yearan act of generosity that cost the government an extra 224 billion riyals over budgeted
expenses. Oil sales make up 80 percent of Saudi government revenue , says Faisal Hasan, head of research at
Kuwait-based Global Investment House. Two years ago the kingdom needed an oil price per barrel of around $70
in order to pay for its budget without tipping into deficit. For 2011, the Saudis break-even oil price was estimated by the
International Monetary Fund to have risen to $80 a barrel, a figure that will increase to $98 a barrel by 2016. Saudi Arabia
will have to keep spending heavily if it is to create 3 million jobs over the next three years, King Abdullahs stated goal. The Saudis are spending
on defense too: the U.S. has agreed to sell the country 84 F-15 fighter jets for $29.4 billion. Raising oil prices too high could backfire. The last
global economic crisis caused prices to fall from nearly $150 a barrel in July 2008 to less than $40 by the end of that year. The possibility of that
happening again has the Saudis trying to keep prices high but not so high they impair global growth. Says Mills, They dont want prices to go
above $100, and they are above $100 at the moment. Saudi Arabia pretty much is at a record production level and so is Kuwait. And the United
Arab Emirates have been increasing too. So the Gulf allies are trying to maintain relative moderate prices. The Iranians and Venezuelans,
members of OPEC but traditional adversaries of the Saudis, have no interest in a lower price. The Saudis have a precarious balancing act to pull
off.

2NC

Saudi stability depends on high oil prices --- Arab Spring magnifies risk of conflict.
Allam 12 (Abeer, Saudi Arabia: in a restless realm, Financial Times Analysis,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/59c7492e-e07b-11e1-9335-00144feab49a.html#axzz2YkfkIhpW)
Meanwhile the most urgent regional crisis Irans pursuit of a nuclear programme and its perceived desire to
dominate the Gulf has intensified. The failure of Tehrans negotiations with world powers has heightened
the prospect of Israeli attacks that would further unsettle the region. As a result, Saudi Arabia today
faces one of its most difficult periods since it was founded 80 years ago. The domestic situation compounds the
problems. An ageing monarchy resistant to political change must focus on appeasing a young population
increasingly connected to the outside world concerned about transparency in government decision-making; the distribution
of the countrys resources, including oil wealth and land; and a dearth of jobs. Oil prices, currently above $110 a barrel,
have provided Saudi Arabia with a fiscal cushion . The central banks net foreign assets rose to a record $591bn in June
from roughly half that level five years ago. The International Monetary Funds 2012 economic growth forecast is 6 per cent, a contrast with the
outlook for struggling western states. But the country is still heavily dependent on oil; non-oil exports represented
only 12 per cent of the total last year. Saudi Arabia has faced several challenges throughout its history, but after the
Arab spring these challenges have become greater, says Hassan al-Mostafa, a Saudi writer. This is an extraordinary
internal and external situation but they are trying to control it [by] using the oil bonanza and by ensuring a
smooth transition of power.

Saudi budget to prevent a Saudi Spring requires high oil prices and revenues ---
experts agree.
Peel and Blas 11 (Michael, Middle East correspondent of the Financial Times, Javier, commodities editor for
the Financial Times, Saudi budget could require high oil price, Financial Times Commodities,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87d60044-5bbb-11e0-b8e7-00144feab49a.html#axzz2YPaSmV7S)
Saudi Arabia could need the oil price to average more than $100 a barrel by 2015 to sustain the big
public spending rises it plans in an effort to forestall the political unrest sweeping the Middle East. The oil market
is growing increasingly worried about Riyadhs fiscal needs as it fears that they could force Saudi Arabia to pursue oil policies similar to those of
Venezuela and Iran, traditionally the price hawks at the Opec oil cartel. The break-even oil price the Gulf kingdom requires
to balance its budget will jump from $68 last year to $88 this and then $110 in 2015, according to new estimates by
the Institute of International Finance, a leading industry group. Only a decade ago Saudi Arabia was able to balance
its budget with oil prices averaging $20-$25 a barrel. The forecast shows the scale of the task facing Saudi Arabia, the
worlds largest oil producer and a crucial plank of the wests regional security strategy, as it grapples with a growing
population and increasing infrastructure problems. Crude oil prices on Thursday surged higher as Libyan rebels failed to
make fresh ground against forces loyal to Muammer Gaddafi, suggesting a protracted oil supply disruption in the north African country. ICE
May Brent rose to a session high of $117.70 a barrel, near a 2-year high. It closed at $117.36 a barrel, up $2.23 on the day. Nymex May West
Texas Intermediate closed at $106.72, a days rise of $2.45. The rise in oil prices caused by the unrest in the Middle East will help
Saudi Arabia and other Opec nations to pay for the increased spending. The International Energy Agency, the western
countries oil watchdog, believes Opec revenues will surpass $1,000bn this year for the first time. The forecasts of higher oil revenue needs
come after the Saudi government announced two packages of social spending totalling $129bn aimed at averting the spread of dissent that
toppled the Egyptian and Tunisian leaders. The largesse failed to satisfy activists who were angry that the package did not include reforms.
One important implication of the ... spending packages is that government spending has shifted to a
higher path for the coming years . Evidence from many countries shows that once such benefits are in the budget, they could be
hard to withdraw without strong resistance, the IIF said.
The Saudi Arabian economy is powered by high oil prices --- its 86% of total revenue.
Bloomberg 11 (Rising oil prices to fuel expansion of Saudi Arabia's economy, 5/15/11,
http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/rising-oil-prices-to-fuel-expansion-of-saudi-arabias-economy)
RIYADH // Saudi Arabia's economy will expand 5.3 per cent this year, powered by higher oil prices and
more government spending in the Arab world's largest economy, National Commercial Bank said. The economy will grow 4.2 per cent in 2012,
the Jeddah, Saudi Arabia-based bank said in an e-mailed report today. The kingdom will "benefit from the recent positive
oil price shock" as it raises output 6.2 per cent to average 8.8 million barrels a day this year, compared
with last, the bank said. The kingdom, which depends on oil for 86 per cent of its revenue , announced increases in
government spending in March as protests calling for more job opportunities and democracy engulfed the Middle East. The package included
$67 billion (Dh 246bn) on housing and funds for the military and religious groups that backed the government's ban on domestic protests, and
followed a $36 bn handout announced on February 23. "The series of royal decrees announced in the first quarter 2011 will provide
favourable stimulus to the non-oil sector, estimated to grow at 5 per cent," National Commercial Bank said. The construction and retail sectors
will be "the key beneficiaries" of the new spending, it said. The Saudi central bank Governor Muhammad al-Jasser said on March 24 that the
kingdom's economic growth will exceed 4 per cent this year. That compares with growth of 3.8 per cent in 2010. With higher oil
prices, Saudi Arabia will record a budget surplus of 62.8 billion riyals ($16.8 billion), National Commercial said. Oil
revenue this year is expected at 828.2 billion riyals, it said. Saudi Arabia predicted on December 20 that its 2011 budget
will have a deficit of 40 billion riyals. At the time, total spending was forecast at 580 billion riyals, according to the Riyadh-based Finance
Ministry. The break-even oil price required to balance the budget this year will increase to $84 a barrels this year from $65 a barrel last year,
the bank said. Oil prices have increased 8.8 per cent this year. Crude oil for June delivery gained 68 cents to $99.65 a barrel
on May 13 on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
Saudi Arabia needs higher oil prices to spend on its citizens.
Daltorio 2-20-13 (Tony, How China and Saudi Arabia Mean You Should Bet on Higher Oil Prices, Money
Morning Commodities, http://moneymorning.com/2013/02/20/how-china-and-saudi-arabia-mean-you-should-
bet-on-higher-oil-prices/)
The Supply Side of the Oil Prices Equation There is also the supply side, where Saudi Arabia continues to hold the
key to the direction of global oil prices. Last summer, when Brent crude oil prices were pushing $120 a barrel, Saudi Arabia
came to the rescue and began pumping nearly 11 million barrels a day. But at the end of 2012, thanks largely to what the Saudis were seeing
from the shale oil fields of the United States, Saudi Arabia drastically cut its oil production. January saw oil production from the kingdom at only
around 9.25 million barrels a day. This move may have been an indicator that the Saudis are comfortable with
oil prices at $110 a barrel versus the country's oft-repeated price of $100 a barrel for Brent crude. The Saudis may need
higher prices as Arab Spring is forcing the country to spend more on its citizens. Spending on
healthcare, for example, jumped by 26% in 2012 to 12.5% of its entire budget, according to NCB Capital. The Saudi
cutbacks did serve to tighten the global oil market. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), overall OPEC production was only 30.34
million barrels a day in January, a 12-month low. The oil bears say not to worry, as OPEC has plenty of spare capacity that it could bring into
production to lower oil prices at a moment's notice. It is true there is plenty of spare capacity - more than 4 million barrels a day in January.
But how much of that can really be brought online?
Decline in oil prices leads to political instability.
Tverberg 12 (Gail, M.S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial
Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, Lower Oil PricesNot a Good Sign!, Our Finite
World, http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/06/28/lower-oil-prices-not-a-good-sign/)
Saudi Arabia makes frequent statements about offering its production to keep prices down, but if a
person looks at production patterns in the past few years, they have been highest when oil prices
have been highest. Production has dropped as oil prices drop. So a rational person might conclude that oil wells which cannot be
operated continuously (of which there are some in Saudi Arabia) tend to be operated when prices are highest, and turned off when prices are
lower, thus maximizing profits. As oil prices drop this time around, we can expect Saudi Arabia and others to find
excuses to save production until prices are higher. Countries exporting oil depend on the revenue
from the sale of oil, plus taxes on this revenue, to help support country budgets. As oil prices drop, governments find
themselves with less money to fund promised public welfare programs. This dynamic can cause
lower oil prices to lead to political instability in some oil exporting nations. Thus, any drop in oil prices tends to be self-
correcting, but not until oil production drops, prices of other commodities drop, and many workers have been laid off from work. We saw in
2008-2009 that this kind of recession can be very disruptive.

Gulf Coast countries need high oil prices to sustain economic growth.
Saudi Gazette 12 (High oil prices to buoy Gulf economies in 2013, Economy,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20121124143820)
JEDDAH High oil prices and production will provide a supportive backdrop for another year of solid nonoil
growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), though the regions economic growth will slow in 2013 due
to a moderation in oil production growth, Fitch Ratings forecast in its first quarterly GCC Sovereign Credit Overview released Thursday.
Many governments in the region will continue to use high oil revenues to stimulate their economies.
Fitch forecast that Qatar will remain the fastest growing of all GCC sovereigns in 2013, driven by the governments huge capital investment
program. Growth will also be strong where fiscal stimulus is combined with healthy rates of bank lending and buoyant consumer and business
confidence, as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Oman. GCC economies will remain heavily influenced by global oil
markets. With conditions tight (low global spare capacity and little new output coming on-stream), Fitch expects Brent crude to average
around $100 per barrel in 2013 despite the weak outlook for demand. As most GCC exporters aside from Saudi Arabia are operating at close to
capacity, there is little scope to raise output after the hikes over 2011 and 2012, it noted.

The Saudi Arabian economy historically depends on high oil prices.
Mann 9 *latest citation+ (Joseph, writer for Global Research in International Affairs, Saudi- Arabia's Economic
Needs and the Price of Oil, GLORIA, http://rslissak.com/content/saudi-arabias-economic-needs-and-price-oil-
joseph-mann)
In addition to security expenditures, a large part of the 2004 revenue was used to cover the countrys debts. On the other hand, a government
attempt to increase its income via privatization and the introduction of foreign companies into the energy market met with little success after a
number of companies that had operated in the Rub al-Khali area in 2004 reported failure in gas exploration.[9] Saudi Arabias fortune
changed in 2005 as a result of a sharp increase in oil prices . In December 2004, the price of WTI crude oil on the
spot market was $33.05; a year later it shot up to $58.12, thereby creating a surplus budget balance. Nonetheless, Saudi
Arabias economic objectives and its desire for significant structural reforms caused the government to demand a
higher target price. Indeed, in 2006, Saudi Arabia announced a new target of $55, which resulted in oil prices that fluctuated between
$53.53 and $66.85 per barrel.[10] Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency The world economic crisis that reached its peak in late 2008 put an
end to Saudi Arabias economic boom. The price of oil reached a nadir of $35.99 in December 2008, but it was precisely that economic collapse
that proved, yet again, the link between the Saudi budget target and oil prices. The Saudis claimed that the drop in oil prices below
the $50 mark was detrimental to their economy . Thus, despite the global economic crisis, oil prices rose above the $50
mark in May 2009. Furthermore, in December 2008, King Abdallah stated that Saudi Arabias economic needs would make it
necessary for oil prices to surpass the $75 mark in the years to come many Saudis expressed great satisfaction when
WTI crude oil spot price reached $76.49 per barrel in late October 2009.[11]


Impact - Economy

Saudi Arabian instability leads to global economic turmoil --- experts agree.
Sambidge 11 (Andy, S&P says Saudi unrest could have adverse global impact, Arabian Business, 4-23-13,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/s-p-says-saudi-unrest-could-have-adverse-global-impact-395636.html)
The global economy could be severely affected if the current wave of political uprisings spread to Saudi
Arabia, the world's biggest oil producer, ratings agency Standard's & Poor's said in its GCC Q1 Outlook report.
While S&P analysts said they saw upheaval in the kingdom as "unlikely", they added that the impact would have a "tangible
adverse economic impact" on oil importers and the global economy. Kai Stukenbrock, a credit
analyst, said in the report that the oil price "could rise beyond historical peak level" should serious
uprisings take hold in Saudi Arabia. Oil peaked at just below $148 a barrel in the summer of 2008 and is currently trading above
the $120 mark as other Middle East and North African countries continue to struggle amid political unrest. "If there were to be political
upheaval in Saudi Arabia, a scenario which we currently consider unlikely, the ramifications, both geopolitical and well as
geo-economical, could be severe," Stukenbrock added. "Depending on the nature of such hypothetical events in Saudi Arabia, the
oil price could rise beyond historical peak levels, and if sustained, would have a tangible adverse economic impact on oil importers and the
global economy," he said in the report. He added that the recent announcement of a $93bn package of extra social
spending, wage increases, and additional public sector jobs "underlines that the Saudi government is
mindful of potential risks, and is trying to assuage social pressures by tapping its sizable fiscal reserves".

That increases the risk of warstrong statistical support.
Royal 10 (Jedidiah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil.
Candidate at the University of New South Wales, Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of
Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economi, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith
and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict .
Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic
decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the
systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-
eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also
Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
(Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999).
Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership
cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests
that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security
behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade
so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future
trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the
likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those
resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or
because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the
link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict,
which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent
to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg,
Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external
tensions . Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary
theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments
have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence
showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller
(1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are
greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are
generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United
States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in
the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with
external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels .5 This implied connection between
integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link
economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those
mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic
interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of
and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered
ancillary to those views.

Impact - EU

Low oil prices trigger North African instability.
Zakaria 12 (Fareed, editor of Newsweek International, editor-at-large of TIME, Zakaria: Why oil prices will say
high, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/15/zakaria-why-oil-prices-will-stay-high/)
You see, traders worry about risk. And the biggest risk to oil supplies is the threat of war in the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, in Nigeria mass protests are raising worries about the supply of fuel from there. Venezuela is in a
slow-motion collapse because of Hugo Chavez's mismanagement. There have also been protests in Russia, the world's top oil producer. And
remember the fallout of the Arab Spring - Libya's oil production in 2011 was severely curtailed. Iraq continues to disappoint with its oil output
and its recent political tensions certainly haven't made things any better. So a mix of war rhetoric and local troubles in key oil states are factors
driving up the price of crude. And that translates to higher prices at the pump. Now that logic suggests that prices will fall when
the news calms down. But perhaps not. Perhaps oil producers want these sky high prices. Usually the major oil producers
understand that keeping prices too high in the short term means people start finding alternatives to oil. They start driving more efficiently; they
start looking for alternate energies. But this time, oil states face crucial challenges. Look closer at the Arab Spring.
The only oil rich country that has been forced into regime change is Libya. Why? The Gulf states lavish
subsidies and salary increases on their citizens. They've upped spending to record levels to suppress any popular
discontent. I saw some striking numbers this week: Look at the "break-even" costs for the world's top oil producers. That is the minimum price
at which these countries need to sell oil so that they can balance their budgets. Russia now needs oil at $110 a barrel to
manage its finances. For Iraq, the number is $100. Even Saudi Arabia now needs oil to trade around $80 a barrel just to
balance its budgets. The numbers are also high for Algeria, Qatar, and Oman. Only a decade ago Saudi Arabia was able to
balance its budget with oil prices averaging around $25 a barrel. So now it is in these countries' interest to keep oil prices
high , which they do by curtailing supply in one way or the other. This is perhaps the most lasting impact of the year of global protest: High
oil prices.
That collapses EU unity --- conflict over immigration.
The Economist 11 (The next European crisis: boat people, 4-11-11,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/04/north_african_migration)
FOR THE past year excessive sovereign debt has endangered the European project. For the coming year it may be north
African boat people who present the greatest danger to European unity . The turmoil over illegal
migrants is a consequence of the Arab pro-democracy awakening on the far side of the Mediterranean and, perhaps,
of the Western military intervention in Libya. According to UNHCR, more than 20,000 boat people have landed on the Italian island of
Lampedusa this year, almost all of them from Tunisia. More than 800 have arrived in Malta, mostly from Libya. At today's meeting of the
European Union's interior ministers in Luxembourg, Italy and Malta called on the EU to activate a 2001 directive to
grant temporary protection to migrants in cases of mass influx and to share the burden of absorbing the
newcomers. But ministers flatly turned down the proposal. The European Commission described the call as premature, but
said the EU was offering solidarity in other ways, including money and additional surveillance teams provided by the EU's Frontex border
agency. Malta would be helped on a voluntary basis in resettling boat people, given its small size and the fact that most of its newcomers are
people fleeing war in Libya. Italy is confronted by a bigger wave, but its boat people are mainly economic
migrants rather than refugees who have taken to the sea because of the economic crisis in Tunisia
after its pro-democracy revolution, and because border controls have become laxer after the downfall of President Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali. In any case, say fellow ministers, the flow of migrants to Italy is nothing like the influx of refugees into Europe (mainly
Germany) during the Balkan wars, in response to which the EU directive was adopted. Nonetheless, Roberto Maroni, the Italian
interior minister, complained bitterly that the EU had abandoned Italy (video here, in Italian). I ask myself if it makes sense to continue
in this position: of continuing to be part of the European Union, an institution that is activated immediately to save banks, to declare warbut
when it is a matter of expressing solidarity with a country in difficulty, such as Italy, it hides. He said that his country had been
told: Dear Italy. It's your business. Manage it on your own. If this is the attitude of the EU, he
declared, we are better off alone than in bad company. Such comments are not entirely unexpected from a leading
member of the anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic Northern League, except that Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, had offered similar
sentiments a day earlier during a visit to Lampedusa: Either Europe is something concrete, or it would be best to part ways. Nobody expects
Italy, a founding member of the EU, to begin proceedings to withdraw. Its lashing out at outside foes may be a sign of a political system that is
in fibrillation because of the multiple legal cases against Mr Berlusconi (he was in court today, denouncing "leftist" magistrates). Yet the anti-
Europe mood has been harsh enough to alarm President Giorgio Napolitano (report here, in Italian). Italy is resorting to a ruse that other
countries suspect is a blatant attempt to export its problem: granting all arrivals from Tunisia temporary protection in Italy. In theory this would
allow them to travel freely throughout the passport-free Schengen area, and most can be expected to take the opportunity to slip across the
Alps to other countries, above all to France. Over the weekend, the Italian finance minister, Giulio Tremonti, seemed to issue a veiled warning:
A cheque that needs to be honoured has arrived in Italy, but it will not stop in Lampedusa. It will arrive in Germany, in the north and all over
Europe. French authorities have already stepped up identity checks in areas near the border with Italy. Claude Guant, the French interior
minister, said about 2,800 Tunisians had been caught so far in the past month, of whom about 1,700 have been expelled back to Italy. He and
Mr Maroni met last week to smoothe over their row over the handling of migrants, agreeing to conduct more joint patrols in the
Mediterranean. But Mr Guant would not yield on the substance of the disagreement. Italy had a right to issue temporary permits, he said;
France had a right to check whether Tunisians arriving from Italy had a proper passport as well as funds to support themselves, as stipulated
under Schengen rules. Every country in Schengen had to bear its responsibilities, he said. Italy was not the only country with a migration
problem: France had to contend with thousands of illegal Afghan and Pakistani migrants who congregate around Calais to try to slip across the
Channel to Britain. Others have been more openly critical of Italy. I was quite dissatisfied with Italy's surprise decision to
pass on its problems to all the others without prior notice, said Gerd Leers, the Dutch minister for
immigration and asylum. Austria's interior minister, Maria Fekter, said her country would investigate means of stopping migrants from
crossing its borders. Similarly, the German states of Bavaria and Hesse said they might introduce border checks. Migration is likely to
be a contentious issue at June's European summit (see this paper by the Centre for European Reform). With anti-
immigrant parties on the rise across Europe, the dispute has great potential to degenerate. Like the euro,
which requires mutual trust among members about their readiness to preserve sound public finances, the Schengen area relies on
mutual trust about the capacity of members to control their borders and migration flows. But Italy
threatens all that: rather than acting as a dam and reservoir for migrants, it would rather be a weir, allowing the human flow to pass over it. In
the euro crisis, creditors and debtors alike wondered whether they would be better off without the other. Now it is the countries of the
Schengen borderless travel area that are starting to question another of Europe's great integration projects.

Only a unified EU can solve extinction --- environment, diseases, and economy.
Bruton 1 (John, Deputy, Joint Committee on European Affairs, The Future of the European Union , 10/2001,
www.irlgov.ie/committees-02/c-europeanaffairs/future/page1.htm)
As the Laeken Declaration put it, "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of
globalisation" adding that Europe must exercise its power in order "to set globalisation within a moral
framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development". 2.6 Only a strong
European Union is big enough to create a space, and a stable set of rules, within which all Europeans can live securely,
move freely, and provide for themselves, for their families and for their old age. Individual states are too small to do that on
their own. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with the globalised human diseases ,
such as AIDS and tuberculosis. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised criminal conspiracies, like the
Mafia, that threaten the security of all Europeans. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised
environmental threats, such as global warming, which threaten our continent and generations of its
future inhabitants. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised economic forces, which could
spread recession from one country to another and destroy millions of jobs. Only a strong European Union is big enough to regulate, in the
interests of society as a whole, the activities of profit seeking private corporations, some of which now have more spending power than many
individual states. 2.7 These tasks are too large for individual states. 2.8 Only by coming together in the European Union can
we ensure that humanity, and the values which make us, as individuals, truly human , prevail over blind global forces
that will otherwise overwhelm us.
Impact Global stability/war
Saudi stability is critical to preventing global war.
Copley 2 (Gregory, Editor GIS, Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 5-22-02, LexisNexis)
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia's problems have become the problems of virtually the entire Muslim
ummah ( nation ), and are perhaps the real core of the schism between Western and Muslim societies.
The danger exists that the Saudi leadership could still collapse in the near future and the integrity of
the Saudi State could come into question. The problems in Saudi Arabia -- decades in the making -- are
at the geopolitical heart of Islam, thus affecting most of the Muslim world and the relationship
between Islamic societies and the West. The phenomena of Osama bin Laden's worldwide terrorism
network, the radical Islamist anti-state activities under Sudan's Dr Hassan al-Turabi, the related and
parallel evolution of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the direction of the Chechen rebellion, and so on, all
owe much to the evolving problems in Saudi Arabia as well as to the radical clerics in Iran. Not even
Saudi Arabia's leadership has acknowledged the extent of the crisis, although privately many leading
Saudi princes have admitted the prospect of an imminent collapse of the House of Sa'ud. Saudi Arabia's
problems have an immediate bearing on whether major war occurs between Israel and its neighbors ,
and whether Saudi Arabia survives with its present form of government. They are therefore critical to
the global economy and global strategic stability.
Impact - Middle East War

High oil prices are key to stabilize the Middle East.
Freidman 8 (George, CEO of Stratfor, American political scientist and author, The Geopolitics of $130 Oil,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitics_130_oil)
As we have already said, the biggest winners are the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Although somewhat strained, these countries
never really suffered during the period of low oil prices. They have now more than rebalanced their
financial system and are making the most of it. This is a time when they absolutely do not want
anything disrupting the flow of oil from their region. Closing the Strait of Hormuz, for example, would be disastrous to
them. We therefore see the Saudis, in particular, taking steps to stabilize the region . This includes supporting
Israeli-Syrian peace talks , using influence with Sunnis in Iraq to confront al Qaeda , making certain
that Shiites in Saudi Arabia profit from the boom. (Other Gulf countries are doing the same with their Shiites. This is
designed to remove one of Iran's levers in the region: a rising of Shiites in the Arabian Peninsula.) In addition, the Saudis are using
their economic power to re-establish the relationship they had with the United States before 9/11. With the
financial institutions in the United States in disarray, the Arabian Peninsula can be very helpful.

Middle East war goes nuclear and escalates --- structural factors dont check.
Primakov 9 (Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Russian Federation, Member
of Russian Academy of Science, The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations, Russia in
Global Affairs, July-September 2009, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593)
The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally . During the Cold War,
amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union
supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time
objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the
United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both
superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt
(which followed Cairos decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States contrary to the widespread belief in various
countries, including Russia not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed along with the Soviet Union for the
cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world
and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global
dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington
urged each other to cool down their clients. When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not
intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On
July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the
Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later
claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S.
Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated
itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military
involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle
East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of
interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a
private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done
amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in
Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to demonstrate Soviet military presence in Egypt in
response to Israels refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and
Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by
the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global
confrontation . After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of
the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion
no longer conforms to the reality . The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The
disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a
direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already
made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level
that would let it make such a decision (the Japanese model) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens
a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region , which would have catastrophic
consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened
the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the
latters danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle
East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike
against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a
strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obamas
position does not completely rule out such a possibility.


Impact - Prolif
Saudi Arabian instability leads to proliferation --- destabilizes neighboring states.
NPC 4 (Naval Postgraduate School, Summary Notes of the Center for Contemporary Conflict Conference on
WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century, 6/28-30/04,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/conferences/recent/jun04mideast.pdf)
The panel on Saudi Arabia focused on Saudi Arabias strategic problems and the issue of nuclear
weapons in Saudi developing security calculus. James Russell from the Naval Postgraduate School presented an argument that the
strategic problems facing Saudi Arabia are causing it to consider acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the
context of upgrading and/or replacing itsCSS-2 missiles bought from China in the late 1980s. Russell outlined a set of changing strategic
circumstances, which are combining to bring the issue of nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh. First, the U.S.
relationship upon which Saudi Arabias security has been founded is in an uncertain state. Second, the
region environment is becoming more threatening due to Irans nuclear aspirations and the prospect of a
Shia-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and reduce the maneuver room
available to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums. A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclear
would cause a cascade of regional proliferation. Potential internal instability within the Kingdom
also makes Saudi Arabia a particularly dangerous proliferation case . Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistans
nuclear program, in addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestive of an interest in nuclear
capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limitedthe United Stated cannot push Saudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close.
Discussions of the issue raised the question, Are Saudi nuclear noises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?
That spills over and escalates to nuclear war.
Edelman et al. 11 (Eric, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Andrew
F. Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Evan Barden Montgomery,
Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran, Foreign
Affairs, January-February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-
krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could
accelerate throughout the region . Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would
face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian
coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim
world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear
weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During
the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation
throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for
the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have
had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several
different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could
provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce
nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such
support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing
facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a
substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy
nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This
arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating
the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one
from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would
accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear
weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps
the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear
weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless
of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means,
would be highly destabilizing . It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to
pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the
remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons
weakens the nonproliferation regime , even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents,
rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would
count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most
analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction
among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation
than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with
an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift
quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the
Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a
nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each
side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its
opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive
but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close
proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might
be compelled to " launch on warning " of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of
miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an
unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be
unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to
accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to
respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party,
potentially triggering a regional nuclear war . Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear
weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links,
which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able
to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and
that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they
might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.
Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East,
other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region
by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead
miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the
emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside
power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it
needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The
ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the
emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game , with unpredictable
consequences.
Impact US-Saudi Relations
High oil prices are key to re-establish US-Saudi relations.
Freidman 8 (George, CEO of Stratfor, American political scientist and author, The Geopolitics of $130 Oil,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitics_130_oil)
**also in Middle East War module
As we have already said, the biggest winners are the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Although somewhat strained, these countries
never really suffered during the period of low oil prices. They have now more than rebalanced their
financial system and are making the most of it. This is a time when they absolutely do not want
anything disrupting the flow of oil from their region. Closing the Strait of Hormuz, for example, would be disastrous to
them. We therefore see the Saudis, in particular, taking steps to stabilize the region. This includes supporting
Israeli-Syrian peace talks, using influence with Sunnis in Iraq to confront al Qaeda, making certain that
Shiites in Saudi Arabia profit from the boom. (Other Gulf countries are doing the same with their Shiites. This is designed to
remove one of Iran's levers in the region: a rising of Shiites in the Arabian Peninsula.) In addition, the Saudis are using their
economic power to re-establish the relationship they had with the United S tates before 9/11. With the
financial institutions in the United States in disarray, the Arabian Peninsula can be very helpful.

That solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war --- regional instability and proliferation.
Russel 2 (James, Senior Lecturer for the Department of National Security Affiars Deconstructing the US-Saudi
Partnership?, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, 9-3-2002,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/CCC/publications/OnlineJournal/2002/sept02/middleEast2.html)
As a lynchpin of U.S. security strategy and policy in the Persian Gulf for over 50 years, Washington's
relationship with Riyadh and the House of Al Saud has been a foundation of stability amidst the region's
currents of instability. However bad things may have been in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, southern Lebanon or any number of other
situations, the U.S.-Saudi relationship provided all concerned with a degree of assurance that events
would not spin completely out of control. But this relationship is now under more pressure than at
any time in recent memory. Various commentators have suggested that the partnership should be restructured to reflect what is
described as a fundamentally adversarial relationship.[1] The inference from such arguments is that a strong U.S.-Saudi
relationship no longer serves U.S. strategic interests. Much of the commentary on the U.S.-Saudi
relationship focuses on supposed broad policy incongruence between the two countries. The two countries are said to
differ in their approach to terrorism, religion, pluralism, human rights, the Arab-Israeli conflict, possible military action against Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia's role and importance in world oil markets. Often left out from this commentary are the ongoing activities between the
two countries that helped preserve regional security and stability over the decades, which stemmed in part from
a shared strategic vision. While the term has become de rigeur of late, the United States could not have pursued its policy of "dual
containment" during the 1990s without Saudi support. While many critics have emphasized that the policy had negligible impact on Iran, the
policy of containment helped prevent Saddam Hussein from seriously disrupting regional peace and
security during the 1990s. The Iraqi military remains hamstrung by a decade of sanctions, and WMD breakout was certainly
made more difficult during the UNSCOM era. Suggestions that the U.S.-Saudi relationship needs to be altered often ignore the
organizations that have been created to manage this partnership - organizations that reflect a depth and complexity in Saudi-American
relations that is generally unappreciated. In and of themselves, these entities and their activities do not justify preserving the status quo, but
they do suggest that the U.S.-Saudi security partnership could be deconstructed only with great difficulty and with dramatic and unforeseen
consequences for regional security.
AT: No link - Venezuelan oil insignificant
Venezuela holds the worlds largest oil reserves --- surpassed Saudi Arabia.
Rowling 12 (Rupert, Venezuela Passes Saudis to Hold Worlds Biggest Oil Reserves, Bloomberg, 6/13/12,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-13/venezuela-overtakes-saudis-for-largest-oil-reserves-bp-says-1-
.html)
Venezuela surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the worlds largest holder of proven oil reserves , a
resource that President Hugo Chavez promises to tap if he gets re-elected in October. The South American countrys deposits
were at 296.5 billion barrels at the end of last year, data from BP Plc (BP/) show. Saudi Arabia held 265.4 billion
barrels, BP said yesterday in its annual Statistical Review of World Energy. The 2010 estimate for Venezuela increased from 211.2 billion in
the previous report. These reserves are quantified and certified by third parties and recognized by the
entire world as being the biggest proven reserves of the world, Venezuelas Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said today in
Vienna. We have always said that in the future the natural resources will become scarce and when the economy recovers and demand will
come back then we will be one of the few countries able to respond to that. Chavez wants to more than double the countrys oil- production
capacity to 6 million barrels a day by 2019, according to a government plan released June 12. The worlds biggest oil-exporting nations faced a
15 percent slump in crude prices last month, the biggest decline since December 2008, on speculation Europes debt crisis would derail the
global economic recovery. Ramirez has said oil prices need to be higher than $100 a barrel. The recent slump in crude is dangerous for
producers, the oil minister said June 12 in Vienna, where the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is meeting today to decide
production quotas.

Russian Oil Supplement
Oil prices high
1NC
Oil prices at 2013 high --- Middle East and US jobs report.
Otter 7-5-13 (Jack, Oil Prices Hit High For the Year, Energy Stocks Up, Barrons Stocks to Watch,
http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/07/05/oil-prices-hit-high-for-the-year-energy-stocks-up/)
Oil prices hit a 2013 high today, driven higher by fears of unrest in the Middle East as well as evidence
that the U.S. economy does, indeed have a pulse. Energy stocks, on the whole, moved higher. The Energy Select Sector SPDR
(XLE) was up nearly 1% shortly before the market close. Oil futures closed above $103, up almost 2% on the day and 7% on the
week. The military coup in Egypt has raised fears of a supply disruption. There was more turmoil today and reports of
shots fired in a confrontation between supporters of recently ousted president Mohammed Morsi and those who opposed his rule. In
domestic news, the Labor Department announced that the U.S. economy added 195,000 jobs in June,
beating expectations and adding evidence that the recovery may be picking up steam. Better growth
could push oil prices higher. Even while the August futures contract increased, prices at the pump are falling, as inventories rise.
The average price per gallon is $3.47 according to AAA, down 5% in less than a month.
2NC
Oil prices up --- US supply drop.
Fahey 7-3-13 (Jonathan, AP Energy writer, Oil: Price above $101 on U.S. supply drop, Egypt,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Oil_Price_above_101_on_US_supply_drop_Egypt/20130703_49_0_NEW
YOR287288?subj=298)
NEW YORK The price of oil rose to its highest level in 14 months on concerns about possible disruptions to
Middle East supplies and signs of an increase in U.S. demand for fuel. U.S. benchmark oil gained $1.64 to $101.24, its
highest close since May 3, 2012. Brent crude, which is used to price oil used by many U.S. refineries to make gasoline, rose $1.76 to finish at
$105.76. Two events propelled the price of oil above $100 a barrel for the first time since the middle of September: unrest in Egypt, and a big
drop in U.S. oil supplies. Traders were worried that political upheaval in Egypt could slow the flow of oil from the Middle East to world
markets. Embattled Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi vowed not to give in to protesters' demands for his resignation. But the head of
Egypt's military announced late Wednesday night local time that Morsi will be replaced and new elections will be held. Egypt is not an oil
producer but it control of one of the world's busiest shipping lanes gives it a crucial role in maintaining global energy supplies. The Middle East
accounts for about a quarter of the world's crude oil output, or 23 million barrels per day. About 2 million barrels of that, or 2.2 percent of
world demand, are transported daily through the Suez Canal, which links the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. Much of that oil is headed to
Europe, but a supply drop anywhere in the world leads to higher prices everywhere. "Markets tend to advance sharply on uncertainty and will
often price in a worst case scenario. This appears to be the case with the unfolding situation in Egypt," wrote Jim Ritterbusch, president of
energy consultancy Ritterbusch and Associates, in a note to clients. Some analysts suggested market reaction to the political crisis in Egypt was
exaggerated. "If there is one thing that the military has control of in Egypt it is the Suez Canal. We therefore do not see a significant risk for
free passage on the waterway," said Olivier Jakob of Petromatrix in Switzerland. In the U.S., the Energy Department reported
Wednesday that crude supplies fell by 10.3 million barrels from the previous week, more than three
times the drop that analysts had expected. The drop was likely the result of reduced supplies from
Canada because of a temporary pipeline shutdown there, as well as increased demand from a BP
refinery that restarted in Indiana. Gasoline supplies fell as well, while analysts expected an increase.
The drop in oil and gas supplies could be an indication that U.S. demand is rising. The rising price of oil could end what has been a streak of 21
days of lower U.S. retail gasoline prices. The average U.S. pump price fell less than a penny Wednesday to $3.48 per gallon. Analysts do not
think the spike in oil prices will lead to sharply higher gasoline prices, though, because U.S. crude supplies remain high and refineries are turning
out plenty of gasoline. U.S. commodities markets are closed Thursday for the July Fourth holiday.
Oil prices are at 2013 high --- Egypt.
Smith 7-5-13 (John, CNN Money reporter,Oil prices at 2013 high above $103 a barrel, CNN Money,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/05/investing/oil-prices-egypt/)
U.S. oil futures for the August contract rose $1.98, or nearly 2%, to settle at $103.22 a barrel. That's the
highest closing price since May 2, 2012, when oil settled at $105.22 per barrel.
The Egyptian army seized control of the government Wednesday amid violent protests, deposing the
country's first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsy of the Muslim Brotherhood. On
Friday, the African Union announced that it was suspending Egypt.
Egypt produces a negligible amount of oil. But the Suez Canal, which passes through the north African
nation, is a major thoroughfare for oil shipping that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf. "I think most folks don't believe that violence in Egypt is going to cause a shutdown of
the Suez Canal," said Tom Kloza, chief oil analyst for Gasbuddy.com. But he also said that military coups
make traders nervous about energy supply, prompting them to buy oil and drive up prices. Oil was on
the rise even before the Egyptian coup. Oil prices have climbed more than 8% in the last month ,
driven by economic growth. Brent crude, the benchmark for oil prices in Europe, rose $1.67, or 1.6%, to
$107.43 a barrel.

Oil prices high --- uncertainty over Egyptian situation.
Reuters 7-6-13 (Reuters, Supply concerns send oil prices soaring above $ 107 per barrel, Arab News,
http://www.arabnews.com/news/457157)
NEW YORK: Brent crude oil prices were trading above $ 107 per barrel for the first time in three months
yesterday, underpinned by political unrest in Egypt that continued to fuel concerns of oil supply disruptions in the Middle East. US crude
oil prices maintained a 14-month high, supported by data showing US employers added more jobs
than expected in June, as other commodity prices sank. The news pushed the US dollar to a near three-year high against a basket of
currencies, which can lead to lower oil prices. Commodities priced in dollars become more expensive for holders of other currencies as the
dollar strengthens. But the crude oil market interpreted the data as a positive, said Matt Smith, commodity analyst at Schneider Electric in
Louisville, Kentucky "because it means we're going to see a stronger economy." Still, crude oil in other currencies is becoming more expensive
and "will provide headwinds at some point," Smith added. The positive data fueled investor fear that the US Federal Reserve may taper its
stimulus program. That coupled with recent reports of weaker economic data out of China caused other commodities prices to collapse. Gold
lost 3 percent and copper was down more than 2 percent. Brent crude oil for August delivery LCOc1 was last trading $ 1.80 per barrel higher at
$ 107.34 by 11:52 a.m. EDT (1552 GMT) after hitting a high of $ 107.40 a barrel. Front-month US crude oil futures CLc1 were up $1.63 per
barrel to $ 102.87 a barrel after hitting a high of $ 102.92. The Egyptian military took control of the nation on
Wednesday. So far, ports and shipping through the Suez Canal have been operating normally, two
shipping sources and a canal official said. The Middle East pumps a third of the world's oil and the Suez Canal and Suez-
Mediterranean pipeline were responsible for transiting some 2.2 million barrels per day of oil into the Mediterranean Sea in 2011, according to
U.S. government data. Libya's largest export terminal was shut late on Thursday. Port guards locked the gate over salary complaints,
preventing workers from continuing operations. Investors remained on edge and were pricing in risk of Mideast supply disruptions should
conflict spread to other regional nations, analysts said. The Egyptian uncertainty added to existing supply worries. Almost all physical crude
grades consumed by Europe are now short including Russian, Iraqi, Libyan and African grades. North Sea supplies, which underpin the Brent
contract, are expected to be extremely low in the coming months when main grade Forties output is reduced due to maintenance in August.
The spread between the Brent oil contracts of August and September LCOQ3-U3 widened to 79 cents, the highest in nearly five months.
Strong employment figures from the United States underpinned futures but support from the data
could be short lived. US job growth increased more than expected in June, which could draw the Federal Reserve closer to scaling back
its massive monetary stimulus later this year, which would sap liquidity and drag on commodity prices. Employers added 195,000 new jobs to
their payrolls last month, the Labor Department said yesterday, while the unemployment rate held steady at 7.6 percent as more people
entered the work force. The closely watched spread between global benchmark Brent crude oil and US West Texas Intermediate CL- had
widened to $ 5.17 per barrel and was last trading around $ 4.50. Brent's premium to WTI crude at one point on Wednesday narrowed to
$3.09, the weakest since December 2010.

Oil prices high --- US jobs on the rise.
AP 7-5-13 (Associated Press, Oil Price Climbs After Strong US Jobs Report, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=199063522)
NEW YORK (AP) The price of oil marched higher Friday with a positive report on U.S. hiring and ongoing
concerns about the crisis in Egypt. Benchmark crude for August delivery rose $1.98, or 2 percent, to finish at
$103.22 per barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. That's the highest closing price since May 2, 2012.
Following the ouster of Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi on Wednesday, his supporters began a series of protests and attacks Friday. The
military opened fire as hundreds of protesters marched on a headquarters of the Republican Guard Egypt is not an oil-producer, but its control
of the Suez Canal, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, gives it a crucial role in maintaining global energy supplies. For now supplies are
moving freely through the canal. U.S. employers added a robust 195,000 jobs in June and many more in April and May
than previously thought. The job growth suggests a stronger economy and makes it more likely the Federal Reserve will slow
its bond purchases before year's end. Those bond purchases have supported the economy by helping keep long-term interest rates low. That
in turn has given a boost to investments such as stocks and oil. At the pump, the national average for a gallon of gas stayed at $3.48 for the
third straight day. That's down 14 cents from a month ago and 14 cents higher than a year ago. Brent crude, which is used to set prices for
crude oils used by many U.S. refineries, rose $2.18, or 2.1 percent, to end at $107.72 per barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London.



US not increasing now
1NC
US will produce less oil in the future --- downward escalator of the economy.
Tverberg 7-4-13 (Gail, M.S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, Fellow of the Casualty
Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, Why Deflation will Cause Oil Production
to Slow, Oil Price, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Why-Deflation-will-Cause-Oil-Production-to-Slow.html)
Each year, an economy produces various kinds of goods and services. It grows crops, and extracts minerals. It uses energy products to process
the crops and minerals into finished goods, and to transport them to their final destination. The amount produced depends on the amount of
goods and services potential buyers can afford. If wages are stagnant, and the governments share keeps rising, the amount wage-earners can
afford (in inflation adjusted dollars) keeps falling. Since the early 2000s, the cost of extracting oil products has been rising,
because the oil that was cheapest to extract was extracted first, and the easy oil is now gone. There tends to be a relatively small
amount of a resource available cheaply, and increasing amounts available at higher and higher prices (Figure 2, below). In fact, minerals of all
types tend to follow the same pattern as oil for two reasons: (1) Mineral extraction follows the same patterncheapest to extract first, moving
to the more expensive to extract, and (2) Oil is generally used in extraction. If the cost of oil is rising, its cost tends to get passed on. Of course,
in some instances, technological improvements can offset rising prices, but for most of the time since the year 2000, cost of commodity
extraction has tended to rise. There has been a lot of publicity recently about more oil being available, and more
natural gas being available. This additional availability is because of high price. It doesnt bring the cost of extraction down.
In fact, if price drops, extraction is likely to drop. This drop will not occur immediately, because much of the cost has already
been paid on wells that have already been drilled, so extraction from these wells tends to continue. But future investment is likely to drop off
quickly if prices drop, bringing supply down, with a lag. Because of the downward escalator the economy is on, wage-
earners dont really have enough money to pay the higher prices that are needed for increasingly
costly extraction of oil and other minerals. Instead, prices tend to be volatile. The general trend can be expected to
be downward , because even if oil prices rise when the economy is functioning fairly well, at some
point, the higher price leads to adverse feedbacks, such as consumers defaulting on debt and cutting
back on discretionary purchases. The result can be expected to be recession, and again lower oil prices. The big
danger is that lower oil prices will lead to lower oil production , and this lower oil production will become a problem for
business and commerce around the world. The United States is likely to be one of the countries whose oil production
will be affected most by lower oil prices, for three reasons: (1) We tend to have most tight oil
production, and tight oil production tends to be high-priced production. It also drops off quite quickly, if drilling stops. (2) Shale gas
drillers tend to use a lot of debt. Shale drillers will especially be hit if interest rates rise because of debt problems. (3) Taxes
and fees related to oil production in the US (unlike many countries) do not vary with the price of oil.
The US government will continue to get most of its revenue (estimated to average $33.29 per barrel on a $80 barrel of US tight oil by Barry
Rogers, Oil & Gas Journal, May 2013), even as companies find themselves short of funds for new drilling.

2NC
Eventual cost limit means energy production will slow in the future.
Tverberg 6-2-13 (Gail, M.S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, Fellow of the Casualty
Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, Rising Costs are Putting Limits on Energy
Production, Oil Prices, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Rising-Costs-are-Putting-Limits-on-Energy-
Production.html)
Rising Costs are Putting Limits on Energy Production. The energy limit we are running into is a cost
limit . I would argue that neither the Republican or Democrat approach to solving the problem will really work. The Republicans
favor Drill Baby Drill. If the issue is that the price of oil extraction is too high, additional drilling
doesnt really fix the problem. At best, it gives us a little more expensive oil to add to the worlds
supply. The Wall Street research firm Sanford Bernstein recently estimated that the non-Opec marginal cost of production rose to $104.50 a
barrel in 2012, up more than 13 per cent from $92.30 a barrel in 2011. US consumers still cannot afford to buy high-priced
oil, even if we extract the oil ourselves. The countries that see rising oil consumption tend to be ones
that can leverage its use better with cheaper fuels, particularly coal (Figure 1). See Why coal consumption keeps
rising; what economists missed. The recent reduction in US oil usage is more related to young people not being able to afford to drive than it is
to improved automobile efficiency. See my post, Why is gasoline mileage lower? Better gasoline mileage?
Russian econ high
1NC
Russian economy is structurally doing well --- experts agree.
Kuzmin 6-12-13 (Viktor, Reviewing 22 years of modernization in Russian economy, Johnsons Russia List,
http://russialist.org/reviewing-22-years-of-modernization-in-russian-economy/)
In 2009, the Russian economy fell by almost 8 percent, alarming many citizens who feared a repeat of the crash in 1998, when whole branches
of industry came to a standstill, the most systemically important banks went bust and candy wrappers almost became currency. Drawing
lessons from the 1990s However, it turned out that Russia had learned the hard lessons of the late 1990s, grasping the
importance of living within ones means. For 13 years, the government did not allow a budget deficit, and only last
year, during the election period, did federal expenditure exceed revenues by 0.1 percent of GDP. Russias
public external debt is now among the lowest in the world . According to Timur Nigmatullin, an
expert at the analytical agency Investkafe , as of April 1, 2013, it stood at just $49.8 billion - with
national GDP at approximately $2 trillion. The main thank you should, of course, be reserved for
energy consumers. Oil and gas make up more than 50 percent of budget income (based on 2012 figures),
making the public finances extremely sensitive to fluctuations in world commodity prices, on the one hand, and recessions and global
downturns relatively painless, on the other. Drawing lessons from the 1990s, Russia now invests some of the surplus from the export of raw
materials into various special funds, and these piggy banks certainly cushioned the 2008-2009 crisis - despite a 7.8 percent drop in GDP and a 3-
4 fold reduction in world energy prices. The economy withstood the shock through an extensive program of financial support from
government reserves. That fact has been acknowledged by rating companies, which have gradually increased Russias sovereign rating to
investment grade - albeit at the lowest boundary. Moodys assigned a rating of Baa1 with a stable outlook, while Fitch and S&P opted for BBB
(stable). Russia is a more profitable investment today than at some point in the rosy future when the measures adopted to
improve the investment climate and economic growth will kick in. The ideology at work here is the same as on the stock market: It is more
profitable to buy shares when the price is relatively low. And now costs are modest, Karina Artemyeva, head of analysis at National Rating
Agency, told RBTH.

2NC
Statistics prove Russia is doing better than expected.
ITAR 6-20-13 (Information Telegraph Agency of Russia, Russian economy has good outlook, and it is
absolutely healthy - Putin, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c32/779450.html)
ST. PETERSBURG, June 20 (Itar-Tass) - Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the B2 meeting with representatives of
business community that unlike in the United States and countries of the Eurozone, the Russian economy has good
outlook. "The unemployment level in Russia is 5.5%, the lowest in its modern history. The GDP grew at a rate of
3.4%, which is comparable to world levels; our inflation rate is still high but it is the lowest in the history
of modern Russia. Our budget has the minimal foreign debt of 2.5% of GDP, the Russian leader said.
Nevertheless, Putin said that the global economic situation was a source of concern for Russia. "If the whole world shrinks, then our
economy will face the same consequences. We can find effective ways out of the situation only if we join our efforts, Putin
went on to say. Of course, it will be extremely dangerous if we lock ourselves up in national apartments given the complexity of problems that
we are facing, the Russian president emphasized. He admitted that it would be difficult to avoid that. However, Putin believes
that its possible to solve the aforesaid problems if the state and business find joint solutions. Putin also
called for liquidation of absolutely unjustified restrictions imposed on banks that invest in economies of other countries. "Obviously, this is
an obstacle to the investment process, and I would like to call your attention to it. Of course, we are going to raise this subject at the G-20
summit. But I would also like you, ladies and gentlemen, to urge your regulatory bodies to remove unjustified restrictions, the president told
businessmen. "At the governmental level, we will certainly do that. It seems to me that the business community is interested in lifting
absolutely ungrounded restrictions. They should be liquidated, Putin said.

Russias rich!
Moscow Times 7-4-13 (IMF Upgrades Russia to Rich,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/imf-upgrades-russia-to-rich/482727.html)
The Russian Federation has been reclassified as a high-income economy by the International
Monetary Fund on the basis of a gross national income of $12,700 per capita, Kommersant reported
Thursday. For the past ten years, Russia has been classified as a middle-income economy. The latest
figures from the World Bank show that the country has nearly caught up with the majority of
developed countries. The new status may facilitate Russia's entry into the OECD. However, OECD
president Jose Angel Gurria has repeatedly stated that membership in the organization is dependent on
compliance with a number of criteria, of which income level is only one. Russia joins a list of 75
countries with the status of a high-income economy.
Russian oil high

Rosneft led Russian oil production to post-Soviet record.
Reuters 7-2-13 (Moscow Reuters, Rosneft drives Russian oil output to post-Soviet high,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/rosneft-drives-
russian-oil-output-to-post-soviet-high/article12918682/)
State-owned OAO Rosneft led the Russian oil industry to another post-Soviet output record in June as
it continued ramping up production at eastern fields key to its China ambitions, Energy Ministry data showed on Tuesday.
The main field driving output growth, Vankor, is the single largest field supplying China and surrounding fields are due to be tapped in coming
years to ensure the output gains necessary for Rosnefts promise to triple Chinese deliveries to nearly 1 million barrels a day in the future.
However, Rosnefts drive to boost the eastward route has been hampered by output decreases at TNK-BP, acquired in March for nearly $55-
billion (U.S.), which has been struggling to stem long-lasting production decline at old fields in West Siberia and other regions. Rosneft, headed
by Igor Sechin, an influential ally of President Vladimir Putin, acquired TNK-BP from BP and a consortium of Soviet-born tycoons earlier this
year, while BP became a shareholder in Rosneft. TNK-BP outputs output declined 1.4 per cent in the first half of this year compared to the first
half of last year, thought it saw a small uptick month-on-month in June. We saw a decline in drilling activity by 8 per cent in the first five
months of the year at TNK-BP. Partially, this was due to the period of uncertainty following the Rosneft acquisition, Valery Nesterov, an analyst
from Sberbank CIB, said. In the first six months of 2013, Russias total oil production, the worlds largest,
averaged 10.47 million b/d, up 1.4 per cent from the same period a year earlier and above a target of 1 per cent set by the ministry
for this year. According to Nesterov, consolidated oil output at Rosneft, excluding TNK-BP and subsidiaries, increased by 2.4 per cent in
January-June thanks to the new Vankor field. Russia, where proceeds from oil and gas constitute around half of
the federal budget revenues, aims to produce at least 10 million b/d of oil this decade. In June, Russias daily oil production rose by
around 0.5 per cent to 10.53 million barrels from May. The previous post-Soviet record monthly peak of 10.50 million
b/d was reached in December. Russian production in June was higher than 9.5 million b/d pumped by Saudi Arabia. In tonnes, Russias total
crude production was 43.083 million last month. Last months increase was mainly due to a production ramp up at TNK-BP Holding, now 95
per cent owned by Rosneft and presented separately in the Energy Ministry data. The company increased its oil production
1.4 per cent in June, month-on-month, thanks to recovery of output at its Orenburg subsidiary in the Volga Urals region, where fields
have been developed for over 75 years and are among Russias oldest. Production at Orenburg rose by 2 per cent in June from May but six
months output declined there by 1.8 per cent, year-on-year.



AT: US oil insignificant
The marginal effect that US oil production tips the scale of world prices.
Smith 7-1-13 (Karl, Assistant Professor of Economics and Government at the School of Government at the
University of North Carolina, Yes Virginia, US Oil Production Can Influence Global Prices, Forbes Modeled
Behavior, http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2013/07/01/yes-virginia-us-oil-production-can-
influence-global-prices/)
There are a couple of ways to tackle this. One is to note that the US produces roughly the same amount of Petroleum
Liquids (a bigger category than crude oil) as Saudi Arabia. Yet, conventional wisdom had been that Saudi Arabia
more or less controlled the global price of oil and gasoline by altering how much it supplied to the markets. If the Saudis cut
production oil prices, went up. If the ramped up production then oil prices went down. How can this be if they control roughly the same market
share as the US? The answer is that the price of oil is determined not by the overall amount of oil produced and consumed
but by whether slightly more oil is being produced than consumers want to buy or slightly less. If slightly
more is being produced then stockpiles will rise larger and larger over time. Stockpiles cant keep growing forever and as they build larger and
larger, vendors become eager to sell and cut the price. Similarly, as stockpiles shrink closer to zero, vendors become nervous that they will run
out and raise the prices. Folks can tack as much or as little cynicism about price gouging and manipulation, as there wont determines. Anyway
you slice it, however, the fundamental limit here is that when the tanks are full you cannot accept deliveries and when the tanks are dry you
cannot sell to consumers. Price has to change to keep those boundaries from being hit. So, the US doesnt have to produce so
much oil that it radically expands global production. It just has to produce enough to tilt the tanks
towards filling up, rather than emptying out. If we go to the charts, it looks like that is exactly what is happening. Below is the daily
price of oil produced in the Central US, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) in The two follow each other closely until about 2011. The US fracking
boom had started well before then. However, thats when oil started to pile up at Cushing, OK. The price of oil is pushed around by many
factors but its fair enough to say that the price of WTI (blue line) continued to sink throughout most of 2011 as the storage depots in Cushing,
Oklahoma became increasingly close to full capacity. In late 2011 Enbridge announced plans to reverse one its pipelines that moved oil from
the Texas coast to Cushing. Reversing the flow direction of a pipeline is no small matter, and the announcement helped ease concern that
Cushing would hit capacity. As a result the blue line rose close to the red line again. However, US production kept going and the Enbridge
reversal was not enough. Over time the gap between WTI and Brent opened up again. Only recently, have it begun to close. Yet, this time its
closing the other way. Brent is coming towards WTI. The result is that consumers are seeing a reduction in prices, related
to the US supply boom. Lets add gas prices to our chart and zoom in blue and the oil used by East Coast refineries, Brent Crude.
The green line is the price of gasoline (minus 49 cents for the average US tax.) With a bit of a delay and some diversions due to refinery outages,
the green line follows the red line. The price of gasoline is determined by the price of Brent. And, since the beginning of
this year the price of gasoline has slowly been coming down, even though the price of WTI has barely changed. In the coming weeks the price of
gasoline is likely to fall even more. There are currently some refinery outages in California and gasoline moves with a delay. This will save
consumers money at the pump, and its happening as the price of Brent converges on to the price of WTI. What
that implies is that US production is beginning to set the world price and the price that consumers pay. The
US is in economists terms the marginal producer. This state of affairs may not last long. The Saudis may attempt reassert
their role. Demand in Asia could pick up beyond what US production can meet, etc. However, its not clear that this will happen. Asian growth
is weakening. Iranian oil production is limited by sanctions. Both factors complicate the Saudis attempts to control prices. The landscape could
continue to shift in this direction. As it does, price will increasingly be set by the marginal producer and the marginal
producer right now, is US fracking operations.

China C.P.
1NC CP Text

Text: China should offer energy sector reform engagement to Venezuela if they cut
ties with Iran and end support of terrorist groups.

1NC Solvency

China can help Venezuelas oil sector and avoids crowding out the US.
Xiaoxia 5/6(Wang Xiaoxia reporter for the economic observer http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-
2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-
economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/ 05/06/2013 IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING
INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA)
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It
is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and
other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America.
Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the
energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent
reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States,
this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become
the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and
diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

Chinas investment in Latin American oil brings it to the global market just the same as
US action
GIGA 13 (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, The Dragon in the Backyard: US
Visions of Chinas Relations toward Latin America, 2013, http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf)
The same conicting opinions on Chinas presence in Latin America can also be seen with regard to Chinas
acquisition of Latin American oil and participation in the exploration of new oil deposits in the region. On
the one hand, a classic critique argues that every barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel
of Western hemispheric oil available to the United States market, making the oil issue a zero-sum
game.1 On the other hand, a more benign view of Chinese investment in oil exploration in Latin America contends that2 if
Washington takes a broad future-oriented perspective, we may be surprised at some of the common interests we share. That list of
shared or broadly compatible interests, in my view, includes the following: One, if China invests in oil and energy
resources in Latin America when others are not prepared to do so, the PRC is contributing to a larger
global pool of available energy. Latin American oil brought to the surface by Chinese probably is going
to end up in the United States.
Solves the Economy

China is key to Venezuelan recovery
Bruno 4/15(Alessandro Bruno is Senior Editor at ProEdgeWire http://investorintel.com/politics-intel/chavezs-political-heir-wins-but-
venezuela-collapsing-in-a-welfare-binge/#sthash.DzuJFclf.dpuf 4/15/2013 Chavezs political Heir wins while Venezuela collapses in Welfare
Binge)
The United Nations Human Development Index, measuring national progress in terms of education, health and income, has ranked
Venezuela as having the second highest growth rate in Latin America. Chavezs policy did have an effect in bringing
down poverty (though oil prices also increased significantly since 1998 when Chavez took power for the first time), lifting domestic market and
consumption, driving the construction and financial services sectors. While Chavez took all the praise for this program,
Maduro, with his much smaller victory margin than expected, will be left to pay the bill and Venezuela has engaged in
binge welfare. Oil exploration is crucial for recovery. The government plans to double its oil production to three million
barrels a day today to six million in 2019. This means that Venezuela will have to open to foreign investment. Had Capriles
won, the United States and the West would have likely come back to Venezuela. Under Maduro, foreign investment can
only mean one source: China. China has already become a key player, with loans totaling about $ 40
billion and such reliance will certainly increase now. China will likely demand even more privileged access to resources to
the Orinoco basin fields, among the most prolific in the world.


Uniqueness
Now is the key time for Venezuela-china relations to reform
Myers 3/30(Margaret Myers is director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue
http://www.chinaandlatinamerica.com/2013/03/the-future-of-china-venezuela-relations.html 3/30/13 The Future of China-Venezuela
Relations)
China has became a critical economic partner for Venezuela over the past decade. By means of the
"China-Venezuela Joint Fund" and other mechanisms, China's policy banks have offered more in loans to
Venezuela than to any other country. But what is the likelihood of continued high-level, bilateral
cooperation in a post-Chvez political environment? Tsinghua Universitys Matt Ferchen, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Sun Hongbo, and Venezuelan journalist, Andrs Rojas Jimnez,
debated the future of China-Venezuela relations at the Inter-American Dialogue on March 22nd. Sun
Hongbo opened with an optimistic view of the China-Venezuela relationship. Economic
complementarity, he suggested, will ensure cooperation between the two nations for the foreseeable
future. With respect to Chinas $40-$50 billion in loans to Venezuela, Sun also foresees little risk, noting
that Chinas loan contracts have sufficient precautions built in. Panelists insisted that however relations
progress, there is a need for greater transparency and accountability in financing agreements and loan
disbursement. All agreed that China and Venezuela will be taking a closer look at the nature of
bilateral relations in the coming months.


Now is the key time to reform the Venezuelan oil sector
Obel 03/07(Mike Obel assigns, edits and writes stories about business, markets,
finance and economics at International Business Times
Getting to that kind of output, even under the most favorable post-Chavez scenario, will require foreign energy
and energy-related companies. And that means change will be slow and incremental, analysts say "Foreign oil companies
desperately want to get in on Venezuelan oil, and, because of that, theyre very likely to accept deals that are not favorable
on the assumption that this is a long-term gamble and over time terms may improve, Velasco said. Right now, they just want to
get in on the game. So in short term, they are willing to accept unfavorable deals. Even if Mr. Maduro can
secure continued funding from China, we suspect that it is only a matter of time before the flaws in Venezuelas economic model
come to the fore. A hollowing out of local industry through a program of nationalizations has left the economy increasingly reliant upon
imports of many goods. But a lack of savings means that the authorities have only been able to sustain the
current level of consumption via FX debt and high oil revenues. As a result, the economy is extremely vulnerable to
lower oil prices. We have already penciled in a recession for this year. But if global oil prices fall below $100 per barrel for a sustained
period over the coming years, as we think likely, then there is a risk that Mr. Maduros presidency will culminate in a balance of payments crisis
and even a possible debt default.
China and Venezuela want increase diplomatic relations
AFP 3/9 (Agence France-Presse is a global news agency http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Peace/2013/03/09/Venezuela--China-vow-deeper-ties-after-Chavez-death 3/9/2013 VENEZUELA,
CHINA VOW DEEPER TIES AFTER CHAVEZ DEATH)
Venezuela's new acting president, Nicolas Maduro, held talks with a Chinese delegation on Saturday and the two sides
vowed to deepen strategic relations in honor of late leader Hugo Chavez. Maduro, who was sworn in late Friday, met
with the chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission, Zhang Ping, who represented
President Hu Jintao at Chavez's funeral. "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante Chavez is to deepen our
strategic relationship with our beloved China," said Maduro, who served as foreign minister for six years before becoming
vice president last year. Maduro, whose inauguration was rejected by the opposition as unconstitutional, thanked China for providing scientific
and medical support for Chavez's cancer treatment. Chavez lost his battle with cancer on Tuesday at age 58. Zhang recalled that Chavez
travelled to China six times during his 14-year presidency, forging a "great friendship" with the Chinese leadership. "We must join
efforts to continue developing and deepening relations between China and Venezuela. It's the only way to
comfort the soul of president Hugo Chavez," he told Maduro in the televised meeting. The Venezuelan government read a letter of
condolences it received from Hu, saying that Chavez's death caused "great pain" to the people of China. China is Venezuela's second
biggest trade partner, with Caracas delivering 600,000 barrels of oil per day to Beijing with plans to increase it to
one million in 2015, according to the Venezuelan government.
Oil Prices stuff
Venezuela needs IOCs to boost production and reduce global oil prices
White and Rowley 3/11(Garry White Questor Editor at Telegraph Media Group and Emma Rowley Journalist at Telegraph Media
Group http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/9920725/Death-of-Hugo-Chavez-propels-Venezuelan-oil-production-into-the-
spotlight.html 3/11/2013 Death of Hugo Chavez propels Venezuelan oil production into the spotlight)
It is likely that oil output could rise, should there be an easing of the countrys antagonism to foreign
investors. Some believe this could lead to a fall in the oil price and a consequent boost to the global
economy. The state oil company PDVSA has increasingly been handing over its income to fund various
government programmes, leaving it with negative cash flows for the past five years, Mr Hansen added. But once it does
another source of increased supply will further help to alleviate some of the worries about future
supply not keeping up with an increase in demand, especially from emerging economies, Mr Hansen said. Should production eventually rise,
which seems likely, the main loser is likely to be Canada. Venezuela positioned its oil industry away from the US to the
more friendly nationals of China and Russia. Goldman Sachs managed to sum up the consensus view, saying that Mr
Chavezs death should have limited impact on the nations oil production in the short term while a
change of leadership may foster longer-term investment and boost output. Venezuela needs foreign
oil companies to boost this output. Once it accepts this, and invites the oil majors to use their skills, global oil prices
should see some relief.

China involvement in Venezuela helps the U.S.
Xiaoxia 5/6(Wang Xiaoxia reporter for the economic observer http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-
2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-
economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/ 05/06/2013 IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING
INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA)
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It
is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and
other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America.
Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the
energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent
reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States,
this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become
the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and
diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.


PPP Key
Venezuela needs foreign investment to reform its energy sector
Mueller 02/07 (Philipp Mueller Assistant Manager at The Global Warming Policy Foundation
http://www.thegwpf.org/fossil-fuel-production-higher-venezuela/ 02/07/13 FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION
COULD BE MUCH HIGHER: THE EXAMPLE OF VENEZUELA)
For Venezuelas offshore gas production to expand in a meaningful way, international energy
companies will need to play a central role. PdVSA does not have experience in producing non-associated gas in
the companys most recent attempt at operating an offshore natural gas project resulted in the sinking of
the drilling rig in May 2010.[6]In 2011, PdVSA spent twice as much on government programmes as it did on
taxes, royalties and dividends. From 1999 to 2012, its foreign debt has risen fivefold. Moreover, oil union
leaders say PdVSAs industrial safety procedures have deteriorated sharply. The petroleum and mining ministrys
annual report shows that maintenance work is frequently postponed for lack of money.[15] Accidents have been
increasing. According to Eddie Ramirez, one of the sacked managers, the old PdVSA averaged less than two accidents per million man-hours.
In 2010, there were 9.4 accidents and almost six deaths per million man-hours. Jose Bodas, the head of the oil workers union, said: PdVSA
is falling to pieces. As long as you are a member of the PSUV, they do not care if you are incompetent.
Public-Private partnership key to oil reforms
Fry and Ibrahim 5/28 (Dr Fry is an Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the LLM Programme at the University of Hong Kong
Faculty of Law Mr Ibrahim is a Lecturer in Law at the Law School of the University of Medical Science and Technology in Khartoum, Sudan.
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/05/28/jwelb.jwt005.full#content-block 5/28/2013 Reassessing Venezuelas organic
hydrocarbon law: a balance between sovereignty and efficiency?)
The Bolivarian Republics laws aim to shape the oil industry based on state control, while keeping the doors open for much needed foreign
participation. Venezuelas Oil Minister, Rafael Ramirez, noted that without the private sectors participation
we will not be able to develop this plan .118 Although it has wisely allowed for private players to carry on with business, the
extent to which the state has seized control is a troubling aspect of Venezuelas hydrocarbon oil
policy. This is not because the state is ipso facto an incompetent actor, but rather because a state as keen as Venezuela in
asserting sovereignty often is unable to delicately balance public and private interests. Venezuelas approach
has been laudable in one way. Despite a revolution vehemently against what it perceives as neo-imperialism that is spread through large
multinational corporations (including IOCs), it has been careful not to exclude these entities. Venezuela seems to believe that
sufficient room must be left open to IOCs, as they are better suited to managing projects and risk. Such
enterprises do not have the safety net of government to count on, and at a time when financial institutions were scarce and the loaning of large
sums was unattainable, the market forces have left standing those who were superior at managing their funds and successfully developing their
prospects via sophisticated technologies that they have developed. Furthermore, the role of IOCs, though clearly reduced by the law, is
still of significant importance, in order to avoid the sick-state syndrome. PDVSA needs IOCs
technology and skills so as to improve its performance and to serve its development goals. In this regard, the
reform has been sensible in allowing private companies to participate, especially through joint ventures with PDVSA or its affiliates. Those
joint ventures look appropriate from the perspective of the state, as they ensure the state the control
necessary to give effect to reforms, without eliminating private participation. The fact that an important number of IOCs accepted
the conversion of their previous agreements into joint ventures is a positive result of the reform. These companies will have to learn to deal
with the government in a more









Venezuelan oil development will increase Chinese NOC expertise
Andres et Al.4/17 (Juan Andrs Chief of Social Affairs for Un Techo para mi Pas Camus, Jane LePham n investment-banking analyst
for the Public Finance group , Roshan Shankar e Social Sciences representative and the Secretary of the Graduate Student Council of
Stanford University, and Kenny White fellowship with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/strictlybusinesssieprpolicybrief.pdf Strictly Business? 4/17/2013 An Examination of Chinas
NaturalResource Acquisition Strategy in Latin America)
Overall, Chinas strategy is highly adaptive and coordinated across instruments. FTAs, loans, and FDI have allowed China to
acquire resources in a variety of different circumstances. FTAs in Peru, for example, have enabled Chinese firms to take advantage of the
countrys underdeveloped copper reserves and position themselves for future growth. In particular, the Chinese government was able to
negotiate an FTA with Peru because the country was small and did not have a large manufacturing sector. Now, as a result of the FTA, China is
positioned to import large amounts of copper without paying tariffs. In Venezuela, Chinese banks have provided the
country with badly needed credit and, in turn, given Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) the opportunity
to secure future oil supplies. Because of the close diplomatic relationship between China and
Venezuela, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) now has control over five percent of oil production in
Venezuela. In Brazil, Chinese oil firms have also taken advantage of cheap credit from the China Development Bank (CDB) and purchased
equity stakes in JV operations with multinational oil companies. These investments will improve the technical acumen of
Chinese NOCs and grant them access to one of the largest untapped oil fields in Latin America.

Venezuela wont increase production without foreign investment
AP 5/4(Associated Press The AP is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05/04/addicted-to-oil-venezuela-faces-grim-future-with-prices-and-production-dropping/
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05/04/addicted-to-oil-venezuela-faces-grim-future-with-prices-and-production-dropping/ 5/4/2013
Addicted to oil, Venezuela faces a grim future with prices and production dropping)
He said that "you can see PDVSA is in trouble" at the $100-a-barrel level because of the many millions lost to gasoline
subsidies and spending on domestic social spending and PDVSA's use as a "geopolitical tool" to maintain regional alliances.
Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves but PDVSA's production, earnings and income all appear to be on a
downward slide and its debts to suppliers rose 35 percent. Its debt to the Central Bank of Venezuela reached $26.19 billion
last year, a nearly eight-fold increase in two years. Ramirez said that PDVSA's efforts remained focused on developing the
remote Orinoco belt, site of the world's biggest oil reserves, with the aid of oil firms from China, Russia, the U.S., Italy,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and Spain. Venezuela hopes to lift overall production to some 3.32 million barrels a day, 200,000 more than last year.
"We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than ours," Ramirez said, assuring reporters
that PDVSA would work with private investors to not take on more debt to make new investment.




U.S-Venezuelan relations bad
America isnt interested in Venezuelan relations
Metzker 6/17 ( Jared Metzker IPS correspondent http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-
could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/ 6/17/2013 Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela
Relations)
Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time, Diana Villiers
Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, and we are a pragmatic country which will
deal with Maduro if it is in our interests. Indeed, Negroponte said she was optimistic about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within
the next six months. She notes a troika of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan
cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC
rebels. Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the
exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter [ Michael
Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue] (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as a small
step) was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term. I dont
think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas, he said. It will probably
take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going.
Venezuela doesnt want to work with the U.S.
Meacham 6/21 (Carl Meacham is director of the CSIS Americas Program
http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations 6/21/2013 The Kerry-
Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations?)
Despite recent discussions with the United States, it doesnt seem to be the case. Earlier this year, the Venezuelan government
suspended talks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that had begun in late
2012, citing alleged U.S. meddling in Venezuelas April election. The Maduro government has also largely
followed the Chvez playbook, constantly accusing the United States of assassination plots, spying, and
economic and political sabotage. While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, its difficult to imagine
that the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, if needed. These good-faith
gestures made by the Venezuelan government are neither new nor unheard of. Despite recent efforts, U.S.
policymakers should temper any positive expectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti-U.S. ideology. Its of course
difficult to improve relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against
your foreign policy agenda. This suggests that Venezuela may be looking to reestablish a purely economic relationshipone that will
eliminate U.S. sanctions. Still, even if certain positive steps are taken, history suggests that the Venezuelan
government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduro shoring up support within his own ranks.

China Key

China has the best opportunity to cooperate with Venezuela
Qian 3/13 (Zhao Qian Global Times writer http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8164901.html 3/13/2013 After Chavez, Sino-
Venezuelan cooperation will not stop)
A Chinese expert said that even if the new president of Venezuela alters the country's oil strategy and privatizes the oil
industry, Chinese companies would also have good opportunities in the process. "Chinese oil companies
have strong international competitiveness to join in market-oriented operations," Lin Boqiang, director of the
Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times Thursday. Construction of an oil refinery set up by PetroChina and PDVSA
costing 58.6 billion yuan ($9.4 billion) started in May 2012, and will have an annual capacity of 20 million tons if completed in 2014, Zhang Ping, head
of the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a conference in Beijing last year. "Given the
country's huge oil reserves, Venezuela will still be an important investment target for Chinese
companies, no matter who comes to power," Lin noted.
Chinas oil demand is key to the Venezuelan market
Tovar 7/6(Ernesto J. Tovar The Economist Newspaper Journalist http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130706/venezuelan-oil-could-
drop-to-usd-95-per-barrel 7/6/13 http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130706/venezuelan-oil-could-drop-to-usd-95-per-barrel)
Under those conditions, the Venezuelan oil basket has shown stability throughout 2013 though it has fallen short of the average
price level for 2012. A price of USD 107.78 per barrel over the first half of that year helped offset a downward trend for the remainder of 2012. And the
outlook seems to be dimming in the short term. Economist Ramn Espinasa, associate professor at Georgetown University in
Washington, where he lectures on Western Hemisphere Energy Security, believes that Venezuelan oil prices may even drop below "95 dollars per barrel."
This would represent a loss of 8.1% compared with year-end 2012 (USD 103.42 per barrel). "Two components seem to be causing prices
to spiral downward. The first one is deceleration in US demand, where efforts aimed at greater energy efficiency as a result of
soaring prices in 2008 have remained steady, as well as stagnant growth rates in Asia," points out Espinasa. "Demand will
entirely stem from Asia, as a consequence of greater consumption in both China and India. In China, it should be noted
that (economic) growth will push prices up as demand for raw materials rises," explains the Georgetown professor. He places
special emphasis on China's per-capita income and energy demand. "As income improves, oil consumption will rise. In China, a
single person's oil demand is just one twelfth of that of an individual in the United States," says Espinasa. He added that if the Asian giant were to
double its per-capita demand, it would go from consuming 8 million barrels per day to using up 16 million
barrels per day, an increase that would on its own represent nearly 10% of global consumption."

Venezuela will say yes
Venezuela prefers to sell its oil to China
IANS 2012(The Indo-Asian News Service http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7173 8/14/2012
Venezuela Boosts Oil Sales to China)
Before, we never sold a single barrel of petroleum to China and now we sell them 640,000 (bpd) ... at a better
price than ... in the US market," Rafael Ramirez said in an interview with El Correo del Orinoco newspaper. Until 1999, when
leftist Hugo Chavez became president, practically all of Venezuela's oil exports went to the US, but the new
government took steps to diversify through sales of crude to China, India, Japan and other nations, Ramirez pointed
out. Thanks to that approach, he said, "we are not subject to the problems of the US and European economy, nor
to the devaluation of the dollar". Venezuela's petroleum relationship with China also includes
investment by Beijing in the Andean nation's oil sector.
Venezuela wants to increase oil trade with China
China Daily 2012(China Daily is the national English-language newspaper and is one of the most authoritative newspapers in the
country http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-12/02/content_27287270.htm 12/2/12 Venezuela seeks to fuel oil links)
Venezuela is looking to double its daily oil exports to China to 1 million barrels in 2015 from the current level of 500,000 barrels, Venezuelan Oil Minister
Rafael Ramirez said on Friday. Meanwhile, China is facing rising dependence on oil imports, which increased to 57 percent of
its total consumption in 2011 from 32 percent at the beginning of the decade, according to official data, as the country became the world's
largest energy consumer. "Venezuela is seeking independent economic development, and we hope
that could be achieved via cooperation (with China)," said the Venezuelan oil minister. By the end of 2011, Chinese
investment in Venezuela was more than $1.9 billion, most of which was oil-related.
China will say yes
China IOCs will get a huge return on investment from Venezuela
Gonzalez and Lefebvre 3/5(Angel Gonzalez reporter for WSJ Ben Lefebvre Energy reporter for Dow
Jones and Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130305-714824.html 3/5/2013
Chavez's Death Open Questions About Venezuela's Oil Future)

"It's the million dollar question, whether they'll open up or not," said Bobby Tudor, president of energy investment firm
Tudor Pickering Holt & Co. uncertain environment, but that does not seem to be something too strange to the oil industry itself.
However, Mr. Tutor said oil companies, especially those with prior experience in the country, will soon be
lining up to re-enter a market with massive oil reserves that have been mostly off-limits to outsiders.
"There's no doubt about the resources," he said, adding the returns for an international oil company could be
enormous
Chinese N.O.C.s want to expand
Xu 4/22 (Conglin Xu Senior Editor-Economics for oil and gas journal http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-4c/regular-
features/journally-speaking/chinese-nocs--expansion.html 04/22/2013 Chinese NOCs' expansion)
Backed by vast foreign exchange reserves and taking advantage of the world economic downturn, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs)
have purchased assets in the Middle East, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. China's overseas equity oil production
increased from 140,000 b/d in 2000 to more than 1.5 million b/d of oil production in 2011, according to the International Energy Agency. As the
NOCs have expanded overseas, they also have adapted strategy to experience and encountered new questions at home. Expanding and
diversifying reserves and production drive Chinese NOCs' expansion plans and serve the interests of the
government and the Communist party. The state thus has provided tremendous financial support for the NOCs'
international investments. But Chinese NOCs need more than money as they strive to become world-class energy
operators. As noted by PFC Energy, Chinese NOCs want to be integrated energy companies and look for "parts
of the value chain that bring synergies to existing portfolios." China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. (Sinopec), for example,
seeks international upstream assets to feed to its domestic refineries, while China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) focuses on global
downstream assets to coordinate with its growing production. NOCs invest increasingly in unconventional resources,
particularly in liquids-rich areas in North America. In 2011, unconventional resources and deepwater
assets accounted for more than 70% of the NOCs' acquisition expenditures, according to China National Petroleum
Corp. (CNPC)'s annual report. NOCs invested $12 billion in 2011, out of a total $18 billion of oil and gas assets purchases, to gain access to
unconventional gas and LNG, according to IEA. Chinese NOCs also have evolved in their economic power,
supported by China's strong economic growth. The companies have formed consortiums with
international oil companies (IOCs), purchased equity in projects and acquired stakes in energy companies. They
also have made multibillion-dollar acquisitions of well-established companies, as in CNOOC's $15.1 billion takeover of Nexen Inc.
China wants to increase relations with Venezuela now
Xinhua 07/08(Xinhuanet is an important central news service-oriented website
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794701.shtml#.UdsdjvmTjzw 07/08/2013 China's top legislator pledges closer ties with Venezuelan
National Assembly)
China's top legislator Zhang Dejiang pledged to strengthen ties with the Venezuelan National Assembly on Monday. Zhang said
China and Venezuela have enjoyed rapid development in bilateral relations since the two countries established
diplomatic ties. The NPC attaches great importance to developing relations with the Venezuelan National Assembly, he
said, adding that China is willing to maintain high-level communication, strengthen cooperation among
special committees and groups and enhance communication with Venezuela side so as to build a brighter future for
the two countries' overall relations.

Other CPs

Diplomacy CP
Diplomacy CP idea
Duddy 12 (Patrick D. Duddy, Visiting Senior Lecturer, Duke University, Political Unrest in Venezuela-Contingency Planning
Memorandum No. 16, Sept, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936)
Together with like-minded nations, the United States could demand that the OAS declare Venezuela in breach
of its obligations as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and encourage a secretary-
generalled mission to Caracas. (Note: It would be difficult to generate a consensus condemnation of Venezuela at the OAS
but the secretary-general can undertake such a mission on his own authority. A secretary-generalled mission would still require
Venezuelan acquiescence to enter the country.) Venezuela would understand that if regional and subregional
organizations determine that the country is no longer a functioning democracy, it will be suspended,
as has happened recently with both Honduras and Paraguay. The United States could bring the issue of Venezuelan
democracy to the United Nations Security Council and urge the UN to endorse a fact-finding mission
or to explicitly endorse regional efforts to restore democracy. With other international partners, including the
European Union, the United States could support offers to mediate. If it proves difficult to get the OAS or UN involved in mitigation
efforts, the United States could propose a delegation of foreign ministers to travel to Caracas to engage
the Venezuelan authorities.


Adv CP idea
Do all this other stuff
Duddy 13 (Patrick D. Duddy, Visiting Senior Lecturer, Duke University, Political Unrest in Venezuela-Contingency Planning
Memorandum No. 16 April 15, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936)
As the election approaches, the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the
importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela. The United States should
restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the
continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States should
emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuela's political problems, it should also
encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemisphere's concern that democracy
be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and violence be avoided.
The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and verification of results should be stressed. At the same time,
U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian
Revolution. More specifically, the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible: Reach
out to important regional and extra-regional partners now to gauge their likely response to instability,
particularly those countries that would be most directly affected (i.e., Brazil, Colombia, and the EU), and
convey a sense of the range of options the U.S. government would entertain in the event of an
outbreak of violence and/or interruption of democracy. It will be particularly important to engage Brazil and its
Mercosur partners early because of their close relations with Chavez to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings arising
between them and the United States. This should include proactively sharing information that would signal
Venezuelan preparations for violence or manipulation of the electoral outcome. Begin identifying important
actors (military and civilian officials as well as opposition figures) now whose visas would be canceled and accounts frozen in the
event that they are linked to political violence and/or an interruption of democracy. Work to build awareness at the UN, in Europe,
and in Japan of what is happening in Venezuela and attempt to organize a coalition of partners to limit an illegitimate Venezuelan
administration's access to government assets held abroad as well as to the international financial system. Continue to stress
directly to the Venezuelan government as well as publicly that the United States will accept and be
prepared to work with a legitimately elected government, including one headed by Hugo Chavez or a Chavista
successor, provided the election is free, fair, and constitutional. Leverage defense department contacts in Latin
American and Spanish armed forces to communicate to the Venezuelan military leadership that they
are obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country's democratic
tradition.