Venezuela Oil Affirmative - SDI 2013

Wake Forest Debate 1 / 69
Matt Struth
1AC

Matt Struth
1AC Oil
Venezuela collapse coming- oil reform and foreign investment is key
Stranko, 13 -- Latin American Private Equity & Venture Capital Association director of communication
[James, Avenida America editor-in-chief, "The Venezuelan Economy: Three Myths and Three Truths,"
No Se Mancha, 3-7-13, semancha.com/2013/03/08/the-venezuelan-economy-three-myths-and-three-
truths/, accessed 7-21-13, mss]

Debunking these myths offers hope for Venezuelans, but one cold hard fact remains: The overall economy is a disaster. As observer and
scholar Moises Naim wrote, Venezuela has one of the worlds largest fiscal deficits, highest inflation rates,
worst misalignment of the exchange rate, fastest-growing debt, and one of the most precipitous drops in
productive capacityincluding that of the critical oil sector. Moreover, during the Chvez era the nation fell to the
bottom of the rankings that measure international competitiveness, ease of doing business, or attractiveness to foreign
investors, while rising to the top of the list of the worlds most corrupt countries. I do think Naim still likes arepas, though. So whats the
way out? In honor of the No Se Mancha approach of tackling Chvezs death three points at a time, I offer my three recommendations to the
next government to slowly start digging out of the hole left by Bolivarian socialism: 1) Things will start looking up if folks start
looking down: Right beneath their feet, Venezuelans possess the worlds largest petroleum reserves. Estimated to last
more than 300 years at current levels of production, the country has the capability for permanent fiscal stimulus and
resource security larger than even the United States. Yet the country imports gasoline, and loses money on PDVSA,
the state-run oil company. Due to restrictions on domestic prices, free oil giveaways to political allies during Chavezs term in office,
pricing and marketing restrictions from its participation in OPEC, and most importantly crumbling or nonexistent infrastructure for
advanced extraction and refining, PDVSA posts US$6 billion+ in cash losses per year on what should be the
crown jewel of the governments coffers. The government is also entirely dependent on oil exports at current prices to fund its
obligations. Oil exports represent 90 percent of the countrys foreign currency inflows, and nearly 50 percent of total government revenues,
meaning that the government is extremely vulnerable to price swings and heavily dependent on an inefficient
sector of the economy. There are two steps Venezuela can take to change this path to perdition. The first would be to invest
heavily in reforming PDVSA, creating a more efficient state company and domestic refinery capacity to
blunt the losses from importing finished fuels. The second would be to cut subsidies on gasoline in the country which, given the
importation of expensive refined gasoline and next-to-free prices, would give PDVSA, and the government, breathing room in its energy budget.
Venezuela is approaching a breaking point- foreign investment is key
Sanati, 3-6 (Cyrus Sanati, Contributor to Fortune Magazine, Education: Columbia University Business
School, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, University of California at Los Angeles, 3-
6-13, CNN Money, Fortune, Chavezs Death Wont Spur New Venezuela Oil Drilling)
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/06/hugo-chavez-death-oil/

It is difficult to see what, if anything, could change in Venezuela's oil industry in the next few months. The political apparatus Chavez has set up
seems fully entrenched. It would probably take a full-fledged revolution for it to be wiped out at this point. Nevertheless, Venezuela is
nearing a breaking point when it comes to oil production. The government cannot continue to rely on
PDVSA to pay its bills. It needs real foreign partners with real experience to come in and help it boost
production. That means bringing back companies like ConocoPhilips, which before getting the boot in 2007, was the
largest foreign operator in the country. They have the engineers and know-how to help Venezuela quickly get off the
ground. Venezuela would be wise to also consult with oil companies like Husky, Suncor (SU), Syncrude and Nexen, all of which have
extensive experience working in Canada's vast Athabasca oil sands.

US oil industries are the only ones who can extract Venezuelan oil
Clayton and Levi 12 [Blake Clayton and Michael Levi - Blake Clayton is fellow for energy and national
security at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He received a doctorate from Oxford
University, where he studied business economics and strategy. The recipient of the University of Chicago
Endowed Fellowship, he holds dual master's degrees from the University of Chicago and Cambridge
University, Taylor and Francis Online; The Surprising Sources of Oils Influence; November 30
th
,
Matt Struth
2012; http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2012.749637#.Uex-ho2Tg1A //
7/21/13/NL]

Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible
good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good
approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary
primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges
from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular
slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is
particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it.
Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the United States, many U.S. refiners could be left without
attractive alternative sources. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new
customers for their oil. The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the United States
shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis, with similar results.

Oil shocks collapse the economy
Erwin 12 [Sandra, editor of National Defense Magazine, 30% Cut in U.S. Oil Imports Would Avert
Future Catastrophe, Study Warns, 11-1-12,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=577]

Unless the United States curtails its consumption of petroleum, these military greybeards caution, any future crisis that disrupts oil
supplies could hamstring the nations economy and cause global instability. We have seen oil shocks before
But at todays level of U.S. consumption, a sustained disruption would be devastating crippling our very
freedom of movement, said retired Army Gen. Paul Kern, chairman of the military advisory board of CNA Corp., a government-funded think
thank. In a report released Nov. 1, a group of 13 generals and admirals are calling for "immediate, swift and aggressive action" over the next
decade to reduce U.S. oil consumption by 30 percent. Of nearly 88 million barrels of oil consumed worldwide every day, the United States eats
up the biggest share, with 20 million barrels. Slightly more than half of the petroleum the United States consumes comes from foreign countries:
Two-thirds from the Middle East, and the rest from Canada and Mexico. You could wake up tomorrow morning and hear that the Iranians sense
an attack on their nuclear power plants and preemptively take steps to shut off the flow of oil in the Gulf, retired Marine Corps Gen. James T.
Conway says in a CNA news release. The U.S. would likely view this as a threat to our economy, and we would take action. And there we are,
drawn into it. Even a small interruption of daily oil supply can have huge ripple effects, the study contends. Even
though just 2 percent of U.S. oil supplies come from Libya, the military campaign there this summer
prompted the U.S. Department of Energy to release 30 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
A larger crisis could disrupt the entire fabric of the U.S. economy, the CNA analysis concludes. If America reduces its
current rate of oil consumption by 30 percent and diversifies its fuel sources, the study says, the U.S. economy would be relatively insulated from
such upheaval, even in the event of a complete shutdown of a strategic chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz, the international passageway for 33
percent of the worlds seaborne oil shipments. The report, titled, Ensuring America's Freedom of Movement: A National Security Imperative to
Reduce U.S. Oil Dependence, was sponsored by the San Francisco-based Energy Foundation, a partnership of major donors interested in solving
the world's energy problems. CNA analyzed the potential economic impact of a future oil disruption. Under a worst-case
scenario 30-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the analysis finds that the U.S. would lose nearly $75 billion in GDP. By cutting
current levels of U.S. oil dependence by 30 percent, the impact would be nearly zero.
Economic decline causes global war- best studies; diversionary theory
Royal, 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah,
Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War
and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of
interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.
First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms
in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody
transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher
in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk
Matt Struth
of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a
permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins
(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is
a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that
interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if
the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for
conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed
conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict
and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and
external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the
favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external
conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an
increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and
lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory" suggests
that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives
to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find
supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency
towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack
of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus
weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic
scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This
implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves
more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a
decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend
to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the
occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to
those views.
Engaging Venezuela key to US-Latin American economic integration
Griffon, 13 -- Crimson editorial writer [John, "Engage with Venezuela," The Harvard Crimson,
www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/, accessed 7-20-13, mss]

Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also
be economically advisable. With the worlds largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and
stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America
can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year,
thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil
company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety
of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a
Free Trade Area of the Americas, an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations,
thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy
normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
Thats key to resilient US growth and competitiveness
Noriega, 12 -- former senior US State Department official
[Roger, visiting fellow at AEI and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, and Jose Cardenas,
contributor to AEIs Venezuela-Iran Project and a director with Vision Americas., "An action plan for US
policy in the Americas," 12-5-12, www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-
america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/, accessed 7-22-13, mss]
Matt Struth

As US policymakers struggle to overcome sluggish economic growth while confronting abiding security threats, there is a
stronger argument than ever for fortifying US partnerships with countries in the Americas whose economies and
security are intertwined with Americas own economy and security. While the United States has been preoccupied with other regions, most Latin
American nations have continued to modernize their market economies; two nations in particularBrazil and Mexicoare
emerging as global players. Therefore, the time is right to restore a strong bipartisan consensus in the United States that promotes a constructive, free-market growth
agenda in the Americas. Practical initiativesnot rhetoricwill encourage America and its neighbors to find common ground for their collective benefit. Key points
in this Outlook: Americas economic crisis and threats to US security have undermined its traditional global-leadership role and weakened its connections to Latin
American nations that continue to modernize their economies. The United States must recover its regional credibility by taking bold initiatives to restore its fiscal
solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. The United States must then retool its strategy for
its partners in the Americas by working with them to combat threats such as cross-border criminality and radical populism, encouraging dialogue with regional
leaders, and ensuring law enforcement cooperation to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. A stable and prosperous Americas is
indispensable to US economic success and security. The region is home to three of the top four foreign sources
of energy to the United States, as well as the fastest-growing destinations for US exports and investment. Clearly,
geography and shared values predetermine a united destiny for the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. How positive and fruitful that destiny will be
depends on whether US policymakers, private businesses, and civil society move with a greater sense of purpose toward seizing promising opportunities and meeting
critical challenges. Times have changed. The US fiscal crisis and preoccupation with two distant wars have distracted policymakers in Washington and undermined
US leadership in the Americas. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits are highly valued by most countries in the
Western Hemisphere, today, the United States is no longer the only major partner to choose from. Asia (principally China) and Europe are making important inroads.
So, as US policymakers retool their strategy for the Americas, they must shelve the paternalism of the past and be much more energetic in forming meaningful
partnerships with willing neighbors. Of course, the United States must recover its credibility by making bold decisions to restore its own fiscal solvency, while
aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. Then, Washington will be better positioned to cultivate greater
economic and political cooperation among its neighbors, beginning with an open and candid dialogue with the regions leaders about their vision, their challenges, and
their priorities. Partnerships can thus be built on common ground. The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day.
Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by petrodollars and allied with dangerous extraregional forces pose daunting
challenges. Although it is wise to prioritize a positive socioeconomic and political agenda, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable prerequisite to
achieving US security and regional leadership. To make the most of their united destiny, the United States and its partners in the Americas should: Promote and
defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and private property as the building blocks of just societies, accountable governments, and prosperous
economies; Advocate and support the empowerment of individuals through the development of strong free-market economies, healthy private sectors, and free trade
among nations; Assist neighbors in addressing their essential security needs so they can grow in peace and be more effective allies to prevent or confront common
threats; Incentivize capital markets and encourage new and innovative technology cooperation to develop a regional community that is interdependent in the
production and distribution of a range of products and servicesparticularly energy; Confront international organized crime in Mexico and Central America by
supporting effective law-enforcement institutions and competent judicial systems; Work with willing allies to restore the Organization of American States to its
essential mission of promoting and defending common values and meeting common threats; Address the role of China and Russia in the Americas by encouraging
open and transparent regional investment and trade and rejecting exploitive policies that undermine local societies, regional security, and economic growth; Combat
threats posed by authoritarian regimes and their ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and transnational criminal organizations; Assist the Cuban people in transitioning to a post
Castro Cuba by helping to jump-start their private sector, rehabilitate their economy, and restore their political freedoms when the dictatorship collapses. Maximizing
Mutual Global Competitiveness Expanding regional economic cooperation is crucial to US economic growth. An
aggressive trade promotion and investment strategy in todays hypercompetitive, globalized economy is
not a policy option; it is an imperative. Clearly, prosperity at home depends on success abroad. The
economic opportunities in the Western Hemisphere are enormous, and US policy-makers and the private sector must recognize
them as critical to US economic growth. In 2011, US exports reached a record $2.1 trillion in total value, despite the fact that only 1 percent of US businesses export
their products to foreign markets. The United States must expand on these opportunities. Exports benefit the US economy by offering companies opportunities to tap
new markets, expand their production, and earn more consumer dollars. Today, 95 percent of the worlds consumers live outside the United States, and the
International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores. It is indisputable that an
aggressive US trade policymeaning selling US goods and services in as many markets as possibleis essential for the US
economy to hone its competitive edge in the 21st century. In this sense, Americas future is inextricably linked to
the future of its neighbors in its own hemisphere. A prosperous hemisphere means a more prosperous
United States. The Western Hemispheres Moment. The United States is strategically well-placed to begin a new chapter in
trade relations with Latin America. The countries within the Americas are bound by close historical, cultural, familial, and geographic ties, linked
by common values and mutual interests. What also facilitates expanded economic engagement is the regional trade
partners proximity to US shores, and the significant number of Hispanics living in the United Statessome 50 millionthat provide an
exceptional strategic advantage in doing business with their countries of origin. Equally important are the advances that many
countries within the region have made in establishing economic stability and growth in recent years as the
roots of democracy and the rule of law continue to take hold. Countries such as Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have
been at the forefront in modernizing their economies and opening them to investment, liberalizing trade, and becoming more competitive overall. The numbers tell the
story. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income
increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that currently, nearly a third of the regions some 570 million people are considered middle class. And in just the
next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability
generates even greater opportunities for US business. The Western Hemisphere already supplies a quarter of the worlds crude oil, a
third of the worlds natural gas, nearly a fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of
renewable energy technologies. Certainly, many in the US private sector have already discovered the benefits of intrahemispheric economic relationships. In fact,
Latin America has played a key role in expanding US exports in recent years. The Congressional Research Service reports that from 1998 to 2009, US trade with Latin
America increased an average of 82 percent, more than 72 percent with Asia, 52 percent with the European Union, and 64 percent with the rest of the world. In 2011
alone, trade with Latin America grew 20 percent. The economic growth in 2011 elevated trade between the United States and the region to a historic high of $772
Matt Struth
million. Exports to the region grew 22 percent to $350 million, while imports increased by 20 percent to a total of $420 million. According to the US Department of
Commerce, American companies now export more to the Western Hemispheresome 42 percent of total US exportsthan to any other part of the world, including
China. Last year, US merchandise exports to Latin America totaled $367 billion, and the US private sector accounts for one-third of all foreign direct investment in the
region. The United States now has trade agreements with 11 countries in the Western Hemisphere, which the Department of Commerce reports help to support nearly
four million US jobs. Clearly, however, there is much more that can be done to fulfill the potential of intrahemispheric
economic relations in the hyper-competitive global economy. High-level official US engagement is imperative to revitalizing
existing alliances and developing new partnerships to boost mutual competitiveness. A reinvigorated US trade policy must transcend past approaches that have been
too identified with solely US interests and too focused on bilateral relationships. A 21st-century approach necessitates more multilateral engagement and cooperation,
mutually beneficial information-sharing and support, and an inclusive vision. A complementary strategy to increase demand for US goods and services requires
mobilizing private capital, encouraging technology transfer, and leveraging existing US programs to strengthen the private sector throughout the Americas.
Traditionally, private-sector growth has been held back by lack of investment and access to credit. In a true win-win strategy, the United States
can boost exports and investment while strengthening regional producers and consumers. In summary,
increased US government initiatives to expand economic partnerships with the countrys Western
Hemisphere neighbors are crucial to Americas economic recovery and competitiveness. A prosperous hemisphere
is also beneficial to US security concerns. The Americas is home to some of the most dynamic markets in the world. The US administration must recognize this reality
and take full advantage of the opportunities.
Competitiveness ensures conflict suppression- no alt causes
Hubbard 10 (Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis By: Jesse Hubbard Jesse Hubbard
Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs
Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim
Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, 2010

Regression analysis of this data shows that Pearsons r-value is -.836. In the case of American
hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even
overall national power, which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance,
with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases.
During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with violent conflict, and yet use of force by the
hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more
closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more
complicated picture of the hegemons role in fostering stability than initially anticipated. VI.
Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I
turned first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential
frameworks for understanding these results. Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the
literature that focuses on hegemonic stability theorys economic implications was the logical first step. As explained above, the
literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps that which focuses on the international economic
system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from
the first camp are still of relevance. Even Kindlebergers early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the
economic instability between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the
lack of an economic hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the
international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that
Germanys economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nations political culture (Keynes 1919). Given later events,
his warning seems prescient. In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into
armed conflict. What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful
position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables above show, Britains economic strength after the First World War was about 13%
of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States possessed about 53% of relative economic power in
the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europes economic strength
with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never
available to the defeated powers after the First World War (Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years
were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In
contrast, when Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, the
United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the GATT that had
an essential role in facilitating global trade (Organski 1958). The possibility that economic stability is an
important factor in the overall security environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis.
Another theory that could provide insight into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin
theorized that when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system,
rivals are more likely to resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed
conflict (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple it makes more sense to challenge a
weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the
Matt Struth
puzzlingly strong positive correlation between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and
conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict in the international
system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemons weaker position,
which is the true cause of the higher levels of conflict in the international system. Additionally, it
is important to note that military power is, in the long run, dependent on economic
strength. Thus, it is possible that as hegemons lose relative economic power, other
nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military
capabilities are still strong. This would help explain some of the variation found between
the economic and military data. The results of this analysis are of clear importance beyond the realm of theory. As the
debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the table.
What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on
stability in the international system. However, this should not give policymakers a justification
to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If
anything, this research points to the central importance of economic influence in
fostering international stability. To misconstrue these findings to justify anything else
would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a stabilizing role in the international system,
but this role is complicated. It is economic strength, not military dominance that is the
true test of hegemony. A weak state with a strong military is a paper tiger it may
appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

Matt Struth
1AC Relations
Engaging Venezuela is key to US-Latin America relations- the offer makes it impossible to
paint the US negatively
Griffon, 13 -- Crimson editorial writer [John, "Engage with Venezuela," The Harvard Crimson,
www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/, accessed 7-20-13, mss]

When Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez died in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political
equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the
current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas
toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and
Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chvez, the opposite now seems more likely.
Before passing away, Chvez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential
election in April. As Chvezs handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentors trend of using anti-American rhetoric to
bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chvez with the cancer that killed him. While
Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its
actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chvezs death, and both
nations have started expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations
with the other. Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chvez-style governance in Venezuela.
Calling himself a 21st-century socialist, Chvez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with
Iran and Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology.
Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only
strengthens the Chavistas hold on their country. The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement
would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies. Diplomatically, positive engagement with
Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in
Latin America. Chvez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by
pointing out the United States attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist
governments in Latin America had rallied around Chvez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three
Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct
opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chvez galvanized these
nationsmany of whom have experienced American interventionist tacticsby vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy.
Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chvezs
position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against
the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chvez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that
Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States diplomatic position, while simultaneously
strengthening Venezuelas. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist,
Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela.
Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better
image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American
nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the worlds largest oil reserves, countless other valuable
resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see
the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands
of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through
Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, an endeavor that would have eliminated
most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to
enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then,
positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship
between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making
economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can
rightly be criticizedauthoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is
doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy
Matt Struth
with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent
catching any flies with our vinegarits high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
The plan overwhelms alt causes- lack of US presence makes minor squabbles seem larger
than they are
Rothkopf, 13 -- Foreign Policy editor-at-large
[David, "The Blind Spot,"
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/15/the_blind_spot_us_policy_latin_america, accessed 7-21-13,
mss]

But mostly what has resonated in the Western Hemisphere during the past four years is a general lack of any
U.S. interest or material activity in the region -- beyond regularly bumping heads with the Latin American
left and patently dismissing the agenda items that Latin Americans want to discuss when meeting in multilateral settings (a drug policy that
addresses demand in the United States, the flow of U.S. guns into the region, or a more rational Cuba policy). The administration
should have seen the death of Hugo Chvez as a chance to recast the relationship with that substantial group
of left-leaning leaders in the region. After all, Obama and those around him not so secretly harbor the desire to bring the U.S.-Cuba
relationship into the 21st century by developing a road map to end the embargo, one of the all-time greatest flops in U.S. foreign-policy history.
That would win some points. And some of the region's top officials from the left, like Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, have been more
constructive on issues like drug-enforcement cooperation and even seemingly more open to progress on some trade issues. And given that
the left has so much clout in many of the region's most important countries -- like Venezuela, Brazil, and
Argentina, not to mention Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, Cuba, and perhaps Chile, where former President Michelle Bachelet is poised for a
comeback -- it seems that would be worth the United States' while. (Not to mention the fact that making nice with the Pacific half
of Latin America to the exclusion of the Atlantic half seems strategically silly.) Since the United States is perfectly happy to work with left-
leaning governments everywhere else in the world (and others that are authoritarian or worse -- yes, I mean you, Vladimir), we have to ask, why
is the Latin America policy establishment having such a hard time getting over the 1980s? Or the 1960s? (The joke in the community goes that
there are two factions in the Latin America policy community -- those still living in the '60s and those still living in the '80s. But all seem more
familiar with the Cold War's tactics and more inclined to discuss import substitution and old school North-South politics than they are with the
new realities of this century.) If the answer is hard to fathom, the consequences could not be more obvious. The absence of
any real focus on the region except to complain about trade disputes or quibble with the likes of Chvez (an
understandable pursuit but not a suitable basis for a regional policy) has created a void that means when something goes
wrong, it actually is seen as the totality of U.S. policy in the Americas. So it loomed larger than it
otherwise might have when there was a fiasco concerning the grounding of Bolivian President Evo Morales's
flight in Europe because he was thought to be ferrying Edward Snowden to a new destination. It inflamed Morales's
colleagues throughout the region. The big bully of the North was dissing them again, extralegally violating their sovereign
prerogatives. And then, when it was discovered that the National Security Agency was actively intercepting communications of millions of
Brazilians, the United States actually succeeded in sending U.S. relations with the region hurtling back to the periods of the last century in which
some U.S. policymakers seem most comfortable. It certainly hasn't helped that it has also been reported that the surveillance efforts extended to
Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, and others. The U.S. intelligence community was in
everyone's business again. The United States was treating them like second-class citizens again. And it was hard to name
major countervailing positive initiatives -- as you might find in the case of China or even Russia -- that could counterbalance and at least keep the
relationships "complex" rather than just lousy. It is sometimes thought that the failure to pay much attention to a
region at least has the advantage of doing no harm. Not true. It leaves the door open for the unexpected
and uncomfortable to define the totality of the relationship and gives the United States little leverage to
offset problems when they do arise. It is akin to the U.S. stance in Syria, where doing nothing doesn't mean the United
States is off the hook. Sometimes you own a problem not because you "broke it," but because your neglect
has exacerbated it or made it possible.
US-Latin American relations are key to check nuclear terror- leads to materials co-op
Shifter 12
(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue.
Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, April, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an
array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation
Matt Struth
could become increasingly important include: As the worlds lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the
opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not
always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges
today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakageor transfer of nuclear materialsto
terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the
region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the
Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has
assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental
meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancn in 2010. The
United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared
interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become
increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy,
they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.
Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material transfers is key.
Ayson10
Robert Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington
After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via
InformaWorld

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily
represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as
belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive
nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that
the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in
the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear
weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors
themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear
terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between
two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during
the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between
the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear
proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an
act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United
States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely
to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in
supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest
themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used
in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any
responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction
given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny
fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the
efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully
responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United
Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North
Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high
stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these
major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this
occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China,
or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The
reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited
conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a
possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil
might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For
example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to
place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when
careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this
Matt Struth
as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to
preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating
response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order
a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support
that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might
interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres
of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington
that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison
claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost
certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or
unwilling to provide.There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of
that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would
extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a
chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would
happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots
with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups
in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing
were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to
use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more
serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong
response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear
use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China
felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from
such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of
nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to
reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important
trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very
visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters.
How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use of nuclear weapons, including
outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate
that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia
be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the
attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare
they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or
support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of reducing, but
probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further international cooperation on the control of existing
fissile material holdings.
Engaging Venezuela solves Latin American relations and democracy promotion
Kragie, 12 -- Duke University [Andrew, "Venezuela's 2012 Presidential Election: Policy
Recommendation," sites.duke.edu/history136a_01_s2012_awk7/policy-recommendations/, accessed 7-
19-13, mss]

The US stands to lose much or gain a bit based on its reactions in the post-election period. A reaction that seems to oppose Chavez on
ideological rather than democratic grounds could reinforce the historically rooted sense the US only supports
democracy when the elected leaders support the US. On the other hand, a reaction guided by democratic principles and
regional cooperation would bolster Latin American nations willingness to cooperate in many domains. The
US reaction might help restore its role as a promoter of democracy and a respected voice for liberty
worldwide. Weeks highlights the memories of past instances of unilateral and indiscriminate uses of force, most recently the 1989
invasion of Panama, and argues that the US focused almost exclusively on security goals in Latin America during the Cold War (2008, 163-4).
Today, the US focuses more on issues of freedom and democracy in policy discussions. The US State Department lists strengthening effective
institutions of democratic governance as one of its four main foreign policy pillars in the Americas (Regional Topics).
Latin American democracy is key to global democracy
Richard S. Hillman, St. John Fisher College political science professor and director, 2, Democracy and
Human Rights in Latin America, pg. vii, google books

Matt Struth
Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, are particularly
relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and economic systems in order to
provide a decent standard of living and incorporate previously excluded populations into the national mainstream. The previous record, of course,
is far from acceptable. The advent of the twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress
for the institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and
suffering. The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with
democracy has never been greater. Clearly the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these
experiments is not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as contemporary
challenges. Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitely entered the political lexicon and discourse
throughout the world.
Democracy is key to solve nuclear war and extinction
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution Senior Fellow, 95
[Stanford Univ. Political Science and Sociology professor, former Baghdad CPA senior adviser,
"Promoting Democracy in the 1990s," http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through
increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to
proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most
of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or
absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize
themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are
much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons
of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally
responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of
their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect
competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new
world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Matt Struth
1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase financial
investment in Venezuelas oil infrastructure.

Matt Struth
1AC Solvency
Oil is key- it will force Venezuela to come to the table
Metzker, 13 Inter Press Service staff writer
[Jared, "Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations," IPS, 6-17-13,
www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/, accessed 7-20-13,
mss]

Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations
A shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela may be pending as a bilateral rapprochement suddenly
appears more possible than it has in years. On the sidelines of talks held earlier this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of
American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerrys
subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction. We agreed today both of
us, Venezuela and the United States that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more
constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that, Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua, which was
reportedly requested by the Venezuelans. The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy Tracy, a U.S. filmmaker whom Venezuela
had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an olive branch being offered by the new Venezuelan
government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formally recognised. Only months ago, before the death of
Venezuelas long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation of relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly
unlikely. In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by a military coup dtat that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known
was imminent. Chavez immediately accused the United States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly
valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing. In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush
was the devil himself. Following Chavezs death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former
vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis--vis the United States. According to Michael Shifter, president
of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered conflicting signals. Maduro has so far
shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one, Shifter told IPS. The new presidents waffling
may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez,
who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly
challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavezs own former political base. Shifter
pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello,
currently head of Venezuelas parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency. Maduros legitimacy stems
largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to
emulate his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. Still, ideological concerns may not
ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which
continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation. Oil economy Over half of Venezuelas federal budget
revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the countrys exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven
reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United
States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuelas oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s,
and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and
imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies.
While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered
growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to
increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed
in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with
Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites. The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela production is down and
the economic situation is deteriorating, explained Shifter. They know they need foreign investment to increase
production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out. If its economy continues to falter,
Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated
fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerrys recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting
with open arms. Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time, Diana
Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, and we are a pragmatic
country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.
Pragmatism will win out- their evidence relies on faulty assumptions about Latin America
Halabi, 13 -- London School of Economics postgraduate fellow
Matt Struth
[Sammy, "Reasons for Optimism in Venezuela," Global Risk Insights,
globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/03/spring-is-coming-we-should-be-optimistic-about-venezuela/, accessed
7-21-13, mss]

Maduro is a man who on the surface appears to fit quite nicely into Chavismo. From his humble beginnings as a Caracas
bus driver, Maduro rose to become something akin to Chavezs son. If one could permit such an analogy, he is what the Venezuelan dream
should represent as a product of a system notionally designed to give power back to the people. Throughout the recent election Maduro tried to
play up these credentials, hoping to bank on his perceived populist appeal and Chavezs messianic cult. His campaign slogan is quite emblematic
of this: Chavez sets the route, Maduro takes the wheel! they said. But Maduro is not Chavez. He is a man from the people, but not a
man of the people. Though he may say the same things, he does not talk the same way. The recent election results, where Chavezs
11-point victory over opposition leader Henrique Capriles was reduced to a disputed outcome, is symptomatic of this. Understanding this
is fundamentally important in predicting the coming trajectory of the Venezuelan state. Though Venezuela will
continue to be able to export oil, slightly mitigating some of Chavezs more disastrous economic policies, Maduro sits on a ticking
time bomb. Inflation is sky high, moving past 30%. Murder rates are skyrocketing while foreign investment
continues to plummet due to past expropriations. And with increased American energy independence the era of
$100 oil may be coming to an end. Chavez had both the ideological conviction and public support necessary to withstand pressures
to liberalize and integrate the Venezuelan economy in the face of such terrible indicators. Yet given his weakened mandate, and the
fractured political climate under which he operates, Maduro will not be able to withstand such pressures
for long. Already there have been signs that Venezuela is inching towards change, with Maduro going so far
as to temporarily open a back-channel with the US State Department during Chavezs cancer treatments. While it
would be difficult to see an overnight reversal of US-Venezuelan relations, these subtle steps are more indicative of a
pragmatist than an ideologue. This is cause for optimism, and may be the root of better ties with
Venezuelas biggest export market in the medium term. In the short term, expect Venezuela to pursue its liberalization on a
more regional basis. Importantly, Brazil very quickly recognized Maduros government in spite of the electoral controversies. Additionally,
Brazil and Peru have shown that there is a viable third way through which Venezuela can integrate into
the international system. States like these have contributed to the general decline in anti-American
sentiment, and give Venezuela a workable model for change. For all the fever and emotion associated with
Latin America, the logic of Venezuelas economic problems remains cold and calculating. Maduro is not the
reincarnation of Chavez and attempts to analyze Venezuelas future on its Chavismo past are superficial at best.
In short, spring is coming.
Venezuela says yes- their evidence is about rhetoric not action
Auken, 13 political activist [Bill Van, "Venezuelas Maduro reaches out to big business and
Washington," WSWS, 6-7-13, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html, accessed 7-
19-13, mss]
After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside
left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuelas biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in
Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his
government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing
candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuelas Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a
40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the
Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerrys words,
establish a more constructive and positive relationship. This is to include resuming the exchange of
ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. We agreed
today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set
out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together, said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that A good relationship between the
government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, its the guarantee of peace
and stability for our peoples. Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as the big boss of the devils and accused him of
backing the fascist right in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence
that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavezs successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters.
He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuelas Public Advocates office. He said that the
discussion had alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which
often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries. In point of fact, the most significant sectors seeking to
Matt Struth
destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduros turn toward accommodation
with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital.

Matt Struth
OIL ADVANTAGE

Matt Struth
UQ
Matt Struth
Venezuela Collapse Now
Venezuelan economic collapse coming now- oil is key and will fail now
McArdle, 13 -- Newsweek special correspondent
[Megan, "Why Hugo Chavez Was Bad for Venezuela," Daily Beast, 3-7-13,
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/07/why-hugo-chavez-was-bad-for-venezuela.html, accessed 7-
21-13, mss]

But in the course of these achievements, he severely compromised the engine of Venezuela's future prosperity: its oil
fields. And over the long run, the poor cannot thrive if the economy is failing. To be sure, Venezuela's economy looks okay in
many respects; it's growth is about average for the region, as you can see in this graph from The Economist. But hey, wait a minute . . .
shouldn't the country with some of the largest proven oil reserves in the world be doing better than the
regional average? Looked at in the context of Latin America as a whole, the poverty reduction achieved doesn't look so special either: Oil
prices are booming, but Venezuela is not. Why? Because they're pumping less oil than they used to. A couple of years after he took power,
Chavez moved to consolidate his power over PDVSA, the state-owned oil company that used to rival Saudi's Aramco as the best-run in the world.
It needed to be. Venezuela's heavy, sulfurous oil is hard to get out of the ground and refine; they had to invest heavily just to keep production
flowing. The power grab was not popular in the oil industry, and ended up being one of the motivations for a 2002 coup attempt. When that
failed, a general strike followed, which temporarily shut down the oil industry. After the smoke cleared, PDVSA was a changed entity. It had
suffered a sizeable brain drain, since over a third of its workforce was fired by Chavez for dereliction of
duty. And it became a slush fund for those beloved social programs. Here's the result: Venezuela's oil output has fallen by
almost a third since Chavez took power. That's why Venezuelan economic growth is pretty underwhelming. Those social programs
so beloved of Nation writers came out of investment funds that were previously used to keep oil production high--necessary, as we've discussed,
because Venezuela's sludgy crude is hard to get out of the ground. Which gives us a paradox: Venezuela's reserves are growing, but
its production is in decline. The only reason that the economy isn't worse is that oil prices have stayed
high. But with production falling, Venezuela doesn't just need high oil prices, but continuously rising oil
prices, to keep funding all that government spending. This is why Venezuela has been one of the hawkiest hawks in OPEC,
always agitating for tighter quotas and higher prices. A country with falling production doesn't need to worry about tighter quotas. But they do
need to worry that lower prices will throw their budget disastrously out of balance.

Chavez wrecked Venezuelan oil industry
Hugo Chavez obliterated Venezuela's credibility among the world's largest oil producers, and it will take
some time for the troubled nation to earn back that trust. FORTUNE -- The death of Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez is no panacea for the nation's dysfunctional energy industry. Political and
economic uncertainty will likely continue to deter foreign investors from fully committing the necessary
cash, resources, and expertise that are desperately needed to effectively tap the nation's oil wealth.
Whoever takes over the reins of the nation will need to dismantle the policies, structures, and rhetoric that
have made investing in Venezuela a fool's errand. It is not hyperbole to say that Hugo Chavez's death
Tuesday rocked the energy industry. The "Bolivarian" strongman has been the oil industry's biggest
villain for over a decade. In his tenure as president of Venezuela, Chavez not only trashed contracts and
expropriated lands and equipment from foreign oil companies, like ExxonMobil (XOM) and
ConocoPhillips (COP); he also managed to crush the national oil company, Petrleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), by using it as a piggy bank to fund the programs and policies associated with his nebulously
defined "21st Century Socialism" experiment.

Matt Struth
Chavez crushed Venezuelan oil economy
With today's oil price being 10 times higher than where it was when Chavez took power in 1998, one
would surmise that the Orinoco oil belt today would be littered with equipment and workers trying
furiously to tap its abundant oil wealth. But, of course, that isn't the case. During his reign, Chavez
instituted a series of devastating "reforms" to the nation's oil industry, which ended up breaking its back.
He ripped up production sharing contracts signed under the previous government, forcing foreign oil
companies to hand over more of their profit to the state. Chavez then used PDVSA as his own personal
ATM, starving the company of the necessary investment capital needed to expand its operations in the
Orinoco. In 2011, PDVSA was left with just $11 billion, or 9%, of its total income, to fund future
operations. That was barely enough to keep the lights on, let alone go out and enough to drill. By contrast,
Pemex, Mexico's state owned-oil company (and all-around bureaucratic basket case), spent around $19
billion, or 17%, of its income on operations, while Brazil's Petrobras invested $42 billion, or 29%, of its
income. PDVSA says it will be investing some $140 billion in the Orinoco by 2015. It is hard to see how
that can happen given how much the government is siphoning off. In January, Chavez ordered PDVSA to
increase its payments to his off-the-books slush fund, Fonden, which is used to support the "revolution,"
further draining its resources. Lastly, the government has saddled PDVSA with around $35 billion in
debt, slapping the company with fat interest payments, which will only augment its money woes. But
probably the fatal blow to Venezuelan oil investment came in 2007 when Chavez essentially
"renationalized" the industry, booting out a number of foreign oil companies who refused to (once again)
renegotiate their contracts, namely U.S. oil giants ExxonMobil and ConocoPhilips, which had each
invested billions of dollars in the country since the early 1990s. The new rules, which are more or less the
same today, require foreign investors to form partnerships with PDVSA in which the state-owned oil
company would have a 60% ownership. The foreign company, which would have 40% ownership, would
still have to fund 100% of the investment. Furthermore, whatever the foreign company made would be
subject to a 50% tax rate and a 33% royalty (tax). Oh, and investors must agree that any dispute that may
arise in the future concerning their ownership with the government will be heard by Venezuelan courts,
not those pesky impartial international arbitration courts.

Venezuelan oil lacks investment and is declining
Ladislaw and Verrastro 13(Sarah O. Ladislaw, co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and
National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
Frank Verrastro, senior vice president and James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS,
Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production, 3/6/13, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production)

The winds of change are once again blowing in Venezuela. The recent announcement of Hugo Chavezs
passing has opened up a host of questions about the future leadership of Venezuela and the potential
impact this leadership transition could have on Venezuelan oil production and global oil markets.
Venezuela is one of the largest oil and natural gas resource holders in the world. It is among the worlds
largest oil producers (13th) and exporters (10th) and has historically been one of the United States largest
sources of oil imports (4th behind Canada, Saudi Arabia and Mexico). Ever since the failed coup and the
subsequent strike that brought about a short collapse in oil production in 2002, followed by
nationalization of the oil sector, onlookers have been waiting for indications that the regimes approach to
energy production would either fail once and for all or that some political change would bring about
reform and rejuvenation of the energy sector. A political transition in Venezuela is now upon us but how
it evolves could mean a lot for the energy sector and global energy markets. Despite its enormous oil
Matt Struth
resources, Venezuela's oil production (regardless of whose figures you use) has long been in steady
decline. In 2011 liquids production was 2.47 million barrels per day (mmbd) , down a million barrels per
day since 1999. Some of this is reflects the changing cost and economics of Venezuelan oil production
but field decline is significant and expertise and reinvestment are questionable and looking harder to
come by. The internal technical and managerial capabilities of state run oil and gas company PDVSA
have deteriorated since the 2002 strike and aftermath. Increasingly, PDVSA relies on contractors, as well
as other private company partners, to keep the fields in production but reports state that contractors have
not been paid in months and that the political uncertainty in the country has even driven routine decision
making to a halt. The sustained political uncertainty has also slowed investment; Russian and Indian
companies were planning to invest in Venezuela's oil fields but so far have withheld incremental new
money. China has not announced a new line of credit or extensions on its development-linked financing
since last April. At the same time that production is dropping, highly subsidized domestic consumption of
oil is increasing while revenue from exports is also declining. The United States remains the largest
recipient of Venezuelan oil exports at 950,000 barrels per day in 2011, roughly 40 percent, plus another
185,000 barrels per day from the Caribbean that was Venezuelan sourced but those volumes area down as
U.S. demand has declined and other crudes have become available. Venezuela's next largest export
destinations are the Caribbean (31 percent) and then China (around 10 percent). Venezuela sells to many
of its Caribbean neighbors at below market rates due to extremely preferential financing relationships,
including additional heavy subsidies for Cuban exports. All of this culminates in an outlook for continued
decline in oil production and a worsening economic outlook for Venezuela during a politically difficult
time. However, conventional wisdom argues that maintaining oil production is in the interest of any
regime. Revenue from oil production is such a large part of Venezuelas government balance sheet that no
leadership could survive for long without a sustained cash flow that oil exports bring. The converse of
this argument is that revenues generated by the energy sector are such an important source of power and
influence in Venezuela that there is potential for infighting over control of the sector. Moreover, the
potential for strikes or instability among groups involved in the sector (some of whom have not been
paid) could have additional negative impacts on production.
Lack of investment projects grim outlook for Venezuelan Oil
Carter 13 (Jon Carter, analyst and reporter for Energy and Capital, Venezuela Oil Crisis, 3/14/2013,
Energy and Capital, http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/venezuela-oil-crisis/3175)

Foreign investment has not exactly been smooth-sailing since Chavez nationalized the oil fields in 2007.
Outside oil companies were encouraged to continue drilling, but the PDVSA would take 60% of the
profits, according to CNN. This forced a number of oil companies to pull out of contract agreements,
including oil giants ConcoPhillips (NYSE:COP) and ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM). Regardless of new
leadership, Venezuelan energy policy caused many investors to leave on bad terms. And the nation's
leaders are failing to acknowledge the need for foreign business to boost oil production and national
profit. However, foreign investment is unlikely to happen any time soon because of Venezuelas rocky
reputation among oil companies, and the current political situation shows little reform in the energy
sector. Forbes mentions center-right candidate Henrique Capriles as the only legitimate opposition to
Venezuelas socialist party, and someone who could open new doors for outside investment. However,
his candidacy is considered a long-shot during a time of mourning for Chavez, and even if there was a
Capriles victory and forthcoming policy change, investors would still remain hesitant in doing business
with Venezuela based on its history. Unless Venezuela is able to secure more loans and drilling
operations from some of its alliesincluding Vietnam, China, Russia, and CubaVenezuelas energy
crisis is inevitable. Foreign companies like Indias Oil and Natural Gas Corporation are holding off on
drilling until the current political situation is fully assessed, as reported by CNN. Venezuelas energy
outlook does not appear stable, but the transition of leadership could affect what little foreign investment
there is left in the nation.

Matt Struth

Matt Struth
Investment Low Now
Foreign investors are skeptical

While it makes sense to have a few foreign partners to help to spread out the risk, one can go too far, especially when those partners have pretty
much zero experience working with oil sands. Indeed, this split looks more like a bizarre public relations stunt than a real division of labor. It
should therefore come as no surprise to learn that there isn't too much drilling going on in the Orinoco
right now. While PDVSA says that it has started to drill wells with its Russian and Vietnamese partners,
the initial production numbers reported are trivial. Meanwhile, India's ONGC and several other
companies are reportedly holding back from investing any more cash until there is some clarity as to the
political situation in the country. You can bet eve Venezuela's staunchest allies, like China, which has
loaned the Chavez regime some $46 billion in the last few years, will be among those taking a breather.

Venezuela will call for foreign oil companies
Mike Obel, editor/writer for International Business Times, worked on the Finance Desk of The
Associated Press, and United Press International, and the Oil & Gas Journal, and has written for BP PLC
and ConocoPhillips, 3-7-13, International Business Times, Analysis: What Will It Take To Restore
Venezuela's Once Mighty Oil And Gas Business?, http://www.ibtimes.com/analysis-what-will-it-take-
restore-venezuelas-once-mighty-oil-gas-business-1114204

On one hand, [Maduro] will need to continue the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Chavez, if only to allay
fears of some that Chavezs policies may not survive him, Velasco said. On the other hand, if they are
strapped for cash, they might have to make some deals with foreign companies. These would be deals
for access to onshore shale oil properties and Orinoco Belt, the worlds single-largest crude oil reserve.
"Foreign oil companies desperately want to get in on Venezuelan oil, and, because of that, theyre very
likely to accept deals that are not favorable on the assumption that this is a long-term gamble and over
time terms may improve, Velasco said. Right now, they just want to get in on the game. So in short
term, they are willing to accept unfavorable deals.

Matt Struth
INTERNAL
Matt Struth
Oil Shocks Kill Econ

High oil prices lead to global economic collapse
Tverberg 13 (Gail Tverberg, an actuary with a background in math, analyzes energy and financial
matters, How high oil prices lead to financial collapse, 3/30/2013, The Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2013/0330/How-high-oil-prices-lead-to-
financial-collapse)

Many analysts discussing resource limits are talking about a very different concern than I am talking about. Many from the peak oil community
say that what we should worry about is a decline in world oil supply. In my view, the danger is quite different: The real danger is
financial collapse, coming much earlier than a decline in oil supply. This collapse is related to high oil
price, and also to higher costs for other resources as we approach limits (for example, desalination of water where water supply is a problem,
and higher natural gas prices in much of the world). The financial collapse is related to Energy Return on Energy
Invested (EROEI) that is already too low. I dont see any particular EROEI target as being a thresholdthe calculations for individual
energy sources are not on a system-wide basis, so are not always helpful. The issue is not precisely low EROEI. Instead, the issue is the loss of
cheap fossil fuel energy to subsidize the rest of society. If an energy source, such as oil back when the cost was $20 or $30 barrel, can produce a
large amount of energy in the form it is needed with low inputs, it is likely to be a very profitable endeavor. Governments can tax it heavily (with
severance taxes, royalties, rental for drilling rights, and other fees that are not necessarily called taxes). In many oil exporting countries, these oil-
based revenues provide a large share of government revenues. The availability of cheap energy also allows inexpensive roads, bridges, pipelines,
and schools to be built. As we move to energy that requires more expensive inputs for extraction (such as the current
$90+ barrel oil), these benefits are lost. The cost of roads, bridges, and pipelines escalates. It is this loss of a subsidy
fromcheap fossil fuels that is significant part of what moves us toward financial collapse. Renewable energy generally
does not solve this problem. In fact, it can exacerbate the problem, because the cost of its inputs tend to be high and very front-ended, leading
to a need for subsidies. What is really needed is a way to replace lost tax revenue, and a way to bring down the high cost of new bridges and
roadsthat is a way to get back to the cost structure we had when oil (and other fossil fuels) could be extracted cheaply.

Empirical studies prove oil shocks negative impacts on economy
Sill, 07
Keith Sill is a senior economist in the Research Department of Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, one of the 12 regional banks
that make up the Federal Reserve System. Sill is Vice President and Director of Real-Time Data Research Center, The Macroeconomics of Oil
Shocks, http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2007/q1/br_q1-2007-3_oil-shocks.pdf

For various reasons, oil-price increases may lead to significant slowdowns in economic growth . Five
of the last seven U.S. recessions were preceded by significant increases in the price of oil. In this article, Keith Sill
examines the effect of changes in oil prices on U.S. economic activity, focusing on how runups in the price of oil can affect
output growth and inflation. He also discusses the channels by which oil-price increases might affect the economy and the historical evidence on
the relationship between oil prices, economic growth, and inflation. During the first quarter of 2002, the price of
crude oil averaged $19.67 per barrel. Four years later, in the first quarter of 2006, the average price of oil had risen to $63 per
barrel. Indeed, the high price of oil may not be a short-lived phenomenon: Futures markets indicate that investors expect the price of oil to
remain above $70 per barrel through 2008 . For the postwar U.S. economy, the data show a clear tendency for oil-price
spikes to precede economic downturns . Though most of these episodes occurred at a time when oils share as an input into U.S.
production was larger than it is today, there is still much debate about how oil prices affect the economy. How
concerned should we be about the economic consequences of persistently high oil prices? Oil prices matter for
the economy in several ways. Changes in oil prices directly affect transportation costs, heating bills, and
the prices of goods made with petroleum products. Oilprice spikes induce greater uncertainty about the future, which may lead to firms
and households delaying purchases and investments. Changes in oil prices also lead to reallocations of labor and capital between energyintensive sectors of the
economy and those that are not energy-intensive. For these reasons and others, oil price increases may lead to significant slowdowns in economic growth. In the
postwar U.S. data, the correlation between oil-price spikes and economic downturns is not perfect some oil-price increases are not followed
by recessions. But five of the last seven U.S. recessions were preceded by significant increases in the
Matt Struth
price of oil. The most recent rise in the price of oil has not led (at least not yet) to an economic recession, but history nonetheless suggests
that oil prices are an important element in assessing the economys near-term prospects.

Matt Struth
Solvency

Oil engagement with Venezuela prevents oil shocks
Rasmussen and Roitman 11(Tobias Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia
Department, IMF, Augustin Roitman, Economist, IMF, Oil shocks around the world: Are they really that
bad?,8/25/2013, VOX, http://www.voxeu.org/article/oil-shocks-around-world-are-they-really-bad)

The fact that the negative impact of higher oil prices has generally been quite small does not mean that
the effect can be ignored. Some countries have clearly been negatively affected by high oil prices. Moreover,
our results do not rule out more adverse effects from a future shock that is driven more by lower oil supply
than the more demand-driven increases in oil prices that have been the norm over the past two decades. In
terms of policy lessons, our findings suggest that efforts to reduce dependence on oil could help reduce the exposure to oil price shocks and hence
costs associated with macroeconomic volatility. At the same time, given a certain level of oil imports, strengthening economic
linkages to oil exporters could also work as a natural shock absorber.

Venezuela has immense oil reserves
But the ineptitude and corruption of the Chavez kleptocracy have contributed to a decline in overall
Venezuelan oil output, which at last count came in at 2.4 million barrels a day, 25% less than what it was
when Chavez took power 14 years ago. That would have been excusable if Venezuela's oil reserves were
rapidly depleting, but that isn't the case -- not by a long shot. Indeed, in 2010, OPEC confirmed that Venezuela's
Orinoco oil belt contained tar sand deposits equivalent to around 300 billion barrels of oil, enough to
fulfill current world demand for 10 years. That would mean Venezuela would have the largest oil reserves
on the planet, outstripping Saudi Arabia's 260 billion barrel oil stash.

Matt Struth
RELATIONS ADVANTAGE
Matt Struth
INTERNAL
Matt Struth
Plan Key LA Relations
Engaging Venezuela solves Latin American relations and democracy promotion
Kragie, 12 -- Duke University [Andrew, "Venezuela's 2012 Presidential Election: Policy
Recommendation," sites.duke.edu/history136a_01_s2012_awk7/policy-recommendations/, accessed 7-
19-13, mss]

The US stands to lose much or gain a bit based on its reactions in the post-election period. A reaction that seems to oppose Chavez on
ideological rather than democratic grounds could reinforce the historically rooted sense the US only supports
democracy when the elected leaders support the US. On the other hand, a reaction guided by democratic principles and
regional cooperation would bolster Latin American nations willingness to cooperate in many domains. The
US reaction might help restore its role as a promoter of democracy and a respected voice for liberty
worldwide. Weeks highlights the memories of past instances of unilateral and indiscriminate uses of force, most recently the 1989
invasion of Panama, and argues that the US focused almost exclusively on security goals in Latin America during the Cold War (2008, 163-4).
Today, the US focuses more on issues of freedom and democracy in policy discussions. The US State Department lists strengthening effective
institutions of democratic governance as one of its four main foreign policy pillars in the Americas (Regional Topics).

Matt Struth
A2 Snowden Alt Cause

Snowden impact will be minimal on relations
Lee 7-16 (Briana, Senior Production Editor, 7-16-13, Will Snowden Come Between the U.S. and Latin
America? Council of Foreign Relations)
http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/snowden-come-between-us-latin-america/p31109

Christopher Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says that
for many of these countries, the wide scope and nature of the alleged U.S. surveillance activities have
"triggered an understandable reaction"though he acknowledges that some responses have been
disproportionate. In the end, he says, the practical implications for U.S. relations in the region " will be
minimal , in part because the United States has such a multifaceted relationship with these countries."

Matt Struth
DEMOCRACY
Matt Struth
A2 Transition Wars

No transition wars-empirics show democratic stability is trending upwards.
McFaul, Stanford political science professor, 2009
(Michael, Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can, pg 55-6)

Few argue that liberal democracies are unstable political systems. Rather, the critique is focused on democratization or new democracies,
especially in the developing world. New democracies in poorer countries, are more likely to revert back to autocracy
than are those in richer countries. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi estimate that, in countries with per capita , income below $ 1,000, the
expected life of a democracy is eight years; in those with per capita income between $1,001 and $ 2,000, the expected duration of a democracy is eighteen years; and
in countries with a per capita income above $4,000, the probability of democratic survival is nearly 100 percent.102 Likewise, | new democracies that fail to generate
economic growth are much j more likely to collapse than are new democracies that do generate i economic growth.103 But these probabilities for new
democracies' survival do not imply that autocracies are more stable. On the contrary, what is striking about the last
three decades is autocratic instability. In 1973, forty of the 150 countries (26.7 percent) in the world were
democracies. In 2007, 119 of 193 countries (61.7 percent) were democracies. This period represents the
most radical decline in autocratic rule in world history. In addition, the survival rate for new democracies
increased to roughly 75 percent in the 1980s and 1990s, a sharp increase over the rate in the previous two decades.104 Moreover,
the length of rule of new autocracies coming to power through military coups also has shortened
dramatically in the past two decades as international norms about a return to civilian rule pressure these soldiers to get out of government and return to the
barracks.

Matt Struth
SOLVENCY

Matt Struth
A2 July Announcment
The July announcement isnt anything new- relations will always be on/off without prior
US engagement
Neuman, 13 -- Andes Region correspondent
[William, "Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations," NY Times, 7-20-13,
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-us-
relations.html?_r=2&, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

This is not the first time that Venezuela has backed off the idea of renewed relations with the United States.
The two countries quietly began talks late last year aimed at improving relations, although those ground to a halt
after the health of Mr. Chvez, who had cancer, deteriorated in December. After Mr. Chvezs death in March, a State Department
official said the United States hoped that the election to replace him would meet democratic standards prompting Mr. Jaua to angrily announce
that Venezuela was halting the talks between the two countries. Venezuelan officials have repeatedly said relations with the
United States should be conducted on a basis of respect.
Economic factors still matter more
Times Argus, 13 ["Quit the Sniping," 7-22-13,
www.timesargus.com/article/20130722/OPINION02/707229989, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

The foreign ministry described Powers comments as interventionist and boasted that the UN had often recognized
Venezuelas solid system of constitutional guarantees that ensured its citizens fundamental rights. By contrast, the whole world is constantly
expressing its concern over repressive practices carried out by the United States, the statement added. Maduro earlier angered Washington by
offering asylum to the fugitive intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden, who has been stranded in a Moscow airport while seeking a home
where hed be able to avoid prosecution by the United States. All but two have rejected his request. I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum
to the young American Edward Snowden, Maduro had explained, to protect this young man from the persecution unleashed by the worlds
most powerful empire. Washington may appear understandably preoccupied with pending talks between Israel and Palestine, the continued
unrest in Egypt, the worsening situation in Syria and the sectarian violence in Iraq, but clearly the state department also must deal with hostility
from certain parts of Latin America. One oddity: More than 100 players on Americas Major League Baseball teams are natives of Venezuela,
and their performances are closely watched by their friends, relatives and fans back home. And, unlike Cuban players, they didnt have to defect
to play in the United States. Theyre well paid in this country. Also, the United States is an important customer for Venezuelas
major export, oil. The two nations can keep sniping at each other, but they also need each other, and that
fact may help save their relationship.

Matt Struth
A2 US Alt Causes
Obama will avoid antagonizing Venezuela
Smilde, 12 -- University of Georgia sociology professor
[David, "Obamas Second Term Provides an Opportunity to Reset Relations with Venezuela," 11-12-12,
venezuelablog.tumblr.com/post/35618113768/obamas-second-term-provides-an-opportunity-to-reset,
accessed 7-20-13, mss]

It is also a good time to avoid needless antagonisms. Fortunately, the Obama Administration seems to have
learned that engaging in tit-for-tat is counter-productive. The Chvez government thrives on a third-worldist,
anti-imperialist narrative that portrays Venezuela as heroically standing up to U.S. interference. Thus, any
attempt to pressure Venezuela with tough talk only reinforces this narrative, and not only distances it from the US, but gives
the Chvez government the opportunity to deflect the demands of Venezuelan citizens.

Matt Struth
A2 Snowden
Kerry never threatened Venezuela
RT, 13 ["Kerry vows to put the screws to Venezuela over Snowden report," 7-19-13,
rt.com/news/kerry-threatens-venezuela-snowden-308/, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

Later on Friday US State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf has denied that Kerry ever touched upon the
possible nature of US response to Venezuela granting asylum to Snowden in his conversation with Jaua. She
dismissed the report that Kerry has threatened Venezuela as utterly wrong.

Matt Struth
IADB MECHANISM

Matt Struth
1AC
Matt Struth
1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase financial
investment in Venezuelas oil infrastructure, including but not limited to increased
technical assistance through the Inter-American Development Bank.

Matt Struth
1AC Solvency
US can cooperate with the IDB to provide technical and financial assistance
Noriega, 12 -- former senior US State Department official
[Roger, visiting fellow at AEI and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, and Jose Cardenas,
contributor to AEIs Venezuela-Iran Project and a director with Vision Americas., "An action plan for US
policy in the Americas," 12-5-12, www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-
america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

Americas Economic Freedom Initiative. To accelerate the growth of the regional middle classand thereby spur demand for US goods and
servicesa presidential-level initiative should be implemented to help boost a robust private sector throughout the region.
Some recommendations for accomplishing this: Marshal US and regional expertise to develop regional capital markets
that will increase the availability of private financing for business expansion, budding entrepreneurs, and
innovators. First, this would entail convening a regional capital-markets summitwith the participation of the US Department of the
Treasury and regional counterpartsto launch a public-private task force to develop a capital formation work plan identifying the prerequisites
and targeting obstacles to the development of robust capital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. The team would consist of
government financial-sector experts, Inter-American Development Bank specialists, and business and investment
professionals. Second, it would require joining other nations in developing and funding a regional private-enterprise
investment fund through the Inter-American Development Bank to provide equity and debt capital
directly to private entrepreneurs quickly and on commercial terms (especially in locations traditionally neglected by private
capital because of high risk). This fund should be governed by a private board and managed independently by investment professionals subject to
public oversight; Charge multilateral development banks to technically and financially support the creation of
national or subregional enterprise funds to bolster local private-sector development at the grassroots level, which will provide seed
capital and technical support to small and medium enterprises. These funds would be capitalized with public and private funds and managed by
investment professionals; Ensure that adequate protections exist in regional capital markets to prevent international terrorist financing and illicit-
narcotics money laundering; Convene a summit of deans of business schools to expand exchange programs between the 20 most prominent
business schools in the Americas. This program should bolster expertise in trade, business management, and capital management, among other
fields, to strengthen the professional capacity in national economies; Expand exchanges among scientists and engineers with innovator-
entrepreneurs and those engaged in private research and development to cross-fertilize and identify commercially viable technology and
innovation; Revise US Millennium Challenge Corporation guidelines to prioritize programs in subregions (for example, in Southern Mexico and
Northeast Brazil) and to emphasize cooperative funding arrangements, including private-sector contributions.

Matt Struth
1AC Enviro Adv
IDB assistance key to sustainable oil development
Brito, 12 -- IDB lead environmental specialist
[Elizabeth, Ximena Herbas, Inter-American Development Bank, Senior Environmental Specialist, "Inter-
American Development Bank Financing of Responsible Oil and Gas Developments," June 2012,
www.iaia.org/conferences/iaia12/uploadpapers/Final%20papers%20review%20process/Brito,%20Elizabe
th.%20%20Inter-
American%20Development%20Bank%20Financing%20of%20Responsible%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20
Developments.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1, accessed 7-19-13, mss]

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is supporting the development of responsible oil and gas development in
Peru since 2004 with the Camisea and Peru LNG Projects, establishing a benchmark high for environmental and social
practices and corporate social responsibility in the country. Notwithstanding the sensitive and controversial environmental and
social aspects of the Camisea Project (Camisea fields located in areas reserved for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation and in areas of
unique biodiversity value, pipeline crossing three sensitive ecosystems and a fractionation plant located in the buffer zone of a national reserve)
the Bank leveraged its limited presence in the transport (pipeline) component to extend its environmental and social
requirements to the Upstream Component (exploration and explotation), and to the Government of Peru (GOP), strengthening its
ability to monitor the environmental and social aspects of the Project helping improve the overall
environmental and social sustainability in the Project area. The Peru LNG Project was financed by the IDB in 2008. The
environmental and social requirements established as part of the Banks financing to the Project built upon the Camisea experiences and the new
Bank Environment and Safeguards Compliance Policy approved in 2006. Lessons learned and good practices implemented in
the Camisea Project were expanded and improved for this project, setting exemplary practices for participatory
monitoring, biodiversity protection, construction over sensitive peatbogs (Andean wetlands), social investments, and
others. In parallel, the Bank is continuously working with the GOP to provide the technical basis for the development of a sustainable energy
matrix for the country. These projects have generated important environmental and social benefits, including
enhanced legal protection for vulnerable indigenous populations, creation of close to 1 million hectares of environmental
protected areas, establishment of a multi-stakeholder institution to develop and implement a sustainable
development plan for the natural reserve Paracas, enhanced environmental protection legislation for
hydrocarbon development, and increased governmental and civil society institutional capacity. I. Projects
Summaries The Camisea Project The Camisea Project (hereinafter Camisea or Project) consists of two separate components with a total cost
of approximately $1.7 billion. The upstream component consists of exploration and exploitation of gas deposits in the Camisea field, processing
facilities at Las Malvinas located 431 kilometers east of Lima, and a fractionation plant and marine terminal for natural gas liquids on the Pacific
coast south of Pisco, all under the responsibility of a multinational consortium led by the private firm Pluspetrol. The downstream component
includes 714 kilometers of a natural gas pipeline from Las Malvinas to Pisco and from Pisco to Lima, and a separate 540-kilometer natural gas
liquids pipeline from Las Malvinas to Pisco. Both pipelines share the same right- of- way and are the responsibility of the private firm
Transportadora de Gas del Per (TGP). IDB involvement began in 2001, prior to initiation of construction1 .The Project was approved by the
Board of Executive Directors in December 2003 and started operations in August of 2004. In December 2002, the Bank also provided a US$5
million loan to the Government of Peru (GOP) to help strengthen its institutional capacity to monitor the environmental and social effects of the
Project. The IDB did not participate in the financing of the upstream component of the Project. The Peru LNG Project The Peru LNG Project
consists of the development, construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant on the coast of Peru, South of Lima; a marine
terminal with a breakwater; and a 408 km, 34 natural gas pipeline through the highlands to the coastal LNG plant2 , all under the responsibility
of Peru LNG, a consortium led by Hunt Oil, SK Energy, Repsol, and Marubeni Corporation. The Project liquefies natural gas from the Camisea
fields operated by Pluspetrol, and exports LNG to available markets. II. Sustainability Camisea IDBs participation was based upon the principles
of sustainable development including strong environmental and social safeguards for both the downstream and upstream components (this one
not financed by IDB) and specific actions to create long-term benefits for local populations and the environment. The IDB took a series of
proactive steps to improve the environmental and social sustainability of the project and ensure stakeholder participation, including semi-annual
public meetings for the life of the loan. In addition to IDB supervision, the project is supervised by the GOP, the project companies, and by local
communities, each with transparent reporting mechanisms. During due-diligence, prior to any formal approval of the financing, the Bank
innovated by implementing day-to-day monitoring of the construction to ensure adequate environmental and social protection measures were
implemented. The participation of the IDB clearly made a significant difference in the environmental and social viability of the Project. The
institutional strengthening loan provided to the GOP increased its supervision and monitoring activities and enabled additional actions to mitigate
environmental and social impacts. As part of its involvement, the IDB strongly encouraged the GOP to improve the sharing of Camisea benefits
with the local population in the area of influence of the project. In this context, the GOP, working with the IDB and Peruvian civil society,
designed a mechanism known as the Camisea Fund. The proposed fund would have used 3.5 percent of the royalties from the upstream
component to finance specific environmental, social and economic development projects in the area of the Project and would have been managed
by an independent entity. However, in December 2004, the Peruvian congress passed a law (Ley del Fondo Camisea, or FOCAM), which while
returning project royalties to the Project area, did not meet all the objectives established in the draft Camisea Fund proposed by IDB. On the
positive side, FOCAM provides substantially more resources than had been proposed in the original Camisea Fund. However, FOCAM does not
Matt Struth
provide for an independent entity to administer the fund, resources are available only to governments and not to private or community
organizations, and does not allow for financing productive projects or federal environmental protected areas created by the Project. 3 Specific
data on the transfers authorized and accredited under FOCAM (and gas royalties) to regional and local Governments can be accessed at the
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)s website http://transparencia-economica.mef.gob.pe/. Since the law came into effect in April 2005,
FOCAM has generated over 1.3 billion soles (over 500 million US dollars) for local and regional governments in the Camisea area. To facilitate
the use of FOCAM resources by the regional and local governments, the Bank financed a series of regional sustainable development plans for the
departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, and the province of La Convencion. In addition, various training programs were instituted for local
governments on public sector investments, the Peruvian budget, and appropriation regulations. While the governmental institutions that access
FOCAM resources still need further institutional capacity to more effectively and efficiently design and implement projects, significant progress
has been made (all the more impressive given the limited capacity that existed prior to the creation of the FOCAM ). With its involvement, the
Bank significantly increased the environmental and social sustainability of the Project, in particular
development of a protection plan for the NahuaKugapakori indigenous area (indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation), which is the first
and only time in Peru such enhanced legal protection has occurred. Creation of approximately 1 million hectares of new protected areas in the
rainforest area, including Otishi National Park, Ashaninka and Machiguenga Communal Reserves, and Megatoni Sanctuary, and their respective
management plans and financial resources to
Bay (CSDPC), public-private partnership between the GOP, IDB, regional and local governments of Pisco, San Andres and Ica, to develop and
implement the Paracas Bay decontamination plan. The initiative leveraged significant resources (over $24 million) to address priority
decontamination efforts and implementation of remedial projects (such as a marine outfall for the effluents of the fisheries industry), properly
the pipeline
right-of- ands known as peatbogs
or bofedales, enabling the complete restoration of such sensitive environments. An important indirect benefit of the Banks involvement,
though one not easily quantified, is the enhanced institutional capacity of local civil society organizations in large infrastructure projects.
Similarly, while challenges still remain, the GOPs institutional capacity to develop environmentally and socially sustainable oil and gas projects
in Peru has unquestionably progressed relative to the point at which the IDBs involvement in the project began. Peru LNG Lessons learned and
good practices implemented in the Camisea Project were expanded and improved for the Peru LNG Project, setting exemplary practices for
management of social impacts, biodiversity protection, construction over sensitive peatbogs (Andean wetlands), social investments, and others. In
parallel, the Bank continues to work with the GOP to provide the technical basis for the development of a sustainable energy matrix for the
country. Management of social impacts The social management plans and programs developed by Peru LNG are considered exemplary within the
industry, in particular the cultural heritage management, stakeholder engagement, influx management, grievance mechanism, local hiring,
participatory monitoring, and local purchases plans and programs. Throughout construction, approximately 20,000 meetings were held with plant
and pipeline stakeholders; approximately 11 million dollars were spent in local purchases; and approximately 10,000 local workers were hired.
The participatory monitoring program (community monitoring program) employed 83 community monitors and was instrumental to the
successful conclusion of the construction through sensitive Andean communities. Biodiversity protection The company implemented various
plans to ensure the preservation of biodiversity along the pipeline. Particularly relevant were the biodiversity action plan, the bio-restoration
management program, and the marine environmental management plan. The company also built upon the experience of Camisea in constructing
on the bofedales and implemented a state-of-the-art construction method for crossing the Andean wetlands. Social Investments Social
investment plans were developed to add value beyond Project-related compensation and employment for communities in the PERU LNGs area
of influence. During construction, the community investment budget, which excludes monitoring costs, was distributed between the main
components of the Project as follows: US$4.1 million for the LNG Plant area, and US$2.5 million for the Pipeline area. For the operation phase,
the communities needs are being re-assessed and the social investment program will be modified to address those needs. Lessons learned from
the construction-phase communities projects will be applied. The budget for the operation phase community projects will be equally distributed
among the communities along the pipeline route. Sustainable energy matrix For the IDB, the Peru LNG Project represents a cornerstone for
important cooperation with the GOP in the management of the social and environmental risks in the hydrocarbon sector in Peru. Specifically, the
additional and complementary collaboration between IDB and the GOP includes a Programmatic Loan for a New Sustainable Energy Matrix; a
Technical Cooperation on Sustainable Energy and Biofuels Strategy; and another Technical Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Lower Urubamba, the sensitive rainforest area where the Camisea fields are located. The Bank is also in the process of discussing with the GOP
specific areas for capacity strengthening, in particular, to strengthten the capacity of local and regional governments to access the resources more
efficiently generated by the gas developments and to enhance the institutional capacity of the governmental agencies that are,ultimately and in the
long term, responsible for ensuring that sustainable development goals are achieved. III. Conclusions and Lenders Additionality
Participation of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in financing large oil and gas projects is critical to
ensuring environmental and social responsibility by project companies and enhancing the environmental
and social protection of the people, biodiversity and natural resources. The supervision practices of MDBs,
and IDB in particular, ensure these benefits throughout the life of the loan. When financing projects, the IDB is committed
to have important additionality and encourage borrowers to develop sustainable social and economic initiatives that extend
beyond the mitigation of impacts or the creation of project-specific jobs in the projects area of influence. As an example, in the Camisea Project,
over 10 US$ million were invested by TGP in support to community projects and their local development plans, whereas Pluspetrol invested over
US$ 23 million in socioeconomic agreements with the fishermen organizations and local governments in the Paracas Bay area. Peru LNG
invested US$ 6.6 million during the construction phase in community investment programs and has planned to have rolling budgets to be
determined annually or at other intervals in the operations phase. In addition, IDBs support for Camisea encouraged innovation
by leveraging its relatively small financial contribution (6% of project costs) and extending its environmental and
social safeguards to the upstream component not financed by the Bank. In Peru LNG, Bank involvement went beyond the Project financing
to extend its support to the GOP in developing a new sustainable energy matrix for the country. Lessons Learned The IDBs experience
with oil and gas projects provides important lessons that can hopefully benefit other financial institutions when
financing large projects in the sector. Lessons include: the importance of pre-construction planning for works
in sensitive environments and indigenous reserves; the need to create credible and effective supervisory
Matt Struth
systems (particularly in extremely complex projects with extensive information, and where there is a
general lack of trust among stakeholders);workers health and safety training during the early stages of the project
construction; and the need for an effective communication strategy on environmental and social issues with
all stakeholders. The IDBs experience has also demonstrated the importance of mainstreaming
environmental and social aspects into sector planning and addressing issues of mixed responsibilities, belonging to public and
private entities, and among the different public entities and private companies.

Unsustainable oil development threatens Orinoco- its a key biodiversity hotspot
WWF no date* (World Wildlife Fund, an organization dedicated to protecting the worlds animals
and ecosystems, *unknown date, but Orinoco is one of their current-Jul 2013- projects, The
Orinoco Basin, WWF website)
http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/colombia/wwf_colombia_conservation/orinoco_basi
n/
The Orinoco basin lies between Colombia and Venezuela from the Andes to the Atlantic. The river flows
2,140km from its source in the extreme south of the Guianan massif until it reaches the ocean. Its
tributary basins represent one of the most biologically and hydrologically diverse areas of the
world. It is considered to be the 3rd most important river system on the planet, particularly due to the
volume of water flowing into the Atlantic - an average of 36,000 m3 per second. The 830,000km2 area of
the Orinoco basin includes parts of the Andes, plains of the Llanos and the Guiana shield. 63% of this
area is located in Venezuela and the remaining 37% in Colombia. Among the most important tributaries
of the Orinoco are the Rivers Guaviare, Meta, Arauca, Vichada, Capanaparo, Cinaruco, Apure, Caura,
Caron, Ventuari, Portuguesa, Atabapo and Alto Orinoco. The combination of 3 different ecosystems
(Andes, Guiana and Orinoco Delta) form an extraordinary aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity within the
ecoregion. To date, 17,420 species of plants, 1,300 species of birds, more than 1,000 species of fish, 250
mammals and 119 reptiles have been recorded in the area. The area also has a high ethnic diversity and is
home to indigenous groups such as the Achagua, Amorua, Baniba, Bare, Betoye, Chiricoa, Cuiba,
Guahbos, Hoti, Kapo, Karina, Kuripako, Makaguaje, Masiguare, Ninam, Panare, Pemon, Piapoko,
Piaroa, Puinave, Saliba, Sanema, Uwa, Warao, Yanomami, Yekuana and Yeral. The Orinoco basin
represents an important opportunity for conservation as it is one of the most intact river systems in the
world with a relatively low population density (13 inhabitants per sq km). Infrastructure development in
this area is still very limited. However , threats are looming large in the form of gold and diamond
mining in Guiana highlands, petroleum exploitation in the foothills of Colombian Andes and
Venezuelan Llanos, extensive cattle ranching and the projected expansion of industrial-scale agriculture
such as oil palm and rice cultivation. Both Venezuela and Colombia face threats that embrace a wide
range of human and economic activities. If not managed appropriately, they could severely affect the
integrity of this natural region.

Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction. Key to ag, medicine, and ecosystems
Mittermeier 11
(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological
Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30
years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is
considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book
Biodiversity Hotspots F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This
evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is irreversible. Human activities
have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a thousand or more times the natural background
Matt Struth
rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity for future resource
use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earths species (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even
fewer (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every human. Earths species
are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen cures waiting to be
discovered. Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all commercial medicines even more in developing
nations (Chivian and Bernstein 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration for a growing array of new
materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared to burning
down the worlds libraries without knowing the content of 90% or more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate
source of our crops and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for manufactured products,
and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems that support humans and all life on Earth
(McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency, and freedom of
choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs
inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake, and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the
worlds cultures (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin
our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly
exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease
outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for
human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of
Earths natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually
(TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more
diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As
Earths climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009). In many
respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these
ecosystems the most and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all
biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living
resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far
beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its
conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget perhaps 90% originates in and is spent in
economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally exible funds available in the hundreds of millions
annually be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss. The establishment
of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action
toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented rst ? The eld of conservation planning addresses this
question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability
measures the risk to the species present in a region if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not
get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of
species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high
levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put
another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high
concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because
of heavy human impact. Myers seminal paper (Myers1988) was the rst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to
guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest hotspots on the basis of extraordinary
plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of hotspot status. A subsequent
analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an
institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a rst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict
quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics ( > 0.5% of the worlds total), and
it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive
global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientic publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the
basis of both the better-dened criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but
revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these
regions. That update redened several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots
but for which sufcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered
another region the East Melanesian Islands which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region
that failed to meet the less than 30% of original vegetation remaining criterion to a genuine hotspot.
Sustainable Venezuelan energy policies key to prevent catastrophic climate change
Edwards, 13 -- Brown University's Centre for Environmental Studies research fellow
[Guy, "Death of Hugo Chvez gives Venezuela a choice on climate change," Guardian, 3-7-13,
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2013/mar/07/death-hugo-chavez-venezuela-climate-change,
accessed 7-22-13, mss]
Matt Struth

Regardless of one's position on el Comandante Hugo Chvez, the death of the Venezuelan president opens the door for a
policy debate on a critical issue for Venezuela and the world's security: climate change. As the 2015
deadline to create a new global treaty on climate change approaches, the question for the oil-rich country
looms: will Venezuela be a key architect of an ambitious and equitable deal, or will it sabotage progress? The
International Energy Agency reports that no more than one-third of proven fossil fuel reserves can be consumed
prior to 2050 if we are to limit warming to 2C. Writer Bill McKibben pointed out that if Venezuela were to exploit
its heavy crude oil and Canada's tar sands are fully tapped, this would mean "game over" for the climate
as both reserves would fill up the remaining "atmospheric space" or "carbon budget." President Chvez
oversaw a schizophrenic posture on climate change. He insisted that climate change is an existential crisis
caused by capitalism, while simultaneously pushing for the development of the Orinoco's heavy crude. Under
Chvez, Venezuela's oil dependency increased and it now obtains 94% of export earnings and more than 50% of its federal budget from oil
revenues. Due to high oil prices and Chvez's leadership, poverty and inequality have dropped. Chvez's administration appeared committed to
increase oil production to continue funding its social programmes, often through long-term agreements with China to supply oil. Venezuela's
"commodity backed loans" from China, estimated at more than $35bn, require it to pay back China in oil. The key to solving climate
change is shifting all countries to low carbon economies. At a United Nations negotiation in Bonn, Germany, in 2009,
however, a Venezuelan official said that a shift to a low-carbon economy would adversely impact developing country oil exporters, suggesting
that a robust climate change treaty would conflict with Venezuela's development model. At the climate negotiations, Venezuela
has clung to arguments that developing countries have the right to emit to ensure their development.
Undermining Venezuela's position at the negotiations has been their often vociferous rhetoric, while exhibiting a lack of action at home.
Meanwhile, a number of poorer countries have shown a willingness to take on far more ambitious emissions cuts. Venezuela releases only
0.56% of the global total of greenhouse gas emissions, but its per capita emissions (at approximately six tonnes per person) are much
higher than the world's poorest nations. Venezuela's current emissions, however, pale in significance
compared to what is at stake if it does fully develop its oil reserves. Former UK special representative for climate change
John Ashton has said that a country's ability to contribute to global efforts to tackle climate change depends on the credibility of its domestic
policies. Venezuela's national development plan (2013-19) includes measures to limit emissions, which include
the oil industry and would create a world movement to confront climate change. The Venezuelan government has invested
$500m in windfarms and distributed 155m energy-saving lightbulbs. However, critics suggest that Venezuela has little interest and
commitment in tackling climate change, and that the plan's objectives are unlikely to be implemented. According to
ClimateScope, which ranks a country's ability to attract capital for low-carbon energy sources and efforts to build a green economy, Venezuela is
currently 24th out of 26 countries. In the UN climate negotiations, Venezuela is part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas
(ALBA) with Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua, which is praised by many citizens' groups for fighting for climate justice. Venezuela is also
a member of the Like-Minded group alongside China, India, Saudi Arabia and its ALBA partners. Venezuela will understandably not stop oil
production at the expense of its social programmes, nor its loan repayments to China. Partial or full compensation for loss of revenue from
keeping the oil in the ground is unlikely. Venezuela could consider backing Ecuador's fascinating plan to be proposed at the next Opec meeting to
create a 3-5% 'Daly-Correa' tax on every barrel of oil exported to rich countries to raid billions for poor countries to adapt to climate change.
With the death of its great leader, Venezuela has a choice on climate change. It can rebrand itself as a proactive
actor at home by working towards a low-carbon economy while joining with its ambitious neighbors at the UN climate
negotiations. With the largest known oil reserves, Venezuela's position on climate change is pivotal. En route
to 2015, it remains to be seen whether it will be regarded as an engineer of an ambitious and equitable
global treaty, or as a saboteur.

Warming is anthropogenic and causes extinction
DEIBEL 7 (Terry L. Deibel, professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs
Strategy Today Anthropogenic caused by CO2)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in
the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all
earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three
decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty.
Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals
from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. In legitimate scientific circles, writes Elizabeth
Kolbert, it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global
Matt Struth
warming. Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as
this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts brutal droughts, floods and
violent storms across the planet over the next century; climate change could literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid
the spread of cholera and malaria; glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, andworldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade
ago; rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes; NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature
measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second; Earths warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each
year as disease spreads; widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidadkilled broad swaths of corals due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. The world is slowly disintegrating,
concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. They call it climate changebut we just call it breaking up. From the founding of the first cities some 6,000
years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are
accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to
reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above
show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction,
and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees
or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would
cover North Carolinas outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of
Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation
that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage
to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP.
But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the
buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures.
Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one
was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that humankinds
continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earths climate and humanitys life support
system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, were just going to burn everything up; were
going to het the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will
collapse. During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between
the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the
post-Cold War eras equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better
supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to
shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the
continued existence of life on this planet.

Unsustainable Venezuelan oil risks massive Amazon destruction
Mongabay, 6 ["Venezuela," 2-5-6, rainforests.mongabay.com/20venezuela.htm, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

Venezuela, one of the ten most biodiverse countries on Earth, is home to extensive rainforests that are
increasingly threatened by development. Each year, roughly 287,600 hectares of forest are permanently destroyed, while other
areas are degraded by logging, mining, and oil extraction. Between 1990 and 2005, Venezuela officially lost 8.3 percent of its forest cover, or
around 4,313,000 hectares. Energy is Venezuela's most important export and President Hugo Chavez has used oil as a political
tool to extend his influence to other parts of Latin America. In 2006, Chavez announced plans to build a massive gas pipeline that would carry
natural gas from the oil-rich state 5,000 miles south. Environmentalists fear that the project could damage the Amazon
rainforest by polluting waterways and creating roads that would attract developers and poor farmers.
Analysts also question the wisdom and viability of the plan, which may cost $20-50 billion depending on who makes the estimate. Venezuela also
continues to expand the construction of an electricity transmission line towards Brazil. When completed, the transmission line will carry power
from the massive Guri hydroelectric projectit in itself considered an ecological disaster for the amount of land it flooded in the early 1980s
through sensitive forest areas to Roraima state in Brazil. Environmentalists are concerned that the lines will give colonists
and developers access to remote forest areas.
Amazon collapse causes extinction
David Takacs, THE IDEA OF DIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE, 1996, p. 200-1.

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think
about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian
roulette with global ecology and human futures: It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the
Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily
dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the
Matt Struth
extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion
human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which
could extinguish civilization. Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current
decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of
dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will
accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher.
Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for
example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic
disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be
unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear
winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a
bang but a whimper.
Sustainable Venezuelan oil key to prevent mangrove destruction
Valladares, 11 -- IPS staff
[Danilo, "Environment-Latam," Inter Press Service, 8-11-11, l/n, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

In Venezuela, for instance, extractive industries like oil and mining are the worst enemies, according to Henderson Colina
of the Ecological Association for the Environmental Preservation of Falcn State, in the northwest of the country. "Government policies
have made our economy almost entirely dependent on extraction of fossil fuels, granting big concessions for oil and
gas exploration and putting the mangroves at even greater risk," the activist complained to IPS. "In Falcn alone, natural gas
exploration is being undertaken in 33 blocks, by Italian, Chinese and Cuban corporations, among others," he said. Economic
diversification and technological innovation have "an essential role to play in mitigating environmental
impacts, because if we lose the mangroves, opportunities for more sustainable economic development in our
countries, like tourism, will also disappear," Colina said.
Mangroves key to biodiversity and key ecosystem functions
Valiela, 1 -- Boston University Marine Biology professor
[Ivan, Jennifer Bowen and Joanna York, graduate students, "Mangrove Forests: One of the Worlds
Threatened Major Tropical Environments," BioScience, Oct 2001, 51.10,
www.sfu.ca/~ianh/geog315/readings/Valiela.pdf, accessed 7-22-13, mss]

Do losses of mangrove forests matter? Mangrove ecosystems support essential ecological functions, so
significant losses of mangrove forests will have important consequences. Mangrove forests intercept land-derived
nutrients, pollutants, and suspended matter before these contaminants reach deeper water (Marshall 1994,Rivera- Monroy and
Twilley 1996, Tam and Wong 1999), and they export materials that support near-shore food webs, including shrimp and
prawns (Rodelli et al. 1984,Twilley 1988, Sasekumar et al. 1992). These natural subsidies are provided in addition to
various extractive benefits, including wood, lumber, honey,tannins, mariculture crops, salt, and so on (Saenger et al.
1983, Spalding et al. 1997). Because mangroves are strategically located between land and sea and are
biogeochemically important, the effects of losses of their area are magnified. Nutrient transport from land
to estuaries is the principal agent of ecological change in many coastal areas (GESAMP 1990, Goldberg 1995); land-
derived nutrients thus have to tra- verse fringing coastal wetlandsincluding mangrove forestson their way to receiving estuaries.In fact,
nutrient processing down-estuary from mariculture facilities might mitigate eutrophication caused by effluent
from the mariculture ponds (Wolanski et al. 2000). Burial and denitrification within mangrove forests significantly lower the export of
terrigenous nutrients to the estuaries (Rivera-Monroy et al. 1995, Robertson and Phillips 1995, Rivera-Monroy and Twilley 1996). This
fortuitous location means that the role of mangrove forests is far more important biogeochemically than
their relatively small area (compared with terrestrial tropical forests, for example) might suggest. Mangroves also
perform other important services, such as preventing coastal erosion by stabilizing sediments (Marshall 1994,
Tam and Wong 1999), furnishing nursery and spawning areas for commercially important coastal fish and shellfish species
(Rodelli et al. 1984, Sasekumar et al. 1992), and providing stopover sites for migratory birds, fish, and mammals
(Saenger et al. 1983).Mangrove forests are also habitats for a diversity of species that have considerable
importance, both economically and ecologically.The fauna of mangroves includes fish and shellfish taxa that support subsistence fishing,
as well as rare endemic proboscis monkeys in Borneo,scarlet ibis,the vulnerable straight-billed woodcreeper in Trinidad, threatened Bengal tigers
in India and Bangladesh, rare Bul- bophyllum and other orchids in Singapore, endangered man- atees in Florida, and many other key species
Matt Struth
(Saenger et al. 1983). Any loss of mangrove forest therefore means a loss of important subsidies to subsistence uses and
ecological, economic, and conservation functions.
Extinction- hydro-cycle
Ramsar 96 (Convention on Wetlands with Dr David Stone, funded by the World Wide Fund for
Nature, Ramsar Convention, October 1996, http://www.ramsar.org/about/about_biodiversity.htm)

Wetlands - including (inter alia) rivers, lakes, marshes, estuaries, lagoons, mangroves, seagrass beds, and peatlands - are among
the most precious natural resources on Earth. These highly varied ecosystems are natural areas where water accumulates for at
least part of the year. Driven by the hydrological cycle, water is continuously being recycled through the land,
sea and atmosphere in a process which ensures the maintenance of ecological functions. Wetlands support
high levels of biological diversity: they are, after tropical rainforests, amongst the richest ecosystems on this
planet, providing essential life support for much of humanity, as well as for other species. Coastal wetlands,
which may include estuaries, seagrass beds and mangroves, are among the most productive, while coral reefs contain some of the highest known
levels of biodiversity (nearly one-third of all known fish species live on coral reefs). Other wetlands also offer sanctuary to a wide
variety of plants, invertebrates, fishes, amphibians, reptiles and mammals, as well as to millions of both migratory and
sedentary waterbirds. Wetlands are not only sites of exceptional biodiversity, they are also of enormous social and economic value, in
both traditional and contemporary societies. Since ancient times, people have lived along water courses, benefiting from the wide range of goods
and services available from wetlands. The development of many of the great civilisations was largely based on their access to, and management
of, wetland resources. Wetlands are an integral part of the hydrological cycle, playing a key role in the
provision and maintenance of water quality and quantity as the basis of all life on earth . They are
often interconnected with other wetlands, and they frequently constitute rich and diverse transition zones between aquatic ecosystems and
terrestrial ecosystems such as forests and grasslands.

Matt Struth
ENVIRO

Matt Struth
EXT: Orinoco

High biodiversity in Orinoco
Lasso et al 04 (Carlos A. Lasso, Leeanne E. Alonso, Ana Liz Flores y Greg Love, Instituto de
Investigacin de Recursos Biolgicos Alexander von Humboldt Colombia (Institute of Investigation of
Biological Resources), RAP Bulletin of Biological Assessment 37, Conservation International, Rapid
assessment of the biodiversity and social aspects of the aquatic ecosystems of the Orinoco Delta and the
Gulf of Paria, Venezuela, ISBN: 1-881173-76 3, 2004)
http://www.conservation.org/global/celb/Documents/ConocoPhillips_Gulf_of_Paria_Rap.pdf
The AquaRAP team found a high diversity of benthic invertebrates (96 species total), with 92 species
recorded from seven sampling localities in Focal Area 2: Orinoco Delta. Among the invertebrates,
decapod crustaceans (Crustacea: Decapoda, 30 species) and mollusks (17 species) were most diverse.
In Focal Area 1 (GoP, two sampling localities), the team documented 34 species, of which decapod
crustaceans were again the most diverse (17 species). Other groups of benthic invertebrates recorded
included Amphipoda, Isopoda, Thoracica, Cirripedia, Tanaidacea, Misidacea, Annelida: Polychaeta
(polychaete worms), Hemiptera (true bugs), Diptera (fl ies), and Odonata (damselfl ies and dragonfl ies).
A total of 106 species of fi shes were documented, with 104 species found in Focal Area 2 and forty-eight
(48) fi sh species recorded in Focal Area 1. The community composition of fi shes at this time of the year
(low water, dry season) was basically marine-estuarine. Only 19 species of freshwater fi shes were found.
The perciform fi shes (croakers, jacks, mullets, groupers, cichlids, etc.) were most diverse (39 species),
followed by the marine-estuarine catfi shes (family Ariidae) with 18 species.

Oil is a main threat to Orinoco
The Socio-economic Threats and Opportunities Assessment, conducted with several regional
stakeholders, identifi ed several key threats to the biodiversity of the GoP and Orinoco Delta. These
include: 1) Use of trawl nets (for shrimp and fi shes), 2) Lack of regulations on commercial fi sh and
shrimp collection, 3) Dredging of channels for boats and increased sedimentation, 4) Contamination
from upstream activities, 5) Potential impacts from petroleum operations, 6) Deforestation within the
mangroves, 7) Regulation in fl ow from the Mnamo channel, 8) Eutrophication of the Guanipa River
Basin, 9) Unregulated discharge of waste waters from human settlements, 10) Presence of abandoned
petroleum infrastructure, 11) Introduction of exotic/invasive species, 12) Illegal collection of fi shes and
other wildlife.

The region merits special conservation because of endangered species
Matt Struth
The Orinoco Delta and GoP constitute one of the richest regions when it comes to aquatic and terrestrial
biodiversity, both regionally and globally. There are more than 200 species of mollusks, about 50 species
of crustaceans and numerous species of invertebrates, many of which are unknown to science (Pereira et
al., this volume). There are at least 400 species of fi shes, and most likely more (Lasso et al., this volume).
These high levels of biodiversity result from the presence of fauna whose life cycles depend on changing
environments. The combination of fresh, marine and brackish waters gives this region its unique
ecological characteristics, refl ected in the variety of adaptations of the species and the exceptional
community dynamics. These areas constitute natural breeding areas and refuges for a variety of species.
The productivity of this area has attracted industrial and subsistence fi shing activity, which forms an
important part of the local and regional economy for indigenous and Creole communities. The benefi ts
of the regions productivity are also exported to other parts of Venezuela and to the neighboring
countries of Trinidad and Guyana. Critical to the regions productivity are the extensive stands of
mangroves, which play a key role in maintaining the marine, fresh and brackish water ecosystems of the
GoP and larger Delta area. Many of the regions extensive mangrove areas are in near pristine condition,
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is currently working with the Venezuelan
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio del Ambiente y de los Recursos Naturales;
MARN) in the implementation of an Orinoco Biosphere Reserve project, as well as the creation of a
database for the Orinoco River Delta. The study area is heavily infl uenced by the presence of brackish
waters, and the riparian vegetation along the local channels is dominated by fi ve species of mangrove:
black mangrove (Avicennia germinans), red mangrove (Rhizophora racemosa, Rhizophora harrisonii and
Rhizophora mangle) and white mangrove (Laguncularia racemosa). Eighteen vegetation units have been
classifi ed in the study area (Ecology and Environment, 2002). The Orinoco Delta and GoP are rich in
terrestrial vertebrates as well. There are about 50 species of amphibians, and probably over 100 reptile
species (Searis, this volume). Birds are also a diverse group, with more than 300 species recorded for
the entire Orinoco Delta and GoP (Salcedo, in press). A total of 129 species of mammals have been
recorded (Linares and Rivas, in press). The Orinoco Delta and GoP are high biodiversity regions that
are home to many species that are threatened in other parts of the continent. While there is not
an elevated level of endemism for the vertebrate fauna, as is characteristic for many other deltas and
lowland ecosystems, the high species richness is suffi cient reason for the region to merit
special conservation attention.

Matt Struth
EXT: Drilling Bad
Drilling in Venezuela harms animals
Jones et al 12 (Jones, Daniel O.B., Cruz-Motta, Juan J., Bone, David and Kaariainen, Janne I. (2012)
Effects of oil drilling activity on the deep water megabenthos of the Orinoco Fan, Venezuela. Journal of
the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, 92, (02), 245-253.)
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FMBI%2FMBI92_02%2FS0025315411001123a.pdf
&code=d64741276b2037a15eecd461067b11c3
Megafaunal abundance at the Orca site was significantly reduced after drilling. Megafaunal numbers were
very low in disturbed areas and close to the disturbance source. As this study was completed within 10
days of the initial disturbance it reflected the immediate disturbance of the communities by physical
smothering and burial of organisms by sedimentation also observed in other studies (Jones et al., 2006, 2007b).
There was no additional chemical disturbance, as the well was drilled by jetting with seawater. Highly motile organisms
responded by moving away from the disturbance, as has been previously noted (Bluhm, 2001), and in some cases by moving in to the disturbed
area after disturbance, possibly in search of carrion. There was also some evidence of lower densities of sessile
organisms and higher densities of motile organisms pre-drilling close to the proposed drill centre than observed further away, perhaps in
response to increased activity of the ROV observing the installation of the guidebase structure and causing minor sediment disturbance in this
area. Alternatively, mobile fauna may have been attracted to the structure as an artificial reef, as found on shipwrecks in the Gulf of Mexico
(Kilgour & Shirley, 2008) From the multivariate analyses it was apparent that the assemblage composition of
sessile taxa was altered by the drilling activity, and univariate analyses suggested that the total density of sessile fauna
increased with distance from disturbance. The responses of common sessile taxa would have driven overall patterns in total density, but
multivariate analyses (with a fourth root transformation) account for changes across the whole assemblage, including the rarer taxa. These
analyses suggest that there was a significant effect of drilling on sessile fauna, but the varying sensitivities of taxa
do not allow any significant interaction to occur as a result of distance and drilling. Sessile organisms disturbance avoidance responses are
variable (Hall, 1994). The immediate effects of drilling, including displacement of sub-seafloor sedimentary
material, were of sufficient magnitude to usually overwhelm avoidance responses and cause smothering
of sessile and infaunal organisms. In the time frame of this work it would have been impossible for a
new complement of sessile animals to settle, establish and grow to the sizes seen in the video. Fauna only buried by a thin layer
of sediment or buried for a short time may be less impacted (Trannum et al., 2010) and be able to clear sediment or recover relatively quickly.
An example of this may be seen by halos of cleared sediment around caryophylliids in areas with lower sediment thicknesses in the post-
drilling survey. The morphology of taxa also appears to be important, e.g. tall sabellids seem to In general, megafaunal animals, as a result of
their size, may be less impacted than smaller organisms. The numbers of individual animals and different taxa observed
within the 20 m zones before and after drilling was likely a function of drilling-related sedimentation
depth as well as the morphology and sediment clearing abilities of specific taxa.suffer less impact than other flatter organisms (e.g.
asteroids).
Drilling creates sedimentation
the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, 92, (02), 245-253.
The Orca well was located west-north-west of Venezuela on the Orinoco Fan (Figure 1; 0984907.98N
5984416.35W). Water depth at this location is 543 m and the bottom water temperature was recorded as 38C (26 July 2007). Seabed currents
observed in remotely operated vehicle (ROV) video were extremely slow for the duration of the study (,1 m min21). In addition, there were no
seabed features, such as ripples, that would have indicated recent higher-current events. The major influence on the benthic
environment on the shelf and slope of eastern Venezuela is terrigenous sedimentation from the Orinoco
River (Bowles & Fleischer, 1985). The outflows of the major South American rivers move northwards with the
Brazilian current (Lalli & Parsons, 1997) and result in high primary production (Bonilla et al., 1993) and
sedimentation (Longhurst, 1998) throughout the study area.

Matt Struth
Oceans Scenario

Drilling in Venezuelan ocean kills animals
&code=d64741276b2037a15eecd461067b11c3
In the undisturbed assemblage (pre-drilling), cnidarians were most common (44%) being
predominantly represented by the caryophylliid cup coral Flabellum moseleyi (31%) and a
cerianthid (10%). There were almost equal numbers of echinoderms and annelids (22%).
Echinoderms were represented predominantly by isocrinid crinoids (19%) and annelids solely by
sabellids. Crustaceans (6%), fish (3%), poriferans (1%) and cephalopod molluscs (0.3%)
comprised the remainder.After drilling the assemblage composition displayed some changes.
Cnidarians were still the most common group, constituting 51% of all organisms observed (3% reduction
in abundance from pre-drilling). Annelids represented the next most common group (42% reduction)
while echinoderms accounted for 10% of the total organisms (60% reduction). The abundance of fish
(13%) and crustaceans (11%) had increased (increase of 270% and 50% respectively) after disturbance.
Poriferans and molluscs were not observed after disturbance in the post-drilling survey. The taxa
recorded in the 0 to 20 m zone after drilling were either scavengers or occurred only in the areas of this
zone with partial cuttings coverage.

High amounts of biodiversity in Venezuelan waters
&code=d64741276b2037a15eecd461067b11c3
It was not possible to ascertain whether the megafaunal assemblage outside the area directly disturbed was typical for the local area, or even the
region, owing to limited background information. Most species that were identified to species level (i.e. those where specimens were collected
by ROV) had been previously recorded in Venezuelan waters. The only exception was one of the two
species of hagfish trapped in this study, Myxine robinsi, which was a new record for Venezuelan waters
(Wisner & McMillan, 1995). The natural megafaunal assemblage at Orca (observed predrilling and distant from disturbance)
was dominated by cnidarians, echinoderms and annelids. At similar depths in the Gulf of Mexico the
megafaunal assemblage was, in contrast, dominated by decapods and fish (Pequegnat et al., 1990). The extensive
bioturbation observed at Orca may be evidence that infaunal decapods were present. The infauna are likely to be better represented in boxcore
and megacore samples than, as here, in visual assessments.The megafaunal densities observed at Orca were two to three
orders of magnitude higher than the maximum so far recorded for the Gulf of Mexico at comparable
depths (Pequegnat et al., 1990). They were also an order of magnitude higher than found in the deep bathyal and
abyssal zones of the Venezuela Basin (Briggs et al., 1996). Some of this variation may be accounted for by methodological
variation, photography generally revealing higher megafaunal densities than trawls (Thurston et al., 1994; Bett et al., 2001).Methodological
variation is unlikely to account for such large differences. The high surface production and associated flux of organic material to the seafloor is
probably responsible for high faunal densities observed in this area (Lampitt et al., 2001).

Marine ecosystems are critical to the survival of all life on earth.
Craig 3 (Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, 34
McGeorge L. Rev. 155)

Matt Struth
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these
arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable
ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services
worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function
that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global
geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon,
nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense,
therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining
biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in
general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its
biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly
dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among
component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the
most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the
reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to
maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems
have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive
preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary
justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such
arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems.
The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect
anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not
completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers
and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence
should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory
relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we
kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us . The Black Sea is almost
dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins,
emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not
necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a microcosm of what is happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills,
industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an alien species. The sea weakened, slowly at first,
then collapsed with [*266] shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much
of what happened here is being repeated all over the world. The ecological stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not
unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis. n865 Oxygen-starved "dead zones" appear
with increasing frequency off the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. n866 Ethics as
well as enlightened self-interest thus suggest that the United States should protect fully-functioning marine ecosystems wherever possible - even
if a few fishers go out of business as a result.

Matt Struth
EXT: Oceans

High density of underwater wildlife disturbed by drilling
the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, 92, (02), 245-253. summary,
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/300242/)
The response of a deep-water megafaunal assemblage to sedimentation disturbance from hydrocarbon
drilling was investigated using remotely operated vehicle video off the Atlantic coast of Venezuela. This was the first assessment of
megafauna in bathyal waters in this region. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) design was used to assess patterns in density and
assemblage structure both temporally, before and after the drilling event, and spatially, at different distances from the disturbance. High
levels of sedimentation occurred within a radius of 20 to 50 m from the drilling site. Megafaunal densities
were reduced with high levels of disturbance (from 0.60 m2 to 0.17 m2 <20 m from the drilling site). The responses of motile
and sessile fauna were different. Sessile fauna were most common (77% total) and reflected trends for total density. Motile megafaunal density
was generally higher after drilling (up to double the pre-drill density). Species richness was reduced by disturbance and
proximity to the disturbance. Multivariate ANOVA revealed significant differences in assemblage composition with distance and
before and after drilling but no interaction. This was most likely a result of variable species-specific responses to disturbance. Megafaunal
densities were generally much higher than reported densities from comparable depths in the Gulf of
Mexico or from deeper locations in the Caribbean Sea. The responses to sedimentation disturbance were generally less
obvious than observed elsewhere and may result from the fauna being adapted to the naturally high levels of sedimentation deriving from the
Orinoco River.

Matt Struth
DISAD ANSWERS

Matt Struth
OPPOSITION DA

Matt Struth
2AC
PSUV dominates now- stranglehold over government, Chavez nostalgia, and purse strings
George, 13 -- Bertelsmann Foundation project manager
[Samuel, "Venezuela After Chavez," 3-5-13, www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/BBrief%20-
%20Venezuela%20After%20Chavez%20(5%20March%202013).pdf, accessed 7-21-13, mss]

1. Chavistas will dictate the conditions of any forthcoming election. The Venezuelan government has been built in Chvezs
image over 14 years. The Legislative Assembly, Supreme Court and PSUV governors control 20 of 23
states. Eleven of these governors are former military officials, indicative of Chavista reach into the armed
forces. PSUV officials will determine the timing of the election and the rules for the vote. The incumbent
stranglehold on institutional power will have key procedural implications. Although a ballot must occur within a
month, for example, nothing stops the government from announcing that elections will be held more quickly. Such a move would severely limit
the oppositions ability to organize and execute any campaign. The Chvez camp may alternatively seek to delay the elections until June or July,
although this would require constitutional maneuvering. In this case, the lag time would allow the benefits of a recent currency devaluation to set
in and give the government time to reform a backlogged import system that has led to a scarcity of basic goods. 2. Hugo Chvez died an
extremely popular man. Given the generally negative perception of Hugo Chvez internationally, it can be easy to forget that he
commanded resounding support at home. Despite the unprecedented cohesion of the opposition in the October 2012 presidential election, Chvez
still garnered 55 percent of the popular vote. His sickness appears to have bolstered his popularity. The day before his death,
Asdrubal Oliveros, a Venezuelan analyst at Ecoanalitica, reported that Chvezs favorability rating topped 70 percent. Opposition leader
Henrique Capriles could not beat the sick man, and he is unlikely to beat the newly minted martyr. The sympathy and nostalgia vote
will almost certainly see the PSUV through the next election cycle. 3. The PSUV still controls the purse strings.
The powerful state-owned oil company Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) is solidly in the Chavista camp. At the
same time, oil prices remain above the magic level of US$90 per barrel. This represents a daily influx of hard currency into
the coffers of a state starved for dollars. Given the recent devaluation, this consistent source of cash will give the PSUV the
resources required to lavish the electorate in the run-up to an election. This model proved successful for the
PSUV in the past as Chvezs spree ahead of the 2012 elections left the Venezuelan social spending-to-
GDP ratio the highest in the region.

Turn- status quo strengthens Maduro- plan key to end scapegoating
Baverstock, 13 -- CSM contributor
[Alasdair, "Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition," 5-17-13,
www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-
recognition, accessed 7-21-13, mss]

Far from putting a dent in Maduros credibility, other observers believe that continued tensions between
Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose supporters have come to expect
belligerence towards las imperialistas. In many ways John Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him, says Jones.
The USs refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists broader narrative that the US is conspiring to
defeat Venezuelas revolution.
[Matt note: Jones = Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas]

Matt Struth
NK Impact Turn

Capriles would end cheap oil exports to North Korea
Thomson and De Lion 13 (John, former diplomat, journalist and analyst, and Norman Pino, former
ambassador and frequent contributor to Venezuelan newspapers, 4-12-13, "Washington Times OP/ED: A
Post-Chavez Solution for Venezuela Capriles Promises to Throw off Crippling Links to Cuba"
Washington Times) cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2013/04/12/washington-times-oped-a-post-chavez-
solution-for-venezuela-capriles-promises-to-throw-off-crippling-links-to-cuba/

During this brief but heated campaign, Mr. Capriles has emphasized plans and programs, plus Chavista failures. He denounces, and has
committed to end, pervasive and despised Cuban involvement in Venezuelan life government,
intelligence, military and medicine. Vowing to curtail the 100,000 barrel per day Cuban oil allocation, a
proven wealth builder for Fidel Castro and friends, he rails against free and deeply discounted oil deals with
countries ranging from Argentina, Bolivia and Cuba to North Korea. Mr. Capriles admires former Brazilian President
Luis Inacio Lula da Silvas free-market commercial and social-welfare policies. He roundly criticizes the Chavez-Maduro
regimes broken promises, notably in education and public health, and promises to overhaul the
complicated, economy-choking currency-exchange system.
Cheap oil key to prevent North Korean collapse
Petrov 08 (Dr. Leonid, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University,
7/24/08, Russia is key to North Korea's plight Asia Times)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG24Ag02.html

The nervousness of Pyongyang, which has long championed the motto of a "strong and prosperous nation", is understandable.
In January it promised to focus on the economy. Nevertheless, the skyrocketing international prices of fuel and grain have already
caused unprecedented hikes in food prices in North Korea. The crop of the previous year was largely destroyed by a
disastrous hurricane that, in combination with the deportation of international aid agencies, has created the danger of another famine. The new
conservative administration in Seoul, which from the outset has taken a hard line on inter-Korean agreements, has further complicated the picture.
Despite the apparent progress on the international stage, the North Korean leadership is now likely to face a serious
domestic problem. In the mid-1990s, despite universal predictions of imminent collapse, the DPRK managed
to survive. Even the landslide of the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) did not undermine the foundations of its centrally
planned economy. The country endured the "Arduous March" (better known abroad as the "Silent Famine") which cost millions of North
Korean lives. The leadership assumed that one meal per day would keep the majority of the population weak
but loyal, as long as the state machinery and military-industrial complex had an ample supply of energy.
Fortunately for Pyongyang, the 1990s were marked by record low oil prices, to which the secret of the
DPRK's survival can be attributed. Whether Dear Leader Kim Jong-il is able to rescue his nation again
from the looming catastrophe depends on his ability to quickly find access to relatively cheap fuel and energy. In this
connection, the role of Russia as the largest depository of natural resources is difficult to underestimate. Russia holds one third of the world's
natural gas (48 trillion cubic meters), one of the world's largest oil reserves (approximately 50-100 billion barrels), and produces 1 trillion kWh of
electricity annually. In times of political collapse and economic recession, these resources have provided Russia with confidence and attracted
foreign direct investment.
North Korean collapse causes nuclear war between China, the US and South Korea
Bennett and Lind 11 (Bruce, Senior Defense Analyst at RAND, and Jennifer, Assistant Professor of
Government at Dartmouth College, Fall 2011, The Collapse of North Korea MIT Press Journals)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00057

A government collapse in North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-
reaching regional and global effects. Collapse would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis. Many of North Koreas 24
million inhabitants are already severely malnourished; if government provided food and health services were to cease, the
Matt Struth
population would rapidly face the prospect of starvation. Food shortages and the possibility of civil war
would trigger a massive outflow of refugees, as desperate North Koreans searched for food and safety across international
borders. North Koreas weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way out of the country and onto the global
black market. If other countries wanted to intervene to mitigate such instability, they would need to perform complex military operations.
The provision of humanitarian relief could not be delegated to international relief organizations. Because North Korea has some 1.2 million
active-duty military personnel and 7.7 million reservists, outside military intervention would likely be necessary to provide security for such
operations. The consequences of a poorly planned response to a government collapse in North Korea are
potentially calamitous. Rapid cooperation would be essential because many response missions are time-sensitivefor example, the
longer it takes to organize humanitarian efforts, the higher the number of North Koreans who might perish or decide to leave their homes; in
addition, the longer North Korean WMD are left unsecured, the larger the risk that they will disappear
across international borders. Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send their militaries in without
coordination to stabilize the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while
U.S. and South Korean troops race north is terrifying given the experience of the Korean War, a climate
of suspicion among the three countries, and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level. Some countries have begun
planning for North Koreas collapse. The United States and South Korea have negotiated an operational plan for joint military responses to this
and other emergencies that could arise in North Korea. South Koreas president, Lee Myung-bak, has proposed a taxation plan to prepare for the
monumental financial burden of Korean unification. Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly has developed contingency plans for
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counter-WMD-related missions in North Korea. Thus far, however, multilateral planning that
involves China has been stymied. Long aligned with North Korea, China has been reluctant to provoke
the Kim regime by coordinating plans for its demise with its enemies. In addition, the Chinese worry that
open discussion of a North Korean collapse could increase the probability that it occurs. A failure to
engage in combined planning, however, could be catastrophic because of the risks of misperception and
crisis escalation.

Matt Struth
Russia Impact Turn

Capriles would end Russian arms sales
Watts and Lopez 12 (Jonathan and Virginia, staff writers, 9-30-12, "Hugo Chvez rival pledges seismic
shift in foreign policy" The Guardian) www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/30/venezuela-chavez-
challenger-election-pledges

The challenger to Hugo Chvez in the Venezuelan presidential election has vowed a dramatic change in foreign policy
if he is elected next Sunday, shifting his country away from China and Russia and reviewing crucial oil deals. Henrique
Capriles, who has gained ground in recent polls, said he would halt arms purchases from Russia, rethink relations
with Iran and revise deals to exploit one of the world's biggest recoverable oil resources in the Orinoco
belt. In an interview during a campaign stop, Capriles said he would end the Chvez policy of promoting worldwide
revolution and focus on Venezuela's needs. "The foreign policy of this government is driven by politics
to extend a revolution worldwide. My objective with regards to foreign relations is to benefit all
Venezuelans," he said. This would mark a dramatic change. Under Chvez, Venezuela has consistently
thumbed its nose at the US and moved closer to Russia, China, Nicaragua, Cuba and Iran. An example of the close
friendship with Moscow came this week when Vladimir Putin presented Chvez with a Russian terrier
puppy. Capriles did not mention Russian dogs, but said Russian guns would no longer be required. "We
have spent more than $14bn (8.66bn) on arms purchases from Russia," Capriles said. "I am not going to
buy more weapons. I think the policy has been mistaken." The big question is what would happen to the oil industry in
Venezuela, which vies with Saudi Arabia in claiming the biggest proven oil reserves in the world. Until now Russian and Chinese
companies have struck the biggest deals for future exploitation. "We have to revise every deal. I think
they are agreements that are not functioning," Capriles said. Capriles has said he will continue to work
with Beijing because "everyone deals with China" but he appeared ready to distance Venezuela from Iran. "How
have relations with Iran and Belarus benefited Venezuela? We are interested in countries that have democracies, that
respect human rights, that we have an affinity with. What affinity do we have with Iran?"
Venezuela is the largest importer of Russian arms
RIA Novosti 11 Venezuela ranked top importer of Russian arms)
http://en.rian.ru/world/20111227/170519145.html

Venezuela became the largest importer of Russian arms for ground forces in 2011, the Moscow based Center
for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) said on Tuesday. Russia delivered a large consignment of
arms to Venezuela under contracts signed in 2009 and 2010, CAWAT head Igor Korotchenko said without offering any figures. In
2011, Venezuela bought an unspecified number of T-72B1 tanks, BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicles,
BTR-80A armored personnel carriers, Msta-S 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, Nona-SVK 120-mm self-propelled mortars,
Grad multiple rocket launchers, and an assortment of other weaponry, he said.
Arms sales are key to the Russian economy
Rivlin 5 Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies,
Tel Aviv University (Dr. Paul, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, The Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies)

In the years 1994-98, Russian arms exports to the Middle East exceeded $2 billion and those of the US totaled $17.6 billion.2 Russias arms
exports to the Middle East increased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, at a much faster rate than those
of other suppliers, and in 2003 alone they totaled almost $1.5 billion. Since 2000, the Middle East has accounted
for 18 percent of Russian arms exports and Russia sees the region as an important market for arms and nuclear
equipment, one that it is determined to retain. Yet these exports, and especially sales of nuclear materials to Iran, are highly controversial on the
international scene and therefore have exacted a political price for Russia in the West and in Israel. This study examines why Russia persists in
Matt Struth
these sales nonetheless, and why it is likely to do so in the future. Three principal explanations can be posited to account for the
controversial export policy. The first is economic necessity: Russia has little to sell abroad except oil and arms,
and the latter provides a vital source of employment for Russian scientists, technicians, and engineers
who might otherwise emigrate in search of better professional opportunities. The second explanation is political:
Russia has important political interests in the Middle East that are advanced by selling arms and nuclear materials. The third is what might be
called chaos theory: the Russian government lost control and the result was that different public and private sector bodies followed their own
interests rather than those of the state.3 This study contends that the first two explanations are the key to understanding Russias Middle East
arms export policy. The state of the Russian economy is a function of its Soviet past, and the structure that the Soviets
built was a response to their geo-political position, strongly influenced by Marxist thinking (appendix1). This pattern of development isolated the
Soviet Union from world markets and resulted in Soviet goods being uncompetitive on international markets. The Soviet economy
developed on the basis of exploiting raw materials, together with heavy industry and large-scale
production. The communist system, dominated by an archaic central planning mechanism, was unable to respond to changes in demand, and
the economy did not diversify sufficiently. As a result its exports were mainly confined to raw materials and arms. When
Russia became an independent state in 1991, it had little to sell abroad except oil, gas, and arms, and it was
forced to rely heavily on fluctuating income from oil and gas sales.

Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war
OLIKER AND CHARLICK-PALEY 2002 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force,
Assessing Russias Decline, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1442/)
The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russias decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges
and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international
actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the
potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of
economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military
interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying
point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the
cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy
more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil,
which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided
nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given
Russias conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear
weapons use, and Russias demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with
possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russias civilian and military
nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation
of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident
at one of Russias nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious
concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflictinternal or otherwiseand
the general deterioration that Russia has in common with failing states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging
crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United
States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition,
could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios
that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the
trends implicit in Russias decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by
Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict.
Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan,
or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or
using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the
United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sties for nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear
accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A
chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and neighboring states. Ethnic
Matt Struth
pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine.
Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and
gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread
illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for
crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten
the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and
technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon
materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

Matt Struth
EXT: Non-Unique

Capriles has no chanceMaduro wont give up power
Martinez 13 (Guillermo, 5-2-13, Capriles won't get chance to become leader in Venezuela Sun
Sentinel) http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-02/news/fl-gmcol-venezuela-oped0502-
20130502_1_maduro-cuban-doctors-fuerte-tiuna

Slowly, a growing number of Venezuelan exiles living in South Florida are realizing it will be hard
for Henrique Capriles Rodonski to peacefully get the government of Nicols Maduro to accept a true
recount of the vote count in the presidential election of April 14. Capriles has the facts to back up the
charge the government cheated to win the election. He has pointed out that in 737 voting precincts his
supporters were ousted by government thugs at gunpoint; at another 39 voting precincts Maduro got 100
per cent of the vote; and in 1,176 precincts; Maduro, whose ineptness as a speaker and leader has been
acknowledged by many, got more votes than his predecessor, Hugo Chvez, who had defeated Capriles
by more than 1.5 million votes in last October's elections. Unfortunately where governments rule by
force, being right does not mean those in power will play by the rules. Capriles probably won
by several hundred thousand votes, but the National Electoral Council, where Maduro has a 4-1 majority,
determined the former bus driver had defeated Capriles by 250,000 votes. At first they said they were
willing to accept a recount of the votes, but slowly they have been turning away from that promised.
Instead, Maduro and those in power are following the advice of Cuba's Fidel and Ral Castro that have
not permitted one of their candidates in their hemisphere to lose an election since Violeta Chamorro
surprised Nicaraguans and defeated Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega in 1990. Nowhere in Latin America
has the influence of Cuba in governing and in elections been more prevalent than in Venezuela. First
Chvez and now Maduro provide Cuba the oil it needs in exchange for the presence of Cuban doctors,
teachers and military advisers in Venezuela. Cuba depends on that oil in order to maintain its precarious
economy afloat. Instead of permitting an open and transparent vote recount, Venezuela has begun to use
force against its opponents. One of the first jailed was retired General Antonio Rivero, of the Voto
Popular opposition party, who on Feb. 21 gave precise details of Cubans living in Venezuela as part of
the oil for services program. He said more than 210,000 Cubans were in Venezuela, of which 86 percent
worked for Cuba. Venezuela paid them $1,300 a month part to live in Venezuela; part was sent to their
families in Cuba; and 14 percent was paid to the Cuban government directly. Rivero went further. He said
300 Cuban military advisers were headquartered at Fuerte Tiuna, the largest military base in Venezuela.
That was enough to get Rivero arrested. Then Maduro's government arrested an American documentary
film maker, Timothy Tracy. He was charged of inciting anti-government crowds to violence. He is being
held in a prison run by Venezuela's national intelligence service in Caracas until further notice. Capriles
has urged his supporters to bang pots and pans at night to demonstrate their strength. The noise is
deafening. The effect on who rules Venezuela, limited. He has also urged peaceful demonstration, one set
for May 1. Among those Venezuelans in South Florida who follow events in their homeland closely,
some acknowledge it is impossible to oust the regime by force. At the same time, many also believe
Maduro will not be able to govern for six years. He has to choose between trying to improve the
countries' bankrupt economy and risk a social revolution; or continue to give government subsidies to the
poor and risk an economic collapse. Nobody can predict Venezuela's future, particularly with the tight
economic and military links with Cuba. Some, however, speculate Maduro is such a weak candidate that
another former Chvez supporter will replace him in a bloodless coup. It is not likely Capriles will
govern anytime soon. That is a shame for Capriles is a true democrat who won the elections
Matt Struth
legitimately and has all the talent needed to bring Venezuela out of the chaos it now is submerged in. And
in the process democracy in Venezuela will not come anytime soon.

Matt Struth
A2 Drugs Impact
Maduro cant solve narcotics, corruption checks
Board, 2013 Washington Post Editorial Board, Venezuela gets a lifeline from the United States-
Washington Post- June 11, 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/venezuela-gets-a-lifeline-
from-the-united-states/2013/06/11/ab20c178-d2b1-11e2-8cbe-1bcbee06f8f8_story.html

Theres nothing wrong, in principle, with diplomatic meetings or even in dispatching an ambassador to a
country such as Venezuela. The State Department has also been meeting with senior opposition leaders
and has yet to say it recognizes the presidential election results. But Mr. Kerrys words amounted to a
precious endorsement for Mr. Maduro and the Obama administration appears bent on cultivating him regardless of his actions.
Perhaps the increasingly desperate new leader has secretly promised concessions to Washington on
matters such as drug trafficking. But with senior government and military officials involved in the
transhipment of cocaine to the United States and Europe, he is unlikely to deliver.

Matt Struth
COUP DA
Matt Struth
2AC
Zero chance of a coup
Fox News Latino, 13 ["Venezuela's Defense Minister Would Never Support A Coup To Unseat
Maduro," latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/06/02/venezuela-defense-minister-would-never-
support-coup-to-unseat-president-nicolas/, accessed 7-21-13, mss]

Venezuela's Defense Minister Would Never Support A Coup To Unseat Maduro Venezuela's defense minister would never
entertain the idea of supporting a military coup to unseat President Nicolas Maduro. Adm. Diego Molero also said that Venezuela's
military takes advice from Cubans but that they do not influence its decisions. Molero's statements on Sunday during a television
talk show appear to reflect official concern over the opposition's recent release of a recording allegedly showing an influential pro-government
figure discussing coup rumors with a Cuban intelligence officer, a conversation that seemed to highlight Cuban influence in the oil-rich nation. In
the lengthy conversation, the purported voice of influential TV talk show Mario Silva discusses a power struggle between Maduro and National
Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, whom he accuses of conspiring against the president amid rumors of "saber rattling" in the military. The
speaker on the recording suggests Cabello's allies are behind false rumors that Molero might back an attempt to oust Maduro, who is close to
Cuba's leaders and is said by analysts to have less backing in the military. Silva alleged the recording was a fraud, but his show was pulled from
state TV after the conversation's release. Maduro squandered a double-digit lead in less than two weeks, but defeated challenger Henrique
Capriles by a razor-thin margin on April 14 in an election to replace the late President Hugo Chavez. On Sunday, former Vice President Jose
Vicente Rangel asked Molero on his talk show if "democratic and institutional stability is guaranteed in Venezuela," if a coup
attempt were possible. Molero turned his head, looked straight into the camera and responded: "It's impossible." "I am a
loyal guarantor of the constitutional concept that Maduro remain in the government until the people decide otherwise," Molero said, adding for
emphasis: "It's impossible that such an idea would go through my head." Capriles has repeatedly complained about what he calls Cuba's growing
influence over Venezuela's government and military under Maduro, whose first postelection foreign trip was to Havana. Cabello has denied
plotting against Maduro and called for unity among the political heirs of Chavez, who are struggling with widespread discontent over
worsening food shortage, rampant power outages and decreasing oil production. Molero did not provide details regarding Cuban military advice,
saying only that Venezuela welcomes it, but makes its own decisions. Maduro has defended his government's close ties with Cuba, whose
economy depends on Venezuelan oil shipments worth $3.2 billion a year that account for about half its consumption. Cuba partially pays for the
oil in a barter deal, sending medics, sports trainers, political advisers and other professionals to Venezuela. The remainder is covered by 25-year,
1 percent interest loans.

Venezuela Oil Affirmative - SDI 2013

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Venezuela Oil Affirmative - SDI 2013

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wake Forest Debate 1 / 69

You might also like