IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH

APPELLATE DIVISION


PRESENT:
Mr. Justice A.B.M. Khairul Haque.
-Chief Justice.
Mr. Justice Md. Muzammel Hossain.
Mr. Justice S. K. Sinha.
Mr. Justice Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah.
Ms. Justice Nazmun Ara Sultana.
Mr. Justice Syed Mahmud Hossain.
Mr. Justice Muhammad Imman Ali.

CIVIL APPEAL No. 139 of 2005 with CIVIL PETITION
FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL NO.596 OF 2005.

(From the certificate granted under Article 103(2)(a) of the Constitution
of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and from judgment and order
dated 4.8.2004 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.
4112 of 1999 )

Abdul Mannan Khan .................. Appellant.
(In C.A. No.139/20005)

Abdul Mannan Khan ................... Petitioner
(In C. P. No.596/2005)
-VERSUS-
Government of Bangladesh, represented
by the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice
and Parliamentary Affairs and others.
: ..................Respondents.
(In both the cases)




For the Appellant.
(In C.A. No.139/05)
: Mr.M.I. Farooqui, Senior Advocate
(with Mr. Mohsin Rashid, Advocate)
instructed by Mr. M.G. Bhuiyan,
Advocate-on-Record.
For the Petitioner.
(In C.P.No.596/05)
: Mr.M.I. Farooqui, Senior Advocate
(with Mr. Mohsin Rashid, Advocate)
instructed by Mr. M. G. Bhuiyan,
Advocate-on-Record
For Respondent Nos.1-2.
(In C.A. No.139/05)
: Mr. Mahbubey Alam, Attorney
General, with Mr. M. K. Rahman,
Additional Attorney General, Mr.
Murad Reza, Additional Attorney
General, Md. Mothahar Hossain Saju,
Deputy Attorney General, A.B.M.
Altaf Hossain, Deputy Attorney
General, Md. Ekramul Haque,
2
Assistant Attorney General, Khandaker
Diliruzzaman, Assistant Attorney
General, Amit Talukder, Assistant
Attorney General, instructed by Mr. B.
Hossain, Advocate-on-Record.

Respondent Nos.3-7.
(In C. A. No.139/05)

: Not represneted.

Respondents.
(In C.P.No.596/05)

: Not represented.
As amici curiae :
Mr. T.H. Khan, Senior Advocate
Dr. Kamal Hossain, Senior Advocate
Mr. Rafique-ul-Huq, Senior Advocate
Dr. M. Zahir, Senior Advocate
Mr. M. Amirul Islam, Senior Advocate
Mr. Mahmudul Islam, Senior Advocate
Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud, Senior Advocate
Mr. Ajmalul Hossain, Senior Advocate

Dates of hearing. : 01.03.2011, 10.03.2011, 21.03.2011,
22.03.2011,24.03.2011, 30.03.2011,
31.03.2011, 03.04.2011, 04.04.2011,
06.04.2011 & 10.05.2011.



J U D G M E N T


A.B.M. KHAIRUL HAQUE, C.J. :-

c _ g f vM

A vc xj ` vqi I c v_ wgK A vj vPbv

1| c vi t nvBK vUwef vM K Z K msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996 ( 1996 Gi 1bs A vBb) Gi eaZ v c ` vb
mwVK nBqvQ wK bvA A vc xj mB c k D vc b K i vnBqvQ|
c K Z c msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb,1996 ( 1996
Gi 1bs A vBb) Gi A vBbMZ A e vb wbi c Y A A vc xj i wePvh
wel q|
2| msw A v` k t 10/ 05/ 2011 Z vwi L i vq c ` vbK vj
wbv A v` k c ` vb K i vnq t
3
It is hereby declared:
(1) The appeal is allowed by majority without any order as to costs.
(2) The Constitution (Thirteenth amendement) Act, 1996 (Act 1 of 1996)
is prospectively declared void and ultra vires the Constitution.
(3) The election of the Tenth and the Eleventh Parliament may be held
under the provisions of the above mentioned Thirteenth Amendment
on the age old prinicples, namely, quod alias non est licitum,
necessitas licitum facit (That which otherwise is not lawful, necessity
makes lawful), salus populi suprema lex (safety of the people is the
supreme law) and salus republicae est suprema lex (safety of the
State is the Suprme law).
The parliament, however, in the meantime, is at liberty to bring
necessary amendments excluding the provisions of making the
former Chief Justices of Bangladesh or the Judges of the Appellate
Division as the head of the Non-Party Care-taker Government.
The Judgment in detail would follow.
The connected Civil Petition for leave to appeal No.596 of 2005 is
accordingly, disposed of.

3| nvBK vUK Z K i j R vi x t A A v` vj Z i GK R b we
GvW&f vK U gi g M. Saleem Ullah qv` k msk vab A vBbi eaZ v
D vc b K i Z t nvBK vUwef vM GK wU i xU&gvK v gv, i xU wc wUk b bs
4112/ 1999 ` vqi K i b| ` i L v K vi x c i we GvW&f vK U
gnv` qK k eY K i Z t nvBK vUwef vMi GK wU e evsj v` k
mi K vi c mwPe, A vBb I msm` wel qK g Yvj q I A bvb
c wZ ev` xMYi ei vei GK wU Rule Nisi wbwj wL Z f ve 25- 1- 2000
Z vwi L R vi xK i t
Upon hearing Mr. M.I. Farooqui the learned Counsel for the petitioner in
support of the petition and the learned Attorney General appearing for the
Bangladesh who opposed the petition and as serious points of constitutional
importance emerged out of the arguments of the learned counsel and the learned
Attorney General, let a rule nisi be issued upon the respondents calling upon
them to show cause as to why the impugned Constitution (Thirteen Amendment)
Act, 1996 (Act No. 1 of 1996) (Annexure A & A-1 to the petition) should
not be declared to be ultra vires of the constitution of the Peoples Republic of
4
Bangladesh and of no legal effect and/or pass such other or further order or
orders as to this court may fit and proper.
.......................................................................
4| c wZ ev` x c f ~ K i Y t evsj v` k d Wvi j BDwbqb
A e&R vbvwj m Gi mf vc wZ R bve A vgvbyj vn K wei Gi A ve` bi
wf w Z nvBK vUwef vM Bnvi 19- 4- 2000 Z vwi L i A v` k ej
Z vnvK 5bs c wZ ev` x wnmve c f z K i | Z vnvQvo v, A vI qvgx j xM
I evsj v` k R vZ xqZ vev` x ` j Gi gnvmPxeqi A ve` b g
A v` vj Z Bnvi 25- 4- 2000 Z vwi L i A v` k ej Z vnvw` MK
h_ v g 6 I 7 bs c wZ ev` x wnmve c f ~ K i Z t Z vnv` i ei vei
Rule R vi xnq|

5| R eve, c Z z i BZ vw` t 1,5 I 6 bs c wZ ev` xc
c _ K c _ K affidavit in opposition ` vwL j K wi qv RulewU Discharge c v_ bv
K i | ` i L v K vi xc GK wU Supplementary affidavit I GK wU affidavit in
reply ` vwL j K i vnq|
6| wWwf k b e bvbx t nvBK vUwef vMi wePvi c wZ
Shah Abu Nayem Mominur Rahman I wePvi c wZ Md. Abdul Awal mgbq MwVZ
GK wU Division Bench G 21- 7- 2003 Z vwi L gvK v gvwU bvbx A vi
nq| wK bvbx K vj c Z xqgvb nq h qv` k msk vab A vBbwUi
eaZ v c m BwZ c ~ei xU&wc wUk b bs 1729/ 1996 ( mq` gvnv`
gwk Di i ngvb ebvg evsj v` k i i vc wZ I A bvb) gvK v gvq
D vc b K i vnBqvwQj , wK wePvi c wZ Md. Mozammal Haque I wePvi c wZ
M.A. Matin mgbq MwVZ Division Bench K vb Rule R vi x bv K wi qv 25- 7-
1996 Z vwi L wbwj wL Z msw A v` k c ` vb K wi qv wc wUk bwU
L vwi R K i b t
Since the provisions of the 13
th
Amendment Act, as it appears to us, do
not come within definitions of alternation, substitution or repeal of any provision
of the Constitution and since for temporary measures some provisions of the
Constitution will remain ineffective, we do not find any substance in the
submission of the petitioner that Article 56 of the Constitution had been in fact
5
amended by 13
th
Amendment Act. On the face of the 13
th
Amendment Act it
appears that those provisions were made only for a limited period for ninety
days before holding general election after dissolution of the Parliament or before
expiry of the Parliament. We find that no unconstitutional action was taken by
the legislature and as such we do not find any reason to interfere with 13
th

Amendment Act, we do not find any merit in the application and accordingly it
is summarily rejected.

7| en i e MVbi myc vwi k t eZ gvb i xU&gvK v gvq
( i xU&wc wUk b bs 4112/ 1999) we wePvi K e` nvBK vUwef vMi
Dc i v A v` k i mwnZ wgZ c vl Y K wi qv wel qwU bvbx K wi evi
R b GK wU Full Bench MVb K wi evi R b 21- 7- 2003 Z vwi L
wbwj wL Z gZ c K vk K wi qv gvbbxq c avb wePvi c wZ ei vei c k
K i bt
Since we could not agree with the earlier decision in the case of Syed
Md. Mashiur Rahman on the issue of validity of Act 1/96, we refrain from
entering into other issues raised in the writ petition and did not take into our
consider any submission on the issue of violation as to or destruction of basic
structure of the Constitution, though we have mentioned hereinabove in the
context of understanding the issue of amendment of Articles-48 and 56 of the
Constitution, and the same should not be treated as our opinion or observation
on the issue of violation or destruction of the basic structure of the
Constitution, more so when we have not given any hearing on that issue.
Accordingly as submitted by the learned Advocates on behalf of the
petitioner and respondent No. 6 as well as by the learned Additional Attorney-
General we are of the opinion that it is proper case for referring for a decision by
Full Bench as per provision of chapter-VII of the High Court Division Rules.
Having regard to the gravity and importance of the issues raised in the writ
petition, including that of destruction of basic structure of the Constitution, we
are of the opinion that the Full Bench, if constituted, should decide all issues
raised in the writ petition and particularly the issue whether the Act 1/96 has
caused amendment in the provisions of Articles-48(3) and 56 of the Constitution
requiring assent thereto through referendum as contemplated by Article-
142(1A), (1B) and (1C) of the Constitution.
Accordingly let this matter be placed before the learned Chief Justice for
necessary order for a decision by a Full Bench as required under Rule-1 of
Chapter-VII of the High Court Division Rules.

6
A Z tc i , gvbbxq c avb wePvi c wZ wZ bR b wePvi c wZ mgbq
GK wU Full Bench MVb K i Z t A i xU&gvK v gvwU bvbxi wb` k c ` vb
K i b|
8 | Full Bench G bvbx t bvbx A nvBK vUwef vMi
GK wU Full Bench qv` k msk vab A vBbwU ea Nvl Yv K wi qv Rule wU
L vwi R K i |
` yBwU c v_ wgK wel qmn gvU c vuPwU wel q Full Bench weePbv
K i | c v_ wgK wePvhwel qq wbi c t
K ) whether the petitioner had the necessary locus standi to challenge
the impugned amendment,
L ) whether the writ petition is hit by the principle of res judicata.
Full Bench Dc i i ` yBwU wePvhwel qB i xU&` i L v K vi xi c
wb w K i |
Full Bench Dc i v wePvhwel q weePbv K wi Z hvBqv K.M.
Rahman V. Bangladesh 26 DLR (AD) 44, Dr. Mohiuddin Faruque V. Bangladesh 49
DLR (AD) 1 Ges ETV Ltd. V. BTRC 54 DLR(AD) 130 gvK v gv wj i i vqi
Dc i wbf i K i Z t A i xU&gvK v gvwU ` vqi K wi Z ` i L v K vi xi
locus standi i wnqvQ ewj qvNvl YvK i |
Res judicata Z m^ Full Bench Gi wbK U c wi j w Z nq h
eZ gvb i xU& gvK v gvi ` i L v K vi x c ~ei i xU& wc wUk b bs
1729/ 1996 gvK v gvq ` i L v K vi x wQj b bv ev Z vnv` i ga A b
K vb c vi wi K c wZ wbwaZ gyj K mK (mutual representative character)
wQj bv| GB K vi Y eZ gvb i xU&gvK v gvRes judicata Z vi v ` y bq
ewj qvFull Bench gZ c K vk K i |

A bvb c avb wePvhwel q wj wbi c t
M) whether the impugned amendments require referendum under sub-
article (1A) of Article 142 of the Constitution.
N) whether the impugned Act, bringing the amendments in the
Constitution, is destructive of the principle of democracy,
7
O) whether the amendment of Article 142 by adding clauses (1A), (1B)
and (1C) thereto by the Second Proclamation (Fifteenth Amendment) Order,
1978, can be said to be a valid constitutional amendment.
Z vnvQvo v, wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v ms v wel qwUI Full Bench
weePbvK i |
Full Bench Gi wZ bR b we wePvi K e` GK gZ nBqv Rule wU
Discharge K i b, Z e Z uvnvi vc Z K B c _ K c _ K i vq c ` vb K i b|

9| 103 A byQ` i A axb mvwUwd K U c ` vb t i vq
c ` vb k l ` i L v K vi xi A ve` b weePbv K i Z t Full Bench msweavbi
103 A byQ` Gi A vI Z vq GB ggmvwUd K U c ` vb K i h
gvgj vwUi mwnZ msweavb- evL vi wel q A vBbi i Z c ~Yc k R wo Z
i wnqvQ|
nvBK vUwef vM mywbw` f ve Dj L bv K wi j I c K Z c
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb,1996 ( 1996 Gi 1bs A vBb)
Gi A vBbMZ A e vb wbi c YB mvsweavwbK i I c ~bc k I A
A vc xj wef vMi g~j wePvhwel q|
A Z tc i , A vc xj wef vM wel qwU A vc xj wnmve bw_ f z K i v
nq| Z vnvQvo v, i xU&` i L v K vi x A vi GK wU c _ K Civil Petition for Leave
to Appeal No. 596 of 2005 ` vqi K i | BnvI A vc xj wUi mwnZ GK i vL v
nq|
A vc xj K vi x A ve` bi c w Z we Chamber wePvi c wZ Z uvnvi
14- 12- 2010 Z vwi L i A v` k ej A vc xj wU 10- 1- 2011 Z vwi L
bvbxi R b wbavi Y K i b|
A Z c i , 1- 3- 2011 Z vwi L A vc xj wUi bvbxA vi nq|

10| nvBK vUwef vMi i vq c hvj vPbv t c _ gB A vgi v
nvBK vUwef vMi Full Bench Gi i vq A vj vPbvK wi e|
8
c ~eB ej v nBqvQ h g~j wePvhwel q weePbvi c ~eFull Bench
c _ g ` yBwU c v_ wgK wel q, h_ v, i xU&` i L v wUi i YxqZ v I res
judicata Z vi vevwi Z wK bvZ vnvweePbvK i |
Full Bench Gi wZ b R b we wePvi K e` GK gZ nBj I
c Z K B c _ K c _ K i vq c ` vb K i b|
c _ gB wePvi c wZ Md. Joynul Abedin Gi A vj vPbvwU weePbvq
j I qv nBj | wZ wb Z vnvi i vqi c _ g ` i L v K vi xi wbR i Locus standi
I ` i L v wU res judicata Z vi v evwi Z wK bv Z vnv c v_ wgK wePvhwel q
wnmve weePbvK wi qvQb|
h K vb i xU&gvK v gvq, wek l K wi qv Z vnv hw` R b ^v_ g~j K
i xU&gvK v gv nBqv _ vK m ` i L v K vi xi locus standi wel qwU
A Z i Z c ~Y| K vi Y, h K vb ew msweavbi 102 A byQ` i
A vI Z vq myc xg K vUi nvBK vUwef vMi GB wek l A vw` gZ v
hvP&T v K wi Z c vi bv| wZ wb h 102 A byQ` i A vI Z vq GK R b
ms z ew c _ gB Z vnvc wZ wZ K wi Z nBe|
i xU&` i L v K vi xZ vnvi i xU&` i L v i 2q ` d vq Z vnvi locus standi
c m wbwj wL Z e e c ` vb K wi qvQbt
Your petitioner is a citizen of Bangladesh. He is a practising Advocate
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and holds the Constitution of the
Republic in high esteem. It is the sacred duty of every citizen to
safeguard and defend the Constitution and to maintain its supremacy as
the embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh. Your petitioner
is also the Secretary General of the Association for Democratic and
Constitutional Advancement of Bangladesh (ADCAB), which has been
working for the peoples awareness to guard against the violation of the
Constitution and the rule of law.

msweavb gvb K i v evsj v` k i mK j bvMwi K i GK wU wek l
mvsweavwbK ` vwqZ | eZ gvb i xU&gvK v gvq ` i L v K vi x msweavbi
Z wK Z msk vabwUK msweavbi A bZ g c avb basic feature MYZ i
mwnZ mvsNwl K ` vex K wi qvQb| Z wK Z msk vab evsj v` k i
GK R b mveK c avb wePvi c wZ K Z veavqK mi K vi i Dc ` v
9
wbqvMi weavb _ vK vq wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v zbnBZ c vi
ewj qv Z vnvi ` i L v A vk v c K vk K i v nBqvQ| wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vI msweavbi GK wU basic structure ewj qv wZ wb ` vex K wi qvQb|
Z vnvQvo v, ` i L v K vi x myc xg K vUi GK R b we GvW&f vK U|
A Z Ge, evsj v` k i GK R b bvMwi K wnmve I myc xg K vUi GK R b
we GvW&f vK U wnmve ` k i msweavb I wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vi wel q ` i L v K vi xi ms z nBevi K vi Y _ vwK Z c vi
weavq GB i xU&gvK v gv ` vqi Z vnvi locus standi i wnqvQ ewj qv
A vgi vnvBK vUwef vMi wmv i mwnZ GK gZ |
A A v` vj Z i c ~ewbw K Z Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman V. Bangladesh
26 DLR (SC) (1974) 44 I Dr. Mohiuddin Faruque V. Bangladesh 49 DLR (AD)
(1997) 1 gvK gvq D vwc Z Locus standi Bmyi Dc i c ` wmv
A bygv` b K i vnBj |

Dj L h A A vc xj gvK v gvwU A vc xj wef vM wePvi vaxb
_ vK vK vj xb mgq g~j i xU&` i L v K vi x A vwc j U gZ zgyL c wZ Z
nb| A Z c i , R bve gvt i j K z ym, GvW&f vK U, Z vnvi j vwf wl
nb| R bve gvt i j K y ym Z vnvi j vwf wl nBevi 4- 11- 2008
Z vwi L i A ve` bc wbwj wL Z wbe` b i vL bt

2. That during pendency of the present appeal, the appellant M. Saleem Ullah
died on 3.8.2008 at BIRDEM hospital in Dhaka. A true copy of his death
certificate is annexed hereto as Annexure-A.
3. That Mr. M. Saleem Ullah was a pioneer of Public Interest Litigation and
was the Secretary General of the Association for Democratic and
Constitutional Advancement of Bangladesh (in short ADCAB) and he
brought the case before the Honble Court in capacity of the Secretary
General of ADCAB in the interest of public.
4. That the applicant Md. Ruhul Quddus is the successor Secretary General of
ADCAB after the sad demise of Mr. M. Saleem Ullah. He is a learned
Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, a public interest litigant and
public spirited person believes in supremacy of the Constitution and is
having same grievance of Mr. M. Saleem Ullah.
10
5. That the present Civil Appeal is having great public importance, by which
the Constitution (Thirteen) Amendment) Act 1996 (Act No. 1 of 1996) has
been challenged as being ultra vires of the Constitution. The said amendment
has introduced the concept of Non-party Care Taker Government, a non-
representative and undemocratic Government in violation of the basic and
fundamental concept of democracy and also in violation of the mandatory
provision of Article 142 (1A) of the Constitution; that independence of the
judiciary, a basic structure of the Constitution is also affected and impaired
by the impugned Act.

BwZ ga R bve gvt i j K z ym nvBK vUwef vM wePvi c wZ
wbhy nBj R bve A v yj gvbvb L vb A vc xj K vi x wnmve Z vnvi
j vwf wl nb| Z vnvi 9- 12- 2010 Z vwi L i A ve` bc wZ wb
ej bt

4. That after the sad demise of M. Saleem Ullah, his successor-in-office
Md. Ruhul Quddus was substituted in the present appeal, who has now been
elevated on the bench on 4.11.2010.
5. That after elevation of Mr. Ruhul Quddus, the central committee of
ADCAB through a decision of its general meeting entrusted the present
applicant, Md. Abdul Mannan Khan as the next Secretary General of ADCAB
and also instructed him to proceed with and conduct the public interest
litigations (PIL) initiated by ADCAB. The applicant is an Advocate of the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh, a public spirited person who believes in
supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic and independence of the
judiciary. He is having the same grievance as Mr. M. Saleem Ullah had as
Secretary General of ADCAB.

Dj L , hL b A vc xj wU ` vqi K i v nq Z L b g~j A vc xj K vi x
R xweZ wQj b| Z r c i , Z vnvi j vwf wl ew I myc xg K vUi
GK R b we GvW&f vK U| ` k i bvMwi K I A A v` vj Z i we
GvW&f vK U wnmve A A vc xj gvK v gvwU c wi Pvj bv K wi Z Z vnvi
c qvR bxq locus standi i wnqvQ eU|

Z vnvQvo v, eZ gvb A vc xj gvK v gvq GK wU A Z i Z c ~Y
mvsweavwbK c k D vwc Z nBqvQ| Bnv myi vnv K i v R vZ xq ^v_ A wZ
c qvR b| GB c m Ardeshir H Mama V. Flora Sassoon 55 Ind. App. 360=AIR
11
1928 PC 208 gvK v gvwU c wYavbhvM| Bnv GK wU Pzw c ej i
gvK v gv wQj | wK gvK v gvwU wbA v` vj Z wb w nBevi c ~eB
ev` x Pzw A vi c vj b K wi Z i vwR bb ewj qv weev` xK R vbvq weavq
Privy Council G c MYi A vBbMZ A e vb wbavi Yi c qvR b wQj bv,
Z eyI we vwi Z bvbxnq Ges G c m Lord Blanesburgh ej bt
In these circumstances their Lordships think, that whether or not this
appeal can be disposed of without further reference to it, they ought to express
their views upon so important a question of practice now that it has been raised
and fully argued. In such a matter certainty is more important than anything else.
A rule of practice, even if it be statutory, can when found to be inconvenient be
altered by competent authority. Uncertainty in such a matter is at best an
embarrassment and may at its wrost be a source of injustice which, in some
cases, may be beyond judicial remedy. Accordingly in this judgment, their
Lordships will deal with all the matters in controversy to which they have
referred, irrespective of the question whether last of them of necessity now calls
for determination at their hand. (page 366 IA)

Union of India V. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, AIR 1977 SC 2328
gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Sheth K A b GK wU nvBK vUe` wj K wi j
R i vU nvBK vUZ vnv A ea Nvl Yv K i | myc xg K vUA vc xj
wePvi vaxb _ vK vK vj xb mgq mi K vi Z vnvi e` wj i A v` k c Z vnvi
K wi j wZ wbI i xU&gvK v gvwU c Z vnvi K i b| wK Z vnv mZ I
myc xg K vUi wePvi c wZ MY Z wK Z wel qwU mK we vwi Z i vq c ` vb
K i b| G c m Justice VR Krishna Iyr Gi A wf gZ c wYavbhvMt
118. We have earlier stated that the appeal has happily ended by
consensus. The deeper constitutional issues have been considered and answered
by us, responding to our duty under Article 141 and to avoid future shock to the
cardinal idea of justice to the justices. ......... The highest court with
constitutional authority to declare the law cannot shrink from its obligation
because the lis which has activised its jurisdiction has justly been
adjusted.(A avi L vc ` )

GgZ A e vq hnZ zg~j A vwc j Ui j GK B ai bi Locus
Standi mbA vwc j U j vwf wl nBqvQb Ges Z wK Z wel qwU
mvsweavwbK f ve A wZ k q i Z c ~Yweavq wb w K i vc qvR b|
12
c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h i xU&wc wUk b bs 1729/ 1996 (Syed
Muhammed Mashiur Rahman V. Bangladesh 17 BLD 55) gvK v gvq msweavb
( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi eaZ v Pvj K i v nBqvwQj wK
nvBK vUwef vM i j R vi x bv K wi qv GK wU msw A v` k Z vnv
L vwi R K i |
Bnv mZ h ` I qvbx K vhwewa A vBbi 11 avi v A bymvi GK B
c MYi ga GK B wel q j Bqv GK B K vi Yvaxb A vi GK wU b~Z b
gvK v gv res judicata Z A bymvi evwi Z | BnvI mZ h ` I qvbx
K vhwewa A vBbi 141 avi v A bymvi mvavi YZ ` I qvbx K vhwewa
A vBb i xU&gvK v gvi I c hvR , Z e mB c qvM ` I qvbx
gvK v gvi bvq memgq GK B i K g f ve bvI nBZ c vi |
i xU&gvK v gv GK wU wek l A vw` ev g~j gvK v gv| GBi c
gvK v gv g~j Z A vBbi c k Z B mxgve| nvBK vUwef vMi GK wU
e hw` A vBbi c k wU GK f ve wmv c ` vb K i Z e mvavi Y
f ve BnvmgMnvBK vUwef vMi B wmv ewj qvMnY K wi Z nq|
Z e GK wU gvZ K A vBbx wmv K L bB nvBK vUi A vi GK wU
e A bymi Y K wi Z eva bq| The blunders of one age cannot warrant the
blunders of another ( Watkins : Principles of Conveyancing) (Professor J.H.Baker : An
Introduction to English Legal History, page-105) |
K vb GK wU wel q c ~ev wmv nBj nvBK vUwef vM GK B
A vBbi c k n c K wi Z mshZ nBe wVK B wK GL &wZ qvi wenxb
nBe bv| GB c vc U f vi Z xq myc xg K vUi B. Prabhakar Rao V. State
of A.P, AIR1986 SC 210, gvK v gvq c ` i vq c wYavb hvM ( c v-
227) t
23........ a writ petition similar to Writ Petitions Nos. 3420-346/83 etc.
had been filed earlier and had been dismissed in limine by a Bench of
this Court. We do not see how the dismissal in limine of such a writ
petition can possibly bar the present writ petitions. Such a dismissal in
limine may inhibit our discretion but not our jurisdiction. So the
objection such as it was, was not pursued further.

13
Z e hw` nvBK vUwef vMi A vi GK wU e c ~ev e i
wmv i mwnZ wgZ c vl Y K i Z e High Court Rules A bymvi D
e GK wU en i e MVb K wi evi j c ` c MnY K wi Z
c vi | Gnb res judicata-i K vb c k DV bv|
g~j K _ v nBZ Q h Z wK Z wel qwU Pzo v wmv nBqvQ wK bv|
hw` A vc xj wef vM K vb A vBbx c k i Pzo v wmv nq, Z vnv
nvBK vUwef vM Ges A a b mK j A v` vj Z i Dc i evaK i | mB
GK B c k evGK B NUbvc ybi vq nvBK vUD vc b evwi Z nBe|
A vc xj wef vM hw` I stare decisis Z A bymvi D wef vM
gxgvsmxZ c k bwR i (precedence) wnmve c vq mK j mgqB A bymi Y
K wi e Z e A vc xj wef vMi wbK U hw` wbR i K vb A vBbx wmv
gvZ K ewj qv c Z xqgvb nq Z e D A vBbx wmv c wi eZ b K wi Z
c vi K vi Y For that were to wrong every man having a like cause, becuase another
was wronged before: Vaughan, C.J. (in Bole V. Horton,1673) (Professor J.H.Baker:
An Introduction to English Legal History, page-105) |
Gnb A vBbx A e vb A vgi v res judicata c k nvBK vUwef vMi
mwnZ GK gZ c vl Y K wi |
Z r c i g~j wePvhwel q ( M) m^ wePvi c wZ Abedin ej b h
msweavbi c vebv ev mswk h mK j weavb h wj msk vab K wi j
MYf vU c qvR b nq Z uvnvi GK wUI msk vab K i v nq bvB weavq
MYf vUi I c k I V bv|
` i L v K vi x c wbe` b h msweavbi 58 L , 58 M I 58 N
A byQ` wj c vebv, 8 , 48 I 56 A byQ` wj K mi vmwi bv
nBj I c i v f ve msk vab K wi qvQ GB e ei c w Z we
wePvi K wmv c ` vb K i b h D A byQ` wj i K vb msk vabx nq
bvB, Z wK Z A vBbwU 48 ( 3) , 141K ( 1) I 141M( 1) A byQ` wj K
mxwgZ mgqi R b wMZ K wi qvQ gv |
Z r c i , msweavbi basic structure h_ vt MYZ I wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vK 58 L nBZ 58 O Ges 99( 1) A byQ` i msk vabx K vb
14
f ve L eK wi qvQ wK bv Z vnv we wePvi K weePbv K wi qvQb| GB
c m Z uvnvi g e GB h MYZ I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v Df qB
msweavbi basic feature | Z vnvQvo v, A eva I my wbevPbI MYZ i
A sk Ges msweavbi basic feature|
c vwK vb I f vi Z GgbwK evsj v` k i g~j msweavbI caretaker
mi K vi ee v i wnqvQ, R bve i wd K - Dj nK I R bve i v vK we
GvW&f vK U gnv` qMYi GB wbe` b, Ges Since such scheme was not
found to suit the genius of the people of our country there was an out cry for a non-party
care-taker government to hold the general election of the Parliament to ensure free, fair
and independent election Z uvnv` i GB e e wePvi c wZ Abedin h_
A _ en ewj qvgZ c K vk K i b|
msweavbi 99( 1) A byQ` m^ ` i L v K vi x c D vwc Z
e e h A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ I wePvi c wZ MYK h_ v g
c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvMi mvsweavwbK evav ` ~i xf ~Z K wi qv wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ v L eK i v nBqvQ| GB e ei c w Z wePvi c wZ
Abedin gb K i b h A eva, myz I wbi c wbevPbi mv_
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ I wePvi c wZ MYK h_ v g hw` c avb
Dc ` vwbqvM K i vnq Z vnvweZ wK Z K wi evi K vb K vi Y bvB|
wePvi c wZ Md. Joynul Abedin MYZ I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vK
msweavbi basic structure ewj qvQb eU Z e Z wK Z msk vab wj D
basic structureqK L eK wi qvQ wK bv m m K vb g e K i b
bvB| wePvi c wZ Md. Awlad Ali Z uvnvi c _ K i vq ej b h Z wK Z
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb msweavbi 8 ,48 I 56
A byQ` K msk vab K i bv weavq 142( 1K ) A byQ` i A vI Z vq
MYf vUi K vb c qvR b bvB|
wePvi c wZ Ali gb K i b h c K Z MYZ i ^v_ B wbi c
Z veavqK mi K vi ee v c ewZ Z nBqvQ| wZ wb gb K i b h
MYZ i ^v_ mxwgZ mgqi R b msweavbi 48 ( 3) , 56 I 57( 3)
15
A byQ` wMZ i vwL j K vb wZ bvB| wK msweavb I i vxq R xeb
D weavb wj i i Z m^ wZ wb K vb e e c ` vb K i b bvB|
A Z tc i t, wePvi c wZ Ali msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb,
msweavbi 8 , 48 ( 3) , 56 I 57( 3) A byQ` wj K vb f ve
msk vab K i wK bv Z vnv A vj vPbv K i b| wZ wb ej b h 58 ( L )
nBZ 58 ( O) c h A byQ` wj msweavbi , wek l K wi qv 48 ( 3) ,
56 I 58 ( O) A byQ` i K vb c wi eZ b ev msk vab A vbqb K i
bvB| Z wK Z msk vab ` vi v Dc i v A byQ` wj c wi ewZ Z nBj
m wj K K vhK i K wi Z msm` K c ybi vq A vBb wewae K wi Z
nBZ , wK G wZ b gvm c i b~Z b mi K vi gZ v MnYi c i g~j
48 ( 3) , 56 I 57( 3) A byQ` wj c ybi vq ^qsw qf ve K vhK i
nBe| GB wZ b gvm mgq D A byQ` wj wMZ I A K vhK i
_ vwK e gv , K vR B GB K vh gK msweavb msk vab ej v hvq bv
ewj qvwZ wb gZ c K vk K i b|
A ek qv` k msk vab mK wePvi c wZ Ali i wbR i g et
is a peculiar and novel political contrivance, and it is an unprecedented
legislation in our legislative history....

G m^ A vi K vb g e wb vqvR b|

A Z c i t, wePvi c wZ Ali qv` k msk vab A vBb, wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ v zbK wi qvQ wK bv m mK A vj vPbv K i b| wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ v msweavbi GK wU basic structure ewj qv wePvi c wZ Ali
g e K i b| wZ wb ej b h GK R b A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ
A emi MnYi c i wePvi wef vMK A vi K vb f ve c f vevwbZ K wi Z
c vi b bv| wZ wb A vk v c K vk K i b h A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ ev
A bK vb wePvi c wZ hvnvi c avb Dc ` v nBevi K _ v Z uvnvi hw` K vb
wek l i vR bwZ K ` j i c wZ c c vZ ev ` yej Z v _ vK Z e Z vnvi
D c ` MnY bvK i vB DwPr |
wK c K Z c c vZ ev ` yej Z v _ vK v ev bv _ vK v c k bq, mwVK
c k nBZ Q h H i c K vb mvebv A vQ wK bv| Ggb wK hw`
16
mebvI _ vK Z vnv nBj B mswk wePvi c wZ I Z vnvi m wePvi
wef vMi f vegywZ I zbnBe|
msweavbi basic structure asm nI qv c m wePvi c wZ Ali mvgwi K
A vBb vi v msweavb c wi eZ b Ges Z r c i msweavb ( c g msk vab)
A vBb, 1979, gvi d r A bygv` b I wbw Z K i Y c m A vj vPbv K i b
hvnv eZ gvb gvK v gvi wel qe ybq| wZ wb A ek mwVK f veB ej b
h R vZ xq msm` i I basic structure c wi eZ b K wi evi K vb gZ vbvB|
we wePvi c wZ basic structure c wi eZ b c m A vj vPbv K wi Z
hvBqv mvgwi K A vBb vi v msweavbi basic structure c wi eZ b m^
A vj vPbv K i b wK GB c m A gvK v gvi wePvhwel q bn|
wePvhwel q nBj Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBbwUi vi v MYZ I
wePvi wef vM Gi bvq basic structure K K vbf ve L eK wi qvQ wK bv,
wK G m^ we wePvi K K vb wbw Z g e K i b bvB|
wePvi c wZ Mirza Hussain Haider Z uvnvi i vqi c vi MYZ j Bqv
A vj vPbv K i b| wZ wb MYZ c m President Abraham Lincoln nBZ
DwZ c ` vb K i b, Justice Mathew nBZ rule of majority Ges Sir Ivor
Jennings nBZ the vesting of the political power in free and fair election g e
DZ K i Z t wbevPb gvagB h msL vMwi Z v wbYq me Z vnv
ej b| MYZ K c vwZ vwbK i c c ` vb K wi evi R b mgqgZ A eva
I myy wbevPbi c qvR bxqZ v Ges H i c A eva I myy wbevPbi
A byc w wZ Z MYZ h A _ nxb nBqv c o Z vnvI mywbc yb f ve eYbv
K i b|
Rao V. State (1998) 4 SCC 626 bwR i wUi c wZ ` w A vK l Y c ~eK
wePvi c wZ Haider ej b h MYZ hw` I msweavbi GK wU basic structure
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MYZ i Dr K l mvab K wi qvQ|
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MYZ nxbZ vi K _ v ej v nq bvB| Z wK Z msk vabxi K vi Y nqZ v
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17
Bnvi A vBbMZ I mvsweavwbK A e vb m^ we wePvi K e` K nB
weePbvK i b bvB|
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hnZ zZ wK Z msk vabx c vebv, 8 , 48 ,56 I 142 A byQ` K vb
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A vBbMZ mwVK A e vb GB h BwZ ga myc xg K vUi Df q
wef vM msweavb ( c g msk vab) A vBb, 1979, evwZ j K i vq Ges
142 A byQ` Bnvi g~j A e vb wd wi qv hvI qvq mswk msk vab
MYf vUi weavb j y nBqvQ|
wePvi c wZ Abedin I wePvi c wZ Haider Df qB GB Dc - gnv` k i
wZ bwU ` k i msweavb wbevwPZ mi K vi i k vmbK vj A GK ai bi
care-taker mi K vi ei vei B we` gvb _ vK Ges we` vqx c avbg x I
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K wi j I wK f ve ev wK c w qvq Z uvnvi v Z uvnv` i c wZ wbwaZ k xj Pwi
nvi vq Z vnv evL v K i b bvB| Dj L h Z wK Z msweavb msk vab
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A byvbi weavb i vwL qvQ|

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99 A byQ` i msk vab weePbvi c k I V|
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18
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12| A vc xj K vi x c e e c k t R bve Gg A vB
d vi K x, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, A vc xj K vi x c Z vnvi e e c k
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19
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20
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msk vab K msk vab evamendment A wf wnZ bvK wi qvPZ y_ f vMi 2q
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21
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Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj i wewf bNUbvej xeYbvK i b|
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wZ wb U.N. R. Rao V. Smt. Indira Gandhi, AIR 1971 SC 1002, gvK v gv
Dj L c ~eK wbe` b K i b h R vZ xq msm` f vwOqv hvI qvi c i I
g xmf v K vhK i _ vwK Z c vi , Z veavqK mi K vi i K vb c qvR b
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mgq wePvi wef vMK wbq Y K wi evi GK Uvc PvwQj |
Z vnvQvo v, Anwar Hassain V. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Special Issue)
gvK v gvi Dj L c ~eK wZ wb wbe` b K i b h wePvi c wZ Badrul Haider
Chowdhury msweavbi 7 A byQ` K Ges wePvi c wZ M.H. Rahman
msweavbi c vebvK Pole Star wnmve eYbv K i b| wZ wb D
gvK v gvq c ` i vqi wewf bA sk DZ K wi qv GK wU mvi vsk ` vwL j
K i b|

R bve d vi K x, GvW&f vK U, wbe` b K i b h GB f ve
qv` k msk vab A vBb msweavbi c R vZ vw K Pwi L eK i |
Z vnvQvo v, wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vI zbK i |

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gvnvg` gvnmb i wk ` A v` vj Z i A bygwZ MnY c ~eK Z vnvi e e
c k K i b|
wZ wb msweavbi i Z c ~Y w` K wj Z zwj qv ai b| wZ wb MYZ
h msweavbi GK wU Basic Structure Z vnv wewf bbwR i Gi c wZ ` w
22
A vK l b c ~eK evL v K i b| Z vnvQvo v, wZ wb ej b h Z wK Z msweavb
msk vab A vBb wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v L eK wi e, A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ i vR bwZ K D k i wk K vi ( Political victim) nBZ c vi b|
we Gv&Wf vK U gnv` q ej b h, wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
Ggb ew eMmgbq MwVZ hvnvi v R bMYi f vU wbevwPZ bnb|
GgZ ve nvq wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa` i Z _ v R vZ xq msm` i m` m` i
mgbq Z veavqK mi K vi MVb K i v hvBZ c vi | hB mi K vi wU
A eZ xK vj xb mi K vi wnmve 90 w` b gZ vq _ vwK qv wbevPb
c wi Pvj bv K wi e| GB mi K vi i m` mMY K gc GK gqv` K vj
wbevPb A sk MnY K wi Z c vwi e bv| GB mi K vi wU MwVZ nBe
R vZ xq msm` i Z c ~YA e` vb i vwL qvQb A _ vr wbqwgZ nvwR i
_ vwK qv weZ K mn msm` i mK j K gK v A sk MnY K wi qvQb Ggb
mK j m` m evQvB K wi qv MwVZ nBe| Z vnv` i ga nBZ B
GK R bK mi K vi c avb K i v hvBe| Z uvnvi v GK wU A eva I
MnYhvM wbevPb A byvbi ee nvK wi eb|
wZ wb A vi I ej b h GK B mv_ wbevPb K wgk bK k w k vj x
K wi Z nBe| K vi Y wbevPb K wgk bB mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi
i Z c ~YK vR mbK wi e| c qvR bxq A vBb c Yqb K wi qv
K wgk bi k wI ew K wi Z nBe|

13| A vUbx- R bvi j c e e t
A vUbx- R bvi j gnv` q A vgv` i gyw hy I Z r c i 1991
mvj MYZ c Z veZ bi BwZ nvm eYbv K i Z t wZ wb A vBbi k vmb
I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vm^ e e i vL b|
c R vZ m^ e e i vwL Z hvBqv wZ wb ej b h 1990
mvj i k l f vM wePvi c wZ mvnvey w b A vn&g` ` j gZ wbwek l
mK j i A byi va A vqx i vc wZ i c ` MnY K i b Ges ` k GK wU
A eva I wbi c wbevPb A bywZ nq I ` k MYZ c ~benvj nq|
i vc wZ R vZ xq msm` K Z K wbevwPZ nb K vR B wZ wb h A wbevwPZ
23
Z vnv ej v hvq bv| Z vnvQvo v, msweavbB Z uvnvK K Z K wj gZ v
c ` vb K wi qvQ, hgb, c avbg x I c avb wePvi c wZ wbqvM c ` vb|
Z vnvQvo v, 49 A byQ` A bymvi h K vb ` i gvR bv, wej ^b I
wei vg g yi K wi evi Ges h K vb ` gI K zd , wMZ ev nvm K wi evi
gZ v i vc wZ i i wnqvQ| K vR B i vc wZ i K vb gZ v bvB G K _ v
ej vhvq bv|
MYZ c k wZ wb ej b h evsj v` k i vi A bZ g g~j bxwZ
nBj MYZ Ges i vi c Z K wU i MYZ i vee v wbw Z K i v
nBqvQ| Z e msweavbi 56( 2) A byQ` ej A wbevwPZ ew I g x
c ` wbqvM c vBZ c vi b Z vnvi weavb i wnqvQ| G c m wZ wb
msm` - m` mMY K Z K wbevwPZ gwnj v m` mMYi I K _ v Dj L
K i b|
GB c vc U wZ wb A eva I wbi c wbevPb A byvbi R b
A wbevwPZ Dc ` vwbqvMi c qvR bxqZ vi K _ vDj L K i b|
wZ wb ej b h f vi Z i wbevPb K wgk b Gi bvq evsj v` k i
wbevPb K wgk bi I GK B gZ v I ` vwqZ i wnqvQ wK NUbv c evn
` L v hvq h evsj v` k i wbevPb K wgk b wbevPb ee vc bvq f vi Z i
wbevPb K wgk bi bvq k f ~wgK v j BZ e_ nb| GB K vi YB
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi c qvR b nBqvQ ewj qvwZ wb R vbvb|
msweavb msk vabi R b Mbf vUi c k wZ wb ej b h
msweavb c g msk vab gvK v gv c ` i vqi c i D msk vabx
K Z K A bxZ msweavbi 142 A byQ` i msk vabwU j y nBqvQ
weavq MYf vUi K vb c k A vi I V bv|
we A vUbxR bvi j ej b h hnZ zZ wK Z msk vabwU vi v
wK Qyb~Z b A byQ` mshvR b K i v nBqvQ gv wK we` gvb K vb
A byQ` ev mi K vi i ai Y c wi eZ b K i v nq bvB weavq Bnv ej v hvq
bv h Z wK Z qv` k msk vab msweavbi Basic structure Gi K vb
c wi eZ b NUvBqvQ|
24
wZ wb A vi I ej b h hnZ z msm` - m` mMY GK wU wbw`
gqv` i R b wbevwPZ nb Ges c avbg xI g~j Z t GK R b msm` -
m` m wK wZ wb i vc wZ i A byi va c i eZ x c avbg x ` vwqZ MnY bv
K i vc h D c ` envj _ vwK Z c vi b|
GK B hyw Z wZ wb ej b h hnZ z c avbg x Z uvnvi gqv`
c i eZ x wK QyK vj mgq Z uvnvi c ` _ vwK qv mi K vi c wi Pvj bv K wi Z
c vi b h mgqi R b wZ wb wbevwPZ bnb K vR B A eva I wbi c
wbevPbi ^v_ A wbevwPZ Dc ` vMYI mi K vi c wi Pvj bv K wi Z
c vi b|
A vc xj K vi x we GvW&f vK U gnv` qi e e h wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb Dc ` v c ` c avb wePvi c wZ ev A c i
K vb wePvi c wZ wbqvM c v nBj wePvi wef vMi f veg~wZ zbnBe
GB e ei mwnZ we A vUbx- R bvi j wgZ c vl Y K i b, Z e
wZ wb ^xK vi K i b h c avb Dc ` v c ` MnYi myhvM _ vwK evi
K vi YB c avb wePvi c wZ A vj vwPZ / mgvj vwPZ nb|
14| Amicus Curiae c e e t
( 1) R bve wU GBP L vb, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, Z uvnvi hyw
Z K i c vi ej b h nvBK vU4- 8 - 2004 Z vwi L hL b eZ gvb
Z wK Z msk vab m^ i vq nq Z L bI c g msk vab wel q i vq nq
bvB, nvBK vUD i vq nq 29- 8 - 2005 Z vwi L I A vc xj wef vM
i vq nq 1- 2- 2010 Z vwi L |
R bve L vb 1990 mvj i wWm^i i c _ g evsj v` k i gZ vi
c U c wi eZ b I wePvi c wZ k vnveyw b A vn` Gi A vqx i vc wZ i
` vwqZ MnYi NUbv c ybtmi Y K wi qv ej b h wZ wbB Gwel q
wePvi c wZ k vnveyw b A vn` i mwnZ mv vr K wi qv i vc wZ i ` vwqZ
MnYi R b A byi va K wi qvwQj b|
1996 mvj 15B d eqvi x Z vwi L A bywZ GK Z i d v wbevPbi
c i ` k c P A w i Z v A vi nBj A avc K W. e` i vR v Payi x
25
meR bve wU.GBP L vb, R wgi Dw b mi K vi , L ` K vi gvn&eye Dw b,
mvj vg Z vj yK ` vi mK j wgwj Z nBqv Z veavqK mi K vi i avi Yv mw
K i b| wePvi c wZ R bve K z ym Payi x A vBbwUi L mo v c yZ K i b|
` k Z L bK vi c P A w i Z vi c vc U qv` k msk vab A vBbwU
c Yqb K i v R bMYi ^v_ A ek c qvR bxq nBqv c wo qvwQj | mvb`
mK j Z vnv Z L b MnYI K wi qvwQj | mB A vBbwUB GL b msweavb
c wi c w A R ynvZ A ea Nvl Yvi eA vBbx c v_ Yv K i v nBqvQ ewj qv
R bve L vb ` ytL c K vk K i b|
wZ wb ej b h msweavbi K vb msk vab nBZ c vi bv Ggb
e e K L bB MnYhvM nBZ c vi bv| MYZ GK wU wek l avi Yv|
BnvK c K Z c ywUZ K wi Z A ` w D` vi I c mvwi Z K wi Z nq|
wbi c I ^vaxb wbevPb ewZ i K MYZ K bvI K i v hvq bv|
MYZ i mwnZ wbevPb A vxf ve R wo Z | MYZ K c K Z
i c ` vbi R b wbevPb engine Gi bvq K vR K i |
A Z tc i , we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Harold Lasky, Sir Ivor Jennings I
Sir Winston Churchill nBZ MYZ i ms v DZ K wi qv ej b h ` k i
R bMYi ^v_ I MYZ i ^v_ qv` k msk vab msweavbi mwnZ
mshy K i vnBqvwQj |
MYZ I wbevPbi K _ v ewj Z wMqv R bve L vb Sir Winston
Churchill K DZ K wi qvej bt
At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking
into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper,
no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the
overwhelming importance of the point.

wZ wb ej b h MYZ i R bB myyI wbi c wbevPb c qvR b
Ges mB D k B GB msk vabxwU A vbvnBqvwQj |
R bve L vb A vi I ej b h wePvi c wZ Gg GBP i ngvb I
wePvi c wZ j wZ d zi i ngvb K Z K c wi Pvwj Z wbevPb wj meR bMvn
nBqvwQj |
26
A Z tc i , R bve wU GBP L vb, we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Full
Bench Gi wePvi c wZ R bve R qbyj A vew` bi i vqi Dc msnvi i w` K
A vgv` i ` w A vK l Yc ~eK c _ g Pvi wU wmv K ( c c vi eyK c v-
96- 97) mg_ b K i Z t e e i vL b| c g wmv mK wZ wb
ej b h msweavb ( c g msk vab) A vBb gvK v gvq A vc xj
wef vMi i vq nBevi c i D i vq K vhK i nBqvQ Ges D i vq
mvc c g msk vabx evwZ j K vhK i nBqvQ awi qv j Bqv ej v hvq
h 142 A byQ` i 1( K ) , 1( L ) I 1( M) ` d vq ewYZ MYf vUi
(referendum) ` vex ms v ` i L v K vi xi e e evwZ j nBe Ges
A v` vj Z i c g wmv A bvek K nBe|
wZ wb ej b h gvbbxq c avbg x ewj qvQb h k xNB msweavb
msk vab K i vnBe|
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v weNnI qv m^ ` i L v K vi xi
wbe` bi c w Z wZ wb ej b h 1991 mvj i mvavi Y wbevPbmn
wZ bwU wbevPb evsj v` k i mveK c avb wePvi c wZ MY md j f ve
c wi Pvj bvK wi qvwQj b|
wZ wb ej b h msweavbi PZ z_ f vM 2K c wi Q` mshvR b,
msweavbi basic structure c wi eZ b ev asm ev msweavbi K vb weK wZ
mvab K i bv| GB m wZ wb ej b h hw` beg- K f vM MYZ K
zbbvK wi qv_ vK Z e 2K c wi Q` I MYZ K zbK i bvB|
2004 mvj msweavb ( PZ z` k msk vab) A vBb, 2004, gvi d r
96( 1) A byQ` msk vab K i Z t myc xg K vUi wePvi K MYi PvK zi xi
eqm 67 er mi c h ew K wi evi mgvj vPbvi R eve wZ wb msweavb
( PZ z_ msk vab) A vBb, 1975, gvi d r 116 A byQ` msk vab
K wi evi mgvj vPbvK i b|
msweavbi c vebvi c wZ ` w A vK l Y c ~eK wZ wb ej b h
evsj v` k GK wU MYc R vZ vw K ` k | GL vb R bMY Z vnv` i wbevwPZ
c wZ wbwa gvi d r Z vnv` i gZ v c qvM K i | GB K vi Y wbevPbI
27
msweavbi GK wU basic structure | wbevPb ewZ i K MYZ K bvI
K i vhvq bv| wbevPbi gvagB MYZ A R b K i vme|
wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn` B c K Z c Z vavqK mi K vi
avi Yvi c _ c ` k K Ges K nB Z uvnvi c wi Pvwj Z c k vmb Pvj K i
bvB|
f vU wQbZ vB i va K wi evi R bB Z veavqK mi K vi ee v
MnY K i vnBqvwQj |
Z veavqK mi K vi ee v K Z er mi ej er _ vK v DwPr c k
K wi j wZ wb Z vr wYK R eve ` b h c vk er mi |
R vZ xq msm` f vwOqv hvBevi c i c i B Z veavqK mi K vi
` vwqZ MnY K i |
R vgvZ - B- Bmj vg ` j me mgqB ewj qv A vwmqvQ h wbevPb
A byvb K wi evi R b GK wU c wZ vb c qvR b GB e ei judicial notice
j Bevi R b R bve L vb A A v` vj Z i wbK U A ve` b R vbvb|
Z vnvQvo v, wZ wb R vZ xq msm` msweavb msk vab K i v c h A
gvK v gvi bvbx wMZ K wi Z ev A Z i vq wMZ K wi Z A ve` b
R vbvb|
gyj msweavbi 95 A byQ` i vc wZ c avb wePvi c wZ i mwnZ
c i vgk K wi qv A bvb wePvi K K myc xg K vUwbqvM c ` vb K wi eb
ewj qv weavb wQj wK msweavb ( PZ z_ msk vab) A vBb wePvi K
wbqvMi c avb wePvi c wZ i mwnZ c i vgk i weavb eR b K i v
nBqvQ ewj qvR bve L vb wbe` b K i b|
Dc msnvi R bve wU GBP L vb nvBK vUwef vMi Full Bench Gi
i vq envj Ges A vc xj L vwi R K wi evi R b gZ c K vk K i b|
( 2) W.K vgvj nvmb, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, Z uvnvi e ei
c vi ej b h GL vb msweavb weePbvi R b Dc vc b K i vnBqvQ
(propounding the Constitution)| A vgv` i msweavbi A bZ g gwj K bxwZ
evOvj xR vZ xqZ vev` Bnvi wf w |
28
wZ wb ej b h myc xg K vUi wePvi K ` i f xwZ ev A byMni Da
DwVqv i vq c ` vb K wi Z nBe| A vgv` i i vxq R xeb A vgi v A bK
` ytmgq (moments of darkness) A wZ evwnZ K wi qvwQ wK A vgi v K L bB
A wePvi MnY K wi e bv| c wi evi i c wZ , mgvR i c wZ A vgv` i ` vwqZ
i wnqvQ, i vi c wZ A vgv` i mvsweavwbK ` vwqZ i wnqvQ| msweavb
mK j i R bB A c wi nvh| A vgv` i mvsweavwbK g~j eva i wnqvQ|
evOvj x R vwZ qZ vev` A _ A ^v` wk K Z v (Chauvinism) bn| Bnv
mv` vwqK R vwZ qZ vev` bq| msweavb A Z xZ nBZ A byc i Yv c vBqv
_ vK | msweavb c YZ vMY g~j evaK mvb K wi Z b| msweavb
g~j evai Dc i wf w K wi qv i wPZ nBqvwQj , A _ i Dc i wf w K wi qv
bn| Bnvi GK wU H wZ nvwmK gv vi wnqvQ|
GK B f ve MYZ i I gyj eva i wnqvQ| msweavbi 7
A byQ` mgM msweavbi k w m vi Y K wi qvQ| R bMY (people)
k i A _ A vgv` i A byaveb K wi Z nBe| i vi ^v_ i mwnZ
ew MZ ^v_ mgwbZ K wi Z nBe|
msweavbi GK wU c we Z v i wnqvQ| wbevPbi bvg A b wK Qy
NUvb nBZ Q| c Z K wU gvbyl i B A _ , k w , Pvc , wbc xo b I
A xK vi i c f ve gy A e vq wbR i c Q` gZ f vU c ` vbi A waK vi
i wnqvQ|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q 1990 mvj i 3i v wWm^i i
A mvavi Y I NUbvej A e vi K _ v mi Y K wi qv ej b h Z L b
GK w` K mvgwi K k vmbi mvebv A bw` K mK j i wbK U MnYhvM
GK R b wbi c i vc wZ c qvR b wQj | GBi c i Z i mgq
wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vng` A vqx i vc wZ i ` vwqZ f vi MnY K i b|
A Z tc i , msweavb I i v i v K wi evi ^v_ msweavbi GK v` k I
v` k msk vab K i vnq|
wK gv i v Dc - wbevPb GK wU Dc vL vb, Bnv mK j
wek vmhvMZ v nvi vq| hvw K f ve msweavb A bymi Y K wi j ewj Z
nq h GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j msL vMwi f vU c vBqvDc - wbevPbwUZ
29
R q j vf K wi qvQ| wK c K Z c Bnv GK wU bvggv wbevPb wQj
hL vb 10% f vUvi MYI A sk MnY K i bvB| Bnv wQj GK wU
A wZ k q i Z i A e v hL vb msweavbi c we Z v Ges MYZ vw K
g~j eva j vc c vBqvwQj |
GBi c c wi w wZ Z GK wU Z veavqK mi K vi gvi d r wbevPb
A byvb K wi evi avi Yv R bj vf K i K vi Y wbevPb K wgk b myywbevPb
A byvb K wi Z evi evi e_ nBqvQ|
msweavb GK wU R xe ` wj j | Bnv K vb A c wi k xwj Z ev hvw K
MbYvbn|
msweavbi 7 A byQ` c wZ wbwaZ k xj MYZ i avi Yv ev evqb
K wi qvQ| 1996 mvj l R vZ xq msm` msweavb ( qv` k msk vab)
A vBb wewae K i |
qv` k msk vabi wf w Z mveK c avb wePvi c wZ Gg GBP
i ngvb c avb Dc ` v nb Ges Z uvnvi bZ Z 23- 6- 1996 Z vwi L
mg R vZ xq msm` wbevwPZ nq|
K vb i vR bwZ K ` j K evuPvbvi R b bq, msweavbK i v
K wi evi R b qv` k msk vab c qvR b nBqvwQj | Bnv Qvo v Z L b
A vi K vb Dc vqI wQj bv Ges Z vnv K i v nBqvwQj mK j ` j i
gZ vbymvi |
GB c hvq we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Professor Amartya Sen wj wL Z
The Argumentative Indian M i 12- 13 c vi K Z K vsk c wo qv k vbvb
Ges ej b h mK j i m A vj vPbvB Z veavqK mi K vi avi Yvi
hw K wf w | Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi 7 A byQ` emvgwi K k vmbi
avi YvB ` q|
MYZ m^ ewj Z wMqv W. K vgvj nvmb ej b Bnv aygv
GK wU evj U ev I GK wU f vUi evc vi bq| Z vnvi _ K I A bK
wK Qyek x| Bnv aymsL v Mwi i wel q bq| GK wU MYZ mK j
R bMYi e e _ vwK Z c vi | GgbwK k Z K i v GK f vM j vK i I
K _ vej vi A waK vi A vQ, Z vnv` i I e e _ vwK Z c vi |
30
1948 mvj Z ` vbx b i gbv i mK vmgq` vb c vwK vbi c _ g
Mf Yi R bvi j R bve Gg G wR bvni e Z v c m Dj L K wi qv we
GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h hL b wZ wb D` yB c vwK vbi i vf vl v
nBe ewj qv Nvl Yv K i b Z L b XvK v wek we` vj qi K qK R b Qv
bv bvewj qv wPr K vi K wi qv DV| D c wZ ev` B wQj hvnv mwVK I
bvq, Z vnvi GK wU my` i m~Pbv| MYZ vw K A v` vj b memgqB
k vw c ~YnI qv DwPr | mi K vi MYgvag wbq Y K wi Z Pvwnj I
R bMYi e eB k eY K i vDwPr |
h_ vh_ wbevPb K wgk bi A byc w wZ Z myy wbi c wbevPb
me bn, d j MYZ weK wk Z nBe bv|
MYc R vZ vw K Z v m^ we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, wK f ve msweavbi
MYc R vZ vw K Pwi zbK i Z vnveywS Z wZ wb A g|
wbevPb A byvb i nmgwZ nq K vi Y mK j B gZ vi
A c eenvi K i | Z e wZ wb ej b h A vgi v mvgwi K k vmb Pvwn bv,
ei , myy I wbi c wbevPbi gvag wZ wb bvMwi K ^vaxbZ vi
k Z ` vexK i b|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q msweavbi Pvi g~j bxwZ Dj L K i Z t
wbe` b K i b h Bnvi A wZ mi j xK i Y c wi Z vR | c K Z gge y
nBZ Q mZ K vi g~j eva, BnvB wPi vqx|
Dr. Ambedkar Gi K _ v Dj L K wi qv wZ wb ej b h mvgvwR K
MYZ , mgvR Z , mgZ v, mvbi mwnZ mgA waK vi GB wj B
nBZ Q msweavbi c K Z g~j bxwZ |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q wbe` b K i b h msweavb mwnsmZ v
eR b K wi qvk vw c yYf ve mgZ v vc b K i |
` i L v K vi x c D vwc Z e e h Z wK Z msk vabx MYZ vw K
avi Yv asm K wi qvQ Z vnv L b K wi qv wZ wb ej b h D e e
GK wU mvMvb eB A vi wK QyB bn|
31
wZ wb ej b h Z veavqK mi K vi wbevPb K wgk bK mvnvh
mnhvwMZ v K i d j k wZ Z wbevPb A bK ek x myyI wbi c nq|
Z veavqK mi K vi ewZ i K f vUvi ` i c Q` gZ f vU c ` vbi
^vaxbZ v _ vK bv| wbevPb A _ i GK wU wei vU f ~wgK v _ vK |
i vR bwZ K ` j wj Z gbvbqb q- we q nq, GgbwK gbvqb j Bqv
wbj vgi bvq A e v nq| wZ wb ej b h GgbwK c ywj k evwnbxI
wbevPb K wgk bK c qvR bxq mnhvwMZ vc ` vb K i bv|
wZ wb 1970 mvj i wbevPbK mi Y K wi qv ej b h Z L b
wbevPb gbvbqb wbj vg DwVZ bv wK GL b ` ybxwZ GK wU wek l
gwK eU| wZ wb ej b h gbvbqb c w qvi ^QZ v wbw Z K i v
A wZ k q c qvR bxq| i vR bwZ K ` j wj i wbR ^` j xq ee vc bvZ I
^QZ v c qvR b hvnvZ R bmvavi Y i vR bwZ K ` j wj Z mZ Z v I
MYZ i wnqvQ m m^ wbw Z nI qvhvq|
wZ wb A vi I ej b h 2006 mvj myc xg K vUi GK R b
wePvi K K c avb wbevPb K wgk bvi wnmve wbqvM c ` vb K i v nq|
c i eZ xZ GK K vwU w k j f zqvf vUvi ai vc o |
eZ gvb wbevPb K wgk bi A vav- ePvwi K I R bk L j v i vi
gZ v i wnqvQ Z e gZ v A vi I ew K wi evi c qvR b i wnqvQ
ewj qv we GvW&f vK U gnv` q gb K i b| qv` k msk vabi
c i wb w K Z Masder Hossain gvK v gvq A vBbi k vmb I wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ vi c qvR bxqZ vi K _ v ej v nBqvQ ewj qv wZ wb
R vbvb| wePvi wef vMi I GK wU mw q f ~wgK vi c qvR b i wnqvQ
ewj qvwZ wb gb K i b|
( 3) R bve i wd K Dj nK , wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, Z uvnvi wj wL Z
hyw Z K D vc b K wi qv ej b h 1994 mvj gv i v Dc wbevPb
c i eZ x R i i x A e vi c vc U R vZ xq msm` 1996 mvj GK wU ` j
wbi c Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ msweavbi PZ z_ f vM 2q
c wi Q` i c i 2K c wi Q` wnmve mshvR b K i |
32
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h R vZ xq msm` f vwOqv
hvBevi c i wbevPb A byvb K wi evi R b A vgv` i msweavbB GK
ai bi Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ we` gvb i wnqvQ wbevPb A byvb bv
nI qv c h Ges b~Z b c avbg x K vhf vi MnY bv K i v c h
msweavbi 56( 4) I 57( 3) A byQ` i A axb msm` m` m I
c avbg x ^xq c ` envj _ vK b| GB c wZ K B GK ai bi
Z veavqK mi K vi ej v hvq| wK 1996 mvj A Z mUgq
c wi w wZ Z wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ c eZ b K i v nq|
R vZ xq msm` i wbevPb A byvb R bMY Z ` vbx b mi K vi i Dc i
A v v nvi vBqv d wj qvwQj weavq wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MVb
K wi evi c ve K i v nBqvwQj | H mgq evsj v` k R vZ xqZ vev` x ` j
gZ vmxb wQj | R vZ xq msm` GK wU my~I wbi c wbevPb
A byvbi R b A bvb i vR bwZ K ` j i c nBZ GK wU wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi vc bi ` vex wQj | mK j i vR bwZ K ` j wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi ee v Z Z GK gZ nI qvq mswk A vBbwU
wewae K i v nq| H mgq wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee vi
c qvR b wQj wK eZ gvb Bnvi i Z ev c qvR b d zi vBqv wMqvQ
wK bv Z vnvB weePbvi wel q| wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi avi Yv
msweavbi g~j Z wj i mwnZ mvsNwl K ewj qv mgvj vPbv K i v nq|
c _ gZ t wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi A wbevwPZ ew ` i vi v MwVZ ,
wZ xqZ t hnZ z, mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ c avb Dc ` v
nBeb, mnZ zBnvwePvi wef vMi f veg~wZ ybK wi Z c vi |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q wbe` b K i b h c v_ wgK c hvq
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi mvd j i mwnZ Bnvi ` vwqZ c vj b
K wi qvwQj | wK mek l 1/ 11 ( 2007 mvj ) NUbvi c vi wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi i bvg i vc wZ wbR B wbR K c avb Dc ` v
wbqvM K i b Ges mvgwi K evwnbxi wb` k c i eZ xZ Z vnv c wi eZ b
K i b| we GvW&f vK U gnv` q meZ 2007- 2008 mvj i
Z veavqK mi K vi i mgqi K _ v ewj qv A vk v c K vk K i b h Bnv
33
A vi K L bI c ybi vew nBe bv Ges Z vnvQvo v wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi m mveavbZ vi K _ vej b|
A Z c i , we GvW&f vK U gnv` q nvBK vUwef vMi Full Bench
Gi i vq A vj vPbv K i Z t ej b h 1996 mvj h wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ i c qvR b A byf ~Z nBqvwQj , c wi eZ xZ
c wi w wZ Z Z vnv Pvj y _ vwK e wK bv Z vnvB GL b c k | Z wK Z
msk vabwU K vb msk vab bq Full Bench Gi K vb K vb we
wePvi K i GB gZ i mwnZ wgZ c vl Y K wi qv wZ wb ej b h
qv` k msk vab A ek B msweavbi GK wU msk vabx wK , wZ wb
ej b h c k nBZ Q h D msk vabx msweavbi K vb basic structure
zbK wi qvQ wK bv A _ ev eZ gvb c vc U GB c wZ i c qvR bxqZ v
I i Z ybnBqvQ wK bvZ vnvB weeP|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h hw` I qv` k msk vabi
c i A bK w` b A wZ evwnZ nBqvQ wK myyI wbi c wbevPb, hvnv
GK wU MYc R vZ vw K i vi R b GK v A c wi nvh, Z vnv msweavb
i Y K i vGL bI c qvR b i wnqvQ|
Z e qv` k msk vab A vBb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
c avb wePvi c wZ I A bvb wePvi K MYi c avb Dc ` v wnmve
wbqvMi weavbi K vi Y R bMYi gb mevP A v` vj Z nBZ
^vaxb, bvh I wbi c wmv c ` vbi evc vi R bMYi gb
A vk vi D` K nBZ c vi |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q A vk v c K vk K i b h A vgi v
A vgv` i eVK L vbvq A vj vPbv K wi h K vb&c avb wePvi c wZ ev
wePvi c wZ whwb mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ nBeb wZ wb
wbi c f ve Z uvnvi ` vwqZ c vj b K wi Z Qb bv A _ ev K vb&
wePvi c wZ K vnvK A wZ g K wi Z Qb (Supersede) hvnvZ wZ wb mek l
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ nBqv wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi c avb
nBZ c vi b| GB ai bi A vk v me vP A v` vj Z i c wZ R bMYi
mvbeva zbK wi Z c vi | h mK j wePvi K MYi mek l c avb
34
wePvi c wZ nBevi mebv i wnqvQ Z uvnvi v nqZ v GB c ` i R b
GK evi B c f vweZ bb wK R bMYi gb GB A vk v memgq
_ vwK Z c vi h wePvi c wZ X gZ vk xb ` j i ^v_ msi Y
K wi Z Qb K vi Y wZ wb c avb wePvi c wZ Ges mvavi Y wbevPbi c ~e
mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ nBZ Pvnb| c K Z c Bnv
c Z xqgvb nq h A vc xj wef vMi GK R b R wePvi c wZ K A wZ g
K i v nBqvwQj Ges GK R b K wb wePvi K K c avb wePvi c wZ wbqvM
K i v nq| Bnv nqZ v m~Yf ve hvMZ vi wf w Z nBZ c vi wK
R bMY gb K i , h mi K vi gZ vq A vQ R bve X c avb Dc ` v
wnmve Z vnv` i c wi K bv md j K wi e, myZ i vs X hvnvi Dc i ` j xq
ew i c Z vnv` i A v v I wek vm i wnqvQ, wZ wb Y K A wZ g
(Supersede) K i b| R bMYi gb GB ai bi A vk v MnYhvM bq,
K vgI bq|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h Z e wb` j xq I Z veavqK
mi K vi i GL bI c qvR bxqZ v i wnqvQ, K vi Y gZ vk xj ` j ev
c avb wei vax` j mwVK c _ A vPi Y K wi Z Qb bv| K vbi c
mvbeva ewZ i K Z vnvi v c i i K mgvj vPbv K wi Z Qb| we
GvW&f vK U gnv` q A vk v c K vk K i b h Bnv A wZ k q c wi vi h
hw` mevP A v` vj Z qv` k msk vabK A ea Nvl Yv K i , Z vnv
nBj evsj v` k R vZ xqZ vev` x ` j wbevPb A sk MnY K wi e bv |
wZ wb A ek gb K i b h wePvi K ` i c avb Dc ` v ev Dc ` v
nI qvDwPr bq|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q G mK wbwj wL Z Pvi wU c ve
K i b t

(i) Before dissolution or expiry of Parliament, the party in power and the
opposition party in the Parliament shall nominate 3 or 5 persons each
whom they think are eligible to become Chief Adviser or Adviser of
the Non-party Caretaker Government.
(ii) Three retiring last Chief Justices of Bangladesh shall nominate one of
them from the panel of persons nominated as above to be the Chief
Adviser.
35
(iii) The Chief Adviser should then request the party in power and the
opposition party to suggest names from whom he can appoint
Advisers of the Non-party Caretaker Government. Both parties may
give 10 names each and from these 20 names the Chief Adviser shall
appoint the advisers of the Non-party Caretaker Government. May be
there are common names.
(iv) And it should be clearly stated that the Non-party Caretaker
Government shall complete the election of the Parliament within 90
days from the dissolution of Parliament. This is required to be
mentioned so that 1/11 is not repeated.

we GvW&f vK U gnv` q gb K i b h Dc i v f ve hw`
wb` j xq Z vavqK mi K vi MwVZ nq Z vnv nBj Z vnvi v R bMYi
c wZ wbwa bb ewj qv K n mgvj vPbv K wi Z c vwi e bv ( Z vnvi v
wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa bv nBj I wbevwPZ c wZ wbwaMY` vi v gbvbxZ ) | hw`
GB f ve me` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MwVZ nq Z e wZ wb gb K i b
h wePvi wef vM i vi k vmb ee v c wi Pvj bv K wi Z Q Ges/ A _ ev
Z vnvi v R bMYi c wZ wbwa bb, GB ai bi mgvj vPbv K wi evi myhvM
K gB _ vK | A vR I mvavi Y gvbyl gb K i , h mi K vi gZ vq
i wnqvQ Z vnv` i Z veavbi c wi eZ aygv wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi i Z veavb my I wbi c wbevPb A bywZ nBe|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q gb K i b h Bnv ` yf vMR bK | Bnv
A vZ A egvbbvK i | hw` I gZ vk xb` j 5( c vuP) er mi mi K vi
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z c vi , Bnv R vZ xq msm` i wbevPb A byvb K wi Z
c vi bv| A vgv` i ` k Ggb A e v h K vnvi I K vb A v v A c i i
Dc i bvB| wbR ` i ga mK j i B A wek vm| myZ i vs, Ggb GK wU
c _ evwni K wi Z nBe h hvnvZ wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee v
eR vq _ vK wK GK B m wePvi wef vMi mi vmwi m Z v Go vb
me, A b_ vq R bMYi gb wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v j Bqv c k
DwVZ c vi |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Z uvnvi wj wL Z e ei k l f vM
^xK vi K i b h wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi avi Yv A vgv` i
msweavbi g~j K vVvgv ev i mwnZ mvg mc ~Ybq| wK
36
c wi ewZ Z c wi w wZ Z evsj v` k A vBbi k vmb I MYZ i R b
Gi K g GK wU mi K vi mn K wi Z nq| mek l A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ i hnZ z evsj v` k i c avb Dc ` v nBevi K _ v wQj
aygv mB K vi Y 1/ 11 Gi mgq mi K vi i K gb A e v nBqvwQj
Z vnv mK j B R vb| f wel Z GB i c NUbv A vevi I NUzK Z vnv
K nB Pvnbv| mK j B myy I wbi c wbevPb Pvq hvnv ewZ Z
MYZ c wZ v me bq| wZ wb ej b h Bnv A vgv` i Dc j w h
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi A vgv` i A ek c qvR bxq wK Bnv Ggb
f ve c ybMVb c qvR b hvnvZ i vi c k vmb wePvi wef vMi mi vmwi
m Z v_ vwK e bv|
( 4) W. Gg.R nxi , wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, gnv` q ej b
h evsj v` k ewZ Z c w_ exi K v_ vI A wbevwPZ Z veavqK mi K vi i
avi Yv c vI qv hvq bv| A tZ wZ b gvm GK R b A wbevwPZ ewI Z _ v
mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ whwb msweavbi A vj vK A emi
wMqvQb, wZ wb ` k c wi Pvj bv K wi eb| GB avi YvwU A vgv` i mK j
i vR bxwZ we` ` i Ges wbevwPZ mi K vi i mZ Z vi Dc i K vwj gv j c b
K wi qvQ| Z I veavqK mi K vi c wZ GB avi YvB c ` vb K i h, mK j
i vR bwZ K ` j B A mvayGes Z vnv` i Dc i GK wU wbi c wbevPb
c wi Pvj bv K wi evi wbwg A v nv i vL v hvq bv| ^xK Z gZ B hw`
A mZ Z vi A R ynvZ GK wU A eva wbi c wbevPb c wi Pvj bvi R b
Z vnv` i Dc i A v nv i vL v mf e bv nq Z vnv nBj ` k c wi Pvj bvi
R b wK f ve Z vnv` i Dc i A v nvi vL vhvq ? c w_ exi K v_ vI wbevPb
c m i vR bwZ K ` i c wZ A mZ Z vi Ges A wek Z Z vi Ggb mi j
^xK vi vwI A vi bvB| i vR bwZ K MY Ges ` j wj A mr Ges wbevPbi
mgq Z vnvw` MK gZ vi k xl i vL v hvq bv- Bnv awi qv j I qv
A hwI K |
msweavbi 7 A byQ` wU g~j touchstone| BnvZ ej v nBqvQ h,
msweavb R bMYi A vk v A vK vsL vi ewntc K vk Ges Z vnvi vB
c R vZ i mK j gZ vi gvwj K | GB A v` vj Z i wewf bi vq vi v
37
A vBb I msweavbi wewf bweavbK evwZ j K wi qv GB A byQ`
myc wZ wZ K i vnBqvQ|
wb` j xq Z I veavqK mi K vi ms v weavbmg~n, Chapter IIA Ges
141( K ) , ( L ) I ( M) A byQ` GK wU wec ` bK mwbek hvnv
MYZ Ges A vBbi k vmbK Z I veavqK mi K vi vi v A wbw` K vj i
R b wePzZ K wi qv d wj Z c vi | Bnvi A wf Z v mvwZ K A Z xZ
2007- 08 mvj nBqvQ| MYZ i GB wePzwZ msweavbi qv` k
msk vabxi c Z d j | hw` K vb e nr i vR bwZ K ` j gb K i h
K vb wbw` A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ c vwUR vb Ges GB A R ynvZ
wbevPb eqK U K wi qv em, Z e GB mgmv wbi mbi Dc vq K x? Ggb
wK c i eZ x c avb wePvi c wZ K I GB A vc w i myL xb nBevi A vk sK v
_ vK |
A b` k , wek l Z t c wZ ek x f vi Z wbevPb K wgk bK
k w k vj x I ^vaxbf ve Mwo qv Z vj v nBqvQ Ges mL vb wbi c
ew eMK wbevPb K wgk b MVb evwQqv j I qv nq| A vgv` i eZ gvb
wbevPb K wgk b K ej 2008 mvj i mvavi Y wbevPbB mbK i bvB
vbxq wbevPb mg~nI c wi Pvj bv K wi qvQ hvnvi vi v K wgk b ^QZ v I
wbi c Z v c gvY m g nBqvQ| hw` I wbR c v_ x c i vwR Z nBevi
A R ynvZ K wgk b Df q enr ` j K Z K Xvj vI f ve mgvj vwPZ
nBqvQ| Bnv wbi c Z vi GK wU c K Z wb` k b| Bnv wbw Z h
A vgi v GL bI f vi Z i bvq gR eyZ MYZ I A vBbi k vmb c wZ vq
m g nB bvB| A vgv` i ` k mK j wK QyGZ UvB i vR bxwZ K i Y K i v
nBqvQ h c avb wePvi c wZ K i vR bxwZ i I weZ K i Di vL vi
avi YvwUI c wi Z vM K i v nBqvQ| evsj v` k i c Z K wU bvMwi K i B
wbR ^i vR bwZ K gZ i wnqvQ Ges i vR bxwZ i R MZ i c uvwPj i Df q
c vk i ew MY wek vm K i b h c avbwePvi c wZ mn c Z K B GK B
gvbwmK Z vc vl Y K i b A _ vr i vR bwZ K c c vZ ` vl ` y|
msweavbi 58 O A byQ` c ` gZ v ej i vc wZ R i i x
A e v Nvl Yv K wi Z c vi b- Bnvi R b c avbg xi c wZ ^v i i
38
c qvR b nq bv| hvnvi d j 1/ 11 mw nq| 1/ 11 Gi d j mve
i vb Gi nvZ nBZ ` k i v c vBqvQ Ges wbevPbx f ~wgK vI
h_ vh_ wQj | Z _ vwc Bnv c gvY nBqvQ h, qv` k msk vavbxi
A c eenvi K vb Z Z xqc K wi Z c vi Ges Z vnvi v A wbw` K vj i
R b gZ vA uvK o vBqv_ vwK Z I c vi |
GL vb 1/ 11 ewj Z we GvW&f vK U gnv` q 2007 mvj i
11B R vbyqvi x Z vwi L Nvwl Z R i i x A e nv Ges Z r c i eZ x c vq ` yB
er mi k vmbK vj eyS vBqvQb|
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ R bgb wePvi wef vMi
f veg~w K wZ M K wi Z c vi ; mi K vi i c A v` vj Z nBZ
K vb i vq nBj GK ai bi mgvj vPbv nBZ c vi | Bnv A vgv` i K
R b i Z mbA vi K wU c k i myL xb K i - GB c wZ P er mi
awi qv Pwj qv A vwmZ Q Ges K vb i vR bwZ K ` j B wbevPb A c i
` j i mvavi Y wbevPb c f vweZ bv K i vi wel q A v vk xj bq- Ggb
GK wU c wi w wZ Z GB A v` vj Z hw` qv` k msk vabx evwZ j K wi qv
` q Z vnv nBj wK nBe? msweavb ewYZ MYZ i gZ gwj K
K vVvgvi mwnZ A mvg m weavb mg~n evwZ j K wi evi gZ v GB
A v` vj Z i i wnqvQ| wK A vBb c Yqb ev msweavb K vb wK Qy
mshvR bi gZ v bvB| GB i xU&wc wUk bwU hL b ` vqi K i v nq
Z L bI 1/ 11 NUbvwU NU bvB| wK GB i xU&wc wUk b h A vk sK v
e K i v nBqvQ Z vnv c i eZ x NUbvi vi v hw K c gvY nq| 1/ 11
Gi K zk xj eMY ` yB er mi i I A waK mgq awi qv gZ vq wQj hvnv
Z vnv` i K i v DwPZ nq bvB | we GvW&f vK U gnv` q A vk sK v
c K vk K i b h, c i eZ x 1/ 11 wf bPwi j Bqv A vi v ` xNmgqi
R b A vwmZ c vi | A ek B MYZ msi Yi GK UvB Dc vq A vi
Z vnv nBj R bMYi MYZ vw K eva- hgbwU i wnqvQ c w gv
` k wj Z evf vi Z |
GB A e v nBZ D i Yi GK gv Dc vq nBj ^Z Z _ v c _ K
evR U m^wj Z GK wU k w k vj x wbevPb K wgk b| i vR bxwZ we` ,
39
mi K vwi A vgj v Ges wePvi K e` K wbR wbR ` j gZ Ges ew
i vR bwZ K c Q` i D _ vwK qv K vR K wi Z nBe| hvBnvK ,
GK R b A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ nqZ v ev wZ b gvmi R b
mi K vi c wi Pvj bv K wi j - wZ wb A _ ev Z uvnvi K vb Dc ` v wK mgM
` k wbevPb K wgk bi K gK vi Dc i n c K wi Z c vi b?
c avb Dc ` vi bZ Z MwVZ Z veavqK mi K vi ` k K ev ` nxb
evNewZ Z wK QyB bn| wbevPb K wgk b Ges Z vi K gK Z ve` wbevPb
c w qv c wi Pvj bv K wi eb| A wbevwPZ Z veavqK mi K vi wZ b gvmi
ga GK wU myzwbevPb mbK wi eb Bnv GK wU A c wi c avi Yv
eU|
GB A vgi v ej wR qvgi ` v j K wi Z c vwi |
mL vb GK wU Z veavqK mi K vi 270 w` bi ek x mgq awi qv
gZ vq wQj | A ek l i vR bxwZ K MYK GK wU mi K vi i wel q
GK gZ K wi evi R b m` k i R bMY i v vq bvwgqv A vwmqvwQj |
K Z K A c Pwj Z c wZ Z Z vnvi v c wZ ev` I c Pvi bv Pvj vBevi K k j
MnY K wi qvwQj |
A wj qvi Z veavqK mi K vi ewj Z Mf Yi K Z K c vj vgU
f vwqv w` evi c i nBZ mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb c h mi K vi K
eyS vBqv _ vK | wbevPbi c i I ^ mgqi R b, hZ Y c h
c i eZ x g xmf v wbhy bv nBe GB mi K vi gZ vq _ vwK Z c vi |
mB ` k K vb c _ K Z veavqK mi K vi wbhyw i c qvR b nq bv|
we` gvb mi K vi B wbQK Caretaker mode G Pwj qv hvq| 1975 mvj
A wj qvi mvsweavwbK msK UK vj Mf Yi R bvi j mvi R b K i
GK wU Z veavqK mi K vi gvj K g d R vi i bZ Z MVb K wi qv
` b| k Z wQj h A wej ^mvavi Y wbevPbi Nvl Yv ` I qv nBe
Ges GB mi K vi wU Z veavqK wnmve K vR K wi e| c wi w wZ A bymvi
BnvwQj GK wU Pgr K vi mgvavb|
Guidance on Caretaker Conventions k xl K GK wU ` wj j vi v g x
c wi l ` i ` i nBZ Bnv c wi Pvwj Z nBqv _ vK | GB Z I veavqK i
40
weavbvej x mywbw f ve ewj qv w` Z Q h, msm` f vwqv hvBevi c i
mi K vi i K vhGg A ek B Pvj vBqv hvBZ nBe Ges ` bw` b
c k vmwbK wel q wj A ek B aZ ei ga A vwbZ nBe| hvBnvK ,
Z I veavqK ms v i I qvR Z I veavqK mi K vi i Dc i K Z K
wewawbl a A vi vc K i | D` vni Y ^i c ej v hvq h, R i i x wel q
eZ xZ mi K vi wU K vb i Z i bxwZ wbavi Yx wel q wmv MnY K wi Z
c vwi e bv| mi K vi x K vb DPc ` wbqvM c ` vb K wi e bv| K vb
c K vi eo i K gi PzwI Z A ve nBe bv ev c wZ k wZ e nBe bv;
mK j c K vi A v R vwZ K mgS vZ vgqv` v i R b wc QvBqvw` e|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q wbe` b K i b h, wb` j xq
Z I veavqK mi K vi i c wZ wU msm` xq MYZ vw K mi K vi i wei
hvq| wbevwPZ mi K vi i vi vB ` k c wi Pvj bv K i v msGv R vwZ i
c Z vk vK B K ej GB qv` k msk vabx A K vhK i x K i bv- wePvi
wef vMK I weZ K R o vBqv d j | mi K vi K Z K wbevPb c wi Pvj bvq
A c eenvi Go vBevi R b Z vunvi my c c Z ve nBj - GK wU
A vPi Ywewamn A wj qv Ges c w gv ` k mg~ni bvq Z I veavqK
mi K vi evsj v` k I c eZ b K i v hvBZ c vi | GB i K g wbQK
` bw` b K vhvej x c wi Pvj bvi weavb A ek qv` k msk vabxZ I
wQj | wbevPb K wgk bK mevZ K gZ v c ` vb Ges Bj K UwbK
f vUvi Z vwj K v c Z zZ K wi evi R b we GvWf vK U gnv` q gZ
c ` vb K i b|
( 5) R bve Gg A vwgi - Dj Bmj vg, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U,
c _ gB msweavb c g msk vab gvK v gv Gi c m D vc b K wi qv
ej b h D i vqi c w Z msweavbi K vb weavb c wi eZ b
MYf vUi A vi c qvR b bvB|
Z r c i we GvW&f vK U&gnv` q msweavb c vebvi c vi i
c wZ ` w A vK l b K wi qv ej b h msweavbwU R bMYi msweavb Ges
GB evsj v` k i vi gvwj K evsj v` k i R bMY|
41
wZ wb ej b h GK wU myzwbevPb A byvbi R b GK wU mwVK
f vUvi Z vwj K v c qvR b nq wK b 2006 mvj wbevPb K wgk b f vUvi
Z vwj K v mwVK f ve nvj bvMv` K wi Z m~Ye_ nq, ei f vUvi
Z vwj K v A msL f zqv f vUvi c wi c ~YwQj | BwZ ga Z ` vbx b
gnvgvb i vc wZ Z vunvi mvsweavwbK A e nvb I ` vwqZ - K Z e wemZ
nBqv wbR B c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY K i b| Z vunvi D c ` c
nvBK vUwef vM Pvj K i v nq| wK c avb wePvi c wZ Z vnv nwMZ
K i b|
wZ wb wePvi c wZ Holmes K DZ K wi qv ej b h The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience|
wZ wb msweavb m^ ej b h Bnv GK wU Social contract| Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Gi Nvl Yvi c wZ ` w A vK l Y c ~eK
wZ wb ej b h c Z K wU bvMwi K i wbR i mi K vi c Q` K wi evi
A waK vi i wnqvQ| 1971 mvj i 10B Gwc j i Proclamation of
Independence GB A waK vi i Dc i wf w K wi qvB Nvwl Z nBqvwQj | GB
mveR bxb f vUvwaK vi A eva I wbi c wbevPbi Dc i wbf i k xj |
GB A eva I wbi c wbevPbI msweavbi GK wU basic structure |
we GvW&f vK U&gnv` q A Z tc i i vR bwZ K bvq wePvi i
K _ v ej b| wZ wb ej b h i vR bwZ K bvq wePvi i R bB A eva I
wbi c wbevPb c qvR b| f vUvi Z vwj K vq bvg DVvbv GK wU
bvMwi K A waK vi |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Anwar Hossain V. Bangladesh gvK v gvi
i vqi c wZ ` w A vK l bc ~eK ej b h evsj v` k i v GK wU
MYc R vZ vw K i v| G c m wZ wb msweavbi c vebv, 8 I 11
A byQ` i c wZ ` w A vK l Y K i b|
wZ wb i vR bwZ K e_ Z vi K vi Y wnmve A vBbi k vmbi
A byc w wZ K B ` vqxK i b|
wZ wb ej b h A bK ` k B wbevPb K vj xb mgqi R b
A eZ xK vj xb mi K vi i wnqvQ hvnv c wZ wbwaZ k xj mi K vi bq| H
42
mK j ` k wbevwPZ m` mMYB DI A eZ xK vj xb mi K vi _ vK b
eU wK H mgqi R b wbevwPZ msm` m` m wnmve mi K vi
c wi Pvj bv K i bbv,Z vnvi v Z vnv` i wbevwPZ hvMZ v ev ewk
c wi Z vM K i Z t A eZ xK vj xb mi K vi i m` m wnmve H
wbevPbK vj xb mgqi R b mi K vi c wi Pvj bvK i b|
wbevPbi c ~emek l c avb wePvi c wZ i c avb Dc ` v c `
wbqvM c m wZ wb wePvi wef vMi f veg~wZ h zbnBZ c vi Z vnv
A ^xK vi K wi Z c vi b bvB|
gv i v Dc - wbevPb mK we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h
wbevPb K wgk b A vBbi k vmb A bymi Y K wi Z e_ nBqvwQj | c avb
wbevPb K wgk bvi GgbwK gv i v nBZ Pwj qv A vwmZ eva
nBqvwQj b| 1996 mvj i 15B d eqvi x Z vwi L A bywZ l R vZ xq
msm` i wbevPb GK wU gv i vR bwZ K ` j A sk MnY K wi qvwQj |
GB K vi YB R bMY wb` j xq Z Z veavqK mi K vi i R b msMvg
K wi qvwQj Ges GB msMvg wQj c K Z c MYc R vZ vw K mi K vi
c ~btc wZ vi j | wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i gvag wbevPb
K i Z t MYc R vZ vw K mi K vi c wZ vme nBqvwQj |
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q Dj L K i b h myz, A eva I
wbi c wbevPbi gvagB gvbyl f vUvwaK vi wd wi qv c vBZ c vi I
c K Z MYZ c wZ wZ nBe Ges msweavbi 7 A byQ` Gi D k
md j nBe|
wZ wb A vi I ej b h GK wU wbi c mi K vi ewZ i K ` k i
A vgj vZ K mwVK c _ c wi Pvj bvK i vme bq|
Dc msnvi wZ wb ej b h eZ gvb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
ee vq h mg d uvK d vK i i wnqvQ Z vnv ` ~wi f ~Z K wi evi c qvR b
i wnqvQ|
wZ wb gb K i b h MYZ i ^v_ GL bI Z veavqK mi K vi i
c qvR b i wnqvQ Ges Z wK Z msweavb qv` k msk vab A vBbwU
ea|
43
wK 2007 I 2008 mvj i Z veavqK mi K vi ewZ i K I 3
( wZ b) gvmi R b Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` K vj xb mgq evsj v` k
MYZ vw K I c R vZ vw K i vee v _ vK wK bv GB c k wZ wb Go vBqv
hvb|
( 6) gvngy` yj Bmj vg, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, gnv` q wbe` b
K i b h, qv` k msk vabxwU msweavbi Pvi wU gwj K ewk i
mwnZ Z _ v c R vZ vw K ewk , MYZ Ges wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vi
mwnZ A mvg mc ~Y(ultra vires) ggPvj K i vnBqvQ|
wZ wb wbe` b K i b h c k D vc b K i v nBqvQ h, eaf ve
MwVZ bv nI qvi ` i Y K L bB wei vax` j K Z K MnYhvM nq bvB
Ggb GK wU ^ vqymsm` ( l R vZ xq msm` ) vi v c vmK Z msweavbi
GBi c msk vabx wK f ve ea wnmve weewPZ nBZ c vi ? c _ g
w` K A ek msweavbi 142( 1K ) A byQ` ewYZ MYf vU Gi weavb
j swNZ nI qvi wel qwU Pvj K i v nBqvwQj | MYf vU A byvbi
c mwUi msw R eve nBj - GB weavbwU mvgwi K A vBbi d i gvb
ej A vbqb K i v nq Ges msm` K Z K msweavbi c g msk vabxi
gvag eaZ v ` vb K i v nq; wK D c g msk vabxwU msweavbi
mwnZ ultra vires Z _ v A mvg mc ~YNvwl Z nBevi c i 142( 1K )
A byQ` wUi A emvb NU Ges MYf vU A bywZ bv K i vi A R ynvZ
msweavbi K vb msk vabxK GL b A vi A K vhK i x ewj evi myhvM
bvB| l R vZ xq msm` i K vhK vwi Z v mK ej v hvq h, ` k i
mK j i vR bwZ K ` j l R vZ xq msm` K Z K c vmK Z qv` k
msk vabx MnY K wi qvQ; Bnvi weavbi A bymi Y GK vwa g A bywZ
wZ bwU mvavi Y wbevPb ` k i R bMY A sk MnY K wi qvQ| myZ i vs l
R vZ xq msm` i hvMZ v ev K vhK wi Z v c m c k D vc b K i v
evZ zj Z vgv |
c R vZ vw K ewk ( c K wZ ) m^ wZ wb c k D vc b K wi qvQb
h, weePbvaxb msk vabxwU vi v msweavb ev i vi c R vZ vw K
Pwi i K vbi c evZ q NwUqvQ wK bv| hL b i vc avbi c ` wU
44
i vR K xq D i vwaK vi m~ wbavwi Z nq Z L b BnvK i vR Z ej | hw`
GB i vR v megq gZ vi A waK vi x mvef g bvI nBqv _ vK b - K ej
bvg gv i vR v nBqv _ vK b Z _ vwc BnvK i vR Z B ej v nBqv _ vK |
MU weUb, A wj qv, K vbvWv, wbDwR j v GB k Yxi gaB MY
nBqv _ vK - hw` I GB mK j i v wj MYZ vw K | A vgv` i
msweavbi 48 ( 1) A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ nBj b i vc avb| wZ wb
R vZ xq msm` R bMY K Z K wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa` i vi v wbevwPZ nBqv
_ vK b| qv` k msk vabx vi v 48 ( 1) A byQ` i K vbi c c wi eZ b
NUvbv nq bvB| i vc wZ i c ` wU GL bI R bc wZ wbwa` i vi v c ~i Y
nBqv _ vK Ges msweavbi c R vZ vw K ewk qv` k msk vab
hvnvwK Qz_ vK zK bvK b Bnvi vi v zbnq bvB|

MYZ vw K ewk c m we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h
MYZ GK wU A Ges A w wZ vc K avi Yv| Bnvi c K wZ ev eZ v
A bymvi Z vi Z g NwUqv _ vK | GgbwK K wgDwb i vwk qvI ` vex K wi Z
h Z vnvi v c K Z MYZ i avi K | A vgi v Bnvi ej c Pwj Z A _ B
ewj Z c vwi - R bMYi vi v, R bMYi R b I R bMYi MwVZ
mi K vi B MYZ | hvnv me nBqvwQj c Pxb bMi i vmg~n - hL vb
mK j bvMwi K MY GK wU wbw vb GK w Z nBqv i vR bwZ K wmv
mg~n MnY K wi Z | eZ gvb wek i z` Z g i vI GB ai Yi c Z
A sk MnYi gvag i v c wi Pvj bv me bn| Z ` j R bMYi
wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa` i vi vi vc wi Pvj bvi c wZ vb K wi qvj BqvQ|
A vgv` i msweavbi mg ( 7) I GK v` k ( 11) A byQ`
R bc wZ wbwa` i vi v c wZ wbwaZ g~j K mi K vi Gi wb` k bv c ` vb
K i | A vc xj K vi xi A wf hvM nBj - qv` k msk vabxi weavb
A bymvi c uvP er mi A i hZ K g mgqi R bB nDK bv K b GK evi
` k i mi K vi c wi Pvj bvi f vi R bc wZ wbwa bn Ggb ew eMi
nvZ Pwj qv hvq - hvnv msweavbi gwj K K vVvgvi MYZ vw K Z vK
evnZ K wi qv _ vK | Bnv j Yxq h MYZ i wbR ^mxgveZ v
i wnqvQ| MYZ i A f i B Bnvi wbR ^webvk i exR enb
45
K wi Z Q| GB wel q mevr K D` nvi YwU nBj Z Z xq R vgvb
wi c vewj K i gvag wnUj vi i D vbc e| Pareto, Mitchel Ges Moscai
gZ wZ bR b c L vZ i vR bwZ K ` vk wbK K Vvi f ve MYZ i GB
wU wj Z zwj qv ai b| hvnvi c wi YwZ Z BUvj xZ d vmxev` i D vb
nBqvQ| GK wU c _ K c _ A vgv` i c R vZ I MYZ asmi
c w qv Pwj Z Q| A eva I wbi c wbevPbi gvag wbevwPZ
R bc wZ wbwa` i vi v MYZ c wZ v K i v me| wK gZ vmxb ` j i
wbevPb K vi Pzwc ewZ gi c wi eZ wbqg c wi YZ nq| gv i v Dc -
wbevPb K vi Pzwc i mevwbK ` v nBqv i wnqvQ| c wZ ev`
gZ vmxb ` j ewZ Z i vR bwZ K ` j mg~n i vR c _ A e vb
j BqvwQj b| A vBb- k L j v c wi w wZ i gvi vZ K A ebwZ NwUqvwQj |
R bR xeb wei nBqv c wo qvwQj | BZ vga R vZ xq msm` i gqv`
k l nBqv A vm Ges weGbwc ewZ Z g~j i vR bwZ K ` j wj i
A sk MnY Qvo vB GK wU wbevPb A bywZ nq| ` xN` i K l vK wl i c i
GK wU i vR bwZ K H K gZ c wZ wZ nq - hvnvi d j nBj msweavbi
qv` k msk vabx Ges gvUvgywU MnYhvM wbevPbi gvag mg
R vZ xq msm` MwVZ nq| GB K mva c qvm K ej MYZ K i v
K wi evi R b MnY K i v nBqvwQj | Bnv mZ h qv` k msk vabxi
weavb vi v mi K vi R bc wZ wbwaZ ^ mgqi R b wMZ _ vK ; Z e
Bnv ` k MYZ PPvi c _ K myMg K i | mvgvwR K we vb meK vj i
- me vbi mec K vi i vR bwZ K mgmv wbi mbi R b K vb vqx
mgvavb bvB| MU weUb hvnv c qvM K wi qv myd j c vI qv wMqvQ
Z vnvevsj v` k i R b c hvR bn|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` qi gZ evsj v` k i R bMbi eZ gvb
i vR bwZ K c wi c Z v A byhvqx ` k i I msweavbi MYZ vw K ewk
msi Yi wbwg Z veavqK mi K vi i A axb wbevPb A byvbi K vb
weK bvB| MYZ K euvPvBqv i vwL evi R b bv nq ^ mgqi R b
MYZ vw K ee v wMZ B i vL vnBj |
46
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v c m we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b
h, wePvi wef vMxq ^vaxbZ v vi v A vgi v c K Z c wK eyS vBZ wQ
Z vnvi Dc i wbf i K wi qv ewj Z nq h msweavb Ggb A bK wel q
i wnqvQ hvnvi vi v wePvi wef vMxq ^vaxbZ v L eK i v nBqvQ| Bnv
ej v hvq h wbevnx wef vM K Z K wePvi K wbqvMi weavb wePvi
wef vMxq ^vaxbZ v L eK wi qvQ| ej v nBqv _ vK h msm` K Z K
c YxZ A v` vj Z i K vhwewa c K Z bvqwePvi c wZ vq wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vK L eK wi qvQ| wK Jurisprudence Gi ` wK vY nBZ wePvi
wef vMxq ^vaxbZ vi mywbw A _ i wnqvQ| Secretary of Ministry of Finance
V. Masdar Hossain 2000 BLD(AD) 104 gvK gvq GB A v` vj Z ( hL b
qv` k msk vabx envj wQj ) c he Y c ` vb K i b h, msweavbi
K vb weavbB DP A v` vj Z i wePvi K MYi ^vaxbZ vK L eK i bv
Ges GB Z wK Z msk vabxwUZ K ej DP A v` vj Z i wePvi K MYB
mswk |
msweavb Ggb wK QzB bvB hvnvi wf w Z ej v hvBZ c vi h
myc xg K vUi wePvwi K K vhc i v n Z c K wi evi myhvM A vQ|
A waK , myc xg R ywWwmqvj K vDw j Gi vi v myc xg K vUi
wePvi K MYi K vhK vj wbw Z K wi qvQb| A vc xj K vi xc nBZ GB
hyw c ` k b K wi Z c vi b h, c avb Dc ` vi c ` wU myc xgK vUi
wePvi K MYi R b S zj g~j v ^i c wbi c wePvi evnZ K wi evi
K vi Y nBZ c vi | wK BnvK GK R b wePvi K i wePvi K vhi
n Z c wnmve weePbv K i v hvBe bv ev BnvZ Z vnvi PvK zwi i
myweav K Z b ev A b K vbf ve Z vnvi K gK vj enZ K i v hvBe bv|
Bnv gb i vL v DwPZ h wePvi K MY f qf xwZ ev c f ve ev c xwZ ev
wel Gi E a_ vwK qv R b ^v_ wVK K vR wU K wi evi R b k c _ MnY
K wi qvQb| K vb wePvi K hw` mi K vi wei vM nBe Ges Z vnvK
A emi hvBevi c i c avb Dc ` v wnmve wbqvM c ` vb K wi e bv
GB wP vq h_ vh_ i vq ` vb nBZ wei Z _ vK b Z vnv nBj wZ wb k c _
f K wi eb; Z e Bnv ej v hvBe bv h Z vnvK K n bvqwePvi evav
47
w` qvQ| myc xgK vUi GK R b wePvi K K A vevwmK c U ei v K wi evi
GL wZ qvi wbevnx wef vMi | Bnv ej v hvBe bv h H GL wZ qvi i
K vi Y wePvi K MYi wePvi K vhc f ve d wj e| A vgi v GB c hvq
` wL e h, wbevnx wef vM ev mi K vi i A vBb wef vM vi v K vbi c
c f ve Qvo vB wePvi K MY ^vaxbf ve wePvwi K K gmv` b K wi Z Qb
wK bv| qv` k msk vabxi A vj vK GB c k i D i A ek B
bwZ evPK |

mvc wZ K A Z xZ msweavb A bymvi Z veavqK mi K vi MVb
c w qvi A c eenvi K i v nBqvQ| wK wK Qz A vBbi A c eenvi i
K vi Y K L bB A vBbwU eA vBbx nBqv hvq bv| D A c eenvi i va
K wi evi R b c qvR bxq ee vMnY K wi j B nq|

( 7) | R bve i vK b Dw b gvngy` , wmwbqi
GvW&f vK U, GK wU mZ K evYx DPvi b K i Z t Z vunvi eI e A vi
K i b GB ewj qv h Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBbwU
A veMewR Z f ve weePbvK wi Z nBe|
wZ wb ej b h Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBbwU c qvMi c ~e
1973 mvj nBZ h i vR bwZ K ` j gZ vq _ vK b Z vnvi v K L bI
wbevPb nvi b bvB, Ggb wK Dc - wbevPbI K vi Pzwc nq, hgb gv i v
Dc - wbevPb|
2004 mvj GK wU wek l D k msweavb msk vab K i Z t
myc xg K vUi wePvi K MYi A emi MnYi eqm ew K i v nq| c avb
Dc ` v c ` wbqvMi R b A vc xj wef vMi A emi c v wePvi K MYi
m~L GK wU gyj vS zj vBqvi vL vnq|
^xK Z gZ B wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v msweavbi GK wU basic
structure | c k nBZ Q h Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBbwU wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ vK K vb f ve zbK i wK bv|
A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMY, K _ v wj msweavbi 7 A byQ` i
mwnZ c wo Z nBe| msweavb evsj v` k i mevP A vBb K vi Y Bnv
48
evsj v` k i R bMYi BQv ( will) K c ~wUZ K i | myc xg K vUB
msweavbi k Z avi Y K i K vi Y myc xg K vUB msweavbi
A wf f veK | msweavbi 102 A byQ` myc xg K vUi nvBK vUwef vMi
Dc i K wZ c q A v` k I wb` k c ` vbi gZ vA c b K i |
msweavbB MYZ wK f ve A byk xwj Z nBe Z vnv eYbv K i v
nBqvQ| wbevPbi gvavg R bMY Z vnv` i c wZ wbwa wbavi Y K i b|
gw mf vR vZ xq msm` K c wZ wbwaZ K i |
R vZ xq msm` A _ - A vBbmn mK j c K vi A vBb c Yqb K i |
R vZ xq msm` 142 A byQ` i A axb 11 A byQ` I gwj K A waK vi
ewZ Z msweavbi h K vb msk vab K wi Z gZ vc v|
Anwar Hossain V. Bangladesh (A g msweavb msk vab) gvK v gvq
msweavbi basic structure c wi eZ b ev msk vab K i v hvq bv ewj qv myc xg
K vUi A vc xj wef vM Nvl Yv K i | msweavbi A wf f veK weavq
myc xg K vUmsm` K Z K c YxZ A vBbi eaZ v/ A eaZ v Nvl Yv
K wi Z c vi |
i vc wZ myc xg K vUi wePvi K wbqvM ` vb K wi qv _ vK b wK
myc xg K vUi Dc i wbevnx wef vMi A vi K vb wbq Y _ vK bv|
aygv A m` vPi Yi R b wePvi K MYK A c mvi Y K i vhvBZ c vi |
myc xg K vUi Judicial Review Gi gZ v i wnqvQ| K vb msm`
m` mi A hvMZ vi c k DwVj xK vi gnv` q wel qwU wbevPb
K wgk bi wbK U c i Y K i b| wbevPb K wgk b bvbx A Z vnv` i
gZ vgZ xK vi gnv` qi wbK U c i Y K i b| GB gZ vgZ I myc xg
K vUPvj K i vhvq|
c avb wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn&g` A vqx i vc wZ c ` wbqvM
c v nBqv i vi wbevnx c avb nBqvwQj b wK K nB Z uvnvi
wbi c Z vm^ c k D vc b K i bvB|
c avb Dc ` v c ` c avb wePvi c wZ i wbqvM c m wZ wb ej b
h i vR bwZ K ` j wj i wbK U c avb wePvi c wZ ewZ i K A b K vb
ew MnYhvM wQj bv| Bnv mev g mgvavb bv nBj I A vi K vb
49
c ve mK j i vR bwZ K ` j i wbK U MnYhvM wQj bv| H mgq
c avb wePvi c wZ B GK gv A vk vi A vj vwQj b|
c avb wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn&g` A vqx i vc wZ wQj b,
Z r c i c ybi vq c avb wePvi c wZ c ` c Z veZ b K i b wK Z vnvZ
myc xg K vUi ` vwqZ c vj b Z uvnvi K vb mgmvnq bvB|
myc xg K vUi wePvi K MYi eqm ewVK mgq ewVK Dc vq
ew K i v nBqvwQj , A ek Z ` vbx b we` vqx c avb wePvi c wZ R bve
K , Gg, nvmvb 2006 mvj i k l w` K c avb Dc ` v nBZ Z uvnvi
A c i vMZ vc K vk K i b|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h hL vb K gi Z wePvi K MYI
wewf bai bi Z ` K wi Z m g mL vb GK R b A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ i c avb Dc ` v nBZ evav K v_ vq| 1996 mvj i
d eqvi x gvmi wbevPb c i eZ x NUbvej x eYbv K wi qv we
GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h hZ R wUj Z vB _ vK zK bv K b GB mgq
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ewZ Z A vi K vb MnYhvM mgvavb wQj
bv|
hy i vR Parliament f vwOqv Mj convention A bymvi wbevPbi c i
b~Z b c avbg x hvM` vb bv K i v c h c ~eZ b c avbg x Queen Gi
A byi va mi K vi c wi Pvj bv K i b | wK H A wZ wi mgq wZ wb
A wbevwPZ B _ vK b|
c avbg x c ` Z vM K wi j ev ^ xq c ` envj bv _ vwK j g xMY
c ` Z vM K wi qvQb ewj qv MY nBj I 58 ( 4) A byQ` A bymvi
Z uvnv` i D i vwaK vi xMY K vhf vi MnY bv K i v c h Z uvnvi v ^ ^c `
envj _ vwK eb| BnvZ hw` MYZ j L b bv nq Z vnv nBj 58 L
A byQ` vi vMYZ j L b nBZ c vi bv|

mveR bxb f vUvwaK vi gvi d r msm` 300 m` m wbevPb
MYZ i wf w | msweavbi 7( 2) A byQ` MYZ wbw Z K wi qvQ
Ges 11 A byQ` MYZ i ai Y eYbv K wi qvQ| 59 I 60 A byQ`
50
vbxq mi K vi mw K wi qvQ| R vZ xq msm` f vwOqv hvBevi mv_ mv_
c avbg xI msm` m` mMYi Mandate Gi mgvw nq|

msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi D k nBj
K vi Pzwc nxb A eva I myzwbevPb A byvb|

wbevPb K wgk b gv i v Dc - wbevPbi K vi Pzwc e K wi Z c vi
bvB| 1996 mvj i d eqvi x gvm A bywZ wbevPb f vU K vi Pzwc
nBqvwQj | msweavbi A axb wbevPb K wgk bi wbhyw mwVK f ve
nBj I i vR bwZ K ` j wj i c f ve Bnv f vj f ve I A vBbvbyMf ve
` vwqZ c vj b K wi Z c vi bv|

we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h Z wK Z msweavb msk vab
A vBb evwZ j K wi j I 2006 mvj i k l f vMi Pi g mU Go vb
me nBZ bv| c K Z c GB ai bi mU Go vBevi R bB l
R vZ xq msm` i wbevPbi c i Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBb c Yqb
K i v nq| Z vnvi c i I mU K vwUZ Q bv| mek l c avb wePvi c wZ
GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j i wbK U MnYhvM bvI nBZ c vi , A vevi ,
Z vnvi c ~eeZ xc avb wePvi c wZ A b i vR bwZ K ` j i wbK U MnYhvM
nBe bv| mgmvPwj Z B _ vwK e|

( 8 ) A vR gvj yj nvmb, wmwbqi GvWf vK U, gnv` q
ej b h, qv` k msk vabxi gvU wZ bwU g~j wel qK Pvj K wi qv
GB A vc xj wU A vbvqb K i v nBqvQ| A bf ve ej v hvq qv` k
msk vabx msweavbi wZ bwU gwj K wel qK web K wi qv w` qvQ|
GB wj nBZ Qt MYZ , c R vZ vw K ewk Ges wePvi wef vMxq
^vaxbZ v| msweavbi gwj K K vVvgvi mvwnZ Z wK Z msk vabxwU
GB K vi b mvsNwl K |
nvBK vUwef vM A vi K wU hy wI Z zwj qv ai v nBqvQ h,
msweavbi 142 A byQ` A bymvi GB msk vabxwUi R bgZ hvPvBqi
wbwg MYf vU A vnvb K i v nq bvB weavq Dnv A | GB c msM
we GvW&f vK U gnv` qi gZ nBj c g msk vabxi i vqi c i
51
MYf vUi A vi A vek K Z v bvB| K vi Y H i vq vi v MYf vUi
wel qwUI msweavbi mwnZ A mvg mc ~YggNvwl Z nBqvQ|
wZ wb ej b h, qv` k msk vabxi gvag msweavbi gwj K
K vVvgvweb nBqvQ weavq DnvevwZ j Nvl Yvi hvM|
MYZ Ges c R vZ vw K ewk c m we GvWf vK U
gnv` q ej b h, MYZ Ges c R vZ vw K ewk A vgv` i
msweavbi gwj K K vVvgv| A vgv` i msweavb A bymvi MYZ i
c qvM nBqv _ vK msm` R bMYi wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa` i gvag|
msweavbi c Z vebv, 7 A byQ` PZ z_ f vMi 1g I 2q A avq ` k
K ej B R bc wZ wbwa` i vi v c wi Pvwj Z nBevi c Z vk v K i v nBqvQ|
me` vB 'A vgi v,evsj v` k i R bMY'B Z vnv` i mi vmwi wbevwPZ
c wZ wbwai gvag Z vnv` i wel qvw` mK wmv MnY K wi e|
msweavbi g~j PZ bv nBj K vb A e vZ B GB c wZ wbwaZ g~j K
ewk i mwnZ A vc vl bv K i v| 1972 mvj i g~j msweavbi webvm
A bymvi R bMY K Z K wbevwPZ c avbg x I g x c wi l ` wbevnx
K vhvej x c qvM K wi e| c R vZ i i vc wZ msm` m` m` i vi v
wbevwPZ - mi vmwi R bMYi vi v wbevwPZ bnb- c K Z c ve Z uvnvi
K vb K vhK i x wbevnx K gK v bvB| c K Z c wZ wbwaZ g~j K ewk bv
_ vK vq Z uvnvK c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi K vhmv` b K wi Z nq|
GK B K vi Y ^vaxb K Z Z wZ wb K vhmv` b K wi evi A waK vi x
bnb| Ggb wK GK wU gyZ i R bI GB c wZ wbwaZ g~j K ewk
nBZ wePzZ nI qvhvBe bv- BnvB msweavbi g~j PZ bv|
GK B f ve i vR Z i wec i xZ evsj v` k GK wU c R vZ |
i vi wZ bwU A i mK j gZ vB A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMYGi
gvwj K vbvaxb| Z vnvi v mvef g Ges me Yi R bB GB mvef gZ
Z vnv` i A waK vi B _ vK | A Z Ge, i vi mK j wmv Ges K vh g
A ek B msweavb ewYZ c w qvq mi vmwi R bMYi f vU wbevwPZ
c wZ wbwa` i gvagB mbnBZ nBe|
52
f vi Z I evsj v` k i bvq GK wU MYc R vZ | f vi Z xq myc xg
K vUR.C. Poudyal v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1804 gvK gvq
MYc R vZ Gi A _ c ` vb K wi qvQ| hvnv A vgv` i msweavb eI
MYc R vZ xGi A byi c |
A vgv` i msweavb MYc R vZ xewj Z R bMYi gZ v eyS vq
hvnvmsweavbi gwj K K vVvgv|
Z wK Z msk vabx MYZ Ges c R vZ vw K ewk K msK zwPZ
K wi qv d wj qvQ| msweavb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i K vVvgv
A vg` vbx K i vi c i nBZ msweavb GK wU c wZ wbwaZ nxb mi K vi
R bc wZ wbwaZ K vi x mi K vi i j veZ x nBqvQ hvnv msweavbi
MYZ I c R vZ vw K ewk ` yBwUi mwnZ mvsNwl K |
GBL vb Dj L h, nvBK vU wef vM MYZ K
k w k vj xK i Yi j A eva wbevPbi c qvR bxqZ vi wel qwUZ R vi
w` qvQ; wK gwj K K vVvgv Z Z i c m bR i ` q bvB| GB
K vi Y DI i vq evwZ j nBevi hvM|
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v c m GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h
Bnv c wZ wZ h, wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v h K vb msweavbi gwj K
K vVvgv| weL vZ A g msk vabx gvK gvwUB ( 198 9 we.Gj .wW
wek l msL v) A vgv` i ` k i msweavbi gwj K K vVvgv ms v
c _ g gvK gv|
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee nvq mek l A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ c avb Dc ` v wbhyw i weavb A vQ| Z vunvK c vI qv bv
Mj A c i c avb wePvi c wZ nBeb c avb Dc ` v| GB ee nv Pvj y
nBevi c i mK j B wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v mK DM c K vk
K wi qv A vwmZ wQj b| A vgv` i A wf Z v nBj GB ee nvi mevwaK
g` i wk K vi nBqvQ wePvi wef vM| hnZ z c avb wePvi c wZ B
Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb Dc ` v nBeb mnZ z gZ vmxb ` j
Z vnv` i c Q` i ew K c avb wePvi c wZ wbhy K wi evi Pv K i -
hvnvZ wZ wbB c i c avb Dc ` v nBZ c vi b| myc xg K vUwePvi K
53
wbqvMi mgqI GK B j wP vq i vwL qv K vR K i v nq, hvnvi
d j k wZ Z wePvi wef vM ^vaxb I wbi c wePvi K c vw nBZ ew Z
nBZ Q| c avb wePvi c wZ i c ` wUI gk weZ wK Z nBqv c wo Z Q|
wek l Z t 2006 mvj i A wf Z v nBZ ` L v wMqvQ h, Z L b
wei vax ` j mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ i A axb wbevPb bv
hvBevi R b A v` vj b- msMvg I we vf K wi qvQ| c i ` yB eQi
mbv mgw_ Z Z veavqK mi K vi ` k i A vBbi k vmb Ges gwj K
A waK vi j sNb K wi qv` k k vmb K wi qvQ|
k l ` yB eQi i A wf Z vq ` L v hvBZ Q h A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ i A axb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi c wZ A vi K vR
K wi Z Q bv| wek l Z wZ wb hL b R bMbi wbK U MnYhvM bv nb|
BnvB c gvY K i h A eva wbi c wbevPb A byvbi wbwg
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ i A axb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
c wZ mev g weK ee nvbn|
we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h GB hywI D vc b K i v
nBqvQ h, evsj v` k A eva wbi c wbevPb A byvbi j
wb j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee nvwU wZ xq mev g mgvavb| GB
c m we GvW&f vK U ej b h, evsj v` k i GK wU Mi egq
^vaxbZ v hyi BwZ nvm i wnqvQ, evsj v` k i R bMY GK wU D g
R vwZ wnmve gwj K A waK vi I msweavbi c vavb m^wj Z c w_ exi
gvS GK wU D g msweavb c Yqb I MnY K wi qvQ| Z vnv nBj
^vaxbZ vi Pwj k er mi c i K b A vgvw` MK wZ xq mev g
MYZ vw K ee nvq hvBZ nBe ? A ek B GB R vwZ i R b mev g
MYZ B c Z vwk Z |
nvBK vUwef vMi d zj e A bygv` b K wi qvQ h, A eva I
wbi c wbevPb A byvbi R b wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi B GK gv
mgvavb bq Ges wek i mK j DbZ R vwZ B wbevPbi mbvZ b c w qvB
A bymi Y K wi qv _ vK | Bnv ej v hvBZ c vi h, g~j j nBj A eva
I wbi c wbevPb A byvb K i v- wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi bq|
54
DbZ ` k mg~n wbevPb A bywZ nq wbevPb K wgk bi A axb; wb` j xq
Z I veavqK mi K vi i A axb bq| mB me ` k K nB wbevPbi
wbi c Z v wbqv c k D vc b K i bv| A vgv` i myL I UK mB
GK wU weK B i wnqvQ Z vnv nBj wbevPb K wgk bi A axbB wbevPb
A bywZ K i v| Bnvi R b c qvR bxq A vBb I wewa c Yqb K i v hvnvZ
wbevPb K wgk b A eva I wbi c wbevPb A bywZ K wi Z c vi |
myZ i vs msweavbi gwj K K vVvgvi wZ K vi K qv` k msk vabwU
A vBbZ i Yxq bq|
A vgv` i msweavb ewYZ c wZ wbwaZ g~j K MYZ i weavbwU
wei wZ nxb| wK qv` k msk vabx GB wbtwQ` avi vevwnK Z vq wei wZ i
mw K i | A tZ ` yBevi A mvsweavwbK c nvq gZ v MnYi wZ
A wf Z v A vgv` i i wnqvQ Ges Df qwUB A v` vj Z K Z K c g I
mg msk vabx gvgj vi i vq vi v eA vBbx Nvwl Z nBqvQ| Bnv
j Yxq h, msweavb K vb c K vi myhvM bv _ vK v ^Z I
eA vBbxf ve gZ v MnYi gZ NUbv NwUqvQ Ges mB K vi Y
myc xg K vUeA vBbx Nvl Yv K wi Z c vwi qvQ| wK GB ai Yi
myhvM qv` k msk vabxZ we` gvb _ vK vq mB myo c _ awi qv
A vBbx A vei Yi gvag DPvwf j vl x` i gZ v MnY K wi evi ee nv
_ vwK qv hvBe| mbvevwnbx mgw_ Z Z veavqK mi K vi i ` yBwU
er mi i A wf Z v A vgv` i K mB A vk sK vi K _ vB mi Y K i vBqv
` q| A Z Ge, GBme ev Z eZ vi A vj vK B qv` k msk vabx
evwZ j nI qvA vek K |

15| c v_ wgK weePbvt
1994 mvj gv i v Dc - wbevPb wec yj K vi Pzwc i A wf hvM DwVj
Z ` vbx b wei vax ` j GK wU wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i gvag
wbevPb A byvb K wi evi R b c ej A v` vj b A vi K i | evsj v` k i
i vR bxwZ Z GB Bmy GK c P A w i Z v mw K i | ` k i me GB
ee v j Bqv A vj vc - A vj vPbv, Z K - weZ K Pwj Z _ vK | wei vax` j
K Z K A vnvbK Z gvMZ ni Z vj ` k i ^vf vweK R b- R xeb c vq
55
wei nBqv c o | Z vnvi v c i eZ x A Z wZ bwU mvavi Y wbevPb
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i Z veavb A byvb K wi evi ` vex
R vbvBZ _ vK b| GBi c GK c wi w wZ i ga 1996 mvj i 15B
d eqvi x evsj v` k l mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nq wK b ` k i
c avb wei vax ` j wj H wbevPb eR b K i | A Z c i t R vZ xq msm`
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee v m^wj Z msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996, wej MnY K i | Z r c i , i vc wZ 28 k gvP
Z vwi L wej wUZ ^v i ` vb K wi j Z vnvA vBb c wi YZ nq|
Dc i v A vBbi A axb MwVZ wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
1996 mvj i 12B R yb Z vwi L mg R vZ xq msm` i wbevPb A byvb
K i |
wK GB A vBbi c qvR bxqZ v I A vBbMZ eaZ v j Bqv ` k
A vj vc - A vj vPbv Pwj Z B _ vK | GB c vc U Z wK Z A vBbwUi
eaZ v Pvj K wi qv i xU&wc wUk b bs 1729/ 1996 ` vqi nq| Bnv
GK wU msw A v` k L vwi R nq| Z r c i , A i xU&gvK v gvwU ` vqi
nq| nvBK vUwef vM GB i xU&gvK v gvq GK R b c exY mvsevw` K
Ges ` k i ` yB enr i vR bwZ K ` j i gnvmwPeMY c f z nb| Bnv
nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h Z wK Z A vBbwUi eaZ vi c k ` k A bK i B
Dr K v i wnqvQ| A ek A vc xj wef vM Z vnv` i c nBZ K vb
hyw - Z K D vc b K i v nq bvB| Z e Bnv mZ h evsj v` k i
R bMYi GK wU ek eo A sk wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i
Z veavb wbevPb A byvbi c c vwZ | Bnvi c mevc v eo hyw
nBj h MYZ i ^v_ GK wU myyI wbi c wbevPb A byvb K i Y,
K vi Y, gv i v Dc - wbevPb A byvb Z ` vbx b wbevPb K wgk b I
mi K vi i Pi g e_ Z vi NUbv GL bI mK j i B gb D j nBqv
i wnqvQ| mK j i f q h ` j xq mi K vi i A axb myyI wbi c
wbevPb A byvb A v` me bn| BnvB mK j weZ K i g~j | h
i vR bwZ K ` j K ` k i R bMY f vU c ` vb K wi qv mi K vi MVbi
R b K Z Z c ` vb (mandate) K wi j , A _ P c i eZ x mvavi Y wbevPb
56
A byvb mB mi K vi K B ` k i R bMY,A Z Bnvi GK wU enr
A sk , c i eZ x mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi mgq gZ vq ` wL Z Pvn
bv, c vQ gv i v Dc - wbevPbi c ybi vew nq| A ek gv i v Dc -
wbevPbi c i A vi K vb Dc - wbevPb f vU K vi Pzwc i K vb R vi vj
A wf hvM A vi I V bvB|
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi mwK vi x msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996, mvj i eaZ v A i xU&gvK v gvq Pvj
K wi j nvBK vUi Full Bench Bnvi 4- 8 - 2004 Z vwi L i i vq Rule wU
Discharge K i Z t msweavbi 103 A byQ` i A axb mvwUwd K U c ` vb
K i vq Bnv mi vmwi A vc xj wnmve bw_ f z nq| Z vnvQvo v, i xU&
` i L v Z K vi x c GK wU c _ K Civil Petition For Leave to Appeal No. 596 of
2005 ` vqi K i vnq|
GB A vc xj gvK v gvq wbtm` n GK wU myK wVb i vR bwZ K
f ve weZ wK Z wel q R wo Z i wnqvQ hvnv GB A v` vj Z i wb w i
wel q A ek B bn| wK nvBK vUwef vMi i xU&A wa i A vI Z vq
(Writ Jurisdiction) Dc i ewYZ Z wK Z A vBbwUi eaZ v Pj K i Z t
` vex K i v nBqvQ h Z wK Z A vBbwUi gvag msweavb h msk vab
A vbqb K i vnBqvQ Z vnvA mvsweavwbK Z _ vA ea|
G Z wK Z A vBbwU msweavbi A vj vK weePbv K i v
nvBK vUwef vMi ` vwqZ I K Z e wQj , A b_ vq GK wU A mvsweavwbK
msk vab mvsweavbK K j ywl Z K wi Z c vi | Dj L , GB myc xg
K vUi c wZ wU wePvi K msweavb I A vBbi i Y, mg_ b I
wbi vc vweavb K wi Z Z uvnv` i k c _ vi veva|
Dj L , R bve wU GBP L vb, GvW&f vK U, Z wK Z wel qwU R vZ xq
msm` i weePbvi Dc i Qvwo qvw` evi R b gZ c K vk K wi qvQb|
R vZ xq msm` i m` mMYi mgM ` k i R bMYi c wZ wbwaZ
K i b| msweavb mvc msweavb msk vab K wi evi gZ vI Z uvnv` i
i wnqvQ| wK msm` i K vR i wbR ^A MvwaK vi i wnqvQ| c v i
msweavbi evL v I wek l Y K wi evi gZ v GK gv myc xg K vUi
57
Dc i b | mB ` vwqZ I K Z e myc xg K vUK L bB Go vBZ c vi
bv|
2004 mvj nvBK vUwef vMi i vqi c i 7( mvZ ) er mi
A wZ evwnZ nBqvQ| BwZ ga GK c gvK v gvwU bvbxi c v_ bv
K wi j , wek l K wi qv hL vb R wUj mvsweavwbK evL vi c k R wo Z ,
mB A vc xj bvbx K i v c qvR b nq| i vi A vi GK wU ^vaxb
wef vMi R b myc xg K vUGi A c vK i vmgxPxb bn|
h K vb gvK v gvq i vR bwZ K mgmv R wo Z _ vwK j I myc xg
K vUmvsweavwbK c k Dnvi wb w h Go vBZ c vi bv Z vnvi
^c US myc xg K vUi f ~wgK vA vj vPbvK i vhvq|
c _ g Colegrove V. Green 328 US 549(1946) gvK v gv A vj vPbv K i v
c qvR b| Illinois A i vR 51wU R j vq wef wQj | c Z K wU R j v
nBZ A i vR i wmbU I i vR c wZ wbwaMY wbevwPZ nBZ b| K vj
K vj k ni wj Z R b msL v e Y ew c vBj I Z vnv` i c wZ wbwai
msL v ew bv c vI qvq Mvg Gj vK vi mwnZ k ni Gj vK vi c wZ wbwai
msL v A sk vbyc vZ wef vR b A bvh A mgZ v (unjust congressional
apportionment) c wi j w Z nq| GB A bvh A mgZ vPvj K wi j myc xg
K vUBnv GK wU i vR bwZ K c k ewj qv c v_ bv L vwi R K i | myc xg
K vUi msL v Mwi wePvi K MYi c Justice Frankfurter ej b h
Z wK Z BmywU of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination.|
wK 16 er mi i ga c avb wePvi c wZ Earl Warren Gi bZ Z
myc xg K vUBaker V. Carr 369 US 186 (1962) gvK v gvq Bnvi gZ c wi eZ b
K i | c K Z c Bnv b~Z b hyM mwK vi x GK wU i vq| Justice Warren
wbR I ewj qvQb h GB i vqwU Z vunvi R xebi mek i vq| Bnv
Tennessee A i vR nBZ A vMZ GK wU gvK v gv| 1901 mvj i GK wU
A vBb A i vR wUi 95wU county Gi ga c wZ wbwai msL v A sk vbyc vZ
wef vR b K wi qv ` q| 1960 mvj i A v` g gvi xZ ` L v hvq h Mvg
Gj vK vi Z zj bvq k ni Gj vK vi j vK msL v e b ewc v nBj I
58
j vK msL vi A sk vbyc vZ c wZ wbwai msL v ew K i v nq bvB weavq
Mvg I k ni Gj vK vi A sk vbyc vZ c wZ wbwaZ A mgZ vi mw nBqvQ|
US myc xg K vUi msL vMwi wePvi K MYi c g~j i vqwU Justice
Brennan c ` vb K i b t
The question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal
Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political
branch of government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of
our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with
Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged. Nor need the
appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the court to enter upon policy
determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial
standards under the Equal Protection clause are well developed and familiar, and
it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no
policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.........
We conclude that the complaints allegations of a denial of equal
protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which
appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision. The right asserted is within the
reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dc i v i vqi mwnZ GK gZ c vl Y K wi qv Justice Clark
msweavbi g~j avi YvK c L vc b (project) K i b t
As John Rutledge (later Chief Justice) said 175 years ago in the course
of the Constitutional Convention, a chief function of the Court is to secure the
national rights. Its decision today supports the proposition for which our
forebears fought and many died, namely that to be fully comformable to the
principle of right, the form of government must be representative. That is the
keystone upon which our government was founded and lacking which no
republic can survive. It is well for this Court to practice self-restraint and
discipline in constitutional adjudication, but never in its history have those
principles received sanction where the national rights of so many have been so
59
clearly infringed for so long a time. National respect for the courts is more
enhanced through the forthright enforcement of those rights rather than by
rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges. In my view
the ultimate decision today is in the greatest tradition of this Court.
c Z xqgvb nq h 1946 mvj unjust congressional apportionment
wel q i vR bwZ K c k R wo Z i wnqvQ GB I R ynvZ myc xg K vUZ wK Z
A ve` bwU bvK P K wi j I 1962 mvj GK B ai bi A ve` b
Dc i v f ve myc xg K vUweePbv K i Z t bvh apportionment K wi evi
A v` k c ` vb K i |
Baker V. Carr gvK gvi i vq mK Professor Keith E. Whittington
wbwj wL Z g e K i b t
The famed legislative apportionment decision of 1962 is an example of
the Court cutting through the political thicket. Chief Justice Warren later
regarded Baker v. Carr as the most important case of my tenure on the Court.
As governor of California, Warren had contributed to the preservation of
malapportioned and gerrymandered legislative districts, which he later admitted
was frankly a matter of political expediency. But I saw the situation in a
different light on the Court. There, you have a different responsibility. From
that perspective, he came to believe that he was just wrong as Governor. The
Courts willingness to intervene in the field was an abrupt departure from the
traditional understanding of apportionment being a legislative and deeply
political prerogative. (Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, Page-126).

i vR bwZ K ev R bMYi K Z ~nj v xc K gvK v gvq GK R b
wePvi K i K Z e mK Northern Security Co. V. United States (1903) 193 US
197 gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Oliver Wendell Holmes Z uvnvi wf bgZ m~PK
i vqi c vi ej bt
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called
great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future but
because of some accident of immediate over-whelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind
of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful,
and before which even well-settled principles of law will bend. What we have to
do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words. We must
60
try, I have tried, to do it with the same freedom of natural and spontaneous
interpretation that one would be sure of it the same question arose upon an
indictment for a similar act which excited no public attention and was of
importance only to a prisoner before the court. (A avi L vc ` ) |

Dennis V. United States 341 US 494 (1951) gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Felix
Frankfurter gvK v gv wb w Z A v` vj Z i f ~wgK v m^ wbgv g e
K i bt
..........Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be
a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and
therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is
detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of
the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the
day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political,
economic and social pressures. ( A avi L vc ` )

Secretary of State for Education And Science V. Tameside Metropolitan
Borough Council 1977 AC 1014 gvK gvq Tameside Borough Z wk v ee v
b~Z b c Pwj Z comprehensive c wZ A bymvi Pwj e bv mbvZ b Grammar
School wj Pvj y _ vwK e Bnv j Bqv wei va | 1975 mvj j evi
K vDw j i MY msL vMwi wQj b| Z vnvi v Tameside Borough Z
Comprehensive c wZ Pvj yK wi evi R b K ` xq wk v g xi wbK U c ve
K i b| Z L b K ` I j evi mi K vi gZ vq wQj | K ` xq wk v g x
Z vnv 1944 mvj i A vBb A bymvi D c wZ i A bygv` b c ` vb
K i b| A bygv` b A bymvi mvavi Y zj wj I K qK wU Grammar zj
comprehensive zj i c v wi Z nq| wK 1976 mvj A bywZ Borough
wbevPb Tameside G K bR vi f wUf c vwUmsL vMwi Z v j vf K i |
Z vnvi v A ewk Grammar zj wj K comprehensive zj i c v i K wi Z
A ^xK vi K i | Bnv Z vnv` i A bZ g wbevPbx A xK vi wQj | GB
wel qwU j Bqv msL vMwi K bR vi f wUf K vDw j i vi v MwVZ Borough
Gi mwnZ K ` xq j evi mi K vi i i vR bwZ K gZ Z Z vi mw nq
Ges Borough Council K ` xq mi K vi i wb` k gvb K wi Z A ^xK wZ
61
R vbvq| hw` I wel qwU K ` xq j evi I Borough Gi K bR vi f wUf
c wvUi i vR bwZ K gZ v` k i wei va wK k l c h Bnv A v` vj Z c h
Mo vq| A vBbMZ wei vawUi mwnZ h ` yBwU i vR bwZ K c wZ c i
gZ v` k i wei vaI h R wo Z Z vnv Court of AppealI Dc j w K i | Lord
Denning MR,Z vunvi i vq g e K i b ( c t 1021) t
We, of course, in this court support neither side in this controversy: but we have
to take notice that the political parties are concerned in it. This is shown by the
dispute which is now before the court.
Geoffrey Lane L.J Z uvnvi i vqi GK vsk g e K i b ( 1033) t
At the root of the dispute, and there is no advantage in closing ones eyes to the
fact, are the two opposing views as to the better form of secondary education.
Unfortunately the argument has become politically aligned, with the result that
the true issues may sometimes become lost in the dust of political battle.
( A avi L vc ` )

` yBwU i vR bwZ K c wZ c i ga g~j Z t i vR bwZ K
gZ v` k i wei vaK hy i vR i mevP A v` vj Z House of Lords wK ` w
f xZ wePvi K i Z vnvB mK j wePvi K MYi wk Yxq | Lord Russell of
Killowen Dc i v A vc xj gvK v gvq Z uvnvi i vq A vi K i b GB f ve
( c t 1073) t 1977AC p-1073 :
My Lords, I would remark upon some matters introductory to consideration of
this appeal.
1. In my judicial capacity I must have no preference for a particular system of
state supported education, whether mixed or comprehensive. In my personal
capacity I have in fact no preference for any particular system, and this fact,
while it may disable me from arriving at a conclusion that a particular view is
wrong, may assist me in arriving at a correct conclusion as to whether a
proposed course of action, motivated in whole or part by a particular view, is
unreasonable. In this latter respect I may indeed, because of my very
neutrality, or if you please indifference, be in a position of relative advantage in
concluding what may be considered unreasonable , while at the same time
(though not paradoxically) being at a disadvantage in concluding which system
is the better. ( A avi L vc ` )

62
weZ wK Z wel q j Bqv A v` vj Z I wePvi K ` i A v` k A e vb wK
nI qv DwPr m m^ S.P. Gupta V. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149
gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ P.N. Bhagwati A vj vK c vZ K i b ( c v- 177) t
1..................We find, and this is not unusual in cases of this kind, that a
considerable amount of passion has been injected into the arguments on both
sides and sometimes passion may appear to lend strength to an argument, but,
sitting as Judges, we have to be careful to see that passion does not blind us to
logic and predilections pervert proper interpretation of the constitutional
provisions. We have to examine the arguments objectively and dispassionately
without being swayed by populist approach or sentimental appeal. It is very easy
for the human mind to find justification for a conclusion which accords with the
dictates of emotion. Reason is a ready enough advocate for the decision one,
consciously or unconsciously, desires to reach.........
..........We have therefore to rid our mind of any pre-conceived notions or
ideas and interpret the Constitution as it is not as we think it ought to be, We can
always find some reason for bending the language of the Constitution to our
will, if we want, but that would be rewriting the Constitution in the guise of
interpretation. We must also remember that the Constitution is an organic
instrument intended to endure and its provisions must be interpreted having
regard to the constitutional objectives and goals and not in the light of how a
particular Government may be acting at a given point of time, Judicial response
to the problem of constitutional interpretation must not suffer from the fault of
emotionalism or sentimentalism which is likely to cloud the vision when Judges
are confronted with issues of momentous importance........... ( A avi L v
c ` )
GK B c m Federation of Pakistan V. Haji Muhammed Saifullah Khan,
PLD 1989 SC 166, gvK gvq wePvi c wZ Nasim Hasan Shah Gi g e c Yxavb
hvM ( c v- 190) |
The circumstance that the impugned action has political
overtones cannot prevent the Court from interfering therewith, if
it is shown that the action taken is violative of the Constitution.
The superior Courts have an inherent duty, together with the
appurtenant power in any case coming before them, to ascertain
and enforce the provisions of the Costitution and as this duty is
derivable from the express provisions of the Constitution itself
the Court will not be deterred from performing its Constitutional
duty, merely because the action impugned has political
implications. ( A ai L vc ` ) |

63
h mK j gvK v gvq i vR bwZ K weZ wK Z wel qv` x R wo Z _ vK
m mg I GK R b wePvi K aygv msweavb I A vBbi c wZ
GK vM` w wbe i vwL qv Z wK Z wel qwU wb w K wi eb| wePvi K MY
wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa bnb wK R bMYB Z vnv` i Dc i R bMYi
msweavb I A vBb A bymvi wePvi K vhmbK wi evi ` vwqZ A c b
K wi qvQ| i vR bxwZ we` MY i vR bxwZ K wi eb, wePvi K MY i vR bxwZ
ewR Z wePvi K vhc wi Pvj bv K wi eb| mvgwqK i vR bwZ K D R bv ev
A v` vj b wePvi K MYK A v` vwj Z K wi e bv| Z vunv` i ` w
mvsweavwbK bvq wePvi i Pole star Gi c wZ w i i vwL Z nBe| GB
mvabvq Z vnv` i GK gv nvwZ qvi nBZ Q msweavb| i vR bwZ K
K zUZ K ev A veM GK R b wePvi K K L bB g~j A vBbMZ Bmy nBZ
wePzr nBeb bv|
nvBK vUwef vMi Full Bench Gi i vq nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h
evsj v` k i ` yB c avb i vR bwZ K ` j i gnvmwPeq i xU gvK v gvq
c f y nBqvwQj b| mi K vi c we A vUYx- R bvi j Ges 6bs
c wZ ev` x c we GvW&f vK U gnv` q wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
ee v Z _ v Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBb mg_ b K wi qv e e
i vwL qvwQj b| A A v` vj Z I we A vUbxR bvi j mn ek xi f vM
we Amicus Curiae wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee v mg_ b
K wi qvQb|
A vgi v wePvi K MYi K vb wek l ee vi c wZ K vbi c A byi vM
ev wei vM K vbUvB bvB| Z e Bnv Z B c Z xqgvb nq, h
i vR bwZ K ` j eZ gvb mi K vi MVb K wi qvQ Z vnvi v Ges c avb
wei vax ` j Df qB wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee v Z _ v Z wK Z
msk vab A vBbK mg_ b K wi Z Qb| Z vnv` i c Z K i ` j xq
A veMi mwnZ GK gZ nBZ c vwi j A vgv` i c wi k g A bK UvB
j vNe nBZ wK A vgv` i wePvi K MYi ` vwqZ I K Z e A Z
myK wVb| wePvi K MY m~Yi vR bxwZ I A veM ewR Z f ve aygv
msweavbi K wc v_ i m~Yc c vZ nxb f ve Z wK Z wei vawU wb b
64
K wi eb| wePvi K MY MYf vU (plebiscite) gvi d r wePvi K i b bv, Z uvnvi v
wbf R vj hyw I nZ z(reason) Gi Dc i wbf i K i b|
A vgi v eZ gvb mvsweavwbK weZ K A vc xj K vi x c we
GvW&f vK U, A vUbx- R bvi j Ges we amicus curiae MYi e e
A Z gbvhvM mnK vi k eY K wi qvwQ Ges Z uvnv` i DM I
A wbwnZ evYx(message) Dc j w K wi evi PvK wi qvwQ|
Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, msweavbi
A vj vK evL vI wek l Y K i Z t Bnvi eaZ vwbi c Y K i vnBe|
16| c vK - K _ b t ewUk - i vR 190 er mi f vi Z el i vR Z
K wi evi c i 1947 mvj Indian Impendence Act, 1947, gvi d r f vi Z I
c vwK vb bvgK ` yBwU ^vaxb Dominion mw nq| gvnv` A vj x
wR bvn 1947 mvj i 11B A Mv Z vwi L c vwK vbi MYc wi l ` i
(Constituent Assembly) c _ g President wbevwPZ nBqv Z uvnvi f vl Y
c vwK vbK GK wU agwbi c A vaywbK i v wnmve Mwo qv Z zwj evi
A vk vev` e K i b| 1947 mvj i 14B A Mv c vwK vb Ges 15B
A Mv Z vwi L f vi Z ^vaxbZ vj vf K i |
1948 mvj wR bvn&i gZ zi c i c vwK vb gvbq Bmj vg
agwf w K i v c wi YZ nBZ _ vK | f vi Z 1950 mvj i R vbyqvi x
gvm Bnvi msweavb MnY I Nvl Yv K i Z t c R vZ c wi YZ nq|
A bw` K c vwK vb gvMZ c vmv` l o h i wk K vi nBZ _ vK Ges
MvxZ ej er nq| MYc wi l ` c ~eevsj vi c wZ wbwaZ 44 nBZ
38 G K wgq A vbv nq Ges c w g c vwK vbi gvU c wZ wbwa 26
nBZ ew K wi qv 32 K i v nq| Z vnvQvo v ek K qK R b D` yf vl x
hvnvi v wef vMc ~ef vi Z i wewf bc ` k i A waevmx wQj b Z vnvw` MK
c ~eevsj vi K vUv nBZ Constituent Assembly Gi c wZ wbwa K i v nq,
hgb, wj qvK Z A vj x L vb, Mvj vg gvnv` c gyL | GB f ve
c vwK vbi mwi mgq nBZ B c ~eei c wZ Pi g el gg~j K A vPi Y
nBZ _ vK | hw` I mgM c vwK vb evsj vf vl x j vK msL vMwi
nBj I D` yK i vf vl v K wi evi wmv c ~eevsj vi Dc i Pvc vBqv
65
` I qv nq, d j 1948 mvj nBZ B evsj vK A bZ g i vf vl v
K wi evi R b ` vex I V| c ~eevsj v c K Z c c w g c vwK vbi
K j vbxZ i c v wi Z nq|
1956 mvj Islamic Republic of Pakistan Gi c _ g msweavb MnxZ nq
Ges 1959 mvj i d eqvi x gvm c _ g mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ
nBevi K _ v _ vK , wK c vwK vbi c wmWU Major General Iskander
Mirza 1958 mvj i 7B A vei Z vwi L mgM ` k mvgwi K A vBb
R vi x K i b| 27k A vei Z vwi L c avb mbvc wZ R bvi j A vBqye
L vb c wmWUK A c mvi Y K wi qv wbR B c wmWU c ` MnY K i b|
A Z tc i , wZ wb wbR K Field Martial c ` c ` vbwZ c ` vb K i b| 1962
mvj mvgwi K A vBb c Z vnvi K i v nq Ges b~Z b GK msweavbi
A vI Z vq To suit the genius of the people A R ynvZ Basic Democracy ewj qv GK
A yZ ai bi Z _ vK w_ Z MYZ c Pj b K i v nq| A ek GB Basic
Democracy avi YvK I ` k x I we` k x wK QymsL K c wZ ew A Z
c k smv K i b| 1966 mvj i R yb gvm k L gywR eyi i ngvb Z vunvi
c L vZ 6 ` d v ` vex c k K wi qv c ~ec vwK vb mn c vwK vbi c vuPwU
c ` k i R b ^vqZ k vmb I mveR bxb f vUvwaK vi i wf w Z mvavi Y
wbevPb ` vex K i b| BnvB c ~ec vwK vbi R bMYi c vYi ` vex nBqv
I V| 1969 mvj c wmWU wd gvk vj A vBDe L vb c vwK vbi
c avb mbvc wZ R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vbi wbK U mK j gZ v n v i
K i b| 1962 mvj i msweavb evwZ j nq| ` k A vevi I mvgwi K
k vmb ej er K i v nq| R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vb c vwK vbi c wmWU I
c avb mvgwi K K gK Z vi ` vwqZ f vi MnY K i b|
A Z tc i Legal Framework Order Gi A vI Z vq 1970 mvj i
k l f vM A L c vwK vbi c _ g I k l mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nq|
GB wbevPbi c _ g I c avb ` vwqZ wQj c vwK bi R b GK wU
msweavb c Yqb K i v|
66
K ` xq I c ~ec vwK vb c v` wk K c wi l ` Df q c wi l ` B k L
gywR eyi i ngvbi bZ A vI qvgx j xM f ~wgam f vU wbi yk R qj vf
K i |
1971 mvj i 3i v gvPZ vwi L XvK vq MYc wi l ` i A waek b
A vnvb K i v nq| wK R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vb 1j v gvPi GK Nvl Yvq
D A waek b A wbw` K vj i R b wMZ K wi j c ~ec vwK vbi
R bMY vf , ` ytL , va, nZ vk vq d vwUqv c o | 7B gvPZ vwi L
k L gywR eyi i ngvb Z ` bx b i gbv i mK vmgq` vb j j
R bZ vi myL c ` f vl Y _ nxb f vl vq Nvl Yv K i b h Gevi i
msMvg A vgv` i gywI i msMvg, Gevi i msMvg ^vaxbZ vi msMvg|
23k gvPc vwK vb w` em K vUgU wj ewZ i K c ~e
c vwK vbi me ^vaxb evsj v` k i c Z vK vk vf vc vq|
25k gvPw` evMZ i v mvgwi K evwnbx XvK v, PMvg I
c ` k i wewf b vb A K mvr wbi evOvj x` i Dc i evc K MYnZ v
A vi K i | GB mgqB 26k gvPi c _ g c ni k L gywR eyi i ngvb
evsj v` k i ^vaxbZ vNvl YvK i b|
1971 mvj i 10B Gwc j Z vwi L evsj v` k i mi K vi MwVZ nq
Ges A vbyvwbK f ve Proclamation of Independence gywR e bMi nBZ
Nvl Yv K i v nq| BnvB evsj v` k i c _ g mvsweavwbK ` wj j | GB
` wj j B evsj v` k i c Uf ~wgK v I f wel Z evsj v` k i i c i L v eYbv
K i v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, GB Nvl Yvc ` wj j gvi d r evsj v` k i
R bMYK mK j gZ vi Dr m wnmve ^xK wZ c ` vb K i v nq Ges
GK wU MYc wi l ` mw K i v nq| GK B w` b Laws Continuance Enforcement
Order R vi x nq| GB ` wj j vi v 1971 mvj i 26k gvPZ vwi L ej er
mK j A vBbi eaZ vc ` vb K i vnq|
` xNbqgvm evc x i qx hy Ges GK mvMi i i ga w` qv
1971 mvj i 16B wWm^i Z vwi L c vwK vb mbvevwnbx f vi Z I
evsj v` k Gi h_ mbvevwnbxi wbK U A vZ mgc b K i | j
67
gyw hvvi R xebi wewbgq evsj v` k i c Z vK v Dw qgvb nq|
evsj v` k ^vaxb nq|
1972 mvj i 10B R vbyqvi x Z vwi L c vwK vbi ew` ` k v nBZ
R vwZ i wc Z v i vc wZ k L gywR eyi i ngvb XvK vq c ` vc Y K i b| 11B
R vbyqvi x Z vwi L Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972, R vi x nq|
msweavb c Yqbi R b 22k gvPZ vwi L Constituent Assembly of
Bangladesh Order, 1972, R vi x nq| MYc wi l ` ^ Z g mgqi ga
msweavb i Pbv I wewae K wi qv MnY K i | GB msweavb 1972
mvj i 16B wWm^i Z vwi L nBZ K vhK i nq|
17| mvgwi K k vmb t 1975 mvj i 20k A Mv Z vwi L
evsj v` k mvgwi K A vBb R vi x nq| 15B A Mv Z vwi L nBZ Bnv
K vhK i K i v nq| 1979 mvj i 6B Gwc j Z vwi L i vZ 8 Uvq c K vwk Z
GK Proclamation vi v mvgwi K A vBb c Z vnvi K i v nq| Bnv c i w` b 7B
Gwc j Z vwi L i evsj v` k MR U c K vwk Z nq| R i i x A vBb 1979
mvj i 27k bf ^i Z vwi L c Z vnvi K i vnq|
BwZ ga 6B Gwc j Z vwi L wZ xq msm` , msweavb ( c g
msk vab) A vBb 1979, gvi d r 1975 mvj i 15B A Mv nBZ
1979 mvj i 9B Gwc j c h mK j mvgwi K A vBbi eaZ v c ` vb
K i | myc xg K vUA ek A bK wej ^nBj I msweavb ( c g
msk vab) A vBb evwZ j K wi qvQ|
198 2 mbi 24k gvPZ vwi L j t R bvi j mvBb gvnvg`
Gi k v` evsj v` k i i vxq gZ v ` L j K i b Ges ` k c ybi vq
mvgwi K k vmb ej er nq| evsj v` k i gvbyl c ybi vq Z vnv` i bvMwi K
^vaxbZ vI A waK vi nvi vq|
198 6 mvj i 11B bf ^i Z vwi L c YxZ msweavb ( mg
msk vab) A vBb, 198 6 gvi d r PZ z_ msm` , 198 2 mvj i 24k gvP
Z vwi L nBZ 198 6, mvj i 11B bf ^i c h mK j mvgwi K A vBbi
eaZ v c ` vb K i | myc xg K vUi nvBK vUwef vM A ek A vevi I D
68
mvgwi K k vmb A ea Nvl Yv K wi qv msweavb ( mg msk vab) A vBb
evwZ j K wi qvQ|
198 8 mbi 9B R yb Z vwi L msweavb ( A g msk vab) A vBb,
198 8 , gvi d r c R vZ i i vagBmj vg wbavi Y K i v nq Ges
msweavbi 100 A byQ` msk vab K i Z t nvBK vUwef vMi vqx
e wj evsj v` k i wewf bk ni vc b K i vnq|
myc xg K vUi A vc xj wef vM Anwar Hossain V. Government of
Bangladesh 1989 BLD ( Special Issue ) gvK v gvq Bnvi 2- 9- 198 9
Z vwi L i i vq msweavbi 100 A byQ` i msk vab evwZ j Nvl Yv
K i | A Z tc i , i vR avbxi evwni A ew Z nvBK vUwef vMi vqx
e wj XvK vq c Z veZ b K i |

18 | MYZ c Z veZ b t mgMevsj v` k c P we vf I
` yevi A v` vj bi gyL j t R bvi j mvBb gvnv` Gi k v` 1990
mvj i 6B wWm^i Z vwi L i v c wZ c ` nBZ c ` Z vM K i b| Bnvi
c ~e ` j gZ wbwek l mK j i vR bwZ K ` j I R vU evsj v` k i
Z ` vbx b c avb wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn&g` K GK wU wb` j xq I
wbi c mi K vi i c avb wnmve ` vwqZ MnYi A vnvb R vbvb|
BwZ ga Dc - i vc wZ c ` Z vM K i b| D k ~Y c ` Z r K vj xb
i vc wZ c avb wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn&g` K Dc - i vc wZ c `
wbqvM c ` vb K wi qv 6B wWm^i Z vwi L Z uvnvi wbK U i vc wZ Gi k v`
c ` Z vM K i b| D Z vwi L B ` k i wZ bwU c avb i vR bwZ K R vU
I ` j i ^Z t yZ A vnvb mvo v w` qv MYZ c ~bi vi i D k
Z ` vbx b c avb wePvi c wZ mvneyw b A vn&g` A vqx i vc wZ wnmve
wbi c mi K vi c wi Pvj bvi ` vwqZ f vi MnY K i b|
1991 mvj i 27k d eqvi x Z vwi L evsj v` k GK wU mvavi Y
wbevPb A bywZ nq| GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j wbi ym msL vMwi Z v j vf
K wi qv20/ 3/ 1991 Z vwi L mi K vi MVb K i |
69
1991 mvj i 10B A Mvi msweavb ( GK v` k msk vab) A vBb,
1991, ej wePvi c wZ mvnveyw b A vn&g` c ybi vq evsj v` k i c avb
wePvi c wZ c ` c Z veZ b K i b|
1991 mvj i 18 B m ^i Z vwi L i vR bwZ K R vU wj i
c ~ewmv A bymvi msweavb ( v` k msk vab) A vBb, 1991, wewae
nq| GB msk vab A vBb evsj v` k msweavb A Z i Z c ~Y
c wi eZ b A vbqb K i | msweavbi PZ z_ f vM 1g I 2q c wi Q` i
c wi eZ 1g, 2q I 3q c wi Q` wj c wZ vwc Z nq| BnvZ
i vee vq gwj K c wi eZ b mvwaZ nq| c ~ei Presidential System Gi
c wi eZ msm` xq i vee vq c ybt c Z eZ b K i | Z vnvQvo v, K wZ c q
i vc wZ i eqi K Z Z m^wj Z msweavbi 92K A byQ` wU
wej y K i vnq| Z e 70 A byQ` wU A vi I mmvwi Z K i vnq|
A Z tc i , l msm` 1996 mvj i 28 k gvPZ vwi L Z wK Z
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996 ( 1996 mbi 1bs A vBb)
wewae K i | msweavbi GB msk vab A vBbi eaZ v eZ gvb
gvK v gvi wePvhwel q|

19| R bve Gg A vB d vi K x, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, Gi
e ei mvi ggt R bve d vi K x, GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b h
c R vZ , MYZ I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v evsj v` k msweavbi g~j
wf w ev Basic Structure| R vZ xq msm` msweavbi Dc i v g~j
wf w wj L eK wi Z c vi bv, A _ P, we GvW&f vK U gnv` q ej b,
Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBbwU Dc i v c Z K wU Basic Structure L e
K wi qvQ Ges R bMYi mvef gZ asm K wi qvQ weavq Z wK Z
msk vabwU A mvsweavwbK I A ea|
wZ xq f vM
A vBbMZ A vj vPbv

A Z c i , msweavbi Dc i v g~j wf w wj gvbq A vj vPbv
K i vnBj |
70
20| MYZ t evsj v` k msweavbi c vebvi wZ xq ` d vq
eYbv K i v nBqvQ h mK j gnvb A v` k evsj v` k i exi R bMYK
R vZ xq gyw msMvg A vZ wbqvM I exi k nx` w` MK c vYvr mMK wi Z
Dz K wi qvwQj Z vnvi A bZ g nBj MYZ |
msweavbi wZ xq f vMi 8 A byQ` i vc wi Pvj bvi h mK j
g~j bxwZ eYbv K i v nBqvQ Z vnvi ga MYZ A bZ g| Z vnvQvo v,
11A byQ` ej v nBqvQ h ( evsj v` k ) c R vZ nBe GK wU
MYZ | A vc xj K vi x c wbe` b K i v nBqvQ h MYZ msweavbi
GK wU basic structure ev g~j ewk ev K vVvgv wK Z veavqK mi K vi
avi Yv msweavbi GB basic structure Gi mwnZ mvsNwl K | c K Z c
msweavb MYZ j L v _ vwK j I Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj MYZ
m~Yf ve wej y _ vK |
c _ gZ t MYZ basic structure wK bv Ges hw` basic structure nBqv
_ vK Z e wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi avi Yv Bnvi mwnZ mvsNwl K
wK bv Z vnv wek l Y K wi evi c ~eMYZ A _ wK , Bnvi BwZ nvm wK ,
A vaywbK hyM Bnvi weeZ b wK f ve nBj , Z vnv ms c A vj vPbv
K i vc qvR b|
c vPxb wek i c vq mK j ` k c avbZ i vR Z we` gvb wQj |
K vb K vb ` k i A waevmxMY i vR vK ` eZ v vb K wi Z | L c ~e
c g k Z vw Z Mxm ` k i Athens bMi - i vi i vR bwZ K A e vbK
A vaywbK i vR bwZ K wP vwe` I A avc K MY Democratic ev MYZ vw K
ewj qvA vL vwqZ K i b|
MYZ ev Democracy k wU Dr c w nBqvQ c vPxb Mxm ` k i
demokratia k nBZ | MxK demos A _ R bMY I KratosA _ k vmb |
A _ vr democracy evdemokratia ewj Z R bMYi c Z ev mi vmwi k vmb
evS vBZ |
c vPxb Mxm ` k ^vaxb bMi - i vi A f z` q nq| L c ~ec g
k Z vw Z H mK j bMi - i vi A waevmxMY K vb A vBb c Yqb ev
K vb mgmv mgvavb K GK w Z nBqv f vUvwaK vi A vi vc gvi d r
71
A vBb c Yqb K wi Z ev mgmv mgvavb K wi Z | H i c mgvek
(assembly) h K vb wbevnx wmv , wePvwi K K vhGes c qvR b gvwd K
A vBb c Yqb K i vnBZ |
A ek eZ gvb bMi wj i Z zj bvq Z ` vbx b bMi ev i v wj i
bvMwi K R bmsL v L ye K g B ` k nvR vi i A waK nBZ | Z L b
bMi i v ewj Z bMi I Dnvi wbK U PZ zc vk Mvgv j evS vBZ |
Dj L , mB mgq gwnj v I xZ ` vmMY bvMwi K wQj b bv| hw` I
mvavi Y mgvek wj Z wk w Z - A wk w Z , abx- ` wi ` wbwek l mK j i
mgvb f vUvwaK vi _ vwK j I Z L b mveR bxb mgZ vi ( equality) A f ve
wQj |
mgvek (assembly) bvMwi K MY i vi wewf bc ` wbevwPZ nBZ |
A bK mgq j Uvwi gvi d r wewf bc ` weZ i Y K i v nBZ | mK j
K gK Z vMY Z vnv` i K vhvej xi R b R bmgvek i wbK U ` vqe
_ vwK Z |
L c ~ec g k Z vw Z Mxmi G_ bMi i v GBi c c Z
MYZ weK wk Z nq| G_ i bZ Z Mxmi A bvb MYZ vw K bMi -
i v wj GK w Z nq| Z e Mxmi mK j bMi - i v MYZ wQj bv,
hgb, vUv| vUvq Mvw k vmb ( Oligarchy) we` gvb wQj |
c i eZ xZ vUv bMi - i vi mwnZ hy G_ i c i vR qi c i
Z ` vbx b c Z MYZ gk A e q nBZ nBZ c i v gk vj x
i vgK ` i A v gbi c i m~Yj vc c vq|
GBi c NUbv L c ~e6 k Z vw Z D i c ~ef vi Z I NwUqvwQj |
` exc mv` Pvc vavq Z vnvi i wPZ j vK vqZ ` k bM ` L vBqvQb
h H mgq i vR vk vwmZ i vR mg~ni c vk vc vwk MY- k vwmZ e R bc `
we` gvb wQj | k vK ` i ga c Pwj Z A _ K vb i vR v wQj bv,
k vmbee v wQj MYZ vw K Ges bZ v nBZ b wbevwPZ | k vK ` i
mvavi Y mf vMni bvg wQj g vMvi | mL vb k vmb- c wi Pvj bvi
wel q wj A vj vwPZ nBZ | gj I wj Qvwe` i gaI GBi K g g vMvi
ev j vK mf vi A w Z wQj | whwb c avb wZ wb nBZ b wbevwPZ , Z vK
72
i vR v A vL v ` I qv nBj I K vhZ Z vnvi ghv` v wQj MxK A K b Gi
bvq| wK GB UvBevj MYZ i K vVvgv j Bqv R bc ` j x
^vaxbf ve wUwK qv _ vwK Z c vi bvB| gMa I K vk j i i vk w
gvbq Z vnv` i Mvm K wi qvwQj |
A vaywbK hyM A bK i vR bwZ K wP vwe` MY c vPxb Mxmi bMi -
i v wj i k vmb ee vq Pgr K Z nBqv c Z MYZ wnmve A wf wnZ
K wi j I A bK A vevi BnvK msL vMwi i Pi g ` ytk vmb ev
Mobocracy ewj qvI A wf wnZ K wi qvQb|
c vPxb Mxmi A bZ g k ` vk wbK Plato Z ` vbx b c Pwj Z
c Z MYZ K wbc xo bg~j K ewj qvB gb K wi Z b Ges Z vnvi
wj wL Z Republic M mBf veB wPw Z K wi qvwQj b| Z uvnvi i
Socrates K GBi c MYmgvek ( Popular Assembly) nBZ B c vY`
` wZ nBZ nBqvwQj | wk w Z , ` vk wbK MYi nvZ B ` k i
k vmbf vi _ vK v DwPZ ewj qv Plato gb K wi Z b| Plato Gi Qv
AristotleI mB hyMi GK R b k ` vk wbK I wP vwe` wQj b| wZ wb
Z uvnvi Politics M MYZ m^ we vwi Z c he Y c ` vb
K wi qvQb| wZ wbI Z ` vbx b mgqi MYZ PPv m^ myavi bv
c vl Y K wi Z b bv| Z e Plato I Aristotle Df qB c Pwj Z MYZ K GK
ai bi mvgvwR K k vmb ee v ewj qvgb K wi Z b|
c vPxb i vg c _ g L c ~e750 mvj nBZ L c ~e510 mvj
c h i vR Z we` gvb wQj | Z r c i c R vZ vwc Z nq| A ek
A vaywbK hyMi c R vZ i avi Yvi mwnZ Bnvi mvgvbB wgj c wi j w Z
nq| c K Z c Bnv wQj Oligarchic ev MvxZ vw K c R vZ | GB
ai bi c R vZ L c ~e31 mvj c h i vg we` gvb wQj | GBmgq
Bsj vmn BDi vc i c vq mevsk i vgK Consul` i A axb
GK bvqK Z c wZ wZ nq| L c ~e31 mvj Octavious i vg mvgvR
c wZ v K i b| c vq 6 k Z er mi c i i vg mvgvR i c Z b nq Ges
D mvgvR i A MZ BDi vc i wewf b` k c avbZ t i vR Z
73
( absolute monarchy) c wZ wZ nq| i vR vMY Divine right gZ ev` ev A waK vi
ej ` k k vmb K wi Z Ges mevsk Z vnv ^i Z wQj |
Z e Bsj v R wg` vi (barons and knights) wek c (the clergy) I
burgesses ` i GK ai bi gnvmgvek (Great Council of the Realm) nBZ
i vR vc i vgk MnY K wi Z b Ges hy evA bvb wek l K vi Y Z vnv` i
gZ vgZ j Bqv c qvR bxq K i A vi vc K wi Z b| GB ai bi mgvek
(estates) nBZ Parliament Gi m~ c vZ nq| 1215 mvj Magna Carta G
^v i K i Z t i vR v John R wg` vi I A bvb` i mwZ ewZ i K K i
A vi vc bv K i vi c wZ k wZ c ` vb K wi qvwQj b| 14k k Z K i k l f vM
nBZ Parliament c wZ wbwaZ g~~j K c vwZ vwbK i c c vBZ _ vK | 1649
mvj i vR v Charles I Gi wk i Q` i c i Oliver Cromwell Bsj v GK wU
Republican Commonwealth vc bi e_ c qvm c vb wK 1660 mvj
i vR Z c ybtc wZ wZ nq| 168 8 mvj i k l f vM i vR v James II
wmsnvmb c wi Z vM K wi j William III I Mary II h_ f ve Bsj vi
wmsnvmb A vi vnb K i b| 168 9 mvj i 25k A vei Z vwi L
weL vZ Bill of Rights c YxZ nq| Bnvi gvag Bsj v absolute Monarchy
Gi A emvb nq Ges mvsweavwbK i vR Z c wZ wZ nI qvq
Bsj vevmxi A waK vi A v` vq I i vR bwZ K weR q mywbw Z nq|
GBi c i vR bwZ K c wi eZ b i vi c K Z gZ v i vR vi c wi eZ
Parliament MnY K i wK BnvZ MYZ c wZ v c vq bv K vi Y Z L bK vi
Parliament Gi ewk i f vM m` m wQj b ` k i R wg` vi I c f vek vj x
ew eM| Z vnvi vB Parliament wbq Y K wi Z b, mvavi Y R bgvbyl i
c K Z K vb c f ve Parliament Gi Dc i Z L bI wQj bv| D i vR bwZ K
A e vK Mvxk vmb evOligarchic ej vhvBZ c vi |
GB mgq Bsj v John Locke ( 1632- 1704) bvg GK R b L yeB
bvgK i v wP vwe` i A vwef ve nq| Z ` vbx b mf R MZ Z uvnvi j L vi
c f zZ c f ve c wo qvwQj | Q` bvg ` yBL wj wL Z Z uvnvi Treatises on Civil
Government 1690 mvj c K vwk Z nBj Z vnv mvavi Y R bgvbyl i
gwj K A waK vi m^ GK wec e A vbqb K i | Z uvnvi j L bxi
74
gvag mvavi Y gvbyl i mvef g , bvMwi K ^vaxbZ v I A waK vi
m^ wZ wbB mec _ g mvPvi nb| wbR i R xeb, ^vaxbZ v I m`
h K vb gvbyl i mnR vZ A waK vi i wnqvQ ( inalienable rights) Ges
mi K vi mB A waK vi i v K wi Z Pzw e| h mi K vi Z vnv i v
K wi Z e_ nq, R bMY mB mi K vi K gZ vPyr K wi evi A waK vi x|
mi K vi hvnvZ ^QvPvi x bv nBqv hvq, m K vi Y wZ wb wbevnx gZ v
I A vBb c YqY gZ vi c _ K &K i Y K wi evi K _ v ej b| hw` I Z uvnvi
j L bx i vR Z K B mg_ b K wi Z wK wZ wbB mec _ g ` k I
mi K vi i ga c v_ K wbYq K i b Ges mi K vi In the consent of the
people A bymvi MwVZ nBe Z vnvI ej b|
GBf ve John Locke Gi j L bxi gvag MYZ A ywi Z
nBqvwQj |
Bnvi wK QyK vj c i d v Jean Jaques Rousseau ( 1712- 1778 ) bvg
A vi GK R b wP vwe` A vwef ~Z nb| Z uvnvi wj wL Z The Social Contract
mB hyMi A bZ g k K xwZ | Z uvnvi gZ ev` wQj h i vi
A waevmx` i mwZ ewZ i K K vb w wZ k xj i vi A w Z wUwK qv
_ vwK Z c vi bv Ges i vi A waevmx K Z K c ` gZ vB nBj
i v gZ v| GBf ve k vmK I k vwmZ i mK GK wU Pzw i Dc i
wbf i k xj hvnvK Charter ev msweavb ej v nq| D Pzw Z B k vwmZ i
c wZ mi K vi i ` vwqZ I K Z e wbwnZ _ vwK e| Rousseau GBf ve
gahyM we` gvb i vR vi ^Mxq A waK vi i c wi eZ i vi k vwmZ i
mwZ B c k vmbi wf w GB gZ ev` c wZ wZ K i b| GB gZ ev`
A bymvi i vR v k vwmZ i mwZ A bymvi B i v c wi Pvj bv K wi evi
gZ v c v nb, Z vnvi K vb H k wi K gZ v bvB| RousseauB mec _ g
i v mvavi Y R bgvbyl i mvef gZ K GK wU mnR vZ A waK vi
(inalienable right) wnmve c wZ vi c qvm c vb| Z uvnvi j L bxi gvagB
mvavi Y R bgvbyl i vxq K vhZ vnv` i i vR bwZ K A waK vi i K _ v
mec _ g Dc j w K i | GBf ve e k Z er mi c i MYZ A vevi
b~Z b f ve Rousseau Gi j L bxi gvag c ybi xweZ nBevi c _ g
75
mvc vb L yuwR qv c vq| The Social Contract gZ ev` A bymvi memvavi Yi
mwZ ewZ i K K vb A vBbB ea bn, GB gZ ev` mec _ g DwVqv
A vm| wZ wbB mec _ g i vi A vBb c Yqb R bMYi mi vmwi f ~wgK v
_ vwK evi c hvR bxqZ vi Dc i R vi ` b|
m` n bvB h, hy i vi ^vaxbZ v msMvg Ges 178 9 mvj
A bywZ d i vmx wec e Rousseau Gi j L bxi vi v Mf xi f ve c f vweZ
nBqvwQj |
Z e Z L bI MYZ ewj Z Athens Gi mvavi Y R bMYi c Z
MYZ K B mK j eywS Z Ges Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau Gi gZ
` vk wbK MY K nB D c Z MYZ K ev e mZ ewj qv ( in positive
terms) MnY K i b bvB| 18 k k Z K Z L bK vi wk w Z wP vwe` MY
MYZ K GK evi B hyMvc hvMx gb K wi Z b bv, ei c vPxb
K vj i GK wU A Pj i vR bwZ K k vmb ee v ewj qv gb K wi Z b|
GK vi YB d i vmx wec e c Z MYZ MnYi c K vnvi I Z gb
K vb Dr mvn wQj bv|
GB mgq Abbe de Sieyes (1748-1836) c wZ wbwaZ g~j K mi K vi ee v
c wZ vK wec ei c K Z D k ewj qv A ewnZ K i b| wZ wb i vR vi
mvef gZ i c wi eZ mvavi Y R bMYi mvef gZ i (Popular
Sovereignty) Dc i wf w K wi qv c wZ wbwaZ g~j K mi K vi i gZ ev` i
(Concept) ga GK wU mvg m A vbqb K i b| Sieyes Z ` vwb b mgqi
c Uf ~wgK vq c Z MYZ K A ev e ewj qv gb K wi Z b Ges
c wZ wbwaZ g~j K i v ee vK A bK ek x K vhK i I d j c m~ewj qv
gb K wi Z b| Z uvnvi gZ ` yBf ve R bMY i v gZ vq A sk MnY
K wi Z c vi , c _ gZ t c Z MYZ vw K i v ee vq mi vmwi A sk
MnY, wZ xqZ t R bMYi c wZ wbwaMYK R bMYi c ` vwqZ c ` vb
gvi d r k vmb ee v | Sieyes Gi gZ wZ xq ee vB GK wU A vaywbK
i v ee vi R b A bK ek x K vhK i I k q| K vi Y, GB c wZ Z
R bMY Z vnvi A waK vi ybbv K wi qvB Bnvi c wZ wbwa` i gvag i v
c wi Pvj bvq A sk MnY K wi Z c vi | Z e wZ wb mi vmwi i vR vK
76
wmsnvmbPzZ K wi evi c wQj b bv, ei i vR v wbR I R bMYi
c wZ wbwaZ K wi eb GBi c gZ ev` Sieyes avi Y K wi Z b| GBi c
mgq 1792 mvj i 21 k m ^i Z vwi L d v c R vZ Nvwl Z
nq|
Thomas Paine ( 1737-1809) H hyMi GK R b wewk wP vwe` | wZ wb
1791- 92 mvj ` yB L Rights of Man bvg GK wU M i Pbv K i b|
GB M , wek l K wi qv 2q L mi K vi c wZ mK GK wU m~Y
beZ i e e i vL b Ges ew gvby l i A waK vi I c vPxb I
g~j MYZ vw K wP avi vi Dc i A vaywbK avi v c eZ b K i b| wZ wb
c wZ wbwaZ g~j K c wZ K MYZ i mwnZ mymsnZ (compatible) ewj qv
gb K wi Z b | mvavi Y MYZ i mgmv wj c wZ wbwaZ g~j K c wZ i
gvag ` ~i K wi qv A vaywbK i v ee vi Dc hvMx K i v me | wZ wb
` L vb h MYZ i mwnZ c wZ wbwaZ g~j K c wZ GK K wi j GK wU
A vaywbK mi K vi DyZ mK j i ^v_ i v K i v me| Rights of Man
M MYZ K ev e I MVbg~j K wnmve wZ wb wPw Z K wi qvQb Ges
c wZ wbwaZ g~j K c wZ i mwnZ GK BnvK A vaywbK i v ee vi
mwnZ hyMvc hvMxewj qv` L vBqvQb|
Maximilien Robespierre ( 1758-1798) d i vwm wec ei GK R b c avb
bvqK , i vR bxwZ we` I wP vwe` | wZ wbB mec _ g MYZ K wbtk Z f ve
mi K vi c wZ wnmve MY K i b| wZ wb ej b h MYZ Ggb GK
c wZ hL vb R bMY A vBbi A vI Z vq wbR i ` vwqZ c vj b K wi Z
c vi Ges h mK j ` vwqZ Z vnv` i c mi vmwi c vj b K i v me bq
Z vnv Z vnv` i c wZ wbwa gvi d r mbK wi Z c vi | MYZ A _
c Z k vmb bn, ei ,Bnv A vewk K f ve c wZ wbwaZ g~j K mi K vi
c wZ | GBf ve Robespierre ` yB nvR vi er mi c i MYZ K c _ g
evi i gZ c ybtm~ e K i Z t (reformulated) MYZ vw K i v ee vK B
MnYhvM ej b| c K Z c , H mgq MYZ K mec _ g wZ wbB
c wZ wbwaZ k xj k vmb ee v (representative government) ewj qv gb
K i b|
77
GBf ve ` yB nvR vi er mi c ~ej y MYZ c ybi vq A vaywbK wK
K ej Z vwZ K i c d v A vwef ~Z nBj I mL vb Z L b Bnv gvUI
MnxZ nq bvB, ei Bnvi i vR bwZ K A byk xj b mxwgZ f ve
msk vaxZ A vK vi nBj I mec _ g hy i vA vi nq|
1776 mvj hy i v ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yv K i | 178 1 mvj Bsi R
mbvc wZ Continental army Gi wbK U A vZ mgc b K i | GB ^vaxbZ v hy
wec e wQj bv ev MYZ i R b hy wQj bv| Bnv wQj Bsi R ` i
K Z Z nBZ ^vaxbZ vi hy, Z e Bsi R k vmK ` i c vbi c i
hy i vi bZ vbxq bZ eMb~Z b ` k i k vmb ee v j Bqv wP v-
f vebv A vi K i b| G wel q Z uvnvi v Bsj v I BDi vc xq wP vwe`
h_ v Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Thomas Paine I A bvb` i j L bxvi v
A byc vwYZ nb|
A vgwi K vi K j vwb wj c ~enBZ B Royal Chartar vi v k vwmZ
nBZ | K vR B Z ` vbx b 13 wU K j vbx wj K GK wU wj wL Z msweavb
gvi d r c wi Pvj bvi c ve Z vnvi v mnR B MnY K i b| GB wel q
178 7 mvj Philadelphia k ni GK wU mvsweavwbK Convention A vi nq|
^vaxbZ vi c ~eA vgwi K vi K j vwb wj Z GK w` K i vR Z A bw` K
A vwf R vZ Z we` gvb wQj | The Federalist Papers G Publius bvg
Z ` vbx b A vgwi K vi wewk i vR bxwZ we` I wP vwe` James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton I John Jay we` gvb mvgvwR K c vc U 178 7 mvj i
A vei nBZ 178 8 mvj i A Mv gvmi ga b~Z b i vi wewf b
mvsweavwbK mgmvi Dc i A vj vK c vZ K i b|
R bgvbyl i mvef gZ wbw Z K i Y wQj hy i vi msweavbi
g~j j | c R vZ i A vK vi c wZ wbwaZ k xj MYZ K msweavbi
A wbwnZ bxwZ wnmve MnY K i v nq| wK msL vMwi Z v hb
^i k vmb c wi YZ bv nq mBi c Checks and belances i vL v nq| GB
K vi Y House of representatives Gi m` mMY mi vmwi f vU wbevwPZ
nBj I Senate m` mMY I i vc wZ wbevPb c i v f ve A byvb
K wi evi weavb K i v nq| Z vnvQvo v, Congress, wbevnx wef vM I wePvi
78
wef vM c _ K &K i Yi gvag gZ vi c _ K &K i Y (Seperation of Powers)
wbw Z K i v nq| Z e c _ gw` K Bsj vi bvq aygv vei
mw i gvwj K ` i gaB f vUvwaK vi mxwgZ wQj | Z vnvQvo v, gwnj v
I xZ ` vmi K vb f vUvwaK vi wQj bv| mveR bxb f vUvwaK vi Pvj y
K wi Z e er mi A c v K wi Z nBqvwQj | D` vi bxwZ K MYZ
A vbqb K wi evi R b msweavb c _ g ` k wU msk vab gvi d r evK -
^vaxbZ v, msev` c i ^vaxbZ v, mgvek i ^vaxbZ v, agxq ^vaxbZ v
BZ vw` weavb A vbqb K i v nq| xZ ` vm c _ v wej vc K wi Z hy i v
GK wU Mnhyi c qvR b nq| H Mnhyi mgqB 18 63 mvj
hy i vi i vc wZ Abraham Lincoln Gettysburg hy i GK wU A sk gZ
hvv` i c wZ Dr mMK wi Z hvBqvZ uvnvi f vl Y ej bt
that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not
perish from the earth.
f vl Yi Dc i v A sk K B A vay wbK MYZ i ms v wnmve
A wf wnZ K i vnq|
A Z tc i 18 65 mvj msweavbi qv` k msk vabxi gvi d r
xZ ` vm c _ v wej y Nvl Yv K i v nq Ges 18 68 mvj PZ y` k
msk vabx gvi d r hy i vi mK j bvMwi K MYi ga A vBbi ` wZ
mgZ vA vbqb K i vnq|
GBf ve hy i v mvsweavwbK MYZ (Constitutional democracy) ev
Alexis de Tocqueville Gi f vl vq A democratic republic exists in the United States
(Democracy in America) c vwZ vwbK i c j vf K i |
c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h, Bsj v 168 8 mvj Gi wec e
A bywZ nBevi c i Ges 168 9 mvj Bill of Rights c YxZ nBevi d j
Z _ vq c vj vgUi k Z vwc Z nq, wK GK w` K House of Lords Gi
c ~Y gZ v we` gvb _ vK A bw` K Commons mf vqI DP k Yxi B c ~Y
c f ve we` gvb _ vK | wK d i vwm wP vwe` MYi j L bx Ges
Bsj vi Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Hill Green c f wZ
wP vwe` MY Z uvnv` i j L bxi gvag Bsj vK MYZ vw K I
R bK j vYg~j K i vwnmve c wZ wZ K wi Z A vc vY Pv K wi qvQb|
79
wek l K wi qv Z L b Z vnv` i myL hy i vi bvq GK wU mvsweavwbK
MYZ i D` vni Y wQj | d j k wZ Z , 18 32 mvj Reforms Act c YxZ
nq| BnvZ f vUvi i msL v wK QyUv we Z nq| Z r c i 18 67 I
18 8 4 mvj i Reform Act A bymvi f vUvi i msL vi c wi wa A vi I we Z
nq| 1911 mvj i Parliament Act Gi gvag House of Lords Gi gZ v
A bK vsk L enq|
c _ g gnvhy wec yj msL K mwbK c vY nvi vq hvnv` i ek xi
f vMi B vei mw wQj bv| c k I V h Z vnvi v wK aygv i vR v I
` k i R bB c vY w` Z Q, h ` k Z vnv` i wbR ` i B f vUvwaK vi
bvB| hy i vi i vc wZ Woodraw Wilson Bsj vi c hy
hvM` vbi K vi Y wnmve ej b to save democracy| GB mK j c vc U
1918 mvj i Representation of People Act vi v mK j c veq c yi l Ges
1928 mvj i Representation of People Act ` vi v mK j c veq gwnj v
f vUvwaK vi c v nb| Z vnvQvo v, 1948 mvj i Parliament Act vi v House
of Lords Gi gZ vA vi I L eK i vnq|
GBf ve Bsj v A wZ axi R bMYi c K Z mvef gZ I A wR Z
nq, hw` I King in Parliament Gi mvef gZ Z vwZ K f ve GL bI
i wnqvQ| Bsj vi GL b mBai Yi MYZ c Pwj Z hL vb R bMY
mK j gZ vi A waK vi x wK Z vnvi v Z vnv` i c wZ wbwa gvi d r mB
gZ v c qvM K i b| wbevwPZ c wZ wbwaMY mi K vi i mK j K vR i
R b R bMYi wbK U ` vqx _ vK b| hw` I Bnv Z vwZ K f ve m~Y
msL vMwi i k vmb Z eyI Z vnvi v mvsweavwbK Convention vi v
msL vj wN R bMYi GK K ev h_ A waK vi eR vq i vwL Z eva|
msL vMwi mi K vi hK vb A vBb ev c ` c j BZ A vBbMZ f ve
gZ v c v wK K vb A vBbMZ i vK eP ewZ i K B aygv bwZ K
A waK vi i (moral rights) A byc w wZ Z Z vnvi v gwj K A waK vi c wi c nx
K vb c ` c K L bB MnY K wi e bv, hgb, ew ^vaxbZ v (Civil
liberties), gwj K A waK vi mg~n, hgb, evK - ^vaxbZ v, msev` c i
^vaxbZ v, mgvek i ^vaxbZ v, agxq ^vaxbZ v BZ vw` | Bsj v GB
80
A waK vi wj ei L j vc K wi qv K vb A vBb K L bB c Yqb nBe bv |
A bwZ K A vBb c Yqbi GK wU Pi g D` vni Y wnmve Professor A.V.
Dicey wbwj wL Z f ve Leslie Stephen (Science of Ethics,1882) K DZ
K i bt
................... If a legislature decided that all blue eyed babies should be
murdered, the preservation of blue eyed babies would be illegal; but
legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects
be idiotic before they could submit to it. (Professor A. V. Dicey :
Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Costitution, page-81).

Z vnvQvo v, MYZ vw K i v ee vq R bgvbyl i ga A vw_ K
c v_ K K gvBqvA vwbevi I c Pv_ vK |
GBf ve k Z k Z er mi i c Pvq Bsj v c wZ wbwaZ g~j K
MYZ , mvsweavwbK MYZ I mvgvwR K MYZ c wZ wZ nq|
Dc i v Yvej x h mK j i vi i vee vq c wZ d wj Z nq
Z vnv` i B A v` k MYZ ej v hvq| hw` I c w_ exZ e ` k i wnqvQ
hvnvi v wbR ` i MYZ vw K ewj qv ` vex K i | GgbwK mvgwi K c k vmK
I ^i vk vmK MYI GBi c ` vex K wi qv _ vK b| S.E. Finer Z vnvi The
Man on Horseback ( 1962) M Ggb GK wU Z vwj K vc ` vb K wi qvQbt
Nasser : Presidential Democracy
Ayub Khan : Basic Democracy
Sukarno : Guided Democracy
Franco : Organic Democracy
Stroessner : Selective Democracy
Trujillo : Neo-Democracy
(Bernard Crick : Democracy nBZ DZ )

Dc i v i v ee v wj Z R bMYi k Z i K vb vb bvB
wK D ee v wj K MYZ A vL vwqZ K wi Z ` k x we` k x
wP vwe` i A f ve nq bv, hw` I A vgv` i wbR ` i A wf Z vi
A vj vK ej v hvq h Bnvi GK wUI MYZ bq| Finer evuwPqv _ vwK j
Z vnvi GB Z vwj K vA vi I ewaZ nBZ c vwi Z |
81
A vaywbK hyMi c vc U Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, Z vunvi wj wL Z
Law & Life c y Z K MYZ m^ wbwj wL Z g e K i b t
There are three different systems of democracy. The U.S. system is
where the President matters most and the Congress cannot, except by
impeachment, override his powers which are large. The Swiss system is where
cantons are territorial subdivisions with State Power and are elected. They
discharge governmental function and differ from the third pattern which is the
Westminster system prevalent in the United Kingdom where the parties with
Parliamentary majority rule with the Cabinet enjoying powers of administration
and have a formal head of the nation like the queen............. Page-34)

21| MYc R vZ ( Republic) t evsj v` k msweavbi
c vebvq MYc R vZ x evsj v` k c wZ vi K _ v ej v nBqvQ|
msweavbi 1 A byQ` evsj v` k h GK wU c R vZ Z vnv Nvl Yv K i v
nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi c _ g f vM, wZ xq f vM I msweavbi
me evsj v` k h GK wU c R vZ Z vnvc ybt c ybt ej vnBqvQ|
A vc xj K vi x c wbe` b K i v nq h evsj v` k i vh GK wU
c R vZ hvnv msweavbi GK wU basic sturcture, wK Z veavqK mi K vi
A vgj , msweavb c R vZ j L v mZ I , i vi c R vZ vw K Pwi H
mgq m~YA byc w Z _ vK |
msweavb evsj v` k K MYc R vZ x evsj v` k bvg A wf wnZ
K i v nBqvQ| c _ gZ t c R vZ basic structure wK bv, wZ xqZ t hw` Bnv
msweavbi basic structure nBqv _ vK Z e Z veavqK mi K vi avi Yv
Bnvi mwnZ mvsNwl K wK bv Z vnv wek l Y K wi evi c ~ec R vZ A _
wK , Bnvi BwZ nvm wK , Z vnvms c A vj vPbvc qvR b|
j vwUb f vl vq res publica A _ public good ev public thing| Bnvi
A _ republic ev c R vZ I eU| c R vZ Ggb GK wU k vmb ee v
hvnvi g~j D k R bMYi K j vY mvab|
Thomas Paine Gi gZ ev` A bymvi republicanism ev c R vZ vw K Z v
K vb c k vmb c wZ bq, ei , Bnv R bK j vY g~j K GK wU mi K vi i
A v` k k vmb ee v| c R vZ vw K Z v mgybZ nq, Pocock Gi f vl vq a
way of life given over to civic concerns and the ultimately activity of citizenship.|
82
Republic government ev c R vZ w K mi K vi m^ wZ wb ej b republican
government is no other than government established and conducted for the interest of
the public, as well individually as collectively|
Paine Gi gZ A bymvi c R vZ K vb wek l ai bi k vmb
c wZ Z mxgve bq| Bnv c wZ wbwaZ k xj c wZ i mwnZ I c qvM
nBZ c vi |
Z e h c wZ B nDK , c R vZ i vR vi ev K vb Mvxi A w Z
_ vwK e bvGes BnvR bK j vY g~j K nBZ nBe|
A vaywbK H wZ nvwmK MY L c ~e510mvj i vgK i vR v` i
i vR Z i k l nBZ L c ~e31mvj mgvU Octavious Gi mvgvR i
c vi K vj c h republican period ev c R vZ vw K K vj wnmve wPw Z ev
A wf wnZ K wi qvQb| 7g i vgK i vR v Tarquin A Z A Z vPvi x wQj b|
L c ~e510 mvj i vgi A waevmxMY i vR v Tarquin K i vR nBZ
ewn vi K i | Patrician I Plebian vi v MwVZ Comitia Centuriata ` yBR b
Consul K GK er mi Gi R b wbevwPZ K wi Z | Consul A _ mnK gx|
Z vnv` i i vR vi gZ B gZ v wQj | c vq me mgqB A wf R vZ Patrician
nBZ Consul wbevwPZ nBZ , K vR B c K Z i vR gZ v A wf R vZ
i vgK ` i gaB mxgve wQj | GK vi Y wbR ` i A waK vi A v` vq
Plebian ` i K c vq ` yBk Z er mi awi qv hy K wi Z nBqvwQj | 479
er mi c i L c ~e3 1 mvj Octavious mvgvR c wZ v K i b I Imperator
Dc vwa MnY K i b| Z vnvi k vmb ee v aygv bvgB c R vZ wQj
wK c K Z c c ybi vq i vR Z A vi nq| GB f veB i vgK
c R vZ i A emvb NU|
ga hyMi k l f vM BDi vc i bmuvi beR vMi Yi mgq
BUvwj i K qK wU bMi i v ^ mgqi R b c R vZ i c ybtA vwef ve
NU| bMi wj i ga wek l K wi qv Venice I Florence c avb | GBmK j
bMi - i vi Pwi wbYq H wZ nvwmK MY D i v wj Z i vR Z ,
MvxZ , GK bvqK Z BZ vw` i A byc w wZ c he Y K i Z t D i v
ee vK c R vZ vw K wnmve wPw Z K i b| H mK j bMi - i v ^
83
msL K ew mxwgZ f vUvwaK vi i gvag wbevwPZ nBqv i v
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z b| Venice bMi - i v bvg gv ev L Z vwe ( Titular)
i v- c avbi Dc vwa wQj Doge|
Bsj v 1649 mvj nBZ 1660 mvj c h GK ai bi
Commonwealth we` gvb wQj | 1649 mvj Charles I Gi wk i Q` K i v
nq| A Z tc i , Oliver Cromwell Bsj v Lord Protector Dc vwa MnY K i Z t
mi K vi c wi Pvj bv K i b| H ^ mgq i vR Z A byc w Z _ vwK j I
GK K k vmb we` gvb wQj , Z e k vmK eMMYgvbyl i K j vYi Pv
K wi qv wQj b| wek l K wi qv f vUvwaK vi i vei mw i
gvwj K vbv j Bqv Putney debates G mvavi Y mb` i c nBZ c k
D vc b K i v nBqvwQj h Z vnvi v ` k i R b hy K wi e A _ P
mw i gvwj K vbv bv _ vK vq Z vnv` i f vUvwaK vi _ vwK e bv, Bnv
K b|
18 k k Z vw Z Montesquieu I Rousseau c f wZ wP vwe` MYi
j L bxi c f ~Z c f ve BDi vc xq ` k j vi Dc i c o | gvbq
SwitzerlandG c R vZ mw nq|
k vmbee vq k vwmZ i A bygv` b Ges MYgvbyl i A waK vi GB
` yB g~j bxwZ A vgwi K vb hy i vI d v Df q ` k i wec eK B wek l
f ve c f vweZ K i |
l vo k k Z v xZ Bsj v D i A vgwi K vq 13wU K j vbx- i v
vc b K i | K j vbx wj i i v gZ v Bsj vi i vR v I c vj vgU
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z | K j vbxi wj i A waevmxMY gb K wi Z h,
Bsj vi i vR v Z vnv` i I i vR v wK Bsj vi c vj vgU K j vbxi
wbR ^K vb evc vi A vBb c Yqb K wi Z ev K i A vi vc K wi Z c vi
bv K vi Y, mL vb Z vnv` i K vb c wZ wbwa wQj bv| BnvB wQj
K j vbx wj i mwnZ Bsj vi wei vai g~j K vi Y| 1774 mvj
K j vbx wj i c wZ wbwa mgevq c _ g Continental Congress Gi GK mf v
A bywZ nq| Congress Z vnv` i ` vex- ` vI qv m^ i vR vi wbK U
A ve` b K i Z t GK wU Declaration of Rights c i Y K i wK mgS vZ vi
84
c wi eZ i vR vGeorge III 1775 mvj i A Mv gvm GK Proclamation vi v
K j vbx wj K we` vnx ewj qv Nvl Yv K i b| 1775 mvj MwVZ
Continental Congress K j vbx wj i K ` xq i v c wi Pvj bvi gZ v MnY
K i Ges MU weUbi wei hyi wmv MnY K i | 1776
mvj i 4Vv R yj vB Z vwi L Continental Congress A vBb A vK vi ^vaxbZ v
Nvl Yvi wej wU c vm K i | GB m k l nq 13wU K j vbxZ wewUk
A vwac Z |
^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvi gvag GK wU R vZ xq mi K vi vwc Z nq| GB
mi K vi wbR K ^vaxb I mvef g weePbv K i | k vmb gZ v
mymsnZ K wi evi j Continental Congress GK wU Articles of Confederation
MnY K i | 178 1 mvj wewUk evwnbx Continental army Gi wbK U
A vZ mgc Y K i |
A Z tc i Continental Congress GK wU msweavb c Yqbi c qvR bxqZ v
A byf e K i | mB j K j vbxi wbevwPZ c wZ wbwaMY vi v MwVZ
GK wU Constitutional Convention 178 7 mvj A vZ nq|
H mgq mvsweavwbK mgmvej x j Bqv ` k i i vR bxwZ K I
wP vwe` MY BDi vc xq wP vwe` MYi f veavi v I j L bx weePbvq
j qb| Alexander Hamilton, John Jay I James Madison wewf bmvsweavwbK
mgmv j Bqv The Federalist Papers G Z vnv` i we gZ vgZ c K vk
K i b|
GK w` K K ` xq mi K vi i gZ v A bw` K 13wU A i vi
gZ vi we wZ , Df q c k vmbi ga checks and balances i Y, A v`
MYZ _ vwK e wK bv, _ vwK j Bnvi evw K Z ` ~i nBe Ges
f vUvwaK vi K vb c h c mvwi Z K i v wVK nBe BZ vw` wewf bmgmv
j Bqv Philadelphia Gi Constitutional Convention G weZ K nBZ _ vK |
H mgq Bsj vi c vj vgUi mvef gZ wQj wK mvavi Y
R bMYi wQj bv| wK hy i vi msweavb R bMYi mvef gZ K
g~j bxwZ wnmve MnY K i v nq| mB 18 k k Z v xZ MYZ ewj Z
85
Z L b c vPxb Mxm ` k xq msL vMwi i MYZ evS vBZ wK H i c
msL vMwi i megq gZ vConvention Gi wbK U MnYhvM wQj bv|
hy i vmi K vi i ai Y wK nBe m m^ A vj vK c vZ K wi Z
wMqvJames Madison 178 7 mvj Federalist 10 G ej bt
............ A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises
the cure for which we are seeking. ............... In the extent and proper
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government. ..............

c i eZ xZ hy i vi msweavbi PZ z_ A byQ` i 4 avi vq GB
i vi ai Y h republican evc R vZ vw K nBe Z vnvwbw Z K i vnq|
Madison 1791 mvj Government bvg GK wU c e j L b t
A republic involves the idea of popular rights. A representative republic chuses
the wisdom, of which hereditary aristocracy has the chance; whilst it excludes
the oppression of that form....... To secure all the advantages of such a system,
every good citizen will be at once a centinel over the rights of the people; over
the authorities of the confederal government; and over both the rights and the
authorities of the intermediate governments.
( Larry D. Kramer: The People Themselves, c v- 114 nBZ DZ )

GBf ve A vaywbK wek mec _ g GK wU c K Z c R vZ vw K ` k
A vZ c K vk K wi j |
Minor V. Happerse H.88 US (21 Wall) 162(1874) gvK v gvq US Supreme
Court gwnj v` i f vUvwaK vi bvB ewj qv e e c ` vb K vj hy i vh
GK wU c R vZ Z vnv Nvl Yv K i | Morrison R.Waite C.J., Z uvnvi i vq
ej bt
............It is true that the United States guarantees to every State a
republican form of government............. The guaranty is of a republican
form of government........

Duncan V. McCall 139 US 449 (page-219) (1891) gvK v gvq US State
Court Gi GL wZ qvi mK A vj vPbv c m US
Supreme Court hy i v h GK wU c R vZ Ges MYgvbyl B h mK j
86
gZ vi Dr m Z vnv eYbv K i | Melville Weston Fuller, C.J., Z uvnvi i vq
ej bt
By the constitution , a republican form of government is guaranteed to
every state in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the
right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental
administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power
reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be
those of the people themselves; but while the people are thus the source
of political power; their governments, national and state , have been
limited by written Constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set
bounds to their own power, as against the sudden impulses of mere
majorities.

GBf ve 178 7 mvj c YxZ msweavbi gvag c w_ exi c _ g
c K Z c R vZ Bnvi hv v A vi K i | g g c w_ exi e` k
c R vZ vw K i vee vMnY K i |
1971 mvj i 10B Gwc j Z vwi L evsj v` k Bnvi Proclamation of
IndependenceG BnvK MYc R vZ i c Nvl Yv K wi qvQ| c i eZ xZ
Bnvi msweavbi c vebvq I c _ g A byQ` B MYc R vZ x evsj v` k
bvg Nvl YvK wi qvQ|
22| wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v t c i eZ x c k Z veavqK
mi K vi c wZ Z mek l c avb wePvi c wZ ev A vc xj wef vMi A b
K vb wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvM wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vK K vb f ve zbK i wK bv|

Dj L h msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, Gi 3
avi v ej msweavbi PZ z_ f vM Gi 2q c wi Q` Gi c i 2K
c wi Q` - wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi mwbewk Z K i v nq|
wePvi c wZ MYi ga nBZ c avb Dc ` v wbqvM ms v weavb 58 M
A byQ` i 3 I 4 ` d vq eYbvK i vnBqvQt
58 M ( 1) ..................
( 2) ...................
( 3) i vc wZ evsj v` k i A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ MYi
ga whwb mek l A emi c v nBqvQb Ges whwb GB
87
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Dc ` vwbqvM K wi ebt
Z e k Z _ vK h, hw` DI i c A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ K c vI qv bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c `
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wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|

( 4) hw` K vb A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ K c vI qv bv
hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY A mZ nb, Z vnv
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whwb mek l A emi c v nBqvQb Ges whwb GB A byQ` i
A axb Dc ` v wbhy nBevi hvM Z vunvK c avb Dc ` v
wbqvM K wi ebt
Z e k Z _ vK h, hw` D i c A emi c v wePvi K K
c vI qv bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY A mgZ
nb, Z vnv nBj i vc wZ A vc xj wef vMi A emi c v
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K wi eb|


A vc xj K vi x c nBZ R bve Gg A vB d vi K x I R bve gnmxb
i k x` gb K i b h Dc i v weavb A bymvi A emi c v
wePvi c wZ MYi ga nBZ c avb Dc ` v wbqvM c ` vb wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ vK K vb bvK vb f ve zbK i |
we A vUbx- R bvi j A ek Z vnv gb K i b bv| Z uvnvi e e
h wbi c wbevPbi R b Z veavqK mi K vi c qvR b Ges c avb
Dc ` vc ` i R b c v b c avb wePvi c wZ i K vb weK bvB|
GwgK vm wK Dwi qvMYi ga R bve wU GBP L vb, Wt K vgvj
nvmb, wmwbqi GvWf vK Ue` , G c m K vb e e i vL b bvB|
R bve i wd K - Dj nK , wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, c avb Dc ` v
c ` i R b A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ wbqvM wePvi wef vMi
vaxbZ vK zbK wi e Z vnv A xK vi K i b bvB| wZ wb Z veavqK
88
mi K vi ee vK necessary evil A vL vwqZ K i Z t Z veavqK mi K vi i
R b weK c avb Dc ` vI Dc ` veMmK c ve c ` vb K i b|
Wt Gg.R wni wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, c avb Dc ` v c `
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ i wbqvM wePvi wef vMi vaxbZ vi
c wi c xewj qvgb K i b| wZ wb weK ee vi c i vgk c ` vb K i b|
R bve gvngy` yj Bmj vg, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, Gi G c m
e e nBj h hnZ zA emi c v wePvi c wZ MYi ga nBZ c avb
Dc ` v wbqvM K i v nBe, K vR B myc xg K vUnBZ c vb K wi evi
c i Z uvnvi H i c wbqvM wePvi wef vMK K vb f veB c f vweZ K i
bv|
R bve Gg A vwgi - Dj Bmj vg, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, c avb
Dc ` v c ` c v b c avb wePvi c wZ i wbqvM h wePvi wef vMi
vaxbZ vi c wi c xZ vnvA xK vi K wi Z c vi b bvB|
R bve i vK bDw b gvngy` , wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, ej b h
c avb Dc ` v c ` c v b c avb wePvi c wZ i wbqvMi K vb weK
bvB|
R bve A vR gvj yj nvmb, wmwbqi GvW&f vK U, _ nxb f vl vq
ej b c v b c avb wePvi c wZ i c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvM wePvi
wef vMi vaxbZ vi c wi c x|
wePvi wef vMi vaxbZ vi K _ v mevB ewj qv _ vK b, wK
c _ gB Dc j w K i v ` i K vi wePvi wef vMi vaxbZ v ewj Z c K Z
c wK evS vq| Z vnvQvo v, Bnvi i wnqvQ my` xNBwZ nvm| wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ vA R b K Z gnvgvby l i K Z Z vM wZ wZ vi d j Z vnv
ms c nBj I A vgv` i R vbv c qvR b| wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vi
BwZ nvm c K Z c gvbe mf Z vi BwZ nvm|
h wePvi ee vq wePvi K MY mec K vi c j y Z v, Pvc I f q- f xwZ
_ vK v mZ I mi K vi I A b mK j pressure group Gi A wf j vl I
K gc vi Da_ vwK qv wbf xK f ve aygv ` k i msweavb I A vBb
89
A bymvi wePvwi K K vh g wbw Z K i Z vnvK B ^vaxb wePvi wef vM
ej vhvq|
GB wePvi wef vMi g~j K ` we` y nBj b GK R b wePvi K |
A vewk K f veB wZ wb R bMbi ga nBZ A vMZ GK R b mr I
wk w Z gvbyl nBeb| GK R b wePvi K i R b Z vnvB h_ bq| hL b
wZ wb wePvi K i A vmb A vmxb nBeb Z L b Z vnvK i vM- wei vM ewnf ~Z
c v_ i i bvq A byf ~wZ nxb nBZ nq (Edmund Burke: cold neutrality of an
impartial judge)| wK GK R b wePvi c wZ I mvavi b i gvsmi gvbyl |
Z vnvi I ew MZ PvI qv- c vI qv, c qvR b I mgmv _ vwK Z c vi |
Z vnvi c i I GK R b wePvi K K mec K vi c j vf bi myL I m~Y
wbi c I wbgvn f ve Z vnvi Dc i A wc Z ` vwqZ I K Z e c vj b
K wi Z nq| Z vnvK BnR vMwZ K GgbwK c vi j wK K R xebi c wZ I
gvnnxb f ve aygv bvq wePvi c wZ vK wi Z nBe|
i vi c nBZ I GK R b wePvi K K mec K vi i vxq
c wZ K ~j Z vi nvZ nBZ i v K wi evi R b Z vnvi PvK zi xi gqv` K vj
mvsweavwbK f ve wbw` K wi qv ` I qv nq| Z vnvQvo v, Z vnvi eZ b
f vZ v I myweav` xI msweavb myi v c ` vb K i | GB f ve i vi c
nBZ I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vA zbi vwL evi c ` c j I qvnq|
Z e wePvi wef vMi vaxbZ vi eZ gvb A e vb A vbqb K wi Z
k Z k Z YR bvgvbyl i nvR vi er mi i msMvg c qvR b nBqvQ|
A vo vB nvR vi er mi c ~e Mxm ` k i wewf bbMi - i v vb-
we vb, ` k b, A vBbi A byk xj bi R b weL vZ wQj | i vgK
K bmvj MYi hyM H ` k A vBb mgw j vf K i | c bwUd &ev i vgK
wePvi K MY wePvi K vhc wi Pvj bv K wi Z b| Z e H mgq K vb wj wL Z
c _ vMZ A vBb wQj bv| wj wL Z A vBbi A byc w wZ Z c weqvb c R vMY
c vqk B A wePvi i wk K vi nBZ b| A ek l Z vnv` i ` vexi gyL
GK wU K wgk b Mxm ` k i Athens mn wewf bbMi Z vnv` i A vBb I
c _ v m^ mgK vb j vf i R b c i Y K i v nq| Z vnvi v wd wi qv
90
A vwmqv L t c ~t 451 mvj A vBb I c _ v wj 12 wU Table G A vBb
mswnZ v A vK vi c K vk K i | A Z tc i , mK j we` gvb A vBb m^
gvUvgywU GK wU avi Yvc vb|
A wZ c vPxb Bsj vi wePvi ee v A Z yj A e vq wQj |
1066 mvj William the Conquerer Gi Bsj v weR qi c i bi gvb
i vR vMY ` k GK wU mymsnZ c k vmb I wePvi ee v DbZ K wi evi
c qvm c vb| H mgq The king is the fountain of justice GB c ev` A bymvi
^qs i vR v wePvi vj q ( Kings Bench) Dc ek b K i Z t wePvi K vh
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z b| hy weMn I bvbvb K vi Y i vR K vhew c vBj
g g i vR vdurante bene placito (during good pleasure) ( i vR vi mw` Qvi
Dc i wf w K i Z t) k Z vbymvi wePvi K wbqvM c ` vb K wi Z b| Z vnvi v
i vR vi bvg I Z vnvi c nBqv wePvi K vhc wi Pvj bv K wi Z b| Z e
i vR vi gZ zi c i mK j wePvi K MY ^qsw qf ve Z vnv` i c `
nvi vBZ b| b~Z b i vR v c ybi vq b~ Z b K wi qv c Q` gZ wePvi K wbqvM
c ` vb K wi Z b| i vR vi A m wi K vi Y nBj wePvi K MY
Z vr wYK f ve ei L v Z nBZ b| Lord Chancellor Sir Thomas More i vR v
Henry VIII Gi A v` k 16 er mi Tower G A i xb wQj b, Z r c i Z uvnvi
wk i Q` K i v nq| c K Z c , wePvi K MY A b i vR K gPvi x` i bvq
i vR vi GK v emse` meK (servant) _ vwK qv wbR ` i K MweZ gb
K wi Z b | wK mB i K g mgqI 13k k Z v xZ i vR v Henry III Gi
i vR Z K vj Justice Henry de Bracton Z uvnvi i wPZ M De Legibus G j L bt
Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege (that the
king should not be under man, but under God and the law)
H i c absolute monarchyi hyM i vR vi GBi c vb wbavi Y
GK w` K Dc i v wePvi K i Pvwi w K ` pZ v A bw` K i vR vi
we` vr mvwnZ vc gvY K i |
i vYx Elizabeth I Gi gZ zi c i 1603 mvj James I Bsj vi
wmsnvmb A vi vnb K i b| wZ wb ^Mxq A waK vi ej (divine right) i vR
k vmb K wi Z Qb ewj qv gb K wi Z b | wZ wb wbR K A vBbi Da
91
ewj qv gb K wi Z b Ges Parliament ewZ i K i vR K xq Proclamation I
Prerogative A waK vi vi v A vBb c Yqb K i Z t i vR k vmb K wi evi gZ
c vl Y K wi Z b| GB wel q Court of Common Pleas Gi c avb wePvi c wZ
Sir Edward Coke Gi gZ vgZ wR vmv K wi j wZ wb wbwj wL Z gZ vgZ
c K vk K i b ( 1608 mvj ) t
The law, he said was the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of
his subjects: and which protected his majesty in safety and peace. The king in
his own person cannot adjudge and case either criminal ......... or betwixt party
and party. The king cannot take any cause out of any of his courts and give
judgment upon it himself. The judgments are always given per curiam; and
the judges are sworn to execute justice according to the law and customs of
England. (Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law Vol. V page -
430 Z Z xq gy` Y 1945, nBZ DZ )

wbR i R xeb wec bK wi qv Pvwi k Z er mi c ~ei vR vi myL
A vBbi GB f vl c ` vb Sir Edward Coke Gi Pvwi w K ` pZ v, mvnm Ges
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vi K _ vB mi Y K i vBqv` q|
GgbwK c vj vgU K Z K wewae A vBbI hw` mvavi Y A vBbi
` wZ A ea c Z xqgvb nq Z vnvI evwZ j K wi evi gZ v A v` vj Z i
i wnqvQ ewj qvDr. Bonham ( 1610) gvK v gvq Coke Nvl YvK i bt
Where an Act of Parliament is against right and reason repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control and adjudge
that Act to be void ( Lord Denning K Z K wj wL Z What Next In
The Law c v- 319 nBZ DZ )
A vBbi GK B ai Yi f vl Day V. Savage ( 1614) gvK gvq
Hobart, C.J. ej bt
................ Even an Act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to
make a man judge in his own cause, is void in itself, for jura natural sunt
immutabilia and they are leges legumes HWR Wade Gi
Administrative Law,c g gy` Y, 198 2, c y K i 418 c v
nBZ DZ ) |

92
Common Law Gi k Z memgq Dc vc b K wi qv Coke Gi wewf b
i vq c ` vbi K vi Y i vR v James I wei nBqv 1613 mvj Z uvnvK Court
of Common Pleas nBZ A c mvi Y K i Z t Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ
wnmve wbqvM c ` vb K i b|
Colt and Glover V. Bishop of Coventry (Case of Commendams)(1616)
gvK v gvq wek c K commendam A vK vi i vR vi g yi x c ` vbi
Prerogative Pvj K i v nq| wei vaxq wel qwUi i Z A byaveb K wi qv
Court of Common Pleas, Kings Bench Ges Court of Exchequer Gi 12 R b
wePvi K mgbq MwVZ Exchequer Chamber A v` vj Z bvbx A vi nq| H
mgq i vR v j bi evwni Newmarket G A e vb K wi Z wQj b| hnZ z
i vR vi prerogative Gi wel qwUI wePvi axb mBnZ zi vR v Attorney General
Sir Francis Bacon gvi d r Z vnvi e e bv k vbv c h i vq c ` vb bv
K i vi R b wePvi K MYK wb` k c ` vb K i b| wK wePvi K MYi wbK U
Bnv A vBb I Z uvnv` i k c _ c wi c x c Z xqgvb nI qvq Z uvnvi v
wePvi K vh wMZ bv K wi qv c wi Pvj bv K wi Z _ vK b| i vR v j b
d i r A vwmqv mK j wePvi K MYK WvwK qv A Z vavwbZ f ve
wR vmv K i b h f wel Z Z vnvi v i vR vi BQv A bymvi gvK v gv
nwMZ K wi eb wK bv| Coke ewZ Z mK j wePvi K B i vR vi BQv
A bymvi c ` c j Bevi A xK vi c ` vb K i b| wK Coke h D i
c ` vb K i b Z vnv f wel r mK j wePvi K i R b wk Yxq I A byK i Yxq
nBqv_ vwK e| wZ wb ej bt
When that happens, I will do that which it shall be fit for a
Judge to do.
(Lord Denning wj wL Z What Next In The Law M nBZ DZ )
Sir Edward Coke wbR i R xebi Dc i S zuwK j Bqv I f wel Z
mvebv R j v wj c ` vb K wi qv wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v mB absolute
monarchyi hyMI GBf ve mgybZ i vL b| Bnvi wK Qyw` b c i 1616
93
mvj Sir Edward Coke K c avb wePvi c wZ c ` nBZ ei L v K i v nq|
c i eZ xK vj wZ wb House of Commons mf vi m` m wbevwPZ nb|
i vR v James I Gi gZ zi c i Z vnvi R c y Charles I 1625 mvj
Bsj vi wmsnvmb A vi vnb K i b| H mgq bi mwnZ hy
Pwj Z wQj | H L i P wgUvBevi R b A wZ wi K i A vi vc K i v Qvo vI
wZ wb R bmvavi YK F Y c ` vb eva K i b Ges hvnvi v F Y c ` vb
A ^xK wZ R vbvBZ wQj Z vnvw` MK K vi v` c ` vb K i v nBZ wQj |
Kings Bench Gi Z ` vbx b c avb wePvi c wZ H i c K vi ` i eaZ v
c ` vb K wi Z A ^xK wZ R vbvBj Z uvnvK I ei L v Z K i vnq|
wK mK j wePvi c wZ Coke Gi bvq ghv` vc ~YwQj b bv| Darnel
Gi gvK v gvq ( 1627) Darnel I A b K qK R b Habeas Corpus i xU&Gi
gvag Z vnv` i A i xY A v` k Pvj K i b| F Y c ` vb A ^xK wZ i
K vi Y Z vnvw` K A i xY K i v nBqvwQj wK c avb wePvi c wZ Sir
Nichols Hyde i vR vi gZ vi GBi c A c eenvi n c bv K wi qv
gvK v gv L vwi R K i b| d j k wZ Z Prerogative of arbitrary commitment Gi
gvag GK R b c R vK A wbw` K vj A i xY i vwL Z i vR vi GBi c
^QvPvi g~j K A waK vi i wePvwi K ^xK wZ c ` vb K i vnq|
i vR vi GBi c ^QvPvi x A vPi Y mvavi Y R bMY A Z y
nBqv I V| Commons mf vq Coke Gi bZ Z wewf bA waK vi m^wj Z
Petition of Right wej A vK vi D vc b K i v nq| D wej eA vBbx f ve
UvK v A v` vq, ^QvPvi g~j K A i xY, emvgwi K j vK K mvgwi K
A vBb k vw c ` vb BZ vw` wbwl K i v nq| i vR v c _ g c ej A vc w
K wi j I c i Commons mf vi c P Pvc i gyL i vR K xq mw c ` vb
K wi Z eva nb| 1628 mvj ^v wi Z GB Petition of Right Bsj vi
2q weL vZ mvsweavwbK ` wj j |
1649 mvj Charles I Gi wk i Q` nq| 1660 mvj Charles II
wmsnvmb A vi vnb K i b (restoration)| Charles II Z vnvi i vR Z i
k l f vM A Z ^QvPvi x nBqv I Vb Ges wePvi wef vMK Z vnvi
94
^QvPvi K vheenvi K wi Z _ vK b| 168 5 mvj Z vnvi gZ zi c i
i vR v James II GK B f ve wbR i ^QvPvwi Z vi K vhwePvi wef vMK
eenvi K i b| Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ Scrogg, George Jeffreys I
Robert Wright mB hyM wePvwi K ^QvPvwi Z v I A Z vPvi i c Z xK
wQj b| Z vnvi v A vBbi c K Z D k mwVK c vc U A bymi Y
K wi evi c wi eZ i vR vi ^QvPvi x D k K A MvaxK vi c ` vb I bvh
c gvY K i vUvB hb Z vnv` i ` vwqZ gb K wi Z b | Lord Chancellor c `
wbqvM c vBqv Lord George Jeffreys i vR vi wei vaxq ` j i c wZ Z vnvi
A c Q` A vi I c K U nBqvc o |
Godden V. Hales (1686) gvK v gv gahyMxq i vR v` i dispensing
gZ vi eaZ v m^ wQj | GB Prerogative gZ v ej i vR v K vb
wek l ew ev A c i vaxi Dc i mswk A vBbi c qvM e i vwL Z
c vwi Z b| Common Pleas A v` vj Z i c avb wePvi c wZ Sir Thomas Jones
i vR vi D gZ vK ea gb K wi Z b bv| wK Z uvnvK c wi vi
f ve R vbvBqv ` I qv nq h, Z uvnvi gZ c wi eZ b K wi Z nBe A _ ev
Z uvnvK c ` Z vM K wi Z nBe| wePvi c wZ Jones ej bt
For my place, I care but little. I am old and worn out in the service of
the crown; but I am mortified to find that your Majesty thinks me
capable of giving a judgment which none but an ignorant or a dishonest
man could give.
(Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead: English Constitutional History, Tenth
Edition, page-402,note-h)
Gi c i Exchequer A v` vj Z i Chief Baron mn wZ wb Ges A vi I
` yBR b wePvi K ei L v nb|
A Z tc i , i vR vi Dc i v gZ vi c i vq nq|
i vR vJames II Gi wmsnvmb c wi Z vMi (abdication) c i 168 9 mvj
myweL vZ Bill of Rights A vBb A vK vi c YxZ nq| GB A vBb vi v absolute
Monarchy Gi A emvb nq, mvsweavwbK i vR Z c wZ wZ nq Ges King in
95
Parliament Gi mvef gZ A wR Z nq| Lord Chatham GB c m h_ v_
f veB ej bt
The Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right(1628) and the
Bill of Rights (1689), together constitute the Bible of the English
Constitution.
i vR vWilliam III I i vYx Mary II 168 9 mvj wmsnvmb A vi vnYi
c i wePvi K MYK quamdiu se bene gesserint ( during his good behaviour) k Z
wbqvM c ` vb K wi Z b| A _ vr wePvi K K vb i Z i A c i va bv K wi j
A vgZ z Z vnvi c ` envj _ vwK Z c vwi eb| d j A nZ zK ei L v
nBevi mvebv bv _ vK vq wePvi K MY wbweNZ vnv` i wePvi K vhK wi Z
c vwi Z b| Z eyGB wbqvM i vR vi mw` Qvi Dc i B wbf i K wi Z |
A Z tc i , 1701 mvj Act of Settlement c YxZ nq| D A vBbi 7
avi vq wePvi K ` i PvK zi xi gqv` I eZ bv` x wbw Z K i v nq| D
avi vwbi c t
(7) ................. Judges commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserint
and their salaries ascertained and established but upon the address of
both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them ( Thomas
Pitt Taswell-Langmead: English Constitutional History,1946, page-518
Dc i v A vBb ej DP A v` vj Z i wePvi K ` i wbqvM,
PvK zi xi gqv` BZ vw` i vR v` i mQvPvwi Z vi A emvb NU Ges
Z vnv` i ^vaxbZ v Z _ v wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v A bK vsk wbw Z K i v
nq|
168 8 mvj i wec ei c i Bsj vi wePvi wef vMI c wi eZ b
A vm| Lord John Holt 168 9 mvj Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ c `
wbqvMc v nb| Sir Edward Coke Gi c i wZ wbB A vBbi k vmb c wZ vq
wbi wewQbf ve Pv K wi qv wMqvwQj b| Coke K i vR vi wei A vBbx
j o vB K wi Z nBqvwQj A vi Lord Holt K House of Lords I House of
96
Commons Gi wek l vwaK vi (Privilege) ` vexi wei A vBbi k vmb
c wZ vq A wei vg msMvg K wi Z nBqvQ|
Rex V. Knollys (1695) gvK gvq House of Lords Gi wek l vwaK vi
(Privilege) Gi wei A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi i wel qwU weeP wQj | GB
gvK v gvq Kings Bench wmv MnY K i h Knollys GK R b peer weavq
commoner wnmve Z vnvi wei A vbxZ A wf hvM L vwi R hvM| wK
House of Lords c ~eB wmv MnY K wi qvwQj h Knollys K vb Peer bb|
G c m Kings Bench A wf gZ c vl Y K i h hnZ zi vR v Knollys Gi
c ` ghv` vi wel qwU wbi c b K wi evi R b House of Lords G c i Y K i b
bvB mnZ zH wel q wmv c ` vb K wi evi K vb GL wZ qvi House of
Lords Gi wQj bv | ^vf vweK f veB House of Lords Gi Peer MY A Z
z nBqv Lord John Holt K ew MZ f ve House of Lords G Dc w Z
nBqv Z uvnvi H i c wmv i K vi Y ` k vBZ wb` k ` b| Dj L h
House of Lords GK w` K Parliament Gi DP K A bw` K mevP
A v` vj Z | wK Lord John Holt Z vnv Mvn bv K wi qv hyw ` L vb h writ of
error gvi d r House of Lords Gi myL wel qwU A vbyvwbK f ve D vc b
K i v bv nBj K vb A v` vj Z i wmv mi vmwi n c K wi evi K vb
gZ v House of Lords Gi I bvB | A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi m wZ wb
ej bt
If there was any such law and custom of Parliament ................. yet
when this comes incidentally in question before them (the judges), they
ought to adjudge, and inter-meddle with it, and they adjudge things of as
high nature every day; for they construe and expound Acts of
Parliament.............
House of Lords Gi wb` k mZ I K vi Y c ` k b bv K wi evi
hw K Z vm^ wZ wb ej bt
.............if the record was removed before the peers by error, so that it
came judicially before them, he would give his reasons very willingly;
but he gave them in this case, it would be of very ill consequence to all
97
judges hereafter in all cases.( Sir William Holdsworth: The History of
English Law, vol.V1, page-271)
GBf ve Lord John Holt i vi mevP c wZ vbi Dc i I
A v` vj Z i k Z Z _ v A vBbi k Z c wZ wZ K i b| K vhwewa
ewnf ~Z f ve mevP A v` vj Z I h A b K vb A v` vj Z i K vh g
n c K wi Z c vi bv Z vnv c wZ wZ nq| House of Lords Gi Peer MY
Lord Holt Gi Dc i A Z y nBj I c i eZ xZ mK j B Z uvnvi
wmv i h K Z vDc j w K i b|
Ashby V. White (1704) gvK v gvq GK w` K House of Commons Gi
wek l vwaK vi (Privilege) A bw` K A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi i wel qwU
weeP wQj | GB gvK v gvq Aylesbury Gi GK R b burgess Ashby K
Aylesburyi gqi f vU c ` vb K wi Z bv w` j Ashby wbevPbx K gK Z v
White Gi wei gvK v gv K i b| Kings Bench A v` vj Z i c avb
wePvi c wZ Lord John Holt Z uvnvi dissenting ev wf bgZ m~PK i vq ej b h
Parliament Gi wek l vwaK vi A vQ wK bvB Z vnv hnZ zGK wU A vBbi
c k mnZ z BnvK A vBbvbymvi wePvi K wi evi GL wZ qvi nBj
A v` vj Z i | Lord John Holt ej bt
But they say that this is a matter out of our jurisdiction and we ought
not to enlarge it. I agree we ought not to encroach or enlarge our
jurisdiction; by so doing we usurp both on the right of the Queen and the
people: but sure we may determine on a charter granted by the King or
on a matter of custom or prescription, when it comes before us without
encroaching on the Parliament. And if it be a matter within our
jurisdiction, we are bound by our oaths to judge of it We do not
deny them their right of examining elections, but we must not be
frighted, when a matter of property comes before us, by saying it belongs
to the Parliament, we must exert the Queens jurisdiction. My opinion is
founded on the law of England. (Sir William Holdsworth: The History
of English Law, Vol.V1, note-6, Page no. 271 )
Kings Bench Gi msL vMwi wePvi c wZ MY Lord Holt Gi Dc i v
gZ i mwnZ GK gZ bv nBj I House of Lords, Writ of error Gi gvag
bvbxA Lord John Holt Gi wbv gZ vgZ MnY K i bt
98
. there is a great difference between the right of the electors and
the right of elected: the one is a temporary right to a place in parliament,
pro hac vice; the other is a freehold or a franchise. Who has a right to sit
in the House of Commons may be properly cognisable there ; but who
has a right to choose is a matter originally established, even before there
is a parliament. . The same law that gives him his right must
defend it for him,
(Thomas Pitt Taswell Langmead: English Constitutional History, Tenth
Edition, 1946, page-650)
Parliament A vBb c Yqb K wi Z mevP gZ v c v nBj I
A vBbi evL v I c qvM m^ P~ o v wmv c ` vb K i v A v` vj Z i
GL wZ qvi , GB i vq Z vnvc wZ wZ K i |
Reg. V. Paty (1705) gvK v gvwU Bsj vi mvsweavwbK BwZ nvmi
A vi I GK PgK c ` NUbv|
Ashby V. White gvK v gvi i vqi c i Paty mn Aylesburyi c uvP R b
burgess GK B ai bi gvK v gv Z vnv` i Gj vK vi c ywj k i wei
` vqi K i | wK House of Commons Bnvi A egvbbvi (Contempt)
A wf hvM ev` x I Z vnv` i A vBbR xwe mK j K B A i xY K i |
Z vnv` i gyw i R b Kings Bench A v` vj Z Writ of habeas ` vqi K i v
nBj msL vMwi wePvi c wZ MY House of Commons Gi wek l vwaK vi i
evc vi Z vnvi v wbR i vB wmv j Bevi R b gZ vevb GB i vq c ` vb
K wi qv i xU&L vwi R K i b| GK gv c avb wePvi c wZ Lord John Holt Z uvnvi
wf bgZ m~PK (dissenting) i vq House of Commons Gi wek l vwaK vi m^
gZ c K vk K i b h GB aygv House of Commons Gi wmv
(resolution) h_ bq, Bnv A vBb A vK vi wewae nBj B ayevaK i
nBe, bPr bq| wZ wb ej bt
I will suppose, that the bringing of such actions was declared by the
House Commons to be a breach of their privilege; that that declaration
will not make that a breach of privilege that was not so before. But if
they have any such privilege, they ought to shew precedent of it. The
privileges of the House of Commons are well known, and are founded
upon the law of the land, and are nothing but the law... And if they
99
declare themselves to have privileges, which they have no legal claim to,
the people of England will not be estopped by that declaration. This
privilege of theirs concerns the liberty of the people in a high degree, by
subjecting them to imprisonment for the infringement of them, which is
what the people cannot be subjected to without an Act of Parliament
Hillaire Barnett: Constitutional And Administrative Law, Fourth Edition,
2002, page-563)|
ev` x I Z vnv` i A vBbR xweMYi A i xY Gi A vBbMZ A e vb
m^ Lord John Holt ej b h House of Commons mywbw` K vi Y Dj L
c ~eK ev` x I Z vnv` i A vBbR xweMYK A i xYe K wi qvQ| hnZ z
A i xY K wi evi K vi Y wj i eaZ v c i x v K i v A v` vj Z i
GL wZ qvi f z Ges hw` D K vi Y wj ea bv nq Z vnv nBj
A i xY` i gyw c ` vb K wi evi A v` k w` Z c vi | wZ wb ej bt
the legality of the commitment depended upon the vote recited in the
warrant . That this was not such an imprisonment as the freemen of
England ought to be bound by; for that this, which was only doing a
legal act, could not be made illegal by the vote of the House of
Commons; for that neither House of Parliament, nor both Houses jointly,
could dispose of the liberty or property of the subject; for to this purpose
the Queen must join.(Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English
Law, Vol.-V1, page-272, note-2, Second Edition, 1966)
Kings Bench Gi msL vMwi wePvi c wZ MYi gZ vgZ i wf w Z
ev` xc i Writ of habeas Corpus gvK v gv L vwi R nBj Z vnvi v Writ of
error gvi d r House of Lords Gi myL A vc xj ` vqi K wi evi R b
A ve` b R vbvb| wK House of Commons c ybi vq wmv MnY K i h
G Writ of error ` vqi hvM bq Ges i vYxi wbK U Writ of error MnY
bv K wi evi R b A ve` b R vbvb| A b w` K House of Lords i vYxK
R vbvb h Writ of error GK wU Writ of right ev ex debito justitiae (as a matter of
right) evA waK vi weavq D Writ A vBbvbyM f ve MnYhvM|
i vYx Anne Z r c i House of Commons Gi A waek b wMZ
(prorogation) Nvl Yv K i b| d j House of Commons Gi wek l vwaK vi
` vexI wMZ nBqv hvq| GB f ve wZ wb ` yB c i ga GB A k vf b
100
A vBbx hy e K i b| d j k wZ Z ev` x I Z vnv` i A vBbR xweMY
A i xb nBZ gy nb Ges House of Lords Gi c ~eeZ xi vqi c w Z
wbevPb ms v gvK v gvq Z vnv` i c i vq nq|
Dc i A vj vwPZ gvK gv wj Z GK w` K A vBbi k Z
A bw` K Parliament Gi Df q K i k Z i ` c K vk c vq|
House of Commons gb K i h Z vnv` i wek l vwaK vi (Privilege)
Gi A e vb A vBbi I Dc i | h K vb A waK vi K Z vnvi v Z vnv` i
wek l vwaK vi Nvl Yv K wi qv wmv j Bj Z vnv A v` vj Z i Dc i
evaK i nBe| 17k k Z K i c vi nBZ Stuart i vR vMY GK B f ve
Z vnv` i PrerogativeK Common Law nBZ k Z i (arcana imperii) ( State
Secret) Ges A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi ewnf ~Z gb K wi Z b| 168 8 mvj
Parliament Gi mvef gZ c wZ wZ nBj Parliament Gi Df q K B
Z vnv` i wek l vwaK vi K ` k i A vBb nBZ I k Z i weePbv
K wi Z b Ges GK B f ve wel qwUK A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi ewnf ~Z gb
K wi Z b|
Rex V. Knollys gvK v gvq House of Lords Gi wek l vwaK vi i ` vexi
K _ v ewj Z hvBqv Attorney General GK B f ve Stuart i vR v` i bvq arcana
imperii k wU eenvi K i b|
Sir Edward Coke K h f ve i vR v James I Gi ` vexK Z Prerogative
Gi k Z i wei A vBbx hy K wi Z nBqvwQj Lord John Holt K I
GK B f ve Rex V. Knollys (1695) gvK v gvq House of Lords Gi wei
Ges Ashby V. White (1704) I Reg. V. Paty ( 1705) gvK v gvq House of
Commons Gi wei A vBbx hy K wi qv A vBbi k Z I h K vb
wei vaxq wel q A v` vj Z i P~o v wmv c ` vbi GL wZ qvi c wZ v
K wi Z nBqvwQj |
1701 mvj i Act of Settlement vi v DP A v` vj Z mg~ni ^vaxbZ v
i vi c ` c MnY K i v nBj I i vR v ev i vYxi gZ zi m m Privy
Council mn mK j i vR K gK Z v I wePvi K MYi PvK zi xi gqv` mgv
101
nBZ Ges b~Z b i vR v b~Z b K wi qv Z vnvw` MK wbqvM c ` vb K wi Z b|
GB ai bi c w qv wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vi mwnZ h_ vc hy I
mwVK wQj bv| 1760 mvj i vR v George III Bsj vi wmsnvmb
A vi vnY K wi qv Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act, 1760 (George III c. 23)
A vBbvi v Dc i v c _ v evwZ j K i Z t wePvi K MYi PvK zi xi gqv`
A vgZ z envj i vwL evi c ` c MnY K i b| d j i vR v ev i vYxi gZ z
wePvi K MYi PvK zi xi gqv` K A vi K vb f veB c f vweZ K wi Z bv|
GB f ve i vR v Henry II Gi mgq nBZ h wePvi ee v mymsnZ
K wi evi c qvm j I qv nBqvwQj Z vnv g g i vR vi c f ve ej q I
Z r c i i vR bwZ K c f ve ej q nBZ m~Ygy nq| aygv K vb
i Z i A wf hvMi K vi Y Parliament Gi Df q K i wmv
ewZ i K wePvi K ` i PvK zi xi A emvb me wQj bv|
GB f ve Bsj vi mek ew eMi k Z k Z er mi i mvabv
I Pvi gvag Bsj vi wePvi wef vM ^vaxb nq Ges Rule of Law ev
A vBbi k vmb c wZ wZ nBevi c _ myMg nq|
gahyM nBZ B Bsj v A vBb Bnvi k Z c K vk K wi Z
_ vK | mB mgq ` yB ai bi A vBb, mwK Z vi A vBb (Divine Law) I
gvbyl i mw A vBb (Man made Law), GB ` yB ai bi A vBbB c Pwj Z
wQj | Z e k vmK I k vwmZ mK j B GK B A vBb vi v evaMZ wQj |
GB K vi Y 1250 mvj wj wL Z De Legibus G Justice Henry de Bracton
ewj Z c vwi qvwQj bt
In justitia recipienda minimo de regno suo (rex) comparatur, ( The
law bound all the members of the State, whether rulers or subjects, and
Justice according to law was due to all ) ( Sir William Holdsworth: A
History of English law vol. X page 647)|
` k i A vBbi c wZ mK j i k v evai K vi YB A vR nBZ
c vq Qqk Z er mi c ~eI 1441 mvj i Year Book G wj wc e nBqvwQj t
The law is the highest inheritance which the King has; for by the
law he and all his subjects are ruled, and if there was no law there
would be no King and no inheritance.
102
(Sir William Holdsworth: A History of English law, Vol. X Page-648)
16k k Z v xZ i vR v Henry VIII hw` I A Z ` ywebxZ i vR v wQj b
wK K vb A vBb wewae K wi evi c ~ewZ wbI Parliament G ^vaxbf ve
A vj vPbv K wi Z myhvM w` Z b hvnvZ mswk A vBbi vi v c R v` i
K j vY mvab nq| Sir William Holdsworth Gi f vl vqt
In 1536 Henry VIII came in among the burgesses in the Parliament
and delivered them a bill which he desired them to weigh in conscience,
and not to pass it because he gave it in, but to see if it be for the common
weal of his subjects ; ( A History of English Law Vol. IV, page- 91)
i vR v wbR I A vBb gvb K wi qv Pwj Z b | 1538 mvj Lord Lisle
GK c R bK Hussee K ej bt
It had never been seen that the King would stop the course of his
common law. (Sir William Holdsworth: A History of English Law, vol.
IV, page- 201, note-7)|
H hyM A vBbi A e vb mK Starkey Z vnvi M j L bt
that the laws must rule and govern the State, and not the prynce after
his own lyberty and Wyle.
(Sir William Holdsworth: A History of English Law, Vol. IV , Page-
201, note-7)|
i vR f Attorney General Sir Francis Bacon 1609 mvj i vR v James I Gi
Divine Right Gi ` vexi mgqI Calvin Gi gvK v gvq e e Dc vc b
K wi Z wMqvej bt
Law is the great organ by which the sovereign power doth
move;
wZ wb i vR vi gZ vm^ ej bt
although the King , in his person, be solutus legibus, yet his
acts and grants are limited by law, and we argue them every
day
( Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law
Vol. IV, Page-201)|
103
GB f ve axi axi nBj I Bsj v wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v
Z _ vwePvi K MYi ^vaxbZ vw wZ j vf K wi Z _ vK |
1761 mvj i vR vGeorge III wePvi K MYi ^vaxbZ vm^ ej bt
he looked upon the independence and uprightness of the Judges as essential
to the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the
rights and liberties of his subjects; and as most conducive to the honour of the
Crown ( House of Commons Journals, March,3, 1761, Sir William Holdsworth
: A History of English Law, Vol. X , 1938 , page 644).
hyM hyM Bsj vi ek xi f vM i vR v` i A vBbgb Z v I
mnvqZ vq Ges Parliament K Z K mgqvc hvMx A vBb c YqYi gvag
Bsj v wePvi K MY i vR vi c vPxb wePvwi K gZ vq gZ vevb nBqv
i vR vi c wePvi K vhc wi Pvj bvi gvag A vBbi k Z i vi
` vwqZ c v nb Ges i vR mevP ghv` vc ~YA e vb c wZ wZ nb|
i vR vi wePvwi K gZ vi GB axi wK wbw Z c wi eZ b I i c v i
m^ Sir William Blackstone ej bt
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a
peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure,
by the crown, consists one main preservation of the public liberty: which
cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administration of common
justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also
from the executive power. Were it joined with the legislative, the life,
liberty, and property of the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary
judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their own
opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though
legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe. Were it
joined with the executive, this union might soon be an overbalance for
the legislative. For which reason by the statute 16 Car. I c. 10 , which
abolished the court of star chamber , effectual care is taken to remove all
judicial power out of the hands of the kings privy council; who, as then
as evident from recent instances, might soon be inclined to pronounces
that for law, which was most agreeable to the prince or his officers.
Nothing therefore is more to be avoided, in a free constitution, than
uniting the provinces of a judge and a minister of state.
(Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law, Vol. X, Page -417, 1938).
104
Blackstone g e K i b h i c v wi Z wePvi ee vq Z vwZ K f ve
i vR v hb is always present in all his Courts (page-415) Ges wePvi K MY
c K Z c i vR vi mK j wePvwi K gZ vi A uvavi wnmve A vZ c K vk
K i bt
At present, by the long and uniform usage of many ages, our kings
have delegated their whole judicial power to the judges of their several
courts; which are the grand depositaries of fundamental laws of the
kingdom, and have gained a known and stated jurisdiction, regulated by
certain and established rules, which the crown itself cannot now
alter. ( Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law, Vol.X,
c _ g gy` Yt 1938 ,645- 6, d zU bvU 10 nBZ DZ ) |
wesk k Z v xi c _ g f vM Holdsworth Bsj vi wePvi ee v
mK ej bt
The courts are thus the main preservation of public liberty to a
much greater extent than they were in the balanced eighteenth-century
constitution. Any curtailment of their jurisdiction means the curtailment
of the one security which the subject has against the arbitrary use of the
great powers which all parties in the House of Commons vie with one
another in conferring upon their leaders, the ministers.
(Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law, Vol. X, page- 417.
1938)|
i vR v, House of Lords I House of Commons Gi Z i d _ K wewf b
mgq Bsj vi wePvi ee vi Dc i bvbvai Yi Pvc A vwmqvQ hvnv
Dc i eYbv K i v nBqvQ| Bnv ewZ i K wePvi wef vMK A b bvbv
vb nBZ I wewf bai Yi Pvc i myL xb nBZ nBqvQ| A bK
mgq DQL j R bZ vnBZ I c ej Pvc A vwmZ |
John Wilkes GK mgq House of Commons Gi m` m wQj b| wK
c i eZ xK vj wZ wb House of Commons nBZ weZ vwo Z nb| wZ wb wbR B
Z vnvi wbR i GK gv D` vni Y wQj b| gvbnvwbK i GK wU i Pbvi
K vi Y Z vnvi wei GK wU d R ` vi x gvK v gv nq| mB gvK v gv
nI qvq ` k evc K wek L j vi mw nq Ges wec i vq nBj
wek L j v A vi I evc K I Z xei vqU A vK vi j BZ c vi ewj qv Rex V.
105
Wilkes (1770) gvK v gvq A vk v c K vk K wi qv Kings Bench Gi myL
Z vnvi A vBbR xex wbe` b i vL b| c avb wePvi c wZ Lord Mansfield Z uvnvi
i vq hvnv ej b Z vnv meK vj i mK j ` k i wePvi K MYi R b
wk Yxqt
The constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence our
judgments: God forbid it should! We must not regard political
consequences; how formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the
certain consequence, we are bound to say fiat justitia, ruat caelum. The
constitution trusts the King with reasons of State and policy: he may stop
prosecutions; he may pardon offences; it is his, to judge whether the law
or the criminal should yield. We have no election. None of us
encouraged or approved the commission of either of the crimes of which
the defendant is convicted: none of us had any hand in his being
prosecuted. As to myself, I took no part, ( in another place) in the
addresses for that prosecution . We did not advise or assist the defendant
to fly from justice: it was his own act; and he must take the
consequences. None of us have been consulted or had any thing to do
with the present prosecution. It is not in our power to stop it: it was not
in our power bring it on. We cannot pardon. We are to say, what we take
the law to be: if we do not speak our real opinions, we prevaricate with
God and our own consciences.
I pass over many anonymous letters I have received. Those in print are
public: and some of them have been brought judicially before the court.
Whoever the writers are, they take the wrong way. I will do my duty,
unawed. What am I to fear? That mendax infamia from the press, which
daily coins false facts and false motives? The lies of calumny carry no
terror to me. I trust, that my temper of mind, and the colour and conduct
of my life, have given me a suit of armour against these arrows. If,
during this Kings reign, I have ever supported his government and
assisted his measures; I have done it without any other reward, than the
consciousness of doing what I thought right. If I have ever opposed, I
have done it upon the points themselves; without mixing in party or
faction, and without my collateral views. I honour the King; and respect
the people: but, many things acquired by the favour of either, are, in my
account, objects not worth ambition, I wish popularity: but, it is that
popularity which follows; not that which is run after. It is that popularity
which, sooner or later, never fails to do justice to the pursuit of noble
ends, by noble means. I will not do that which my conscience tells me is
106
wrong, upon this occasion, to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily
praise of all the papers which come from the press : I will not avoid
doing what I think is right; though it should draw on me the whole
artillery of libels; all that falsehood and malice can invent, or the
credulity of a deluded populace can swallow. I can say, with a great
magistrate, upon an occasion and under circumstances not unlike, Ego
hoc animo semper fui, ut invidiam virtute partam, gloriam, non invidiam,
putarem.
The threats go further than abuse: personal violence is denounced . I do
not believe it: is not the genius of the worst men of this country, in the
worst of times. But I have set my mind at rest. The last end that can
happen to any man, never comes too soon, if he falls in support of the
law and liberty of his country: (for liberty is synonymous to law and
Government). Such a shock, too, might be productive of public good: it
might awake the better part of the kingdom out of that lethargy which
seems to have benumbed them; and bring the mad part back to their
senses, as men intoxicated are sometimes stunned into sobriety.
Once for all, let it be understood, that no endeavors of this kind will
influence any man who at present sits here. If they had any effect, it
would be contrary to their intent: leaning against their impression, might
give a bias the other way. But I hope, and I know, that I have fortitude
enough to resist even that weakness. No libels, no threats, nothing that
has happened, nothing that can happen, will weigh a feather against
allowing the defendant, upon this and every other question, not only the
whole advantage he is intitled to from substantial law and justice; but
every benefit from the most critical nicety of form, which any other
defendant could claim under the like objection.
(Brian Harris: The Literature of the Law, 2003, page-6-7)
bvbx A Wilkes K 22 gvmi K vi v` I 1,000/ = c vD
R wi gvbv K i v nq| c i eZ xZ Lord Mansfield Gi evmf eb I ew MZ
j vBei x c vo vBqv ` I qv nq wK wZ wb wPi K vj A vBb I bvqwePvi
mgybZ i vwL qvwMqvQb|
A bK mgq Print I Electronic media wek l K vb wePvhwel qi
c I wec bvbvb ai bi c Pvi c Pvi Yv Pvj vBqv _ vK |
wePvi K MY wePvi K nBj I Z vnvi vI gvbe m vb | ei x c Pvi
107
c Pvi Yvi K vi Y Z uvnvi vI c P gvbwmK Pvc i wk K vi nBZ c vi b|
d j h bvqwePvi evnZ nBZ c vi Z vnvc vqk tB media wemZ nq|
hy i vi Boston k ni Louise Woodward bvgxq GK R b Bsi R au
pair K A vUgvmi GK Qj K nZ v K wi evi A wf hvM R ywi Z vnvK
hve xeb K vi v` c ` vb K i | GB k vw i wei Louise Gi c
c ej R bgZ Mwo qv I V Ges Z vnvi v R yi xi wmv evwZ j K wi evi
c A v` vj b K wi Z _ vK | A c i c A vi GK ` j R yi xi wmv
K ^vMZ R vbvBZ _ vK | Electronic I print media Gi K j vY hy i v
I hy i vR GB i vq j BqvmBmgq 1998 mvj Z zgyj nP mw nq|
Massachusetts Superior Court Gi GK R b Associate Justice, Judge Hiller B.
Zobel Z uvnvi i vq GB f ve A vi K i bt
The law, John Adams told a Massachusetts jury while defending British
citizens on trial for murder, is inflexible and deaf: inexorable to the cries of the
defendant; deaf as an adder to the clamours of the populace. His words ring
true, 227 years later.
Elected officials may consider popular urging and sway to public opinion polls.
Judges must follow their oaths and do their duty, heedless of editorials, letters,
telegrams, picketers, threats, petitions, panelists and talk shows. In this country,
we do not administer justice by plebiscite.
A judge, in short, is a public servant who must follow his conscience, whether or
not he counters the manifest wishes of those he serves; whether or not his
decision seems a surrender to the prevalent demands.
(Brian Harris : The Literature of the Law, Page 20-21, 2003) ( A avi L v
c ` )
227 er mi c ~eA vBbi h bxwZ John Adams Z uvnvi e e
ewj qvwQj b Z vnv hgb A vR I ae mZ Z gwb mZ Judge Zobel Gi
e e|
c vPxbK vj wek i vR v, ev` k vn ev mgvU A Z Z vwZ K f ve
bvq wePvi i c Z xK wQj b| c vPxb H wZ n A bymvi Z vnvi v Z vnv` i
i vR vwf l K A byvbB (coronation) c R vMYi c wZ bvqwePvi i A xK vi
K wi Z b| vbxq wePvi K MYi i vqi wei mek l bvqwePvi i
108
c v_ bv c R vMY ` k i i vR vi wbK UB K wi Z | GB K vi Y Bsj v
i vR vK Fountain of Justice ej v nBZ | gvNj mgvU R vnvxi 1605
mvj Z vnvi c vmv` GK wU ^Yi k L j Gi mwnZ l vU&wU NUv S zj vBqv
w` qvwQj b hvnvZ Z vnvi h K vb A Z vPvwi Z c R v Z vnvi wbK U
mi vmwi bvq wePvi c v_ bvK wi Z c vi |
mf Z vi m~` xNBwZ nvm c wi g K wi j c Z xqgvb nBe h hL bB
wePvi wef vMi c ` j b NwUqvQ Z L bB ` k A i vR K Z v GgbwK
wec ei mw nBqvQ|
1660 mvj Bsj v i vR Z c ybenvj (Restoration) nBj Charles II
Bsj vi wmsnvmb A vi vnY K i b| wZ wb Z vnvi i vR Z i c _ g w` K
hvM ew ` i during good behaviour k Z wePvi K c ` wbqvM c ` vb
K i b Ges wePvi wef vM Bnvi nZ mvb wd wi qv c vBZ A vi K i |
wK Z vnvi i vR Z i k l f vM Sir William Scrogg ( 1678 ) K Court of
Common Pleas Gi c avb wePvi c wZ Ges Lord George Jeffrey ( 168 3) K
Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ wnmve wbqvM c ` vb K i v nq| GB
` yB c avb wePvi c wZ i gqv` K vj wePvi wef vMi Pi g A e q mvwaZ
nq|
Lord Jeffrey Gi c i vgk i vR v 168 4 mvj Robert Wright Gi bvq
GK R b A c ` v_ A vBbR xweK Kings Bench G wePvi K wnmve wbqvM
c ` vb K i b| Z vnvi m^ Z ` vbx b Lord Chancellor Guildford g e
K wi qvwQj bt
the most unfit person in England to be made a judge a dunce , and no
lawyer , who is not worth a groat ..
( David Pannick: Judges, 1988 , page -65)
168 5 mvj James II Bsj vi wmsnvmb A vi vnY K i b| GB
mgq Duke of Monmouth i vR vi wei we` vn K wi j K Vvi n Z vnv
` gb K i v nq| Lord Jeffrey K zL vZ Bloody Assizes G we` vnx` i K wbgg
f ve k vw c ` vb K wi qv i vR vi wc qc v nb| 168 5 mvj i vR v
109
Z vnvK Lord Chancellor c ` wbqvM c ` vb K i b| H mgq i vR vi gbgZ
gZ vgZ bv nBj wePvi K MYK mi vmwi ei L v K i v nBZ | hvMZ v
ewnf ~Z f ve i vR v Z vnvi c Q` gZ ew eMK m~Yi vR bwZ K
weePbvq wePvi K c ` wbqvM c ` vb K wi Z b| Lord Chancellor wnmve
wePvi K ` i c wZ Lord Jeffrey Gi Dc ` k wQj bMf ve ` j xq t
Be sure, he said, to execute the law to the utmost of its vengeance
upon those that are now knowne, and we have reason to remember them, by the
name of Whigs; and you are likewise to remember the sniveling trimmer; for
you know that our Saviour Jesus Christ says in the Gospell, that they that are
not for us are against us. (Sir William Holdsworth: A History of English Law
Vol.VI Second Edition, 1937 Page-509)
hw` I Robert Wright wePvwi K A bwZ K Z vi c Z xK wQj b wK i vR v
168 7 mvj Z vnvK Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ c ` wbqvM
c ` vb K i b| GB mgq wePvi ee vi mvgwMK Pi g A e q Ges
wek l K wi qv Robert Wright Gi A weePK i vqi K vi Y Bsj v 168 8
mvj i wec e Z i vwbZ nq ewj qvA bK H wZ nvwmK gb K i b|
hy i vi ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvq hw` I all men are created equal Nvl Yv
K i v nBqvwQj wK Dred Scott V. Sanford ( 1857) gvK v gvq c avb
wePvi c wZ Roger Brooke Taney i bZ Z 7- 2 msL vMwi wePvi c wZ MYi
gZ vbymvi US Supreme Court Nvl Yv K i h wbMvi v ` k i bvMwi K
bb weavq Z vnvi v K vb gvK v gv K wi Z c vi b bv Ges xZ ` vm c _ v
evwZ j K wi evi K vb gZ v Congress Gi I bvB | Supreme Court Gi GB
i vq D i i A i v wj Z bwZ evPK ` w f wZ ` L v nBj I
` w Yi i v wj Z i vqwU Z vnv` i weR q wnmve A wf bw` Z nq|
f wel Z President c v_ xAbraham Lincoln GK e Z vq c m g i vqwU
m^ ej bt But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous| c i eZ x
wbevPbx c Pvi Yvq ` vmc _ vi bwZ K Z v I eaZ v c m evi evi DwVqv
A vm Ges Abraham Lincoln President wbevwPZ nb| A bK k l vZ K f ve
ej b h, It may fairly be said that Chief Justice Taney elected Abraham Lincoln to
the Presidency ( Charles Warren: The Supreme Court in United States History)|
110
c K Z c Abraham Lincoln President wnmve 18 61 mvj ` vwqZ MnY
K wi evi K qK gvmi gaB ` w Yv j i Confederate MY we` vn
Nvl Yv K i Ges GK i qx Mnhy Union K c vq asmi gyL
j Bqv hvq| A ek hyi GB WvgvWvj i gaB Lincoln 18 63 mvj i
1j v R vbyqvi x Z vwi L hy i vi K vj v gvbyl ` i R b Emancipation
Proclamation G ^v i K i b|
Emeritus Professor Henry J. Abraham Z vnvi The Judicial Process, Seventh
Edition, 1998 ,M Dred Scott i vq m^ ej bt
Chief Justice Taney delivered the 7:2 opinion of the Court , which , as
history would prove all too soon, did anything but settle the problem .
Indeed, it acted as a catalyst in bringing on the Civil War ( Page-239).
A b wZ wb ej bt
.. Taney, then in his eightieth year , lonely and frustrated, met
his and the Courts judicial Waterloo in 1857 with his monumentally
aberrant opinion in Dred Scott V. Sand ford,. Dred Scott..
dragged the Supreme Court of the United States into its lowest depths,
and hastened the dawn of the Civil War and with it the Emancipation
Proclamation and the Civil War Amendments ( XIII,XIV, and XV).
( Page- 377) .
wesk k Z v xi w k ` k K R vgvbxi wePvi ee v A Z k vPbxq
c hvq A vwmqv ` uvo vBqvwQj | wK H i c ` yi e v nBevi K _ v wQj bv |
K vi Y en i R vgvbxi myc vPxb wePvi ee v i vgK wePvi ee vi Dc i
wf w K wi qv Mwo qv DwVqvwQj Ges Z vnv Bsj vi Common Law Gi
bvq A Z DbZ I mg wQj | bvr mx k vmb A vgj A vBbi A avc K
I wePvi K MY mgevq c ~ei bvq bxwZ i Dc i c wZ wZ A vBb ee v
m~YwemZ nBqv A yZ GK bvr mx Jurisprudence ms wZ Mwo qv Z zwj qv
wQj b hvnvi GK gv D k wQj me bvr mx bxwZ ev evqb| h
mK j A avc K I wePvi K MYi ga GB A c ms wZ MnY mvgvbZ g
K zv c wi j w Z nBZ Z vnv` i aygv mi vmwi ei L v K i v bq
c vqk tB Z vnv` i k vw f vM K wi Z nBZ |
111
Professor Ingo Mller wj wL Z Hitlars Justice : The Courts of the Third Reich,
1987 I Deborah Lucas Schneider K Z K A byw` Z M GB A e v m^
A vj vK c vZ K i vnqt
The law for Restoration of the Professional Civil Service had already
done away with judges security of tenure, since it allowed the
government to dismiss from office all judges who were politically
undesirably, or not Aryan or who would not undertake to support the
national state at all times and without reservation. (c v- 72)
Edward Kern (1933-34) I A bvb` i DZ K wi qvwZ wb j L bt
German law professors now informed them that in the interest of
consistent government, certain limits must be imposed on the autonomy
of the courts. ( c v72) .
wePvi K ` i K i Yxq m^ Professor Georg Dahm ( 1934) ej bt
A Judge should therefore approach a case with healthy prejudice
and make value judgments which correspond to the National Socialist
legal order and the will of the political leadership. ( c v- 73)
wePvi K ` i mveavb K wi qv A vBb A byl ` i Dean Professor Erik Wall
ej bt
In the everyday practice of law, genuine National Socialism is
certainly best represented where the idea of the Fiihrer is silently but
loyally followed.
Fhrer Gi mi K vi i bxwZ i c wZ wePvi K ` i c K Z evaevaK Z v
mi Y K i vBqvw` qv Rohling (1935) ej bt
Judges were liberated from their obligation to the law only to be
constrained by an incomparably more restrictive obligation to the main
principles of the Fhrers government.
mgM wek hL b A vBb wesk k Z vw Z A v` k I bwZ K Z vi
wbwi L A Mmi gvb Z L b GK w` K wbevwPZ mi K vi i d i gvqk gZ
R vgvbxi msm` A vBb c Yqb K wi qvQ , A bw` K R vgvbxi ey wR xex
m` vqi GBi c bwZ K A e q mf Z vi BwZ nvm GK wU K j gq
A avq| Z vnvi vB bvr mx mi K vi i mK j c K vi A Z vPvi , A wePvi ,
^QvPvi I gvbeZ v wei vax K gK vi Z _ vK w_ Z Z vwZ K wf w c ` vb
112
K i Z t Dc i v A bwZ K K vhK j vc i A vBbx I R i c ` vbi c qvm
c vb| d j k wZ Z wZ xq gnvhyi m~ c vZ , K vwU K vwU gvbyl i
c vYbvk Ges A ek l gnvbR vgvb R vwZ i k L j ve A e v|
BwZ nvm A vgv` i GB wk v ` q h K vb i v hL bB Supreme
Court Z _ v wePvi wef vM i vi wbevnx wef vM I A vBb mf vK msweavb
I A vBbi A vI Z vq i vwL Z e_ nq Ges wbevnx wef vMi A v ven
nBqv ` vuo vq Z L bB i v I bvMwi K ` i R xeb Pi g wec w ` L v
` q|
R vgvb ` k Qvo vI A vi I A bK ` k i wnqvQ hL vb myc xg
K vUi mgqc vhvMx c ` c MnYi e_ Z vi gv j mgM R vwZ K
ggvw K f ve c ` vb K wi Z nBqvQ|
1954 mvj c vwK vb d Wvi j K vUi c avb wePvi c wZ i wk `
A emi Mgb K wi j Z L b meR wQj b wePvi c wZ A vey mvj n
gvnv` A vK i vg| wK wZ wb evOvj x wQj b| A Z c i t d Wvi j
K vUi mK j wePvi c wZ K A wZ v K wi qvj vnvi nvBK vUGi c avb
wePvi c wZ Muhammad Munir K d Wvi j K vUi c avb wePvi c wZ c `
mi vmwi wbqvM c ` vb K i vnq|
H mgq c vwK vbi Mf bi R bvi j Mvj vg gvnv`
MYc wi l ` i msL vMwi m` mMYi A v vf vR b L vR v bvwR g Dw bK
c avbg x c ` nBZ ei L v K i b Ges 1954 mvj L mo v msweavb
MYc wi l ` ` vwL j K wi evi c v vj MYc wi l ` f vwqv` b|
Z r c i , MYc wi l ` i w K vi gj f x Z wgR Dw b L vb wmzwPd &
K vU( nvBK vU) D A v` k i eaZ v Pvj K wi qv gvK v gv
` vqi K wi j wPd &K vUMYc wi l ` f vwqv w` evi A v` k A ea Nvl Yv
K i | c avb wePvi c wZ Munir Gi bZ Z d Wvi j K vUA vc xj MnY
K i Ges MYc wi l ` f vwqv w` evi A v` k i eaZ v c ` vb K i b| ay
Z vnvB bn, Bnvi c i Z ` vbx b c vwK vb mi K vi i i vc avb c `
hvnvi vB A vwmqvQb Z vnv` i c Z K i mec K vi A ea I A bwZ K
113
K vhvej x I c ` c i eaZ v wZ wb c ` vb K i b| wePvi c wZ Munir Gi
GB ai bi wePvwi K K vhK j vc GK gv wesk k Z vw i 30 ` k K i
R vgvb wePvi K ` i K vhK j vc i mwnZ Z zj bxq|
Dj L h i vR v James II 168 8 mvj PZ yw` K A m vl i K vi Y
Bsj v gvk vj j R vi xi gvag ` k k vmb K wi evi c wi K bv
K wi qvwQj b wK H mgq wePvi wef vMi Pi g A e qi c i I G
evc vi Z vnvK mg_ b K wi evi gZ GK R b wePvi K I mgMBsj v
c vI qvhvq bvB|
A _ P mvo wZ bk Z er mi c i State V. Dosso 1958 PLD SC 533
gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ gywbi Gi bZ Z Pakistan Supreme Court
mvgwi K k vmbK eaZ v c ` vb K i | wK Munir C.J. f ywj qv wMqvwQj b
h Government of India Act, 1935 ev Indian Independence Act, 1947 , ^vaxbZ v
c v Dorminion wj K mvgwi K A vBb vi v k vmb K wi evi K vb weavb
K i bvB|
14 er mi c i Asma Jilani V. Government of Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139
gvK v gvq Dosso Gi i vq over-rule ( evwZ j ) nq| Yaqub Ali, J. evsj v` k
^vaxb nBevi wc Qbi K vi Yvej xeYbvK wi Z hvBqvej bt
A National Assembly was yet to be elected under the 1956-
Constitution when Mr. Iskander Mirza who had become the first
President by a Proclamation issued on the 7
th
October 1958, abrogated
the Constitution; dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies and
imposed Martial Law throughout the country: General Muhammed Ayub
Khan Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, was appointed as the
Chief Administrator of Martial Law......
The judgment in State V. Dosso set the seal of legitimacy on the
Government of Iskander Mirza though he himself was deposed from
office by Muhammad Ayub Khan, a day after the judgment was
delivered on the 23
rd
October 1958, and he assumed to himself the office
of the President. The judgments in the cases Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan;
Governor-General Reference 1of 1955 and The State V. Dosso had
profound effect on the constitutional development in Pakistan. As a
commentator has remarked, a perfectly good country was made into a
laughing stock(page-219)
114

GB f ve c vwK vb myc xg K vUi Pi g e_ Z vi K vi Y evOvj xi
m c vwK vbK c wi Z vM K wi Z nq Ges 1971 mbi 25k gvPi
w` evMZ i v k L gywR eyi i ngvb evsj v` k i ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yv
K i b|
c vwK vb A vgj i wZ A wf Z vi A vj vK A vgv` i msweavb
c YZ vMY mvsweavwbK k Z mn i vi c R vZ vw K I MYZ vw K Pwi
Ges A bvb g~j bxwZ hZ i mwnZ mwbewk Z K i b| wK Z vnvi
c i I k l i v me nq bvB| mvgwi K evwnbxi wK Qy msL K
wec _ Mvgx mwbK 1975 mvj i 15B A Mv Z vwi L R vwZ i R bK k L
gywR eyi i ngvbK ^c wi evi nZ v K i | L ` K vi gyk Z vK A vng`
msweavb f K i Z t i vc wZ i c ` A ea f ve ` L j K i b| 20k
A Mv Z vwi L wZ wb mvgwi K A vBb R vi x K i b| 8 2 w` b wZ wb gZ vq
_ vK b| bf ^i gvmi c _ g mvn coup I counter coup nq| 8 B
bf ^i Gi Proclamation ` c Z xqgvb nq h evsj v` k i c avb
wePvi c wZ Justice Abu Sadat Moahammad Sayem evsj v` k i i vc wZ I
c avb mvgwi K c k vmK c ` A wawZ nBqvQb| GBi c wbqvMI
msweavb f K wi qvB K i vnBqvwQj |
mvo wZ bk Z er mi A vM i vR v James I Gi Proclamation vi v A vBb
c Yqbi ` vexi gyL c avb wePvi c wZ Sir Edward Coke ewj Z
c vwi qvwQj bt
the king cannot change any part of the common law nor create any
offence by his proclamation which was not an offence before , without
Parliament; ( the case of Proclamations ,1611)
(Sir William Holdsworth: A History of English law vol.1V, Page 296)|
A _ P wesk k Z v xi k l f vM A vwmqv evsj v` k i GK R b c avb
wePvi c wZ msweavb I A vBbi i Y, mg_ b I wbi vc vweavb
K wi evi c wi eZ msweavb f K wi qv aygv i vc wZ i c ` bn c avb
mvgwi K c k vmK i c ` I MnY K i b| Z r c i wZ wb i vi msm`
115
evwZ j K i b| c i eZ x c vq mvo wZ b er mi evsj v` k msm` wenxb
A e vq wQj | GL vbB k l bq, ^i Z vw K mvgwi K c k vmK MY
Z vnv` i c Q` I c qvR b gZ A vgv` i gnvb msweavb wbweev`
h_ QvK uvUvQuo vK i b|
GB c m 1944 mvj GK mf vq c ` US Circuit Court of Appeals
Gi c avb wePvi c wZ Justice Billing Learned Hand Gi g e c YxavbhvMt
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe
me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women.
When it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it. No
constitutions, no law, no court, can even do much to help it. While it lies
there, it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
(Brian Harris: The Literature of the Law, 1998, page -330-40) ( A avi L v
c ` )
wesk k Z vw i w k ` k K i R vgvbxi wePvi ee vq mi c
A e q nBqvwQj , c vwK vb myc xg K vUi hi c A e q nBqvwQj ,
wesk k Z vw i m i ` k K i k l f vM I A vwk ` k K i c _ g f vM
A Z t mvsweavwbK c k evsj v` k i mevP A v` vj Z I Z gwb
A e q c wi j w Z nq|
Dc i i GB A vj vPbvi K vi Y nBj h Bsj v 16k , 17k I
18 k k Z v xZ wePvi wef vM i vR vi wei , House of Lords Gi
wei , House of Commons Gi wei gvMZ msMvg K wi qv
A vBbi h k Z c wZ wZ K wi Z m g nBqvwQj wek A vi
K vb ` k Z vnv A R b K wi Z c vi bvB, Ggb wK hy i vI
bn|
1701 mvj Smith V. Browne gvK v gvq Lord Holt ej bt
as soon as a Negro comes to England he is free; one may be a villein in
England but not a slave .
wK GB K _ v ewj Z US Supreme Court Gi A vo vBk er mi
j vwMqvwQj | Bnvi ga xZ ` vm c _ v c k Pvi er mi evc x Mnhy
116
BDwbqb c vq asm c v nBZ ewmqvwQj | msweavbi 13Z g I
14Z g msk vabx K wi evi c i I xZ ` vm c _ vi A c Qvqv hy i v
we` gvb _ vK | 1954 mvj Brown V. Board of Education gvK v gvq US
Supreme Court c _ g evi i gZ mv` v gvbyl I K vj v gvbyl i ga
Segregation wbwl Nvl YvK i |
K L b K L bI wePvi K ` i mZ i c GK K f ve ` uvo vBZ
nq| 17k k Z v xZ Sir Edward Coke, 18 k k Z v xZ Lord John Holt I
Lord Mansfield Gi bvg mi Yxq | wesk k Z v xi ga f vM Lord James
Richard Atkin I Z r c i Lord Alfred Thompson Denning Gi bvg wek l f ve
Dj L hvM|
Liversidge V. Sir John Anderson, 1942 AC 206, gvK v gvq wZ xq
gnvhyi c vi Bsj vi Defence ( General) Regulation , 1939 Gi 18B
i j k vbi A vI Z vq Liversidge K wbeZ bg~j K A vUK v` k c ` vb
K i v nq, K vi Y ^i vg x gb K wi qvwQj b h Liversidge k Z vf vevc b
GK R b ew nBZ c vi b| Liversidge Gi A vUK v` k i eaZ v
A v` vj Z Pvj K i v nBj | wel qwU k l c h House of Lords G
wmv i R b j I qv nq| 3/ 11/ 1941 Z vwi L gvK v gvwUi i vq nq|
H mgq wewf bi Yvb wg k w c hy` | GgbwK j b k ni evgvi
A vNvZ Z we Z | wewUk c i vk w Pi g ` yhvMi myL xb| GgZ
A e vZ I House of Lords Gi msL vMwi wePvi K MYi mwnZ wgZ
c vl Y K wi qvLord Atkin ej b ( c v- 244) t
I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere question
of construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the
subject show themselves more executive minded than the executive.
Z r c i wZ wb ej b t
In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They
may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It
has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of
liberty for which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges
are no respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any
117
attempted encroachments of his liberty by the executive, alert to see that
any coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to
arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of
Kings Bench in the time of Charles I. ( A avi L vc ` )
Dc msnvi wZ wb ej b t
I protest, even if I do it alone, against a strained construction put on
words with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment
to the minister. ( A avi L vc ` )
A Z tc i , wZ wb Z uvnvi i vq Lewis Carroll wj wL Z Alice Through the
Looking Glass nBZ DZ K wi qvK Z zK K i b ( c v- 245) t
When I use a word,
Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I
choose it to mean, neither more nor less. The question is said Alice,
whether you can make words mean so many different things. The
question is said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master - thats all.
Lord Chancellor Lord Simon i vq nBZ Lewis Carroll nBZ DZ
A sk UzK zeR b K wi evi R b Lord Atkin K A byi va K wi j wZ wb D i
` b t
The present cases as I see them do not merely involve questions of the
liberty of the particular persons concerned but involve the duty of the
courts to stand impartially between the subject and the executive.........
But I did mean to hit the proposed construction as hard as I could and to
ridicule the method by which it is reached. I consider that I have
destroyed it on every legal ground : and it seems to me fair to conclude
with a dose of ridicule. I cannot think therefore that there are sufficient
grounds for altering this prepared opinion.(Geoffrey Lewis : Lord
Atkin, page-139)
Z e GB i vq c K vwk Z nBevi c i Lord Atkin Z uvnvi mnK gx Law
Lords` i ga GK i K g GK Ni nBqv hvb| Z vnvi K bv Mrs. Robson
R vbvb h i vq Nvl Yvi c i Lord Atkin Z vnvi K bvK j Bqv House of
Lords Gi Dining Room G Lunch Gi R b hvb wK Z uvnv` i Uwej A vi
K nB emb bvB | Lord Macmillan I Lord Romer Z uvnvK bv ` wL evi f vb
K i b| Lord Wright Z uvnvi wc Z vi ez wQj b Ges c vqB Z uvnv` i
118
evmf eb Mgb K wi Z b| wK mBw` b wZ wb Z uvnv` i wbK U w` qv Mgb
K wi j I K vb K _ vB ej b bvB ei Lord Atkin K Dc vK i b|
GB wel q Lord Maugham Gi GK c i D i Lord Atkin
Bsj vi wePvi wef vMi gnvb H wZ n mgybZ i vwL qvD i ` bt
........I had not and have not any intention publicly to discuss any
judgment once it has been delivered.(Geoffrey Lewis : Lord Atkin,
page-145)
Z e A bK gb K i b h 1944 mvj gZ zi c ~ec h Lord
Atkin Z vnvi c wZ GB A c gvbR bK eenvi i K _ v f zwj Z c vi b bvB|
( Professor Robert Stevens : Law and Politics . The House of Lords as a Judicial Body,
1978, page-287)
wbf xK f ve mZ K _ bi R b Lord Atkin Gi bvq GZ eo
gvc i GK R b vbx I Yx ew K I GBi c A c gvb mn K wi Z
nBqvwQj | A _ P 40 er mi c i IRC V. Rossministy Ltd. 1980 AC 952
gvK gvq House of Lords GBevi Liversidge V. Anderson gvK v gvq Lord
Atkin Gi wf bgZ B mwVK wQj ewj qvg e K i |
GK R b wePvi K K GBf veB wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v mgybZ
i vwL Z mvgvwR K f veI nqi vbxI A c gvb mn K wi Z nq|
Z e GK R b wePvi K i R bwc qZ vi c wZ A vK vL v _ vwK j
Pwj e bv| ew MZ j vf - j vK mvb, f q- f xwZ i Da DwVqv aygv
bvq wePvi i w` K w i _ vwK Z nBe| Z vnvK A vBb k v eyr c w
ewZ i K mr I Pvwi w K ` pZ vi A waK vi x nBZ nBe, mec K vi
c wZ K ~j Z vi gyL I wbwf K f ve bvq wePvi i c Z xK nBZ nBe|
Alexis de Tocqueville Z vnvi Democracy in America ( 18 35) M ej bt
The Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed
of that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates,
but they must be statesmen-politicians, not unread in the signs of the
times, not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued, not slow
to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy
of the Union and the obedience which is due to the laws
119
wZ wb A vi I ej b t
........of the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad
citizens, the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war.
(K.C. Wheare : Modern Constitutions nBZ DZ )
18 29 mvj Virginia State Gi msweavb ms vi K wi evi Convention
G Marshall, C.J. K A sk MnY K wi Z nBqvwQj | mB Convention G
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vc m wZ wb GK R b vbZ vc mi bvq ej bt
The argument of the gentleman, he said, goes to prove not only that
there is no such thing as judicial independence , but that there ought to
be no such thing:- that it is unwise and improvident to make the tenure of
the judges office to continue during good behaviour. I have grown old
in the opinion that there is nothing more dear to Virginia, or ought to be
more dear to her statesmen, and that the best interests of our country are
secured by it. Advert, sir, to the duties of a judge. He has to pass between
the government, and the man whom that government is prosecuting,-
between the most powerful individual in the community, and the poorest
and most unpopular. It is of the last importance, that in the performance
of these duties, he should observe the utmost fairness. Need I press the
necessity of this? Does not every man feel that his own personal security,
and the security of his property, depends upon that fairness. The judicial
department comes home in its effects to every mans fire side;- it passes
on his property , his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not to the last degree
important, that he should be rendered perfectly and completely
independent, with nothing to control him but God and his conscience.
I acknowledge that in my judgment , the whole good which may grow
out of this convention, be it what it may will never compensate for the
evil of changing the judicial tenure of office. I have always thought
from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry
heaven ever inflicted upon ungrateful and a sinning people, was an
ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.
(Horace Binney: An Eulogy on the Life and Character of John Marshall, 1853)|
( A avi L vc ` )
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v m^ John Marshall Gi GB A wf ew
A vR I mZ |
120
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ewj Z c K Z c wK evS vq|
wePvi vj q ev A v` vj Z i c i wnZ K i b wePvi K | K vR B
Z vnvi gvbwmK ^vaxbZ vB wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v mgybZ K i |
bvqwePvi K wi Z wePvi K K GK w` K eR mg K Vvi A bw` K K zmygi
gZ K vgj nBZ nq| Z vnvi gvbwmK k w wePvi wef vMi k w |
wewUk f vi Z el hL b mevB c i vaxb wQj Z L bI wK wePvi wef vM
^vaxb wQj K vi Y wePvi K MY gvbwmK f ve ^vaxb wQj b| wePvi K MY
bvbvw` K nBZ gvbwmK ev mi vmwi Pvc i ^xK vi nBZ c vi b|
hvnvi v gvbwmK k w ev ^vaxbZ vi A waK vi x, Z vnvi v GB mK j Pvc
A enj v K wi Z c vi b| Thomas More, Sir Edward Coke, Lord John Holt c P
A Z vPvi , f q f xwZ I gvbwmK Pvc i gaI A vBbK mgybZ
i vwL qvQb| Lord Chancellor Thomas More K 16 er mi Tower G A i xY
i vwL evi c i wk i Q` K i v nBqvwQj wK i vR v Henry VIII Z uvnvK
bxwZ K wi Z c vi b bvB| Sir Edward Coke K mZ K _ bi R b Kings
Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ c ` nBZ c _ g ei L v , Z r c i Tower G
mvZ gvm A i xY _ vwK Z nq| c avb wePvi c wZ Lord John Holt K House
of Commons I House of Lords nBZ c P ei x eenvi mn K wi Z nq|
DQL j R bZ v c avb wePvi c wZ Lord Mansfield Gi evmf eb I Z uvnvi
ew MZ j vBei x c vo vBqv ` q| c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall I
wePvi c wZ Samuel Chase A wf msk b (Impeachment) Gi mebv mZ I
judicial review I msweavbi k Z A K zZ f q Nvl Yv K wi qv wMqvQb|
GB mK j wePvi K MY Z uvnv` i gvbwmK k w I ^vaxbZ v vi vB
mZ K , A vBbK myc wZ wZ K wi Z c vwi qvwQj b| wesk k Z vw Z
Lord Atkin GK Ni nBqvI gvbwmK k w Z D xweZ nBqv ewj Z
c vwi qvwQj b I protest even if I do it alone|
wewUk f vi Z el hL b mevB c i vaxb wQj Z L bI wePvi wef vM
^vaxb wQj K vi Y wePvi K MY gvbwmK f ve ^vaxb wQj b| c K Z c
121
wePvi K MYi gvbwmK k w B Z uvnv` i K ^vaxb i vwL qvwQj | huvnvi v
gvbwmK f ve ` yej Z uvnvi vB K ej bvbvgywL Pvc i ^xK vi nb|
wk v, mZ Z v, mvnm GK R b wePvi K K gvbwmK k w hvMvq|
wZ wb c qvR b eR i bvq K wVb nBeb, c qvR b K zmygi bvq
K vgj nBeb| Z vnvi _ vwK e cold neutrality of an impartial Judge (Edmand
Burke)| mec wi c qvR b mZ K memgq mgybZ i vL v| m K vi YB To
say truth, although it is not necessary for counsel to know what the history of a point is,
but to know how it now stands resolved, yet it is a wonderful accomplishment, and,
without it, a lawyer cannot be accounted learned in the law (Roger North,1651-1734)|
Dc i v e e wePvi K MYi c wZ I GK B f ve c hvR |
hL bB A vgi v ^vaxb wePvi ee vi K _ v ewj e Z L bB A vgv` i
gb i vwL Z nBet Justice without power is unavailing; power without justice is
tyrannical. Justice without power is gainsaid, because the wicked always exist; power
without justice is condemned. We must therefore combine justice and power, making
what is just strong, and what is strong just (Blaise Pascal, 1623-1662)| GK wU
K j vYagxi vBnvB mec _ g c qvR b|
Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law Gi Dci Zvunvi eI Zvq ej b:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent normal and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to
do than syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nations development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become..........
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always
with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the
juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for
the community concerned.
(Henry J Abraham: The Judicial Process, cv 11 nBZ DZ)


122
c vq wZ b hyM c i Gompers v. United States (1914) gvK v gvi i vq
wePvi c wZ Holmes ej b :

The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from
English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply
by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth. (Henry J. Abraham : The Judicial Process cv 11 nBZ
DZ)|

wePvi K ` i ` vwqZ I K Z e mK 1610 mvj Sir Francis
Bacaon ej bt
It shall appear from time to time ..........where the Kings acts have been
indeed against law, the course of law hath run, and the Judges have worthily
done their duty. (Philip Hamburger: Law and Judicial Duty).

Professor Philip Hamburger wePvi K MYi ` vwqZ I K Z e mK
ej b t
English judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land,
including their constitution. This duty was part of the office of a judge, to which
judges were bound by their oaths, and with their high ideal of this office and a
sworn obligation to adhere to it, judges could find the strength to do their duty,
even when it required them to hold unconstitutional acts void. ................The
duty of the judges when holding government acts unconstitutional had the
functional benefit of allowing them to enforce the constitution and thus preserve
constitutional liberty. ....................................................................................
Americans inherited the common law ideals of law and judicial duty. If
constitutions willed by the people were part of the law of the land, and if judges
had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land, American judges, like
their English predecessors, had no choice but to decide the constitutionality of
government acts. As put by the judges in Bayard v. Singleton, this was required
by the obligations of their oaths, and the duty of their office...................By
virtue of their office, judges had a distinctive authority in their cases not only to
give judgment but also to expound law. The exposition of law had traditionally
been recognized as pert of the office of judgment, and although the resolution of
cases had always been the core of judicial office, this focus of judicial authority
became more pronounced already in England under the pressure of ideals of
123
lawmaking authority. After American statues spelled out the jurisdiction of the
courts in terms of various actions, suits, causes, cases, or controversies,
Americans grew especially accustomed to thinking about judicial office in such
terms, and this tight conception of judicial office was all the more appealing
when it came to seem a concrete manifestation of the separation of powers.
(Philip Hamburger: Law and Judicial Duty Page. 609,610, 612, 614).

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f ve Z vnvi wePvwi K K vhK wi Z nq| GB j Z vnvi wbR ^
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Z vnv hb K L bB Z vnvi wePvi K vhK K vb f ve c f vweZ K wi Z bv
c vi mw` K Z vnvK memgq mZ K _ vwK Z nBe| ew MZ c Q` -
A c Q` K Z vnvi wePvwi K ` vwqZ I K Z e nBZ m~YwewQbK i v
wk wL Z nBe|
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c wZ k vk xj nBZ nBe| A vBb, bwR i Ges Z _ I NUbvej xi
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c vm K wi Z c vi wK mB A vBb msweavbi K wc v_ i m~Y
wb` j xq I i vR bxwZ ewnf ~Z f ve weePbv K wi evi ` vwqZ I K Z e
myc xg K vUi | ev e mgmvi K vi Y wbevnx wef vMK I nqZ v wewf b
wmv j BZ nq wK Z vnvi A vBbx wek l Y K wi evi ` vwqZ I wePvi
wef vMi | mB ` vwqZ I K Z e msweavb myc xg K vUZ _ v
mvgwMK f ve wePvi wef vMi Dc i A c b K wi qvQ| K vb wePvi K
Z vnvi Dc i A wc Z D i c ` vwqZ ev K Z e c vj b K wi Z e_ nBj
wZ wb msweavb I A vBb f K wi eb|
Gf veB GK R b wePvi K K mec K vi j vf I mewea c j y Z vi
DaDwVZ nq| Z vnvK c v_ i i bvq A byf ~wZ nxb nBZ nq|
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124
K wi evi R b GK R b wePvi K K mvi v R xeb wbR i mwnZ I mgvR i
mwnZ hy K wi Z nq|
Z e wePvi K I GK R b mvavi Y gvbyl , wZ wbI mgvR emevm
K i b| Z vnvi I PvI qv- c vI qv i wnqvQ| Z vnvK I wPi b mva I
mvai ga mgbq K wi qv Pwj Z hvBqv c vqk B e_ nBZ nq|
Justice Benjamin Cardozo Gi f vl vqt
Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their
lives, forces which they do not recognise and cannot name, have been
tugging at them inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired
convictions, and the resultant is an outlook on life,a conception of social
needs, a sense, in James phrase, of the total push and pressure of the
cosmos which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where
the choice shall fall. ( The Nature of the Judicial Process).
Gw` K w` qv myc xg K vUi wePvi K e` i ` vwqZ I K Z e A vi I
K mva| GK w` K Z vnvw` MK msweavb I gxgvswmZ bwR i A bymvi
A vBbi k Z K mgybZ I c evngvb i vwL Z nq| A bw` K m` v
weeZ bk xj mgvR A vBb hb e R j vk q A eva I g~j evanxb
K Z wj A _ nxb g c wi YZ bv nq mB w` K I mR vM _ vwK Z nq|
Pj gvb R xeb I m` v c wi eZ bk xj mgvR i g~j evai c wZ mZ Z
` w i vwL qv A vBbi b~Z b b~Z b evL v vi v A vaywbK hyMi m
mvg m mvab K wi evi ` ~i n ` vwqZ I K Z e GK R b wePvi K i |
GB c m Lord Denning ej bt
Law does not stand still. It moves continually. Once this is recognised,
then the task of the Judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously
seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time. He must not
be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick
without thought to the overall design. He must be an architect-thinking
of the structure as a whole- building for society a system of law which is
strong, durable and just. It is on his work that civilised society itself
deppends. Union of India V. Sankalchand AIR 1977 SC 2328
gvK v gvq K Iyer J, Gi i vq nBZ DZ ) |
125
GL vb gb i vL v c qvR b h BwZ nvmi c wZ wU i BUi Dc i
BU w` qv wek vj ma wbgvY K wi evi bvq wePvi K MY hyM hyM A vBbi
Dr K l mvabi ` ~i n K vhmvab K wi qv _ vK b| c K Z c mf Z vi
A bZ g k ` vb nBZ Q A vBb|
c vq ` yBk Z er mi c ~e18 28 mvj Lord Chancellor, Lord Henry
Brougham, House of Commons G QqNUv evwc Z uvnvi e Z vi GK vsk
ej bt
It was the boast of Augustus....... that he found Rome of brick, and left
it of marble; a praise not unworthy of a great prince, and to which the
present reign also has its claims. But how much nobler will be the
Sovereigns boast, when he shall have it to say, that he found law dear,
and left it cheap; found it a sealed bookleft it a living letter; found it the
patrimony of the richleft it the inheritance of the poor; found it the two-
edged sword of craft and oppressionleft it the staff of honesty and the
shield of innocence (Professor Robert Stevens: Law and Politics, 1978,
page-24, note-93)

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wPw Z nBZ b| wePvi K gv B nb GK wek l mvbi c v |
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mvnvh j BZ nq t
evg&nb Xvgb gyi L f q m~` c p MxZ v|
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muvPvK vgvi j vVvS zUvR Mr wc Z vi |
Mvi m Mwj Mwj d i myi veV eK vq \
mZ xK vbvgj avwZ M vb c ni L vmv|
126
K n K exi v` L f vB ` ywbqvK vZ vgvmv\
ev Y gyL nq, A _ P k ~` MxZ v c vV K i | k V I c Z vi K i v
Dr K A bf Y K i , A _ P c wZ i v K ej K c vq| j vK bvqK
` vNvZ K i , A _ P A bvqK wc Z er k v K wi qv _ vK | c _ c _
c hUb K wi qv ` y we q K wi Z nq, A _ P myi v GK vb A ew Z
_ vwK qvB wew Z nBqv hvq| c wZ eZ v mZ x xi GK L vwb ayZ x wgj bv,
A _ P ` y vwi Yx K vwgbxi v c K c wi Q` c wi avb K i | A Z Ge K exi
K nb, f vB! R MZ i K gb K Z zK , ` L | ( A qK zgvi ` t
K exi c xq m` vq)
Pvwi k Z er mi c ~ei wePvi K MY i vR vi wei , House of Lords I
House of Commons wei msMvg K wi qv A vBbi k vmb K vqg
K wi qvwQj b| wesk k Z vw i A vwk ` k K A vgv` i ` k I mvgwi K
k vmb A vgj GK R b mvnmx wePvi K K ei L v K i v nBqvwQj | GL b
A vi mB ai bi msMvgi c qvR b nq bv, GL b wePvi K MY mZ
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nBj Z vnvi mZ Z v, Z vnvi wk v, Pi g I c i g GK wb wbi c Z v|
wK mgqi c wi eZ b nBqvQ| c ~eR bwc q wePvi K i K _ v k vbv hvq
bvB| gvbyl K Vvi wePvi K i K _ v mvbi mwnZ mi Y K wi Z | A bK
wePvi K A vR Z vnv` i gvbwmK k w I ^vaxbZ v nvi vBqv
d wj Z Qb| mB mv_ wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vI b~Z b K wi qv zb
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wePvi K MYK A vi A vj v` vK wi qvPbvhvq bv|
A bw` K eZ gvb hyMi Edmand Burke, Sir Tej Bahadur Shopru, Sir
Rashbihari Ghose, M. C. Sitalvad, S.R. Pal, Hamidul Haque Chowdhury, Asrarul
Hossain c gyL i k vwbZ hyw hb c _ nvi vBqvQ| GL bK vi A bK
127
c exY GvW&f vK U gnv` q forum shopping G j v eva K i b bv|
A ek wePvi K MYB Bnvi R b ` vqx| GL b hb The most indifferent
arguments are good when one has a majority of bayonets (Bismarck)|
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wP vK i vA c wi nvhnBqvc wo qvQ|
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K wi Z Qb| Z uvnvi vB f wel Z i c w_ K Z |
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c wZ v K wi Z A MYx f ~wgK v c vj b K wi eb| BnvB nBe i vi
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c qvR b | R bwc qZ v bq, ` yi ` gb I wk i c vj b I i vi wewf b
wef vMi ^QvPvwi Z vi nvZ nBZ mvavi Y gvbyl K i v K i v Ges
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wb` k Gi d j k wZ B nBZ Q msweavb| GL vbB msweavbi k Z |
evsj v` k i Supreme Court evsj v` k i msweavbi A wef veK | A _ P
GB Supreme CourtI wesk k Z v xi m i ` k K i k l f vM I A vwk
` k K i c _ g f vM Bnvi GK wUi c i GK wU i vq vi v msweavbK Pi g
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hy i vi msweavbi 6 A byQ` wbi c t
128
..
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance there of;. shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby , anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not with standing.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the member of
the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both
of the United Sates and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation, to support this Constitution;..

hy i vi msweavbi c vc U wePvi c wZ St. George Tucker 1793
mvj (Kamper V. Hawkins) ej b h msweavb nBZ Q t
the voice of the people themselves, proclaiming to the world their
resolution ......... to institute such a government, as, in their own opinion,
was most likely to produce peace, happiness, and safety to the individual,
as well as to the community.

wZ wb ej b h msweavb nBj the first law of the land Ges t
a rule to all the departments of the government, to the judiciary as well
as to the legislature.
msweavb m^ wZ wb A vi I ej b t whatsoever is contradictory
thereto, is not the law of the land.

i vi wewf b wef vM wek l K wi qvwePvi wef vM m^ wZ wb
ej bt
Now since it is the province of the legislature to make, and of the
executive to enforce obedience to laws, the duty of expounding must be
exclusively vested in the judiciary. But how can any just exposition be
made, if that which is the supreme law of the land be withheld from their
view.
(Larry D. Kramer: The People Themselves, c v- 101 nBZ DZ )

mvqv ` yBk Z er mi c ~eUS Circuit Court, Pennsylvania Z Vanhornes
Lessee V. Dorrance (1795) gvK gvq myc xg K vUi Justice William Paterson
mswk A vBbi mvsweavwbK eaZ v c m msweavbi k Z mK
R yi x` i c wZ c ` e Z vq ej bt
.. What is Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated
by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of
129
fundamental laws are established. The Constitution is certain and fixed;
it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of
the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be
revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving
principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand.
What are Legislatures? Creatures of the Constitution; they owe their
existence to the Constitution: they derive their powers from the
Constitution: It is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts must be
conformable to it, or else they will be void. The Constitution is the work
or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and
unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the Legislature in their
derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the Creator,
and the other of the Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the
exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it
must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the
political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial
bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in
this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to
the Constitution, is absolutely void. ( A avi L vc ` )

Justice Paterson Z vnvi e ei k l f vM ej bt
The Constitution encircles, and renders it an holy thing........It is
sacred; for, it is further declared, that the Legislature shall have no power
to add to, alter, abolish, or infringe any part of, the Constitution. The
Constitution is the origin and measure of legislative authority. It says to
legislators, thus far ye shall go and no further. Not a particle of it should
be shaken; not a pebble of it should be removed.
( Professor John B. Sholley : Cases on Constitutional Law, 1951, page 27,30
nBZ DZ ) | ( A avi L vc ` )

Bnvi I c ~eThe Federalist G Alexander Hamilton wj wc e K i bt
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the constitution can be
valid. To deny this would be to affirm than the deputy is greater that his
principal; that the servant is above his master, that the representatives of
the people are superior to the people themselves; that man acting by
virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but
what they forbid.......... the Constitutions ought to be preferred to the
Statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
(Quoted from K.C. Wheare on Modern Constitutions c v- 60)
(A avi L vc ` )
130
Justice Thomas M. Cooley Z vnvi wj wL Z A Treatise on The Constitutional
Limitations M msweavbm^ ej bt ( c v- 2)
A constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of a state,
containing the principle upon which the government is founded,
regarding the division of the sovereign powers, and directing to what
persons each of these powers is to be confided, and the manner in which
it is to be exercised.

mvsweavwbK Z v mK Martin Loughlin I Walker Gi wbv eI e
c wbavbhvM t
Modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two fundamental though
antagonistic imperatives : that governmental power ultimately is generated from
the consent of the people and that, to be sustained and effective, such power
must be divided, constrained, and exercised through distinctive institutional
forms. The people, in Maistres words, are a sovereign that cannot exercise
sovereignty; the power they possess, it would appear, can only be exercised
through constitutional forms already established or in the process of being
established..............................(Martin Loughlin and Nail Walker : The
Paradox of Constitutionalism, page-1).


Marbury V. Madison (1803) gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall
msweavb m^ ej bt
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
(Professor John B. Sholley : Cases on Constitutional Law, 1951, Page-39,50
nBZ DZ ) ( A avi L vc ` )

Fazlul Quader Chowdhury V. Mohammad Abdul Hoque PLD 1963
SC 486 gvK gvq Hamoodur Rahman J. (as his Lordsihip then was) msweavb
m^ ej b ( c v- 535) t
Thus the written Constitution is the source from which all governmental
power emanates and it defines its scope and ambit so that each
functionary should act within his respective sphere. No power can,
therefore, be claimed by any functionary which is not to be found within
131
the four corners of the Constitution nor can anyone transgress the limits
therein specified. ( A avi L vc ` )

Asma Jilani V. Government of Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139 gvK gvq
The Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order , 1969 (Presidents Order No. 3
of 1969) A Wvi Gi K vi Y A vmgv wR j vbxi wc Z v gvwj K Mvj vg
wR j vbxi A i xY mK K vb A v` k c ` vb GL &wZ qvi wenxb ewj qv
j vnvi nvBK vUi vq c ` vb K wi j c vwK vb myc xg K vUmvgwi K
A vBb A ea ewj qvNvl YvK i |
c vwK vbi c avb wePvi c wZ Hamoodur Rahman GB c m ej b
( c v- 199) t
.........General Agha Mohammad Yahia Khan had according to me, no
authority to pass such legislation taking away the powers of the Courts in
his capacity as President under the Provisional Constitution Order. The
Martial Law introduced by him was illegal and, therefore, even as Chief
Martial Law Administrator he was not competent to validly pass such
laws ...


Dc msnvi Yaqub Ali, J. R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vb K Z K ej er
mvgwi K A vBb, i vc wZ i gZ v MnY BZ vw` A ea Nvl Yv K i b
(c v- 238 - 39) t
The Martial Law imposed by Yahia Khan was, therefore, in itself illegal
and all Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders issued by him
were on this simple ground void ab initio and of no legal
effect..........Yahia Khan, therefore, assumed the office in violation of
Article 16 of the Constitution to which he had taken oath of allegiance
as Commander in Chief. It could not, therefore, be postulated that Yahia
Khan had become the lawful President of Pakistan and was competent to
promulgate orders and Ordinances in exercise of the legislative function
conferred by the Constitution on the President. All Presidential Orders
and Ordinances which were issued by him were, therefore, equally void
and of no legal effect.

j j k nx` i GK mvMi i i wewbgq evsj v` k ^vaxbZ v
j vf K i | GK er mi i I K g mgqi ga Bnvi msweavb MnxZ nq|
msweavbi 7 A byQ` msweavbi c vavb Nvl YvK i |
132
7 A byQ` wbi c t
7 ( 1) c R vZ i mK j gZ vi gvwj K R bMY; Ges
R bMYi c mB gZ vi c qvM K ej GB msweavbi A axb
I K Z Z K vhK i nBe|
( 2) R bMYi A wf c vqi c i g A wf ew i c GB msweavb
c R vZ i mevP A vBb Ges A b K vb A vBb hw` GB
msweavbi mwnZ A mg m nq, Z vnv nBj mB A vBbi
hZ L vwb A mvg mc ~Y, Z Z L vwb evwZ j nBe|

1973 mbi A.T. Mridha V. State 25 DLR (1973) 335 gvK v gvq
myc xg K vUi nvBK vUwef vM msweavbi k Z Nvl Yv K i | D
gvK v gvq Badrul Haider Chowdhury, J. (as his Lordship then was) _ nxb f ve
ej b ( c v- 344) t
10. .............. The Constitution is the supreme law and all laws are to be
tested in the touch stone of the Constitution ( vide article 7). It is the
supreme law because it exists, it exits because the Will of people is
reflected in it. (A avi L vc ` )

GK B f ve Md. Shoib V. Government of Bangladesh, 27 DLR (1975) 315
gvK v gvq D.C. Bhattacharya, J. ej b ( c v- 325) t
In a country run under a written Constitution, the Constitution is the
source of all powers of the executive organs, of the State as well as of the
other organs, the Constitution having manifested the sovereign will of
the people. As it has been made clear in Article 7 of the constitution of
the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh that the Constitution being the
solemn expression of the will of the people , is the Supreme law of the
Republic and all powers of the Republic and their exercise shall be
effected only under, and by the authority of, the Constitution . This is a
basic concept on which the modern states have been built up.
( A avi L vc ` )

wbtm` n BnvB msweavbi mZ K vi A vBbvbyM A e vb| wK
gv K qK er mi i eeavb A vgv` i mevP A v` vj Z Bnvi GK wUi
c i GK wU i vq A vgv` i mevP A vBb gnvb msweavbK mvgwi K
A vBbi A at b (subordinate) wnmve Nvl Yv K i | GB i vq wj
A vgv` i i vR bwZ K , mvgvwR K , bwZ K I wePvwi K g~j evai Pi g
A e qi mv enb K i | A _ P myc xg K vUmeA e vq msweavbK
133
mgybZ i vwL evi c we ` vwqZ enb K wi evi K _ v wQj | GB i vq wj
A vgv` i gb i vL v c qvR b hb A Z f wel Z A vgv` i GBi c
c ` j b A vi bvnq|

Halima Khatun V. Bangladesh, 30 DLR (SC) 207 gvK v gvwUi i vq nq
4.1.1978 Z vwi L | Z L b ` k mvgwi K A vBb ej er wQj | c wi Z
mw Nvl Yvi eaZ v j Bqv i xU&gvK v gv ` vqi K i v nBqvwQj |
wel qwU Martial Law Regulation VII of 1977 Gi A vI Z vf ~ weavq A v` vj Z i
GL &wZ qvi ewnf ~Z t ewj qv i v c ` vex K i v nBqvwQj | evsj v` k
myc xg K vUi c Fazle Munim , J. (as his Lordship then was) Z uvnvi i vq
ej b ( c v- 218 ) t
18............ by clause (d) and (e) of the Proclamation made the
Constitution of Bangladesh , which was allowed to remain in force,
subordinate to the Proclamation and any Regulation or order as may be
made by the President in pursuance thereof . .................. Under the
Proclamation which contains the aforesaid clauses the Constitution has
lost its character as the Supreme Law of the country. There is no doubt,
an express declaration in Article 7(2) of the Constitution. .............
Ironically enough, this Article, though still exists, must be taken to have
lost some of its importance and efficacy. In view of clauses (d), (e) and
(g) of the Proclamation the supremacy of the Constitution as declared in
that Article is no longer unqualified. In spite of this Article, no
Constitutional provision can claim to be sacrosanct and immutable. The
present Constitutional provision may, however, claim superiority to any
law other than a Regulation or Order made under the Proclamation.

State V. Haji Joynal Abedin 32 DLR AD (1980) 110 gvK v gvwUZ
20/ 12/ 1978 Z vwi L i vq nq| Z L bI ` k mvgwi K A vBb ej er
wQj | GK wU Special Martial Law Court K Z K c ` ` v` k i eaZ v D
i xU&gvK v gvq Pvj K i v nBqvwQj | nvBK vUwef vM ` v` k
evwZ j K wi j I A vc xj wef vM wel qwU A v` vj Z i GL &wZ qvi ewnf ~Z
ewj qv Nvl Yv K i | A vc xj wef vMi c Ruhul Islam ,J. ej b ( c -
122) t
134
18. From a consideration of the features noted above it leaves no room
for doubt that the Constitution though not abrogated, was reduced to a
position subordinate to the Proclamation, in as much as the unamended
and unsuspended constitutional provisions were kept in force and
allowed to continue subject to the Proclamation and Martial Law
Regulation or orders and other orders; and the Constitution was amended
from time to time by issuing Proclamation. In the face of the facts stated
above I find it difficult to accept the arguments advanced in support of
the view that the Constitution as such is still in force as the supreme law
of the country, untrammelled by the Proclamation and Martial Law
Regulation.

Kh. Ehteshamuddin Ahmed V. Bangladesh 33 DLR (AD) (1981) 154 i xU&
gvK v gvwUZ 17/ 3/ 198 0 Z vwi L i vq nq| ` k Z L b mvgwi K
k vmb c Z vnvi K i v nBqvQ | D gvK v gvq Special Martial Law Court
K Z K c ` i vq I ` v` k i eaZ v Pvj K i v nBqvwQj | nvBK vU
wef vM Bnv Z vnv` i GL &wZ qvi ewnf ~Z ewj qv i xU&wU msw A v` k
L vwi R K i | A vc xj wef vM mB A v` k envj i vL | Ruhul Islam, J.
msweavbi 7 A byQ` mZ I ej b ( c v- 163) t
16. ......... the supremacy of the Constitution cannot by any means
compete with proclamation issued by the Chief Martial Law.........

nvR x R qbvj A vew` b gvK v gvq c ` i vqi DwZ c ` vb
K wi qvRuhul Islam, J. A vi I ej bt
18. ......... this Division has given the answer that the High Courts being
creature under the Constitution with the Proclamation of Martial Law and the
Constitution allowed to remain operative subject to the Proclamation and
Martial Law Regulation, it loses its superior power to issue writ against the
Martial Law Authority or Martial Law Courts.

evsj v` k i mevP A v` vj Z i Dc i v i vq c wo qv gb nBe
h mvgwi K c k vmK ` i bnvZ A byMn evsj v` k i mevP A vBb
Bnvi c we msweavb I mevP A v` vj Z K vb i K g we` gvb|
mvgwi K k vmK ` i c wZ evsj v` k i mevP A v` vj Z i GBi c bM
A e vb Pvwi k Z er mi c ~ei Batess Cases G ( The Case of Impositions,
1606) i vR vi c i vq c ` vb wePvi K Chief Baron Fleming I Baron Clarke
135
K I j v w` Z | Stuart i vR v` i mgq Z vnv` i c i wePvi K MYI
GZ Uv bMnBZ c vi b bvB| ei James II Z vnvi i vR Z i k l f vM
Martial Law c qvM K wi evi wP v K wi qvwQj b wK Z ` vbx b wePvi
wef vMi Pi g A e q mZ I Z vnvK mg_ b K wi evi gZ GK R b
wePvi K I Bsj v c vI qv hvq bvB| A vgv` i mf vM h c g
msk vabx gvK v gvq myc xg K vUA bK wej ^nBj I c wi vi
f vl vq Nvl Yv K wi qvQ h mvgwi K A vBb ewj qv K vb A vBb bvB Ges
mvgwi K A vBb K Z c ewj qv K vb K Z c i A w Z bvB | ei s
msweavb ` k i mevP A vBb| i vi mK j wef vM I c ` msweavbi
mw | h K vb A vBb Z vnv whwbB c Yqb K i b bv K b, msweavbi
mwnZ mvsNwl K nBj Z vnvi K vb A w Z B _ vwK e bv | GB i v
Government of laws, government of men bq|
Anwar Hossian Chowdhury V. Bangladesh 1989 BLD ( Special Issue)
gvK v gvq A vgv` i mevP A v` vj Z A vc xj wef vM GB c _ g evi i
gZ ^i vPvi x k vmK ` i c wZ Bnvi R o Z v c wi Z vM K wi Z mg_ nq
Ges mv` vK mv` v I K vj vK K vj v ewj Z mg_ nq| GB i vq
msweavbK mgybZ K wi Z I Bnvi hvM mevP vb A wavb K i |
wK Z vnvi c i I GB i vq mvgwi K A vBbi wec wi Z msweavbi
c K Z vb wbYq K wi Z e_ nq | Shahabuddin Ahmed , J. (as his Lordship
then was) Z vnvi i vq nvwj gv L vZ zb, nvR x R qbvj A vew` b ,
GnZ &l vgyw b BZ vw` gvK v gvq c ` i vqi c wZ awb K wi qv ej b
( c v- 118 ) t
272............Bangladesh which got independence from Pakistan through
a costly War of independence, which was fought with the avowed
declaration to establish a democratic polity, under a highly democratic
Constitution, met the same fate as Pakistan. Two Martial Laws covered a
period of 9 years Out of her 18 years of existence. During these Martial
Law periods the constitution was not abrogated but was either suspended
or retained as a statute subordinate to the Martial Law Proclamations.
Orders and Regulation.


136
A vc xj wef vM msweavbi k Z mgybZ i vwL Z A vevi I e_
nq| Bnv wbw Z f ve Nvl Yv K i v nBZ Q h gnvb msweavb
evsj v` k i mevP A vBb| Martial Law ewj qv K vb A vBbi A w Z
evsj v` k bvB|

24| myc xg K vUi f ~wgK vI wePvwi K c ybt weePbvi gZ v
(Power of Judicial Review):

msweavbi A axb msweavb msk vabmn h K vb A vBb c Yqbi
A bb gZ v R vZ xq msm` i i wnqvQ| eZ gvb i xU&gvK v gvq i xU&-
` i L v K vi x msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, Gi eaZ v
msweavbi 102 A byQ` i A axb nvBK vU wef vM Pvj
K wi qvQb| GB c vc U myc xg K vUi nvBK vUwef vMi Judicial
Review Gi gZ vi Mvo vi K _ v Ges D gZ vi ew m^
A vj vK c vZ K i vc qvR b|
evsj v` k msweavbi l f vM wePvi wef vM m^ eYbv K i v
nBqvQ| 1g c wi Q` myc xg K vU, 2q c wi Q` A a b A v` vj Z I
3q c wi Q` c k vmwbK UvBeybvj m^ eYbvK i vnBqvQ|
94( 1) A byQ` evsj v` k myc xg K vUmw K wi qvQ| 94( 1)
A byQ` wbi c t
94| ( 1) evsj v` k myc xg K vU bvg evsj v` k i
GK wU mevP A v` vj Z _ vwK e Ges A vc xj wef vM I nvBK vU
wef vM j BqvZ vnvMwVZ nBe|
101 A byQ` nvBK vUwef vMi GL wZ qvi I 102 A byQ`
gwj K A waK vi ej er K i Ymn wewf bA v` k I wb` k c ` vb
nvBK vUwef vMi gZ veYbvK i vnBqvQ|
A vc xj wef vM evsj v` k i mevP A v` vj Z |
137
msweavbi 103, 104 I 105 A byQ` A vc xj wef vMi
GL wZ qvi I wewf b gZ v eYbv K i v nBqvQ| BnvQvo v, 106
A byQ` A vc xj wef vMi Dc ` vg~j K GL wZ qvi c ` vb K wi qvQ|
hy i vB mec _ g msweavbi gvag wePvi wef vM vc b K i |
hy i vi msweavbi Z Z xq A byQ` i c _ g ` d v hy i vi myc xg
K vUI A bvb A v` vj Z vc b K i | c _ g ` d vwbi c t
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.
..............................................................................
A v` vj Z i GL wZ qvi m^ wZ xq ` d vq eYbv K i v nq| wZ xq
` d vwbi c t
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States,..........................
msweavbi GB Z Z xq A byQ` myc xg K vUK wePvwi K
GL wZ qvi I gZ v c ` vb K i |
msweavbi l A byQ` msweavbi k Z Nvl Yv K i Z t A -
i vmgyni wePvi K MYi Dc i Z vnv` i mvsweavwbK ` vwqZ A c b
K i | l A byQ` i mswk A sk wbi c t
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof;.................... shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding..............
Z e msweavb mvavi Y K vb A vBb bq| Bnv i vi mevP
A vBb| GB mevP A vBb i vi wewf bwef vM I mK j mvsweavwbK
c ` mw Ges Bnvi c avb ` vwqZ I K Z e wbw` K wi qvQ| Z vnvQvo v,
i vi mevP A vBb GB msweavbi evL v, wek l Y I mgybZ i vwL evi
` vwqZ A wc Z nBqvQ wePvi wef vMi Dc i |
138
United States V. Morrison (2000) gvK v gvq hy i vi c avb
wePvi c wZ Rehnquist ej bt
[T]he Framers crafted the federal system of government so that the
peoples rights would be secured by the division of power. Departing from their
parliamentary past, the Framers adopted a written Constitution that further
divided authority at the federal level so that the Constitutions provisions would
not be defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of legislative power
limited only by public opinion and the legislatures self-restraint. It is thus a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.
No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying
the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate
expositor of the constitutional text
( Larry D. Kramer: The People Themselves, Popular Constitutionalism And
Judicial Review, page-225 nBZ DZ )

Judicial Review m^ Professor Philip Hamburger ej b:
Almost every day a judge in the United States holds a statute
unconstitutional. This is judicial review, and it often seems the central feature
of American constitutional law.

American constitutions, however, are almost silent about judicial re-
view. Even today, they scarcely mention the power of judges to decide
constitutional questions. The power of judges to hold statutes unlawful and void
is therefore a puzzle. Where does this power come from? and what is its
character and scope?

The familiar answer to these questions comes in the form of a history of
judicial review. According to the conventional version of this history, the
American people in the 1770s and 1780s discovered the principle of popular
power and thereby invented written constitutions. The people, however,
apparently did not foresee how their constitutions should be enforced.
Fortunately---- so the story goes---- the judges discerned the possibility of
enforcing constitutions in their cases, and they made some fitful experiments in
this direction in the 1780s and then more confidently in the 1790s. Although
they could draw upon earlier, English and colonial traditions, they had to
develop the mechanism of reviewing enactments for their unconstitutionality,
and they most decisively settled the authority of this new power in 1803 in
Marbury v. Madison. (Philip Hamburger: Law and Judicial Duty, page-1)
139
178 7 mvj hy i vi msweavb c Yqbi convention G msweavb
c YZ vMY hy i vi Congress K hy i vR i Parliament Gi bvq megq
gZ v mbK wi Z Pvn bvB| K j vbx wj i c wZ hy i vR i
Parliament Gi eenvi Z vnvi v gvUB wemZ nb bvB| Parliament h
K j vbx wj i Dc i wewf bmgq Stamp Act I A bvb K i vi vc K wi Z
Ges bvbv f ve Z vnv` i Dc i K Z Z c ` k b K wi Z msweavb i Pbvq
Z vnv Z vnv` i weePbv I wP vi c vZ wQj | Ggb wK Five Intolerable
Act R vi x K wi evi c i I mK j c K vi ` vex j Bqv Continental Congress Gi
c nBZ GK wU A ve` b c mi vmwi hy i vR i i vR vi wbK U c i Y
K i v nq K vi Y K j vbx wj i R bMY Z vnv` i K gK v Parliament Gi
gvMZ n c Z wei nBqv DwVqvwQj A _ P Z L bI
msL vMwi R bMY hy i vR i i vR vK Z vnv` i i vR v ewj qv MY
K wi Z wK hy i vR i Parliament Z vnv` i Dc i A vBb wewae K wi e
Z vnvmn K wi Z PvwnZ bv|
GB mK j bvbvwea K vi Y msweavb c YZ vMY Congress K
memgq gZ v- mbK wi evi c wi eZ Charles Louis de Montesquieu Gi
Z Z A bymvi gZ vi c _ K &K i Y (separation of powers) Gi Dc i gbvhvM
w` qvwQj b|
18 k k Z v xi A g ` k K judicial review m^ mvavi Y R bMYi
Z gb K vb avi Yv wQj bv | H mgq K j vbx wj i wbR ^GK ai Yi
PvUvi ev msweavb wQj | mK j i GK wU mvavi Y avi Yv wQj h msm`
K vb A bwZ K ev A mvsweavwbK A vBb wewae K wi j c i eZ x wbevPb
R bMY Z vnv` i f vUvwaK vi c qvM K wi qv Z vnvi R eve w` e| wK
A v` vj Z i I h A mvsweavwbK A vBbK A ea Nvl Yv K wi evi myhvM
i wnqvQ m m^ L ye K g msL K j vK i avi Yv wQj , m avi YvI
wQj A |
hvnvi v judicial review Gi c e v wQj b Z vnv` i e e wQj h
msweavb ayA vBb bq Bnv mevP A vBb, wK msm` c YxZ K vb
140
A vBb hw` msweavb ewnf ~Z nq ev mvsNwl K nq Z e D A vBb A ea
nBe Ges A v` vj Z Bnvi judicial review Gi gZ v ej Z vnv Nvl Yv
K wi Z c vi | Z e GB Z Z I mB mgq avqvmvc ~YwQj | msm`
K Z K wewae K vb A vBb msweavb c wi c w , K vR B D A vBb
A bymi Y K i v hvq bv, Ggb wbe` bi c i I mB hyM A v` vj Z K vb
A vBbi mvsweavwbK Z vi c k mvavi YZ Go vBqv hvBZ | K ` vwPr K vb
A - i vi A v` vj Z K vb A vBb A mvsweavwbK ewj j c vqmB BnvK
msm` I ^v_ m ew eMi Z xe mgvj vPbvi myL xb nBZ
nBZ | GgbwK mswk wePvi K MYi A wf k smb (impeachment) nBevi
mebv ` L v w` Z | A bK mgq er mi v Z vnv` i A vi wePvi K
wbevPb K i vnBZ bv|
wK GB i K g ai Yi c wi w wZ Z I A bK mvnmx wePvi K
wQj b hvnvi vmei K g A e vZ I A vBbi f vl vZ B i vq w` Z b|
Commonwealth V. Caton (1782) gvK v gvq wePvi K George Wythe
ej bt
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the general court, Fiat
Justitia, ruat coelum; and, to the usurping branch of the legislature, you
attempt worse than a vain thing; for, although, you cannot succeed, you
set an example, which may convulse society to its centre. Nay more, if
the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to
overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in
administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united
powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to constitution, will say,
to them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go but
no further. ( A avi L vc ` )
(Larry D. Kramer: The People Themselves, Popular Constitutionalism
and judicial Review, Oxford University Press, c v- 64 nBZ DZ )
Dc i v gvK v gvwU Virginia A i vR DyZ nBqvwQj |
wek vmNvZ K Z vi A c i va wZ bR b A vmvgxi gZ z` nBj Z vnv` i
A ve` bi c w Z House of Delegates Z vnv` i gv K i wK Senate
gv K wi Z A ^xK vi K i | Treason Act Gi A vI Z vq Df q K B gvi
A ve` b g yi K wi j A vmvgxi gv c vBevi weavb i wnqvQ, wK D
141
A - i vi msweavb gv K wi evi gZ v A - i vi Governor A _ ev
House of Delegates K c ` vb K wi qvQ|
GB c wi w wZ Z wePvi K George Wythe I James Mercer A vBbwUi
mvsweavwbK Z v evL v K wi Z Pvwnj I wePvi K Peter Lyons Bnvi
wei vwaZ vK i b| A b c vuPR b wePvi K I GB c k Go vBqvhvb|
c i eZ xZ House of Delegates Gi mwnZ Senate GK gZ nBj wel qwU
A vmvgx` i c wb w nq|
Trevett V. Weeden (1786) gvK v gvwUZ Rhode Island A - i vi
GK wU A vBb eemvqx` i K vMR i bvU MnY K wi evi evaevaK Z v
mw K i | BnvK A mvsweavwbK ` vex K i v nq K vi Y D bvUi Dc i
D vwc Z ` vexi wePvi R yi x ewZ i K mvavi Y gvK v gvq nBZ
c vi |
ev` xc i K wj James Varnum Z vnvi hyw Z K Dc vc b K wi Z
wMqvej b t
But as the legislative is the supreme power in government, who is to
judge whether they have violated the constitutional rights of the people?-
I answer........ the people themselves will judge, as the only resort in the
last stages of oppression. But when [legislators] proceed no further than
merely to enact what they may call laws, and refer those to the Judiciary
Courts for determination, then, (in discharge of the great trust reposed in
them, and to prevent the horrors of a civil war, as in the present case) the
Judges can, and we trust your Honours will, decide upon them.
(Larry D. Kramer i wPZ M The People Themselves nBZ DZ , c v-
63) |
( A avi L vc ` )
Dc i v gvK v gvq D vwc Z mvsweavwbK c k Go vBqv hvBqv
GL wZ qvi i c k A v` vj Z gvK v gvwU L vwi R K i | wK GZ ` mZ I
A - i vwUi Governor GB c k msm` i wek l A waek b A vnevb K i
Ges msm` wePvi K ` i wbK U evL v ` vex K i | wePvi K MY c _ g
Z vnvi v accountable only to God and (their) own conscience ewj qv i nvB c vb
142
bvB| ei msm` Z vnv` i A m w wj wc e K wi qv mgMBench wU
ei L v K wi evi c ve weePbvi R b MnY K i | A Z tc i , wePvi K MY
wj wL Z f ve disclaim(ing) and totally disavow(ing) any the least power or
authority, or the appearance thereof, to contravene or control the constitutional laws of
the state. ewj qv A vc vZ Z t i nvB c vb| Z e wePvi K ` i c i eZ x
wbevPbi mgq GK R b ewZ Z A b K nB wbevwPZ nb bvB|
Bnv A ek mK j i ^xK vhwQj msweavb mK j i R b mgf ve
c hvR Ges i vi mK j wef vM msweavb vi v eva wK Z vnvi A _
Bnv bq h wePvi wef vM A b K vb wef vMi Dc i K Z Z K wi Z c vi ,
K vi Y K vb wef vMB A b K vb wef vM nBZ k Z i bq| i vi mK j
wef vMi mvsweavwbK A e vb nBj h GB wef vM wj mK j B R bMYi
A axb I Z vnv` i meK | hw` msm` msweavb ewnf ~Z K vR K i Z e
Z vnv Z Z veavb K wi evi ` vwqZ R bMYi | R bMY wbevPbi gvag
msm` m` m` i R evew` wnZ v wbw Z K i | hw` wePvi wef vM msm` i
wewae K vb A vBb m^ e e c ` vb K i Z e mvavi Yf ve Z vnv
nBe i vi A b GK wU mg i Z mbwef vMi K vh g n c
K i v| A bK i gZ hnZ z A - i vi msm` A vBb c YqY
gZ vc v mnZ z Bnvi B A vBbi eaZ v c i x v K wi evi GL wZ qvi
i wnqvQ| A vevi A bK i gZ c K Z c h K vb A vBb ev h K vb
wel q wek l Y K wi evi Pzo v gZ v R bMYi Ges R bMY wbevPbi
mgqB mK j i R eve` vwnZ vwbw Z K i |
Thomas Jefferson msweavb j Nb NUbvej x wek l Y K wi evi R b
R bMYi Convention A vn&evbi c ve K wi qvwQj b| A bK council of
censors Gi c ve K wi qvwQj b hvnvi v mvZ er mi A i A i
msweavbi A e vb c i x vK wi e|
Z L bI A bK R bwc q mvef gZ i R b judicial review c qvR b
ewj qv gb K wi Z b| hnZ zmsweavb mevP A vBb, mnZ zmsweavb
ewnf ~Z h K vb A vBb A ea| c K Z c Z vnv A vBbB bn|
143
Gi K g ai bi K vb A vBb hw` A v` vj Z i myL c k nq Z e
A v` vj Z D A vBbi mvsweavwbK A e vb Dc v K wi Z c vi bv |
hw` Dnv ea nq Z e Z vnv D vwc Z NUbvej x ev wei vaxq wel qi
Dc i c qvM K wi e, hw` A ea nq, Z e Z vnvI Nvl Yv K wi Z
mvsweavwbK f ve eva|
msweavb Ges msweavb mgybZ i vwL Z A v` vj Z i GBi c f zwgK v
178 0- 90 ` k K c vq m~YA c wi wPZ wQj | Dc i v Z vwZ K
A e vb L yeB ^ msL K A vBb i ga avqvmv A vK vi mxgve
wQj | Gi K gB GK R b wQj b James Iredell | 178 6 mvj Z vnvi g j
Bayard 1777 mvj hy i vi ^vaxbZ v hyK vj xb mgq evR qvK Z
Z vnvi mw d i r c vBevi R b gvK v gv K wi j weev` xc Z vnv
L vwi R K wi evi R b GB K vi Y c v_ bv R vbvq h c ~eeZ x er mi A vBb
K wi qv D i c evR qv K i v mw d i r c ` vb wbwl nBqvwQj |
Iredell D A vBbi mvsweavwbK eaZ v A v` vj Z i weePbvi R b
D vc b K wi Z PvwnZ wQj b|
wZ wb An Elector GB Qbvg c w K vq A mvsweavwbK A vBb A ea
Nvl Yv K wi Z A v` vj Z i gZ v c m GK wU c e j L b| Iredell
j L b t
[T]hat though the Assembly have not a right to violate the constitution,
yet if they in fact do so, the only remedy is, either by a humble petition that the
law may be repealed, or a universal resistance of the people. But that in the
mean time, their act, whatever it is, is to be obeyed as a law [by the judges]; for
the judicial power is not to presume to question the power of an act of
Assembly.
(Kramer : The People Themselves, page-61)
A bmK j c wZ K vi A c hv ` vex K wi qv Iredell ej b h msweavb
R bMYi mvef gZ Nvl Yv K i Ges Z vnv nBZ A v` vj Z i judicial
review Gi gZ vDyZ nBqvQt
For that reason, an act of Assembly, inconsistent with the constitution,
is void, and cannot be obeyed, without disobeying the superior law to which we
144
were previously and irrevocably bound. The judges, therefore, must take care at
their peril, that every act of Assembly they presume to enforce is warranted by
the constitution, since if it is not, they act without lawful authority. This is not a
usurped or a discretionary power, but one inevitably resulting from the
constitution of their office, they being judges for the benefit of the whole people,
not mere servants of the Assembly.
(Kramer : The People Themselves, page-61-62)
Iredell Gi hyw wQj h i vi mevP ev g~j A vBb R bMY K Z K
i wPZ | Bnv msm` K Z K c YxZ A b A vBb nBZ m~Yc _ K Ges
judicial review Gi gZ v A v` vj Z D R bMYi A vBbx c wZ wbwa wnmve
c qvM K wi Z gZ vc v| Z vnvQvo v A mvsweavwbK A vBb c qvM K i v
nBZ A ^xK vi K wi qv A v` vj Z ei R bMYi mvsweavwbK wb` k
c vj b K wi e| R bMYi c judicial review Gi gZ v c qvM K wi qv
A v` vj Z c vw_ Z c wZ K vi k vw c ~Yf ve msweavbi A vI Z vq c ` vb
K wi Z c vi | A Z tc i , K vb A vBbi c wZ ev` R bMYi c wZ i va ev
A b K vb wec ei c qvR b nq bv|
Iredell Gi GB mK j hyw Bayard V. Singleton (1786) gvK v gvq we
wePvi K MY MnY K i b Ges Z vnvi c i vq c ` vb K i b |
Dj L , James Iredell c i eZ x K vj hy i vi myc xg K vUi
wePvi K wbhy nBqvwQj b|
Bayard V. Singleton (1786) gvK v gvwU North Carolina A i v DyZ
nBqvwQj | 1777 mvj Bayard Gi mw evR qv nBqvwQj | 178 5
mvj wewae GK wU A vBb H i c evR qv mw d i r c ` vb wbwl
K i v nq| 178 6 mvj H mw wd wi qv c vBevi R b Bayard
gvK v gvwU K wi j weev` xc Dnv L vwi R K wi evi c v_ bv K i v nq |
wK L vwi R i c v_ Yv ` Z g yi bv K i vq msm` wePvi K ` i WvwK qv
c vVvq Ges Z vnv` i wei A wf hvM c wZ wZ nq| A ek Z vnv` i
k vw c ` vb K i vnBZ A evnwZ ` I qv nq|
BwZ ga gvK v gvwU L vwi R K wi evi R b wZ xqevi A ve` b
K i v nBj wePvi K MY wel qwUZ wmv c ` vb Go vBevi Pv K i b,
145
wK Z vnv me bv nI qvq 178 7 mvj i g gvm hL b Philadelphia
k ni msweavb ms v Convention A waek b A vi nq Z L b A bK Uv
A wbQyK f ve wbgv A v` k c ` vb K wi qv weev` x c i ` vwL j K Z
gvK v gvL vwi R i ` i L v L vwi R K i b t
............. that notwithstanding the great reluctance they might feel
against involving themselves in a dispute with the Legislature of the State, yet
no object of concern or respect could come in competition or authorize them to
dispense with the duty they owed the public, in consequence of the trust they
were invested with under the solemnity of their oaths..........
That by the Constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a
decision of his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legislature could take
away this right, and require him to stand condemned in his property without a
trial, it might with as much authority require his life to be taken away without a
trial by jury, and that he should stand condemned to die, without the formality of
any trial at all: that if the members of the General Assembly could do this, they
might with equal authority, not only render themselves the Legislators of the
State for life, without further election of the people, from thence transmit the
dignity and authority of the legislation down to their heirs male forever.
But that it was clear, that no act they could pass, could by any means
repeal or alter the constitution, because if they could do this, they would at the
same instant of time, destroy their own existence as a Legislature, and dissolve
the government thereby established. Consequently the Constitution (which the
judicial power was bound to take notice of as much as of any other whatever,)
standing in full force as the fundamental law of the land, notwithstanding the act
on which the present motion was grounded, the same act must of course, in that
instance, stand as abrogated and without any effect.
(Noel T. Dowling : Cases on Constitutional Law, 1954, c v- 72- 73)
( A avi L vc ` )
wK Dc i v i vq c ` vbi c i A - i vwUZ c P c wZ ev`
D vwc Z nq Ges msm` wePvi K ` i eZ b ew e K i | Z e g~j
gvK v gvwUZ R yi x ev` xc gZ vgZ c K vk K wi j A e v ^vf vweK
nBqvA vm|
146
GBi c A wb qZ v I bvbv i K g Uvbvc vo bi ga judicial review
Z Z axi axi ` vbv evuwaZ A vi K i | Larry D. Kramer Gi f vl vq
( c v- 57- 58 ) t
This combination of factors- more active government, more explicit
constitutions, more constitutional conflict and arguably unconstitutional laws,
and, above all, a heightened sense of popular sovereignty- could be interpreted
in different ways, and it pulled people in different directions as they confronted
the new experience of managing a constitutional republic. The resulting tensions
shaped the first concept of judicial review. (The People Themselves)
Dc i v A byQ` nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h hy i vi msweavb
mevP A vBb Ges A i vR i msweavb ev A vBb hvnvB _ vK zK bv
K b D A i vR i wePvi K MY hy i vi msweavbvi veva|
hy i vi msweavbi Z Z xq I l A byQ` Bnv wbwnZ (Implicit)
i wnqvQ h myc xg K vUi wePvi K MY msweavb msk vab A vBb, Congress
K Z K wewae A vBb Ges A i vi msweavb I wewae A vBbi
mvsweavwbK eaZ v weePbv I c i x v, judicial review Gi gvag K wi Z
c vwi eb | A bw` K , A i vi wePvi K MY A i vi msweavb I
wewae A vBbi mvsweavwbK eaZ v c i x v I weePbv GK Bi c
GL wZ qvi PPvi gvag K wi Z c vwi eb| Z vnvQvo v, myc xg K vU
A i vR nBZ A vbxZ A vc xj wj I weePbvK wi Z c vwi e|
178 7 mvj Federal Convention msweavb i Pbv K wi evi c i Dnv
A i vmg~n K Z K A bygv` b c hvq _ vwK evi mgq PUBLIUS Q` bvg
Alexander Hamilton, 178 8 mvj i 28 k g Z vwi L Federalist No. 78 G
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vI gZ vm^ j L bt
..............................................................................
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the
like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice not other way than
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
147
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
.....................................................................................
It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the
superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
..................................................................................................
The independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors,
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
.................................................................................................................................
..........
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society.
....................................................................................................
Dj L , 178 7 mvj hL b hy i vi msweavb i Pbv K i v nq
Z L b A v` vj Z i judicial review Gi avi Yv A c wi wPZ wQj | hy i vR
168 9 mvj Bill of Rights c YxZ nBevi c i King in Parliament Gi
mvef gZ c wZ v nq| A Z c i , Parliament K Z K c YxZ A vBb i vR vi
^v i i c i mvavi Y f ve A v` vj Z c qvM K wi Z eva wQj |
hy i vR A vBbi GB avb avi Yv gvUvgywU me c Pwj Z wQj |
Parliament G wewae A vBbi eaZ v A v` vj Z D vc bi avi YvI mB
148
hyM wQj bv| mB mgq hy i vi vR bxwZ we` I c wZ ew MY wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ v I judicial review m^ h Mf xi wP v f vebv K wi Z b
Z vnvmsweavb I Dc i ewYZ Federalist No. 78 _ K c Z xqgvb nq|
A Z c i , Federalist No. 81 G Alexander Hamilton judicial review m^
ej bt
This doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the
plan of the convention, but from the general theory of a limited Constitution;
and as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State
government...............................................................
These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those State who
have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the
legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of
men......................................
To avoid all inconveniencies, it will be safest to declare generally, that
the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact,
and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as
the national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to
modify it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and
security.
A i v K Z K msweavb A bygv` bK vj Ggb ai bi D j I
ev e A vBbx A vj vPbv hy i vi wewf bk ni Z L b Pwj Z wQj |
GgbwK Federalist wei vax ` j I judicial review K mg_ b K wi qvwQj |
Brutus Qbvg Robert Yates j L bt
[T]he judges under this constitution will control the legislature, for the
supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of
the powers of the Congress. They are to give the constitution an explanation,
and there is no power above them to set aside their judgment......... The supreme
court then have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to
the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this
system to correct their construction or do it away. If therefore, the legislature
pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution,
they will declare it void.
18 k k Z v xZ hy i v ^vaxb nBevi c ~ec vq mK j K j vbx
i v wj i wbR ^msweavb wQj | msweavbi mwnZ mvsNwl K K vb A vBb
149
K j vbx i vi A v` vj Z D vwc Z nBj Z vnv A ea weewPZ nBZ |
A bK mgq D i vqi wei hy i vR i Privy Council G A vc xj
` vqi K i vnBZ |
c _ g Congress Bnvi Judiciary Act, 1789, wewae K i | Bnvi 25
avi vq A i vR mg~ni A v` vj Z i mvsweavwbK Z v mK i vqi
wei myc xg K vUA vc xj i weavb K i Z t D A v` vj Z judicial
review Gi gZ vwbw Z K i |
Professor William Treanor Mel Yv K wi qv ` L vBqvQb h 178 8
mvj nBZ 18 03 mvj c h A i vR mg~n 38 wU gvK v gvq A vBbi
eaZ vD vwc Z nBqvwQj |
Hayburns case (1792) G wZ bwU Federal Circuit Court Congress K Z K
wewae GK wU A vBb msweavbi Z Z xq A byQ` i mwnZ mvsNwl K
weavq Z wK Z A vBbwU A mvsweavwbK ewj qv wmv MnY K i | K vi Y
D A vBbi A vI Z vq wePvi K MYK c bk b A ve` bc i Dc i
wmv MnY K wi evi ` vwqZ A c b K i v nBqvwQj hvnv wePvwi K K vh
wQj bv Ges Separation of Powers Z Z i mwnZ mvsNwl K wQj | myc xg
K vUA vc xj wePvi vaxb _ vK v K vj xb mgq Congress A vBbwU evwZ j
K i weavq myc xg K vUPzo v wmv nq bvB|
United States V. Yale Todd gvK v gvq Hayburns caseG D vwc Z
Z wK Z A vBbi A vI Z vq c bk b c ` vb K i v nBqvwQj weavq myc xg
K vUZ vnvevwZ j K i |
Hylton V. United States (1796) gvK v gvq mec _ g myc xg K vU
Congress K Z K wewae GK wU A vBbi eaZ v D vwc Z nq Z e myc xg
K vUA vBbwU ea Nvl YvK i |
Z vnvQvo v, Ware V. Hylton (1796) gvK v gvq mec _ g A i vi
wewae GK wU A vBbK myc xg K vUA ea Nvl YvK i |
Calder V. Bull (1798) gvK gvq Justice Samuel Chase ej b t
150
If any act of congress, or of a legislature of a state, violates those
constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void............

Cooper V. Telfair (1800) gvK gvq Justice Chase ej bt
It is indeed a general opinion-it is expressly admitted by all this bar and
some of the judges have, individually in the circuits decided, that the Supreme
Court can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and therefore
invalid, but there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point.

1791 mvj Georgia A i vi Grand Jury K wb` k c ` vb K vj
(Charging the jury) Circuit Court Gi wePvi c wZ James Iredell K vb A vBb hw`
msweavb c wi c x nq Z vnvevL vK wi Z hvBqvej b t
The courts of Justice, in any such instance coming under their
cognizance, are bound to resist them, they having no authority to carry
into execution any acts but such as the constitution warrants.
(Kramer : The People Themselves, c v- 104)
GK B f ve 1795 mvj Vanhornes Lessee V. Dorrance gvK v gvq
Grand Jury K wb` k c ` vbK vj wePvi c wZ Paterson ej b t
I take it to be a clear position; that if a legislative act oppugns a
constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be rejected on the score
of repugnance. I hold it to be a position equally clear and sound, that, in such
case, it will be the duty of the Court to adhere to the Constitution, and to declare
the act null and void. The Constitution is the basis of legislative authority; it lies
at the foundation of all law, and is a rule and commission by which both
Legislators and Judges are to proceed. It is an important principle, which, in the
discussion of questions of the present kind, ought never to be lost sight of, that
the Judiciary in this country is not a subordinate, but co-ordinate, branch of the
government.
(Kramer : The People Themselves, c v- 104)
wePvi c wZ Samuel Chase 18 00 mvj Pennsylvania Grand Jury K
wb` k c ` vbK vj Judicial Power m^ ej b t
is co-existent, co-extensive, and co-ordinate with, and altogether
independent of, the Legislature & the Executive; and the Judges of the
Supreme, and District Courts are bound by their Oath of Office, to
regulate their Decisions agreeably to the Constitution. The Judicial
151
power, therefore, are the only proper and competent authority to decide
whether any Law made by Congress; or any of the State Legislatures is
contrary to or in Violation of the federal Constitution.
(Kramer : The People themselves, c v- 134- 35)

GB c Uf ~wgK vq 18 03 mvj myc xg K vUMarbury V. Madison
gvK v gvi bvbxnq|
President John Adams Z vnvi A emi MnYi A K vj c ~ejustice of the
peace c ` ek wK QymsL K ew eMK wbqvM c ` vb K i b| wbqvMi
mK j A vbyvwbK Z v mbK i Z t wbqvMc c vq mK j i wbK U c i Y
K i v nBj I mgqvf ve William Marbury Gi wbK U c i Y K i v me
nBqvwQj bv| BwZ ga Thomas Jeferson i vc wZ c ` ` vwqZ f vi MnY
K i b| Z r c i Marbury Gi wbqvMc A vi c i Y K i v nq bvB| GB
c wi w wZ Z Marbury wbA v` vj Z gvK v gv ` vqi bv K wi qv mi vmwi
myc xg K vUgvK v gv ` vqi K wi qv Z vnvi wbqvMc c i Y K wi evi
R b hy i vi Z ` vwb b Secretary of State, James Madison Gi Dc i GK wU
writ of mandamus c v_ YvK i b|
The Judiciary Act, 1789 Gi 13 avi v myc xg K vUK writ of mandamus
mn original gvK v gv bvbx K wi evi GL wZ qvi c ` vb K i | myZ i vs GB
A vBbi A vI Z vq myc xg K vUMarbury Gi gvK v gv bvbx K wi Z
c vwi Z wK hy i vi msweavbi Z Z xq A byQ` i 2q ` d vi
A vI Z vq i v` ~Z ms v gvK v gv Ges Ggb gvK gv hL vb GK wU
A i v c i wnqvQ, mB ai Yi gvK v gv ` vqi K i v hvq|
Z vnvQvo v, A b h ai bi gvK v gvi K _ v ej v nBqvQ Z vnvi ga
mandamus ms v A vc xj gvK gvq GL &wZ qvi _ vwK j I original
gvK v gvq bvbx K wi evi GL &wZ qvi wQj bv| GgZ A e vq Z B
c Z xqgvb nq h msweavbi Z Z xq A byQ` h gZ v myc xg K vUK
c ` vb K wi qvQ Judiciary Act, 1789 Gi 13 avi v BnvK Z vnvi A wZ wi
gZ vc ` vb K wi qvQ|
152
GB c vc U myc xg K vUi c c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall
ej bt
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act
establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus
to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it
becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be
exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become
the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but,
happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary
to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established,
to decide it.
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary
to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions
are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
Certainly all those who have frame written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is,
consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further
consideration of this subject.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige then to give it effect?
Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as
if it was a law?
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.
153
....................The judicial power of the United States is extended to all
cases arising under the Constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in
using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the
constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it
rises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained. ....... Thus, the particular
phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitution, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument. (Professor Noel T. Dowling on the
Cases on Constitutional Law Fifth Edition, 1954, at pages-95-97).
( A avi L vc ` )
Dc msnvi Marshall, C.J. ej b t
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned;
and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
(Professor Noel T. Dowling : Cases on Constitutional Law, page-275)
( A avi L vc ` )
Dj L h William Marbury hy i vi msweavbi k Z A _ ev
myc xg K vUi Judicial review Gi gZ v m^ gvUI Dr mvnx wQj b
bv, wZ wb aygv Z vnvi wbqvM c wU c i Y K wi evi R b Secretary of
State Gi Dc i GK wU mandamus ev myc xg K vUi wb` k c v_ bv
K wi qvwQj b| wK myc xg K vUZ vnvi vf weePbv K wi Z hvBqv
A Z mPZ bf ve Congress Gi GK wU A vBb evwZ j Nvl Yv K i |
Congress Gi wewae A vBbi eaZ v mK myc xg K vUi judicial
review Gi gZ v c qvMi BnvB mZ K vi c vi wQj | A vBbi
BwZ nvm Bnv wQj GK wU gvBj d j K NUbv| wbtm` n Bnv GK wU
154
A vBbx gnvwec e| Judicial review Gi gZ v gvbq wek i mK j
A v` vj Z c qvM K wi Z A vi K i |
Professor Alexander Bickel h_ vZ B Z vnvi The least Dangerous Branch
M ewj qvQb t
T[]he institution of the judiciary needed to be summoned up out of the
constitutional vapors, shaped and maintained; and the Great Chief
Justice, John Marshall,not singlehanded, but first and foremost was
there to do it and did. If any social process can be said to have been
done at a given time and by a given act, it is Marshalls achievement.
The time was 1803; the act the decision in the case of Marbury v.
Madison.
Professor William E. Nelson Z vnvi Marbury V. Madison M i Introduction
G ej b t
Marbury v. Madison will long remain a foundational case for
understanding the work and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the
United States. In an 1803 opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, the
Court explicitly ruled for the first time that it possessed what we now
call the power of judicial review, or jurisdiction to examine whether
legislation enacted by Congress is consistent with the Constitution.
..........Thus, Marbury v. Madison was a truly seminal case, which
ultimately has conferred vast power on the Supreme Court of the United
States and on other constitutional courts throughout the world. What
makes the case even more important is the absence of any clear plan on
the part of the Constitutions framers to provide the Court with this
power.
Marbury V. Madison gvK v gvi i vq mK Professor Charles G. Haines
ej bt
........Marshall, who was an ardent Federalist, was aware of a rising
opposition to the theory of judicial control over legislation, and he no doubt
concluded that the wavering opinions on federal judicial supremacy needed to
be replaced by a positive and unmistakable assertion of authority.
(Rabert K. Carr: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review nBZ DZ , c v-
70)
155
Marbury V. Madison gvK v gv wek l Y K wi qv Professor Robert K.
Carr ej bt
.........Marshall chose to base his decision upon the much broader
ground that the Court must refuse to enforce any act of Congress which it
considers contrary to the Constitution, regardless of whether the act is one
pertaining to the work of the judiciary or dealing with some other matter
altogether................... ( c v- 68 )
..........It refrained from exercising a power which Congress had granted
to it and which in the case at hand it might have used in partisan fashion to
accomplish an act of judicial interference with the conduct of administrative
affairs of the government by the President of the United States and his first
assistant, the Secretary of State. In other words, the Court might have tried to
force Jefferson and Madison to give Marbury his commission, and Federalists
the country over would have applauded. But instead, in an act of seeming self-
abnegation, the Court said No and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
..................................................( c v- 69)
............ In other words, Marshall was invoking that power for the first
time at just such a moment when the Fathers probably intended it should be
exercised. Jefferson had become president and his party had won control of
Congress. The opposition had obtained complete control of the political
branches of the government. Is it not obvious that from the point of view of the
Founding Fathers and the Federalist party the time had come to point out that the
Constitution as a higher law did place restraints upon Congress and that the
Supreme Court as guardian of the Constitution had power to enforce those
restraints.
In Marbury v. Madison we see Chief Justice Marshall suggesting that the
Supreme Court was duty-bound as a matter of unescapable principle to enforce
thee Constitution as a symbol of restraint upon congressional authority through
the exercise of its power of judicial review. ( c v- 71)
(Supreme Court and Judicial Review, Publisher: Rinehart de Company INC.
New York)
( A avi L vc ` )
myc xg K vUi GL &wZ qvi c m Cohens V. Virginia (1821)
gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall ej bt
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary
156
cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the
confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must
decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
Justice Robert H. Jackson myc xg K vUi K Z Z ev A waK vi m^
Harvard wek we` vj q 1954 mvj The Supreme Court as a Unit of
Government wk i vbvg Godkin e Z v c ` vb K wi evi R b c wZ MnY
K wi qvwQj b wK D e Z v c ` vb K wi evi c ~eB Z uvnvi gZ z nq|
c i eZ xZ wek we` vj q K Z c e Z vi L mo vwU gyw` Z K wi qv c K vk
K i b| Dnvi A sk wek l wbi c t
What authority does the Court possess which generates this influence?
The answer is its power to hold unconstitutional and judicially unenforceable an
act of the President, of Congress, or of a constituent state of the Federation. That
power is not expressly granted or hinted at in the Article defining judicial power,
but rests on logical implication. It is an incident of jurisdiction to determine
what really is the law governing a particular case or controversy. In the
hierarchy of legal values, If the higher law of he Constitution prohibits what the
lower law of the legislature attempts, the latter is a nullity; otherwise, the
Constitution would exist only at the option of Congress. Thus it comes about
that in a private litigation the Court may decide a question of power that will be
of great moment to the nation or to state. (Justice Robert H. Jackson of U.S.
Supreme Court, published by Harverd University Press, 1955, at page-22)
( A avi L vc ` )
A v` vj Z A vBbi eaZ v wePvi K wi e, A vBbi weP YZ v bq|
Noble State Bank V. Haskell 219 US 575, 580 (1911) gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ej b t
We fully understand....the powerful argument that can be made against
the wisdom of this legislation, but on that point we have no concern.
Terminiello V. City of Chicago 337 US 1, 11(1949) gvK v gvq wf bgZ
c vl Y K wi qvwePvi c wZ Felix Frankfurter ej b t
157
We do not sit like kadi under a tree, dispensing justice according to
consideration of individual expediency.
wePvi c w qvevjudicial process m^ wePvi c wZ Benjamin N. Cordozo
Z vnvi wj wL Z The Nature of the Judicial Process c y K ej b ( c v- 112-
113) t
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more:
logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right
conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon
the comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby
promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social interests is that law
shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of
prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.
gvK v gvq wmv MnY GK R b wePvi K i ` vwqZ I K Z e
mK wePvi c wZ Cordozo ej b ( c v- 141) t
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his
own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the
primordial necessity of order in the social life. Wide enough in all conscience is
the field of discretion that remains.
A vBb c qvM f zj vw I wePvi K i A e vb mK wePvi c wZ
Cordozo Dc msnvi ej b ( c v- 178 - 79) t
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense
ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish.
The good remains the foundation on which new structures will be built. The bad
will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years. Little by little the old
doctrine is undermined. Often the encroachments are so gradual that their
significance is at first obscured. Finally we discover that the contour of the
landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be cast aside, and the
ground charted anew.
P~o v wePvi c Z xqgvb nq, h K vb ` k i A v` vj Z i gZ vi
c K Z Dr m msweavb Z _ v R bMY K vi Y msweavbi c vebv We, the
158
people of the United States A _ evA vgi vevsj v` k i R bMY(We the people
of Bangladesh ) R bMYi c GB wbi sK zk K Z Z myj f I mk
A wf ew eYbv K i Z t hy i v I evsj v` k i msweavbi c vi |
R bMYi bvg c vebvi GBi c c vi c gvY K i h R bMYB
mvef g| msweavbi gvag R bMYB PvwnqvQ h i vGgb GK wU
^vaxb wePvi ee v _ vwK e hvnv Congress ev R vZ xq msm` Ges wbevnx
K Z c vi v K vbf veB c f vevwbZ nBe bv| R bMY GL bI wek vm
K i h mK j mxgveZ v mZ I myc xg K vU, msweavb K Z K wbw Z ,
Z vnv` i A waK vi I ^vaxbZ v mgybZ i vwL evi R b mevc v
wek vmf vR b I c c vZ nxb i K Ges mvweK f ve wePvi wef vM
R bMYi k l f i mv|
GB K vi YB hy i vi i vc wZ MY hgb Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Roosevelt, Dweight D. Eisenhour A Z c f vek vj x
nI qv mZ I myc xg K vUi gZ v K vbf ve nvm K i b bvB hw` I
Bnvi i vqvi v Z uvnvi v A bK mgqB weeZ nBqvQb| Z vnvQvo v,
Scarecly any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or
later into a judicial question(Alexis de Tocqueville, 1848) | wK mec K vi
i vR bwZ K mU mZ I hy i v i myc xg K vUc c vZ nxb f ve
msweavb mgybZ i vwL qv R bgvbyl i A waK vi i vq f ~ wgK v i vwL qvQ|
mvavi Y f ve msm` K Z K wewae K vb A vBbi c wZ myc xg K vUi
K vb A bxnv _ vK bv| hw` K vb ew z nBqv K vb A vBbi
eaZ v A v` vj Z D vc b K i aygv m B msweavbi A vj vK
myc xg K vUZ wK Z A vBbi eaZ v wePvi weePbv K wi qv _ vK | wK
mec K vi i vR bwZ K mU mZ I myc xg K vUc c vZ nxb f ve
msweavb mgybZ i vwL qv R bgvbyl i A waK vi i vq wbwf K I ` p
f ~wgK v i vwL qvQ| GB L vbB myc xg K vUi ^vZ Z v | It is living voice
of the Constitution (Bryce) | R bMYi msweavb m myc xg K vUR bMYi B
c wZ vb|
159
msweavbi c vavb I msweavb wePvi wef vMK wK ` vwqZ I
K Z e A c b K wi qvQ m m^ Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (AIR 1965 SC
745) gvK v gvq f vi Z xq myc xg K vUweePbv K i | c avb wePvi c wZ
P.B. Gajendragadkar ej b ( c v- 762- 63) t
39.......... The supremacy of the constitution is fundamental to the
existence of a federal State in order to prevent either the legislature of the
federal unit or those of the member States from destroying or impairing that
delicate balance of power which satisfies the particular requirements of States
which are desirous of union, but not prepared to merge their individuality in a
unity. This supremacy of the constitution is protected by the authority of an
independent judicial body to act as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution of
powers...........................
41. In a democratic country governed by a written Constitution, it is the
Constitution which is supreme and sovereign. It is no doubt true that the
Constitution itself can be amended by the Parliament, but that is possible
because Art.368 of the Constitution itself makes a provision in that behalf, and
the amendment of the Constitution can be validly made only by following
procedure prescribed by the said article. That shows that even when the
Parliament purports to amend the Constitution, it has to comply with the
relevant mandate of the Constitution itself. Legislators, Ministers, and Judges all
take oathe of allegiance to the Constitution, for it is by the relevant provisions of
the Constitution that they derive their authority and jurisdiction and it is to the
provisions of the Constitution that they owe allegiance. Therefore, there can be
no doubt that the sovereignty which can be claimed by the Parliament in
England, cannot be claimed by any Legislature in India in the literal absolute
sense.
42. There is another aspect of this matter which must also be mentioned;
whether or not there is distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian
Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has entrusted to the
Judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the
Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. When a
statute is challenged on the ground that it has been passed by a Legislature
without authority, or has otherwise unconstitutionally trespassed on fundamental
rights, it is for the courts to determine the dispute and decide whether the law
passed by the legislature is valid or not. Just as the legislatures are conferred
legislative authority and their functions are normally confined to legislative
functions, and the functions and authority of the executive lie within the domain
160
of executive authority, so the jurisdiction and authority of the Judicature in this
country lie within the domain of adjudication. If the validly of any law is
challenged before the courts, it is never suggested that the material question as
to whether legislative authority has been exceeded or fundamental rights have
been contravened, can be decided by the legislatures themselves. Adjudication
of such a dispute is entrusted solely and exclusively to the Judicature of this
country; ......................................
.......................................................................................
..........................................................................................
129. If the power of the High Courts under Art. 226 and the authority of
this Court under Art. 32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would be futile
to content that a citizen cannot move the High Courts or this Court to invoke
their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated.
The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably
postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf;
otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts and this Court would be
rendered virtually meaningless. Let it not be forgotten that the judicial power
conferred on the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection of the
citizens fundamental right, and so, in the existence of the said judicial power
itself is necessarily involved the right of the citizens to appeal to the said power
in a proper case. ( A avi L vc ` )
Professor O. Hood Phillips Z vnvi M Constitutional and Administrative
Law, Seventh Edition (1987) wK c wZ Z GK wU A vBbi eaZ v weePbv
K i vnq Z vnveYbvK wi qvQbt
.................the federal courts have jurisdiction to declare provisions of
state constitutions, state legislation and federal legislation repugnant to the
Federal Constitution. It is not strictly accurate to say that the Courts declare
legislation void: when cases are brought before them judicially, they may
declare that an alleged right or power does not exist or that an alleged wrong has
been committed because a certain statue relied on is unconstitutional.
( A avi L vc ` )
Asma Jilani V. Government of Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139 gvK v gvwU
GK wU habeas corpus gvK v gv nBZ DyZ nq| gvwj K Mvj vg
R xj vbxK 1971 mvj i Martial Law Regulation 78 Gi A vI Z vq A i xY
K i v nq| nvBK vUThe Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969
161
(Presidents Order No. 3 of 1969) Gi K vi Y A i xY A v` k n c
K wi Z A ^xK vi K i | A vc xj gvK v gvq myc xg K vUPresidents Order
No. 3 of 1969 I Martial Law Regulation 78 Df qK B A ea Nvl Yv K i |
c avb wePvi c wZ Hamoodur Rahman ej b ( c v- 197) t
This provision, as very appropriately pointed out by Mr. Brohi, strikes at the very root
of the judicial power of the Court to hear and determine a matter, even though it may
relate to its own jurisdiction. The Courts undoubtedly have the power to hear and
determine any matter or controversy which is brought before them, even if it be to
decide whether they have the jurisdiction to determine such a matter or not. The
superior Courts are, as is now well settled, the Judges of their own jurisdiction. This is a
right which has consistently been claimed by this and other Courts of superior
jurisdiction in all civilised countries......... ( A avi L vc ` )

f vi Z xq myc xg K vUK vb ms z ew i c K I f vi Z xq
msweavbi 32 A byQ` i A vI Z vq A ve` bc wnmve MY K i Z t
A vBb A bymvi bvq wePvi K wi evi R b c ` c MnY K wi qvQ|
Amnesty International Gi wbK U nBZ GK wU telegram c v nBqv c vwK vb
myc xg K vUgvbeZ vwei vaxI A mvbR bK weavq c K vk d uvwm w` evi
A v` k wMZ K i |
wePvi c wZ Robert H. Jackson GK B gZ c vl Y K wi Z b| wZ wb
Dc i ewYZ Z uvnvi Godkin e Z vq ej b |
.............Thus it comes about that in a private litigation the Court may
decide a question of power that will be of great moment to the nation or to a
State.
Fazlul Quader Chowdhury V. Muhammad Abdul Haque, PLD 1963 SC 486
gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ A.R. Cornelius GK B ai Yi g e K i b
( c v- 503) t
The duty of interpreting the Constitution is, in fact a duty of enforcing
the provisions of the Constitution in any particular case brought before the
courts in the form of litigation.
c Z xqgvb nq, h K vb gvK v gvq bvbx c m K vb A vBbi
mvsweavwbK Z vi c k D vwc Z nBj myc xg K vUm m^ wbwj
162
_ vwK Z c vi bv| hnZ z mvsweavwbK c k wUI A vBbi c k mnZ z
mK j c K bvwUk c ` vb c ~eK Z vnv wbi mb K i vUvB evbxq| A ek
eZ gvb gvK v gvwU R b ^v_ g~j K , G I D vwc Z mK j A vBbi
c k A vj vPbvK i vB k q|
Dj L , ms z ew ev Z vnvi c hw` mwVK A vBbi c k
D vc b K i v me bvI nq Z eyI D vwc Z NUbvej xi Dc i mwVK
A vBb A vj vPbvI Z vnvc qvM K i vwePvi K i ` vwqZ I K Z e| Z vnv
K wi Z hvBqv hw` K vb A vBbi eaZ vi c k D vwc Z nq Z e Z vnv
Go vBqv bv hvBqv Df q c K mB c k m^ I qvwK envj K i Z t
A vBbi c k wU wbi mb K i v evbxq| GB c wZ hy i v I f vi Z xq
myc xg K vUA bymi Y K wi qv _ vK | hy i vR GgbwK GK wU
gvK v gvq GK wU wej A vBb c wi YZ nBevi c ~eB A v` vj Z Z vnvi
eaZ vweePbvK i |
R V. H.M. Treasury ex parte Smedley, (1985)1 All ER 589 gvK v gvq
Parliament Gi c Z A bygv` b ewZ i K mshy Z nwej nBZ A _
c ` vb wel qwU Court of Appeal G D vwc Z nBj Sir John Donaldson MR
ej bt
.............Before considering Mr. Smedleys objections........I think that I
should say a word about the respective roles of Parliament and the
courts. Although the United Kingdom has no written constitution, it is a
constitutional convention of the highest importance that the legislature
and the judicature are separate and independent of one another, subject to
certain ultimate rights of Parliament over the judicature which are
immaterial for present purpose. It therefore behoves the courts to be over
sensitive to the paramount need to refrain form trespassing on the
province of Parliament or, so far as this can be avoided, even appearing
to do so. Although it is not a matter for me, I would hope and expect that
Parliament would be similarly sensitive to the need to refrain from
trespassing on the province of the courts..............It is the function of
Parliament to legislation is necessarily in written form. It is the function
of the courts to construe and interpret that legislation. Putting it in
popular language, it is for Parliament to make the laws and for the courts
to tell the nation, including members, of both Houses of Parliament, what
163
those laws mean........... At the present moment, there is no Order in
Council to which Mr. Smedley can object as being unauthorized...........In
many, and possibly most, circumstance the proper course would
undoubtedly be for the courts to invite the applicant to renew has
application if and when an order was made, but in some circumstances
an expressions of view on questions of law which would arise for
decision if Parliament were to approve a draft may be of service not only
to the parties, but also to each House of Parliament itself. This course
was adopted in R v Electricity Comrs, ex P London Electricity Joint
Committee Co (1920) Ltd. (1924) 1 KB 171, (1923) All ER Rep 150. In
that case an inquiry was in progress, the cost of which would have been
wholly wasted if , thereafter, the minister and Parliament had approved
the scheme only to be told at that late stage that the scheme was ultra
vires.
( A avi L vc ` )
A v` vj Z bvq wePvi K wi evi R b Bnvi mnR vZ DM nBZ
Ggb f ve A vBb wek l Y K wi Z c qvm c vq hvnv Parliament wbR I
mwVK gb K wi qv_ vK | HWR Wade Gi f vl vq ( c v- 418 ) t
The Courts may presume the Parliament, when it grants powers, intends
them to be exercised in a right and proper way. Since Parliament is very
unlikely to make provision to the contrary, this allows considerable
scope for the courts to devise a set of canons of fair administrative
procedure , suitable to the needs of the time. (The underlining are
mine).( Quoted from H.W.R. Wade: Administrative Law Fifth Edition,
1982).
(A avi L vc ` )
Dj L , nvR vi er mi c ~eBsj vi i vR vK fountain of justice ej v
nBZ Ges wZ wbB i vR i mevP wePvi c wZ wQj b| g g wePvi
K vhi ` vwqZ f vi i vR vi wbqvMc v wePvi K MYi Dc i b nBZ
_ vK Ges wePvi K MYB i vR i wePvi K vhc wi Pvj bvK wi Z _ vK b|
1603 mvj i vYx Elizabeth I Gi gZ zi c i Scotland Gi i vR v James
I wnmve Bsj vi wmsnvmb A vi vnY K i b| c ~ei Plantagenet I
Tudor i vR v` i A vgj Bsj v A vBb A v` vj Z i c f ~Z DbwZ nq|
Z vnvi vI ^QvPvi x wQj b eU wK gvUvgywU A vBb gvb K wi qv
164
Pwj Z b| wK i vR v James I ^Mxq A waK vi wmsnvmb A vi vnY
K wi qvQb ewj qv gb K wi Z b| wZ wb wePvi K ` i i vR K gPvi x ewj qv
gb K wi Z b, GgbwK wePvwi K wel qI wePvi K ` i wmv i Dc i
i vR vi wmv P~o v ewj qv gb K wi Z b| i vR vi K vh g A vBb vi v
wbqw Z nBe GB c K vi e e wZ wb i vR ` vn ewj qv gb K wi Z b|
GB mK j wel q Court of Common Pleas A v` vj Z i c avb wePvi c wZ Sir
Edward Coke Gi mwnZ Z vnvi gvMZ gZ Z Z v nBZ | wePvwi K
evc vi i vR vi gZ v m^ Prohibitions del Roy (1608) gvK v gvq Coke
ej b t
The king cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as treason, felony,
etc., or betwixt party and party.......but these matters ought to be determined and
adjudged in some court of justice according to the law and custom of
England..................
God has endowed your Majesty with excellent science as well as great
gifts of nature, you are not learned in the laws of this your realm of England.
That legal causes which concern the life or inheritance, or goods or fortunes, of
your subjects are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason
and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and
experience before a man can attain to the cognizance of it.
( John Hostettler : Sir Edward Coke, c v- 69- 70)
i vR vwbR K mevP wePvi K ` vexK wi qvej b t
inferior Judges were his shadows and ministers.... and the King may, if
he please, sit and judge in Westminster Hall in any court there, and call their
judgments in question. The King being the author of the Lawe is the interpreter
of the Lawe (Sir William Holdsworth : A History of English Law, Vol. V, Page
-428 note-5).
i vR v Henry III Gi A vgj Kings Bench Gi wePvi c wZ Bracton K
DZ K wi qv Coke D i K i bt
the King is below no man, but he is below God and the law; ...the King
is bound to obey the law, though if he breaks it his punishment must be left to
God.(John Hostettler: Sir Edward Coke, page-69-71)
165
Sir Edward Coke GB f ve Pvwi k Z er mi c ~ewePvi wef vMK
i vR vi ^QvPvwi Z vi nvZ nBZ i vK i b|
wePvi c wZ Yaqub Ali GB c m ej b ( c v- 237)
As both Presidents Order No. 3 of 1969 and Martial Law Regulation
78 were intended to deny to the Courts the performance of their judicial
functions, an object opposed to the concept of law. Neither would be recognized
by Courts as law.
Marbury V. Madison (1803) gvK v gvq H wZ nvwmK i vqi c i
hy i vi myc xg K vUmsweavbK evL v wek l Y K i Z t mgybZ
i vwL qvQ| President Woodrow Wilson msweavbK a vigorous taproot wnmve
A vL vwqZ K wi qvQb| hy i v mvsweavwbK K vh g wK f ve Dbqb
nBj Z vnv Lord Denning Gi GK wU g e nBZ Dc j w K i v hvq| wZ wb
Z vnvi What Next In The Law c y K hy i vi A vBb I Bnvi ` k g
c avb wePvi c wZ Charles Evans Hughes m^ ej bt
The rule in the United States is not contained in their Constitution itself.
It is a judge-made rule. It was stated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 in the
Marbury case. Later on Charles Evans Hughes, the tenth Chief Justice, in 1908
firmly declared:
We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say
it is and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and our property under the
Constitution.
Their Constitution nowhere provides that it shall be what the judges say it is.
Yet it has become the most fundamental and far reaching principle of American
constitutional law.(Lord Denning: What Next In The Law at page-318 of First
Indian Reprint, 1993).
( A avi L vc ` )
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v I wePvi K ` i A e vb m^ S.P. Gupta
V. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149 gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ P. N. Bhagwati
Z vunvi A byc gq i Pbvk j xZ ej b ( c v- 197) t
.................The concept of independence of the judiciary is a noble
concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the foundation
on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle
166
which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the principle of the
rule of law and under the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with
the task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and
thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. It is to aid the judiciary
in this task that the power of judicial review has been conferred upon the
judiciary and it is by exercising this power which constitutes one of the most
potent weapons in armory of the law, that the judiciary seeks to protect the
citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse of abuse of
power by the State or its officers. The Judiciary stands between the citizen and
the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power
by the executive and therefore it is absolutely essential that the judiciary must be
free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the
Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution to which
detailed reference has been made in the judgments in Sankalchand Sheths case
(AIR 1977 SC 2328) (supra). But it is necessary to remind ourselves that the
concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence
from executive pressure to independence from executive pressure or influence
but it is a much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from
many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely
fearlessness of other power centres, economic or political, and freedom from
prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong. It we
may again quote the eloquent words of Justices Krishna Iyer:
Independences of the Judiciary is not genuflexion; nor is it opposition
to every proposition of Government. It is neither judiciary made to opposition
measure nor Governments pleasure.....................
.......... Judges should be of stern stuff and tough fibre, unbending before
power, economic or political and they must uphold the core principle of the rule
of law which says Be you ever so high, the law is above you. This is the
principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of
real participatory democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic
concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable sections of the
community. It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which we must
keep in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
GBf ve mvZ k Z er mi c ~enBZ Bracton Z r c i Coke, Holt,
Mansfield bvqi K _ v, A vBbi K _ v, A vBbi k vmbi K _ v ewj qv
wMqvQb| Z vnvi v ewj qv wMqvQb h Sovereign kingI A vBbi Da
167
bb| Z vnvi v mB c vPxb K vj I wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v mgybZ
i vwL qvwMqvQb|
nvBK vUI myc xg K vUi Judicial review Gi gZ v mK L.
Chandra Kumar V. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 gvK v gvq c avb
wePvi c wZ Ahmadi C.J. I A vj vPbvK vj ej b ( c v- 1148 ) t
73. We may now analyse certain other authorities for the proposition
that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts and Supreme Court under
Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution respectively, is part of the basic structure
of the Constitution. While expressing his views on the significance of draft
Article 25, which corresponds to the present Article 32 of the Constitution, Dr.
B. R. Ambedkar, the chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent
Assembly stated as follows (CAD, Vol. VII, p. 953):
If I was asked to name any particular Article in this Constitution as the
most important an Article without this Constitution would be a nullity- I could
not refer to any other Article except this one. It is the very soul of the
Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that the House has realised its
impotence.
78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional
democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it
was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has,
while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important
safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution
incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were
very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. (#)
These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of
effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review...
The judges of the superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of
upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to
interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by
the Constitution maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in
the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations.................
We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative
action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this court under
Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the
Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the
168
power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity
of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
( A avi L vc ` )
Kesavananda Bharati V. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 gvK v gvq
wePvi c wZ H.R. Khanna myc xg K vUi wePvwi K c ybweePbv ev judicial
review Gi gZ vm^ ej b ( c v- 18 99) t
1541..........The machinery for the resolving of disputes as to whether
the Central Legislature has trespassed upon the legislative field of the State
Legislature have encroached upon the legislative domain of the Central
Legislature is furnished by the courts and they are vested with the powers of
judicial review to determine the validity of the Acts passed by the legislatures.
The power of judicial review is, however, confined not merely to deciding
whether in making the impugned laws the Central or State Legislatures have
acted within the four corners of the legislative lists earmarked for them; the
courts also deal with the question as to whether the laws are made in conformity
with and not in violation of the other provisions of the Constitution. Our
Constitution-makers have provided for fundamental rights in Part III and made
them justiciable. As long some fundamental rights exits and are a part of the
Constitution, the power of judicial review has also to be exercise with a view to
see that the guarantees afforded by those rights are not contravened.
( A avi L vc ` )
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi V. Shri Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 gvK v gvq
msweavb I myc xg K vUi gZ v Ges basic structure m^ wePvi c wZ
M.H. Beg ej b ( c v- 2455) t
622. If the constituent bodies, taken separately or together, could be
legally sovereign, in the same way as the British Parliament is, the
Constitutional validity of no amendment could be called in question before us.
But, as it is well established that it is the Constitution and not the constituent
power which is supreme here, in the sense that the Constitutionality of
Constitution cannot be called in question before us, but the exercise of the
constituent power can be we have to judge the validity of exercise of constituent
power by testing it on the anvil of constitutional provisions. According to the
majority view in Kesavanadas case (supra), we can find the test primarily in the
Preamble to our Constitution.
169
623. A point emphasized by J. C. Gray (See: Nature & Sources of Law
p. 96) is that unless and until Courts have declared and recognised a law as
enforcible it is not law at all. Kelsen (See: General Theory of Law & State p.
150) finds Grays views to be extreme. Courts, however, have to test the legality
of laws, whether purporting to be ordinary or constitutional, by the norms laid
down in the constitution. This follows from the Supremacy of the Constitution. I
mention this here in answer to one of the questions set out much earlier: Does
the basic structure of the constitution test only the validity of a constitutional
amendment or also ordinary laws? I think it does both because ordinary law
making itself cannot go beyond the range of constituent power. At this stage, we
are only concerned with a purported constitutional amendment. According to the
majority view in Kesavanda Bharatis case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) the preamble
furnishes the yard-stick to be applied even to constitutional amendments.
( A avi L vc ` )
Minerva Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 gvK v gvq c avb
wePvi c wZ Y.V. Chandrachud A vBbi eaZ v wbYq myc xg K vUi gZ v
A vj vPbvc m ej b ( c v- 1799) t
Our Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power among the three
wings of State, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is the
function of the Judges, nay their duty, to pronounce upon the validity of laws.
( A avi L vc ` )
Minerva Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 gvK v gvq
wePvi c wZ P.N. Bhagwati Z vnvi wf bgZ myc xg K vUi mvsweavwbK
A e vb I judicial review Gi gZ v I c K wZ m^ g e K i b ( c v-
18 25- 26) t
...........if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in
making the law the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative
competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other
provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left
to the determination of the legislature. The Constitution has, therefore, created
an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent
machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to
determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed
by the legislature. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary under the Constitution to
keep the different organs of the State such as the executive and the legislature
170
within the limits of the power conferred upon them by the Constitution. This
power of judicial renew is conferred on the judiciary by Arts. 32 and 226 of the
Constitution.........
........The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the
judiciary is assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power conferred
on each branch of Government, whether it is limited. and if so, what are the
limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is for the
judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional
limitations. That is the essence of the rule of law, which inter alia requires that
the exercise of powers by the Government whether it be the legislature or the
executive or any other authority, be conditioned by the Constitution and the
law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional
system and without it, there will be no Government of laws and the rule of law
would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. I am of the view
that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is
basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is
the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the
basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be
taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanisms or
arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish
to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it
cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If
by a constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it
is provided that the validity of any law made by Legislature shall not be liable to
called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence
of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing
short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the
distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States and render
the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional
amendment is made which has the effect of taking away the power of judicial
review and providing that no amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable
to be questioned no any ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic
structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would
be making Parliament sole Judges of the constitutional validity of what it has
done and that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the
amending power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution.
The conclusion must therfore inevitable follow that clause (4) of Art. 368 is
unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
171
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) V. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC
568 gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ Y.V. Chandrachud myc xg K vUi gZ v
mK A vj vK c vZ K i b ( c v- 574) t
11............The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article
32 is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution
because it is meaningless to confer fundamental rights without providing an
effective remedy for their enforcement, if and when they are violatied. A right
without remedy is a legal conundrum of a most grotesque kind...............
( A avi L vc ` )
Raja Ram Pal V. Honble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 gvK v gvq
msweavb I judicial review m^ A vj vPbv K i v nq| wePvi c wZ C.K.
Thakker G c msM ej b ( c v- 429) t
651. We have written Constitution which confers power of judicial
review on this Court and on all High Courts. In exercising power and
discharging duty assigned by the Constitution, this Court has to play the role of
a sentinel on the qui vive and it is the solemn duty of this Court to protect the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution zealously and
vigilantly.
652. It may be stated that initially it was contended by the respondents
that this Court has no power to consider a complaint against any action taken by
Parliament and no such complaint can ever be entertained by the Court. Mr
Gopal Subramanium. appearing for the Attorney General, however, at a later
stage conceded (and I may say, rightly) the jurisdiction of this Court to consider
such compliant, but submitted that the Court must always keep in mind the fact
that the power has been exercised by a coordinate organ of the State which has
the jurisdiction to regulate its own proceedings within the four walls of the
House. Unless, therefore, this Court is convinced that the action of the House is
unconstitutional or wholly unlawful, it may not exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and material before Parliament and
substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions arrived at by the House.
653. In my opinion, the submission is well founded. This Court cannot
be oblivious or unmindful of the fact that the legislature is one of the three
organs of the State and is exercising the powers under the same Constitution
under which this Court is exercising the power of judicial review. It is, therefore,
the duty of this Court to ensure that there is no abuse or misuse of power by the
legislature without overlooking another equally important consideration that the
172
Court is not a superior organ or an appellate forum over the other constitutional
functionary. This Court, therefore, should exercise its power of judicial review
with utmost care, caution and circumspection.
( A avi L vc ` )
BwZ c ~eAsma Jillani V. Government of Punjab gvK v gvwU c hvj vPbv
K i v nBqvQ| G Y c vwK vb myc xg K vUi A b K qK wU gvK v gv
c hvj vPbvK i vnBj |
State V. Zia-ur-Rahman, PLD 1973 SC 49 gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ
Hamoodur Rahman myc xg K vUi mvsweavwbK A e vb evL v K i b ( c v-
69) t
This is a right which it acquires not de hors the Constitution but by
virtue of the fact that it is a superior Court set up by the Constitution itself. It is
not necessary for this purpose to invoke any divine or super-natural right but this
judicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It flows from the fact that it is a
Constitutional Court and it can only be taken away by abolishing the Court
itself.
(A avi L vc ` )
myc xg K vUi ` vwqZ i ai Y mK wZ wb ej b ( c v- 70) t
The exercising this power, the judiciary claims no supremacy over other
organs of the Government but acts only as the administrator of the public will.
Even when it declares a legislative measure unconstitutional and void, it does
not do so, because, the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the
legislative power, but because the Constitution has vested it with the power to
declare what the law is in the cases which come before it. It thus merely
enforces the Constitution as a paramount law whenever a legislative enactment
comes into conflict with it because, it is its duty to see that the Constitution
prevails. It is only when the Legislature fails to keep within its own
Constitutional limits, the judiciary steps in to enforce compliance with the
Constitution. This is no dubt a delicate task as pointed out in the case of Fazlul
Quader Chowdhury v. Shah Nawaz, which has to be performed with great
circumspection but it has nevertheless to be performed as a sacred Constitutional
duty when other State functionaries disregard the limitations imposed upon them
or claim to exercise power which the people have been careful to withhold from
them. ( A avi L vc ` )

173
A Z c i , Hamoodur Rahman, C.J. msweavbi c c U myc xg K vUi
A e vb Z ywj qvai b ( c v- 71) t
I for my part cannot conceive of a situation, in which, after a formal
written Constitution has been lawfully adopted by a competent body and has
been generally accepted by the people including the judiciary as the Constitution
of the country, the judiciary can claim to declare any of its provisions ultra vires
or void. This well be no part of its function of interpretation. Therefore, in may
view, however solemn or sacrosanct a document, if it is not incorporated in the
Constitution or does not form a part thereof it cannot control the Constitution. At
any rate, the Courts created under the Constitution will not have the power to
declare any provision of the constitutor itself as being the violation of such a
document. If in fact that document contains the expression of the will of the vast
majority of the people, then the remedy for correcting such a violation will lie
with the people and not with the judiciary...................................If it appears only
as a preamble to the Constitution, then it will serve the same purpose as any
other preamble serves, namely, that in the case of any doubt as to the intent of
the law-maker, it may be looked at to ascertain the true intent, but it cannot the
substantive provisions thereof. This does not, however, mean that the validity of
no Constitutional measure can be tested in the Courts. If a Constitutional
measure is adopted in a manner different to that prescribed in the Constitution
itself or is passed by a lesser number of votes than those specified in the
Constitution then the validity of such a measure may well be questioned and
adjudicated upon. This, however, will be possible only in the case of a
Constitutional amendment but generally not in the case a first or a new
Constitution, unless the powers of the Constitution-making body itself are
limited by some supra-Constitutional document.
( A avi L vc ` )
hw` I msweavb I A vBbi Dc i v c v j wek l Y c vwK vbi
1972 mvj i Interim Constitution Gi c Uf ~wgK vq K i v nBqvwQj Z eyI
Bnvi we Z vI h_ v_ Z vm^ A vgv` i K vb m` n bvB|
Sindh High Court Bar Association V. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 879
gvK v gvq c vwK vb myc xg K vUi 14 R b gvbbxq wePvi K mgbq
MwVZ e mvgwi K k vmbi c vc U judicial review Z Z c hvj vPbv
K i b| c avb wePvi c wZ Iftikhar Muhammad Chowdhury ej b ( c v-
118 0) t
174
169.........it is the clear that the power of judicial review is a cardinal
principle of the Constitution. The Judges, to keep the power of judicial review
strictly judicial, in its exercise, do take care not to intrude upon domain of the
other branches of the Government. It is the duty of the judiciary to determine the
legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the
Legislature.
( A avi L vc ` )
ek K qK wU gvK v gvi i vq c he Y K wi qv wZ wb ej b
( c v- 1198 ) t
171........it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that
Courts must always endeavour to exercise their jurisdiction so that the rights of
the people are guarded against arbitrary violations by the executive. This
expansion of jurisdiction is for securing and safeguarding the rights of people
against the violations of the law by the executive and not for personal
aggrandizement of the courts and Judges. It is this end that the power of judicial
review was being exercised by the judiciary before 3
rd
November, 2007. Indeed
the power of judicial review was, and would continue to be, exercised with strict
adherence governing such exercise of power, reaming within the sphere allotted
to the judiciary by the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
Secretary, Ministry of Finance V. Masdar Hossain (2000) (VIII) BLT (AD) 234,
gvK v gvq evsj v` k myc xg K vUi c avb wePvi c wZ Mustafa Kamal
wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v m^ _ nxb f vl vq ej b ( c v- 257-
258 ) t
44.........The independence of the judiciary, as affirmed and declared by
Articles 94(4) and 116A, is one of the basic pillars of the Constitution and
cannot be demolished, whittled down, curtailed or diminished in any manner
whatsoever, except under the existing provisions of the Constitution. It is true
that this independence, as emphasised by the learned Attorney General, is
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, but we find no provision in the
Constitution which curtails, diminishes or otherwise abridges this
independence.........
( A avi L vc ` )
wZ wb A b ej b ( c v- 263- 64) t
175
60.......When Parliament and the executive, instead of Chapter II of Part
VI follow a different course not sanctioned by the Constitution, the higher
Judiciary is within its jurisdiction to bring back the Parliament and the executive
from constitutional derailment and give necessary directions to follow the
constitutional course. This exercise was made by this Court in the case of
Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir Vs. Bangladesh , 44 DLR (AD) 319. We do not see why
the High Court Division or this Court cannot repeat that exercise when a
constitutional deviation is detected and when there is a constitutional mandate to
implement certain provisions of the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
GK B c m wePvi c wZ Latifur Rahman (as his Lordship then was) ej b
( c v- 271) t
76. The written Constitution of Bangladesh has placed the Supreme
Court in the place of the guardian of the Constitution itself. It will not
countenance to any inroad upon the Constitution. A reference to Articles 94, 95
and 147 of the Constitution clearly reveal the independent character of the
Supreme Court.
( A avi L vc ` )
msweavb Ges A mvsweavwbK A vBbK A ea Nvl Yv K wi Z
myc xg K vUi gZ v c m nvBK vUwef vM, Bangladesh Italian Marble
Works Limited V. Government of Bangladesh 14 BLT (Special Issue) 2006
gvK v gvq Nvl YvK i ( c v- 18 9- 190) t
In this part of the world we generally follow the common law principles
but Bangladesh has got a written Constitution. This Constitution may be termed
as controlled or rigid but incontradistinetion to a Federal form of Government,
as in the Untied States, it has a Parliamentary form of Government within limits
set by the Constitution. Like the United States, its three grand Departments, the
Legislature makes, the Executive executes and judiciary construes the law
(Chief Justice Marshall), constituting a trichotomy of power in the Republic
under the Constitution. But the Bangladesh Parliament lacks the omnipotence of
the British Parliament while the President is not the executive head like the U.S.
President but the Prime Minister is, like British Prime Minister. However, all the
functionaries of the Republic owe their existence, powers and functions to the
Constitution. We, the people of Bangladesh, gave themselves this Constitution
which is conceived of as a fundamental or an organic or a Supreme Law rising
loftly high above all other laws in the country and Article 7(2) expressly spelt
176
out that any law which is inconsistent with this Constitution, to that extent of the
inconsistency, is void. As such, the provisions of the Constitution is the basis on
which the vires of all other existing laws and those passed by the Legislature as
well as the actions of the Executive, are to be judged by the Supreme Court,
under its power of judicial review. This power of judicial review of the Supreme
Court of Bangladesh is, similar to those in the United States and in India.
This is how the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary functions
under the Constitutional scheme in Bangladesh. The Constitution is the
undoubted source of all powers and functions of all three grand Departments of
the Republic, just like the United States and India.
It is true that like the Supreme Courts in the United States or in India, the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh has got the power of review of both legislative
and executive actions but such power of review would not place the Supreme
Court with any higher position to those of the other two branches of the
Republic. The Supreme Court is the creation of the Constitution just like the
Legislature and the Executive. But the Constitution endowed the Supreme Court
with such power of judicial review and since the Judges of the Supreme Court
have taken oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, they are
obliged and duty bound to declare and strike down any provision of law which is
inconsistent with the Constitution without any fear or favour to any body. This
includes the power to declare any provision seeking to oust the jurisdiction of
the Court, as ultra vires to Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )
GB c m wbDwR j vi Wellington G A ew Z Victoria University
Z c ` Lord Johan Steyn Gi e Z v c wYavbhvM| wZ wb House of Lords
Gi GK R b wePvi K | wZ wb Z uvnvi e Z vq ej b t
In Britain the press frequently criticise the power exercised by
unelected Judges. It is suggested that it is anti-democratic. This is a fundamental
misconception. The democratic ideal involves two strands. First, the people
entrust power to the government in accordance with the principle of majority
rule. the second is that in a democracy there must be an effective and fair means
of achieving practical justice through law between individuals and between the
state and individuals. Where a tension develops between the views of the
majority and individual rights a decision must be made and sometimes a balance
has to be struck. The best way of achieving this purpose is for a democracy to
delegate to an impartial and independent judiciary this adjudicative function.
Only such a judiciary acting in accordance with principles of institutional
integrity, and aided by a free and courageous legal profession, practicing and
177
academic, can carry out this task, notably in the field of fundamental rights and
freedoms. Only such a judiciary has democratic legitimacy. The judiciary owes
allegiance to nothing except the constitutional duty of reaching through reasoned
debate the best attainable judgments in accordance with justice and law. This is
their role in the democratic governance of our countries. At the root of it is the
struggle by fallible judges with imperfect insights for government under law and
not under men and women.
( A avi L vc ` )

K j vwbqvj hyM A vgwi K vi R bMY hy i vR i i vR v I Parliament
Gi k vmbi wei hy K wi qvwQj | K vR B msweavb i Pbv K wi evi
mgq Z vnvi v H ai bi ^i k vmbi K _ vB gb i vwL qvwQj | Stamp Act
BZ vw` i wei c wZ ev` K wi evi mgq Z vnvi v mi K vi i wei B
c wZ ev` K wi qvQ, A vBbwU Pvj K wi evi K _ v wP v K i bvB|
^vaxbZ vi c i wewf bA i vR msweavb A bygv` b K wi evi mgqI
msm` msweavb c wi c x A vBb h A v` c Yqb K wi Z c vi bv Z vnv
Z vnvi vwP vI K i bvB|
msweavb wQj R bMYi Z i x g~j A vBb (fundamental law) | Bnv
wQj c k vmK MYK ev i vi wbevnx wef vMK wbq b i vwL evi A vBb|
18 k k Z v xi A vwk ` k K ek xi f vM j vK ` i B wP vavi v wQj h
Congress hw` msweavb c wi c x K vb A vBb c Yqb K i , Z vi R b
Z vnvi v R bMYi wbK U ` vqx _ vwK e, A v` vj Z i wbK U bq| wK
1790 ` k K i gaf vM nBZ avi Yv e` j vBZ _ vK | A v` vj Z
R bMYi c wZ wbwa wnmve msweavb wek l b K wi Z A vi K i |
msweavb f K wi qv msm` hw` K vb A vBb c Yqb K i Z e Bnv
eA vBbx K vR nBe Ges wePvi K MY hw` mB A vBb c qvM K i Z e
Z vnvi vI eA vBbxK vR K wi e|
K vb gvK v gvq hL bB K vb A mvsweavwbK A vBbi Dc i wbf i
K i v nq Z L bB mvsweavwbK mxgvbv wbavi Y A v` vj Z i wePvhwel q
nBqv` vuo vq|
178
msweavb f K wi evi h K vb c Pv e K wi evi ` vwqZ
wePvi K MYi , GgbwK hw` R bMYi GK wU enr A sk I Z vnv K wi Z
Dr mvwnZ eva K i |
Dc i ewYZ bvwZ ` xNA vj vPbvq Judicial Review Gi Mvo vi K _ v
Ges wK f ve GB gZ v hyI i vi jurisprudence Gi A sk nBj Ges
Z r c i mgM wek i wewf bDP A v` vj Z GB gZ v c qvM K wi Z
_ vK Ges Bnvi mxgveZ vwK Z vnveYbvK i vnBqvQ|
Commonwealth v. Caton (1782) nBZ wewf bgvK v gvi gvag
Judicial Review Z Z i gweK vk Marbury v. Madison (1803) gvK v gvq
c ~bZ v j vf K wi qvQ hL vb c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall _ nxb
f vl vq ej b It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is| McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) gvK v gvq c avb
wePvi c wZ Marshall ej b, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.| Cohens V. Virginia (1821) gvK gvq Marshall myc xgK vUi
` vwqZ m^ ej b, We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.
Judicial Review Gi hy i vi myc xgK vUi GB A v` wk K
gZ v wek i c vq mK j ` k i A v` vj Z MnY K i Z t bvq wePvi
wbw Z K wi Z Q| f vi Z , evsj v` k I c vwK vbi myc xgK vUGK B
f veavi vq A byc vwbZ | Dc i wewf bi vqi gvag Z vnv A vj vPbv K i v
nBqvQ|
wbtm` n ej v hvq, evsj v` k i v GK wU c R vZ , Bnvi i v
ee nv MYZ vw K , GB i vi gvwj K mvef g R bMY| msweavbi
GBi c c Z K wU Pvwi w K ewk nBj msweavbi Basic structure| Bnv
wbw Z | Z vnvQvo v, wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v nBj A vi GK wU Basic
structure hvnv zbK wi evi A waK vi K vnvi I bvBR vZ xq msm` I
msweavbi GB Basic structure zbK wi Z c vi bv|
179
GB Dc gnv` k f vi Z , evsj v` k I c vwK vbi wePvi ee vq
mvavi YZ Common Law Z Z A bymi Y K i v nq| evsj v` k GK wU wj wL Z
I M f ~ msweavb i wnqvQ| Bnv controlled ev rigid A _ vr
` y wi eZ bxq| wek l c wZ A bymi Y mvc GB msweavb msk vab
K i v nq| hy i vFederal ai bi i vee v we` gvb| evsj v` k Bnvi
msweavbi A vI Z vq msm` xq MYZ we` gvb| Z e hy i vi bvq
evsj v` k i vi I wZ bwU gwngvwbZ i wnqvQ, hgb, R vZ xq
msm` , wbevnx wef vM I wePvi wef vM| i vi GB wZ bwU wef vM GK
A c i i f vi mvg eR vq i vL | R vZ xq msm` A vBb c Yqb K i , wbevnx
wef vM Z vnv K vhK i K i Ges wePvi wef vM Z _ v myc xg K vU
msweavbi A vI Z vq A vBbwU c Yqb K i v nBqvQ wK bv I wbevnx wef vM
A vBb A bymvi mwVK f ve K vhK i K wi qvQ wK bv Z vnv c he Y ev
wbi x Y K wi Z c vi , Z e, myc xg K vUmvavi YZ K vb ms z ew i
A ve` b weePbvK wi qvH i c c ` c MnY K wi qv_ vK |
168 9 mvj nBZ hy i vR King in Parliament mvef g| wK
hy i vR BDi vwc qvb BDwbqb c ek K wi evi c i Z vnv ej v hvq
wK bv Z vnvZ m` n A vQ| Lord Johan steyn Gi gZ There was a clash
between community law and a later Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. Within the
Community legal order, the Queen in Parliament is not sovereign. Community law is
supreme.
evsj v` k i msweavb mvc hy i vR i Parliament Gi avb
avi Yv I bxwZ A bymi Y K wi evi GK wU c qvm i wnqvQ| hy i vR i
c avbg xi bvq evsj v` k i c avbg xI mi K vi c avb| i vc wZ
nBZ Qb i vc avb| wZ wb hy i vi President Gi bvq wbevwPZ bb|
wZ wb msm` m` mMY` vi vwbevwPZ nBqv_ vK b|
evsj v` k i R bMYB mvef g| A b mK j c ` vwaK vi x ew
R bMYi c wZ wbwa eU| A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMY h msweavb
i Pbv K wi qvQb I MnY K wi qvQb Z vnv wbw Z f ve evsj v` k i
180
mevP A vBb| BnvB evsj v` k i gwj K I Organic A vBb| A b mK j
A vBb msweavb mvc we` gvb I Z vnv` i A e vb| msweavbi 7
A byQ` c wi vi I wbw Z f ve Nvl Yv K wi qvQ, A b h K vb
A vBb msweavbi mwnZ A mvg mc ~YnBj Z vnv mi vmwi evwZ j
nBe|
GB c vc U msm` K Z K wewae A vBb I wbevnx K Z c i
h K vb c ` c hw` msweavbi mwnZ A mvg mc ~Ynq mB A vBb
ev A v` k ev c ` c myc xg K vUBnvi judicial review Gi gZ vej
evwZ j ev ultra vires Nvl Yv K wi Z c vi | judicial review Gi GB gZ v
hy i v I f vi Z i myc xg K vUi bvq evsj v` k i myc xg K vUi I
we` gvb i wnqvQ|
GB myc xg K vUR vZ xq msm` I wbevnx K Z c i bvq
msweavbi mw| i vi gwngvwbZ GB wZ bwU wef vMB GK A bi
c wi c ~i K Ges K vb GK wU wef vMB A b wef vM nBZ k Z i bq|
K vb wef vMi B wbR ^K vb gZ v bvB| R bMYB mK j gZ vi
Dr m| R bMYi m msweavbi gvag I mvc Z vnvi v gZ vevb|
msweavb nBZ Dr mvwi Z myc xg K vUmsweavb K Z K c `
gZ vq gZ vevb| myc xg K vUi wePvi K MY Z vnv` i wbhyw i mgq
evsj v` k i msweavb I A vBbi i Y, mg_ b I wbi vc v weavb
K wi e ewj qv k c _ MnY K i b| msweavbi 7, 26, 101 I 102,
103, 104 I 105 A byQ` I Dc i v k c _ i K vi Y myc xg K vUi
Df q wef vM msweavb c wi c w h K vb A vBb Bnvi judicial review Gi
gZ vej evwZ j K wi Z c vi | GB gZ v myc xg K vUi gZ v
mxwgZ K i Y I msweavb msk vabi I GK B f ve c hvR |
MYZ i ^v_ I c qvR b wePvi wef vMi GBi c gZ v
MYZ vw K wek ^xK Z | i vmsL vMwi i ^QvPvi gZ v c qvMi
nvZ nBZ msL vj wN R bMYK i v K wi evi R bB msweavb I
^vaxb wePvi wef vM c qvR b| c K Z c mi K vi I R bMYi gaL vb
181
wePvi wef vMi A e vb hvnvZ wePvi wef vM R bMYi A waK vi I ^v_
msweavb I A vBb A bymvi i vK wi Z c vi |
GB c m Professor Keith E. Whittington Gi eI e c wbavbhvM t
The most basic normative question to be asked is whether judicial
supremacy is essential to constitutionalism. Many scholars and judges have
assumed that it is. The Rehnquist Court was clear in identifying the judicial
authority as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution with the capacity of a
constitution to constrain political actors, who could otherwise alter or ignore the
terms of the Constitution at will as it suited their immediate needs. Likewise, the
Warren Court asserted that judicial supremacy was an indispensable feature of
our constitutional system. Challenges to judicial supremacy thus appear to be
attacks on constitutionalism itself. Without judicial supremacy, the civilizing
hand of a uniform interpretation of the Constitution crumbles and the balance
wheel in the American system would be lost. Many scholars have therefore
been distressed to find that judicial supremacy has not been more widely
accepted and more politically effective. The rejection of judicial supremacy is
tantamount to the rejection of judicial independence. Gerald Rosenberg, for
example, has argued that the judiciary is least likely to resist political initiatives
precisely when it is the most necessary to do so, when the Courts
interpretations are being challenged. The prior assumptions of the judicial
supremacy model of constitutionalism render political pressure on the judiciary
deeply problematic and the supposed foundations of constitutional values quite
insecure. (Keith E. Whittington: Political Foundations of Judicial Review, Page-
13).
25| wbevPb K wgk b t ` k wbevPb A byvb K wi evi
GK K ` vwqZ wbevPb K wgk bi | msweavbi mg f vM wbevPb
ms v weavbvej x wj wc e i wnqvQ| msweavbi 119 A byQ`
wbevPb K wgk bi ` vwqZ eYbvK i vnBqvQ| 119 A byQ` wbi c t
119| ( 1) i vc wZ c ` i I msm` i wbevPbi R b
f vUvi - Z vwj K v c Z K i Yi Z veavb, wb` k I wbq Y Ges
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_ vwK e Ges wbevPb K wgk b GB msweavb I A vBbvbyhvqx
( K ) i vc wZ c ` i wbevPb A byvb K wi eb;
( L ) msm` - m` m` i wbevPb A byvb K wi eb ;
182
( M) msm` wbevPbi R b wbevPbx Gj vK vi mxgvbv
wbavi Y K wi eb ; Ges
( N) i vc wZ i c ` i Ges msm` i wbevPbi R b f vUvi -
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nBe, wbevPb K wgk b mBi c ` vwqZ c vj b K wi eb|

Z vnvQvo v, 126 A byQ` A bymvi mK j wbevnx K Z c i K Z e
wbevPb K wgk bK Bnvi K Z e c vj b mei K g mnvqZ vc ` vb K i v|
evsj v` k msweavbi c vi B ej v nBqvQ h Bnv GK wU
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R bMY mvef g| Z vnvi vB G ` k i GK gv gvwj K | Z e Z vnvi v
Z vnv` i GB mvef gZ mi vmwi c qvM K wi Z c vi b bv, Z vnv` i
c wZ wbwa msm` - m` mMY gvi d r c K vk K wi qv _ vK b| msm` - m` m
evwQqvj Bevi c K c vnBj wbevPb|
A vgv` i ` k GB wbevPb c vi c Pj b GK k Z er mi i I
A waK |

Lord Ripon f vi Z el i Governor-General nBqv A vwmevi c i
Resolution of 1882 MnY K i Z t vbxq mi K vi c wZ vb wj i DbwZ i
c ` c MnY K i b| Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 gvi d r wZ b
Z i wewk vbxq mi K vi vc b K wi evi c ` c j I qv nq| R j vi
R b R j v evW, gnvK zgvi R b j vK vj evWGes BDwbqbi R b
BDwbqb K wgwU | R j v evWi ewk i f vM m` m mi K vi K Z K
gbvbxZ nBj I wK QymsL K m` m wbevwPZ nBZ | j vK vj evW
A ek wK QyK vj c i wej y nBqv hvq| | BDwbqb K wgwUi m` mMY
wbevwPZ nBZ | 1919 mvj i Bengal Village Self Government Act vi v
BDwbqb K wgwUi bvg c wi eZ b K wi qv BDwbqb evWK i v nq Ges 9
R b m` mi ga 3 R b mi K vi K Z K gbvbxZ nBZ , A ewk 6 R b
m` m BDwbqbi Uv c ` vbK vi x A waevmx K Z K wbevwPZ nBZ | GB
183
f ve GB` k i A waevmxMY 18 8 5 mvj nBZ Z Yg~j c hvq
wbevPbi mwnZ c wi wPZ wQj |
Z vnvQvo v, Government of India Act , 1935 , Gi A vI Z vq 1937 mvj
f vi Z el i wewf bc ` k wbevPb gvi d Z c v` wk K mi K vi c wZ wZ
nq| G.K .d R j yj nK evsj vi c avbg x wbevwPZ nb| A vevi 1946
mvj i wbevPb gymwj g j xM f ~wgam weR q A R b K i | 1954 mvj
Z ` vbx b c ~ec vwK vb wbevPb nq| 1970 mvj Z ` vbx b
c vwK vbi c _ g I k l mvavi Y wbevPb nq| K vR B evsj v` k i
gvbyl wbevPbi m f vj f ve c wi wPZ |
wK Qy wK Qy wbevPb ms v wei va D vc b nBj wbevPbx
UvBeybvj B Z vnv wb w K wi evi R b h_ wQj | wK mgmvwU Z xe
A vK vi avi Y K i gv i vDc - wbevPbK K ` K wi qv| D Dc - wbevPb
mwVK f ve c wi Pvj bv K wi Z wbevPb K wgk bi ggvw K e_ Z vB wQj
mgmvi g~j K vi Y| wK mB mgmv mgvavb K wi evi c wi eZ ` yB
er mi hveZ ` k evc x c ej MYA v` vj bi gyL msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996, wU MnxZ nq|
D A vBbi D k mK K vb m` n bvB h msm` mr
D k B D A vBb c Yqb K wi qv GK wU wbi c I myy wbevPb
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c wZ weavb K GK wU wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MVbi weavb Z i x
K wi qvwQj |
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wPi K vj A vengvb K vj Z K we` gvb _ vwK e| K vi Y msweavb i vi
g~j ev fundamental evbasic A vBb| Bnvi vi mevP A vBbI eU| Z e
hyM I mgqi mv_ c wi eZ b nq gvbyl i A vk v A vK vL v, c qvR b
GgbwK mgmvi I | mB weeZ bk xj mgvR i c qvR b K L bI K L bI
184
msweavb msk vabi c qvR b nBZ c vi | Z e msweavbi g~j I
gwj K A sk K L bB c wi eZ bhvM bq|
msweavb mvavi Y A vBb nBZ m~Yc _ K , K vi Y Bnv nBZ
i vi mK j gZ v Dr mvwi Z , Ggb wK msk vab K wi evi weavbI |
mvavi Y A vBb msk vab K wi Z K vb wek l weavb bv _ vwK j I
msweavb msk vab K wi Z wek l K vhwewa _ vK , Z e A wj wL Z
msweavb I wj wL Z nBj I hw` flexible nq, Z e h K vb mvavi Y
A vBbi bvq R vZ xq msm` ev Parliament Gi mvavi Y f vUvf zwUZ
msL vMwi gZ vgZ Z vnv msk vab K i v hvq| GB wj myc wi eZ bxq|
wK h msweavb rigid Z vnvi K vb weavb msk vab ev c wi eZ b K wi Z
wek l c ` c MnYi c qvR b nq, m R vZ xq msm` mvavi Y
msL vMwi i gZ vgZ i wf w Z c wi eZ b K wi Z c vi bv, ` yB
Z Z xqvsk msL vMwi i gZ vgZ c qvR b nq| m wj ` y wi eZ bxq
msweavb|
evsj v` k msweavb msweavb- msk vabi weavb msweavbi ` k g
f vM A ew Z | msweavbi weavb msk vabi gZ v 142 A byQ`
eYbv K i v nBhvQ| myc xg K vUK Z K msweavb c g msk vab
gvK v gvi i vqi c i 142 A byQ` wbi c t
[142| GB msweavb hvnvej vnBqvQ, Z vnvm I -

( K ) msm` i A vBb- vi vGB msweavbi K vb weavb mshvR b,
c wi eZ b, c wZ vc b evi wnZ K i Yi vi vmsk vwaZ nBZ c vwi e;
Z e k Z _ vK h,

( A ) A byi c msk vabxi R b A vbxZ K vb wej i m~Y
wk i bvgvq GB msweavbi K vb weavb msk vab K i v nBe
ewj qv i c Dj L bv _ vwK j wej wU weePbvi R b
MnY K i vhvBe bv;

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f vU MnxZ bvnBj A byi c K vb wej mwZ ` vbi R b
Z vnvi vc wZ i wbK U Dc vwc Z nBe bv;

185
( L ) Dc wi - D Dc vq K vb wej MnxZ nBevi c i mwZ i R b
i vc wZ i wbK U Z vnv Dc vwc Z nBj Dc vc bi mvZ w` bi ga
wZ wb wej wUZ mwZ ` vb K wi eb, Ges wZ wb Z vnv K wi Z A mg_
nBj D gqv` i A emvb wZ wb wej wUZ mwZ ` vb K wi qvQb
ewj qvMY nBe| ]
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GL b msk vabI msk vwaZ k i A _ weePbvK i vhvDK |

evsj v GK vWgx nBZ c K vwk Z eenvwi K evsj v A wf avb
Dwj wL Z k ` ywUi wbwj wL Z A _ eYbvK i vnBqvQ t
msk vab t we wK i Y, c we K i Y, ms vi ( Pwi
msk vab) , f ~j vw ` i xK i Y ( j L v
msk vab)
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mv` bv|

Blacks Law Dictionary ( Eighth Edition) G amendment A _ wbwj wL Z
f ve K i vnBqvQ t
amendment : A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute,
constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif, a change
made by addition, deletion, or correction; esp., an alteration in
wording,amendment by implication. A rule of construction that
allows a person to interpret a repugnant provision in a statute as
an implicit modification or abrogation of a provision that appears
before it. US v. Walden377 US 95, 102. n. 12 (1964)

Chambers Dictionary Z amendment I amend k qi wbwj wL Z A _
K i vnq t Amendment:
Correction; improvement an alteration or addition to a document,
agreement etc.; an alteration proposed on a bill under consideration; a
counter-proposal or counter motion put before a meeting.
Amend:
to free from fault or error; to correct, to improve, to alter in detail, with
view to improvement (eg a bill before parliament); to rectify, to cure, to
mend, to grow or become better; to reform; to recover.

186
Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, Edited By Sara Tulloch, 1997 Z
amendment I amend k qi wbwj wL Z A _ K i vnq t
Amendment:
A minor improvement in a document (esp. a legal or statutory one), an
article added to the US Constitution.
Amend:
Make minor improvements in (a text or a written proposal), correct an
error or errors in (a document), make better, improve.

The Corpus Juris Secundum. G amendment I amended k wj i A _
wbwj wL Z f ve K i vnq t
Amendment:
In general use, the word has different meanings which are determined by
the connection in which it is employed, but it necessarily connotes a
change of some kind, ordinarily for the better, but always a change or
alteration. It has been said that the word implies somethig upon which
the correction, alteration, improvement, or reformation can operate,
something to be reformed, corrected, rectified altred or improved; a
reference to the matter amended; usually a proposal by persons interested
in a change, and a purpose to add something to or withdraw something
so as to perfect that which is or may be deficient, or correct that which
has been incorrectly stated by the party making the amendment; and may
include several propositions, all tending to effect and carry out one
general object or purpose, and all connected with one subject. The word
has been defined or employed as meaning a change of something; a
change or alteration for the better; a continuance in a changed form; a
correction of detail, not altering the essential form or nature of the
matters amended, nor resulting in complete destruction; a correction of
errors or faults; a material change; an addition, alteration or subtraction;
an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed ; an alteration or change; an improvement; a reformation; a
revision; a substitution; the act of freeing form faults; the act of making
better , or of changing for the better; the supplying of a deficiency.
Amended:
The term implies the existence of an original, a defect therein, and of
certain new facts to be added thereto, or a restatement in a more accurate
and legal manner, so that it is no longer indentical with the original text:
but also it involves the superseding of the original and in this respect is
187
to be distinguished from supplemental which ordinarily implies only
something added to and to be read with the original.

Z wK Z qv` k msk vab A vBb 58 K Ges msweavbi PZ z_
f vMi b~Z b 2K c wi Q` 58 L , 58 M, 58 N I 58 O A byQ` wj
mwbewk Z K i v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v 61, 99 I 123 A byQ` msk vab
K i vnBqvQ|

c Z xqgvb nq h ^xK Z f veB Dc i v 58 K nBZ 58 O c h
A byQ` wj b~Z b f ve mshy nBqvQ Ges A ewk 61 I 99
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( 3) ` d vb~Z b f ve c wZ vwc Z nBqvQ|

58 K A byQ` wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` ga
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48 ( 3) A byQ` A bymvi c avbg xi c i vgk I 141K ( 1) I
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188
wef vMi mvb I ghv` v f zj ywZ nBZ Q Ges GK B K vi b wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ vI wZ M nBZ Q|

27| msweavb msk vab- mvavi Y A vj vPbv t eZ gvb
gvK v gvq msweavbi qv` k msk vabi eaZ v D vwc Z nBqvQ|
nvBK vUwef vMi Full Bench msweavbi 8 , 48 , 56 I 57 A byQ` i
K vb msk vab (amendment) nq bvB ewj qv A wf gZ c K vk K wi qvQ,
wK 58 K nBZ 58 O A byQ` mg~n h msweavb msk vabi gvag
msweavb mwbewk Z nBqvQ I msweavbi Dc i mwbewk Z GB
A byQ` wj i c f ve wK Ges GB A byQ` wj msweavbi K vb basic
structure Gi mwnZ mvsNwl K wK bv, hvnv GB gvK v gvi g~j wePvh
wel q, m m^ c qvR bxq evL v- wek l Y c ` vb K i bvB| GK vi Y
D i vqi Dc i wmv c ` vb K wi evi c ~eA vBb I msweavb
msk vab c m GK wU mvavi Y A vj vPbvc qvR b|

GK wU c wZ vb ev msMVbi D k , wewf bwef vM I Bnvi
K gPvi x` i ` vwqZ I K Z e, GK A c i i mwnZ c vi c wi K mK
Ges mvweK f ve c wZ vbwU c wi Pvj bvi R b c qvR bxq wewf b
K vhc Yvj x I bxwZ gvj vi mgwK mvavi Y A _ Dnvi msweavb ej |
Bnv ` k i A vc vgi R bMYi gwj K I MYZ vw K A waK vi mg~ni
i vK eP|

i vI GK wU c wZ vb ev e c wZ vbi mgw| Bnvi ` k xq
I A v R wZ K wewf bgyL x K gK v c wi Pvj bv K wi Z c qvR bxq gwj K
bxwZ gvj vi mgwK i vi msweavb ej |

wePvi c wZ gynv` nvweeyi i ngvb I A avc K A vwbmy vgvb
K Z K msK wj Z I mvw` Z A vBb- k K vl G msweavbK
wbwj wL Z f ve ms vwqZ K i vnBqvQ ( c v- 228 ) t

msweavb we. mvavi Y A _ msweavb nBj K vbv c wZ vb
ev msMVb c wi Pvj bvi gj bxwZ gvj v| i vR bwZ K
c wi f vl vq msweavb nBj i vi gj I mevP A vBb|
189
msweavb i vi wewf bmsMVb c wi Pvj bvi gwj K
bxwZ gvj v wj wc e _ vK | mi K vi i gZ v I ` vwqZ ,
R bMYi gwj K A waK vi , mi K vi - c wZ , wewf bmi K vwi
c wZ vb K xf ve c wi Pvwj Z nBe, Z vnv msweavb wj wc e
_ vK | msweavbK i vi mevP A vBb ewj qv gvb K i v
nq| msweavbi gj bxwZ gvj vi c wi c x K vbv A vBb
c YxZ nBZ c vi bv| wj wL Z bv A wj wL Z GBw` K
weePbvq msweavbK ` yB k Yxf y K i v nq| A waK vsk
` k i msweavbB wj wL Z I M f z | A vevi msweavb
A wj wL Z I nq| wK Qy gwj K A vBb, c _ v,c ~e- A wf Z v
msweavbi gZ v MY nq| hme msweavb mvavi Y
A vBbi gZ v A vBbmf v c wi eZ b K wi Z c vi , m wj
myc wi eZ bxq| A vi hme msweavb msk vab K wi Z wek l
ee v MnYi c qvR b nq, A vBbmf v mvavi Y
msL vMwi i gZ vgZ i wf w Z c wi eZ b K wi Z c vi bv,
m wj ` ywi eZ bxq msweavb|

Professor O. Hood Phillips wj wL Z Constitutional and Administrative Law
M msweavbK wbwj wL Z f ve wPw Z K wi qvQb ( c v- 5) t
The word constitution is used in two different senses, the abstract and
the concrete. The constitution of a state in the abstract sense is the system of
laws, customs and conventions which define the composition and powers of
organs of the state, and regulate the relations of the various state organs to one
another and to the private citizen. A constitution in the concrete sense is the
document in which the most important laws of the constitution are
authoritatively ordained.

c K Z c hy i vR i K vb wj wL Z msweavb bvB | Bnv g~j Z
A wj wL Z nBj I Bnvi I K Z K gwj K mvsweavwbK ` wj j i wnqvQ,
hgb, Magna Carta (1215). Petition of Right (1628) I Bill of Rights (1689)| Lord
Chatham Gi gZ D mvsweavwbK ` wj j wj together constitute the Bible of
the English Constitution | Z vnvQvo v, i vi c qvR b A bymvi wewf b
mgq Bnvi mvef g King in Parliament A vBb c Yqb K wi qv _ vK |
Z vnvQvo v, Bnvi c vPxb Custom ( c _ v) I mg Convention ( mvsweavwbK
i xwZ evH wZ n) i wnqvQ|

G m^ Professor K.C. Wheare ej bt
190
The British Constitution is the collection of legal rules and non-legal
rules which govern the government in Britain. The legal rules are embodied in
statutes like the Acts of Settlement ............... the various Representation of the
People Acts.............the Judicature Acts, and the Parliament Acts of 1911 and
1949........orders and regulations issued under the prerogative or under statutory
authority; and they may be embodied in the decisions of courts. The non-legal
rules find expression in such customs or conventions as that the Queen does not
refuse her assent to a bill duly passed by Lords and commons or that a Prime
Minister holds office because and for so long as he retains the confidence of a
majority in the House of Commons. All there rules are part of the British
Constitution. ( Modern Constitutions page-1-2)|

GK B f ve New Zealand I Israel i vi I K vb wj wL Z msweavb
bvB|

A bw` K wj wL Z I M f y msweavb m^ Professor Wheare
ej bt

The Constitution then, for most countries in the world, is a selection of the
legal rules which govern the government of that country and which have been
embodied in a document. (Mordern Constitutions, page-2)|

h mK j msweavbi A sk wj mvavi Y A vBbi bvq msm` K Z K
mnR c wi eZ bxq Ges msweavb ewYZ wek l ee v MnYi gvag
h mK j msweavb c wi eZ b hvM mB wf w Z I msweavbK flexible I
rigid GB ` yB k YxZ wef K i v hvq| Dc i v i c K bvg wj Lord
Bryce Z uvnvi Studies in History and Jurisprudence M c ` vb K wi qvQb|

A.V. Dicey Z vnvi Law of the Constitution (10
th
edition) M flexible
msweavb m^ ej bt
one under which every law of every description can legally be changed with
the same ease and in the same manner by one and the same body.

rigid msweavb m^ wZ wb ej bt
one under which certain laws generally known as constitutional or fundamental
laws cannot be changed in the same manner as ordinary laws.

msweavbi k Yxf wz m^ Professor K.C. Wheare ej bt
Constitutions may be classified according to the method by which they may be
amended. We may place in one category those constitutions which may be
amended by the legislature through the same process as any other law and we
191
may place in another category those constitutions which require a special
process for their amendment. (Modern Constitutions, page-15)|

msweavb msk vab mwK Z A vj vPbvq hy i vi D` vni Y
L yeB c vmswMK |

c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h hy i v i ^vaxbZ v hyi mgq
Continental Congress Bnvi Articles of Confederation gvi d r K j vbx i v wj i
` vwqZ , K Z e I mK wbYq K i v nBqvwQj | c i eZ xZ hy i vi
msweavb i Pbv K i v nBj | GB msweavb m^ US Supreme Court Nvl Yv
K i t

The Government of the United States was born of the Constitution, and
all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or
by implication from that instrument (Downes V. Bidwell,1901, 182 US 244,
288) (Quoted from Cases on Constitutional Law by Professor Noel T. Dowling,
Fifth Edition 1954, page-398).

Bnv GK wU rigid msweavb A _ vr msk vab ev c wi eZ b K wi Z
wek l ee vi c qvR b| msk vabi D wek l ee v msweavbi
c g A byQ` eYbv K i v nBqvQ| BnvZ ` yBwU avc i gvag
msweavb msk vabi K _ v ej v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, mswk State Gi
A mwZ Z Senate K State c wZ wbwaZ Z K vb Z vi Z g msk vabxi
gvagI A vbqb K i v hvq bv| Congress Gi gZ vi GB mxgveZ v
hy i vi msweavbB wj wc e i wnqvQ|

c _ g gnvhy I wZ xq gnvhy i A eZ xK vj xb mgq BDi vc
e msL K b~Z b i v R b j vf K i | GB ` k wj i c Z K wUi B
wj wL Z msweavb i wnqvQ|

mvavi YZ A wj wL Z msweavb wj flexible Ges wj wL Z I M f z
msweavb wj rigid nBqv _ vK | Z e Bnvi ewZ gI i wnqvQ|
Singapore Gi msweavb wj wL Z nBj I Bnv m~Yf ve flexible|
Australiai c Z K wU State Gi wj wL Z msweavb _ vwK j I Bnvi ek xi
f vM weavb wj flexible|

192
German Federal Republic Gi msweavbi K Z K A byQ` Ges Republic
of Cyprus Gi K Z K g~j A byQ` A c wi eZ bxq |

hw` I msweavb c wi eZ bi wewa ee vi Dc i wf w K wi qv
BnvK bvbv f ve k Yxf z K wi evi c qvm j I qv nBqvQ wK
c qvMi A bK mgqB Bnv mswk i vi c K Z MYZ PPvi
Dc i B Z vnv g~j Z t wbf i K i | GK wU mZ K vi MYZ vw K i vGK wU
mvavi Y A vBb wewae K wi evi c ~eA bK mgqB R bgZ hvPvB Gi
ee v j I qv nq Ges msm` Z vnv Pzj Pi v wePvi weePbv K i v nBqv
_ vK wK wj wL Z msweavb _ vK v mZ I A bK i v Bnvi msweavb
c wi eZ b Z gb K vb MYZ vw K PPv c wi j w Z nq bv| G c m O.
Hood Phillips Gi g et

.............. for it depends on political and psychological factors . It may
be more difficult to pass a British statute amending the law relating to
the sale of intoxicating liquors or the opening of shops on Sunday than to
pass a French statute reducing the period of office of the President of the
Republic from seven to five years. (Constitutional and Administrative
Law, Seventh Edition, page-7)

G evc vi evsj v` k i A wf Z v A vi I ggvw K | Bnvi GK wU
rigid msweavb i wnqvQ| wK GL vb mvgwi K k vmK MY c vqmB ` k
i v K wi evi Z vwM` msweavb ewnf ~Z I A eaf ve i vxq gZ v
` L j K i b Ges m~YGL &wZ qvi wenxb I eA vBbx f ve wbR ` i
c qvR b wgUvBevi D k c Q` gZ msweavb K uvUvQo v K wi qv
_ vK b| nuv/ bv f vU c vq k Z f vM f vU Z vnv` i c c o | Z vnvi v
wbw Z f ve i vc wZ wbevwPZ nb| msm` I Z vnvi i vR bwZ K ` j
ewZ gnxbf ve wec yj Z g msL vMwi A vmb j vf K i | Z r c i ,
msm` i c _ g A waek bi c _ g w` bB K qK wgwbUi gav
msweavbi msk vab wj A ej xj v g msweavbi A sk nBqv hvq|
GB NUbvej x A vgi v msweavb ( c g msk vab) A vBb I msweavb
( mg msk vab) A vBb Gi c Z K wi qvwQ|
193
hvnv nDK , mK j rigid msweavbi msweavb msk vabi
weavb msweavbB c hy i vL v nq| hy i vi msweavbi c g
A byQ` msweavb msk vab K wi evi weavb mwbewk Z K i v nBqvQ
Z vnvDc i A vj vPbvK i vnBqvQ|
msweavbi mvavi Y Pwi m Professor K.C. Wheare ej bt

Constitutions, when they are framed and adopted, tend to reflect the
dominant beliefs and interests, or some compromise between conflicting beliefs
and interests, which are characteristic of the society at that time. Moreover they
do not necessarily reflect political or legal beliefs and interests only. They may
embody conclusions or compromises upon economic and social matters which
the framers of the Constitution have wished to guarantee or to proclaim. A
Constitution is indeed the resultant of a parallelogram of forces-political,
economic, and social-which operate at the time of its adoption.
(Modern Constitutions, page-67)

msweavb c YZ vMY, m h ` k i B nDb, wbtm` n Z vunvi v
vbx, Yx I c wZ ew | wK BnvI A ^xK vi K i v hvq bv h
Z uvnvi v Z uvnv` i hyMi c wZ wbwaZ K i b| Z uvnvi v Z uvnv` i hyMi
` k b, wP vavi v I Z L bK vi c wi w wZ Z i vi c vqvR bK A MvwaK vi
c ` vb K i Z t msweavb i Pbv K wi qvwQj b| mgqi mwnZ wP vavi v I
c qvR bi c wi eZ b nBZ c vi | mB ev eZ vi wbwi L A bK mgqB
msweavb msk vab mgqi ` vex nBqv ` uvo vBZ c vi | mB mveZ vi
K _ v mi Y i vwL qvB msweavb c YZ vMY msweavbB Bnv msk vab
K wi evi weavb I c wZ wj wc e K i b|

GB c m Professor Carl J. Friedrich ej b t
No countervailing power or other amorphous influence, no matter
how effective, satisfies the requirements which the concept of a constitution is
meant to denote. The ideological justifications for such a system, as well as the
thoughts associated with its practice, embody the meaning of constitutionalism.
Although some of these ideological and behavioral projections have treated a
constitution as a static given, as something which never or very rarely changes, a
constitution is, on the contrary, a living system. To be sure, the basic structure or
pattern may remain even though the different component parts may undergo
significant alterations. How very different is the American Congress today than
it was after 1787; how profound are the alterations which the British Parliament
194
has undergone during the same period! And yet, both still constitute vital parts
of the evolving constitution.
(Carl J. Friedrich : Constitutional Government And Democracy, page-29 nBZ
DZ )
Professor K.C. Wheare msweavb msk vab j Bqv GB f ve c k
D vc b K i bt
If it is almost a platitude that Constitutions are the product of their
times, it is also true that times change. Do Constitutions change with them? How
rapidly do they change, and by what processes? Does it happen often that there
is grave disharmony between a Constitution and the society whose political
processes it is intended to regulate.?
(Modern Constitutions, page-70)

h K vb msk vabx A vBbi eaZ v wePvi K wi Z Mj A vBbwUi
g~j D k ev Pith and substance weePbv K i v R i i x| Pith and substance
Gi eaZ vi Dc i B A vBbwUi eaZ vA bK vsk B wbf i K i |

Attorney General for Canada V. Attorney General for Ontario 1937 AC 355
gvK v gvq Employment and Social Insurance Act, 1935, Gi gvag bvMwi K
A waK vi ybK i v nq ewj qv ` vex K i v nBj Privy Council A vBbwUK
A ea Nvl YvK i | Lord Atkin Z uvnvi i vq ej b ( c v- 367) t
................... Dominion legislation, even though it deals with
Dominion property, may yet be so framed as to invade civil rights within
the province, or encroach upon the classes of subjects which are reserved
to Provincial competence. It is not necessary that it should be a colorable
device, or a pretence. If on the true view of the legislation it is found
that in reality in pith and substance the legislation invades civil rights
within the province, or in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise
encroaches upon the provincial field, the legislation will be invalid
( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v gvK v gvq Z wK Z A vBbwU weePbvq ` L v hvq h
Bnvi c K Z pith and substance wQj c ` k i bvMwi K A waK vi i c wi c x|
GB K vi YB Z wK Z A vBbwU A ea Nvl YvK i vnq|

195
Gallagher V. Lynn 1937 AC 863 gvK v gvq wmv nq h A vBb mf v
K vb A ea wel q e Z zj Bqv K vb A vBb wewae K wi Z c vi bv|
Lord Atkin ej b ( c v- 8 69- 70) t
It is well established that you are to look at the true nature and
character of the legislation Russell v. The Queen (I) the pith and substance of
the legislation. If, on the view of the statute as whole, you find that the
substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not
invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorized
field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in fact
encroach upon the forbidden field. Nor are you to look only at the object of
legislature. An Act may have a perfectly lawful object, e.g. to promote the
health of the inhabitants, but may seek to achieve that object by invalid methods,
e.g., a direct prohibition of any trade with a foreign country. In other words, you
may certainly consider the clauses of an Act to see whether they are passed in
respect of the forbidden subject. ( A avi L vc ` )

c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h hy i vi msweavb wj wL Z I rigid|
Dnvi c g A byQ` msweavb msk vab ms v | g~j msweavbwUZ
gvU 7( mvZ ) wU A byQ` i wnqvQ| msweavb i wPZ I MnxZ nq
178 7 mvj i 17B m ^i Z vwi L | A Z tc i , GK GK K wi qv
c v b 13wU K j vbx- A i v wj msweavb A bygv` b (Ratification) K i |
msweavbi g~j 7wU A byQ` K L bI msk vab nq bvB | msk vabx
gvi d r c _ g 10wU A byQ` i mshyw K i Y A bygvw` Z nBqv
msweavbi A sk nq 1791 mvj i 15B wWm^i Z vwi L | GB
msk vabx wj K gvbyl i gwj K A waK vi i v_ A vbqb K i v
nBqvwQj | GB K vi YB GB ` k wU A byQ` K ej v nq The Bill of Rights|
A Z tc i , MZ mvqv ` yBk Z er mi gv 17wU msk vabx A vbv nq|
A i v wj A bygv` bi c i msk vabx wj I msweavbi A sk nBqv
hvq|

MZ mvqv ` yBk Z er mi i BwZ nvm hy i vK xZ ` vm mgmv,
Mnhy, A _ bwZ K mgmv, wZ xq gnvhy BZ vw` A bK eo eo
msUK vj A wZ evwnZ K wi Z nBqvQ wK g~j msweavb m~YA Z
i wnqvQ| ei msk vabx wj msweavbK A vi I gwngvwbZ K wi qvQ|
196
GB K vi Y K vb K vb msk vabxi A bygv` bi c wZ MZ wel q j Bqv
gvK v gv nBj I msk vabxi wel qe yj Bqv K L bI K vb gvK v gv
nq bvB | GB K vi Y K vb msk vabxi vires ev eaZ v j Bqv US Supreme
Court Gi K vb i vq ` L vhvq bv|

hy i vi msweavbi c vc U McCulloch V. Maryland (1819)
gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall msweavb m^ ej bt
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be under
stood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those object be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves. (Robert E. Cushman: Leading Constitutional Decisions, 13
th

Edition, Page-10)

msweavbi K Z Z mK Professor K.C. Wheare ej bt
If we ask what moral basis a Constitution can claim as law the answer
would seem to be that it can command the authority which all law commands in
a community. Whatever theory of morals may be invoked to determine and
define obedience to the law will apply also to the law of the Constitution. But
we may go further than this and say that there is an argument for asserting that a
Constitution can command obligation on an additional ground. It is, by its
nature, not just an ordinary law. It is fundamental law, it provides the basis upon
which law is made and enforce. It is a prerequisite of law and order. There is
indeed a moral argument for saying that a Constitution commands obedience
because it is by its nature a superior or supreme law. This argument represents,
in the moral field, the logical argument adopted in the legal filed by Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury V. Madison. A Constitution cannot be disobeyed
with same degree of lightheartedness as Dog Act. It lies at the basis of political
order; if it is brought into contempt, disorder and chaos may soon follow.

Just as, in the legal sphere, the logical argument for a Constitutions
being supreme law supplemented by the argument that the people, either directly
or through a constituent assembly, is a supreme law-giver, so also in the moral
sphere it is sometimes argued that a Constitution commands obligation because
it expresses the will of the people. What the people has laid down is binding
upon every individual.
197
(Modern Constitutions, page-62-63) ( A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vab mK Professor K.C. Wheare A vi I ej bt
Constitutions are influenced by what people think of them, by their
attitude to them. If a Constitution is regarded with veneration, if what it
embodies is thought to be prima facie right and good, then there exists a force to
preserve the Constitution against lighthearted attempts to change it. Though the
formal process of amendment is there, it will be seldom and hesitatingly
invoked. The Constitution of the Untied States occupies some such position in
the eyes of the citizens. They regard it with great respect, if not with veneration.
In natural reaction to this attitude, those who wish to see the Constitution
amended are led to speak with exasperation of the Myth of the Constitution
which opposes so strong a resistance to attempts to carry through even minor
reforms. (Modern Constitutions, page-77) ( A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vab c m K vbvWvi A wf Z vI eYbv K i v hvBZ
c vi | wesk k Z vw i w k ` k K mgM c w_ ex evc x A _ bwZ K g` v
A vi nq| K vbvWv GB g` vi wk K vi nq Ges K vbvWv mi K vi g` v
gvK vej vq bvbvi c c ` c j BZ eva nq| ` k i A _ bwZ K
A e vi DbwZ K c v` wk K mi K vi wj K I A vw_ K mnvqZ v c ` vbi
c qvR b nq| wK K vbvWv mi K vi i mvsweavwbK gZ vi ga _ vwK qv
H i c A _ bwZ K c ` c MnYi myhvM wQj bv| GgZ A e vq
1940 mvj K vbvWvmi K vi Bnvi msweavb msk vab K wi Z eva nq|

GB f ve mvavi YZ t c qvR bi Z vwM` msweavb msk vab K i v
nq| Z e K vb A vBb c YxZ nBj ev msweavb msk vab K wi qv K vb
A vBb c YxZ nBj Z vnv g~j msweavbi mwnZ mvsNwl K wK bv, mB
wePvwi K ` vwqZ myc xg K vUi Dc i b | Marbury V. Madison (1803)
gvK v gvq c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall ej bt
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to
198
the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
confliction rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the Constitution; and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. (Professor John B.
Sholley : Cases on Constitutional Law, page-39, 48) ( A avi L vc ` )

1950 mvj f vi Z i msweavb K vhK i x nq| f vi Z i ^vaxbZ vi
c i c i B K l K I c R vmvavi bi K j vbv_ R wg` vi x c _ v wej ywmn
K wl - f ~wg m^xq wewf bA vBb c Yqb K i v nq| H A vBb wj i
mvsweavwbK eaZ v j Bqv wewf bi vR i nvBK vUe msL K
gvK v gv nBj mi K vi i f ~wg ms vi c wi K bv evavM nBqv c o |
f ~wg ms vi ` Z A vMvBqv j Bevi D k 1951 mvj f vi Z i
msweavbi c _ g msk vabx The Constitution ( First Amendment ) Act, 1951
gvi d r Article 31A, Article 31B I Schedule IX msweavb mshy K i v nq|
GL vb Dj L , msweavbi 368 A byQ` ewYZ wek l K vhwewa
mvc f vi Z xq Parliament Gi Dc i msweavb msk vabi gZ v
(constituent power) A wc Z i wnqvQ| Shankri Prasad Singh Deo V. Union of India
AIR 1951 SC 458 gvK gvwUZ f vi Z i myc xg K vUmsweavbi Dc i v
msk vabx wj i mvsweavwbK eaZ v mec _ g weePbv K i | wei vawU
f vi Z xq msweavbi 13( 2) A byQ` ewYZ law k wUi A vI Z vq
mvsweavwbK A vBbI A f z wK bvZ vnvB g~j weeP wel q wQj | bvbx
A myc xg K vUmvsweavwbK A vBb D law k wUi A f z bq
ewj qv Z wK Z mvsweavwbK msk vabxwU ea ewj qv i vq c ` vb K i |
c Z xqgvb nq h gwj K A waK vi I msweavbi 368 A byQ` mn D
A byQ` ewYZ wek l K vhwewa mvc Parliament msweavbi h K vb
A sk evweavb msk vab K wi Z gZ vc v|

28 | msweavb msk vab I Basic Structure Z Z t
c vwK vbi c _ g msweavb 1956 mvj i 23k gvPZ vwi L
K vhK i xnq|
199
c v` wk K msm` Pj vK vj xb mgq Mf Yi Z vnv f vwqv w` Z
gZ vc v wK bv GB mvsweavwbK c k j Bqv c vwK vbi i vc wZ
c vwK vb myc xg K vUi gZ vgZ R vwbZ Pvwnqv GK wU Reference c i Y
K wi j Mf Yi Gi mBi c K vb gZ v bvB ewj qv myc xg K vUgZ
c K vk K i | c avb wePvi c wZ Muhammad Munir Z uvnvi gZ vgZ c ` vb
K vj wbvI g e K i b (Reference by the President PLD 1957 SC219=9
DLR SC178) ( c v- 190 DLR) t
33. .....................The Constitution defines the qualifications which a
candidate for election to the Provincial Assembly, or a voter in a constituency
for such Assembly, must possess; but Mr. Manzur Qadir would give to the
President under Article 234 the power to destroy, though for a temporary period,
the very basis of the new Constitution by claiming for him the power to form the
constituencies and to order the preparation of electoral rolls in direct violation of
the Constitution merely to implement the decision of a Governor.
( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v e e the power to destroy...... the very basis of the new
Constitution K _ v wj wek l c wYavbhvM| msweavbi h wK Qygwj K
wel q _ vwK Z c vi Z vnvi B GK wU BwZ Dc i v g e nBZ c vI qv
hvq|

Muhammad Abdul Haque V. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury PLD 1963 Dhaka 669
gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Syed Mahbub Murshed msweavbi k Z m^
wbv g e K i b ( c v- 695) t
53.................A Constitution is a solemn and sacred document of
seminal and supremel consequence, partaking the nature of almost scriptura
sanctity, embodying, as it usually does, the final will and testament of the
sovereign authority that resides in the people and providing the manner and
norms of the Government of a nation. It therefore, assumes something of the
immutability of the laws of the Medes and the Persians. It is not subject to easy
change which is usually effected by a special and somewhat difficult process. In
the present Constitution the provisions with regard to amendment of the
Constitution have been enumerated in Articles 208 to 210. We may note that it
requires a two-thirds majority of the Legislature to effect an amendment in the
constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

200
c vwK vbi i vc wZ K Z K c wi Z Reference G c avb wePvi c wZ
Muhammad Munir Gi Dc i ewYZ g e Dj L K wi qv wePvi c wZ Syed
Mahbub Murshed e e i vL b ( c v- 698 M) t
62.............. The aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is a
pointer that in the case before us the power of adaptation does not extend to
the wiping out of vital provision of the Constitution to implement a decision of
the members of the Assembly who were invited to be Ministers. (A avi L v
c ` )

Dc i v e e .......a vital provision of the Constitution K _ v wj
i Z c ~Y| msweavbi I h vital provision i wnqvQ Z vnv wePvi c wZ
Murshed Gi Dc i v g e nBZ c Z xqgvb nq|

Z vnvQvo v, i vR bwZ K mgmv mgvavbi R b msweavb msk vab
K i vhvq bvBnvI wZ wb Z vnvi i vq Dj L K i b ( c v- 704)
78. The text of Article 224 (3) is very clear and unambiguous. It does
not permit alterations of the provisions of the Constitution for a solution of a
political situation brought about by some members of the National Assembly
who refused to accept appointments as Ministers, if such appointments entailed
cessation of their membership of the Assembly. ( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v i vqi wei c vwK vb myc xg K vUA vc xj nq|
A vc xj i i vq (PLD 1963 SC486) c avb wePvi c wZ A.R. Cornelius ej b
( c v- 512) t
The impression is clear and unavoidable that the ground of expediency
was based on a desire to accede to the wishes of certain persons, probably a
fairly small number of persons, but the Constitution was not intended to be
varied according to the wishes of any person or persons. Anything in the nature
of respecting of person, unless provided by the Constitution itself, would be a
violation of the Constitution, and if the Constitution were itself altered for some
such reason, and that in a substantial, and not merely a machinery aspect, there
would clearly be an erosion, a whittling away of its provisions, which it would
be the duty of the superior Courts to resist in defence of the Constitution. The
aspect of the franchise, and of the form of Government are fundamental features
of a Constitution and to alter them, in limine in order to placate or secure the
support of a few persons, would appear to be equivalent not to bringing the
201
given Constitution into force, but to bringing into effect an altered or different
Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v e e The aspect of the franchise, and of the form of,
Government are fundamental features of a Constitution g e mvsweavwbK f ve
A Z i Z c ~Y| msweavbi h fundamental feature i wnqvQ Z vnvB
Dc i v g e nBZ c K vk c vq|

i vc wZ K Z K c wi Z 1957 mvj i Reference gvK v gvq Dc i
DZ c avb wePvi c wZ Muhammad Munir Gi g e Dj L K wi qv Cornelius
C.J. ej b ( c v- 512) t
In that passage, there clearly appears a determination on the part of the
Court to resist any attempt to manipulate the constitution in order to suit a
particular person, and at the same time to insist that nothing should be permitted
which derogates from the very basis of the Constitution or is in direct
violation of the Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

c avb wePvi c wZ i Dc i v e e the very basis of the
Constitution K _ v wj DwVqv A vwmqvQ hvnv mvsweavwbK f ve A Z
i Z c ~Y|

GK B A vc xj gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Fazle-Akbar c avb wePvi c wZ i
mwnZ GK gZ c vl Y K wi qvej b ( c v- 524)
From the language of the Article it is abundantly clear that this Article
was never meant to bestow power on the President to change the fundamentals
of the Constitution. Our Constitution has provided for a Presidential form of
government and the President by the impugned order has introduced a semi-
Parliamentary form of Government. As already stated, this Article 224(3) was
never meant to bestow power on the President to change the fundamentals of the
Constitution. However wholesome the intention and however noble the motive
may be the extra-constitutional action could not be supported because the
President was not entitled to go beyond the Constitution and touch any of the
fundamental of Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v e e the fundamentals of the Constitution k wj 3 ( wZ b)
evi DwVqv A vwmqvQ| msweavbi h gwj K wK Qywel qe yi wnqvQ
Z vnvDc i v e e nBZ c wZ f vZ nBZ Q|

202
wePvi c wZ Hamoodur Rahman Z uvnvi i vq msweavb I msweavb
c ` mvef g gZ vm^ ej b ( c v- 535) t
................The fundamental principle underlying a written Constitution
is that it not only specifies the persons or authorities in whom the sovereign
powers of the State are to be vested but also lays down fundamental rule for the
selection or appointment of such persons or authorities and above all fixes the
limits of the exercise of those powers. Thus the written Constitution is the
source from which all governmental power emanates and it defines its scope and
ambit so that each functionary should act within his respective sphere. No power
can, therefore, be claimed by any functionary which is not be found within the
four corners of the Constitution nor can anyone transgress the limits therein
specified. ( A avi L vc ` )

i vc wZ K Z K difficulties A c mvi Y c m wePvi c wZ Hamoodur
Rahman ej b ( c v- 536) t
It could, in may view , have no possible relation to a difficulty which
arose de hors the Constitution, as for example, a political difficulty which
necessitated an alteration in the basic structure of Government as originally
contemplated by the constitution.( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v e e GB mec _ g basic structure K _ vwU eenZ nq
hvnvmvsweavwbK f ve L yeB i Z c ~Y|
wZ wb msweavbi g~j wel qe y(main feature) m^ ej b ( c v-
538 ) t
The main feature of the Constitution, therefore, is that a Minister should
not be a member of the House, he should have no right to vote therein, nor
should his tenure of office be dependent upon the support of the majority of the
members of the Assembly nor should he be responsible to the Assembly. This is
an essential characteristic of a Presidential form of Government and Mr. Brohi
appearing on behalf of the respondent has called it the main fabric of the
system of government sought to be set up by the present Constitution. An
alternation of this main fabric, therefore, so as to destroy it altogether cannot,
in my view, be called an adaptation of the Constitution for purpose of
implementing it. ( A avi L vc ` )

Dc i v e e msweavb c m main feature I main fabric
k wj eenZ nBqvQ hvnvmvsweavwbK i Z enb K i |

203
c Z xqgvb nq, msweavbi h K vb gwj K wel q _ vwK Z c vi
m m^ mec _ g c vwK vbi XvK v nvBK vUI c i eZ xZ myc xg K vU
Dj L K i |

Sajjan Singh V. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845 gvK gvq f vi Z xq
myc xg K vUConstitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 K ea Nvl Yv
K i | wK wePvi c wZ M. Hidayatullah I J.R. Mudhalkar Z vnv` i c _ K
c _ K i vq msweavbi basic feature msk vab K i v hvq wK bv Z vnv j Bqv
msk q c K vk K i b| wePvi c wZ Hidayatullah msweavbi 368 A byQ` i
c wi mi evew A vj vPbvK i b|

GK B c m c vwK vb myc xg K vUi Dc i ewYZ i vq Dj L
K wi qvwePvi c wZ Mudhalkar ej b ( c v- 8 64) t
(59) The Constitution has enjoined on every member of Parliament
before entering upon his office to take an oath or make an affirmation to the
effect that he will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution. On the other
hand under Art. 368 a procedure is prescribed for amending the Constitution. If
upon a literal interpretation of this provision an amendment even of the basic
features of the Constitution would be possible it will be a question for
consideration as to how to harmonies the duty of allegiance to the Constitution
with the power to make an amendment to it. Could the two be harmonised by
excluding from the procedure for amendment, alteration of a basic feature of the
Constitution?
.....................................................................................................................
..........................................................
(66) Before I part with this case I wish to make it clear that what I have
said in this judgment is not an expression of my final opinion but only an
expression of certain doubts which have assailed me regarding a question of
paramount importance to the citizens of our country: to know whether the basic
features of Constitution under which we live and to which we owe allegiance are
to endure for all time or at least for the foreseeable future or whether they
are no more enduring than the implemental and subordinate provisions of the
Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

Golak Nath V. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 gvK v gvwU 11( GMvi )
R b wePvi c wZ mgbq myc xg K vUi GK wU en i e bvbx K i |
Golak Nath gvK v gvi c ~emyc xg K vUi A wf gZ wQj h Parliament
204
msweavbi 368 A byQ` i k Z mvc gwj K A waK vi I 368
A byQ` mn msweavbi h K vb A byQ` msk vab K wi Z gZ vevb,
wK Golak Nath gvK v gvi i vq GB A wf gZ i c wi eZ b A vb| D
gvK v gvq wePvi K MYi 6- 5 Mwi Z vq msweavb msk vabi c k
c ~ei mK j i vq wj A wZ w` (overrule) nq| Nvl Yv K i v nq h
msweavbi Z Z xq f vM ewYZ gwj K A waK vi mg~n 368 A byQ` i
A vI Z vq msk vab K i v hvq bv, K wi Z nBj MYc wi l ` A vnevb
K wi qvb~Z b msweavb c Yqbi c qvR b nBe|

A ek The Constitution (24
th
Amendment) Act, 1971, Gi gvag 13
A byQ` ( 4) Dc - A byQ` Ges 368 A byQ` i mwnZ ( 1) Dc -
A byQ` mshy K i Z t Golak Nath gvK v gvi i vq wbeZ b (supersession)
K i vnq|

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru V.State of Kerala AIR 1973
SC 1461 gvK v gvq wePvi K MYi 7- 6 Mwi Z vq hw` I Dc i v
msweavb msk vabxea Nvl YvK i vnq Ges Golak Nath gvK v gvi i vq
A wZ w` (over-rule) K i v nq wK myc xg K vUConstitution (25
th
Amendment )
Act, 1971, A ea Nvl Yv K wi qv 31 wm A byQ` i wZ xq A sk K evwZ j
K i | K vi Y D msk vabx gvi d r A v` vj Z i ePvwi K c yYweePbv
(judicial review) Gi gZ v hvnv msweavbi GK wU Basic structure Z vnv ni Y
K i vnBqvwQj |

D gvK v gvq f vi Z xq myc xg K vUwb` k ` vb K i h
msweavbi basic structure ev fundamental feature ewZ i K Parliament 368
A byQ` i A vI Z vq A b h K vb weavb msk vab K wi Z c vi wVK B
wK Z vnv Ggbf ve K wi Z nBe hvnvZ g~j msweavbi c wi Pq
(identity) zbbvnq|

Golak Nath gvK v gvq mK j gwj K A waK vi msweavbi basic
structure Nvl Yv K wi qv Z vnvi K vbUvB msk vabhvM bn ej v
nBqvwQj wK Kesavananda gvK v gvq H i c evc K Nvl Yv c wi nvi
205
K wi qv c wZ wU gvK v gvq D vwc Z wel qwU basic structure Gi A vI Z vq
A vm wK bv Z vnv weePbv K wi evi gZ v msi Y K i | hgb gwj K
A waK vi A MZ mw i A waK vi Golak Nath gvK gvq basic structure
wnmve MY K i v nq wK Kesavananda gvK gvq Z vnv K i v nq bvB,
ei , mw i A waK vi ms v wel q mvsweavwbK msk vabx A vwbevi
gZ vi ^xK wZ c ` vb K i vnq|

Kesavananda Bharati V. State of Kerala etc AIR 1973 SC 1461 gvK v gvq
msweavbi 368 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msweavb msk vab mK c avb
wePvi c wZ S.M. Sikri ej b ( c v- 153 4) t
291. What is the necessary implication from all the provision of the
Constitution?
292. It seems to me that reading the Preamble , the fundamental
importance of the freedom of the individual, indeed its inalienability, and the
importance of the econmic, social and political justice mentioned in the
Preamble , the importance of directive principles, the non-inclusion in Article
368 of provisions like Arts. 52, 53 and various other provisions to which
reference has already been made an irresistible conclusion emerges that it was
not the intention to use the word amendment in the widest sense.
293. It was the common understanding that fundamental rights would
remain in substance as they are and they would not be amended out of existence.
It seems also to have been a common understanding that the fundamental
features of the Constitution, namely, secularism, democracy and the freedom of
the individual would always subsist in the welfare state.
294. In view of the above reasons, a necessary implication arises that
there are implied limitations on the power of Parliament that the expression
amendment of this Constitution has consequently a limited meaning in our
Constitution and not the meaning suggested by the respondents.
295. This conclusion is reinforced if I consider the consequences of the
contentions of both sides. The respondents, who appeal fervently to democratic
principles, urge that there is no limit to the powers of Parliament to amend the
Constitution. Article 368 can itself be amended to make the Constitution
completely flexible or extremely rigid and unamendable. If this is so, a political
party with a two-third majority in Parliament for a few years could so amend the
Constitution as to debar any other party from functioning, establish
totalitarianism, enslave the people, and after having effected these purpose make
the Constitution unamedable or extremely rigid. This would no doubt invite
206
extra-constitutional revolution. Thereafter, the appeal by the respondents to
democratic principles and the necessity of having absolute amending power to
prevent a revolution to buttress their contention is rather fruitless, because if
their contention is accepted the very democratic principles, which they appeal
to, would disappear and a revolution would also become a possibility.
..................................................................................................................
297. For the aforesaid reasons, I am driven to the conclusion that the
expression amendment of this Constitution in Art. 368 means any addition or
change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of
the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble
and the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights, it would mean that
while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgments of
fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest.
.....................................................................................................................
.......
299. If this meaning is given it would enable Parliament to adjust
fundamental rights in order to secure what the Directive Principles direct to be
accomplished, while maintaining the freedom and dignity of every citizen.
( A avi L vc ` )
msweavbi basic structure m^ Sikri C.J. ej b ( c v- 153 5) t
302. The learned Attorney General said that every provision of the
Constitution is essential; other wise it would not have been put in the
Constitution. This is true. But this does not place every provision of the
Constitution in the same position. The true position is that every provision of the
Constitution can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and
structure of the constitution remains the same. The basic structure may be said to
consist of the following features:
(1) Supremacy of the Constitution;
(2) Republican and Democratic forms of Government;
(3) Secular character of the Constitution;
(4) Separation of powers between the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary;
(5) Federal character of the Constitution.
303. The above structure is built on the basic foundation, i.e., the dignity
and freedom of the individual. This is of supreme importance. This cannot by
any form of amendment be destroyed.
304. The above foundation and the above basic features are easily
discernible not only from the preamble but the whole scheme of the
Constitution, which I have already discussed.
( A avi L vc ` )
207
368 A byQ` I Bnvi Proviso evL v K wi Z wMqv Sikri,C.J. ej b
( c v- 1552) t
408....................The meaning of the expression Amendment of the
Constitution does not change when one reads the proviso. If the meaning is the
same, Article 368 can only be amended so as not to change its identity
completely. Parliament, for instance, could not make the Constitution
uncontrolled by changing the prescribed two thirds majority to simple majority.
Similarly it cannot get rid of the true meaning of the expression Amendment of
the Constitution so as to derive power to abrogate fundamental
rights.( A avi L vc ` )

Dc msnvi Sikri,C.J. ej b ( c v1565) t
492. To summarise, I hold that :
(a)..........................
(b)............................
(c) The expression amendment of this Constitution does not
enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights or
to completely change the fundamental features of the
Constitution so as to destroy its identity. Within these limits
Parliament can amend every article.
(d)..............................................
.....................................
( A avi L vc ` )

368 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msweavb msk vab I basic structure
m^ wePvi c wZ J.M. Shelat I A.N. Grover ej b( c v- 1603) t
599. The basic structure of the Constitution is not a vague concept and
the apprehensions expressed on behalf of the respondents that neither the citizen
nor the Parliament would be able to understand it are unfounded. If the historical
background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, the relevant
provisions thereof including Article 368 are kept in mind there can be no
difficulty in discerning that the following can be regarded as the basic elements
of the constitutional structure. ( These cannot be catalogued but can only be
illustrated).
1. The supremacy of the Constitution.
2. Republican and Democratic form of Government and
sovereignty of the country.
3. Secular and federal character of the Constitution.
208
4. Demarcation of power between the legislature, the executive
and the judiciary.
5. The dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms
and basic rights in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare
State contained in Part IV.
6. The unity and the integrity of the nation.
600. The entire discussion from the point of view of the meaning of the
expression amendment as employed in Article 368 and the limitations which
arise by implications leads to the result that amending power under Art. 368 is
neither narrow nor unlimited. On the footing on which we have proceeded the
validity of the 24
th
Amendment can be sustained if Article 368, as it originally
stood and after the amendment, is read in the way we have read it. The insertion
of Articles 13(4) and 368(3) and the other amendments made will not affect the
result, namely, that the power in Article 368 is wide enough to permit
amendment of each and every Article of the Constitution by way of addition,
variation or repeal so long as its basic elements are not abrogated or denuded of
their identity. ( A avi L vc ` )


msweavb msk vabi D k I Bnvi mxgv m^ we
wePvi c wZ K.S. Hegde I A.K. Mukherjea ej b ( c v- 1628 - 1629) t
681. There is a further fallacy in the contention that whenever
Constitution is amended, we should presume that the amendment in question
was made in order to adopt the Constitution to respond to the growing needs of
the people. We have earlier seen that by using the amending power, it is
theoretically possible for Parliament to extend its own life indefinitely and also,
amend the Constitution in such a manner as to make it either legally or
practically unamendable ever afterwards. A power which is capable of being
used against the people themselves cannot be considered as a power exercised
on behalf of the people or in their interest.
682. On a careful consideration of the various aspects of the case, we are
convinced that the Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic
elements or Fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of
India, the democratic character of our policy, the unity of the country, the
essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens.
.....................................................................................................................
....
683. In the result we uphold the contention of Mr. Palkhivala that the
word amendment in Article 368 carries with it certain limitation and further,
209
that the power conferred under Article 368 is subject to certain implied
limitations though that power is quite large. ( A avi L vc ` )
Dc msnvi we wePvi c wZ q ej b ( c v- 1648 ) t
759. In the result we hold :
(1) ...........................
..............................
(3) Though the power to amend this Constitution under Article 386 is a
very wide power, it does not yet include this power to destroy or
emasculate the basic elements or the fundamental features of the
Constitution.
.......................................
.......................................
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavbi msk vabxi mxgv evL v K wi qv wePvi c wZ P.Jaganmohan
Reddy Z vnvi i vqi Dc msnvi ej b ( c v- 1776) t
1222. I now state my conclusions which are as follows:
(1) .............................
(2) Twenty-fourth Amendment: The word amendment in
Art 368 does not include repeal. Parliament could amend
Art. 368 and Art. 13 and also all the fundamental rights
and though the power of amendment is wide, it is not
wide enough to totally abrogate or emasculate or damage
any of the fundamental rights or the essential elements in
the basic structure of the Constitution or of destroying the
identity of the Constitution. Within these limits,
Parliament can amend every article of the Constitution.
Parliament cannot under Art. 368 expand its power of
amendment so as to confer on itself the power to repeal,
abrogate the Constitution or damage emasculate or
destroy any of the fundamental rights or essential
elements of the basic structure of the Constitution or of
destroying the identity of the Constitution and on the
Constitution placed by me, the Twenty-fourth
Amendment is valid, for it has not changed the nature and
scope of the amending power as it existed before the
Amendment.
.................................
.................................
( A avi L vc ` )
210

368 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msweavb msk vab I Bnvi evw
j BqvA vj vPbvK vj wePvi c wZ H.R. Khanna ej b ( c v- 18 59) t
1437. We may now deal with the question as to what is the scope of the
power of amendment under Article 368. This would depend upon the
connotation of the word amendment. Question has been posed during
arguments as to whether the power to amend under the above article includes the
power to completely abrogate the constitution and replace it by an entirely new
constitution. The answer to the above question, in my opinion, should be in the
negative. I am further of the opinion that amendment of the constitution
necessarily contemplates that the constitution has not to be abrogated but only
changes have to be made in it. The word amendment postulates that the old
constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and
continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of the
amendment , the old constitution cannot be destroyed and done away with; it is
retained though in the amended form. What then is meant by the retention of the
old constitution? It means the retention of the basic structure or framework of
the old constitution. A mere retention of some provisions of the old constitution
even though the basic structure or framework of the constitution has been
destroyed would not amount to the retention of the old constitutions. Although
it is permissible under the power of amendment to effect changes, howsoever
important, and to adapt the system to the requirements of changing conditions, it
is not permissible to touch the foundation or to alter the basic institutional
pattern. The words amendment of the constitution with all their wide sweep
and amplitude cannot have the effect of destroying or abrogating the basic
structure or framework of the constitution. It would not be competent under the
grab of amendment , for instance, to change the democratic government into
dictatorship or hereditary monarchy nor would it be permissible to abolish the
Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The secular character of the state according to
which the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of
religion only cannot likewise be done away with. Provision regarding the
amendment of the constitution does not furnish a pretence for subverting the
structure of the constitution nor can Article 368 be so construed as to embody
the death wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be
called its lawful harakiri. Such subversion or destruction cannot be described to
be amendment of the Constitution as contemplated by Article 368.
1438. The words amendment of this Constitution and the Constitution
shall stand amended in Article 368 show that what is amended is the existing
Constitution and what emerges as a result of amendment is not a new and
different Constitution but the existing Constitution though in an amended form.
211
The language of Article 368 thus lends support to the conclusion that one cannot
while acting under that article, repeal the existing Constitution and replace it by
a new Constitution.

1439. The connotation of the brought out clearly by Pt. Nehru in the
course of his speech in support of the First Amendment wherein he said that a
Constitution which is responsive to the peoples will, which is responsive to
their ideas , in that it can be varied here and there, they will respect it all the
more and they will not fight against, when we want to change it. It is, therefore,
plain that what Pt. Nehru contemplated by amendment was the varying of the
Constitution here and there and not the elimination of its basic structure for
that would necessarily result in the Constitution losing its identity.
...............................................
1445. Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the
Constitution, I have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would
include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles
including those relating to fundamental rights. During the course of years after
the constitution comes into force, difficulties can be experienced in the working
of the constitution. It is to overcome those difficulties that the constitution is
amended. The amendment can take different forms. It may some times be
necessary to repeal a particular provision of the constitution without substituting
another provision in its place. It may in respect of a different article become
necessary to replace it by a new provision. Necessity may also be felt in respect
of a third article to add some further clauses in it. The addition of the new
clauses can be either after repealing some of the earlier clauses or by adding new
clauses without repealing any of the existing clauses. Experience of the working
of the constitution may also make it necessary to insert some new and additional
articles in the constitution. Likewise, experience might reveal the necessity of
deleting some existing articles. All these measures, in my opinion, would lie
within the ambit of the power of amendment. The denial of such a broad and
comprehensive power would introduce a rigidity in the constitution as might
break the constitution. Such a rigidity is open to serious objection in the same
way as an unamendable constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )
Dc msnvi wZ wb ej b ( c v- 1903) t
1550. I may now sum up my conclusions relating to power of
amendment under Art. 368 of the Constitution...........
(i).......................
.......................
........................
212
(iv) Provision for amendment of the Constitution is made with a view to
overcome the difficulties which may be encountered in future in the
working of the Constitution. No generation has a monopoly of wisdom
nor has it a right to place fetters on future generations to mould the
machinery of governments. If no provision were made for amendment of
the Constitution, the people would have recourse to extra-constitutional
method like revolution to change the Constitution.
.................................
..................................
(vii) The power of amendment under Art. 368 does not include the
power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it include the power to alter
the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Subject to the
retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, the
power of amendment is plenary and includes within itself the power to
amend the various articles of the Constitution, including those relating to
fundamental rights as well as those which may be said to relate to
essential features. No part of a fundamental right can claim immunity
from amendatory process by being described as the essence or core of
that right. The power of amendment would also include within itself the
power to add, alter or repeal the various articles.
....................................
.......................................
(x) Apart from the part of the Preamble which relates to the basic
structure or framework of the Constitution, the Preamble does not restrict
the power of amendment.
..........................
.......................... ( A avi L vc ` )

Kesavananda Bharati gvK v gvq msweavb c Yqb MYc wi l ` i
gZ v Ges c YxZ msweavbi A vI Z vq c ` Parliament Gi msweavb
msk vabxi gZ vi ga c v_ K wbYq K i v nBqvQ| MYc wi l ` b~Z b
GK wU msweavb i Pbv K wi Z c vwi j I Parliament Gi mBi c K vb
gZ v bvB| Parliament msweavbi A vI Z vq _ vwK qv msweavb msk vab
K wi Z c vi eU wK mvavi Yf ve msweavbi K vb basic structure
c wi eZ b ev msk vab K wi Z c vi bv| Z vnvQvo v, 368 A byQ` I
A c Z mxgveZ vi wnqvQ|

213
Kesavananda Bharati Gi gvK v gvi ratio decidendi ev wmv i
nZ zSmt. Indira Nehru Gandhi V. Shri Raj Narayan AIR 1975 SC 2299 gvK v gvq
msL vMwi ( 3- 2) wePvi c wZ MYi i vq MnxZ nq| The Constitution
(Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, gvi d r 329- G A byQ` msweavb
mshy K i v nq| Dc i v gvK v gvq 329- G A byQ` i 4 I 5
` d vi eaZ v D vc b K i v nq| 329- G A byQ` c avbg x I xK vi
Gi wbevPb ms v | 4 ` d v vi v c avbg xi wbevPbi eaZ v K vb
A v` vj Z D vc b K i v nBZ gy i vL v c m, myyI wbi c wbevPb
Ges A vBbi k vmbK basic structure w i K i Z t msL vMwi
wePvi c wZ MYi A wf gZ i mwnZ GK gZ nBqv wePvi c wZ H.R. Khanna
ej b ( c v- 2351) t
....................................................................................
......................................................................................
210.................................. The question to be decided is that if the
impugned amendment of the Constitution violates a principle which is part of
the basic structure of the Constitution, can it enjoy immunity from an attack on
its validity because of the fact that for the future, the basic structure of the
Constitution remains unaffected. The answer to the above question, in my
opinion, should be in the negative. What has to be seen in such a matter is
whether the amendment contravenes or runs counter to an imperative rule or
postulate which is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution. If
so, it would be an impermissible amendment and it would make no difference
whether it relates to one case or a large number of cases........................................
What is prohibited cannot become permissible because of its being confined to
one matter.
wePvi c wZ Khanna 329A A byQ` i 4` d v evwZ j K wi Z wMqv
ej b ( c v- 2355) t
213. As a result of the above. I strike down clause (4) of Article 329A
on the ground that it violates the principle of free and fair elections which is an
essential postulate of democracy and which in its turn is a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution.....................

msweavbi evL v c ` vb myc xg K vUi f ~wgK v Ges msweavbi
k Z mK wePvi c wZ M.H. Beg ej b ( c v- 2394- 95) t
214
394. Citizens of our country take considerable pride in being able to
challenge before superior Courts even an exercise of constituent power, resting
on the combined strength and authority of Parliament and the State legislatures.
This Court when properly called upon by the humblest citizen, in a proceeding
before it, to test the Constitutional validity of either an ordinary statute or of
Constitutional amendment, has to do so by applying the criteria of basic
constitutional purpose and constitutionally prescribed procedure. The
assumption underlying the theory of judicial review of all law making, including
fundamental law making is that Courts, acting as interpreters of what has been
described by some political philosophers (See. Bosanquts Philosophical
Theory of the State Chap. V. p. 96-115) as the Real Will of the people,
embodied in their Constitution and assumed to be more lasting and just and
rational and less liable to err than their General Will reflected by the opinions
of the majorities in Parliament and the State Legislatures for the time being, can
discover for the people the not always easily perceived purposed of their
Constitution. The Courts thus act as agents and mouthpieces of the Real Will
of the people themselves. ........................ Neither of the three constitutionally
separate organs of State can, according to the basic scheme of our Constitution
today, leap out side the boundaries of its own constitutionally assigned sphere or
orbit of authority into that of the other. This is the logical and natural meaning of
the principle of Supremacy of the Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

Basic structure evL v K wi Z wMqv wePvi c wZ Y.V. Chandrachud ej b
( c v- 2465) t
665. I consider it beyond the pale of reasonable controversy that if there
be any unamendable features of the Constitution on the score that they form a
part of the basic structure of the Constitution, they are that : (i) India is a
Sovereign Democratic Republic; (ii) Equality of status and opportunity shall be
secured to all its citizens; (iii) The State shall have no religion of its own and all
persons shall be equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion and that (iv) the Nation shall be
governed by a Government of laws, not of men. These, in my opinion, are the
pillars of our constitutional philosophy, the pillars, therefore, of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )
339- G ( 4) A byQ` mK wZ wb g e K i b ( c v- 2469) t
679.............. The plain intendment and meaning of clause (4) is that the
election of the two personages will be beyond the reach of any law, past or
present. What follows is a neat logical corollary. The election of the Prime
Minister could not be declared void as there was no law to apply to that election;
215
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court declaring the election void is itself
void; and the election continues to be valid as it was before the High Court
pronounced its judgment.
.....................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................
682. It follows that clause (4) and (5) of Article 329-A are arbitrary and
are calculated to damage or destroy the Rule of Law.

msweavbi basic structure evL v K wi qv wePvi c wZ Y.V. Chandrachud
ej b ( c v- 2465) t
664. ................. For determining whether a particular feature of the
Constitution is a part of its basic structure, one has perforce to examine in each
individual case the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our
Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the
integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument of countrys
governance..........................
.....................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................
692. .................Ordinary laws have to answer two tests for their validity:
(1) The law must be within the legislative competence of the legislature as
defined and specified in Chapter 1, Part X1 of the Constitution and (2) it must
not offend against the provisions of Article 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution.
Basic structure, by the majority judgment, is not a part the fundamental rights
nor indeed a provision of the Constitution. The theory of basic structure is
woven out of the conspectus of the Constitution and the amending power is
subjected to it because it is a constituent power. The power to amend the
fundamental instrument cannot carry with it the power to destroy its essential
features- this, in brief, is the arch of the theory of basic structure. It is wholly
out of place in matters relating to the validity of ordinary laws made under the
Constitution. ( c v- 2472)
( A avi L vc ` )
Minerva Mills Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789,gvK v gvq
Constitution (42
nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 Gi 4 I 5 avi vi mvsweavwbK
eaZ vD vwc Z nq| D msk vabxvi vmsweavbi 368 A byQ` 4
I 5 ` d v mshy K i v nq| D weavb vi v A v` vj Z i ePvwi K
c ybtweePbvevJudicial review Gi gZ vi wnZ K wi evi c qvm c vI qvnq
216
weavq f vi Z i myc xg K vU4- 1 msL vMwi Z vq D msk vabx evwZ j
K i |

msL vMwi wePvi c wZ MYi c c avb wePvi c wZ Y.V.
Chandrachud msweavbi c vebv Ges 368 A byQ` i evw A vj vPbv
c m ej b ( c v- 1798 ) t
21, In the context of the constitutional history of Article 368, the true
object of the declaration contained in Article 368 is the removal of those
limitations. Clause (5) confers upon the Parliament a vast and undefined power
to amend the Constitution, even so as to distort it out of recognition. The theme
song of the majority decision in Kesavananda Bharati is:
Amend as you may even the solemn document which the founding
fathers have committed to your care, for you know best the needs of your
generation. But, the Constitution is precious heritage; therefore, you cannot
destroy its identity.
The majority conceded to the Parliament the right to make alterations in
the Constitution so long as they are within its basic framework. And what fears
can that judgment raise or misgivings generate if it only means this and no more.
The Preamble assures to the people of India a polity whose basic structure is
described therein as a Sovereign Democratic Republic; Parliament may make
any amendments to the Constitution as it deems expedient so long as they do not
damage or destroy Indias sovereignty and its democratic, republican character.
Democracy is not an empty dream. It is a meaningful concept whose essential
attributes are recited in the preamble itself: Justice, social, economic and
political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; and Equality
of status and opportunity. Its aim, again as set out in the preamble, is to promote
among the people an abiding sense of Fraternity assuring the dignity of the
individual and the unity of the Nation. The newly introduced clause (5) of
Article 368 demolishes the very pillars on which the preamble rests by
empowering the Parliament to exercise its constituent power without any
limitation whatever. No constituent power can conceivably go higher than the
sky high power conferred by cl. (5), for it even empowers the Parliament to
repeal the provisions of this Constitution, that is to say, to abrogate the
democracy and substitute for it a totally antithetical form of Government. That
can most effectively be achieved, without calling a democracy by any other
name, by a total denial of social, economic and political justice to the people, by
emasculating liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship and by
abjuring commitment to the magnificent ideal of a society of equals. The power
to destroy is not a power to amend.
217
( A avi L vc ` )
368 A byQ` i mxgveZ vmK wZ wb ej bt
22. Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on
the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power
enlarge that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending
power is one of the basic features of our Constitution and therefore, the
limitations on that power cannot be destroyed. In other words, Parliament
cannot, under Article 368, expand its amending power so as to acquire for itself
the right to repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and
essential features. The donee of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that
power convert the limited power into an unlimited one. (A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vab gvi d r 368 A byQ` i mwnZ mshy 4 I 5
` d vi gvag A v` vj Z i judicial review Gi gZ v i ` - i wnZ c m
Chandrachud, C.J. ej b ( c v- 1799) t
26. The newly introduced Clause (4) of Art. 368 must suffer the same
fate as Clause (5) because the two clauses are inter-linked. Clause (5) purports to
remove all limitations on the amending power while Clause (4) deprives the
courts of, their power to call in question any amendment of the Constitution.
Our Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power among the three wings
of the State, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is the
function of the Judges, nay their duty, to pronounce upon the validity of laws. If
courts are totally deprived of that power the fundamental rights conferred upon
the people will become a mere adornment because rights without remedies are
as writ in water. A controlled Constitution will then become uncontrolled.
Clause (4) of Article 368 totally deprives the citizens of one of the most valuable
modes of redress which is guaranteed by Art. 32. The conferment of the right to
destroy the identity of the Constitution coupled with the provision that no court
of law shall pronounce upon the validity of such destruction seems to us a
transparent case of transgression of the limitations on the amending
power.( A avi L vc ` )
Z wK Z msk vabi c f ve mK Chandrachud, C.J. ej b ( c v-
18 07) t
63..................On any reasonable interpretation, there can be no doubt
that by the amendment introduced by Section 4 of the 42
nd
Amendment, Articles
14 and 19 stand abrogated at least in regard to the category of laws described in
Article 31.C. The startling consequence which the amendment has produced is
that even if a law is in total defiance of the mandate of Article 13 read with
218
Articles 14 and 19, its validity will not be open to question so long as its object
is to secure directive principle of State Policy....................................

Waman Rao V. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 271 gvK v gvq f vi Z xq
msweavbi 31A, 31B I 31C A byQ` wj ea Nvl Yv K wi Z hvBqv
myc xg K vUKesavananda Bharati I Indira Gandhi gvK v gvq c ` i vqi
g~j vqb K i | c avb wePvi c wZ Y.V. Chandrachud wbi c g e K i b t
16. The judgment of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati (AIR 1973 SC
1461) provoked in its wake a multi-storied controversy, which is quite
understandable. The judgment of the majority to which seven out of the thirteen
Judges were parties, struck a bridle path by holding that in the exercise of the
power conferred by Article 368, the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution
so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The seven
learned Judges chose their words and phrases to express their conclusion as
effectively and eloquently as language can do. But, at this distance of time any
controversy over what was meant by what they said is plainly sterile. At this
distance of time, because though not more than a little less than eight years
have gone by since the decision in Kesavananda Bharati was rendered those few
years are packed with constitutional events of great magnitude. Applying the
ratio of the majority judgments in that epoch-making decision, this Court has
since struck down constitutional amendments which would otherwise have
passed muster. For example, in Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 SCR
347: (AIR 1975 SC 2299), Article 329A (4) was held by the Court to be beyond
the amending competence of the Parliament since, by making separate and
special provisions as to elections to Parliament of the Prime Minister and the
Speaker, it destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. Ray C.J. based his
decision on the ground that the 39
th
Amendment by which Art. 329A was
introduced violated the Rule of Law (p.418); Khanna J. based his decision on
the ground that democracy was a basic feature of the Constitution, that
democracy contemplates that elections should be free and fair and that the
clause in question struck at the basis of free and fair elections (pp. 467 and 471);
Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that was in nature of legislation
ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the
Constitution (p. 515); while on of us, Chandrachud J., held that the clause was
bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the
principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp.663-665).
More recently, in Minerva Mills (AIR 1980 SC 1789), clauses (4) and (5) of
Article 368 itself were held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court, on the
ground that they destroyed certain basic features of the Constitution like judicial
219
review and a limited amending power, and thereby damaged its basic structure.
The majority also stuck down the amendment introduced to Article 31C by
Section 4 of the 42
nd
Amendment Act, 1976.
17..................The law on the subject of the Parliaments power to amend
the Constitution must now be taken as well-settled, the true position being that
though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every article of the
Constitution including the provisions of Part III, the amending power cannot be
exercised so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is
by the application of this principle that we shall have to decide upon the validity
of the Amendment by which Article 31A was introduced. The precise question
then for consideration is whether Section 4 of the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution
damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution.
18. In the work-a-day civil law, it is said that the measure of the
permissibility of an amendment of a pleading is how far it is consistent with the
original: you cannot by an amendment transform the original into the opposite of
what it is. For that purpose, a comparison is undertaken to match the amendment
with the original. Such a comparison can yield fruitful results even in the
rarefied sphere of constitutional law. What were the basic postulates of the
Indian Constitution when it was enacted? And does the 1
st
Amendment do
violence to those postulates? Can the Constitution as originally conceived and
the amendment introduced by the 1
st
Amendment Act not endure in harmony or
are they so incongruous that to seek to harmonies them will be like trying to fit a
square peg into a round aperture? Is the concept underlying Section 4 of the 1
st

Amendment an alien in the house of democracy?its invader and destroyer?
Does it damage or destroy the republican framework of the Constitution as
originally. devised and designed ?

Kesavananda Bharati, Indira Gandhi, Minerva Mills I Waman Rao
gvK v gv wj i i vq nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h Parliament Gi A hw K
gZ vew basic structure Z Z i mwnZ mvsNwl K nBZ c vi K vi Y H i c
gZ vewi mwnZ g~j msweavbi c K wZ I c wi eZ b nBZ c vi |

P. Sambamurthy V. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1987 SC 663 gvK v gvq
371- wW A byQ` i ( 5) ` d vi mvsweavwbK eaZ v D vc b K i v nq|
D mvsweavwbK msk vab i vR mi K vi K c k vmwbK UvBeybvj i i vq
c wi eZ b ev i ` K wi evi gZ v c ` vb K i | myc xg K vUD
220
mvsweavwbK msk vab A ea Nvl Yv K i | c avb wePvi c wZ P.N.
Bhagwati ej b ( c v- 667) t
4.......... It is a basic principle of the rule of law that the exercise of
power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by
the Constitution but must also be in accordance with law and the power of
judicial review is conferred by the Constitution with a view to ensuring that the
law is observed and there is compliance with the requirement of law on the part
of the executive and other authorities. It is through the power of judicial review
conferred on an independent institutional authority such as the High Court that
the rule of law is maintained and every organ of the State is kept within the
limits of the law. Now if the exercise of the power of judicial review can be set
at naught by the State Government by overriding the decision given against it, it
would sound the death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would cease to
have any meaning, because then it would be opon to the State Government to
defy the law and yet to get away with it. The Proviso to Cl. (5) of Art. 371D is
therefore clearly violative of the basic structure doctrine. ( A avi L v
c ` )

GBevi A vgi v Anwar Hossain Chowdhury V. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl.)
1 gvK gvwU A vj vPbv K wi e| GB gvK gvq msweavb ( A g
msk vab) A vBb, 198 8 , Gi mvsweavwbK eaZ vD vc b K i vnq|

evsj v` k mbvevwnbxi Chief of Staff Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad
NDC, PSC, 198 2 mvj i 24k gvPZ vwi L wZ xqevi i gZ evsj v` k
mvgwi K k vmb R vi x K i b| wZ wb c avb mvgwi K c k vmK wnmve
evsj v` k mi K vi i megq gZ v ` L j K i b| wZ wb Proclamation
R vi xi gvag i vi mevP A vBb msweavbi K vh g wMZ K i b
Ges Martial Law Proclamations, Orders I Regulation vi v ` k c wi Pvj bv
A vi K i b| 198 2 mvj i Martial Law Order No. 11 vi v wZ wb XvK vmn
` k i wewf b vb nvBK vUwef vMi vqx e vc b K i b| 198 6
mvj i 10B bf ^i Z vwi L GK Proclamation gvi d r mvgwi K k vmb
c Z vnvi K i v nq Ges msweavb c y bi vi nq| 198 8 mvj i 9B R yb
Z vwi L msweavb ( A g msk vab) A vBb, 198 8 , msm` wewae nq|
D A vBb vi v msweavbi 100 A byQ` msk vab K i v nq|
221
msk vwaZ 100 A byQ` gvi d r XvK v gnvbMi mn ` k i wewf b
R j vq nvBK vUwef vMi 6( Qq) wU vqxe vc b K i vnq|

Anwer Hossain Chowdhury V. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl.) gvK v gvq
msweavbi 100 A byQ` msk vabi eaZ v GB K vi Y D vc b K i v
nq h Z wK Z msk vab msweavbi 142 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msm` i
msk vab gZ vewnf ~Z Ges D msk vabvi v msweavbi GK wU basic
structure asm K i vnBqvQ|

nvBK vUwef vM i xU&gvK v gvwU msw A v` k vi v L vwi R
K i | A vc xj bvbx A A vc xj wef vM msweavbi Z wK Z msk vabwU
3- 1 msL vMwi Z vq A ea Nvl YvK i |

msweavbi 142 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msm` i msweavb
msk vabi gZ v c m wePvi c wZ Badrul Haider Chowdhury ( as his
Lordship then was) ej b BLD (Spl.) (c v- 8 8 ) t
165. The Attorney General argued that the amending power is a
constituent power. It is not a legislative power and therefore the Parliament has
unlimited power to amend the Constitution invoking its constituent power.
166. The argument is untenable. The Attorney General argued this point
keeping an eye on Article 368 of the Constitution of India which says that
Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend etc. which was
inserted by amendment following certain observations in the Golak Nath case.
The amendment therefore recognised the distinction between an ordinary law
and a constitutional amendment. It will not be proper to express any opinion as
to the merit of any constitutional amendment made in Constitution of another
country. It will be enough that our Constitution does not make such distinction.
Secondly, our Constitution is not only a controlled one but the limitation on
legislative capacity of the Parliament is enshrined in such a way that a removal
of any plank will bring down the structure itself. For this reason, the Preamble,
Article 8, had been made unamendable- it has to be referred to the people! At
once Article 7 stares on the face to say. All power in the Republic belongs to
people, and more, their exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only
under, and by the authority, of this Constitution To dispel any doubt it says:
This Constitution is as the solemn expression of the will of the people You talk
of law?- it says: it is the Supreme law of the Republic and any other law
inconsistent with this Constitution will be void. The Preamble says it is our
222
sacred duty to safeguard, protect, and defend this Constitution and to maintain
its supremacy as the embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh. The
constituent power is here with the people of Bangladesh and Article 142(1A)
expressly recognises this fact. If Article 26 and Article 7 are read together the
position will be clear. The exclusiduary provision of the kind incorporate in
Article 26 by amendment has not been incorporated in Article7. That shows that
law in Article 7 is conclusively intended to include an amending law. An
amending law becomes part of the Constitution but an amending law cannot be
valid if it is inconsistent with the Constitution. The contention of the Attorney
General on the non-obstante clause in Article 142 is bereft of any substance
because that clause merely confers enabling power for amendment but by
interpretative decision that clause cannot be given the status for swallowing up
the constitutional fabric. It may be noticed that unlike 1956 Constitution or Sree
Lanka Constitution there is no provision in our Constitution for replacing the
Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )

msweavbi k Z I amendment k i A _ evL v K wi qv
wePvi c wZ Chowdhury ej b ( c v- 96) t
195.It must control all including amending legislation. The laws
amending the Constitution are lower than the Constitution and higher than the
ordinary laws. That is why legislative process is different and the required
majority for passing the legislation is also different (compare Article 80(4) and
Article 142(1)(ii). What the people accepted is the Constitution which is
baptised by the blood of the martyrs. That Constitution promises economic and
social justice in a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human right
and freedom, equality and justice is assured and declares that as the
fundamental aim of the State. Call it by any a name-basic feature or whatever,
but that is the fabric of the Constitution which can not be dismantled by an
authority created by the Constitution itself-namely , the Parliament. Necessarily,
the amendment passed by the Parliament is to be tested as against Article 7.
Because the amending power is but a power given by the Constitution to
Parliament, it is a higher power than any other given by the Constitution to
Parliament , but nevertheless it is a power within and not outside the
Constitution.
196. The argument of the learned Attorney General that the power of
amendment as given in Article 142 Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Constitution is therefore wide and unlimited. True it is wide but when it is
claimed unlimited power what does it signify? to abrogate? or by amending it
can the republican character be destroyed to bring monarchy instead ? The
Constitutional power is not limitless-it connotes a power which is a constituent
223
power. The higher the obligation the greater is the responsibility- that is why the
special procedure (long title) and special majority is required. Article 7(2) says
if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall to the
extent of the inconsistency be void. The appellants have contended that the
integral part of the Supreme Court is the High Court Division. By amendment
this Division has been dismantled into seven courts or regional courts. Before
we proceed further, let us understand what is meant by amendment. The word
has latin orgin emendere- to amend means to correct. ( A avi L vc ` )

wePvi c wZ Chowdhury msweavb msk vab evL v K wi Z hvBqv
Walter F. Murphy wj wL Z Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy M
nBZ wbwj wL Z A sk DZ K i b ( c v- 96) t
196........Thus an amendment corrects errors of commission or
omission, modifies the system without fundamentally changing its nature-that is
an amendment operates within the theoritical parameters of the existing
Constitution. But a proposal that would attempt to transform a central aspect of
the nature of the compact and create some other kind of system-that to take an
extreme example, tried to change a constitutional democracy into a totalitarian
state-would not be an amendment at all, but re-creation, a re-forming , not
merely of the covenant but also of the people themselves. That deed would lie
beyond the scope of the authority of any governmental body or set of bodies, for
they are all creatures of the Constitution and the peoples agreement. In so far as
they destroy their own legitimacy. ( A avi L vc ` )

msweavbi 100 A byQ` i Z wK Z msk vabwU evwZ j (ultra vires)
Nvl Yv K wi Z hvBqv wZ wb ej b h Z wK Z msk vabwU msweavbi 7
A byQ` mn A bvb weavbi mwnZ mvsNwl K | msweavbi basic structure
m^ wZ wb ej b ( c v- 111) t
256...........Now if any law is inconsistent with the Constitution (Article
7) it is obviously only the judiciary can make such declaration. Hence the
constitutional scheme if followed carefully reveals that these basic features are
unamendable and unalterable. Unlike some other Constitution, this Constitution
does not contain any provision to repeal and replace the Constitution and
therefore cannot make such exercise under the guise of amending power.
257. The impugned amendment in a subtle manner in the name of
creating permanent Benches has indeed created new courts parallel to the
High Court Division as contemplated in Articles 94, 101, 102. Thus the basic
structural pillar, that is judiciary, has been destroyed and plenary judicial power
224
of the Republic vested in the High Court Division has been taken
away.( A avi L vc ` )
Dc msnvi wZ wb ej b ( c v- 112) t
259. To sum up :(1) The amended Article 100 is ultra vires because it
has destroyed the essential limb of the judiciary namely, of the Supreme Court
of Bangladesh by setting up rival courts to the High Court Division in the name
of permanent Benches conferring full jurisdictions, powers and functions of the
High Court Division.
(2) Amendment Article 100 is ultra vires and invalid because it is
inconsistent with Article 44, 94, 101 and 102 of the Constitution. The
amendment has rendered Articles 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 nugatory. It has
directly violated Article 114.
(3).....................................
....................................
( A avi L vc ` )

wePvi c wZ Shahabuddin Ahmed ( as his Lordship then was) Z vnvi i vq
msweavb ewYZ amendment k wU wbi c f ve evL v K i b ( c v-
141) t
336.....................The word amendment or amend has been used in
different places to mean different things; so it is the context by refering to which
the actual meaning of the word amendment can be ascertained. My conclusion,
therefore, is that the word amendment is a change or alteration, for the
purpose of bringing in improvement in the statute to make it more effective and
meaningful, but it does mean its abrogation or destruction or a change resulting
in the loss of its original identity and character. In the case of amendment of a
constitutional provision amendment should be that which accords with the
intention of the makers of Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )

msk vab ea nBevi k Z Ges msweavbi basic structure m^
wZ wb ej b ( c v- 143) t
341. There is however a substantial difference between Constitution and
its amendment. Before the amendment becomes a part of the Constitution it
shall have to pass through some test, because it is not enacted by the people
through a Constituent Assembly. Test is that the amendment has been made
after strictly complying with the mandatory procedural requirements, that it has
not been brought about by practising any deception or fraud upon statutes and
that it is not so repugnant to the existing provision of the Constitution that its co-
225
existence therewith will render the Constitution unworkable, and that, if the
doctrine of bar to change of basic structures is accepted , the amendment has not
destroyed any basic structure of the Constitution.
(A avi L vc ` )

Z wK Z msk vabwU msweavbi A bvb weavbvej xi mwnZ
weePbvK wi qvwePvi c wZ Ahmed ej b ( c v- 154) t
373. Now considering the impugned Article as a whole along with the
other Articles related thereto. I am to see what is the position that emerges.
Independent of the contentions that basic structure of the Constitution has been
altered and the amendment has transgressed the limit of amending power, I find
that the amended Article is in serious conflict with the other Articles and the
conflict is so uncompromisable that if it is allowed to stand, other Articles stand
amended by implication. Repeal or amendment by necessary implication,
though permissible in ordinary statutes, is not so permissible in a Constitution
like ours because of the mandatory procedural bar...............
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavbi g~j wf w m^ wZ wb ej b ( c v- 155- 56) t
376. Main arguments against the Impugned Amendment are that a basic
structure of the Constitution has been destroyed and its essential features have
been disrupted. There is no dispute that the Constitution stands on certain
fundamental principles which are its structural pillars and if these pillars are
demolished or damaged the whole constitutional edifice will fall down. It is by
construing the constitutional provisions that these pillars are to be identified.
Implied limitation on the amending power is also to be gathered from the
Constitution itself including its Preamble. Felix Frankfurter, in his book Mr.
Justice Holmes said:
Whether the Constitution is treated primarily as a text for interpretation
or as an instrument of government may make all the difference in the world. The
fate of cases, and thereby of legislation, will turn on whether the meaning of the
document is derived from itself or from ones conception of the country, its
development, its needs, its place in a civilized society.
I shall also keep in mind the following observation of Conrad in
Limitation of Amendment Procedure and the Constitutional power- Any
amending body organized within the statutory scheme, however verbally
unlimited its power, cannot by its very structure change the fundamental pillars
supporting its constitutional authority. He has further stated that the amending
body may effect changes in detail, adopt the system to the changing condition
but should not touch its foundation. Similar views have been expressed by
226
Carl J. Friedman in Man and his Govt., Crawford in his Construction of
Statutes and Cooly in his Constitutional Limitation.
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vab c k basic structure Z Z i f ~wgK v m^
wePvi c wZ Ahmed ej b ( c v- 156) t
377. Main objection to the doctrine of basic structure is that it is
uncertain in nature and is based on unfounded fear. But in reality basic structure
of a Constitution are clearly identifiable. Sovereignty belongs to the people and
it is a basic structure of the Constitution. There is no disputed about it, as there is
no dispute that this basic structure cannot be wiped out by amendatory
process.........................................If by exercising the amending power peoples
sovereignty is sought to be curtailed it is the constitutional duty of the Court to
restrain it and in that case it will be improper to accuse the Court of acting as
supper- legislators. Supremacy of the Constitution as the solemn expression of
the will of the people, Democracy, Republican Government , Unitary State,
Separation of power, Independence of the Judiciary, Fundamental Rights are
basic structures of the Constitution. There is no dispute about their identity. By
amending the Constitution the Republic cannot be replaced by Monarchy,
Democracy by Oligarchy or the Judiciary cannot be abolished, although there is
no express bar to the amending power given in the Constitution. Principle of
separation of powers means that the sovereign authority is equally distributed
among the three organs and as such one organ cannot destroy the others. These
are structural pillars of the Constitution and they stand beyond any change by
amendatory process..................................
( A avi L c ` )

msweavb msk vabi mxgv Ges basic structure m^ wePvi c wZ
Ahmed ej b ( c v- 157) t
378............ As to implied limitation on the amending power, it is
inherent in the word amendment in Art. 142 and is also deducible from the
entire scheme of the Constitution. Amendment of the Constitution means change
or alteration for improvement or to make it effective or meaningful and not its
elimination or abrogation. Amendment is subject to the retention of the basic
structures. The Court therefore has power to undo an amendment if it
transgresses its limit and alters a basic structure of the Constitution.
( A avi L vc ` )

Basic structure Z Z i c vc U A vj vPbv K wi Z hvBqv wePvi c wZ
M.H. Rahman (as his Lordship then was) ej b ( c v- 169) t
227
435.The doctrine of basic stricture is one growing point in the
constitutional jurisprudence. It has developed in a climate where the executive,
commanding an overwhelming majority in the legislature, gets snap
amendments of the Constitution passed without a Green Paper or White Paper,
without eliciting any public opinion without sending the Bill to any select
committee and without giving sufficient time to the members of the Parliament
for deliberation on the Bill for amendment.
A vBbi k vmb I msweavbi c vebv m^ wePvi c wZ Rahman
ej b ( c v- 171) t
443. In the case we are concerned with only one basic feature, the rule
of law, marked out as one of the fundamental aims of our society in the
Preamble. The validity of the impugned amendment may be examined, with or
without resorting to the doctrine of basic feature, on the touchstone of the
Preamble itself.


Subesh Sharma V. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 631 GK wU R b ^v_ g~j K
gvK v gv| GB gvK v gvq f vi Z xq myc xg K vUI nvBK vU
wePvi K ` i k ~Yc ` wbqvM c ` vb c v_ bv K i v nq| msweavbi Basic
structure Z Z m^ myc xg K vUej ( c v- 646) t
44. Judicial Review is a part of the basic constitutional structure and
one of the basic features of the essential Indian Constitutional policy. This
essential constitutional doctrine does not by itself justify or necessitate any
primacy to the executive wing on the ground of its political accountability to the
electorate. On the contrary what is necessary is an interpretation sustaining the
strength and vitality of Judicial Review...............
( A vavi L vc ` )

S.R Bommai V. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 gvK v gvq f vi Z i
i vc wZ K Z K msweavbi 356 A byQ` i A vI Z vq Proclamation R vi x
K i Z t i vR mi K vi evwZ j K wi qv i vc wZ i k vmb R vi x vc b c m
myc xg K vUi judicial review Gi gZ v mK wePvi c wZ K. Ramaswamy
ej b ( c v- 2036) t
162............... It owes duty and responsibility to defend the democracy.
If the Court, upon the material placed before it finds that the satisfaction reached
by the Presidents is unconstitutional highly irrational or without any nexus, then
the Court would consider the contents of the proclamation or reasons disclosed
228
therein and in extreme cases the material produced pursuant to discovery order
nisi to find the action is wholly irrelevant or bears no nexus between purpose of
the action and the satisfaction reached by the President or does not bear any
rationale to the proximate purpose of the proclamation. In that event the Court
may declare that the satisfaction reached by the President was either on wholly
irrelevant grounds or colourable exercise of power and consequently
Proclamation issued under Art. 356 would be declared
unconstitutional.................. ( A avi L vc ` )

Dc msnvi wZ wb ej b ( c v- 2047) t
192. This Court as final arbiter in interpreting the Constitution, declares
what the law is. Higher judiciary has been assigned a delicate task to determine
what powers the Constitution has conferred on each branch of the Government
and whether the actions of that branch transgress such limitations, it is the duty
and responsibility of this Court/ High Court to lay down the law. It is the
constitutional duty to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the
constitutional limitations as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. The
judicial review, therefore, extends to examine the constitutionality to the
Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356. It is a delicate task,
though loaded with political over-tones, to be exercised with circumspection and
great care..................
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavbi c vebv I basic structure m^ wePvi c wZ K.
Ramaswamy ej b ( c v- 2045) t
183. The preamble of the Constitution is an integral part of the
Constitution. Democratic form of Government, federal structure, unity and
integrity of the nation, secularism, socialism, social justice and judicial review
are basic feature of the Constitution. ( A avi L vc ` )


msweavbi msk vab gvi d r wK QyTribunal vc b K wi qv nvBK vU
I myc xg K vUi GL &wZ qvi L e K wi evi c qvm j I qv nBj L. Chandra
Kumar V. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1125 gvK v gvq Z wK Z msk vabx wj
D vc b K i v nq| Judicial Review c k nvBK vUI myc xg K vUi
mvsweavwbK A e vb mK c avb wePvi c wZ A.M. Ahmedi ej b ( c v-
1149- 50) t
229
78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional
democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it
was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has,
while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important
safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution
incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were
very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. (#)
These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of
effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial
review........................................ The Judges of the superior Courts have been
entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been
conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance
of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and
the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional
limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered
by those who man the subordinate Courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict
standards of legal correctness and judicial
independence.................................................... We therefore, hold that the power
of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article
226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and
essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure.
Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test
the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
( A avi L vc ` )

State of Rajasthan V. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1361 gvK v gvq
f vi Z xq msweavbi 356 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vi A vI Z vq i vc wZ i
gZ vi evw Ges K vb&c wi w wZ Z myc xg K vUD gZ v c qvM
n c K wi Z c vi Z vnvA vj vPbvK i vnBqvQ|


i vc wZ K Z K mvsweavwbK c ` c MnYi gvK v gv
nBj Z vnv i vR bwZ K c k weavq myc xg K vUi f ~wgK v mK
wePvi c wZ P.N. Bhagwati ej b ( c v- 1412) t
143............... Of course, it is true that if a question brought before the
Court is purely a political question not involving determination of any legal or
constitutional right or obligation, the Court would not entertain it, since the
Court is concerned only with adjudication of legal rights and liabilities. But
merely because a question has a political complexion, that by itself is no ground
230
why the Court should shrink from performing its duty under the Constitution if
it raises an issue of constitutional determination. Every constitutional question
concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no
constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political. A constitution is a
matter of purest politics, a structure of power............
( A avi L vc ` )


i vR bwZ K c k mZ I K vb& n c K i v myc xg K vUi
A vBbMZ evaevaK Z v Z vnv eYbv K wi qv wePvi c wZ P.N. Bhagwati ej b
( c v- 1413) t
143............... It will, therefore, be seen that merely because a question
has a political colour, the Court cannot fold its hands in despair and declare
Judicial hands off. So long as a question arises whether an authority under the
constitution has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it can
certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed it would be its constitutional
obligation to do so. It is necessary to assert in the clearest terms, particularly in
the context of recent history, that the Constitution is Supreme lex, the paramount
law of the land, and there is no department or branch of Government above or
beyond it. Every organ of Government, be it the executive or the legislature or
the judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within
the limits of its authority. No one howsoever highly placed and no authority
howsoever lofty can claim that it shall be the sole judge of the extent of its
power under the Constitution or whether its action is within the confines of such
power laid down by the Constitution. This Court is the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution and to this Court is assigned the delicate task of determining what
is the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and
if so, what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such
limits. It is for this Court to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the
constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the rule of
law........................................
Where there is manifestly unauthorised exercise of power under the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to intervene. Let it not be forgotten, that
to this Court as much as to other branches of Government, is committed the
conservation and furtherance of democratic values. The Courts task is to
identify those values in the constitutional plan and to work them into life in the
cases that reach the Court..........................................
The Court cannot and should not shirk this responsibility, because it has
sworn the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and is also accountable to the
people of this Country. There are indeed numerous decisions of this Court where
231
constitutional issues have been adjudicated upon though enmeshed in questions
of religious tenets, social practices, economic doctrines or educational polices.
The Court has in these cases adjudicated not upon the social, religious,
economic or other issues, but solely on the constitutional questions brought
before it and in doing so, the Court has not been deterred by the fact that these
constitutional questions may have such other overtones or facets. We cannot,
therefore, decline to examine whether there is any constitutional violation
involved in the President doing that he threatens to do, merely on the facile
ground that the question is political in tone, colour or complexion.
( A avi L vc ` )


Constitution (Seventy-seven Amendment) Act, 1995 I Constitution (Eighty-
fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 Gi gvag msweavb msk vab K i Z t 16( 4-
G) A byQ` mshvR b K i v nq| D msk vabi gvag PvK zi xZ
c ` vbwZ i mgvR i c vr c ` A sk i R b R Z vmn c `
msi Yi weavb K i vnq|

M. Nagraj V. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 gvK v gvq Dc i v
16( 4- G) A byQ` i eaZ v D vc b K i v nq| A ve` bK vi x c
nBZ hyw D vc b K i v nq h D msk vab A mvsweavwbK , basic
structure Z Z Ges 14 A byQ` ewYZ A vBbi ` wZ mgZ vi mwnZ
mvsNwl K | bvbxA f vi Z xq myc xg K vU16( 4- G) A byQ` K
GK wU mg_ xK i Y weavb (enabling provision) wnmve MY K wi qv ej h
mswk i vR aygv mgvR i c K Z c vr c ` A sk i R b mevP
50% GBi c c ` msi Y K wi Z c vwi e weavq Z wK Z weavbwU
ea | D i vq msweavb I basic structure A vj vPbvq DwVqvA vm|


msweavb basic structure wK f ve Bnvi Dc w wZ c K vk K i Z vnv
A vj vPbvK wi Z hvBqvwePvi c wZ S.H. Kapadia ej b ( c v- 242) t
22.......................The concept of a basic structure giving coherence and
durability to a constitution has a certain intrinsic force. This doctrine has
essentially developed from the German Constitution. This development is the
emergence of the constitutional principle in their own right. It is not based on
literal wording.
..................................................................................................
232
..................................................................................................
24. The point which is important to be noted is that principles of
federalism, secularism, reasonableness and socialism, etc. are beyond the words
of a particular provision. They are systematic and structural principles
underlying and connecting various provisions of the Constitution. They give
coherence to the Constitution. They make the Constitution an organic whole.
They are part of constitutional law even if they are not expressly stated in the
form of rules.
25. For a constitutional principle to qualify as an essential feature, it
must be established that the said principle is a part of the constitutional law
binding on the legislature. Only thereafter, is the second step to be taken,
namely, whether the principle is so fundamental as to bind even the amending
power of Parliament i.e. to form a part of the basic structure. The basic structure
concept accordingly limits the amending power of Parliament. To sum up: in
order to qualify as an essential feature, a principle is to be first established as
part of the constitutional law and as such binding on the legislature. Only then,
can it be examined whether it is so fundamental as to bind even the amending
power of Parliament i.e. to form part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
This is the standard of judicial review of constitutional amendments in the
context of the doctrine of basic structure.
26...........axioms like secularism, democracy, reasonableness, social
justice, etc. are overarching principles which provide linking factor for principle
of fundamental rights like Articles 14, 19 and 21. These principles are beyond
the amending power of Parliament. They pervade all enacted laws and they
stand at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of constitutional values............................
( A avi L vc ` )


Basic structure Z Z mvsweavwbK c wi wPwZ ev c K wZ i Dc i wbf i
K wi qvZ vnvevL vK wi Z hvBqvwePvi c wZ Kapadia ej b ( c v- 244) t
28. To conclude, the theory of basic structure is based on the concept of
constitutional identity. The basic structure jurisprudence is a preoccupation with
constitutional identity. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala it has been
observed that one cannot legally use the Constitution to destroy itself. It is
further observed the personality of the Constitution must remain unchanged.
Therefore, this Court in Kesavananda Bharati while propounding the theory of
basic structure, has relied upon the doctrine of constitutional
identity........................
( A avi L vc ` )


233
mvsweavwbK wel qv` x j Bqv wmv c ` vbi mwnZ bvqbxwZ I
A v` k R wo Z _ vK ewj Z hvBqvwePvi c wZ Kapadia ej b ( c v- 245) t
30. Constitutional adjudication is like no other decision-making. There
is a moral dimension to every major constitutional case; the language of the text
is not necessarily a controlling factor. Our Constitution works because of its
generalities, and because of the good sense of the judges when interpreting it. It
is that informed freedom of action of the judges that helps to preserve and
protect our basic document of governance.


msweavb msk vabi eaZ v wbi c Y m^ wePvi c wZ Kapadia
ej b ( c v- 246) t
35. The theory of basic structure is based on the principle that a change
in a thing does not involve its destruction and destruction of a thing is a matter
of substance and not of form. Therefore, one has to apply the test of overarching
principle to be gathered from the scheme and the placement and the structure of
an article in the Constitution. For example, the placement of Article 14 in the
equality code; the placement of Article 19 in the freedom code; the placement of
Article 32 in the code giving access to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the theory
of basic structure is the only theory by which the validity of impugned
amendments to the Constitution is to be judged.
( A avi L vc ` )


I.R. Coelho V. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1 gvK v gvq c k wQj h 24-
4- 1973 Z vwi L Kesavananda gvK v gvq basic structure Z Z De nBevi
c i gwj K A waK vi i evw nBZ , msweavbi beg Z d mxj mshy
b~Z b A vBb wj 31- we A byQ` i A vI Z vq, Parliament msi Y K wi Z
c vi wK bv|

f vi Z xq myc xg K vUi 9R b wePvi K mgbq MwVZ GK wU enr
e wmv MnY K i h c _ g beg Z d mxj A vbxZ mK j c _ K
A vBb c _ K f ve c i x v K wi qv ` wL Z nBe h mswk A vBbwU
msweavbi Z Z xq f vM ewYZ gwj K A waK vi i mwnZ mvsNwl K
wK bv| hw` mvsNwl K nq Z e c i x v K wi Z nBe h Z vnv msweavbi
basic structure K L eK i wK bv| hw` Z vnv K i Z e beg Z d mxj
ewYZ A vBbwU evwZ j nBe|
234

i vqwU msweavb, Bnvi msk vab I basic structure Z Z i Dc i
A vj vK c vZ K wi qvQ|

mvsweavwbK Z v m^ c avb wePvi c wZ Y.K. Sabharwal ej b ( c v-
79) t

43. The principle of constitutionalism is now a legal principle which
requires control over the exercise of governmental power to ensure that it does
not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic
principles include the protection of fundamental rights. The principle of
constitutionalism advocates a check and balance mode of the separation of
powers; it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent
centers of decision-making. The principle of constitutionalism underpins the
principle of legality which requires the courts to interpret legislation on the
assumption that Parliament would not wish to legislate contrary to fundamental
rights. The legislature can restrict fundamental rights but it is impossible for
laws protecting fundamental rights to be impliedly repealed by future statutes.
..........................
.........................
109. ........... The constitution is a living document, its interpretation may
change as the time and circumstances change to keep pace with it.
( A avi L vc ` )

Basic structure m^ c avb wePvi c wZ Sabharwal ej b ( c v- 102) t
114. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that since the basic
structure of the Constitution includes some of the fundamental rights, any law
granted Ninth Schedule protection deserves to be tested against these principles.
If the law infringes the essence of any of the fundamental rights or any other
aspect of the basic structure then it will be struck down. The extent of
abrogation and limit of abridgment shall have to be examined in each case
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vab m^ wZ wb ej b ( c v- 104) t
124. Since power to amend the Constitution is not unlimited, if changes
brought about by amendments destroy the identity of the Constitution, such
amendments would be void. That is why when entire Part III is sought to be
taken away by a constitutional amendment by the exercise of constituent power
under Article 368 by adding the legislation in the Ninth Schedule, the question
arises as to the extent of judicial scrutiny available to determine whether it alters
the fundamentals of the Constitution.

235
125. The question can be looked at from yet another angle also. Can
Parliament increase the amending power by amendment of Article 368 to confer
on itself the unlimited power of amendment and destroy and damage the
fundamentals of the Constitution? The answer is obvious. Article 368 does not
vest such a power in Parliament. It cannot lift all restrictions placed on the
amending power or free the amending power from all its restrictions. This is the
effect of the decision in Kesavananda Bharati case as a result of which
secularism, separation of power, equality etc., to cite a few examples, would fall
beyond the constituent power in the sense that the constituent power cannot
abrogate these fundamentals of the Constitution..........
( A avi L vc ` )

A vBbi k vmb (Rule of Law) I wePvi wef vMi f ~wgK vm^ c avb
wePvi c wZ Sabharwal ej b ( c v- 105) t
129. Equality, rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers
form parts of the basic structure of the Constitution. Each of these concepts are
intimately connected. There can be no rule of law, if there is no equality before
the law. These would be meaningless if the violation was not subject of the
judicial review. All these would be redundant if the legislative, executive and
judicial powers are vested in one organ. Therefore, the duty to decide whether
the limits have been transgressed has been placed on the judiciary.
( A avi L vc ` )

msweavb msk vabi mxgveZ vm^ wZ wb ej b ( c v- 109) t
144. The constitutional amendments are subject to limitations and if the
question of limitation is to be decided by Parliament itself which enacts the
impugned amendments and gives that law a complete immunity, it would disturb
the checks and balances in the Constitution. The authority to enact law and
decide the legality of the limitations cannot vest in one organ. The validity to the
limitation on the rights in Part III can only be examined by another independent
organ, namely, the Judiciary.

Basic structure Gi judicial review Gi f ~wgK v m^ c avb
wePvi c wZ Sabharwal ej b ( c v- 109- 10) t

147. The doctrine of basic structure as a principle has now become an
axiom. It is premised on the basis that invasion of certain freedoms needs to be
justified. It is the invasion which attracts the basic structure doctrine. Certain
freedoms may justifiably be interfered with. If freedom, for example, is
interfered with in cases relating to terrorism, it does not follow that the same test
can be applied to all the offences. The point to be noted is that the application of
236
standard is an important exercise required to be undertaken by the Court in
applying the basic structure doctrine and that has to be done by the Courts and
not by prescribed authority under Article 368. The existence of the power of
Parliament to amend the Constitution at will, with requisite voting strength, so
as to make any kind of laws that excludes Part III including power of judicial
review under Article 32 is incompatible with the basic structure doctrine.
Therefore, such an exercise if challenged, has to be tested on the touchstone of
basic structure as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19,
Article 15 and the principles thereunder.
( A avi L vc ` )

GK R b we amicus curiae A wf gZ c K vk K wi qvQb h msweavb
( qv` k msk vab) A vBb mwK Z wggvsmv R vZ xq msm` nI qv
DwPZ , A v` j Z bq|
` yBk Z er mi c ~ehy i vmvsweavwbK c k GB i K g ai Yi B
gZ wQj wK mvsweavwbK c k wK f ve axi axi myc xg K vUi
Judicial Review gZ vi A vI Z vq A vm Z vnvi Gg weK vk Ges wek l
K wi qv i vxq h c wZ wbwaZ k xj MYZ i gvag wewf b` k i
R bMYi mvsweavwbK m Z v c d zwUZ K wi evi D k i vqi GB
f vM MYZ , c R vZ , wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v, msweavbi k Z ,
msweavb msk vab I Basic Structure Z Z Ges m~c xg K vUi f zwgK v
m^ GK wU mvavi Y A vj vPbvK i vnBqvQ|

Z Z xq f vM
R bMY, msweavb I msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb,1996
A vj vPbv


29| mvsweavb I R bMY t mZ e h ewUk - i vR i
i vR Z K vj evsj v` k mn mgMf vi Z el c i vaxb wQj | wK Government
of India Act, 1935, Gi A vI Z vq mxwgZ A vK vi nBj I ^i vR c ` vb K i v
nq | f vi Z evmx Z vnv` i f vUvwaK vi c vq| Z vnvi v Z vnv` i wbR ` i
c wZ wbwaK f vU c ` vb K wi qv wbevPb K i Z t c v` wk K A vBb mf vq
c i Y K i | e Z t GB f ve c wZ wbwa gvi d r f vi Z evmx A vBb mf vq
Z vnv` i Dc w wZ Dc j w K i |

ewUk - i vR i i vR Z K vj ^vaxbZ v A v` vj b ewZ i K A vBb-
k L j v c wi w wZ L vi vc wQj GUv ej v hvq bv | mgM f vi Z el
237
A vaywbK wk v ee v, wePvi ee v, ^v ee v, hvMvhvM ee vi
c f ~Z DbwZ nq| Bnvi c i I f vi Z evmx f vi Z i gvwj K wQj b bv|
mK j c K vi myhvM myweav mZ I Z vnvi v wQj b wbR ` k c i evmx
Ges k vwmZ | we` k x k vmK i k L j vgy nBqv ^vaxbZ v c vBZ c vq
50 er mi i A v` vj b j vwMqvwMqvwQj |

f vi Z I c vwK vb ` yBwU ` k ^vaxb nBj | f vi Z MYgvbyl i
^vaxbZ v I A waK vi c wZ wZ nBj I c vwK vb MvxZ I c vmv` -
l o h i wk K vi nBj | c ~eevsj v ^vaxK vi nvi vBj , c v vei
K j vbxZ c wi YZ nBj | GBevi gvZ f vl vi A v` vj b, ^vq k vmbi
A v` vj b, mveR bxb f vUvwaK vi Z _ v R bMYi mvef gZ i
A v` vj b A vi nBj | GB A v` vj b ^vaxbZ vi hy Z _ v gyw hy
c wi YZ nBj | j j gvbyl i A vZ Z vMi ga w` qv ^vaxb
evsj v` k GK mvMi i i wewbgq R bMnY K wi j |
evsj vi gvbyl ewUk k vmbK f vj bvB, c vwK vbx` i
wbt l Y, A wePvi , A Z vPvi nBZ Z vnvi v wPi Z i gyw PvwnqvQ|
Z vnvi v Ggb GK evsj vK PvwnqvQ hL vb K nB c i vaxb _ vwK e bv,
k vl Y _ vwK e bv, mK j gvbyl i mgA waK vi _ vwK e, mK j c K vi
i vxq I mvgvwR K k vl Y nBZ Z vnvi v gyw c vBe| c K Z MYZ
c wZ v c vBe| GB K vi Y evsj v` k msweavbi c vebvq Z vnv` i
ay ^vaxbZ v bq, gyw i A vwZ d zwUqv DwVqvQ, MYZ i K _ v,
c R vZ i K _ v, k vl Ygy mgvR i K _ v, agwbi c Z vi K _ v,
gvbevwaK vi i K _ v, mevc wi h j gyw hvv` i A vZ Z vMi
wewbgq evsj v` k gyw c vBqvQ, Z vnvB wj wc e nBqvQt
c vebv
A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMY, 1971 L xv i gvPgvmi
26 Z vwi L ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yv K wi qv R vZ xq gyw i R b
H wZ nvwmK msMvgi gvag ^vaxb I mvef g MYc R vZ x
evsj v` k c wZ wZ K wi qvwQ;
A vgi v A xK vi K wi Z wQ h, h mK j gnvb A v` k
A vgv` i exi R bMYK R vZ xq gyw msMvg A vZ wbqvM I exi
k nx` w` MK c vYvr mMK wi Z Dy K wi qvwQj - R vZ xqZ vev` ,
238
mgvR Z , MYZ I agwbi c Z vi mB mK j A v` k GB
msweavbi g~j bxwZ nBe;
A vgi v A xK vi K wi Z wQ h, A vgv` i i vi A bZ g g~j
j nBe MYZ vw K c wZ Z Ggb GK k vl Ygy
mgvR Z vw K mgvR i c wZ v- hL vb mK j bvMwi K i R b
A vBbi k vmb, gwj K gvbevwaK vi Ges i vR bwZ K , A _ bwZ K
I mvgvwR K mvg, ^vaxbZ vI mywePvi wbw Z nBe;
A vgi v ` pf ve Nvl Yv K wi Z wQ h, A vgi v hvnvZ ^vaxb
m vq mgw j vf K wi Z c vwi Ges gvbeR vwZ i c MwZ k xj
A vk v- A vK v vi mwnZ mwZ i v K wi qv A v R vwZ K k vw I
mnhvwMZ vi c ~Yf ~wgK v c vj b K wi Z c vwi , mBR b
evsj v` k i R bMYi A wf c vqi A wf ew ^i c GB msweavbi
c vavb A zbi vL v Ges Bnvi i Y, mg_ b I wbi vc vweavb
A vgv` i c we K Z e ;
GZ vi v A vgv` i GB MYc wi l ` , A ` Z i k Z E bA vk x
ev i K wZ K gvmi A vVvi Z vwi L , gvZ veK E wbk k Z
evnv i L xv i bf ^i gvmi Pvi Z vwi L , A vgi v GB
msweavb i PbvI wewae K wi qvmgeZ f ve MnY K wi j vg|

Dc i ewYZ A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMY,K vnvi v GB R bMY?
evsj v` k i gyw hvv, K l K , k wgK , Qv , wk K , A MwYZ R bgvbyl ,
R bZ v, Z vnvi vB GB A vgi v, evsj v` k i R bMY| Z vnv` i m
MYc wi l ` mK j i A vk v, A vK vL v I A waK vi i g~Z c Z xK wnmve
GB msweavb i Pbv K wi qvQ| c K Z c , GB msweavb A vgi v,
evsj v` k i R bMYGi B mw |
A vo vB nvR vi er mi c ~eAristotle Z uvnvi The Politics G msweavb
I A vBb mK m^ ej bt
........... for the laws are , and ought to be, relative to the constitution,
and not the constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices
in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end
of each community. (Translated by B. Jowett )

wj wL Z msweavbi c m D vwc Z nBj c _ gB hy i vi
msweavbi K _ vA vgv` i gb A vm|

^vaxbZ v hyK vj xb mgq 1777 mvj Continental Congress
hy i vR i mwnZ Pj gvb hy I Bnvi A vbyl vwK mgmv mgvavb I
239
mnhvwMZ vK 13wU K j vbxi ga GK wU A vbyvwbK A uvZ vZ ev
mK Mwo qv Z zwj evi c qvR bxqZ v A byf e K i | GB j GK wU
Articles of Confederation c Yqb K i v nq| Bnv 178 1 mvj mK j
K j vbxvi v A bygvw` Z nq| BwZ ga hy k l nq| GK wU ^vaxb
i vi c qvR bi Z zj bvq D Articles of Confederation A c hv ewj qv
c Z xqgvb nq| GgZ A e vq BnvK msk vab K wi evi wmv nq|
mB j Continental Congress wewf bK j vbx i v nBZ Philadelphia
k ni A bywZ e Federal Convention G c wZ wbwa c i Y K wi Z A byi va
K i |

GB mgq me i vR bxwZ we` I c wZ ew MYi ga A vmb
msk vab j Bqv A vj vc A vj vPbv Pwj Z _ vK | h_ vmgq 178 7
mvj i g gvm Convention Gi A waek b A vi nq| e A vj vPbvi c i
c ~ew i K Z Articles of Confederation msk vabi c wi eZ GK wU c ~Yv
msweavb i Pbv K i vB wmv nq Ges 16 mvni A vj vPbvi c i
178 7 mvj i 17B m ^i Z vwi L msweavbwU Dc w Z c wZ wbwaMY
^v i K i b| GB mgq ` k i i vR bxwZ we` I c wZ ew MY b~Z b
msweavbi wewf bw` K j Bqv c c w K vq A vj vPbv K wi Z _ vK b|
Bnvi ga The Federalist Papers G Alexander Hamilton, John Jay I James
Madison Gi bvq L vZ bvgv ew eMb~Z b msweavbi wewf b i Z c ~Y
w` K j Bqv Publius Q` bvg c vwZ c ~YA vj vPbv K i b| mvqv ` yBk Z
er mi c i I BnvGL bI i Z enb K i |

msweavbi k Z Z _ v R bMYi k Z mK Alexander Hamilton
178 8 mvj i 28 k g Z vwi L Federalist No.78 j L bt
........... No legislative act, therefore contrary to the Constitution, can be
valid. To deny this , would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master ; that the representatives of the
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of
powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they
forbid.
240
.............. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could
intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that
of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded, by the Judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two , that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought , of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute , the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents. ( A avi L vc ` )

A vaywbK i vi ga hy i vi msweavb mevc v c yi vZ b|
Bnvi c Z vebvi c _ gB R bMYi k Z Nvl Yv K i v nBqvQ| Bnvi
c vi B ej v nq t
We the people of the United States....... do ordain and establish this
constitution for the United States.

Z L b wK hy i v Congress ev President K vb ms vB R bj vf
K i bvB| wewf bK j vbx i v wj nBZ R bmvavi Yi c wZ wbwaMY
Philadelphia Convention G R bMYi c nBZ msweavbi GB c vebv
Nvl Yv K i Z t msweavb c Yqb K i v nq hvnv c i eZ xZ mK j A i v
A bygv` b K i | A _ vr R bMYB GB msweavbi i PwqZ v|

hy i vi ^vaxbZ v hyK vj xb mgq Colony wj i R bMYi
gZ v, Article of confederation i Pbvi c Uf ~wgK v, NUbvej x I Bnvi
A vBbMZ eaZ v m^ Ware V. Hylton (1796) gvK gvq US Supreme Court
Gi c Justice Samuel Chase ej bt
It has been inquired what powers Congress possessed from the first
meeting, in September,1774, until the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation on the 1
st
of March,1781. It appears to me that the powers
of Congress during that whole period were derived from the people they
represented, expressly given, through the medium of their State
conventions or State legislatures;......................
241
(Thomas M. Cooley : A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations page-
7) ( A avi L vc ` )

H GK B gvK v gvq R bMYi gZ vmK Justice Chase ej b t
There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United
States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their
authority the Constitution of the Untied States was established;............
( A avi L v)

Martin V. Hunters Lessee (1816) gvK v gvq U.S. Supreme Court Gi
c Justice Joseph Story ej b t
The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established,
not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the
preamble of the Constitution declares, by the people of the United
States. There can be no doubt that it was competent to the people to
invest the general government with all the powers which they might
deem proper and necessary; to extend or restrain these powers according
to their own good pleasure, and to give them a paramount and supreme
authority.
................................... The government, then, of the United States can
claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the
powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by
necessary implication.
(Professor John B. Sholley: Cases on Constitutional Law1951, page-52-53)
( A avi L vc ` )

GB K vi YB McCulloch V. Maryland (1819) gvK v gvq US Supreme
Court Gi c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall ej bt
From these conventions the Constitution derives its whole authority.
The government proceeds directly from the people; is ordained and
established in the name of the people; ........It required not the affirmance, and
could not be nagatived, by the state governments. The Constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties.
The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the influence of
this fact on the case), is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In
form and in substance it emanates from them, its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.
242
It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents
all, and acts for all. (Cushman: Leading Constitutional Decisions, 13
th
Edition).
(A avi L vc ` )

Gibbons V. Ogden (1824) gvK v gvq R bMYi gZ v I msweavb
m^ c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall ej b t
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted
by the people to their government.
(Professor John B. Sholley: Cases on Constitutional Law, 1951, Page-
109)

c vq GK B ai bi K _ v Justice Stanley Mathews 18 8 5 mvj Yick Wo
V. Peter Hopkins 118 US 356 gvK v gvi i vq _ nxb f vl vq Nvl Yv K wi qv
wQj b t
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institution of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not
mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts

GB f ve R bMY K Z K msweavb c Yqb c m Professor K.C.
Wheare ej bt
Most modern Constitution have followed the American model and the
legal and political theory that lies behind it. The people, or a constituent
assembly acting on their behalf, has authority to enact a Constitution. This
statement is regarded as no mere flourish. It is accepted as law. The Courts of
the Irish Free State spoke of the Constitution of 1922 as having been enacted by
the people, and the Courts of Eire speak in the same way of the Constitution of
1937. The Supreme Court of the United States regards the people as having
given force of law to the Constitution. (Modern Constitution, 1975)
( A avi L vc ` )

1922 mvj A vqvi j vi msweavb c YxZ nq| mj bi
wbevwPZ m` mMY Irish Free State Gi R b GK wU msweavb i Pbv K i b|
243
mj bi m` mMY R bMY K Z K gZ v c v nBqv in the exercise of
undoubted right H msweavb i PbvK wi qvQb ewj qvgb K i b|

c _ g gnvhyi c i R vgvb ` k Weimar Constitution Gi c vi GB
f vet
The German People,........... has given itself this Constitution|

Czechoslovak Republic Gi msweavb Gi A vi wbi c t
We, the Czechoslovak nation, have adopted the following Constitution
for the Czechoslovak Republic.

Estonia ` k i msweavb Gi A vi t
The Estonian people.........has drawn up and accepted through the
Constituent Assembly the Constitution as follows.

Poland Gi msweavb Gi A vi t
We, the Polish nation,.... do enact and establish in the Legislative Sjem
of the Republic of Poland this Constitutional law.

c Z xqgvb nq h c _ g gnvhy i c i BDi vc i wewf bi v
R bMYK B msweavb mv, ` vZ v I c YZ v wnmve ^xK wZ c ` vb
K wi qvQ| wZ xq gnvhyi c i GK B avi v eR vq _ vK | 1946 mvj
Jugoslaviai msweavb Bnvi Constituent Assembly c Yqb K i | West German
Federal Republic Bnvi msweavb Nvl YvK i ht
the German people has, by virtue of its constituent power , enacted this basic
law of the Federal Republic of Germany.

f vi Z i 1950 mvj i msweavbI ` vex K i v nBqvQ h
msweavb c Yqb K wi evi gZ v I A waK vi R bMYi wbK U nBZB
A vwmqvQ| Bnvi c vi ej vnq t
We , the people of India,........in our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day
of November, 1949, do hereby , adopt ,enact and give to ourselves this
constitution.

Dc i i wewf b` k i msweavbi D` vni Y nBZ c Z xqgvb nq
h, R bMYi c wZ wbwa wnmve MYc wi l ` msweavb c Yqb K wi evi R b
R bMY K Z K gZ vc v| Z e msweavb c Yqb nBqv Mj R bMYmn
244
mK j B D msweavbvi v eva| Fourth French Republic Gi msweavbI
R bMYi k Z I msweavbi evaevaK Z v m^ A vj vK c vZ K i |
Bnvi 3q A byQ` wbi c t
National sovereignty belongs to the French people. No section of the
people nor any individual may assume its exercise. The people exercise
it in constitutional matters by the vote of their representatives and by the
referendum. In all other matters they exercise it through their deputies in
the National Assembly, elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret
suffrage.
(K.C. Wheare : Modern Constitution, page-62) ( A avi L vc ` )

Fifth French Republic Gi msweavbI R bMYi k Z I mvef gZ
wbw Z K wi qvQ| msweavbi 2q I 3q A byQ` wbi c t
Article 2 :
..................................................................
....................................................................
The principle of the Republic shall be government of the people, by the
people and for the people.
Article 3:
National sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it
through their representatives and by means of referendum.
..................................................................
.......................................................................
( A avi L vc ` )

GB c m hy i vi msweavbi Preamble m^ Professor Edward S.
Corwin h_ v_ B ewj qvQb t
The Preamble is the prologue of the Constitution. If proclaims the
source of the Constitutions authority and the great ends to be
accomplished under it.
From the Preamble we learn that the Constitution claims obedience,
not simply because of its intrinsic excellence or the merit of its
principles, but because it is ordained and established by the people........
The people are the masters of the Constitutionnot the reverse.
(Professor Edward S. Crown : Understanding the Constitution, 1949,
page-1).

245
Dc i i GB m~` xNA vj vPbv nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h mvqv
` yBk Z er mi c ~ehy i vi ^vaxbZ v hyK vj xb I Z r c i eZ xc wZ wU
hy i vi R bMYi Dc w wZ Dc j w K i v hvq| R bMY
Continental Congress G Z vnv` i c wZ wbwa gvi d r Dc w Z wQj , R bMY
^vaxbZ v hy K wi qvwQj , hy k l Philadelphia Convention G K j vbx
i vi c wZ wbwa` i gvagI R bMY Dc w Z _ vwK qv hy i vi
msweavb i Pbv K wi qvQ| A i v wj i convention G R bMYB msweavb
A bygv` b (ratify) K wi qvQ| hy i v mK j gZ vi Dr m h R bMY
Z vnv US Supreme Court weMZ ` yBk Z er mi c ~ec ybt c ybt Nvl Yv
K wi qvQ| Bnvi c i e i vmsweavb i wPZ nBqvQ | c wZ wU i vi
msweavb R bMYB h gZ vi Dr m Ges R bMYi c wZ wbwa Z _ v
R bMbB h msweavb i Pbv K wi qvQ Z vnvB evi sevi Nvwl Z nBqvQ|
mK j ` k i msweavb R bMYB gZ vi g~j K ` we` y|

30| evsj v` k msweavb R bMY- c Uf ~wgK v t evsj v` k
msweavbI Bnvi K vb ewZ g bq| evsj v` k i vi K ` we` yZ
i wnqvQ Bnvi R bMY| 1971 mvj R bMYB gyw hy K wi qv ^vaxbZ v
wQbvBqv A vwbqvQ| evsj v` k msweavb evsj vi R bMYi A vK vL v I
A wf ew i ^xK wZ | msweavb i vi mevP A vBb K vi Y Bnv R bMYi
A wf c vqi c wZ d j b| mL vbB msweavbi k Z | c K Z c
A vgv` i msweavbi me R ywo qv i wnqvQ R bMY| evsj vi R bMYB
evsj v` k i vi g~j Pvwj K v- k w | msweavb mB k w i evnb|
GB evsj vi R bMY f vi Z el c vwK vb bvg GK wU i v
PvwnqvwQj | 1946 mvj evsj vi R bMY Z vnv` i f vUvwaK vi c qvM
K wi qv gymj gvb` i R b wbw` 119wU A vmbi ga 116wU A vmb
gymwj g j xMK c ` vb K wi qv c vwK vb ` vex md j f ve myL j Bqv
A vm| c K Z c gymwj g j xMi GB f ~wgam&weR q f vi Z el
c vwK vb mw K i |
246
c vwK vb mwZ hgb evsj vi R bMYi mevP A e` vb i wnqvQ
wVK Z gwb f ve evsj v` k mwZ I evsj vi R bMYi ayA e` vb bq
Pi g Z vM I mevP g~j w` Z nBqvQ|
1948 mvj f vl v A v` vj bi c vi | 1952 mvj i 21k
d eqvi x Z vwi L gvZ f vl v evsj vi R b G` k i gvbyl R xeb w` j |
BwZ nvm mw K wi j | mB BwZ nvmi mvc vb evwnqv A vR 21k
d eqvi xA v R vwZ K gvZ f vl vw` em|
c vwK vb A vgj wQj evsj vi R b e bvi BwZ nvm| c vwK vb
mwi c i c ~eevsj vi b~Z b bvgK i Y nBj c ~ec vwK vb| c _ g nBZ B
G` k c vmv` l o h i wk K vi nBj | Z e 1954 mvj i c v` wk K
wbevPb R bMY c _ g myhvMB gymwj g j xMK c ~ee nBZ c vq
wbw K wi qv ` q| wK msL vMwi c ` k nBqvI c w g c vwK vbi
mwnZ BnvK Parity gvwbqv j BZ eva K i v nBj | e l o h i c i
1956 mvj c vwK vb GK wU msweavb nBj eU wK 1959 mvj i
d eqvi x gvm A bywZ e mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb nBevi K qK gvm
c ~e 1958 mvj i 7B A vei Z vwi L mgM ` k mvgwi K A vBb
R vi x nBj | c ~ec vwK vbi c avb i vR bwZ K ` j wj i c vq mK j
bZ vK A i xY K i v nBj | c ~ec vwK vbi R bMY Pi g f ve
A Z vPvwi Z I wb wl Z nBZ j vwMj | c vwK vbi A waevmx` i
genius A bymvi 1962 mvj i msweavbi gvag Basic democracy
ewj qv GK A yZ MYZ Pvj ynBj hvnv BasicI bq democracyI bq
hw` I wK QymsL K A wZ Dr mvnx ` k x I we` k x c wZ ew BnvK
ab ab K wi Z j vwMj b|
1966 mvj Z ` vwb b c ~ec vwK vbi GK wU c avb i vR bwZ K
` j 6 ` d v wf w K ^vqZ k vmb Ges Universal Franchise ev mveR bxb
f vUvwaK vi ` vex K wi j | evsj vi R bMY Z vnv mev K i Y mg_ b c ` vb
K wi j | g g A v` vj b eMevb nBZ j vwMj Ges Pi g i Z i
A vK vi avi Y K wi j c vmv` l o h i bvqK c wi eZ b nBj | 1962
247
mvj i msweavb f K wi qv R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vb c vwK vbi
c wmWU nBj b|

1970 mvj i k l f vM A L c vwK vbi mec _ g I mek l
mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBj | wbevPbi A bZ g c avb D k wQj
mgM c vwK vbi R b GK wU msweavb c Yqb K i v| wbevPb GK wU
i vR bwZ K ` j c ~ec vwK vbi R b wbw` 169wU A vmbi ga
167wU A vmb j vf K wi qv mgM c vwK vb GK K msL vMwi Z v j vf
K i | 1971 mvj i 3i v gvPZ vwi L XvK vq msm` A waek bi Z vwi L
Nvl Yv K i v nBqvwQj | c w g c vwK vb nBZ msm` m` mMY GK
GK K wi qv XvK vq A vMgb K wi Z wQj b GB mgq A K mvr 1j v gvP
Z vwi L R bvi j Bqvwnqv L vb A wbw` K vj i R b A waek b wMZ
Nvl Yv K i b| mgM evsj v` k vf ` ytL d vwUqv c wo j | 6` d v
` vex 1` d v ^vaxbZ vi ` vexZ c wi YZ nBj | 7B gvPZ vwi L i f vl Y
k L gywR eyi i ngvb mK j K c yZ nBevi A vnevb R vbvBj b|
Gevi i msMvg A vgv` i gywI i msMvg, Gevi i msMvg ^vaxbZ vi
msMvg GB A gvN evYx DPvi bi ga w` qv wZ wb mw` b Z vunvi f vl Y
k l K i b|
23k gvPc vwK vb w` em wQj wK H w` b K vUbgU evwZ Z
mgM c ~ec vwK vbi me ^vaxb evsj vi c Z vK v k vf v c vBZ wQj |
25k gvPw` evMZ i v c w_ exi BwZ nvmi R NYZ g MYnZ v XvK vq
I evsj vi wewf b nvb A bywZ nBj | 26k gvPi c _ g c ni B k L
gywR eyi i ngvb evsj v` k i ^vaxbZ vNvl YvK i b|
Bnvi c i eZ xbq gvm evOvj xi A vZ Z vMi BwZ nvm| evsj vi
mvavi Y R bMY A avi Y K wi qv j R xebi wewbgq evsj vi
^vaxbZ v wQbvBqv A vb| Bnv wQj c K Z B R bhy| 1949 mvj nBZ
c _ g m~` xNmvsweavwbK msMvg, Z r c i , R bMYi mk m msMvgi
K vi YB evsj v` k msweavbi me B R bMYi Dc w wZ j K i v
hvq|

248
31| mvsweavwbK K vVvgvt-
c vebv t evOvj x R vwZ i c wi wPwZ , ewk Ges msweavbi
D k , A v` k I g~j bxwZ hvnvi Dc i wf w K wi qv GB i vc wZ wZ
nBqvQ Z vnvi GK wU msw wK i yZ c ~YeYbv c vebvq K i v
K wi qvQ| c K Z c c vebvK msweavbi Touch Stone wnmve eYbv
K i vnq| msweavbi wewf bA sk i c wi wPwZ wbc ` vb K i vnBj |
c _ g f vMt evsj v` k h GK wU MYc R vZ x i v , R bMY GB
i vi gvwj K Ges msweavbi c avb mK Nvl Yv GB f vM c ` vb
K i vnBqvQ|
wZ xq f vMt wZ xq f vM i v c wi Pvj bvi g~j bxwZ mg~n eYbv
K i vnBqvQ|
Z Z xq f vM t GB f vM evsj v` k i R bMYi we` gvb gwj K
A waK vi mg~ni ^xK wZ c ` vb K i vnBqvQ|
PZ z_ f vM t GB f vM i vi wbevnx wef vMi wewf bmvsweavwbK
c ` hgb- i vc wZ , c avbg xmn Bnvi gw mf v, Z veavqK mi K vi ,
vbxq k vmb, c wZ i v K gwef vM Ges A vUbx- R bvi j BZ vw` c `
mw K wi qvQ Ges Z vnv` i mK j i mvavi Y ` vwqZ I K Z e wb` k
K wi qvQ|
c g f vM tGB f vM i vi A vi K wU A vBb mf v mw
K wi qvQ| GB f vM R vZ xq msm` c wZ v, R bMYi c wZ wbwa mvsm` -
xK vi , bvqc vj , A vBb c Yqb I A _ ms v c wZ Ges A av` k
c Yqb BZ vw` eYbvc ` vb K i vnBqvQ|
l f vM t GB f vM msweavb i vi Z Z xq wePvi wef vM
c wZ v K wi qvQ| myc xg K vUc wZ v, wePvi K wbqvM, A at b
A v` vj Z Ges c k vmwbK UvBeybvj c wZ vm^ eYbvi wnqvQ|
mg f vM t GB f vM msweavb wbevPb ms v wel qvw` i eYbv
K wi qvQ| wbevPb K wgk b c wZ v, wbevPb A byvbi mgq BZ vw`
wbw` nBqvQ|
A g f vM t GB f vM gnv- wnmve wbi x K I wbq K c ` i
c wZ vGes G msGv wel qvw` eYbvK i vnBqvQ|
249
beg f vM t GB f vM evsj v` k i K gwef vM m^ eYbv K i v
nBqvQ| msweavb GB f vM mi K vi x K gPvi x` i wbqvM I K gi
k Z vej x, K gwef vM c ~bMVb Ges mi K vi x K gK wgk b c wZ v
K wi qvQ|
beg K f vM t GB f vM msweavb R i i x A e v Nvl Yv I
GZ ` ms v K vhvej xwb` k K wi qvQ|
` k g f vMt GB f vM msweavb msk vabi gZ v eYbv K i v
nBqvQ|
GK v` k f vM t GB f vM wewea wel qvw` m^ eYbv K i v
nBqvQ|

msweavbi 150 A byQ` i vi w K vj xb I A vqx weavbvej x
mwK Z | GB A byQ` i A vI Z vq m PZ z_ Z d &wmj vw K vj xb I
A vqxweavbvej xeYbvK i vnBqvQ|
vw K vj xb ewj Z 1971 mvj i 26k gvPZ vwi L nBZ
msweavb c eZ bi Z vwi L A _ vr 1972 mvj i 16B wWm^i c h
mgqK vj eyS vBZ Q| GB mgqK vj i ga ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvc ,
mK j A vBb I mK j K vh gK PZ z_ Z d &wmj i 3 A byQ`
msweavbi 150 A byQ` i A vI Z vq mvsweavwbK eaZ v ` vb
K wi qvQ| Z vnvQvo v, D Z d &wmj ewYZ 3 A byQ` mn 17wU
A byQ` c vK - msweavb A vBb, i vi wewf bwef vM I Bnvi
K vh g wj K msweavb, msweavb ewYZ A vBbi A vI Z vf ~ K i Z t
mZ ze mw K wi qvQ| GL vbB msweavbi 150 A byQ` i A vI Z vq
c YxZ PZ z_ Z d &wmj i K vh gi mgvw| msweavbi c i eZ x
msk vab wj hnZ zmsweavbi 150 A byQ` ewnf ~Z mBnZ zD
msk vab wj PZ z_ Z d &wmj vb c vq bvB , hgb, msweavb c _ g
msk vab, wZ xq msk vab, Z Z xq msk vab I PZ z_ msk vab | A ea
mvgwi K k vmbvgj I Z r c i eZ xK vj i msweavb msk vabx wj i ga
h wj msweavbewnf ~Z mB wj void ab initio Ges hw` PZ z_ Z d &wmj
mshy K i v nBqv _ vK mB wj D Z d &wmj nBZ evwZ j ewj qv MY
250
nBe| K vb ea msk vabx hw` D PZ z_ Z d &wmj vb c vBqv _ vK
Z e D msk vabx ea _ vwK e eU wK PZ z_ Z d &wmj nBZ wehy
nBe K vi Y PZ z_ Z d &wmj 1972 mvj i 16B wWm^i c h D
Z d &wmj ewYZ vw K vj xb I A vqxweavbvej xmwK Z gv |

32| msweavbi wewf bf vMi ga f vi mvg t
msweavbi g~j I c avb wZ bwU, hgbt A vBb mf v, wbevnx
wef vM I wePvi wef vM|
msweavbi ggevYx nBZ Q h R wUj i vh i wewf bwef vMi
ga Checks and balances Gi gvag Governance G mgZ v ev Balance i v
K i v| G A vBb mf v msweavb A bymvi A vBb c Yqb K wi e,
wbevnx wef vM A vBbi ggA bymvi Z vnv c qvM K wi e Ges wel qwU
wePvi wef vMi myL A vbqb K i v nBj Bnvi A vBbMZ eaZ v
c i x v K wi e| GK Bf ve wbevPb K wgk b, gnv- wnmve wbi x K I
wbq K , mi K vi x K gK wgk b, Z vnvi v mK j B i vh i wewf bA sk i
A sk wek l Ges wbR wbR Governance K c he Y K wi qv
_ vK b, Z e wek l K wi qv wePvi wef vM i vxq gZ vi h_ Qv eenvi
mymsnZ K wi qv _ vK | GB K vi Y GK R b wePvi K i ` vwqZ I K Z e
A Z i Z c ~Y| GB c m Professor W. Friedmann ej b t
In the modern democratic society the Judge must steer his way between
the Scylla of subservience to Government and the charyvdis of remotensess
from constantly changing social pressures and economic needs (Law in a
Changing Society) (Union of India Vs. Sankalchand AIR 1977 SC 2328
gvK v gvq K Iyer, J Gi i vq nBZ DZ )

i vxq h i wewf bwef vMi ga mgZ v i vwL evi c qvR b Ges
K vbwUi ^v_ msNvZ hb bv NU mB K vi YB msweavbi wewf b
f vM wbR wbR ` vwqZ ga ` w i vwL Z Q|

33| evsj v` k msweavb R bMY t GL b ` L v hvK
R bMYi m msweavbi gvag R bMY wK f ve i vwbq Y K i |
251
c _ gB GB c m Senator Daniel Webster Gi e e c wYavbhvM|
hy i vi Federal f ~wg bxwZ j Bqv GK weZ K ( 18 30) Daniel Webster
R bMYi msweavb I R bMYi f ~wgK vm^ ej bt

It is, sir, the Peoples Constitution, the Peoples Government; made for
the People; made by the People; and answerable to the People ..... We are all
agents of the same power, the People ... I hold it to be a popular Government,
erected by the people; those who administer it responsible to the People; and
itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the People may choose it
should be. It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the People, as the State
Governments.
(Karamer: The People Themselves, c v- 177)

Bnvi 33 er mi c i hy i vi Gettysburg hy i GK wU A sk
gZ mwbK ` i mgvwa wnmve Dr mMK wi evi A byvb President
Abraham Lincaln Z uvnvi msw e Z vk l K i b GB ewj qv t
..........that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall
not perish from the earth.

A vR nBZ ` o k Z er mi c ~eGB f ve Abraham Lincaln ` k i
R bMYi k Z mgybZ K i b|
evsj v` k msweavbi c g f vM A vBbmf v eYbv K wi qvQ| 65
A byQ` i 1g ` d v R vZ xq msm` mw K wi qvQ| 3q ` d v c Z
wbevPbi gvag evsj v` k i wZ bk Z wU A v wj K wbevPbx Gj vK v
nBZ wZ bk Z msm` - m` m wbevPbi weavb K i v nBqvQ| GB
wZ bk Z msm` - m` m evsj v` k i R bMYi c wZ wbwaZ K i b| Z e
Z vnvi vR bMYbnb R bMYi wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa gv |
R bMYi c wZ wbwa GB msm` - m` mMY wbevPbi gvag
evsj v` k i i vc wZ K wbevPb K i b| mK j wbevPbB msweavbi
119 I 123 A byQ` A bymvi evsj v` k i wbevPb K wgk b c wi Pvj bv
K i b|
msweavbi 48 I 49 A byQ` Gi gZ v ej i vc wZ Z uvnvi
` vwqZ c vj b K i b| 55( 4) A byQ` A bymvi mi K vi i mK j wbevnx
252
c ` c i vc wZ i bvg MnxZ nBqvQ ewj qv c K vk K i v nq| 55( 5)
A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ i bvg c YxZ A v` k mg~n I A bvb
Pzw c wK i c mZ vwqZ ev c gvYxK Z nBe, i vc wZ Z vnv wewa vi v
wbavi Y K i b| Z vnvQvo v, i vc wZ mi K vi x K vhvej x eUb I
c wi Pvj bvi R b wewamg~n c Yqb K i b| h msm` - m` m msm` i
msL vMwi m` mi A v vf vR b ewj qv i vc wZ i wbK U c Z xqgvb
nBeb, i vc wZ Z uvnvK 56( 3) A byQ` ej c avbg x wbqvM
K i b|
i vc wZ msweavbi 94( 2) , 95( 1) , 97 I 98 A byQ`
A bymvi c avb wePvi c wZ , A vqx c avb wePvi c wZ , myc xg K vUi
wePvi c wZ I A wZ wi wePvi c wZ wbqvM c ` vb K i b|
Z e c avbg x I c avb wePvi c wZ wbqvMi eZ xZ
i vc wZ Z uvnvi A b mK j ` vwqZ c vj b c avbg xi c i vgk A byhvqx
K vhK i b|
Dc i i eYbv nBZ c Z xqgvb nq h i vc wZ R bMYi
c wZ wbwaMY vi v wbevwPZ A _ vr i vc wZ msm` - m` mMY gvag
R bMY K Z K c i v f ve wbevwPZ | A vevi i vc wZ i mK j K vh
g xmf v K Z K wbqw Z Ges g xmf v msm` i wbK U ` vqe, msm` -
m` mMY evsj v` k i R bMYi wbK U ` vqe| Z vnvQvo v, c avbg x I
Z uvnvi gw mf vi A waK vsk g xeMwbevwPZ weavq Z uvnvi vI R bMYi
wbK U mi vmwi ` vqe|
K vR B A vBb c Yqbi msm` - m` mMYi gvag R bMY
msm` Dc w Z | R bMYi wbK U ` vqeZ vB gZ vi c K Z Dr m|
wbevnx K vh c avbg x I gw mf v ` yB f ve R bMYi wbK U
` vqe| c _ gZ , R vZ xq msm` gvi d r , wZ xqZ , wbevwPZ msm` -
m` m wnmve| GB ` yBf veB R bMYi Qvqv c avbg x I Z uvnvi
gw mf vi Dc i wbw Z f ve we` gvb| hnZ z, c avbg x I Z uvnvi
gw mf vi A waK vsk m` m wbevwPZ m K vi Y Z uvnvi v mvef g
R bMYi GB Qvqv A ^xK vi K wi Z c vi b bv, Z uvnv` i c wZ wU
253
c ` c i R b Z uvnvi v R bMYi wbK U ` vqe| (accountable to the
sovereign people)|
c R vZ i K gK gPvi x` i wbqvM I K gi k Z vej x msm`
A vBb` vi v wbq Y K i , K vR B m R bMY msm` gvi d r
evsj v` k i K gwef vMK wbq Y K i b| GgbwK c wZ i v
K gwef vMi I R bMYi wbq Y i wnqvQ K vi Y D K gwef vMI
msm` K Z K c YxZ A vBb vi vwbqw Z I c wi Pvwj Z | Z e GB wbq Y
ayZ vwZ K f ve msweavbi c vq _ vwK j Pwj e bv| i vc wZ nBZ
i vi meK wb mK j K gPvi xK A i GB bxwZ avi Y K wi Z nBe
h Z vnvi v mK j B R bMYi meK gv , R bMYi c wZ mK j i wbR
wbR mevc ` vbi gvagB Z vnv` i c Z K i i Z I Z vr c h
wbwnZ i wnqvQ| BnvB evsj v` k i msweavb g~j g I mK j i c wZ
evZ v|
myc xg K vUewZ i K R j v wf w K wePvi wef vMi A vBb
g Yvj q I myc xg K vUi Z wbq Y i wnqvQ| G A Z t
A vBb g Yvj q Bnvi wewf bc ` c i R b msm` i wbK U ` vqe
Ges msm` gvi d r R bMYi wbK U ` vqe|

Z e myc xg K vUev wbA v` vj Z K vb A v` vj Z B Bnvi wePvwi K
K vh gi R b mi vmwi K vnvi I wbK U ` vqx bn| hw` K vb
wePvi c v_ xK vb i vq y nb, wZ wb A ek B c i eZ x DP A v` vj Z
A vc xj K wi Z c vi b| k Z k Z er mi awi qv wek i mK j mf ` k
GB c wZ B we` gvb, A b_ vq, bvq wePvi evnZ nBevi mebv
_ vK | Z e h K vb A v` vj Z i i vq j Bqv c K Z c vwZ c ~YA eva
A vj vPbv nBZ B c vi , Z vnvZ mK j i B j vf evb nBevi mebv
_ vK , Ggwb wK wePvi K i I , Z e wePvi K K j Bqv mgj vPbv weaq
bn| K vi Y wePvi K K ew MZ f ve mgvj vPbv K wi j c i eZ xZ
i vq c ` vb wZ wb wavM nBqv c wo Z c vi b, Z vnvZ bvqwePvi
evnZ nBevi mebv _ vK , BnvZ wePvi c v_ xMYB wZ M nBZ
c vi b| Dj L , GK R b wePvi K K f qf xwZ I mec K vi c f vegy
254
nBqv i vq c ` vb K wi Z nq| Z vnvQvo v, GK R b wePvi K i myL h
mK j hyw I NUbvej x c K vwk Z nq Z vnv f wel r A vj vPK ` i myL
bvI _ vwK Z c vi | Z e R bMY bvqwePvi A ek B ` vex K wi Z
c vi b, K vi Y, myc xg K vUmn mgM wePvi wef vM R bMYi msweavb
nBZ m I R bMYi B mw Ges mB w` K w` qv wePvi wef vM
P~o v wePvi R bMYi wbK U A ek B ` vqe|
GB c m Senator Daniel Webster Gi e e ( 18 30)
c wYavbhvMt
The People, then, sir, created this Government. They gave it a
Constitution, and in that Constitution they have enumerated the powers which
they bestow upon it. They made it a limited Government. They have defined its
authority.... But, sir, they have not stopped here. If they had, they would have
accomplished but half their work. No definition can be so clear, as to avoid
possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise, as to exclude all uncertainty. Who,
then, shall construe this grant of the People? .... This, sir, the Constitution itself
decides, also by declaring, that the Judicial power shall extend to all cases
arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United States. [That clause
together with the Supremacy Clause], sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in
truth, the keystone of the arch. With these, it is a Constitution; without them, it
is a Confederacy.
(Kramer : The People Themselves, c v- 177)

i vi A bvb wef vMi K vh g hgb R bMY mi vmwi c wi Pvj bv
K i b bv, Z vnv` i wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa gvi d r c wi Pvj bv K i b, Z gwb
R bMYi c wZ wbwa gvi d r wbqvM c v wePvi K MY R bMYi c
R bMYi wePvwi K gZ vc qvM K i b|
mB K vi Y R bMYi c wZ wbwaZ K vi x msm` wePvi wef vMi
wei D vwc Z A wf hvM I GB wef vMi mvweK K vh g (Performance)
m^ ayc k D vc b K wi Z A waK vi x bn, BnvK A waK Z i K g g
K wi evi j c wZ weavb K wi Z c qvR bxq c ` c I j BZ c vi b|
Dj L h R bMYi A _ B wePvi wef vM c wi Pvwj Z nq| A Z Ge,
wePvi wef vMI R bMYi gZ v- ej qi A MZ |
34| msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi
c Uf ~wgK v t gv i v wbevPbx Gj vK vi msm` m` m R bve gvt
255
A vmv` y vgvbi gZ z nBj Z _ vq Dc - wbevPb A byvb K wi evi
c qvR b nq| wbevPb K wgk b 1994 mvj i 20k gvPZ vwi L gv i v
wbevPbx Gj vK vq Dc - wbevPb A byvb K wi evi R b Z d &wmj Nvl Yv
K i | wei vax` j wj A vmbDc - wbevPb f vU- K vi Pzwc i A vk sK v
c ej f ve c K vk K wi Z _ vK |
wbevPbv i K vj wei vax` j wj gv i v Dc - wbevPb K vi Pzwc i
A wf hvM D vc b K i Z t mgM` k c ej c wZ ev` K wi Z _ vK Ges
wei vax` j xq mvsm` MY msm` eR b A evnZ i vL b|
1995 mvj i 4Vv R yj vB i vc wZ msweavbi 106 A byQ`
A bymvi wbwj wL Z wel q myc xg K vUi A vc xj wef vMi gZ vgZ
R vwbZ Pvnb (Special Reference No. 1 of 1995) 47 DLR (AD) (1995) 117 t
Para U: And Whereas, pursuant to the powers conferred on me by
Article 106 of the Constitution, I, Abdur Rahman Biswas, President of the
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh hereby refer the said questions to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to report its opinion
thereon namely -
(1) Can the walkout and the consequent period of non-return by
all the opposition parties taking exception to a remark of a
ruling party Minister be construed as absent from Parliament
without leave of Parliament occurring in Article 67(1)(b) of
the Constitution resulting in vacation of their seats in
Parliament?
(2) Does boycott of the Parliament by all members of the
opposition parties mean absent from the Parliament without
leave of Parliament within the meaning of Article 67(1)(b) of
the Constitution resulting in vacation of their seats in
Parliament?
(3) Whether ninety consecutive sitting days be computed
excluding or including the period between two sessions
intervened by prorogation of the Parliament within the
meaning of Article 67(1)(b), read with the definition of
sessions and sittings defined under Article 152(1) of the
Constitution ?
(4) Whether the Speaker or Parliament will compute and
determine the period of absence ?
Sd/ Abdur Rahman Biswas
256
4.7.95
President
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

bvbx A 24/ 7/ 1995 Z vwi L i i vq A vc xj wef vMi c
we c avb wePvi c wZ wbwj wL Z gZ vgZ c ` vb K i bt
80. Having regard to the discussion as above, we are of the opinion that
the answers to question Nos. 1 and 2 are in the affirmative subject to
computation of ninety consecutive sitting days. As to question No. 3 our opinion
is that the period between two sessions intervened by prorogation of the
Parliament should be excluded in computing ninety consecutive sitting days. As
to question No. 4, our opinion is that it is the Speaker who will compute and
determine the period of absence. Let this report be communicated to the
President immediately.

24/ 11/ 1995 Z vwi L msm` f vwqv ` I qv nq| K qK evi
wMZ nBevi c i 1996 mvj i 15B d eqvi x Z vwi L l msm` i
wbevPb A bywZ nBevi Z vwi L wbavi Y K i vnq|
` k c P MYwe vf Pwj Z _ vK | GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j
wbevPb A sk MnY bv K wi evi wmv MnY K i | mgM` k evc K
gv vq mwnsm NUbvej xi ga w` qv 15/ 2/ 1996 Z vwi L wbevPb
A bywZ nq| wbevPb evc K gv vq f vU K vi Pzwc i A wf hvM D vc b
K i vnq|
l msm` i c _ g A waek bB Z veavqK mi K vi wej A vbqb
K i v nq| wK i vR bwZ K ` j wj i c nBZ d eqvi xZ A bywZ
wbevPb evwZ j Ges c avbg xmn K vwebU Z _ v mi K vi i c ` Z vM
` vex K i v nBZ _ vK | i vc wZ wel q wj j Bqv Df q c i mwnZ
A vj vPbvA vi K i b|

35| msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996 t
26/ 3/ 1996 Z vwi L msm` mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi R b wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi MVbi D k msweavb ( qv` k msk vab)
A vBb Gi wej wU msm` MnxZ nq| 28 / 3/ 1996 Z vwi L i vc wZ D
wej ^v i c ` vb K wi j Z vnvA vBb c wi YZ nq|
257
30/ 3/ 1996 Z vwi L 12 w` bi l msm` f vwqv ` I qv nq I
mi K vi c ` Z vM K i Ges mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ R bve
gynv` nvweeyi i ngvb c avb Dc ` v wbhy nb Ges Z uvnvi bZ Z
Dc i v A vBbi A vI Z vq c _ g Z veavqK mi K vi MwVZ nq|

msweavb ( qv` k msk vab ) A vBb, 1996, A vBbwU wbi c t
1996 mbi 1 bs A vBb
28 k gvP,1996

MYc R vZ x evsj v` k i msweavbi K wZ c q weavbi
A waK Z i msk vabK c YxZ A vBb
hnZ z wbewYZ D k mg~n c ~i YK MYc R vZ x
evsj v` k i msweavbi K wZ c q weavbi A waK Z i msk vab
mgxPxb I c qvR bq;
mnZ zGZ vi vwbi c A vBb K i vnBj t-

1| msw wk i vbvg| - GB A vBb msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996 bvg A wf wnZ nBe|

2| msweavb b~Z b 58 K A byQ` i mwbek | -
MYc R vZ x evsj v` k i msweavb ( A Z tc i msweavb ewj qv
Dj wL Z ) Gi 58 A byQ` i c i wbi c b~Z b A byPQ`
mwbewk Z nBe, h_ vt-
58 K | c wi Q` i c qvM | - GB c wi Q` i K vb wK Qy
55( 4) , ( 5) I ( 6) A byQ` i weavbvej x eZ xZ , h gqv`
msm` f vswMqv ` I qv nq ev f sM A e vq _ vK mB mB
gqv` c hy nBe bvt
Z e k Z _ vK h, 2K c wi Q` hvnv wK Qy_ vK zK bv
K b, h 72( 4) A byQ` i A axb K vb f sM nBqv hvI qv
msm` K c ybi vnvb K i v nq m GB c wi Q` c hvR
nBe|
3| msweavb b~Z b 2K c wi Q` i mwbek | - msweavbi
PZ y_ f vMi 2q c wi Q` i c i wbi ~c b~Z b c wi Q`
mwbewk Z nBe, h_ vt-
2K c wi Q` - wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
58 L | wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi | - ( 1) msm` f vswMqv
` I qvi c i ev gqv` A emvbi K vi Y f sM nBevi c i h
Z vwi L wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb Dc ` v K vhf vi
MnY K i b mB Z vwi L nBZ msm` MwVZ nI qvi c i b~Z b
258
c avbg x Z uvnvi c ` i K vhf vi MnY K i vi Z vwi L c h gqv`
GK wU wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi _ vwK e|
( 2) wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi h_ f ve i vc wZ i wbK U
` vqx_ vwK eb|
( 3) ( 1) ` d vq Dj wL Z gqv` c avb Dc ` v K Z K ev
Z uvnvi K Z Z GB msweavb A byhvqx c R vZ i wbevnx gZ v ,
58 N( 1) A byQ` i weavbvej x mvc , c hy nBe Ges
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c i vgk A byhvqx Z r - K Z K Dnv
c hy nBe|
( 4) 55( 4) ,( 5) I ( 6) A byQ` i weavbej x ( c qvR bxq
A wf evR b mnK vi ) ( 1) ` d vq Dj wL Z gqv` GK Bi ~c
wel qvej xi c hy nBe|
58 M| wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i MVb , Dc ` vMYi
wbqvM BZ vw` | - ( 1) c avb Dc ` vi bZ Z c avb Dc ` v
Ges A c i A bwaK ` k R b Dc ` vi mgbq wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi MwVZ nBe , hvnvi vi vc wZ K Z K wbhy nBeb|
( 2) msm` f vswMqv ` I qv ev f sM nBevi c i eZ x c bi
w` bi ga c avb Dc ` v Ges A bvb Dc ` vMY wbhy
nBeb Ges h Z vwi L msm` f vswMqv ` I qv nq ev f sM nq
mB Z vwi L nBZ h Z vwi L c avb Dc ` v wbhy nb mB
Z vwi L c h gqv` msm` f vswMqv ` I qvi ev f sM nBevi
A eewnZ c ~e` vwqZ c vj bi Z c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf v
Z uvnv` i ` vwqZ c vj b K wi Z _ vwK eb|
( 3) i vc wZ evsj v` k i A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ MYi
ga whwb mek l A emi c v nBqvQb Ges whwb GB
A byQ` i A axb Dc ` v wbhy nBevi hvM Z uvnvK c avb
Dc ` vwbqvM K wi ebt
Z e k Z _ vK h, hw` D i c A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ K c vI qv bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c `
MnY A mZ nb, Z vnv nBj i vc wZ evsj v` k i mek l
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ i A eewnZ c ~eA emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|
( 4) hw` K vb A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ K c vI qv bv
hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY A mZ nb, Z vnv
nBj i vc wZ A vc xj wef vMi A emi c v wePvi K MYi ga
whwb mek l A emi c v nBqvQb Ges whwb GB A byQ` i
A axb Dc ` v wbhy nBevi hvM Z uvnvK c avb Dc ` v
wbqvM K wi ebt
259
Z e k Z _ vK h, hw` D i c A emi c v wePvi K K
c vI qv bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY A mZ
nb, Z vnv nBj i vc wZ A vc xj wef vMi A emi c v
wePvi K MYi ga mek l A emi c v wePvi K i A eewnZ c ~e
A emi c v A byi ~c wePvi K K c avb Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|
( 5) hw` A vc xj wef vMi K vb A emi c v wePvi K K
c vI qv bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY A mZ
nb, Z vnv nBj i vc wZ , hZ ` ~i me, c avb i vR bwZ K
` j mg~ni mwnZ A vj vPbvK g, evsj v` k i h mK j bvMwi K
GB A byQ` i A axb Dc ` v wbhy nBevi hvM Z uvnv` i
ga nBZ c avb Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|
( 6) GB c wi Q` hvnv wK Qy_ vK zK bv K b, hw` ( 3) ,( 4)
I ( 5) ` d vmg~ni weavbvej xK K vhK i K i v bv hvq, Z vnv
nBj i vc wZ GB msweavbi A axb Z vunvi ^xq ` vwqZ i
A wZ wi wnmve wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb Dc ` vi
` vwqZ MnY K wi eb|
( 7) i vc wZ -
( K ) msm` - m` m wnmve wbevwPZ nBevi
hvM;
( L ) K vb i vR bwZ K ` j A _ evK vb
i vR bwZ K ` j i mwnZ hy evA sMxf ~Z
K vb msVbi m` m bnb;
( M) msm` - m` m` i A vmbwbevPb c v_ x
bnb, Ges c v_ xnBeb bvgg
wj wL Z f ve mZ nBqvQb;
( N) evnv i er mi i A waK eq bnb|
GBi c ew MYi ga nBZ Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|
( 8 ) i vc wZ c avb Dc ` vi c i vgk A byhvqx Dc ` vMYi
wbqvM` vb K wi eb|
( 9) i vc wZ i D k ^n wj wL Z I ^v i hy
c hvM c avb Dc ` v ev K vb Dc ` v ^xq c ` Z vM K wi Z
c vwi eb |
( 10) c avb Dc ` v ev K vb Dc ` v GB A byQ` i
A axb D i ~c wbqvMi hvMZ v nvi vBj wZ wb D c ` envj
_ vwK eb bv|
( 11) c avb Dc ` v c avbg xi c ` ghv` v Ges c vwi k wgK
I myhvM- myweav j vf K wi eb Ges Dc ` v g xi c ` ghv` v
Ges c vwi k wgK I mhvM- myweavj vf K wi eb|
260
( 12) b~Z b msm` MwVZ nBevi c i c avbg x h Z vwi L
Z vunvi c ` i K vhf vi MnY K i b mB Z vwi L wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi wej y nBe|
58 N| wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i K vhvej x| - ( 1)
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi GK wU A eZ xK vj xb mi K vi wnmve
Bnvi ` vwqZ c vj b K wi eb Ges c R vZ i K gwbqvwR Z
ew MYi mvnvh I mnvqZ vq D i ~c mi K vi i ` bw` b
K vhvej x mv` b K wi eb; Ges GBi ~c K vhvej x mv` bi
c qvR b eZ xZ K vb bxwZ wbavi Yxwmv MnY K wi eb bv|
( 2) wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi k vw c ~Y, myy I
wbi c f ve msm` - m` mMYi mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi R b
hi c mvnvh I mnvqZ vi c qvR b nBe, wbevPb K wgk bK
mBi ~c mK j mve mvnvh I mnvqZ vc ` vb K wi eb|
58 O| msweavbi K wZ c q weavbi A K vhK i Z v| - GB
msweavbi 48 ( 3) , 141K ( 1) Ges 141M( 1) A byQ` hvnvB
_ vK zK bv K b , 58 K A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vq gqv` wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi i K vhK vj i vc wZ K Z K c avbg xi
c i vgk A byhvqx ev Z uvnvi c wZ ^v i MnYv K vhK i vi
weavbmg~n A K vhK i nBe|
4| msweavbi 61 A byQ` i msk vab| - msweavbi 61
A byQ` i wbqw Z nBe k wj i c wi eZ wbqw Z
nBe Ges h gqv` 58 A byQ` i A axb wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi _ vwK e mB gqv` D A vBb i vc wZ K Z K
c wi Pvwj Z nBek wj c wZ vwc Z nBe|
( 5) msweavbi 99 A byQ` i msk vab| - msweavbi 99
A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vq A vav- wePvi wef vMxq c ` k wj i
c wi eZ A vav- wePvi wef vMxq c ` A _ ev c avb Dc ` v ev
Dc ` vi c ` k wj c wZ vwc Z nBe|
6| msweavbi 123 A byQ` i msk vab| - msweavbi
123 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d vi c wi eZ wbi c ` d v c wZ vwc Z
nBe, h_ vt-
( 3) gqv` A emvbi K vi Y A _ ev gqv` A emvb
eZ xZ A b K vb K vi Y msm` f vswMqv hvBevi c i eZ xbeB
w` bi ga msm` - m` mMYi mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ
nBe|
7| msweavbi 147 A byQ` i msk vab| - msweavbi
147A byQ` i ( 4) ` d vq,-
( K ) ( L ) Dc - ` d vi c wi eZ wbi Dc - ` d v c wZ vwc Z
nBe, h_ vt-
261
( L ) c avbg xevc avb Dc ` v; Ges
( N) ( N) Dc - ` d vi c wi eZ wbi c ` d v c wZ vwc Z
nBe, h_ vt-

( N) g x, Dc ` v, c wZ g x evDc - g x|
8 | msweavbi 152 A byQ` i msk vab| - msweavbi
147 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vq,-
( K ) A byQ` A wf ew i ms vi c i wbi c ms v
mwbewk Z nBe, h_ v-
Dc ` v A _ 58 M A byQ` i A axb D c `
wbhy K vb ew ;
( L ) c R vZ i K g A wf ew i ms vi c i wbi c
ms vmwbewk Z nBe, h_ vt-
c avb Dc ` v A _ 58 N A byQ` i A axb D
c ` wbhy K vb ew |

36| msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi i Z c ~Y
ewk t
GB A vBbi i Z c ~Yewk wj wbi c t
( 1) msm` f A e vq _ vwK j mB gqv` msweavbi 55
A byQ` i ( 4) , ( 5) I ( 6) ` d v wj c hy _ vwK e, wK
msweavbi PZ y_ f vMi 2q c wi Q` i A b K vb A sk
c hy _ vwK e bv;
( 2) hyve vi K vi Y hw` f msm` msweavbi 72( 4)
A byQ` i A vI Z vq A vnvb K wi Z nq Z e 2q c wi Q`
c hy nBe ;
( 3) msm` i gqv` A emvbi K vi Y ev A c ~Ygqv` ga
mvavi Y wbevPbi K vi Y msm` f nBj GK wU wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi MwVZ nBe ;
( 4) Z veavqK mi K vi i gqv` wbevPb c i eZ x msm` MVb
Ges b~Z b c avbg xi ` vwqZ f vi MnY c h ej er
_ vwK e;
( 5) Z veavqK mi K vi h_ f ve i vc wZ i wbK U ` vqx
_ vwK e ;
( 6) Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` ga 58 ( N) ( 1) A byQ` i
weavbvej x mvc c R vZ i wbevnx gZ v c avb
Dc ` vK Z K c hy nBe ;
262
( 7) Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` gaI i v A Z Z vwZ K f ve
nBj I GK wU c R vZ _ vwK e ;
( 8 ) Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` ga 55 A byQ` i ( 4) ,( 5)
I ( 6) ` d v wj Z ewYZ i vc wZ i K vh g eR vq _ vwK e;
( 9) Z veavqK mi K vi i vc wZ c avb Dc ` v I A bwaK
` k R b Dc ` vK wbhy K wi eb ;
( 10) msm` f nBevi 15 w` bi ga Dc ` vMY wbhy
nBeb ;
( 11) c v_ wgK f ve wbevPbi c ~eevsj v` k i mek l
A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ c avb Dc ` vwbhy nBeb ;
( 12) hw` mek l A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ K c vI qv bv hvq
A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY K wi Z A mwZ
R vbvb Z e Z uvnvi A eewnZ c ~eA emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vwbqvM ` I qvnBe ;
( 13) hw` K vb A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` v
c ` wbqvM ` I qv bv hvq Z e m A vc xj wef vMi
mek l A emi c v wePvi K K c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvM
` I qvnBe;
( 14) hw` A vc xj wef vMi mek l A emi c v wePvi K K c vI qv
bv hvq A _ ev wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY K wi Z
A mwZ R vbvb Z e A vc xj wef vM Z uvnvi A eewnZ c ~e
A emi c v wePvi K K c avb Dc ` v wbqvM ` I qv
hvBe;
( 15) hw` A vc xj wef vMi K vb A emi c v wePvi K K c avb
Dc ` v c ` wbqvM c ` vb me bv nq Z e i vc wZ
evsj v` k i GK R b myhvM bvMwi K K c avb Dc ` v
c ` wbqvM K wi Z c vwi eb;
( 16) hw` A vc xj wef vMi K vb A emi c v wePvi K A _ ev K vb
bvMwi K K c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvM c ` vb K i v me bv
nq Z e i vc wZ mek l c ` c wnmve ^qs c avb
Dc ` vi ` vwqZ f vi MnY K wi Z c vwi eb ;
( 17) i vc wZ c avb Dc ` vi c i vgk A byhvqx Dc ` vMYi
wbqvM ` vb K wi eb ;
( 18 ) c avb Dc ` v c avbg xi bvq Ges GK R b Dc ` v
g xi bvq c ` ghv` v Ges c vwi k wgK I myhvM- myweav j vf
K wi eb ;
( 19) b~Z b msm` MwVZ nBevi c i c avbg x h Z vwi L Z uvnvi
c ` i K vhf vi MnY K wi eb mB Z vwi L wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi wej y nBe ;
263
( 20) Z veavqK mi K vi c R vZ i K gwbqvwR Z ew MYi
mvnvh I mnvqZ vq mi K vi i ` bw` b K vhvej x mv` b
K wi e Ges D ` bw` b K vhej x mv` bi c qvR b
ewZ Z K vb bxwZ wbavi Yxwmv MnY K wi e bv ;
( 21) k vw c ~Y, myyI wbi c f ve R vZ xq msm` - m` mMYi
mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi R b Z veavqK mi K vi wbevPb
K wgk bK mK j c K vi mve mvnvh I mnvqZ v c ` vb
K wi e;
( 22) Z veavqK mi K vi i gqv` - ga msweavbi 48 ( 3)
A byQ` ewYZ c avbg xi c i vgk , 141 ( K ) ( 1)
A byQ` ewYZ R i i x A e v Nvl Yv I 141 ( M) ( 1)
A byQ` ewYZ R i i x A e vi mgq gwj K A waK vi mg~n
wMZ K i Y ms v c avbg xi c i vgk BZ vw` MnY
K wi evi weavbmg~n A K vhK i _ vwK e;
( 23) Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` ga evsj v` k i c wZ i v
K gwef vM ms v c k vmb i vc wZ K Z K mswk A vBbvi v
c wi Pvwj Z nBe;
( 24) msweavbi 123 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d v c wi eZ b K wi qv
msm` f nBevi c i eZ xbeB w` bi ga R vZ xq msm`
m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb K wi evi weavb K i v
nBqvQ|

c Z xqgvb nq h gqv` mgvc v msm` f vwqv Mj A _ ev
msm` A b K vb K vi Y gqv` i c ~eB f nBj , msm` f i
Z vwi L nBZ 15 w` bi ga c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf v c ` Z vM
K wi eb Ges i vc wZ Dc ` vMYK c avb Dc ` vi myc vwi k A bymvi
wbqvM c ` vb K wi eb Ges GK wU wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MwVZ
nBe|
wbevPb K wgk b msm` f i Z vwi L nBZ 90 w` bi ga
msm` m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb K wi eb| GB mgqK vj i
ga Z veavqK mi K vi GK wU myymvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi R b
wbevPb K wgk bK mK j c K vi mvnvh mnhvwMZ vK wi e|

37| R bMY I msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb t
wK msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, evsj v` k i
264
R bMYK m~YA ` k K wi qv w` qvQ| msm` bvB, g xmf v bvB,
R bMYi K vb c wZ wbwa bvB| A _ P GB R bMYB hy K wi qvQ, eyK i
i w` qv evsj v` k K gy K wi qvQ| GB R bMYK eR b K wi qvB
R bMYi MYZ c wZ vi R b GB Z wK Z msk vabx GK R b c avb
Dc ` vmn A wbevwPZ 11R b Dc ` v mgwf evnvi GK wU wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi MVbi ee v K wi qvQ| Bnv hb Prince of Denmark
K eR b K wi qv Hamlet Gi A wf bq | h R bMY evsj v` k i vI Bnvi
msweavbi K ` we` yI Pvwj K v k w mB R bMYK eR b K wi qv Z _ v
c R vnxb MvxZ i R b c YxZ GB A vBbi eaZ v GB gvK v gvq
wePvi i wel qe |
Dj L , h wbevPb A byvb me mgqB c avbZ wbevPb
K wgk bi ` vq I ` vwqZ Ges K Z e | Z veavqK mi K vi i wek l I
c avb ` vwqZ nBj 58 N( 2) A byQ` ewYZ k vw c ~Y, myy I
wbi c f ve wbevPb A byvbi R b wbevPb K wgk bK mve mK j
c K vi mvnvh I mnvqZ vc ` vb K i v|
c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf v Z uvnv` i mK j K vh gi R b
h_ f ve R vZ xq msm` i wbK U ` vqe _ vK b Ges msm` i gvag
I ew MZ f ve R bMYi wbK U ` vqe _ vK b| wK Z veavqK
mi K vi hnZ zA wbevwPZ mnZ zZ uvnv` i msm` i wbK U ev R bMYi
wbK U ` vqe _ vwK evi c k bvB| Z uvnvi v Z uvnv` i wbqvMK Z v
i vc wZ i wbK U ` vqe _ vK b|

i vc wZ I msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb t
i vc wZ evsj v` k i i vc avb| wZ wb c avbg x, c avb wePvi c wZ ,
wePvi c wZ mn mvsweavwbK c ` A wawZ mK j ew eMi wbqvMK Z v|
Z vnvQvo v, mvgwi K , emvgwi K mK j K gwef vMi wZ wbB wbqvMK Z v|
Z uvnvi bvgB A av` k I wewagvj v R vi x Ges mK j A v` k , wb` k
c ` vb, mK j wbevnx K gK v c wi Pvwj Z I Pzw wbevn K i v nBqv
_ vK | hw` I wZ wb i vi mevP ew wK i vxq mK j K gK v
Z uvnvi c I bvg c avbg x ev A c i K vb ` vwqZ c v g x
265
c wi Pvj bv K wi qv _ vK b| wZ wb mvsweavwbK i vc avb, Z uvnvi c K Z
K vb wbevnx` vwqZ bvB|
wK msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Dc i v i vxq
i c i L vi gwj K c wi eZ b A vbqb K wi qvQ|
msm` i gqv` A emvbi K vi Y ev A b K vb K vi b mvavi Y
wbevPb A byvbi R b msm` f nBj Dc i v msweavb msk vab
A vBb A bymvi A bvb ` vwqZ i mwnZ wbwj wL Z A wZ wi ` vwqZ
i vc wZ i Dc i eZ vBet
1) msm` f nBevi c bi w` bi ga c avb
Dc ` vI A bvb Dc ` vwbqvM;
2) c wZ i vg Yvj qi wbevnx` vwqZ ;
3) A av` k I wewagvj vR vi x;
4) wbR ` vwqZ R i i xA e vNvl Yv;
5) R i i x A e vK vj xb mgq wbR ` vwqZ gwj K
A waK vi mg~n wMZ K i Y;
c Z xqgvb nq h Z wK Z A vBb A bymvi ^ mgqi R b nBj I
i vc wZ mvsweavwbK ev wbqgvZ vw K i vc avb nBZ wbevnx i vc avb
c wi YZ nb hw` I wZ wb R bMY K Z K wbevwPZ bnb ev wZ wb R bMYi
c wZ wbwaZ I K i b bv| wZ wb h msm` K Z K wbevwPZ nBqvwQj b,
mB msm` I A vi we` gvb _ vK bv| Z veavqK mi K vi i vc wZ i
wbK U ` vqe wK wZ wb K vnvi I wbK U ` vqe bb, GgbwK mvef g
R bMYi wbK UI bn| GL vbB mvsweavwbK f ve Z uvnvi gZ vi
A mvi Z v ev ` bZ v K vi Y i vwU Z L bI c R vZ Ges R bMYi wbK U
` vqeZ vB gZ vi Dr m| ` vqeZ vi A byc w wZ Z gZ vI
A byc w Z |

R bMYi mvef gZ t Dj L h wewUk A vgj evsj vi
R bMY c i vaxb wQj | c i vaxbZ vi k L j nBZ i v c vBevi R b
evsj vi R bMY c vwK vb mw K wi qvwQj | wK c vwK vb A vgj I
evsj vi R bMY c K Z ^vaxbZ vi A v ^v` K vbw` bB c vq bvB | Gi c i
j R xebi wewbgq evsj v` k ^vaxb nq| evsj vi R bMY GB c _ g
266
mvef gZ A R b K i | wK K qK er mi i gaB GB ` k ` yB ` yB
evi mvgwi K k vmb A vi vc K i v nq, evsj vi R bMY c K Z c
A vevi I wbR ` i mvgwi K evwnbxi wbK U mvef gZ nvi vq|

` xNMYA v` vj b k l 1991 mvj msm` xq MYZ c ybi vi
K i v nq| Bnv wQj R bMYi weR q| R bMY Z vnv` i mvef gZ
wd wi qv c vq| wK Z wK Z A vBb 3 ( wZ b) gvmi R b i vR Z bv
nBj I MvxZ vc b K i | GB A vBb i vc wZ K MvxZ i
c avb K i Ges ^ mgqi R b nBj I R bMY A vevi I mvef gZ
nvi vq| evsj v` k i R bMY f vi Z ev c vwK vbi gZ wewUk i vR i
A byMn mvef gZ c vq bvB, hy i vi R bMYi bvq hy K wi qvB e
Z vMi wewbgq GB mvef gZ A R b K wi qvQ| msweavbi c vebv
I 7 A byQ` Z vnv A wZ c wi vi f ve Nvl Yv K i v nBqvQ A _ P GB
msk vabx A vBbi K vi Y R bMY Z vnv` i k Z I wbi yk K Z Z
wZ b gvmi R b nBj I nvi vq| Dj L , R bMYi GB mvef gZ
K vnvi I ` vbi mvgMx bq h hL b L y wk w` j vg ev hL b L ywk wd i vBqv
j Bj vg ev Bnv L K vj xbI bn, R bMY gyw hy K wi qv GK mvMi
i i wewbgq GB wPi b mvef gZ A R b K wi qvQ|

K vb A vBb c Yqb hZ K vi Y I I R i B _ vK zK bv K b, K vb
K vi Y ev K vb A R ynvZ , Z vnv hZ i Z c ~YB nDK bv K b K L bB
R bMYi mvef gZ K vwo qv j I qv hvq bv| R bMYi mvef gZ mK j
K vi Y, c qvR b I I R i i Dc i A ew Z | R bMYi K vi Y I
c qvR b msweavbI msk vab K i v hvq, hgb, hy i vi msweavb
MZ mvqv ` yBk Z er mi 27wU msk vabx A vbvqb K i v nBqvQ,
f vi Z i msweavbI k Z vwaK evi msk vab nBqvQ, wK K vb
msk vabxB R bMYi mvef gZ K L bB K vb f veB ybK i bvB|

hy i v 18 61 mvj Mnhy R o vBqv c o | Pvi er mi evc x
c ej Mnhy Union Gi A w Z wec bnBqv c o | j j gvbyl
Mnnvi v nq, c vY nvi vq wK GBi c Z xe msK Ugq A e vZ I
267
hy i vi R bMYi mvef gZ we` ygv zbnq GBi c K vb A vBb
c Yqb K i v nq bvB ev c ` c MnY K i v nq bvB| wZ xq gnvhyi
mgq R vc vb nvI qvB xc c y A v gb K wi j hy i v m~` xNmgqi
R b mi vmwi hy R o vBqv c o | wK R bMYi mvef gZ i c wi c x
K vb c ` c GBi c R i i x A e vZ I K L bI MnY K i v nq bvB,
GgbwK wbevPbI mwVK mgq A bywZ nBqvQ|
Z ` c f vi Z I 1949 mvj nBZ eevi hy ev hyve vi
myL xb nBqvwQj , R i i x A e vI K qK evi R vi x K wi Z nBqvwQj
wK R bMYi mvef gZ c wi c x K vb c ` c K L bI MnY K i
bvB |

c K Z c Sovereignty ev mvef gZ K L bI gf nBZ c vi
bv, BnvPerpetual Succession Gi bvq wPi b A wewQbf ve Pj gvb|
1649 mvj Bsj vi i vR v Charles I Gi wk i Q` K i v nq Ges
Oliver Cromwell Bsj vK Commonwealth Nvl Yv K i b| Z r c i , wZ wb
wbR Lord Protector Dc vwa MnY K wi qv Bsj v k vmb K wi Z _ vK b|
Z vnvi gZ zi wK QyK vj c i i vR Z c ybi vi nq Ges Charles I Gi c y
Charles II 1660 mvj Bsj vi wmsnvmb A vi vnY K i b| GB 11
er mi mgqK vj i NUbvej x BwZ nvmi c qvR b wj wc e nBqvQ eU
wK mvsweavwbK A vBb A bymvi Charles I Gi gZ yi m mB
^qsw q f ve Charles II 1649 mvj B Bsj vi i vR v nBqvwQj b
ewj qv mvsweavwbK f ve MY K i v nq| GB K vi YB The King is dead
Nvl Yvi m m GK wbtk vmB c i eZ x i vR vi D k Long live the
King ej vnq|

1971 mvj i 26k gvPZ vwi L i c _ g c ni evsj v` k i
^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvi mgq nBZ B wek i gvbwP evsj v` k bvg GK wU
b~Z b i v A vZ c K vk K i | 10B Gwc j Z vwi L A vbyvwbK f ve
Proclamation of Independence R vi x K i v nq Ges Z vnv 26k gvPZ vwi L
268
nBZ K vhK i K i v nq| D Proclamation G A bvb wel qvej xi mwnZ
wbwj wL Z Nvl YvI K i vnq t
declare and constitute Bangladesh to be a sovereign Peoples
Republic................

25k gvPw` evMZ i v nBZ B evsj v` k i R bMY MYhy
A vi K i | hyi c vi nBZ B evsj vi R bMY A v R vwZ K mg_ b
j vf K wi Z _ vK Ges hyi k l f vM wewf b` k evsj v` k K i v
wnmve ^xK wZ (recognition) c ` vb K wi Z A vi K i hvnv wQj evsj vi
R bMYi mvef gZ i c wZ A v R vwZ K ^xK wZ | 16B wWm^i
Z vwi L c vwK vb mbvevwnbxi A vZ mgc bi ga w` qv evsj vi R bMY
^vaxbZ vhy R q j vf K i |

1972 mvj i 11B R vbyqvi x Z vwi L R vi xK Z Provisional
Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972, 10B Gwc j Gi Proclamation K
A bygv` b K i |

msweavbi 153( 1) A byQ` A bymvi msweavb 1972 mvj i
16B wWm^i Z vwi L nBZ ej er nq| msweavbi 150 A byQ` I
PZ z_ Z d wmj i 3( 1) A byQ` A bymvi 1971 mbi 26k gvPnBZ
msweavb c eZ bi Z vwi L c h c YxZ mK j A vBb I ^vaxbZ vi
Nvl Yvc A bygvw` Z nq|

A Z Ge, 1971 mvj i 26k gvPZ vwi L ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvi
mv_ mv_ evsj vi R bMY GK wU mvef g evsj v` k i A waevmx
wnmve mvef gZ j vf K i | msweavb D mvef gZ K aygv
A bygv` bB c ` vb K i bvB, A waK Z i mgybZ I K wi qvQ| c K Z c
evsj vi R bMYi mvef gZ K A bymi Y K wi qv msweavb i wPZ
nBqvQ|

^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvi gvag evsj vi R bMY h mvef gZ A R b
K i , gyw hy j k nx` i i Z vnv gwngvwbZ nq, R bMYi mB
mvef gZ wPi b| evsj v` k wPi K vj ^vaxb _ vwK e Ges wPi K vj
269
evsj vi R bMYi mvef gZ we` gvb _ vwK e| gvS ga ` e` ~NUbvi
bvq mvgwi K k vmb BZ vw` i gZ mvsweavwbK wePzwZ NwUj I NwUZ
c vi wK evsj vi R bMYi mvef gZ wPi b- Pj gvb| Bnvi mwnZ
hvnvB mvsNwl K nBe Z vnvB L wZ nBe, A ea Nvwl Z nBe|

GB c h evsj vi R bMYi mvgf gZ K A v R vwZ K I
i vR bwZ K ` wK vY nBZ wePvi K i v nBj | GBevi Bnvi A vBbMZ
eaZ vweePbvK i vhvK |

c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h evsj vi R bMY msweavb i Pbvi
c ~eB mvef gZ A R b K wi qvQ| 1971 mvj i 10B Gwc j Z vwi L
Proclamation of Independence R vi x nq| BnvB evsj v` k i c _ g
mvsweavwbK ` wj j | GB ` wj j B ^vaxbZ v Nvl Yvi Z vwi L 26k gvP
nBZ B mvef g MYc R vZ i c evsj v` k i c wZ vNvl YvK i |

GL vb Dj L h i vR Z i vR v wbR B mvef g (Sovereign) |
c R vZ MYgvbyl B mvef g| GB K vi YB Proclamation of IndependenceG
Sovereign Peoples Republic A _ ev mvef g MY- c R vZ ej v nBqvQ|
Z e c R vZ A _ nBZ Q c R vA _ vr R bMYi Z evi vR Z |
Blacks Law Dictionary A bymvi Republic A _ A system of government in
which the people hold sovereign power and elect representatives who exercise that
power.
Robert A Dahl Gi gZ A bymvi A republic is a government which (a)
derives all of its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people.........
msweavb i wPZ nBevi c ~eevsj v` k i R bMYi GB A vBbMZ
A e vb msweavbi 150 A byQ` I PZ z_ Z d wmj i 3( 1) A byQ` I
mg_ b I A bygv` b K i |
msweavbi c vebv GK B f ve Nvl Yv K i h evsj v` k i
R bMYB ^vaxbZ vhyi g~j Pvwj K vk w , Z vnvi vB gyw hyi gvag
mvef g MYc R vZ x evsj v` k ^vaxb K wi qvQ Ges evsj v` k i
msweavb i PbvI wewae K wi qvmgeZ f ve MnY K wi qvQ|
270
msweavbi c _ g f vMi wk i vbvg c R vZ , Bsi R xZ The
Republic| msweavbi c _ g A byQ` I GK B f ve Nvl YvK i ht
evsj v` k GK wU GK K , ^vaxb I mvef g c R vZ , hvnv
MYc R vZ xevsj v` k bvg c wi wPZ nBe|

c _ g A byQ` i Bsi R xf vl wbi c t
Bangladesh is a unitary, independent, sovereign Republic to be known as
the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

GB f ve R bMYi mvef gZ Nvl Yvi gvagB
msweavbi m~Pbv|

msweavbi c _ g f vMi mek l mg A byQ` msweavbi
c vavb Nvl Yv K wi Z wMqv R bMYi k Z I mvef gZ wbwj wL Z
f ve mywbw Z K i t
7| ( 1) c R vZ i mK j gZ vi gvwj K R bMY; Ges
R bMYi c mB gZ vi c qvM K ej GB msweavbi A axb
I K Z Z K vhK i nBe|
( 2) R bMYi A wf c vqi c i g A wf ewI i c GB
msweavb c R vZ i mevP A vBb Ges A b K vb A vBb hw`
GB msweavbi mwnZ A mg m nq, Z vnv nBj mB A vBbi
hZ L vwb A mvg mc ~Y, Z Z L vwb evwZ j nBe|
Bsi R xf vl wbi c t
7.(1) All powers in the Republic belong to the people, and their exercise
on behalf of the people shall be effected only under, and by the authority of,
this Constitution.
(2) This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will of the
people, the supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent
with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency,be
void.

GB f ve evsj v` k i c _ g mvsweavwbK ` wj j The
Proclamation of Independence, msweavbi c vebv Ges c _ g I mg
A byQ` evsj v` k i R bMYi mvef gZ K mvsweavwbK f ve Nvl Yv
K wi qvQ, mg_ b K wi qvQ I mywbw Z K wi qvQ weavq A vBbMZ f ve
Bnv msweavbi GK wU A j Nbxq weavb ev Basic Structure | BnvK
271
K vbf veB, K vb K vi YB j Nb K i v hvBe bv| A _ P Z wK Z A vBb
wK f ve R bMYi mvef gZ K j Nb K wi evi c qvm c vBqvQ Z vnv
Dc i i A vj vPbvq weeZ nBqvQ|

Z veavqK mi K vi - MvxZ t Z veavqK mi K vi i
c avb Dc ` v gbvbxZ nBeb c v b c avb wePvi c wZ A _ ev A vc xj
wef vMi A emi c v wePvi K A _ ev evsj v` k i GK R b myhvM
bvMwi K A _ ev Z vnv` i K vnvK I c vI qv bv Mj i vc wZ ^qs c avb
Dc ` v nBeb| Bnv ewZ Z A c i ` k R b Dc ` vI c avb Dc ` vi
c i vgk mvc i vc wZ K Z K wbqvMc v nBeb| Z uvnvi v mevP
beB w` bi R b ` k c wi Pvj bv K wi eb Ges wbevPb K wgk bK myy
f ve wbevPb c wi Pvj bvi R b c qvR bxq mnhvwMZ vc ` vb K wi eb|
m` n bvB h c avb Dc ` v I A b ` k R b Dc ` v mK j B
A Z m b ew Ges vb, Y I wk vq Z uvnvi v ` k i k
m vb` i A bZ g| wK Z uvnvi v A wbevwPZ | Z uvnvi v K vb f veB
` k i R bMYK c wZ wbwaZ K i b bv| ^ mgqi R b nBj I
Z uvnvi v GK wU ^vaxb mvef g i v c wi Pvj bvi ` vwqZ _ vwK eb|
Z uvnvi v mr , bvqc i vqY I me Yvwb Z nI qv mZ I i vwe vbi f vl vq
GBi c i vee vK MvxZ (Oligarchy) ej | A wZ ^ mgqi R b
nBj I Z veavqK mi K vi ee vGK wU MvxZ eB A vi wK Qybn|
MvxZ i BwZ nvm mf Z vi bvqB c yi vZ b | wK GB
i vee vK A vo vB nvR vi er mi c ~ ei Mxmi bMi K ` xK mf Z vI
MnY K i bvB | gahyMi c vi BDi vc i K vb K vb ` k GB
i vee v c Pj bi Pv e_ nq| 18 k k Z v x nBZ B c wZ wbwaZ k xj
MYZ i Dbl | A _ P 21 k Z K i ` vi c v Dc bxZ nBqv evOvj x
R vwZ K GL b GB MvxZ K Mj atK i Y K wi Z nBZ Q| Dc j
nBZ Q GK wU myy wbevPb A byvb K wi Z wbevPb K wgk b I
mi K vi i e_ Z v|

38 | Basic Structure Z Z - mvavi Y A vj vPbvt

272
Kesavananda gvK v gvq A wf gZ c K vk K i v nq h msweavb
msk vab Parliament Gi gZ v A mxg bq ei s 368 A byQ` c `
gZ vq A c Z (implied) mxgveZ v i wnqvQ| D A byQ`
msweavbi basic structure A _ ev framework msk vabi gZ v c ` vb K i
bv|
mvsweavwbK Z v eZ gvb GK wU A vBbMZ bxwZ | Bnv
mi K vi i wbevnx gZ vK wbq Yi ga i vL hvnvZ i vMYZ I
A vBbi k vmb eR vq _ vK | GB MYZ vw K i xwZ bxwZ i A bZ g
nBZ Q gwj K A waK vi msi Y| GB mvsweavwbK Z v separation of
powers ev gZ vi c _ K &K i YK checks and balances Gi ga i vL | Bnv
gZ vK K ` xf ~Z bv K wi qv c wi ev K wi qv ` q| Parliament K L bB
gwj K A waK vi L eK i bv, myc xg K vUGB bxwZ ev avi Yv MnY
K i Z t A vBb wek l Y K wi qv _ vK | Parliament c qvR b gZ gwj K
A waK vi mxwgZ K wi Z c vi wK K L bB A vBb K wi qv evwZ j K wi Z
c vi bv| GK wU ^vaxb wePvi ee vB gwj K A waK vi i v K wi Z
c vi K vi Y Bnv aygv A vBbi mvavi Y evL vB K i bv, A v` k MZ
g~j vqbI K i |

Bsj vi Parliamentary mvef gZ I A vgv` i mvsweavwbK
mvef gZ i ga Z d vr i wnqvQ| A vgv` i msweavb MYc wi l ` i Pbv
K wi qvQ, R vZ xq msm` bq| A vgv` i GK wU ` yt wi eZ bxq msweavb
i wnqvQ| msweavbi Z Z xq f vM ewYZ gwj K A waK vi mg~n A vBbi
k vmbi wf w | A vBbi k vmb (rule of law) I gZ vi c _ K &K i Y I
gwj K A waK vi mg~n mvsweavwbK Z vi bxwZ hvnv judicial review Gi
wf w I eU | GBi c c vc UB basic structure Z Z i De nq|

gwj K A waK vi mg~n mf mgvR GK wU wek l vb A waK vi
K wi qv i wnqvQ| GB A waK vi mg~n gwj K I ` ~ q hvnvK hy i vi
msweavbi A vj vK inalienable A waK vi ej v nq| hy i vi g~j
msweavb gwj K A waK vi mg~n c _ g mshvwR Z wQj bv| c i eZ xZ
273
gwj K A waK vi m^wj Z 10( ` k ) wU msk vabx A vbv nq| msk vab
A vBb wj 1791 mvj i 15B wWm^i Z vwi L GK A i v wj i
A bygv` b (ratification) j vf K i | GB wj K GK Bill of Rights ej v
nq| Z vnvQvo v, Mnhyi c i XIII, XIV I XV msk vab wj A bygv` b
c vq| GB wj msweavbi ma ^i c | evsj v` k msweavbi wZ xq I
Z Z xq f vMK GK msweavbi weeK ej vhvq|

msweavb i Pbv K i i vi R bMYi c wZ wbwa wnmve MYc wi l ` |
D g~j msweavbi eaZ v D vc bi K vb myhvM bvB wK msweavb
msk vab K i v nq msweavb c ` gZ vi A vI Z vq, mL vbB eaZ vi
c k I V|

msweavbi K vb&A sk wU basic feature Z vnv wbYq K wi Z Z wK Z
msk vabi D k I K vi Y mvgwMK f ve msweavbi mwnZ weePbv
K i Z t D msk vabi K vi Y hw` Bnvi K vb g~j A sk Ggbf ve
wZ M nq h msweavbi Pwi B A vg~j c wi eZ b nBqv hvq, m
D g~j A sk K basic sturcture ej v nq| 142 A byQ` i A vI Z vq Ggb
K vb msk vab K i v hvq bv hvnvi vi v msweavb weK j v nBqv hvq|
Bnv wbYq K wi Z c wZ wU Z wK Z msk vab A vBb g~j msweavbi mwnZ
c _ K c _ K f ve Z zj bv K i Z t wePvi weePbv K wi evi c qvR b
i wnqvQ|

Dj L h c Z K wU gvbyl R bi mgq nBZ K Z K wj mvavi Y
A waK vi j Bqv R b j vf K i | msweavbi Z Z xq f vM evsj v` k i
gvbyl K b~Z b K vb A waK vi ` q bvB| R bnBZ gvbyl i we` gvb
A waK vi K mvsweavwbK ^xK wZ c ` vb K wi qvQ gv | msL vMwi Z vi
k w Z GB A waK vi evwZ j K i v hvq bv| GK wU mvavi Y A waK vi i
hw` gwj K Z v _ vK , wPw Z I wbw Z A v` k _ vK , Z e Z vnv gwj K
A waK vi c wi YZ nq| myc xg K vUK Ggb f ve msweavb wek l Y
K wi Z nq hvnvZ gvbyl Z vnvi mvsweavwbK A waK vi Dc f vM K wi Z
274
c vi | gwj K A waK vi mg~n msweavbi GK wU wek l ghv` vc ~Y
A e vb i wnqvQ|

gwj K A waK vi mg~n mvavi Y f ve basic structure I
A c wi eZ bxq| Bnv wek l K vb K vi Y msw K i v hvBZ c vi wK
K L bB i wnZ K i v hvq bv| Bnv i vi A c wi wgZ gZ vK mshZ I
wbq Yi ga i vL | Basic structure Z Z gwj K A waK vi wj i vi
R b c vPxi wnmve K vR K i |

myc xg K vUi judicial review Gi gZ v basic structure Z Z i
A vI Z vf ~ | mg A vBbi mvsweavwbK Z v wePvi K wi evi ` vwqZ wePvi
wef vMi Dc i b | wePvi wef vMi wbq Y ewZ i K msweavb
msk vab msm` xq ^i Z c wi YZ nBZ c vi Ges c wi YwZ Z
msweavbi k Z nvi vBevi mebv` L vw` Z c vi |

mvavi Yf ve R vZ xq msm` msweavbi hK vb A byQ` i
msk vab K wi Z c vi eU wK D msk vab hw` basic structure Gi
mwnZ mvsNwl K nq Z vnvnBj DnvA ea evultra vires nBe|

Indira Gandhi gvK gvq A vBbi ` wZ mgZ v Ges Minerva
gvK v gvq f vi Z xq msweavbi 14, 19 I 21 A byQ` K msweavbi
basic structure Ges Z vnvevwZ j hvM bn ewj qvNvl YvK i vnq|

gwj K A waK vi i c vZ h A v` k I bxwZ we` gvb i wnqvQ
Z vnvB basic structure Gi wf w |

msweavb msk vabi gvag Bill of Rights hy i vi msweavb
mshy K i v nBe GB k Z A i v wj msweavb A bygv` b K wi qvwQj |
wZ xq gnvhyi c i wek A bK b~ Z b MYZ vw K i v R b j vf
K wi qvQ| c vq mK j MYZ vw K i v R bgvbyl i gwj K A waK vi
i vi c ` c MnY K i vnBqvQ|

R vgvbxi msweavb K Z K wj g~j A waK vi basic structure wnmve
mshvwR Z i wnqvQ| K vbvWv Bnvi 198 2 mvj i msweavb K Z K wj
275
gwj K A waK vi msi Y K wi qvQ| 1998 mvj hy i vR Human
Rights Act c Yqb K i vnBqvQ|

c Z xqgvb nq wek i c vq mK j i vi msweavb K Z wj wek l
A waK vi msi Y K i hvnvK L bB c wi eZ bhvM bn|

Indira Gandhi gvK v gvq gZ vi A c Z (implied) mxgveZ v I
controlled msweavbK uncontrolled msweavb i c v i K wi evi c qvmi
K vi Y myc xg K vUmsweavb mshvwR Z 329- G( 4) A byQ` evwZ j
Nvl YvK i |

R vZ xq msm` msweavb msk vab K wi Z gZ vc v wK D
gZ v mxgvnxb ev A wbq xZ bq| hw` msk vabwU msweavbi c K wZ
c wi eZ b K i Z vnvnBj D msk vabxwU evwZ j evultra vires nBe|

c k DwVZ c vi h R vZ xq msm` 142 A byQ` msk vab
K wi qv Bnvi msk vabi gZ v ew K i Z t msweavbi gwj K Pwi
ni Y K wi Z c vi wK bv| 142 A byQ` Ggb K vb gZ v R vZ xq
msm` K c ` vb K i bv| R vZ xq msm` h K vb msk vabx K wi Z
c vwi j I D A byQ` ewYZ msk vabxi k Z f ev basic structure Gi
mwnZ mvsNwl K K vb msk vab A vBb R vZ xq msm` K wi Z c vi bv|

c R vZ , MYZ , A vBbi ` wZ mgZ v, A vBbi k vmb, wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ v, judicial review I gZ vi c _ K &K i Y BZ vw`
msweavbi basic structure| GB A waK vi wj A vevi GK wU A vi GK wUi
Dc i c i i wbf i k xj | A vBbi ` wZ mgZ v GB gwj K
A waK vi i A byc w wZ Z A vBbi k vmb A vk v K i v A _ nxb| K vb
msk vabxZ msweavb j Nb nBZ Q wK bv Z vnv wePvi K wi evi ` vwqZ
me mgqB myc xg K vUi Dc i bv | GB K vi YB myc xg K vUi
judicial review Gi gZ v msweavbi GK wU A wZ c qvR bxq ewk |
Z Z xq f vM ev A bvb f vM msweavbi g~j m~i ev D k wK Z vnv
judicial review Gi gvagB Bnvi c K Z A e vb wbYq K i vme|

276
A vBbi ` wZ mgZ v mvavi Yf ve GB gwj K A waK vi
wbtm` n msweavbi GK wU basic structure, wK mvweK mgZ vi D k
A vBbi gvag GB A waK vi wek l mxwgZ K i v ev GgbwK
mvweK ^v_ L eK i vI me| msweavbi K vb basic structure Gi Pwi
ni Y bv K wi qvI mxwgZ K wi evi GB mxgvbv wbavi Y judicial review Gi
gvagB me|

GB f ve K vb A wZ c qvR bxq A vBbK mvsweavwbK f ve i v
K wi evi j A vBbi k vmb ev gZ vi c _ K &K i Y ewZ g wnmve
wK QyUv Qvo w` Z nq wK Z vnvZ basic structure wnmve Bnv` i g~j
Pwi ni Y nq bv | wK GBi c I msweavbi A bvb A sk i
mwnZ Z wK Z msk vabxwU mymsMwZ c ~YwK bv Z vnv wePvi wek l Y
K wi evi ` vwqZ I myc xg K vUi , R vZ xq msm` ev wbevnx K Z c i
bn|

gZ vi c _ K &K i Y, A vBbi k vmb, mvsweavwbK Z v c Z K wU Z Z
judicial review Gi mwnZ msMwZ c ~Y| A vaywbK MYZ msL vMwi i
k vmbi mwnZ gwj K A waK vi msi Y Df qi Dc i wbf i k xj |
` k i mi K vi hb Bnvi msL v Mwi Z vi k w Z R bMYi gwj K
A waK vi L ebv K i Z vnv wbq Y I Z Z veavqb K wi evi ` vwqZ
myc xg K vUi |

mvsweavwbK msk vabxi mxgveZ v i wnqvQ wK R vZ xq
msm` msweavb msk vab K i Z t c ybi vq Bnvi A vBbMZ wbi vc v weavb
K i v, Bnvi GL wZ qvi ewnf ~Z I h_ v_ bq| GK B c wZ vb K Z K A vBb
c Yqb A vevi mB c wZ vbi Dc i B Dnvi eaZ v wbi c Y K wi evi
` vwqZ c ` vb mvsweavwbK f ve weaq bq| Z vnvZ msweavbi
A wbwnZ checks and balances web nq| R vZ xq msm` A vBb c Yqb
K wi e Ges myc xg K vUmsweavbi A vj vK m~Y ^vaxb I
A veMgy f ve D A vBbi eaZ v wbi c Y K wi e BnvB msweavb
277
A c Z f ve wbwnZ i wnqvQ| GB K vi YB msweavbi 101 I 102
A byQ` A Z i Z c ~Ybasic structure|

msweavb mvavi Y K vb ` wj j bq| GB gnvb ` wj j i vi
R bMYi c R bMYi c wZ wbwaMY gywI hyi A v` k i Pbv
K wi qvwQj b| Bnv GK wU R xe ` wj j | Bnvi wbR ^GK wU ^vf vweK
A wbwnZ k w i wnqvQ| Bnv R bMYi A vk v, A vK vL v I wb` k bvK
c wZ d wj Z K i | GL vbB GB ` wj j i k Z wbwnZ i wnqvQ| GB
` wj j i vi A Z xZ msi Y K i Ges eZ gvb I f wel r w` K
wb` k bv c ` vb K i | Basic structure GK wU ^Z t wm Z Z | GB Z Z
mvsweavwbK c wi Pq (identity) I c K wZ i Dc i wbf i k xj | Bnv
msweavbK ` pZ v c ` vb K i Ges mK j weavb mwZ c ~YK i | GK wU
i vi R xeb hZ wK Qy mgmv Z vnv GB gnvb ` wj j i gvagB
mgvavb K i v me I k q| GB K vi YB msweavbi evL v I wek l Y
mgq I mgvR c wi eZ b I weeZ bi mwnZ mwZ c ~YnBqv_ vK | GB
K vhwU i vi c wePvi wef vM K wi qv_ vK |

mgqi Z vwM` A bK mgq msweavb msk vab c qvR b nBZ
c vi wK D msk vab K L bB g~j msweavbi Pwi MZ c wi eZ b
A vbqb K wi e bv| c K Z c msweavbK ask K wi evi R b msweavb
eenvi K i vhvq bv|

MYZ , mgvR Z , R vZ xqZ vev` , agwbi c Z v BZ vw` bxwZ I
A v` k mg~n msweavbi mwnZ mvsk wqK I webvwmZ | GB A v` k wj B
msweavbK c v j f ve R bgvbyl i wbR ^m` wnmve c K vwk Z
K i | Bnv mvsweavwbK A vBbi A sk I eU | GB wj msm` i
msk vabx gZ vewnf ~Z |

msm` i Dc i evaK i nBevi c i B aymvsweavwbK K vb bxwZ
msweavbi i Z c ~Yewk wnmve c wi MwYZ nBZ c vi | hw` H
weavb GZ UvB gwj K nq h Z vnv msm` i msk vabx gZ vi
Dc i I evaK i nq Z eB DnvK basic structure wnmve MY K i v hvq
278
wK bv Z vnv weePbv K i v hvq| GB basic structure Z Z msm` i msk vabx
gZ vK I mxgve i vL |

mvavi Y f ve msweavb msk vaxZ nBj I msweavb Bnvi g~j
Pwi A zbi vL | msk vab hw` msweavbi g~j c K wZ L enq Z e
msweavbi basic structure i ` i wnZ nBZ c vi | BnvB mvsweavwbK
mvef gZ i c wi Pq| Basic structure GK gv Z Z hvnvi vi v msweavb
msk vabi eaZ vwbYq K i vhvq|
msweavbi K vb wek l weavb basic structure wnmve MY K i v hvq
wK bv Z vnv c Z K wU B A vgv` i msweavbi i c - i L vq Bnvi
c K Z A e vb Ges Bnvi j I D k wbYq K i Z t msweavbi bvq
i vi k vmb c wi Pvj bvi GK wU gwj K ` wj j Bnvi A ^xK wZ ev
A byc w wZ i c wi Yvg wK ` uvo vq c wZ wU A vewk K f ve Z vnv
c i x vi c qvR b nq| hw` Z wK Z msk vabxi K vi Y msweavbi
gwj K c wi wPwZ (identity) ev c K wZ i c wi eZ b NU Z vnv nBj Bnv
Basic structure eU|


39| msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi wek l Yt

GB c h A vgi v MYZ , c R vZ I wePvi wef vM Ges msweavb
msk vab m^ mvavi Y A vj vPbvK wi qvwQ|
GBevi msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, K vhK i x
nBevi c ~ei vi i vR bwZ K A e vbi c wi eZ b I D A vBb
K vhK i xnBj i vi i vR bwZ K A e vb m^ A vj vPbvK i vnBj |

c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ h evsj v` k msweavb i wPZ I
wewae nBqv evsj v` k R bMYi c Bnvi MYc wi l ` K Z K 1972
mvj i 4Vv bf ^i Z vwi L MwnZ nq| GB gnvb msweavb 1972
mvj i 16B wWm^i Z vwi L nBZ c ewZ Z I K vhK i nq|

279
msweavb A bymvi evsj v` k i v c _ g msm` xq MYZ
(Parliamentary Form) c Pwj Z nq| A Z c i t, msweavb ( PZ z_ msk vab)
A vBb, 1975, A bymvi 1975 mvj nBZ i vc wZ k vmbee v
(Presidential System of Government) Pvj ynq| GB ee v 1991 mvj c h
Pvj y_ vK | 1991 mvj mK j i vR bwZ K ` j GK gZ nBj msm` xq
i vee v c ybi vq c Pj b K wi evi wmv MnY K i v nq| mB wmv
A bymvi msweavb ( v` k msk vab) A vBb, 1991, c _ g wej A vK vi
MnxZ nq Z r c i D msk vabx MYf vU MnxZ nBqv A vBb c wi YZ
nq|

msweavbi PZ y_ f vM i vi wbevnx wef vM mwK Z Gi
weavbmg~n mwbewk Z K i v nBqvQ| Bnvi 1g c wi Q` i vc wZ
ms v , 2q c wi Q` c avbg x I gw mf v, 3q c wi Q` vbxq
k vmb, 4_ c wi Q` c wZ i v K gwef vM I 5g c wi Q` A vUwb-
R bvi j ms v weavbvej xwj wc e K i vnBqvQ|

msweavbi 48 ( 1) A byQ` A bymvi evsj v` k i vi GK R b
i vc wZ _ vwK eb| wZ wb A vBb A byhvqx msm` - m` mMY K Z K wbevwPZ
nBeb| Z ` vbyhvqx i vc wZ wbevPb ms v A vBb, 1991 ( 1991
mvj i 27bs A vBb) A bymvi msm` - m` mMY c K vk f vU` vb
K i b| 50( 1) A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ c vuP er mi gqv` Z uvnvi
c ` A wawZ _ vwK eb| wK K vb ew ` yB gqv` i A waK i vc wZ
c ` A wawZ _ vwK eb bv|

48 ( 2) A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ evsj v` k i wbqgvZ vw K
i vc avb| Z uvnvi vb i vi mK j ew i Da|

48 ( 3) A byQ` A bymvi K ej c avbg x I c avb wePvi c wZ
wbqvMi eZ xZ i vc wZ Z uvnvi A b mK j ` vwqZ c vj b
c avbg xi c i vgk A byhvqxK vhK i b|

280
msweavb wbevnx gZ v i vc wZ i Dc i b K i bvB Z e 55
A byQ` i ( 4) ` d v A bymvi mi K vi i mK j wbevnx ee v i vc wZ i
bvg MnxZ nBqvQ ewj qvc K vk K i vnq|

55 A byQ` i ( 5) ` d v A bymvi i vc wZ i bvg c YxZ
A v` k mg~n I A bvb Pzw c wK i c mZ vwqZ ev c gvYxK Z nBe,
i vc wZ Z vnvwewamg~n- vi vwbavi Y K i b|
55 A byQ` i ( 6) ` d v A bymvi i vc wZ mi K vi x K vhvej x
eUb I c wi Pvj bvi R b wewamg~n c Yqb K i b| GB gZ vej
i vc wZ mi K vi i K vhvej x eUb I c wi Pvj bvi R b Rules of Business,
1996, c Yqb K i b|

Rules of Business Gi rule 6 ( i) Gi A vI Z vq Z d wmj 3G Dj wL Z
wel qv` x, h_ vt c avbg x I c avb wePvi c wZ i wbqvM I c ` Z vM
mwK Z wel qvej xi vc wZ i wbK U mi vmwi Dc vc b K i vnq|

56 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d v A byhvqx h msm` m` m msm` i
msL vMwi m` mi A v vf vR b ewj qv i vc wZ i wbK U c Z xqgvb
nBeb i vc wZ Z uvnvK c avbg xwbqvM K i b|

c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi 56 A byQ` i ( 2) ` d v A bymvi
i vc wZ A bvb g x, c wZ g xI Dc - g xw` MK wbqvM ` vb K i b|

c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi i vc wZ evsj v` k i A vUwb-
R bvi j ( 64A byQ` ) , myc xg K vUi Df q wef vMi wePvi K MY ( 95
A byQ` ) , c avb wbevPb K wgk bvi I A bvb K wgk bvi
( 118 A byQ` ) , gnv- wnmve wbi x K I wbq K ( 127 A byQ` ) ,
mi K vi x K gK wgk bi mf vc wZ I m` mMY` i ( 138 A byQ` )
wbqvM ` vb K i b|

61 A byQ` A bymvi evsj v` k i c wZ i v K gwef vMmg~ni
mevwabvqK Z v i vc wZ i Dc i b Ges A vBb vi v Z vnvi c qvM
wbqw Z nq|

281
93 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d v A byhvqx msm` f vwqv hvI qv A e vq
A _ ev Dnvi A waek bK vj eZ xZ K vb mgq i vc wZ i wbK U A v
ee v MnYi R b c qvR bxq c wi w wZ we` gvb i wnqvQ ewj qv
m vl R bK f ve c Z xqgvb nBj wZ wb D c wi w wZ Z hi c
c qvR bxq ewj qv gb K wi eb, mBi c A av` k c Yqb I R vi x
K wi Z c vi b|

49 A byQ` i A vI Z vq K vb A v` vj Z , UvBeybvj ev A b K vb
K Z c K Z K c ` hK vb ` i gvR bv, wej ^b I wei vg g yi
K wi evi Ges hK vb ` gI K zd , wMZ ev nvm K wi evi gZ v
i vc wZ i _ vwK e|

48 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d v A bymvi K ej c avbg x I c avb
wePvi c wZ wbqvMi ewZ Z i vc wZ Z uvnvi A b mK j ` vwqZ
c vj b c avbg xi c i vgk A byhvqxK vhK i b|

Dc i i eYbv nBZ Bnv Z B c Z xqgvb nq h Dc i i ` yB
ewZ i K A b mK j K vhi vc wZ c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi
K i b|

GBevi c avbg xi mvsweavwbK A e vb c i x vK i vhvDK |

GK R b c avbg x A ek B GK R b wbevwPZ msm` - m` m, A _ vr
wZ wb R bMYi GK R b wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa| Z vnvQvo v, wZ wb msL vMwi
msm` - m` m, hvnvi vwbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa, Z vnv` i A v vf vR b|

i vc wZ Dc i ewYZ c ` c wj msweavb A bymvi aygv
c avbg xi c i vgk gB MnY K wi qv _ vK b A b K vnvi I c i vgk
bq| wZ wb A bK vb msm` - m` m ev g xi c i vgk A bymvi I Dc i v
K vb c ` c MnY K wi Z c vi b bv, K wi j Z vnv A ek B
A mvsweavwbK nBe|

56 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d v A bymvi evsj v` k i vi GK R b
c avbg x _ vwK eb| 57 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d v A bymvi c avbg xi c `
282
k ~b nBe hw` wZ wb K vb mgq i vc wZ i wbK U c ` Z vMc c ` vb
K i b, A _ ev, wZ wb msm` - m` m bv _ vK b| Z vnvQvo v, ( 2) ` d v
A byhvqx msL vMwi m` mi mg_ b nvi vBj c avbg x c ` Z vM
K wi eb wK sev msm` f vswMqv w` evi R b wj wL Z f ve i vc wZ K
c i vgk ` vb K wi eb| Z e, ( 3) ` d v A byhvqx c avbg xi D i vwaK vi x
K vhf vi MnY bvK i vc h c avbg x ^xq c ` envj _ vwK eb|

55 A byQ` i ( 2) ` d v A bymvi c avbg x K Z K ev Z uvnvi
K Z Z msweavb- A byhvqx c R vZ i wbevnx gZ v c hy nBe| ( 3)
` d vA byhvqxgw mf vh_ f ve R vZ xq msm` i wbK U ` vqx_ vwK eb|

GB wZ bwU ` d v wek l Y K wi j c Z xqgvb nBe h wK f ve
msweavb i vi k vmbee vq c i v f ve nBj I R bMYi wbK U
R evew` wnZ vwbw Z K wi qvQ|

Z vnvQvo v, c avbg x I Z vnvi gw mf vi A b~b bq- ` k gvsk
g xB wbevwPZ msm` - m` m A _ vr Z vnvi v mK j B R bc wZ wbwa Ges
mB wnmve R bMYi wbK U ` vqe|

Dj L , 1972 mvj i g~j msweavbi 56 A byQ` A bymvi
mvavi YZ g x c ` wbqvM c vBZ nBj Z vnvK GK R b msm` - m` m
nBZ nBZ | A ek 56 A byQ` i ( 4) ` d v A bymvi g x c ` wbhy
nBevi mgq K vb ew msm` - m` m bv _ vwK j c i eZ xQqgvmi
ga Z vnvK msm` - m` m wbevwPZ nBZ nBZ , A b_ vq wZ wb g x
_ vwK Z b bv|

1991 mvj msweavb ( v` k msk vab) A vBb, 1991 ( 1991
mbi 28 bs A vBb) A bymvi i vc ybi vq msm` xq MYZ c Z veZ b
K i | wK g~j 56 A byQ` i ( 2) ` d vi c i k Z (Proviso) c wi eZ b
K i vnq| ( 2) ` d vwbi c t
( 2) c avbg x I A bvb g x, c wZ g x I Dc g xK
i vc wZ wbqvM ` vb K wi eb t
Z r c i c wi ewZ Z k Z (Proviso) wbi c t
283
Z e k Z _ vK h, Z vnv` i msL vi A b~b bq- ` k gvsk
msm` - m` mMYi ga nBZ wbhy nBe Ges A bwaK GK -
` k gvsk msm` - m` m wbevwPZ nBevi hvM ew MYi ga
nBZ gbvbxZ nBZ c vwi eb|

c Z xqgvb nBZ Q, Dc i v k Z (Proviso) A bymvi gw mf vi
GK - ` k gvsk m` m msm` - m` m wnmve wbevwPZ bv nBqvI g x
wnmve gbvbqb c vBZ c vi b, hw` I Z uvnvi vMYc wZ wbwa bnb|

1972 mvj msweavb c YZ vMY evsj v` k i vi msweavb h
ai Yi R bc wZ wbwaZ k xj MYZ I R bMYi gZ vqbi m~Pbv
K wi qvwQj b Dc i v k Z Z vnvi ei L j vc |

Dj L , h msweavb ` yBf ve R bMYi wbK U g x` i
R evew` wnZ v wbw Z K wi qvQ, c _ gZ t g x wnmve R vZ xq- msm`
gvi d r R bMYi wbK U, wZ xqZ t wbevwPZ msm` - m` m wnmve
R bMYi wbK U|
A vi v Dj L h 1972 mvj i g~j msweavbi c wZ wU i
MYZ vw K A byk xj b I R bMYi gZ vqb hf ve c ywUZ nBqv
DwVqvwQj 1991 mvj i Dc i v A MYZ vw K weavb msweavbi g~j
A v` k i mwnZ m~YmvsNwl K ewj qv c Z xqgvb nBZ Q, Z e hnZ z
wel qwU eZ gvb gvK v gvq wePvhwel q bn, mnZ zG mK K vb
Nvl Yv` I qv nBj bv|

hy i vR i mvsweavwbK i xwZ (Convention) A bymvi g xMY
gw mf vi m` m wnmve h_ I wbR wbR g Yvj qi R b GK K
f ve House of Commons Gi wbK U ` vqe _ vK b| f vi Z i msweavb
g xMYi wbR wbR g Yvj qi R b ew MZ ` vqeZ vi K _ v ej v bv
nBj I Z vnvi v mvavi YZ hy i vR i mvsweavwbK i xwZ A bymi Y K wi qv
ew MZ ` vqeZ vMnY K i b|

evsj v` k gw mf vi g xMY R vZ xq msm` wbR wbR g Yvj q
ms v D vwc Z c k i D i c ` vb K i b Ges c qvR b weewZ I
c ` vb K i b eU wK wbR i ev g Yvj qi e_ Z vi ` vqf vi MnY
284
Ges c qvR b c ` Z vMi K vb NUbv A vgv` i ` k Z gb GK Uv
` L v hvq bv| evsj v` k Ministerial responsibility ev g xi ` vwqZ k xj Z vi
ms wZ GL bI Z gb f ve Mwo qvI V bvB|

msweavbi 141 K A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ R i i x- A e v
Nvl Yv K wi Z c vi b, Z e Nvl Yvi c ~eB c avbg xi c wZ - ^v i
c qvR b nBe|

Rules of Business Gi rule- 4 (ii) A bymvi gw mf vi A bygv` b
ewZ i K K vb i Z c ~YbxwZ MZ wmv MnY K i vnq bv|

Rule- 7 A bymvi Rules of Business Gi Z d wmj - 4 G Dwj wL Z c K wZ i
mK j wel qvej x mwK Z A v` k R vi xi c ~ec avbg x I i vc wZ i
wbK U Dc vc b K wi Z nq|

Rule- 8 A bymvi Rules of Business Gi Z d wmj - 5 G Dwj wL Z
wel qvej xc avbg xi wbK U Dc vc b K wi Z nq|

c Z xqgvb nq, c avbg x wbevnx c avb nBj I mvavi YZ
gw mf vq A vj vPbv ewZ i K K vb wmv MnY me bq, K vi Y,
c avbg xmn mgM gw mf v h_ f ve R vZ xq msm` i wbK U ` vqx
_ vK b| c avbg x hw` K vb K vi Y gw mf vi mwnZ A vj vPbv
ewZ i K K vb wmv MnY K i b Z vnv nBe Z uvnvi GK K wmv |
GB GK K wmv i R b gw mf v R vZ xq msm` i wbK U ` vqe
_ vwK e bv Ges c avbg xi bZ Z mgmv ` L v w` Z c vi | msweavb
c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf vi mK j c ` c i R b R vZ xq msm` i
wbevwPZ msm` - m` mMYi gvag ` k i R bMYi wbK U Z uvnv` i
R evew` wnZ v wbw Z K wi qvQ| GL vbB msm` xq MYZ i hw K Z v
I k Z |

GL vb A vi v Dj L , h whwb msm` i msL vMwi m` mi
A v vf vR b nBeb wZ wb evsj v` k i mK j R bMYi , GgbwK hvnvi v
Z uvnvK Ges Z uvnvi i vR bwZ K ` j K f vU ` q bvB Z vnv` i I
c avbg xnBeb|
285

GBevi msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, wK f ve
i vc wZ i K vh g c wi eZ b A vbqb K i Z vnv A vj vPbv K i v
c qvR b| Z e Z vnvi c ~eDc i v A vBbwU msweavb msk vab
K wi qvQ wK bv Ges msk vab K i v nBj wK f ve K i v nBqvQ Z vnvI
A vj vPbv c qvR b, K vi Y, nvBK vUwef vMi wePvi c wZ MY Dc i v
A vBb vi v A v` K vb msk vab nq bvB ewj qv gZ c K vk
K wi qvQb|

Dc i v A vBb c i x v c Z xqgvb nq h msweavbi 58
A byQ` i c i 58 K A byQ` mwbewk Z K i v nq| PZ z_ f vM 2q
c wi Q` i c i GK wU b~Z b c wi Q` 2K c wi Q` , mshvwR Z K i v
nBqvQ| D b~Z b c wi Q` 58 L , 58 M, 58 N I 58 O A byQ` wj
mwbewk Z K i v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi 61, 99 I 123
A byQ` msk vab K i vnq|
c ~eB msweavbi 142 A byQ` i A vI Z vq msweavb msk vab
m^ A vj vPbv K i v nBqvQ| c ybe K wi qv ej v hvq h msweavbi
K vb weavb mshvR b, c wi eZ b, c wZ vc b ev i wnZ K i Yi vi v
msk vwaZ nBZ c vwi e|
wbw` avq ej v hvq h 58 L , 58 M, 58 N I 58 O A byQ` wj
mwbek msweavbi PZ z_ f vM 2K c wi Q` wU msweavb mshvR bi
gvag msweavb msk vab K i v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, 58 K A byQ` wUI
mshvR b K i vnBqvQ|
msweavbi 61 A byQ` i wbqw Z nBek wj i c wi eZ
wbqw Z nBe Ges h gqv` 58 L A byQ` i A axb wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi _ vwK e mB gqv` D A vBb i vc wZ K Z K
c wi Pvwj Z nBe k wj Ges 99 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vq A vav-
wePvi wef vMxq c ` k wj i c wi eZ A vav- wePvi wef vMxq c `
A _ ev c avb Dc ` v ev Dc ` vi c ` k wj Df q vb h_ v g
c wZ vwc Z nBqvQ|
286
Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi 123 A byQ` i c ~eZ b ( 3) ` d vi
c wi eZ b~Z b ( 3) ` d vc wZ vwc Z nBqvQ|
123 A byQ` i c ~eZ b ( 3) ` d vwbi c t

123| ( 1) .................................................................
..............................................................
( 3) msm` - m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBe|
( K ) gqv` - A emvbi K vi Y msm` f vwqv hvBevi
f vwqvhvBevi c ~eeZ xbeB w` bi ga ; Ges

( L ) gqv` - A emvb eZ xZ A b K vb K vi Y msm`
f vwqv hvBevi f vwqv hvBevi c i eZ xbeB w` bi
ga ;
Z e k Z _ vK h, GB ` d vi ( K ) Dc - ` d v A byhvqx
A bywZ mvavi Y wbevPb wbevwPZ ew MY D Dc - ` d vq
Dj wL Z gqv` mgv bv nI qv c h msm` - m` mi c
K vhf vi Mnb K wi eb bv|


qv` k msk vabi c i c wZ vwc Z ( 3) ` d vwbi c t

123| ( 1) ................. ................................................
..............................................................
( 3) gqv` A emvbi K vi Y A _ ev gqv` A emvb eZ xZ
A b K vb K vi Y msm` f vwqv hvBevi c i eZ xbeB w` bi
ga msm` - m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBe|
( A ai L vc ` )
GB ` yBwU weavbi ga c v_ K nvBK vUwef vMi we
wePvi K MY A byaveb K wi Z e_ nBqvQb|

Dc i v A byQ` wj Z c wZ vc bi gvag msweavb msk vab
K i vnBqvQ|
Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi PZ z_ f vM 58 K A byQ` Ges 2K
c wi Q` i wewf bA byQ` 2q c wi Q` i A byQ` wj , 141K ( 1) I
141M( 1) wj K I wewf bf ve msk vab K wi qvQ|
Dc i ewYZ msk vab wj i A vBbMZ A e vb Ges GB wj
msweavbi wK wK c wi eZ b A vbqb K wi qvQ Ges Z vnv msweavbi
287
basic sturcture Gi mwnZ mvsNwl K wK bv Z vnv G b A vj vPbv K i v
nBe|
c _ gB i vc wZ i K gc wi mi GB msk vab wK c f ve A vbqb
K wi qvQ Z vnvA vj vPbvK i vhvDK |
c ~eB Dj L K i v nBqvQ, i vc wZ evsj v` k i wbqgvZ vw K
i vc avb| wZ wb i vi wbevnx c avb bnb| c avbg x I c avb
wePvi c wZ i wbqvM I c ` Z vM c MnY ewZ i K A b mK j ` vwqZ
c vj b wZ wb c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi K vhK i b| BnvB
mvsweavwbK c wi K bv|
wK qv` k msk vabx K vhK i x nBj Z uvnvi f ~wgK vi A vg~j
c wi eZ b nq|
mvavi Y f ve i vc wZ evsj v` k i c wZ i v K gwef vMmg~ni
mevwabvqK nBj I A vBb vi v Z vnvi c qvM wbqw Z nq| A _ vr
wbqgvZ vw K f ve i vc wZ c wZ i v K gwef vMmg~ni mevwabvqK
nBj I Bnvi c K Z wbevnx gZ v i vR bwZ K mi K vi i Dc i B b
_ vK Ges mi K vi i mswk c wZ i v g Yvj qi mi vmwi A vBbMZ
wbq Y c wi Pvwj Z nq|
wK qv` k msk vabx K vhK i x nBj h gqv` 58 L
A byQ` i A axb wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi _ vwK e mB gqv`
c wZ i v K gwef vMmg~n i vc wZ K Z K A vBb vi v mi vmwi c wi Pvwj Z
nBe A _ vr H mgqi R b wZ wb i vR bwZ K mi K vi i wbevnx gZ v
MnY K wi eb Ges c K Z c i vc wZ i ` vwqZ i mwnZ wZ wb GK B
mv_ c wZ i vg Yvj qi g xi ` vwqZ I c vj b K wi eb|
mvavi Y mgq ` vwqZ c vj bi Z c wZ i v g x GK R b wbevwPZ
R bc wZ wbwa| Z uvnvi gvag evsj v` k i R bMY MYZ vw K f ve
evsj v` k i c R vZ i c wZ i v K gwef vMmg~ni wbq Y K i |
i vc wZ mvsweavwbK f ve i vi mevP c ` vwaK vi x ew eU wK
wZ wb MYZ vw K f ve c R vZ i wbe vwPZ c wZ wbwa bnb| g~j msweavb
c wZ i vK gwef vMmg~ni wbevnx` vwqZ i vc wZ i Dc i b K i bvB,
288
wbevwPZ i vR bwZ K mi K vi i Dc i K wi qvQ| GgZ A e vq i vc wZ
K Z K c wZ i v g Yvj qi GB wbevnx ` vwqZ c vj b g~j mvsweavwbK
c wi K bvi mwnZ m~YmvsNwl K |
msweavbi 48 ( 3) , 141K ( 1) Ges 141M( 1) A byQ` hvnvB
_ vK zK bv K b, 58 L A byQ` i ( 1) ` d vi gqv` 58 O A byQ`
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i K vh K vj i vc wZ K Z K c avbg xi
c i vgk A byhvqxA _ evZ vunvi c wZ ^v i MnYv K vhK i vi weavbmg~n
A K vhK i K wi qvQ|
Dj L , msweavbi R i i x weavbvej x m^wj Z beg- K f vM g~j
msweavb wQj bv| msweavb ( wZ xq msk vab) A vBb, 1973 ( 1973
mbi 12bs A vBb) ej D beg- K f vM msweavb mshvR b K i v
nq|
141K ( 1) A byQ` c ` gZ vej i vc wZ ` k R i i x-
A e v Nvl Yv K wi Z c vi b| ` k R i i x- A e v Nvwl Z nBj 141L
I 141M A byQ` ewYZ weavbvej x A bymvi gwj K A waK vi mg~nmn
msweavbi K wZ c q A byQ` i weavb wMZ nBqv hvq| GB K vi Y
i vc wZ K Z K R i i x- A e v Nvl Yvi gZ vi A c eenvi i vaK
48 ( 3) A byQ` c ` mvavi Y k Z ewZ i K A b GK wU wek l k Z ,
141K ( 1) A byQ` i k l wbwj wL Z f ve ewYZ nBqvQ t
Z e k Z _ vK h, A byi c Nvl Yvi eaZ vi R b
Nvl Yvi c ~eB c avbg xi c wZ - ^v i c qvR b nBe|

wK K vi Y c avbg xi c wZ - ^v i c qvR b nBZ c vi , Z vnv
weePbv K i v c qvR b| gwj K A waK vi gvbyl i A g~j m` I
mf Z vi c K D` vni Y| Bnv gvbyl i mek A waK vi | Z e ` k i
en i ^v_ mB gwj K A waK vi I A bK mgq wMZ i vwL Z nq|
wK mB gZ v hb K vb f veB A c eenvi bv nq m K vi YB
R i i x- A e v R vi xi c ~eGB A wZ wi k Z A vi vc K i v nBqvQ,
K vi Y c avbg x wbR GK R b wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa| Z vnvQvo v,
c avbg x wnmve msL vMwi R bc wZ wbwaMYi wZ wb A v vf vR bI
289
eU| wbtm` n R i i x A e v Nvl Yv GK wU i Z c ~YbxwZ MZ
wmv | A vewk K f veB gw mf vq GB Nvl Yv m^ c yL bvc ~L f ve
A vj vPbvi c i B G m^ wmv j I qv nq| gw mf vi A waK vsk
m` mMY wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa| mK j i mwwj Z A vj vPbv I
weePbvi c i hw` c Z xqgvb nq h Ggb R i i x- A e v we` gvb
i wnqvQ, hvnvZ hy ev ewni v gY ev A f i xY Mvj hvMi
vi v evsj v` k ev Dnvi h K vb A sk i wbi vc v ev A _ bwZ K
R xeb wec ` i myL xb, Z vnv nBj c avbg x c _ gZ msweavbi
48 ( 3) A byQ` A bymvi i vc wZ K R i i x- A e v Nvl Yv c m
c i vgk c ` vb K wi eb Ges wZ xqZ t 141K A byQ` i k Z gvZ veK
i vc wZ K Z K R i i x- A e v Nvl Yvi c ~eB DnvZ c wZ - ^v i c ` vb
K wi eb| Z r c i R i i x- A e v Nvl Yv K i v nBe| BnvB R i i x- A e v
Nvl Yvi mvsweavwbK c ~ek Z vej xI A e vb|

wK 58 O A byQ` i vc wZ K ^xq weePbv A bymvi Z uvnvi
GK K wmv ` k R i i x- A e v Nvl Yvi wbevnx gZ v c ` vb K i |
GB GK K gZ v c _ gZ t i vc wZ i mvsweavwbK wbqgvZ vw K
A e vbi c wi c x Ges wZ xqZ t msweavbi 48 ( 3) I 141K ( 1)
A byQ` i k Z c ` mvsweavwbK i vK ePi mwnZ mvsNwl K | GgZ
A e vq i vc wZ i c ^i vPvi xi f ~wgK vq hvBevi GK wU mvebv
_ vwK qv hvq| nqZ v i vc wZ K vb w` bB ^i vPvi xi f ~wgK v MnY
K wi eb bv, wK Z gb mvebv _ vwK j B mB ee v msweavb e
MYZ vw K A v` k i mwnZ mvsNwl K nBe weavq Z vnv A mvsweavwbK
nBe|

58 L A byQ` i ( 2) ` d v A bymvi wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
h_ f ve i vc wZ i wbK U ` vqx _ vwK eb| wK mvavi Y A e vq
c avbg x ev Z uvnvi gw mf vi g xMY Z uvnv` i K vR i R b i vc wZ i
wbK U ` vqe _ vK b bv| ei 55 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d v A byhvqx
c avbg xmn gw mf v h_ f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqx _ vK b Ges
ew MZ f ve I msm` - m` mMYi gvag mvef g R bMYi wbK U
290
` vqe _ vK b| BnvB MYZ vw K bxwZ I i xwZ | GgZ A e vq wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj g~j msweavbi mek k Z ev basic structure
evsj v` k i R bMYi mvef gZ Z vnv L enq Ges R bMYi
mvef gZ i c wi eZ i vR vi bvq i vc wZ mvef g nb| Bnv
msweavbi gwj K bxwZ i c wi c xI mvsNwl K |

58 L A byQ` i ( 4) ` d v A bymvi 55( 4) , ( 5) I ( 6)
A byQ` i weavbvej x ( c qvR bxq A wf hvR b mnK vi ) ( 1) ` d vq
Dj wL Z gqv` GK Bi c wel qvej xi c hy nq| Z e c v_ K
nBZ Q GB h 55 A byQ` i mK j c ` c 48 ( 3) A bymvi
wbevwPZ c avbg xi c i vgk mvc c hy nq, wK 58 L ( 4)
A byQ` i A vI Z vq wbevwPZ c avbg xi Z _ v R bMYi f ~wgK v
A byc w Z _ vK | d j k wZ Z MYZ I A byc w Z _ vK | Bnv g~j
msweavbi gwj K A v` k I bxwZ i mwnZ m~Y mvsNwl K | MYZ K
A byc w Z i vwL qv Z vnv hZ ^ mgqi R bB nDK bv K b, K vb
ee vB mvsweavwbK nBe bv|

58 M A byQ` A bymvi msm` f vswMqv ` I qvi ev f sM nBevi
c i eZ x c bi w` bi ga i vc wZ c avb Dc ` v I A c i A bwaK
` k R b Dc ` vi mgbq wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MVb K wi eb|

msm` f vwqv hvI qv A e vq A _ ev Bnvi A waek bK vj eZ xZ
K vb mgq i vc wZ i wbK U A v ee v MnYi R b c qvR bxq
c wi w wZ we` gvb i wnqvQ ewj qv m vl R bK f ve c Z xqgvb nBj
msweavbi 93 A byQ` i ( 1) ` d v A bymvi wZ wb D c wi w wZ Z
A av` k c Yqb I R vi xK wi Z c vi b|

GK B f ve i vc wZ 93 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d vi A vI Z vq Ggb
A av` k I c Yqb I R vi x K wi Z c vi b hvnvZ msweavb- vi v mshy
Z nwej i (Consdidated Fund) Dc i K vb eq ` vqgy nDK ev bv nDK ,
D Z nwej nBZ mBi c eq wbevni K Z Z c ` vb K i vhvBe|

291
mvavi YZ A vBb c Yqb R vZ xq msm` i A bb gZ v| c vweZ
A vBbi L mo v, c ve ev wej A vK vi msweavbi 8 0 A byQ`
A bymvi msm` c k K wi Z nq| c vweZ Public Bill c _ g gw mf vq
A vj vPbv nq| gw mf v K Z K A bygvw` Z nBj mvavi YZ mswk g x
Z vnv msm` c k K i b| msm` c qvR b gb K wi j wej wU msm` xq
K wgwUZ Z vnv c i x v wbi x vi R b c i Y K wi Z c vi | Z r c i
msm` xq K wgwUi myc vwi k mnK vi Z vnv msm` i weePbvi R b
c ybi vq c k K i v nq| Z r c i , wej wU msm` A bygv` b K wi j Z vnv
^v i i R b i vc wZ mgxc c k K i v nq| i vc wZ i ^v i i c i
wej wU A vBb c wi YZ nq|

msm` i A waek bK vj ewnf ~Z K vb mgq hw` K vb A av` k
c Yqb I R vi xi wek l c qvR b A byf ~Z nq Z vnv nBj 93
A byQ` i wek l gZ vej i v c wZ A av` k c Yqb I R vi x
K wi Z c vi b| wK m I gw mf vK c vweZ L mo v
A av` k wU c i x v K i Z t A bygv` b K wi Z nq| GL vb c ybi vq
Dj L , c avbg xmn gw mf vi A waK vsk m` m wbevwPZ
R bc wZ wbwa| c vweZ A av` k wUi L mo v gw mf vK B A bygv` b
K wi Z nq, A b K vnvi I A bygv` b Pwj e bv| gw mf v L mo vwU
A bygv` b K wi evi c i i vc wZ i A v` k g A av` k wU R vi x nq|
GBi c i vc wZ i A av` k R vi xI c i v f ve R bMYi K Z Z i
A vI Z vi ga _ vwK qvB K wi Z nq|

wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi gqv` L mo v A av` k wU Dc ` v
c wi l ` A bygv` b K i , wK Dc ` vMY K nB wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa
bnb| K vR B wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj i A av` k wj i
L mo v A wbevwPZ ew eMK Z K A bygvw` Z hvnv R bMYi K Z Z Z _ v
GK wU MYZ vw K i vee vi mwnZ mvsNwl K | memgq Bnv n` q
L vw` Z _ vwK Z nBe h evsj v` k i vGK wU wPi b MYZ vw K i v,
GgbwK Z vwI K f ve Z I veavqK mi K vi A vgj I , hw` I Z I veavqK
mi K vi ee vMYZ i mwnZ mi vmwi mvsNwl K |
292

A _ ms v A av` k i wel qwU mvsweavwbK f ve A vi I
mxb nBqv` uvo vq|

1215 mvj i Magna Carta Gi mgq nBZ Bnv ae mZ h
R bc wZ wbwa` i mwZ ewZ i K K L bB A _ ms v K vb A vBb K i v
hvq bv| 1648 mvj Purging of the Parliament K wi qvI Oliver Cromwell
c qvR bxq A _ Qvo K i vBZ c vi b bvB|

hy i vR i mwnZ Bnvi A vgwi K v K j vbx i v wj i wei vai
g~j K vi Y wQj h hy i vR i Parliament G A vgwi K v K j vbx
i v wj i K vb c wZ wbwa wQj bv wK Parliament K j vbx i v wj i Dc i
K i A vi vc K wi Z | K j vbx i v wj i e e wQj h hnZ zZ vnv` i
K vb c wZ wbwa hy i vR i Parliament G bvB, mB nZ zD Parliament
Z vnv` i Dc i K i A vi vc K wi Z c vi bv| BnvB wei vai g~j
K vi Y|

hy i vi i vc wZ mvsweavwbK f ve i vi wbevnx c avb|
hy i vi msweavbi Article II wbi c t
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States...........

wbevnx c avb wnmve Z uvnvi ` vqeZ v hy i vi R bMYi wbK U
hvnvi vZ uvnvK wbevwPZ K wi qvQ, A vi K vnvi I wbK U bq|

f vi Z wbevnx gZ vi vc wZ i Dc i wbwj wL Z f ve A wc Z t
Article 53. Executive power of the Union ; (1) The executive power of
the Union shall be vested in the President.......

wK wZ wb gw c wi l ` (Council of Ministers) Gi aid and advise vi v
c wi Pvwj Z nBeb| Article 74 wbi c t
Article 74. Conucil of Ministers to aid and advise President : There shall
be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise
the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with
such advice.
293
Shamsher Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 gvK gvq f vi Z xq
m~c xg K vUi vc wZ i f zwgK vmK g e K i t
There is no doubt that the imprint of his personality may chasten and
correct the Polititical government, although the actual exercise of the functions
entrusted to him by law is in effect and in law carried on by his duly appointed
mentors, i.e., the Prime Minister and his colleagues.

K vR B f vi Z xq i vc wZ i wmv c K Z c gw c wi l ` i B
wmv hvnvi vR bMYi wbevwPZ c wZ wbwa|
evsj v` k i vi vc wZ i A e vb wbi c t
48 | ( 1) .............
( 2) i vc avbi c i vc wZ i vi A b mK j ew i Da vb
j vf K wi eb Ges msweavb I A bK vb A vBbi vi v Z uvnvK
c ` I Z uvnvi Dc i A wc Z mK j gZ v c qvM I K Z e c vj b
K wi eb| Ges
55| ( 4) mi K vi i mK j wbevnx ee v i vc wZ i bvg
MnxZ nBqvQ ewj qvc K vk K i vnBe| wK
55| ( 2) ( 3) A byQ` wbi c t
55| ( 1) .................
( 2) c avbg x K Z K ev Z uvnvi K Z Z GB msweavb-
A byhvqxc R vZ i wbevnx gZ vc hy nBe|
( 3) gw mf v h_ f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqx
_ vwK eb|


c Z xqgvb nq h i vc wZ evsj ` k i v mevP c ` vwaK vi x
ew nBj I i vi c K Z wbevnx gZ vgw mf vi Dc i b |

evsj v` k i msweavb hy i v ev f vi Z i msweavbi bvq
h_ v g The Executive power shall be vested in a President ev in the President
ej vnq bvB|

evsj v` k msweavbi 55 ( 2) I ( 3 ) A byQ` GK Dc j w
K wi Z nBe h c avbg x GK K f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqe bnb,
wZ wb I Z uvnvi gw mf vh_ f ve ` vqx| g~j K _ vnBj t

( 3) gw mf vh_ f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqx_ vwK eb|

msm` i wbK U GB ` vqeZ vB R bMYi gZ vi A wf ewI |
294

msweavbi GB f vl i c vc U nBj , c vwK vb A vgj gZ v
memgqB GK - ew K w` K wQj | evsj v` k i msweavb c YZ vMY
GB GK - ew K w` K Z vnBZ evwni nBqvR bMYK gZ vqb K wi Z
PvwnqvwQj b| GB K vi YB P~o v ` vqeZ v R bMYi wbevwPZ
c wZ wbwaMYi wbK U i vL vnBqvQ|

Dc j w K i v c qvR b, hy i vI f vi Z i i vc wZ i bvq wbevnx
gZ v evsj v` k i c avbg xi Dc i vested ev A wc Z nq bvB| GL vb
wbevnx gZ v c avbg x K Z K ev Z uvnvi K Z Z c hy nBe ej v
nBqvQ wK Z uvnvi GK K wmv c hy (exercised) nBe Z vnv ej v nq
bvB| Z B c Z xqgvb nq h c K Z wmv MnY K wi e gw mf v
Ges Z r c i c avbg x K Z K ev Z uvnvi K Z Z D wmv c hy
nBe| GB K vi YB gw mf v h_ f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqe| hw`
c avbg x Z uvnvi GK K wmv wbevnx gZ v c hy K wi Z b Z e
wZ wb wbR GK K f ve msm` i wbK U ` vqe _ vwK Z b| m
gw mf v c avbg xi GK K wmv i R b h_ f ve msm` i wbK U
` vqxnBZ b bv|

hy i vR i Prime Minister Gi Z vwZ K A e vb nBj h wZ wb First
among the equals, hw` I wZ wbB gw mf v MVb K i b Ges Z uvnvi c Q`
A bymvi B wewf bMP K g x c ` wbqvM ` I qv nq| bxwZ wbavi Yi
I Z uvnvi f ~wgK vB mec avb|

evsj v` k i msweavb c YZ vMYI evsj v` k i i vc wZ K
hy i vR i Queen Gi A byi c Ges gw mf vK meZ Dc i v A v` k
A e vb A wavb K wi Z PvwnqvwQj b|

A av` k i i vc wZ i h m ywi K _ v ej v nBqvQ Z vnv
c K Z c gw mf vi m yw| GB m yw GK wU mvavi Y evj k
bn| Bnvi i Z A c wi mxg| Dj L , gw mf vi A waK vsk m` m
wbevwPZ MYc wZ wbwa| msweavb c YZ vMY GBf ve GgbwK A av` k
295
c Yqbi I gw mf vi wbevwPZ m` mMYi gvag R bMYi
m Z vwbw Z K wi qvQb|

wK wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj i A av` k i
Dc ` v c wi l ` K L bB gw mf vi j vwf wl nBZ c vi b bv, Z vnvi
c avb K vi Y Dc ` vMY A wbevwPZ | Z uvnvi v vb Y bgm nBZ
c vi b wK Z uvnvi v R bc wZ wbwa bnb| BnvB Z uvnv` i mevc v
A hvMZ v| wbevwPZ I A wbevwPZ i ga GB c v_ K A vK vk mg|
The Rules of Business, 1996 Gi Rule-34 A bymvi c avbg x I g xi
j h_ v g c avb Dc ` v I Dc ` v c hvR nBe| Rule-34
wbi c t
Rule-34 : During the period in which the Non-Party Care-Taker
Government is in office, all references to the Prime Minister and Minister
shall be construed as reference to Chief Adviser and Adviser respectively
and these rules shall, mutatis mutandis, apply.

wK c avbg x ev g xMYi h R bc wZ wbwam~j f Pvwi w K
ewk i wnqvQ Z vnv c avb Dc ` v ev Dc ` vMYi ga GK evi B
A byc w Z | BnvB Z vnv` i ga A vK vk mg c v_ K mw K i |

K vR B wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj A av` k c Yqb
K wi evi R b Dc ` v c wi l ` i m yw mvsweavwbK f ve GK evi B
A MnYxq|

K vb K vb we amicus curiae GB gghyw D vc b K wi qvQb
h i vc wZ hnZ z R vZ xq msm` K Z K wbevwPZ K vR B Z uvnvK I
wbevwPZ i vc wZ ej v hvq Ges Z uvnvi m ywI 93 A byQ` i A vI Z vq
A av` k c Yqb I R vi xi R b h_ |

Dc i v hyw mwVK bn| c _ gZ t wbevPb ewj Z mveR bxb
f vUvwaK vi gvi d r wbevPb ev adult franchise evS vb nq| msm` K Z K
i vc wZ i wbevPb GB ai bi wbevPb bn Ges wZ wb R bc wZ wbwaI
bnb| GgZ A e vq Z uvnvi ew MZ m wi Dc i wbf i K wi qv 93
A byQ` i A vI Z vq A av` k c Yqb I R vi x mvsweavwbK bn| mi Y
296
i vwL Z nBe h c v_ wgK f ve GK gv msm` B A vBb c Yqb K wi Z
gZ vevb, K vb A wbevwPZ ew A vBb c Yqb K wi Z c vi b bv,
aygv ewZ g wnmve, R i i x c qvR b A av` k R vi x K i v nq,
K vR B G I gw mf vi wmv GK v c qvR b nq, K vi Y,
gw mf vi A waK vsk m` mB wbevwPZ R bc wZ wbwa|


58 M A byQ` i gZ vej i vc wZ mek l A emi c v c avb
wePvi c wZ K wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb Dc ` vi c `
MnYi R b A vnvb R vbvBeb| Z uvnvi A c vwZ Z uvnvi A eewnZ
c ~eA emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnYi R b
A vnvb R vbvBeb| Z uvnvi A c vwZ i vc wZ A vc xj wef vMi mek l
A emi c v wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnYi R b A vnvb
R vbvBeb| Z uvnvi A c vwZ Z u vnvi A eewnZ c ~eA emi c v
wePvi c wZ K c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnYi R b A vnvb R vbvBeb|

A vc xj wef vMi K vb A emi c v wePvi K i A c vwZ i vc wZ ,
hZ ` ~i me, c avb i vR bwZ K ` j mg~ni mwnZ A vj vPbv g,
evsj v` k i h mK j bvMwi K GB A byQ` i A axb Dc ` v wbhy
nBevi hvM 58 M A byQ` i ( 5) ` d v A byhvqx Z vnv` i ga nBZ
c avb Dc ` vwbqvM K wi eb|

hw` Dc i ewYZ K vb ew K c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvMi
R b c vI qv bv hvq, Z vnv nBj i vc wZ GB msweavbi A axb Z uvnvi
^xq ` vwqZ i A wZ wi wnmve wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb
Dc ` vi ` vwqZ MnY K wi eb|

c Z xqgvb nq h qv` k msk vabi d j Dc i v f ve c avb
Dc ` v c avbg xi j vwf wl nBeb| Rules of Business Gi Rule-34 G
BnvB c ybe K i vnBqvQ|

GL vb c ybi j L K i v c qvR b h i vi wZ bwU c avb i
ga wbevnx wef vM GK wU| wbevnx wef vMi Ges i vi mevP c `
i vc wZ A wavb _ vwK j I c K Z wbevnx gZ v c avbg x I Z uvnvi
297
gw mf vi Dc i b | Bnv aygv myweavi R b K i v nq bvB, Bnvi
GK wU mvsweavwbK evL vi wnqvQ|

evsj v` k i vi Pvwi w K ewk nBj Bnv GK wU c R vZ
( A byQ` - 1) | msweavbi c _ g f vMi wk i vbvg nBj c R vZ | GB
f vMi c wZ wU A byQ` c R vZ k wU evi sevi DPvi Y K i v
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K wi qv ej v nBqvQ| GB c R vZ h GK wU MYZ nBe Z vnv 11
A byQ` ej v nBqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, GB msweavbi A bZ g g~j bxwZ
nBe MYZ Z vnv msweavbi c vebvq ej v nBqvQ| GK B g~j bxwZ i
K _ v8 A byQ` I ej vnBqvQ|

GB c vc U Bnv A wZ k q ^vf vweK h i vee vc bvi c wZ wU
i c R vZ vw K Z v I MYZ vw K Z v A v` k wnmve c ywUZ | wbtm` n
BnvB evsj v` k i msweavbi g~j wf w ev basic structure | c vebv I
msweavbi m~Ywebvm nBZ Dc i v wf w I basic structure wbw Z
f ve wbYq K i v hvq| msweavb Ggb f ve K L bB msk vab K i v hvq
bv hvnvZ Dc i v ` yB basic structure Gi K vb c K vi c wi eZ b nq
hvnvZ msweavbi c wi Pq evPwi c wi ewZ Z nBqvhvq|

h c wi eZ b R bMYi mvef gZ i wec hvq, Z vnv hZ ^
mgqi R bB nDK bv, R bMYi ^v_ ev c eenvi K i v nBZ Q
Z vnv ej v hvq bv| 142 A byQ` i A axb R vZ xq msm` hK vb
msk vab K wi Z c vi mZ wK R bMYi mvef gZ , i vxq bxwZ i
c R vZ vw K Z v I MYZ vw K Z v K L bB c wi eZ b K wi Z c vi bv,
GgbwK zbI K wi Z c vi bv| memgq gb i vwL Z nBe h j vL v
k nx` i i i A vL i GB msweavb i wPZ nBqvQ, Bnv L j vayj vi e y
bn| R vZ xq msm` h A vBbB K i K bv K b Z vnv msweavbi 7
A byQ` vi v A ek B c i xw Z nBZ nBe| K vi Y msk vabi
gZ vI msweavbB R vZ xq msm` K c ` vb K wi qvQ|


298
R vZ xq msm` i msweavb msk vabi wek vj gZ v i wnqvQ,
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Ggb wK n c I K wi Z c vi bv| A wZ ^ mgqi R bI K vb
A R ynvZ c R vZ ev MYZ ybK wi qv MvxZ A vbqb K wi Z c vi
bv| h K vbi c msk vab we` gvb msweavbi mxgvi gaB _ vwK Z
nBe| we` gvb A e vb nBZ A bK vb c wZ Z c wi eZ b nI qv,
hgb, mvsweavwbK MYZ nBZ GK bvqK Z i vee v ev MvxZ
c wi eZ b K i vhvBe bv|


A eva myzI wbi c wbevPb wbtm` n msweavbi GK wU basic
structure, wK H i c wbevPb A byvbi R b wbevPb K wgk bK c K Z
A _ k w k vj x K wi Z nBe, we` gvb mi K vi K msweavb I A vBb
gvb K wi Z eva K wi Z nBe| wK mB A R ynvZ K vb msk vab
vi v R bMYi mvef gZ K K vb f veB ybK i v hvq bv, A _ ev
c R vZ I MYZ i c wi eZ GK bvqK Z ev MvwZ A vbqb K i v
hvBe bv| A b_ vq BnvnBe mvsweavwbK hara-kiri|

memgq mi Y i vwL Z nBe h g~j msweavb R bMY Bnvi
MYc wi l ` i gvag mw K wi qvQ wK msk vab R vZ xq msm` A vbqb
K wi qvQ|

A vi v mi Y i vwL Z nBe h K vb msk vabx vi v msweavbi
g~j wf w i wec i xZ K vb wK QyK i v hvq bv| GK vi Y Z wK Z msk vabx
mvsweavwbK f ve ea wK bv Z vnv wbi c Yi R b g~j msweavbi mwnZ
Z zj bv c qvR b nq| g~j msweavb hL b MnY K i v nBqvwQj Z L b
^Z twm bxwZ wnmve MnxZ bxwZ wj i mwnZ Z wK Z msk vabxwU wK
mvsNwl K ev D g~j bxwZ c wi c x Z vnv weePbv K wi Z nBe|
Z vnvQvo v, Z wK Z msk vabxwU g~j msweavbi mwnZ mwZ c ~YwK bv
Z vnvI weePbv K wi Z nBe| hw` mwZ c ~Ynq Z e Z wK Z
msk vabxwU ea nBe| wK hw` Dnv g~j msweavbi mwnZ GZ UvB
A mvg mc ~Ynq h Z wK Z msk vabxwU g~j msweavbi mwnZ mymsMZ
299
nBe bv, m msk vabxwU A mvsweavwbK Z _ v A ea nBe|
BnvQvo v, A vi I A byaveb K wi Z nBe h Z wK Z msk vabxwU wK
MYZ vw K Pwi wei vax, Bnv wK g~j msweavb e i vi c R vZ vw K
Pwi K K vb f ve wZ M K i , hw` K i m I Z wK Z
msk vabxwU A ea nBe|

GBevi Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, g~j
msweavbi wK ai bi c wi eZ b A vbqb K wi qvQ Ges Z vnv msweavbi
g~j wf w I basic structure K ybK i wK bvZ vnvc i x vK i vnBe|

^xK wZ gZ B i vc wZ i vi mevP c ` vwaK vi x ew nBj I
wZ wb wbqgZ vw K i vc avb| g~j msweavb Z uvnvi K vb wbevnx gZ v
bvB| A _ P Z wK Z msk vabx i v c avbi nvZ wbevnx gZ v c ` vb
K wi qv msweavbi g~j Pwi B c wi eZ b K wi qv d wj qvQ| g~j
msweavb R bMYi gZ vqbB c avb Dc R xe| GB K vi YB wbevwPZ
c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf vi Dc i B i vi mK j wbevnx gZ v A c b
K i v nBqvQ| Z uvnv` i gvagB R bMYi gZ vqb| A _ P GK w` K
A wbevwPZ c avb Dc ` v I A bvb Dc ` vMY gw mf vi wbevnx
gZ v c qvM K wi Z Qb| A bw` K i vc wZ wbR c wZ i v
g Yvj qi wbevnx ` wvqZ c vj b K i b| 48 A byQ` i ( 3) ` d vi
gvag R bMYi c wZ wbwa I gw mf vi gyL c v Ges R vZ xq msm`
R bMYi c wZ wbwaMYi A v vf vR b c avbg xi c i vgk A bymvi
i vc wZ Z uvnvi mK j ` vwqZ c vj b K wi evi K _ v Ges GBf ve
i vc wZ i mK j K vR i gaI R bMY Dc w Z _ vK | Ggb wK R i i x-
A e v Nvl Yv K wi evi c ~eI c avbg xi c i vgk I c wZ - ^v i i
gvag R bMYi m Z v I Dc w wZ wbw Z K i v nBqvQ|
c avbg xI Z uvnvi c wZ wU c i vgk I c wZ ^v i i c ~egw mf vi
wmv MnY K i b| Dj L , Z uvnvi v h_ f ve R vZ xq msm` i wbK U
` vqe| GBf ve g~j msweavb i vi c R vZ vw K I MYZ vw K Pwi
eR vq i vL v wbw Z K i v nBqvQ| wK Z wK Z msk vabx gvi d r 48
A byQ` i ( 3) ` d vi evaevaK Z v Ges R i i x- A e v Nvl Yvq
300
c avbg xi c wZ - ^v i i k Z wej y K wi qv i vc wZ i ` vwqZ c vj b
R bMYK A byc w Z K i Z t wZ bgvmi R b nBj I , Z wK Z msk vabxi
gqv` ga R bMYi mvef gZ , i vi c R vZ vw K I MYZ vw K
Pwi , msweavbi GB wZ bwU basic sturcture L eK i vnBqvQ|

Z vnvQvo v, gw mf vi wmv I c avbg xi c i vgk ewZ i K
A wbevwPZ Dc ` v- mf vi wmv A bymvi i vc wZ K Z K A av` k
c Yqb I R vi xGK wU A MYZ vw K c ` c hvnvi vi MYZ vw K Pwi
GB basic sturcture Gi mwnZ mvsNwl K |

c K Z c , Z wK Z msk vabxi A axb i vi c R vZ vw K I
MYZ vw K Pwi hf ve j y nq Z vnvi mwnZ g~j msweavbi A axb
evsj v` k i vi A v` wk K Pwi i mwnZ K vb f veB mvg m A vbqb
me bq|

Z wK Z msk vabx g~j msweavbi wf w ` yB c avb basic sturcture,
c R vZ I MYZ i c wi eZ MvxZ A vbqb K wi qvQ hvnvi c avb
i vc wZ wbR | GBi c MvxZ i mwnZ g~j msweavbi ^Z twm
bxwZ wj GK evi B A msMwZ c ~YI mvsNwl K Ges msweavbi Pole-
star 7 A byQ` i m~Yc wi c x|

Z vnvQvo v, i vc wZ hw` 58 M A byQ` i ( 6) ` d v A byhvqx ^xq
` vwqZ i A wZ wi wnmve wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i c avb
Dc ` vi ` vwqZ MnY K i b Z vnv nBj evsj v` k GK bvqK Z vw K
i v c wi YZ nBe| BnvI g~j msweavbi ^Z twm A v` wk K
bxwZ wj i m~Yc wi c xI mvsNwl K |

A vi GK wU hyw D vc b K i v K i v nBqvQ h Z wK Z msweavb
( qv` k msk vab) A vBb Gi A axb vwc Z wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi c k wU g~j Z GK wU i vR bwZ K c k weavq A A v` vj Z i K Z Z
ewnf ~Z |

D vwc Z hyw wU A v` mwVK bn| Bnv wVK h a~gv K vb
i vR bwZ K wei va wb w Z A v` vj Z K L bB A sk MnY K wi e bv|
301
Z e hw` K vb A vBbMZ ev mvsweavwbK eaZ v I A waK vi i c k
D vwc Z nq Z vnv nBj GB myc xg K vUD vwc Z wel qwU weePbv
K wi e K vi Y, myc xg K vUmsweavbi A wef veK wnmve msweavb I
A vBbi i Y, mg_ b I wbi vc v weavb K wi Z mvsweavwbK f ve
eva| Z vnvQvo v, mvsweavwbK K vb wei va wb w i mwnZ i vR bwZ K
c k R wo Z _ vwK j I _ vwK Z c vi | m I GB A v` vj Z Bnvi
mvsweavwbK ` vwqZ I K Z e msweavb I A vBb A bymvi c vj b K wi Z
K L bB Go vBqv hvBZ c vi bv ev A bxnv c K vk K wi Z c vi bv|
K vi Y msweavb evL v I wek l Y K wi evi ` vwqZ myc xg K vUi Dc i
b | R bMYi wbK U myc xg K vUi BnvB mvsweavwbK ` vqeZ v|

40| Z veavqK mi K vi Gi A axb mvavi Y wbevPb t
ewk i f vM we Amicus Curiae wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee vi c
gZ c K vk K wi qvQb| Z vnvi v evsj v` k GK wU wbi c I my y
wbevPb A byvbi R b GB ee v GK v B A c wi nvhewj qv gZ c K vk
K wi qvQb| Bnv vqx ee v wnmve c eZ b K i v nBqvQ wK bv c k
K wi j R bve wU GBP L vb ej b h Bnv vqx ee v bv nBj I
wbi c I myywbevPb A byvbi ^ v_ GB ee v ew` b A evnZ
i vwL Z nBe| K Z w` b wR vmv K wi j wZ wb Z vr wYK f ve ej b,
A Z c vk er mi i R b c qvR b nBe|
Z uvnv` i c vq mK j i B avi Yv h wbevPb ms v mK j mgmvi
mgvavb Z veavqK mi K vi ee vi gaB wbwnZ i wnqvQ| BnvB
mK j wb` vbi Dc mg| A Z Ge, Z veavqK mi K vi ee v 1996,
2001 I 2006 mvj wK f ve mgmv mgvavb c ` c MnY
K wi qvwQj Z vnvR vwbevi PvK i vc qvR b|
GB i vqi c _ g w` K B 1994 mvj A bywZ gv i vi Dc -
wbevPbi K _ v ej v nBqvQ| H wbevPb mec _ g bvbv c K vi
A wbqgi A wf hvM I V| ` yB er mi ec x gvMZ A v` j bi g~L
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, c YxZ nq|
302
Dc i v A vBbi A axb mec _ g mg R vZ xq msm` i
wbevPb A bywZ nq| D wbevPb NUbv ej wQj bv Z vnv ej v hvq
bv| 1996 mvj i 20k g Z vwi L XvK vi i vR c _ XvK vevmx
K Z znj I wemqi mwnZ mvgwi K evwnbxi Uv Pj vPj c Z K i |
K vb K vb mi j gbv ew GB wj K K vb c v_ xi wbevPbx c Z xK gb
K wi qvwQj b| hvnv nDK , ` k i mf vM h k l c h mswk
mK j i f eywi D` K nq Ges ` k A vevi I GK wU wec hqi nvZ
nBZ i vc vq|
A g R vZ xq msm` i wbevPb c avb Dc ` v k c _ j Bevi
c i c i B Z vnvi Dc ` v c wi l ` k c _ j Bevi c ~eB ek K qK R b
mwPeK e` wj i A v` k c ` vb K i b| Z vi c i gvbq e K gK Z vK
e` wj K i v nq| d j GK i vR bwZ K ` j i c nBZ c ej A vc w
D vc b K wi qv Z veavqK mi K vi i Dc i A bv v vc b K wi Z
_ vK | A bw` K A vi GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j h_ e` wj K i v nBZ Q
bvewj qvZ veavqK mi K vi i Dc i A bv v vc b K i |
2004 mvj i gaf vM msweavb ( PZ z` k msk vab) A vBb,
2004, wewae K i v nq| D A vBb A bvb wel qi mwnZ myc xg
K vUi wePvi K MYi A emi Mgbi eqm 65 er mi nBZ ew K wi qv
67 er mi K i v nq| mi K vi c Bnvi K vi Y wnmve ej v nq h
A wf wePvi K MYK A vi I ` yB er mi PvK zi xZ i vwL evi gnr D k
GBi c A vBb K i v nq| A c i w` K Z ` vbx b wei vax` j i c c ej
A vc w D vc b K wi qv ej v nq h A emi c v qv` k c avb
wePvi c wZ K beg R vZ xq msm` i wbevPb c avb Dc ` v wbqvM
c ` vb K wi evi D k B Dc i v f ve msweavb msk vab K i Z t myc xg
K vUi wePvi K MYi eqm ew K i vnq|
2006 mvj i k l f vM wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi wbqvMi
c v vj Z ` vbx b i vc wZ msweavbi 58 M A byQ` i ( 6) ` d vi
A axb wbR B c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY K i b| BnvZ mgM ` k
c ej D R bv I A v` vj b A vi nq| mgM ` k GK i K g
303
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GmgqI A bK c wZ ew i vc wZ i Z r K vj xb f ~wgK vi f ~qmx
c k smvK wi qvQb|
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c avb Dc ` vi c ` nBZ c ` Z vM K i b Ges mgM ` k R i i x
A e vNvl YvK i b| Z uvnvi Nvl Yvwbi c t
wemwgj vwni i vngvwbi i vnxg|
wc q ` k evmx, A vmmvj vgyA vj vBK zg|
` k I R vwZ i vw j MwK Qy i Z c ~YK _ v Ges wmv
A vc bv` i K vQ Dc vc b K i vi R b A vwg A vc bv` i mvgb
nvwR i nqwQ| weMZ 29 A vei 2006 Z vwi L A vwg msweavb
Gi 58 M avi v gvZ veK Dc ` vi ` vwqZ f vi MnY K wi Ges
Dc ` vgj x mnK vi A eva, wbi c Ges myz wbevPb
A byvbi j wewf bc ` c MnY K wi | A vgv` i c vq
meK wU wmv I c ` c mK j i vR bwZ K ` j mg~n K Z K
mgv` Z nqwb| c vq c wZ wU wmv GK R vU c gZ vgZ
w` j I A b R vU wec A e vb wbqQ| c v i ` k i
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` yf vMi wk K vi |
Z veavqK mi K vi i A bZ g K vR k vw c ~Y, myz I
wbi c f ve msm` wbevPb A byvb wbevPb K wgk bK mevZ K
mvnvh I mnvqZ v K i v| A eva, myy I wbi c wbevPbi
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304
wewf bai Yi wU- wePzwZ Z c wi c ~YGes Gi MnYhvMZ v
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I we` k MnYhvM ne bv|
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wec i xZ gi Z A e vb K i Q| ` ywU i vR bwZ K R vUi
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ne Ges ` k mvgbi w` K G bvi c wi eZ wc Qbi w` K
hZ _ vK e| GK wU ` k K mve DbwZ i j c Q w` Z
nj R vZ xq bZ Z Pvi wU bvej xi mgbq c qvR b| h_ v,
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^w Z | A bvPvi A ee vc bv, A mwn yZ v I mxgvnxb ` ybxwZ i
K vi Y R bMYi A vk v, A vK vL v, myL I k vw wbevwmZ | ej v
305
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DbwZ NUvZ ne| R bMYK myL I k vw Z emevm K i vi
myhvM K i w` Z ne| ^vaxbf ve Z v` i c Q` gvZ veK
wbi c , A eva I myywbevPbi gvag GK wU mr I Dc hy
mi K vi MVbi A waK vi I myhvM w` Z ne| GB gnr c qvR b
ee vMnYi wbwg A vgv` i mgqi c qvR b|
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wef vMi DPv` vj Z i f vegywZ ` vi Yf ve zbnqQ| ` k K
me ^vej ^x K i Z nj , ` k i A _ bxwZ K mPj i vL Z
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k L j v c ybt Dvi Ges mi K vi K c qvR bxq mvnvh K i vi R b
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wbevPbi c _ K myMg K i vi j A vwg Z veavqK mi K vi
c avbi c ` _ K B d v c ` vbi wmv MnY K i wQ Ges A vwg
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306
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K i R bc wZ wbwa` i vi v` k k vmbi ee vK i eb|

A vj vn A vc bv` i mnvq nvb| A vj vn nvd R | evsj v` k
wR ` vev` |
( ` wbK B d vK c w K vi 12- 1- 2007 Z vwi L i c w K v nBZ
DZ )

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Z _ vK w_ Z mvd j i mi K vi xf vl | g e wb qvR b|
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c wi l ` wbqvM c ` vb K i Z t Z veavqK mi K vi c ybMwVZ K i b|
c ybMwVZ GB Z veavqK mi K vi ` yB er mi K vj hveZ mi K vi
c wi Pvj bv K i b| A _ P Z wK Z msweavb msk vab A vBbi A vI Z vq
Z veavqK mi K vi i gqv` K vb gB beB w` bi A wZ wi
nBevi K _ vbq|
Bnv mZ h msweavbi PZ z_ f vMi 2K c wi Q` G 58 L
A byQ` wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi MVbi weavb _ vwK j I Bnvi
gqv` m^ K vb weavb bvB wK msk vwaZ 123( 3) A byQ`
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ga msm` - m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBe|
Bsi R xf vl t
123.(1) ............................
............................
(3) A general election of members of Parliament shall be
held within ninety days after Parliament is dissolved,
whether by reason of the expiration of its term or
otherwise than by reason of such expiration.
307
Dc i v weavb wbevPb A byvb beB w` bi ga A bywZ
K wi evi K _ v ej v nBqvQ| K vR B mvavi Y wbevPb msm` f vswMqv
hvBevi 90 w` bi ga A bywZ K wi Z nBe| A vi , wb` j xq
Z veavqK mi K vi MVb K wi evi GK gv D k nBZ Q mvavi Y
wbevPb A byvb| msweavb wek l Y K wi evi wbqg nBZ Q h
msweavbi GK wU A byQ` c _ K f ve weePbv K wi j nBe bv, mgM
msweavb GK weePbv K wi qv Bnvi ggA byaveb K wi Z nBe|
eZ gvb aygv PZ z_ f vMi 2K c wi Q` wewQbf ve weePbv
K wi j nBe bv, Bnvi mwnZ 123( 3) A byQ` I weePbv K wi Z
nBe| 58 L I 123( 3) A byQ` GK wek l Y K wi j wbw Z f ve
c Z xqgvb nBe h Z veavqK mi K vi i gqv` 90 w` b, Bnvi
A wZ wi bq|
A Z Ge, wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i gqv` mevP 90w` b|
wK g~j msweavb Ges GgbwK msweavb ( qv` k msk vab)
A vBbi A vI Z vi evwni 90 w` bi A waK c vq ` yB er mi K vj m~Y
A ea f ve Dj wL Z wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ` k k vmb
K wi qvQ| 90 w` bi A wZ wi mgqK vj m~YA mvsweavwbK f ve
DI mi K vi ` k k vmb K wi qvQ|
GB mgqK vj i ga Z ` vbx b mi K vi ewea c k vmwbK I A b
bvbvwea K vh g c wi Pvj bv K wi qvQ| i v I R bMYi ^v_ H
mgqK vj i mK j A eaZ vgvR bvK i v( condone) K i vc qvR b nBe|
Dj L h msweavbi 121 A byQ` A bymvi msm` wbevPbi
R b GK wU f vUvi Z vwj K v evaZ vg~j K f ve c yZ i vwL evi weavb
i wnqvQ| Z vnvQvo v, msweavbi 123 A byQ` A bymvi I A axb
mgqgZ mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb K wi evi mK j ` vq I ` vwqZ wbevPb
K wgk bi Dc i b | wbw` mgq mxgvi ga wbevPb A byvb K wi Z
bv c vwi j msweavb f K wi evi ` vq- ` vwqZ wbevPb K wgk bi Dc i B
eZ veB, Z e wej ^A bywZ wbevPbi eaZ v zbnq bv, wbevPb
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308
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2007 mvj i 11B R vbyqvi x Z vwi L i GK A v` k ej i vc wZ ` k
R i i x- A e v R vi x K wi qvwQj b Ges D R i i x- A e v c vq ` yB er mi
K vj ` k ej er wQj | ^xK Z gZ B H mgq R vZ xq msm` i
A waek b we` gvb A e vq wQj bv|
R i i x- A e v R vi x K wi Z nBj Z vnv A ek B msweavbi
141K A byQ` e k Z vw` c vj b mvc R vi x K wi Z nBe Ges
Dnvi gqv` D weavb ewYZ gqv` A bymvi B nBZ nBe| R i i x
A e v R vi xi eaZ v mK K vb g e ewZ i K Bnv wavnxb f ve
ej v hvq h R vZ xq msm` i A bygv` b ewZ i K c vq ` yB er mi K vj
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c Z xqgvb nq| msm` i A bygv` b ewZ i K h K qw` b R i i x- A e v
eR vq i vL v me, mB K qw` bB R i i x A e v eR vq _ vwK e, Z r c i
^qsw q f ve Z vnv A K vhK i nBqv hvBe| 141K A byQ`
ewnf ~Z f ve K L bB R i i x- A e v R vi x ev Pj gvb i vL v hvBe bv|
A b_ vq msweavb f nBe|
Dc i v A vj vPbv nBZ c Z xqgvb nBe h A wZ c k swmZ
1996 mvj i Z veavqK mi K vi , 2001 mvj i wZ xq Z veavqK
mi K vi ev 2006/ 2007 mvj i Z veavqK mi K vi q K vbwUB
K vwL Z A v vgvUI R vMZ K i bv|
1996 mvj i c _ g Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj ` k mebvk i
vi c v (precipice) Pvwj qv wMqvwQj | Z vnv A vi hvnvB nvK ej
c Pvwi Z I c k swmZ wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i wek vmhvMZ v I
K wZ Z i mv enb K i bv| wbevPbi c i GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j
wbevPbi d j vd j MnY K wi Z A ^xK vi K i |
2001 mvj i wZ xq Z veavqK mi K vi A vgj wewf b
i vR bwZ K ` j GK A c i i c wZ A wf hvM A vbqb Ges mevc wi
309
Z veavqK mi K vi K gvMZ c k we K wi qvQ| wbevPbi c i GK wU
i vR bwZ K ` j wbevPbi d j vd j MnY K wi Z A ^xK vi K i |
Z vnv nBj c v_ K Uv wK nBj | msweavb msk vabvi v
Z I veavqK mi K vi ee v A vbqb K wi qv c wi w wZ i DbwZ B ev wK
nBj | Z I veavqK mi K vi vi v A bywZ wbevPb Z v mK j i vR bwZ K
` j i wbK U MnbhvM nq bv| Z vnv nBj GB ee vi mvd j
K v_ vq ?
2006 mvj qv` k c avb wePvi c wZ c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY
K wi Z A ^xK wZ vc b K i vq k l c h i vc wZ wbR B c avb
Dc ` vi c ` MnY K i b| Bnv c K Z c GK bvqK Z c wZ v K i
Ges evsj v` k i vi g~j wf w c R vZ I MYZ m~Ywbevmb
hvq| c P MYA v` vj bi gyL wZ wb 2007 mvj i 11B R vbyqvi x
Z vwi L c ` Z vM K i b|
GB mK j NUbvej x A vi hvnvB nvK Z veavqK mi K vi i
mvd j evMnYhvMZ vI wek vmhvMZ vA vbqb K i bv|
Bnvi c i R bve d L i Dw b A vng` c avb Dc ` v wnmve
wbqvM c vb| meZ t msweavb msk vabx A bymvi 58 L A byQ` i
( 5) ` d vi A axb Z uvnvi wbqvM nq|
c k I V h i vc wZ wK 58 L ( 5) A byQ` i A axb c avb
Dc ` v wbqvM c ` vbi c Pv ewZ i K B wK 58 L ( 6) A byQ` i
A vI Z vq wbR c avb Dc ` vi c ` MnY K wi qvwQj b? A _ ev 58 L ( 6)
A byQ` i A vI Z vq wZ wb c avb Dc ` vi c ` GK evi MnY K wi evi
c i c ybi vq 58 L ( 5) A byQ` i A vI Z vq c avb Dc ` vi c ` wbqvM
c ` vb K wi Z c vi b wK bv? hnZ z Z wK Z qv` k msk vab
A vBbwUi B eaZ v weePbv K i v nBZ Q, mnZ z Dc i v c k wj
wek l Y K wi evi K vb c qvR b bvB|
c ~eB ej v nBqvQ h GgbwK Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBbi A axbI wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi mevP 90
310
w` b gZ vq _ vwK Z c vi , Z vnvi A waK bn| GgZ A e vq A wZ wi
c vq GK er mi bq gvm K vj D wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi
msweavb, GgbwK Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBbi I
A vI Z v ewnf ~Z f ve evsj v` k k vmb K wi qvQ| Bnvi K vb
mvsweavwbK ev A b K vb A vBbMZ eaZ v wQj bv| 2006 mvj
A vei gvmi h Z vwi L Z ` vbx b c avbg x 58 L ( 6) A byQ` i
A vI Z vq Z ` vbx b i vc wZ i wbK U ` vwqZ f vi n v i K wi qvwQj b
mB Z vwi L nBZ 90 w` b c i GgbwK Z wK Z ( msk vab) A vBbi I
A vI Z vi evwni Z _ vK w_ Z Z veavqK mi K vi gZ vq A wawZ wQj |
GB mvsweavwbK hara-kiri m^ we A vUbx- R bvi j ev Amicus
curiae MY K vb e e c k K i b bvB|

41| wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ vI msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBbt-
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c avb wePvi c wZ ev A vc xj wef vMi A emi c v wePvi c wZ MYK c avb
Dc ` v wbqvM c ` vb K wi evi weavb K wi qv wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v
L eK i v nBqvQ| wZ wb A vk v c K vk K i b h Bnvi d j i vR bwZ K
` j wj mswk wePvi K MYK wbR ` i c A vwbevi R b c f ve
we vi K wi Z _ vwK eb| Z vnvQvo v, h i vR bwZ K ` j mi K vi
i wnqvQ Z vnvi vI wbR ` i f veavi vi ew K c avb wePvi c wZ
K wi evi c qvm c vBeb| d j k wZ Z nqZ v A hvM ew c avb
wePvi c wZ nBeb Ges hvM ew i A e` vb nBZ ` k I R vwZ
ew Z nBe|
wZ wb A vk v c K vk K i b h nqZ v K vb K vb wePvi c wZ
A mZ K gyZ c avb Dc ` v nBevi A vK vL v c vl Y K wi qv K vb
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d j bvq wePvi zbnBZ c vi | bvq wePvi zbnBj wePvi
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311
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nBj I c avb Dc ` v wnmve Z vnvi wbqvM wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v
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D vwc Z e e Z wK Z wel qwUi A wZ mi j xK i Y, wK wel qwU gvUB
mi j bq| ei h_ R wUj | K vi Y mgmvwU g~L Z gvbwmK Ges
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wePvi K MY K nB wbR wbR P^vi wd wi qv hvBZ wQ bv Ges
A v` vj Z i K vR I e nBqv i wnqvQ| Z L b R vbv Mj h Judges
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meZ Z vnvi v c _ Qvwo qv w` Z c vi b, wK Z ` vbx b c avb
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312
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c avb Dc ` v c ` wbqvM c vb| Z L b ` yB NUvi A waK mgq myc xg
K vUi Df q wef vMi mK j A v` vj Z i K vh g e _ vK , wK c avb
wePvi c wZ mghvc hvMx ` p c ` c j BZ Z L b K b e_ nBj b|
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R wePvi K MYK A wZ v K i b| GK B f ve l vo k , m` k I
Dbwesk Z g c avb wePvi c wZ MY A vc xj wef vM Z vunv` i R
wePvi K K A wZ v K wi qv c avb wePvi c wZ nb| qv` k c avb
wePvi c wZ Z uvnvi R wePvi K K A wZ Gv K wi qv wbqvMc v nBj
Z gb K vb b nq bvB| wZ wb 26- 1- 2004 Z vwi L A emi Mgb
K i b|
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c i eZ xZ msweavb ( PZ z` k msweavb) A vBb gvi d r myc xg
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wei vax` j BnvZ c ej A vc w D vc b K wi Z _ vK |
Z vnvi v hyw D vc b K wi qv ej b h Z L b h i vR bwZ K ` j
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A ^xK wZ R vbvb|
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wbqvM Z gb K vb A vc w K vb Z i d nBZ B D vc b K i v nq
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f veg~wZ wbw Z f ve zbnq Ges wePvi wef vMi f veg~wZ
c i v f ve nBj I zbnq|
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GBf ve K vb wePvi K i c avb wePvi c wZ wnmve wbqvM c vBevi
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A d vW, K gexR , A vBb wk vi wewf bInns of Court f wel r
i vR bxwZ we` MYi m~wZ K vMvi wQj | hy i vi ^vaxbZ vi A MMvgx
wQj b Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay, Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
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GR bB Z vunvi v webv i c vZ wewUk - i vR i wbK U nBZ ` yBwU i v
^vaxb K wi Z c vwi qvwQj b|
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eZ gvb evsj v` k gb nq GK R b A vi GK R bK nq K i v,
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wei A nZ zK Ggb D R bv I A v` vj b mw K wi Z _ vK b hvnv
c vqk B mvavi Y wk vPvi ewnf ~Z nBqv hvq| Z vnvQvo v, Z vnvi v bvbv
f ve Z vnvK weZ wK Z K wi Z _ vK b| c avb wePvi c wZ wnmve A bK
317
mgqB Z vnvK A wc q wmv I j BZ nq, wK K vi Y ev A K vi YB
Z vnvi wei vPi b I c we A v` vj Z A b Pi g Dk L j A vPi Y
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` ytmn A wf Z v|
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c _ gB wePvi K MYi k c _ c m A vj vPbv K i v c qvR b|
msweavbi 148 A byQ` A bymvi Z Z xq Z d wmj Dwj wL Z h K vb
c ` wbevwPZ ev wbhyI ew K vhf vi MnYi c ~eD Z d wmj -
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msweavbi Z Z xq Z d wmj ewYZ ew MYi ga myc xg K vUi
wePvi K MYI i wnqvQb| myc xg K vUi h K vb wef vM wbqvMi c i
mswk wePvi K K wbi c f ve k c _ evNvl Yvc vV K wi Z nq t
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K wi Z wQ h, A vwg A vBb- A byhvqx I wek vi mwnZ A vgvi c ` i
K Z e c vj b K wi e;
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A vwg evsj v` k i c wZ A K w g wek vm I A vbyMZ c vl Y
K wi e;
A vwg evsj v` k i msweavb I A vBbi i Y, mg_ b I
wbi vc vweavb K wi e ;
Ges A vwg f xwZ ev A byMn, A byi vM ev wei vMi ek Z Z x bv
nBqvmK j i c wZ A vBb- A byhvqxh_ vwenxZ A vPi Y K wi e|

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A vbyvwbK Z vbn| Bnvi c wZ wU k wek l Z vr c henb K i |
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c k vwZ Z A vbyMZ , wbw Z wbi c Z v Ges mec wi msweavb I A vBb
mgybZ K wi evi ` vwqZ A c b K i |
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c i I , Z vnvi k c _ vi veva|
BwZ nvmi w` K Z vK vBj A vgi v ` wL Z c vB h Lord Chancellor
Sir Thomas More Z uvnvi k c _ K A Z i Z i mwnZ weePbv
K wi Z b| i vR v Henry VIII Z vnvK Head of the Church of England wnmve
^xK wZ c ` vb K i Z t k c _ j Bevi R b Sir Thomas More K wb` k ` b
wK wZ wb Z vnv gvb K wi Z A ^xK wZ vc b K i Z t 1532 mvj Lord
Chancellor c ` nBZ c ` Z vM K i b| i vR vi A v` k A gvb K i vq
i vR ` vni A wf hvM Z vnvK 16 er mi Tower G A i xY _ vwK Z nq
Z eyI mK j i A byi va mZ I H i c k c _ MnY K wi Z A ^xK vi
K i b| A Z c i , Z uvnvi wk i Q` nq|
1591 mvj wePvi K MYi gZ vgZ ( Opinion of Judges) ` L vhvqt

We are almost daily called upon to minister Justice according to law,
whereunto we are bound by our office and our oath (Philip Hamburger:
Law and Judicial Duty).

Pvwi k Z er mi c ~eExchequer Chamber A v` vj Z 12 R b wePvi K i
myL Commendams ( 1616) gvK gvwUi bvbx Pwj Z wQj | DI
gvK gvq i vR vi GK wU Prerogative A bymvi g yi x c ` vbi wel qwUI
gvK gvi wel q e z wQj | H mgq i vR v James I j b Gi evwni
319
A e nvb K wi Z wQj b| wZ wb Attorney General Sir Francis Bacon gvi d r
i vR vi mwnZ A vj vPbv bv K i v c h gvK gvwUi bvbx nwMZ
K wi Z ej b| wK wePvi K MY R vbvb t
Obedience to His Majestys Command to stay proceedings would have
been a delay of justice, contrary to the law, and contrary to oaths of the Judges.
( A vavi L vc ` )

i vR v James I j b k ni wd wi qvB 12R b wePvi K K WvwK qv
c vVvb Ges wR vmvK i bt
When the king believes his interest is concerned and requires the judges
to attend him for their advice, ought they not to stay proceedings till His Majesty
has consulted them?

Kings Bench Gi c avb wePvi c wZ Sir Edward Coke ewZ i K A b
mK j wePvi c wZ i vR vi A wf j vl A bymvi c ` c j Bevi A xK vi
K i b| aygv Coke ej bt
When that happens, I will do that which it shall be fit for a judge to do.
A ek Coke K Z vunvi GB ^K xqZ vi R b A bK g~j w` Z nq|
K qK w` bi gaB i vR v Z vunvK ei L v Z K i b Ges 7 gvm
Z vunvK Tower G A i xb _ vwK Z nq|
( Dc i i DwZ wj Lord Denning wj wL Z What Next In The Law
c y Z K nBZ eYbvK i vnBj ) |
` yBk Z er mi c ~ehyI i vi c avb wePvi c wZ John Marshall Marbury
V. Madison (1803) gvK gvq wePvi K i k c _ m^ A vj vK c vZ K i bt
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it?
This oath certainly applies in an especial manner, to their conduct in their
official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as
the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to
support !

The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely
demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: I
do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and
do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as-,according to the best of
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my abilities and understanding agreeably to the constitution and laws of the
United States.

Why does a judge swedr to discharge his duties agreeably to the
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his
government ? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him ?

If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To
prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime. (Quoted from
Professor Noel T. Dowling on the Cases on the Constitutional Law, Fifth
Edition, 1954, at page-96. ( A vavi L vc ` )

Federation of Pakistan V. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan PLD 1955 FC 240
gvK gvq wePvi c wZ A.R.Cornelius (as his Lordship then was) Z vunvi
wf bgZ m~PK i vq wePvi K ` i k c _ m^ ej b ( c v319) t
The resolution of a question affecting the interpretation of important
provisions of the interim constitution of Pakistan in relation to the very high
matters which are involved, entails a responsibility going directly to the oath of
office which the constitution requires of a Judge, namely, to bear true faith and
allegiance to the Constitution of Pakistan as by law established and faithfully to
perform the duties of the office to the best of the incumbents ability,
knowledge and judgment. ( A vavi L vc ` )

Fazlul Quader Chowdhury V. Muhammad Abdul Haque, PLD 1963 SC 486,
gvK gvq c avb wePvi c wZ A.R. Cornelius k c _ m^ ej b ( c v
502- 03) t
The Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts when they enter
upon their office, are required to swear an oath that they will preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution.
.......... The reasons why the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High
Courts have to take a similar oath can in my opinion be found within the simple
provisions of Article 58. It is there provided for all persons in Pakistan that in
any case where it becomes necessary for them to assert in their interest, any
provision of the Constitution, they shall have access to the High Courts and
through the High Courts to the Supreme Court as of right, and these two Courts
are bound by their oath and duty to act so as to keep the provisions of the
Constitution fully alive and operative, to preserve it in all respects safe from all
defeat or harm, and to stand firm in defence of its provisions against attack of
any kind. The duty of interpreting the Constitution is, in fact a duty of enforcing
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the provisions of the Constitution in any particular case brought before the
Courts in the form of litigation. ( A vavi L vc ` )

Asma Jilani V. Government of Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139 gvK v gvq c avb
wePvi c wZ Hamoodur Rahman k c _ m^ ej b ( c v- 203- 04) t
Incidentally it may also be mentioned here that a great deal that has
been said about the oath of Judges is also not germane to the question now
before us, for, in the view I take of the duty of a Judge to decide a controversy
that is brought before him it cannot be said that any Judge of this Court has
violated his oath which he took under the Constitution of 1962.
.................So far as this Court is concerned it has always acted in
accordance with its oath and will continue to do so whenever a controversy is
brought before it, no matter what the consequences ( A vavi L vc ` )

Anwar Hossain Chowdhury V. Government of Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Special )
gvK gvq wePvi c wZ B.H. Chowdhury (as his Lordship then was) k c _ m^
ej b ( c v- 106) t
246. While it is the duty of the people at large to safeguard, protect
and defend the Constitution, the oath of the President, Judges is to preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution. To preserve it is an onerous duty. While for
the people the duty is to safeguard. Nature of the two duties are different and
run in parallel. To deny the power to judiciary to preserve the constitution is
to destroy the independence of the judiciary thereby dismantling the
Constitution itself.

GK B gvK gvq wePvi c wZ Shahabuddin Ahmed, (as his Lordship then
was) k c _ m^ wbwj wL Z A wf gZ c K vk K i b ( c v- 157) t
379. Judges are by their oath of office bound to preserve, defend and
protect the Constitution and in exercise of this power and function they shall act
without any fear or favour and be guided by the dictate of conscience and the
principle of self restraint. It is these principles which restrain them from
exceeding the limits of their power. In this connection the following observation
of the sitting in the Court of Appeal, State of Virginia, is quite appropriate:
I have heard of an English Chancellor who said, and it was
nobly said, that it was his duty to protect the rights of the subject against
the encroachments of the crown; and that he would do it at every hazard.
But if it was his duty to protect a solitary individual against the rapacity
of the sovereign, surely it is equally mine to protect one branch of the
legislature and consequently the whole community against the
usurpations of the other and whenever the proper occasion occurs, I shall
feel the duty ; and fearlessly perform it...... if the whole legislature, an
322
event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed
to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the court,
will meet the united powers at my seat in this tribunal, and pointing to
the constitution, will say to them, there is the limit of your authority; and
hither shall you go, but no further. ( A vavi L vc ` )

wePvi c wZ M.H. Rahman (as his Lordship then was) wePvi K MYi k c _
m^ wbwj wL Z g e K i b ( c v- 18 0) t
488. The Courts attention has repeatedly been drawn to the oath the
Chief Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court takes under art. 148 of the
Constitution on his appointment. Mr. Asrarul Hossain has pointed out the
difference between the language of the oath the Judges of the Indian Supreme
Court take to uphold the Constitution. The import of the single word uphold
is no less significant or onerous than that of the three words preserve, protect
and defend. In either case the burden is the same. And the Court carries the
burden without holding the swords of the community held by the executive or
the purse of the nation commanded by the legislature.

Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Limited V. Government of Bangladesh 2006
(Special Issue) BLT (HCD) gvK v gvq wePvi K ` i k c _ I ` vwqZ m^
wbvI g e K i vnq ( c v- 203) t
It should be noted that the oath of office, an individual Judge takes at
the time of his elevation to the Bench, is a personal one and each individual
Judge declares it taking upon himself, the obligation to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution. It is an obligation cast upon each individual Judge.
Each individual Judge himself remains oath-bound to fulfill his own obligations
under the Constitution. This obligation under the oath is personal and remains so
upon him, every day, every week, every month, every year, during his tenure as
a such Judge. His all other obligations are subject to his Oath and the
Constitution.
..........We the Judges have got the obligation to uphold the
Constitution and we are oath-bound to do it, no matter who is hurt. It is better to
hurt a few than the country. In any case everybody must face the truth however
awkard it may seem at first. But truth and only the truth must prevail. We Judges
are obliged to enhance the cause of justice and truth and not to disgrace it,
however political over-tone it may seem to have but the Constitution, the
supreme law with the ever vigilant people of this country, shall over-ride all
political implications.

323
GgZ A e vq c avb wePvi c wZ hw` weeK eywmbmZ K vi
wePvi c wZ nb Ges f wel r c avb Dc ` vi c ` hw` Z vunvK c f vweZ
bv K i Z vnv nBj wZ wb Z vnvi k c _ A bymvi ` pn c wi w wZ
gvK vwej v K wi eb Ges A vBb I bvqbxwZ A bymvi bvq wePvi wbw Z
K wi eb hw` I mBi c ` pZ vi R b Z vunvK c wZ c ` c ` A c gvb
mn K wi Z nBZ c vi | A bw` K wZ wb hw` c avb Dc ` v c ` i
wP vq GgbwK A eZ b gbI c f vevwbZ nb, Z vnv nBj mK j mgq
mK j i mwnZ A vc vl K wi qv Pvwnevgv Qvo w` eb| BnvZ mK j B
L yk x nBeb Ges wZ wb mevc v R bwc q c avb wePvi c wZ nBeb wK
wePvi i evYxwbf Z K vuw` e|
c k DwVZ c vi h c avb Dc ` vi c ` wU nBZ c avb
wePvi c wZ ev A b wePvi c wZ K m bv K wi j wK myweav nBZ
c vi |
c ~eA vj vPbv K i v nBqvQ h GK R b wePvi K i gvbwmK
k w B nBZ Q wePvi wef vMi c avb k w | c avb Dc ` vi c `
MnYi wel qwU bv _ vwK j GK R b c avb wePvi c wZ gvbwmK Pvc nBZ
gy _ vwK qv m~Y ^vaxb _ vwK Z c vwi eb| wZ xqZ t wei vax ` j xq
i vR bwZ K ` j i mg_ K A vBbR xweMYi i vR bwZ K K vi Y m Pvc
nBZ c avb wePvi c wZ gy _ vwK Z c vwi eb|
GB ` yBwU wel qB ^vaxb wePvi ee vi R b A wZ c qvR bxq|
` k i ^vaxb wePvi ee vi mv_ A ek B c avb wePvi c wZ I A vc xj
wef vMi wePvi K MYK ` k i i vR bxwZ we` MYi e_ Z vi ` vqf vi
nBZ i v K wi Z nBe| wePvi K MYi mvsweavwbK ` vq I ` vwqZ
wePvi wef vMi c wZ I mK j wePvi c v_ xMYi c wZ | i vR bxwZ we` MYi
e_ Z vi ` vqf vi MnY wePvi K MYi K vbB mvsweavwbK ev bwZ K
` vwqZ bvB| Dj L h Z wK Z msk vabxwU i vR bxwZ we` MYi e_ Z vi
K vi YB A vbqb K wi Z nBqvQ| i vR bxwZ we` MYi wbR ` i ` vq I
` vwqZ Z vnv` i wbR ` i K B enb K wi Z nBe| wePvi wef vM Z vnv
enb K wi e bv| A b_ vq wePvi wef vM wbR B A v nv msK U c wo e|
324
A vi R bgvbyl i A v nvB nBZ Q wePvi K MYi c K Z k w | Samson
Gi k w j y vBZ wQj Z vi Pzj i ga, wePvi K MYi k w Z vunvi
c k vZ xZ mZ Z v, wbi c Z v I ` p c wi k xwj Z gbbk xj Z vq| GB
k w i Dc i wbf i K wi qvB GK R b wePvi K wbf xK I ` pf ve i vi
mevc v k w gvb ew i wei I A ej xj v g i vq c ` vb K wi Z
GZ UzK zwav eva K i b bv|
wePvi wef vM K vb wK Qyi wewbgqB GB k w c wi Z vM K wi Z
c vi bv| Ggb wK c avb Dc ` vc ` i R bI bn|
GK R b wePvi K mZ Z _ vwK eb t
Be just, and fear not :
Let all the ends thou aimst at be thy countrys,
Thy Gods, and truths;


42| R bMYi mi K vi t
evsj v` k i vi g~j wf w nBj mec hvq R bMYi gZ vqb|
msweavbi c vebv, msweavbi c _ g f vM, wZ xq f vM I me
R bMYi gZ vqb c ywUZ nBqv DwVqvQ| msweavbi g~j wZ bwU
i gaI R bMY Dc w Z | R bMYi gZ vqb A vgv` i
msweavbi mek Basic Structure|
R bve i wd K - Dj nK we GvW&f vK U gnv` q hyw D vc b
K wi qvQb h c vwK vbi msweavbI GK ai bi Z eavqK mi K vi
i wnqvQ| wK evsj v` k msweavbi c wZ i e R bMYi wPi b
c evngvb gZ vqbi c ~ek Z wU Z u vnvi ` wi A MvPi i wnqvwMqvQ|
nvBK vUwef vMI hyw Dc vc b K i v nBqvQ h f vi Z i
msweavbI GK ai bi Z veavqK mi K vi i wnqvQ hL vb wbevPb
Dc j Parliament f vwOqv Mj c avbg x I Z vunvi gw mf v
Z veavqK mi K vi i ` vwqZ c vj b K i b|
R bve i wd K - Dj nK we GvW&f vK U gnv` q hyw D vc b
K i b h f vi Z i bvq evsj v` k i msweavbI H ai bi Z veavqK
mi K vi i wnqvQ| qv` k msk vabx aygv c avbg x I gw mf vi
325
c wi eZ m~YA i vR bwZ K ew eMvi v Dc ` v c wi l ` MVb K i Z t
wbi c I myz wbevPb wbw Z K wi qv i vi MYZ vw K ee vK
A vi I ` p K i v nBqvQ wK R bMYi gZ vqbi c ~ek Z wU wZ wb
c ybi vq we gZ nBqvQb|
c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf vi c wi eZ Dc ` v c wi l ` wbqvMi
c hyw wel qwUi A wZ mi j xK i Y| c avbg x I Z uvnvi gw mf vi
A waK vsk m` m R bMYi wbevwPZ Ges Z uvnvi v R bMYK c wZ wbwaZ
K i b| Z uvnv` i gvagB R bMY gw mf vq Dc w Z _ vK b Ges
gw mf vi c wZ wU wmv R bMYi wmv ewj qv c wi MwYZ nq|
GL vbB R bMYi gZ vqb| Z vnvQvo v, gw mf v R bMYi c wZ wbwa
R vZ xq msm` i wbK U ` vqe| GB ` yBf ve R bMYi gZ vqb|
c k DwVZ c vi , R vZ xq msm` i ` yB A waek bi gaeZ xmgq
Ges wbevPb Dc j R vZ xq msm` f vswMqv Mj R bMYi gZ vqb
D mgqi R b Q` c o wK bv ev Bnvi A wewQbZ v web nq wK bv|
bv K L bI nq bv, K vi Y, A wewQbZ v K vb wek l ew ev ew eMi
R b bn, ew ev ew eMh_ v g c avbg x nBeb ev gw mf vi
m` m nBeb Ges GK mgq c vb K wi eb, A b K n ev A bi v
A vwmeb Ges GK mgq Z vnvi vI c vb K wi eb, wK c avbg x I
gw mf v A wewQbf ve Pwj Z _ vwK e, mB m R bMYi Dc w wZ I
gZ vqb we` gvb c avbg x I gw mf vi gvag A weQbf ve
A vengvb K vj awi qv Pwj Z _ vwK e| R bMYi GB A wewQbf ve
A vengvbK vj awi qv i vi me gZ vqb i vi g~j wf w |
K L bB K vb K vi YB GB avi vevwnK Z vq Q` (Hiatus) A vbvhvBe bv|
g~j msweavb A bymvi c avbg x I gw mf vi m` mmn mK j
msm` - m` mMY 5 ( c vuP) er mi i R b wbevwPZ nb| msweavbi g~j
123( 3) A byQ` A bymvi gqv` A emvbi K vi Y msm` f vwqv
hvBevi f vwqv hvBevi c ~eeZ xbeB w` bi ga wbevPb
A bywZ nBZ nBe| wK msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBbi
A vI Z vq msk vwaZ 123( 3) A byQ` A bymvi mvavi b wbevPb A bywZ
326
nBe msm` f vwqv hvBevi c i eZ xbeB w` bi ga | m c k
DwVZ c vi h c vuP er mi A wZ g nBqv Mj c avbg x I gw mf vi
m` mMY msm` - m` m _ vK b wK bv|
Bnvi D i msweavbi 56( 4) , 57( 3) , 72( 3) , 72( 4) I g~j
123( 3) A byQ` c ` vb K i v nBqvQ| wb Dc i v A byQ` wj
eYbvK i vnBj t
56| ( 4) msm` f vswMqv hvI qv Ges msm` - m` m` i
A eewnZ c i eZ x mvavi Y wbe vPb A byvbi gaeZ xK vj GB
A byQ` i ( 2) ev ( 3) ` d vi A axb wbqvM ` vbi c qvR b
` L v w` j msm` f vswMqv hvBevi A eewnZ c ~ehuvnvi v msm` -
m` m wQj b, GB ` d vi D k mvabK Z uvnvi v m` mi c
envj i wnqvQb ewj qvMY nBeb|
57| ( 3) c avbg xi D i waK vi x K vhf vi MnY bv K i v
c h c avbg xK ^xq c ` envj _ vwK Z GB A byQ` i K vb
wK QyB A hvM K wi e bv|
72| ( 3) i vc wZ c ~ef vwqv bv w` qv _ vwK j c _ g
eVK i Z vwi L nBZ c vuP er mi A wZ evwnZ nBj msm` f vwqv
hvBe;
Z e k Z _ vK h, c R vZ hy wj _ vwK evi K vj
msm` i A vBb- vi v A byi c gqv` GK K vj A bwaK GK er mi
ewaZ K i v hvBZ c vwi e, Z e hy mgv nBj ewaZ gqv`
K vb g Qq gvmi A waK nBe bv|
72| ( 4) msm` f nBevi c i Ges msm` i c i eZ x
mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi c ~e i vc wZ i wbK U hw`
m vl R bK f ve c Z xqgvb nq h, c R vZ h hy wj
i wnqvQb, mB hyve vi we` gvbZ vi R b msm` c ybi vnvb
K i v c qvR b, Z vnv nBj h msm` f vwqv ` I qv nBqvwQj ,
i vc wZ Z vnvA vnvb K wi eb|

Dc i vI weavb wj nBZ c Z xqgvb nBe h msweavb
c YZ vMb i vxq K vhR bMbi c wZ wbwa Z _ v R bMbK m
i vwL Z K Z Uv mP wQj b| Ggb wK hy A e nvq msm` i gqv`
ewi ee nv i vL v nBqvQ hvnvZ R bMbi c wZ wbwaMY c qvR bxq
wmv c ` vb K wi Z c vi b|
327
GK Bf ve msm` f vwqv hvBevi c i wK msm` i c i eZ x
mvavi Y wbevPb A byvbi c ~ehw` hy A vi f nq m I
i vc wZ i m vl A bymvi h msm` f vwqv ` I qv nBqvwQj Z vnv
c ybi vq A vnvb K i vhvBZ c vi |
ej vi A c v i vL bv h i vc wZ i m w c K Z c wbf i
K wi e we` gvb gw mf vi m w I wmv Ges mB A byhvqx
c avbg xi c i vgk i Dc i | Dj L h gw mf v we` gvb _ vK v mZ I
hyve nvi R b msm` c ybi vnvb K wi evi ee nv msweavb i vL v
nBqvQ|
GBf ve i vxq K vhi c wZ Z i evsj v` k i R bMbi
gZ vqb I A e nvb msweavb wbw Z K wi qvQ|
Z vnvQvo v, c vK msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996
A _ vr msk vabi c ~ei msweavbi 123( 3) A byQ` wbi c t

123| ( 3) msm` - m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBe
( K ) gqv` - A emvbi K vi Y msm` f vwqv hvBevi
f vwqvhvBevi c ~eeZ xbeB w` bi ga;
Ges
( L ) gqv` - A emvb eZ xZ A b K vb K vi Y
msm` f vwqvhvBevi f vwqv
hvBevi c i eZ xbeB w` bi ga|
( A avi L vc ` )


Z e k Z _ vK h, GB ` d vi ( K ) Dc - ` d v A byhvqx
A bywZ mvavi Y wbevPb wbevwPZ ew MY Dc - ` d vq
Dj wL Z gqv` mgv bv nI qv c h msm` - m` mi c
K vhf vi MnY K wi eb bv|


Dc i ewYZ msweavbi weavb wj wek l Y K wi j c Z xqgvb
nBe h msm` - m` mMY hw` I c vuP er mi gqv` wbevwPZ nb, wK
K vb hy ev R i i x A e vi mw nBj D R i i x A e v mgv bv
nI qv c h msm` - m` mMY Z vnv` i K vh g Pvj vBqv hvBeb|
328
BnvZ B c Z xqgvb nq h b~Z b wbevwPZ msm` - m` mMY k c _ MnY bv
K i v c h c ~ei msm` - m` mMY R bMYi c wZ wbwaZ K i b|
R bMbi c wZ wbwa wnmve Z vnv` i Pvwi w K ewk gvUB wej xb
nBe bv|
c avbg xi 57( 3) A byQ` A bymvi Z vnvi D i vwaK vi x
K vhf vi MnY bv K i v c h wZ wb ay ^xq c ` envj _ vK b bv, wZ wb
R bMYi c wZ wbwaZ I K i b|

mec wi c vK - qv` k msk vabxi g~j 123( 3) A byQ`
A bymvi msm` - m` m` i mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBe gqv` A
msm` f vswMqv hvBevi c ~eeZ xbeB w` bi ga| GB weavb L yeB
i Z c yY, K vi Y, m I b~Z b msm` - m` mMY k c _ MnY bv K i v
c h c ~eZ b msm` - m` mMY wbR ` i A waK vi ej ^vf vweK wbqgB
R bc wZ wbwa _ vwK eb Ges Z vnv` i gvag R bMYi gZ vqb
wei wZ nxb f ve Pj gvb _ vwK e|

myZ i vs g~j msweavb A bymvi wbevPb Dc j msm` f vswMqv
hvBevi c i gw mf v GK ai bi Care taker mi K vi ev Z veavqK mi K vi
wnmve ` vwqZ c vj b K wi j I Z L bI c avbg x I gw mf vi mf MY
wbR ` i mvsweavwbK A waK vi ej R bc wZ wbwa _ vK b Ges Z uvnv` i
c wZ wU c ` c i ga R bMYi gZ v Dc w Z _ vK weavq Z uvnv` i
A vBbMZ A e vbi mwnZ qv` k msk vabi A axb m c avb
Dc ` v I Dc ` v c wi l ` i K vbB Z zj bv nq bv K vi Y Z uvnvi v
A wbevwPZ Ges i vi ^xK Z gvwj K R bMYi mwnZ Z uvnv` i K vb
m Z v bvB| hnZ z, R bMbi mwnZ Z uvnv` i K vb c K vi
m Z v bvB, mnZ zmsweavb Z uvnvw` MK k vmb (Governance) K wi evi
K vb A waK vi ` q bv| K vi b, MYZ i c ~ek Z B nBj governance by
consent| Dc ` v` i c R bMYi K vbB consent bvB|

329
A Z Ge, Dc ` vMY K vbf veB i vh ^ Z g K vj i R bI
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z c vi b bv| K vi b, Every man, and every body of men on
earth, possess the right of self-government. (Thomas Jefferson, 1790)| Bnv
gvbyl i R bvwaK vi |

43| Dc msnvi t
Dc i i ` xNA vj vPbv nBZ c Z xqgvb nBe h R bMYi
mvef gZ i vi c R vZ vw K I MYZ vw K Pwi , wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ vwbtm` n msweavbi Basic Structure I i vi g~j wf w |
msweavbi 142 A byQ` A bymvi h K vb msk vab A vBbB
msm` c Yqb K wi Z gZ vevb eU wK i vi g~j wf w ev Basic
Structure L eev zbK i Ggb K vb msk vabx msm` Bnvi msk vabx
gZ vej K wi Z c vi bv| H msk vab myc xg K vUi myL A vbqb
K i v nBj myc xg K vUewj e It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. (John Marshall)|
K vb A R ynvZ B Ges Z wK Z wel qwU myc xg K vUi A wa i
A MZ bq, k Z A vBbR xwei GBi c eI e mZ I Z wK Z A vBb hw`
msweavbi evL v I wek l b K wi evi c k _ vK Z vnv nBj myc xg
K vUB Bnvi ` vwqZ w ni K wi e We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution. (John Marshall).
Dc i msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, m^
we Z vwi Z A vj vPbv nBqvQ| DI A vBbwU i vi g~j wf w R bMbi
mvef gZ , i vi c R vZ vw K I MYZ vw K c wi Pq I wePvi wef vMi
^vaxbZ v L eK wi qvQ weavq Bnv A mvsweavwbK Z _ v A ea ewj qv
Nvl bvK i vnBj | BnvA vBb bq|
c i eZ x c k nBZ Q h GB i vqi f ~Z vc c qvM K i Z t
Z wK Z A vBbwUK void ab initio Nvl bv K i v nBe wK bv| c k wU wek l
i Z c ~YA vK vi avi b K wi qvQ K vi b 1996 mvj nBZ Z wK Z
330
msweavb msk vab A vBbi A axb mg,A g I beg R vZ xq msm`
wbevPb A byvb nBqvQ| ` yBwU wbevwPZ mi K vi 10( ` k ) er mi K vj
` k c wi Pvj bv K wi qvQ Ges Z Z xq wbevwPZ mi K vi eZ gvb ` k
c wi Pvj bv K wi Z Q| GB ` xNmgqi ga A vewk K f ve ` k e
msL K A vBb wewae nBqvQ| eevi evr mwi K evR U c vm
nBqvQ| meZ t GB mgqi ga e msL K A v R vwZ K ,
eR vwZ K I wc vw K Pzw ^v wi Z nBqvQ| gvU K _ v, 1996 mvj
nBZ GB 15 er mi i vxq A msL K gK v c wi Pvwj Z nBqvQ| hw`
Z wK Z A vBbwU void ab initio ej v nq Z e GB 15 er mi i i vxq mK j
K gK v A ea nBqv hvBe Ges ` k GK wU Pi g wec hqi mw
nBe|
GB c m Dj L h 1996 mvj i 6 R vZ xq msm` Bnvi
A wa i ga _ vwK qvB (within jurisdiction) Z wK Z A vBbwU wewae
K wi qvwQj hw` I Dc i A vj vwPZ K vi bvaxb BnvA ea|
GBi c A mvavi Y c wi w nwZ gvK vej v K wi evi R b A vgv` i
wePvi c wZ Benjamin N. Cardozo K mi b K wi Z nq| wZ wb hL b New York
A i vR i c avb wePvi c wZ wQj b Z L b GK e Z vq wZ wb ej bt
The rule (the Blackstonian rule) that we are asked to apply is out of tune
with the life about us. It has been made discordant by the forces that generate a
living law. We apply it to this case because the repeal might work hardship to
those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice however that any one
trusting to it hereafter will do at his peril.

A Z c i , Great Northern Rly V. Sunburst Oil and Ref. Co. (1932) 287 US 358,
366 gvK v gq US myc xg K vUc _ gevi i gZ Prospective Overruling Z Z
c qvM K i | D gvK v gvq wePvi c wZ Cardozo ej b t
Adherence to precedent as establishing a governing rule for the past in
respect of the meaning of a statute is said to be a denial of due process when
coupled with the declaration of an intention to refuse to adhere to it in
adjudicating any controversies growing out of the transactions of the future.
We have no occasion to consider whether this division in time of the
effects of a decision is a sound or an unsound application of the doctrine of stare
331
decisis as known to the common law. Sound or unsound, there is involved in it
no denial of a right protected by the Federal constitution. This is not a case
where a Court in overruling an earlier decision has given to the new ruling of
retroactive bearing and thereby has made invalid what was valid in the doing.
Even that may often be done though litigants not infrequently have argued to the
contrary.....This is a case where a Court has refused to make its ruling
retroactive, and the novel stand is taken that the constitution of the United States
is infringed by the refusal.
We think the Federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state
in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation back ward. It
may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law
nonetheless for intermediate transactions ......On the other hand, it may hold to
the ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a platonic or ideal
existence before the act of declaration, in which event, the discredited
declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered
declaration as law from the beginning ..... The choice for any state may be
determined by the juristic philosophy of the Judges of her courts, their
conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not the wisdom of their
philosophies, but the legality of their acts.

c i eZ xZ Linkletter V. Walker 381 US 618 (1965) gvK v gvq
Prospective Overruling Z Z c ybtc wZ wZ nq| wePvi c wZ Clarke msL vMwi
wePvi c wZ ` i c ej b t
It is clear that based upon the factual considerations heretofore
discussed the Wolf Court then concluded that it was not necessary to the
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment for the exclusionary rule to be extended
to the States as a requirement of due process. Mapp had as its prima purpose
the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the
exclusionary rule within its rights.................................
We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the rule
retrospective. The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred
and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved................On the
other hand, the States relied on Wolf and followed its command. Final
judgments of conviction were entered prior to Mapp. Again and again this Court
refused to reconsider Wolf and gave its implicit approval to hundreds of cases
in their application of its rule. In rejecting the Wolf doctrine as to the
exclusionary rule the purpose was to deter the lawless action of the police and to
332
effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment. That purpose will not at this late
date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty victims.
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the
integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings
would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long since destroyed,
misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the witness available at the time of
the original trial will not be available or if located their memory will be dimmed.
To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing
on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.

Dc i vI i vqi c wZ ` w A vK l b c ~eK L.C. Golak Nath V. State of
Punjab gvK gvq c avb wePvi c wZ K. Subba Rao ej bt
This case has reaffirmed the doctrine of prospective overruling and has
taken a pragmatic approach in refusing to give it retroactivity. In short, in
America the doctrine of prospective overruling is now accepted in all branches
of law, including constitutional law. But the carving of the limits of
retrospectivity of the new rule is left to courts to be done, having regard to the
requirements of justice.

A Z c i , Prospective Overruling m^ wZ wb ej bt
Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implication speak
against the doctrine of prospective overruling. Indeed, Arts.32, 141 and 142 are
couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate
legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. The only limitation thereon is reason,
restraint and injustice. Under Art. 32, for the enforcement of the fundamental
rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue suitable directions or orders or
writs. Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts; and Art. 142 enables it in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice
in any cause or matter pending before it. These articles are designedly made
comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such
directions or pass such orders. as are necessary to do complete justice. The
expression declared is wider than the words found or made. To declare is to
announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former
expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the
process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The
law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we de not see
any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in supersession of the law
declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to
333
future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise that were
effected on the basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court
on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not
make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the
hands of the highest judiciary of this country.

A vBbMZ GB A e vbi c vc U Ges msweavbi 104
A byQ` i A axb m~Ybvq wePvi i R b (for doing complete justice)
msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, A vBbwU f vexmvc f ve
(Prospectively) 2011 mvj i 10B g Z vwi L nBZ A ea Nvl Yv K i v
nBj |
c ~eB A vj vPbv K i v nBqvQ h we A vUbx- R bvi j I
msL vMwi Amicus Curiae MY wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi ee v
we` gvb i wL evi c gZ c K vk K wi qvQb| R bve wU.GBP.L vb, we
GvW&f vK U gnv` q Z v ewj qvQb GB ee v 50 er mi _ vK v
c qvR b|
GB evc vi ` yBwU wel q weePbv K i v c qvR b| c _ gZ ,
c K Z c wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi bq, hvnv c qvR b Z vnv nBj
K vi Pzwc nxb GK wU myz, A eva I wbi c wbevPb| mB R b c qvR b
GK wU k w k vj x, ^vq k vwmZ I ^vaxb (autonomous) wbevPb K wgk b,
K vb Z veavqK mi K vi bn| K vi Y, wZ xqZ , wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi i A axb A bywZ c Z K wU wbevPbi c ~eI c i eZ xZ bvbv
ai Yi Pi g mU ` L v w` qvQ hvnv ej c Pvwi Z I ej c k swk Z
wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi i wek vmhvMZ v I K wZ Z i mv enb
K i bv| Z vnvQvo v, c wZ evi B h i vR wZ K ` j msL vMwi A vmb
j vf K wi Z e_ nBqvQ Z vnvi vB wbevPbi d j vd j MnY K wi Z
mi vmwi A ^xK vi K wi qvQ| ay Z vnvB bn, wbevPbi c ~eI
i vR bwZ K ` j wj wb` j xq Z veavqK mi K vi K bvbvwea A wf hvM
A wf hy K wi qvQ| Bnv A vi hvnvB nvK , Z I veavqK mi K vi ee vi
mvd j i c wi Pq enb K i bv|
334
Dj L h 30 j k nx` i i i Dc i evsj v` k i vwek i
GK wU ^vaxb i vi c A vZ c K vk K i | wek i vc y i ` i evi hw`
c Z xqgvb nq h GK wU i vR bwZ K ` j mvavi Y wbevPb R q j vf
K wi qv mi K vi MVb K i Ges c uvP er mi K vj i v c wi Pvj bv K i ,
wK mvavi Y wbevPb c wi Pvj bv K wi Z A c vi M| Bnv R vwZ i R b
A c gvbR bK | mi K vi K ay` k c wi Pvj bv bq, A v R vwZ K A bI
wewf bgyL x wmv MnY K wi Z nq| ` k i A vBb c Yqb, evR U
c Yqb I DbqbgyL x wewf bK vR I K wi Z c vi | ayZ vnvB bq, gqv`
ga A bK Dc - wbevPbI nq| me wK QyB mi K vi Bnvi gqv` gaB
K wi Z c vi , aygv c i eZ x mvavi Y wbevPb A byvb K wi Z A c vi M
K i v nq| wbevPb K wi evi R b A vi GK wU A wbevwPZ mi K vi c qvR b
nq| GK wU A vZ ghv` vk xj R vwZ wnmve Bnv A Z j vi K _ v| Bnv
MYZ i j v, GB c R vZ i j v| wek - i v c y i mgvR GB
NUbv A vgv` i mvb ew K i B bv, ei Bnv Pi g A c gvbR bK |
A v hh mB A c gvb Dc j w K wi evi gZ vI hb A vgi v nvi vBqv
d wj qvwQ|
Dc i GB ee nv c vuPer mi evc x R bc wZ wbwa` i i v
c wi Pvj bvi ` vwqZ K bwZ K f ve c k we K wi qvZ vj |
GB Z veavqK mi K vi ee vi ai Yv A vgi v mw K wi qvwQ
ewj qv MeK wi qv evK vi ^Mevm K wi , A _ P c w_ exi A bK ` k B
wbevPb c ej K vi Pzwc nq,m mK j ` k i msev` gvag I c qvR b
myc xg K vUK Vvi Z g f vl vq mswk wef vM Ggb wK mi K vi K I
mgvj vPbv K i eU, wK c R vZ vw K Z v ev MYZ K wbevmb
c vVvBevi K _ v Z vnvi v wP vI K i bv| wePvi wef vMK Z vnvi v mK j
c k i Dai vL |
G I c vc U A vgv` i wePvi K ` i ` vwqZ wK ?
I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon this
occasion, to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of all the papers
which come from the press: I will not avoid doing what I think is right; though it
should draw on me the whole artillery of libels ; all that falsehood and malice
335
can invent, or the credulity of a deluded populace can swallow. ( Lord
Mansfield)
Ges
wePvi K MY nBeb deaf as an adder to the clamours of the
populace (John Adams) | Z uvnvi v must follow their oaths and do their duty,
heedless of editorials, letters, telegrams, picketers, threats, petitions, panelists
and talk-shows. In this country, we do not administer justice by plebiscite.
(Judge Hiller B. Zobel)|

wbevPb K vi Pzwc m^ we Amicus Curiae MYi DM I
` yw vi c wZ mgvb c ` k bc ~eK ewj Z PvB h wb` j xq Z veavqK
mi K vi Bnvi mgvavb bn| K vi Pzwc gy myz, A eva I wbi c wbevPb
A byvbi R b c qvR b mZ K vi ^vaxb I k w k vj x wbevPb K wgk b|
GB j A R bi R b mK j vbx I Yx ew MYi GK v I
wbf R vj c Pvc qvR b|
wbevPb K wgk bK A vw_ K f ve ^vaxb K wi Z nBe| BnvK
m~bc k vmwbK gZ v c ` vb K wi Z nBe| j vK ej wbqvM K vb
c K vi euvav mw K i v hvBe bv| wbevPb A byvb K wi Z mec K vi
c qvR b wbi mbK mi K vi Z vr wbK f ve c ` c j Beb|
msweavbi 126 A byQ` ewYZ mK j c K vi mnvqZ v mi K vi i
wbevnx wef vM Z wo r c ` vb K wi Z eva _ vwK eb, A b_ vq Z vnvi v
msweavb f K wi evi ` vq ` vqx nBeb| GB evc vi K vb Z i d
K vb Mvwd j wZ ` L v w` j wbevPb K wgk b c K vk A wf hvM D vc b
K wi eb Ges c qvR bxq c ` c Z wo r MnY K wi eb, A b_ vq
Z vnvi vI msweavb f i ` vq ` vqx nBeb| mvavi Y wbevPbi
Z c mxj Nvl Yvi Z vwi L nBZ wbevPbi d j vd j Nvl Yvi Z vwi L
c h wbevPbi mwnZ c Z f ve R wo Z Ges wbevPb K wgk bi
weePbv ( discretion) A bymvi , hvnvi v GgbwK c i v f ve R wo Z ,
i vi mB mK j K gK Z vI K gPvi xe` mn mswk mK j ew wbevPb
K wgk bi wbq Y _ vwK e| wbevPb K wgk bvi MY A g~~~L x ( introvert)
nBeb bv| hZ ` yi me Z vunv` i ` vwqZ c vj b ^QZ v ( transparence)
eR vq i vwL eb| mZ Z gb i vwL eb h R bMYi wbK UB Z vunv` i
336
R evew` wnZ v ( accountability) | Z vunvi v mK j R bMbi meK gv |
Z vunvi v wK K vR K wi Z Qb Z vnvI R bMbi R vwbevi A waK vi
i wnqvQ, Z vunvi v wK K vR K wi Z c vwi Z Qb bv Ges K b c vwi Z Qb
bv Z vnvI R vwbevi A waK vi R bMbi i wnqvQ| wbevPbx A vBb ev wewa
f K vi x` i wei h_ vc hyI A vBbMZ c ` c Z wo r j BZ nBe|
G evc vi K vbi c k w_ j c ` k b Pwj e bv| k w_ j c ` k b K wi j
wbevPb K wgk bi mswk K gK Z v ew MZ f ve A vBb A gvbK vi x
nBeb|
ayZ vnvB bn, msev` gvag I A vc vgi R bmvavi Y Z vnv` i
A waK vi m^ ay I qvwK envj bq, mvPvi nBZ nBe| Z vnv
nBj B aywbevPb K wgk b I mi K vi Gi R evew` wnZ v wbw Z nBe
Ges Z vnvi vmK j B wbR wbR ` vwqZ c vj b mP _ vwK eb|
Dj L h, A bK ` k B wbevPb A byvb h_ Qv K vi Pzwc nq
wK m K vi b K vb ` k msweavb msk vab K i Z t MYZ nwMZ
K i vnq bv| wbevPb mK wePvi c wZ V.R.Krisha Iyer ej bt
Philosophically speaking, election is an expression of opinion, a means
not an end; a process, not a product.

BnvB wbevPbGi c K Z A vBbMZ A e vb |

f vi Z A bywZ wbevPb mK wePvi c wZ Iyer ej bt .
The election process, now a lunatic, terrorist bedlam operation,
manipulated by the political mafia, shall have to undergo a civilizing mission.
(Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer: Law & Life, c v- 135)

19k k Z K hy i vi ` w Y A j wbMv R bMvwK wK f ve
Z vnv` i f vUvwaK vi nBZ ew Z K i v nBZ Z vnvi GK wU eYbv The
Will of the People Mn c vI qvhvq :
While explicit discrimination by law was forbidden, it took only a little
artifice on the part of states to accomplish the same goals in effect. Even the rights
to serve on juries and to vote were subsequently curtailed by state governments,
with the Court unwilling or unable to intervene. The Chicago Tribune explained in
1890 that to avoid federal interference, the Southern States all have constitutional
provisions and election laws which apparently guarantee the Negroes the right to
337
vote, but nonetheless under this cover election cheating has been reduced to a
system and the blacks are practically disenfranchised in several Southern States. To
cite but one example, plucked from Charlestons News and Courier, a leading
Democrat in the 1876 gubernatorial election in South Carolina called on each
Democrat to control the vote of one negro by intimidation, purchase, keeping him
away or as each individual may determine. (Barry Friedman : The Will of the
People page : 145).


wK hy i vevf vi Z K n G R b Z I veavqK mi K vi ee vi
K _ vwP vI K i bvB|

Bnv wbw Z h m` v Pj gvb A L I wbf R vj MYZ vw K k vmb
ee vi K vb weK mgMwek GL bI DvweZ nq bvB| GB ee v
` p f ve vc b K wi Z MYZ vw K K vVvgvi gaB c qvR bxq
c wZ K vi g~j K ee v ( remedial measures) R vZ xq msm` i weePbv
(Discretion) A bymvi j I qv hvBZ c vi , wK Z vnvi R b MYZ vw K
k vmb ee vK K vb A R ynvZ B, GgbwK m Z g mgqi R bI
c wi nvi K i vhvBe bv|
GgZ A e vq t
( 1) mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBevi , R vZ xq
msm` i weePbv (Discretion) A bymvi , hyw mZ K vj
(reasonable period) c ~e, h_ v, 42 ( eqvwj k ) w` b c ~e
msm` f vwqv ` I qv evbxq nBe, Z e, wbevPb
c i eZ x b~Z b gw mf v K vh f vi MnY bv K i v c h
c ~eeZ xgw mf v msw A vK vi MnY K i Z t D
mgqi R b i vi mvf vweK I mvavi Y K vh g
c wi Pvj bvK wi eb;
( 2) mvavi Y wbevPbi Z c mxj Nvl Yvi Z vwi L nBZ
wbevPbi d j vd j Nvl Yvi Z vwi L c h wbevPbi
mwnZ c Z f ve R wo Z Ges wbevPb K wgk bi
weePbv ( Discretion) A bymvi hvnvi v GgbwK c i v
f ve R wo Z , i vi mB mK j K gK Z v I
K gPvi xe` mn mswk mK j ew wbevPb K wgk bi
wbq Y _ vwK e|

338
we Amicus Curiae MY mK j B GB A v` vj Z i wmwbqi
GvW&f vK U| Z vunv` i myMf xi vb, c v, A wf Z v Ges ` k i
c wZ Z vunv` i ` vwqZ eva c k vZ xZ | msL vMwi Amicus Curiae MY K vb
bv K vb A vK vi Z veavqK mi K vi ee nv eR vq i vwL evi c gZ
c K vk K wi qvQb| Z vunv` i A vk v wbevPbK vj Z veavqK mi K vi
ee nvi A byc w nwZ Z ` k A i vR K Z v I wek L j v mw nBZ
c vi | Z vunvi v mK j B ` vwqZ k xj ew | Z vunv` i A vk v A vgi v
GK evi A enj v K wi Z c vwi bv| hw` I Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k
msk vab) A vBb, 1996, K A mvsweavwbK I A ea Nvl bv K i v
nBqvQ Ges Bnv A ek B A ea| Z eyI GBi c A vk vi K vi b mnm
er mi i c yi vZ b Latin Maxim, hgb, Id Quod Alias Non Est Licitum, Necessitas
Licitum Facit (That which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful), Salus
Populi Est Suprema Lex (Safety of the people is the supreme law) Ges Salus
Republicae Est Suprema Lex (Safety of the State is the Supreme Law) Bnvi mnvqZ v
j BZ nBj |
Dc i v bxwZ mg~ni A vj vK Z I veavqK mi K vi ee nv
mvgwqK f ve aygv c i eZ x` yBwU mvavi Y wbevPbi _ vwK e wK
bv m m^ P~o v wmv aygv R bMYi c wZ wbwa R vZ xq msm`
j BZ c vi |
D mgqi ga mswk mK j B wbR wbR K Z e mwVK i c
c vj b K wi Z m~YmR vM I c wi c ~Y` vwqZ k xj nBeb ewj qv A vk v
K i vhvq|
GBi c A mvavi Y c wi w nwZ i K vi b Dc i v mnm er mi i
c yi vZ b Latin Maxim c qvM K i Z t Z wK Z msweavb ( qv` k msk vab)
A vBb, 1996, A ea nI qv mZ I A vMvgx ` k g I GK v` k mevP
GB ` yBwU mvavi Y wbevPb R vZ xq msm` i weePbv A bymvi
Z veavqK mi K vi ee nvi A axb nBZ c vi |
Z e,
339
( 1) R vZ xq msm` Z veavqK mi K vi ee nvq
evsj v` k i A emi c v c avb wePvi c wZ ev A vc xj
wef vMi A emi c v wePvi c wZ MYK ev` ` I qvi
R b A vBb c Yqb K wi Z c vi , K vi Y wePvi
wef vMi ^vaxbZ v i vi ^ v_ Z vnvw` MK m
K i vevbxq bq|
ei ,
( 2) Z veavqK mi K vi aygv R bMYi wbevwPZ R vZ xq
msm` m` mMY vi v MwVZ nBZ c vi , K vi b,
R bMYi mvef gZ I gZ vqb, MYZ ,
c R vZ vw K Z v, wePvi wef vMi ^vaxbZ v msweavbi
basic structure Ges GB i vq D wel q wj i Dc i
mevwaK i Z A vi vc K i vnBqvQ;

( 3) Dc i ewYZ wbevPb K wgk bi gZ v Z I veavqK
mi K vi A vgj I envj _ vwK e|

Z e aygv A vBbvi v K vb ee vB mK j mgqi R b
^qsm~YI wbw ` (Full proof) K i v me bq| R bMYi m` v me` v
mPZ bZ vB c qvR b|
GL vb Dj L h, A A vc xj msweavb ( qv` k msk vab)
A vBb,1996, Gi A vBbMZ A e vb wbi c Yi c k B aygv D vc b
K i vnBqvQ|
i vq k l K wi evi c ~eGK wU NUbv eYbv K i v c qvR b| NUbvwU
Prefessor Ronald Dworkin Gi Justice in Robes c y K eYbvK i vnBqvQ|
Oliver Wendell Holmes I Learned Hand ` yBR bB L ye bvgK i v wePvi K
I Jurist wQj b|
GK w` b Holmes myc xg K vUhvI qvi c _ Z i Y Learned Hand K
Z vunvi Mvo xZ K wi qv Z vnvi M e j c QvBqv ` b| Mvo x nBZ
bvwgqv Hand ewj qv I Vb Do justice, Justice | BwZ ga Mvo xwU wK Qy` yi
Pwj qv wMqvwQj wK y Holmes Mvo x wd i vBqv A vwbqv Hand K A evK
K wi qvewj j b Thats not my job, Z vnvi c i wZ wb Pwj qvMj b|
Bnvi c i I A vgi vewj e
Fiat justitia, ruat caelum |
340

44| mvi ggt
( 1) R bMY evsj v` k i vi gvwj K , R bMbB mK j gZ vi
Dr m, R bMYB GK gv mvef g;
( 2) evsj v` k i mi K vi gvbyl i mi K vi bn, A vBbi mi K vi
( Government of laws and not government of men) ;
( 3) msweavb evsj v` k i mevP A vBb, Bnv evsj v` k i
mK j c wZ vb I c ` mw K wi qvQ Ges c qvR bxq gZ v
I ` vwqZ A c b K wi qvQ;
( 4) R bMYi mvef gZ , c R vZ , MYZ I wePvi wef vMi
mvaxbZ vi vi g~j wf w Ges msweavbi Basic structure;
( 5) MYZ w K i v ee vq K vb ai Yi Q` (interruption)
evsj v` k i msweavb A bygv` b K i bv;
( 6) myc xg K vUBnvi Judicial Review Gi gZ vej h K vb
A mvsweavwbK A vBbK A ea Nvl bv K wi Z c vi ev
evwZ j ( Strike off ) K wi Z c vi ;
( 7) K vb gvK gvi bvbxK vj K vb A vBbi
mvsweavwbK Z vi c k D vwc Z nBj myc xg K vUm
mK wbwj _ vwK Z c vi bv, A vBbi c k wU wbi mb
K i vB myc xg K vUi ` vwqZ ;
( 8 ) msweavbi 142 A byQ` i A axb R vZ xq msm`
msweavbi hK vb msk vab K wi Z gZ vc v wK
i vi g~j wf w I msweavbi Basic structure zbev L eev
msk vab K wi Z c vi bv;
( 9) msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, evsj v` k
msweavb msk vab ( amendment) K wi qvQ;
( 10) msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, i vi wf w
Ges msweavbi Basic structure K L eK wi qvQ weavq D
Z wK Z A vBb A mvsweavwbK I A ea, myZ i vs evwZ j nBe;
( 11) wek l c qvR bxq I K vi bvaxb K vb A vBb
f vexmvc f ve ( Prospectively) A ea Nvl bv ev evwZ j
K i vhvBZ c vi ,
( 12) mvavi Y wbevPb A bywZ nBevi , R vZ xq msm` i
weePbv (Discretion) A bymvi , hyw mZ K vj (reasonable
period) c ~e, h_ v,42 ( eqvwj k ) w` b c ~e, msm` f vwqv
` I qv evbxq nBe, Z e, wbevPb c i eZ x b~Z b gw mf v
K vhf vi MnY bvK i vc h c ~ eeZ xgw mf vmsw A vK vi
MnY K i Z t D mgqi R b i vi mvf vweK I mvavi Y
K vh g c wi Pvj bvK wi eb;
341
( 13) msweavb ( qv` k msk vab) A vBb, 1996, A mvsweavwbK
I A ea nBj I R vZ xq msm` Bnvi weePbv(Discretion) I
wmv A bymvi Dc i ewYZ wb` k vej x mvc ` k g I
GK v` k mvavi Y wbevPbK vj xb mgq c qvR bgZ
b~Z bf ve I A vwK Z veavqK mi K vi MVbi ee nv
MnY K wi Z c vwi e;

( 14) mvavi Y wbevPbi Z c mxj Nvl Yvi Z vwi L nBZ wbevPbi
d j vd j Nvl Yvi Z vwi L c h wbevPbi mwnZ c Z
f ve R wo Z Ges wbevPb K wgk bi weePbv (Discretion)
A bymvi GgbwK c i v f ve R wo Z , i vi mK j
K gK Z v I K gPvi xe` mn mswk mK j ew wbevPb
K wgk bi wbq Y _ vwK e;
( 15) we` gvb msweavbi 56( 2) A byQ` i k Z ( Proviso) Gi
c wi eZ 1972 mvj i g~j msweavbi 56( 4) A byQ`
MYZ i ^v_ A vbvqb K i vc qvR b;
( 16) 2007 mvj wZ xq Z veavqK mi K vi i 90 w` b gqv`
c i eZ x A wZ wi I c vq ` yB er mi mgqK vj c k we weavq
H A wZ wi mgqK vj i K vhvej x gvR bv ( condone) K i v
nBj |

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C.J.

Md. Muzammel Hossain, J.:- I have had the advantage of
going through the judgments proposed to be delivered by A. B. M.
Khairul Haque, the learned Chief Justice, Md. Abdul Wahhab
Miah, J. and Muhammad Imman Ali, J.. I concur with the
judgment and order passed by the learned Chief Justice.

J.

S.K.Sinha,J: Whi l e agr eei ng wi t h t he opi ni on
of t he l ear ned Chi ef J udge, I woul d add a f ew
wor ds of my own. Thi s cer t i f i cat ed appeal cal l s
f or det er mi nat i on on whet her t he Const i t ut i on
( Thi r t eent h Amendment ) Act , 1996 ( Act 1 of 1996)
changed t he basi c st r uct ur es of t he Const i t ut i on.
By t hi s amendment Ar t i cl e 58A has been i nser t ed i n
Chapt er I I , Par t I V and Ar t i cl es 58B, 58C, 58D and
58E al ong wi t h Chapt er I I A under t he headi ng of
Non- Par t y Car et aker Gover nment have al so been
343
i nser t ed. Al ong wi t h t he above addi t i ons Ar t i cl e
61 has al so been amended. I t i s pr ovi ded i n
Ar t i cl e 58A t hat except cl auses ( 4) , ( 5) and ( 6)
of Ar t i cl e 55, t he ot her pr ovi si ons of Chapt er I I
shal l not appl y dur i ng t he per i od of Non- Par t y
Car et aker Gover nment , ( t he Car e- t aker Gover nment ) .
Ar t i cl e 58B pr ovi des f or t he pr ocedur e and t he
power s t o be exer ci sed by t he Car e- t aker
Gover nment ; Ar t i cl e 58C r el at es t o t he composi t i on
of such Gover nment and t he pr ocedur e f or
appoi nt ment of Chi ef Advi ser and ot her Advi ser s;
Ar t i cl e 58D r el at es t o t he f unct i ons of t he Car e-
t aker Gover nment ; Ar t i cl e 58E pr ovi des t hat dur i ng
t he per i od of Car e- t aker Gover nment except t he
pr ovi si ons of Ar t i cl e 48( 3) , 141A( 1) and 141C( 1) ,
ot her pr ovi si ons of t he Const i t ut i on r equi r i ng t he
Pr esi dent t o act on t he advi ce of t he Pr i me Mi ni st er
shal l be i nef f ect i ve.
Thi s amendment was chal l enged mai nl y on t he
gr ound t hat i t was passed by t he Par l i ament
i nt r oduci ng new concept of non- r epr esent at i ve
Car e- t aker Gover nment syst em vi ol at i ng t he basi c
344
concept of democr acy, t he f undament al st r uct ur e of
t he Const i t ut i on and vi ol at i ve of t he mandat or y
pr ovi si on of Ar t i cl e 142( 1A) of t he Const i t ut i on.
I t i s st at ed t hat Bangl adesh i s a Republ i c i n
whi ch ef f ect i ve par t i ci pat i on of t he peopl e, by
t he peopl e and f or t he peopl e i s ensur ed by t he
Const i t ut i on and t he el ect ed r epr esent at i ves i n
admi ni st r at i on at al l l evel s ar e al so ensur ed t o
achi eve f undament al human r i ght s and f r eedom and
r espect f or t he di gni t y wor t h of t he human per son
i n Bangl adesh. The exer ci se of gover nment al power s
f or t he i nt er r egnum i s dest r uct i ve of t he
democr at i c val ues ensur ed by t he Const i t ut i on. The
democr acy bei ng a cor ner st one of t he
Const i t ut i on, t he amendment made by t he i mpugned
Act by i nt r oduct i on of t he non- r epr esent at i ve
Gover nment even f or i nt er r egnum i s dest r uct i ve of
democr at i c val ues. Ther ef or e, t he Par l i ament can
not i nt r oduce such dest r uct i ve pr ovi si ons al l owi ng
unr epr esent at i ve and non- el ect ed gover nment t o
r ul e t he count r y.
345
The unani mous vi ews expr essed by t he l ear ned
J udges of t he Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on ar e:
" 1) The Const i t ut i on ( Thi r t eent h
Amendment ) Act , 1996 ( Act No. 1 of
1996) i s val i d and Const i t ut i onal .
2) The Const i t ut i on ( Thi r t eent h
Amendment ) Act , 1996 has not amended
t he Pr eambl e, Ar t i cl e 8, 48 and 56 of
t he Const i t ut i on and i t was t her ef or e
not r equi r ed t o be r ef er r ed t o
r ef er endum.
3) The Const i t ut i on ( Thi r t eent h
Amendment ) Act , 1996 has not af f ect ed
or dest r oyed basi c st r uct ur e or
f eat ur e of t he Const i t ut i on,
par t i cul ar l y t he democr acy and
i ndependence of t he j udi ci ar y.
4) Cl auses ( 1A) , ( 1B) and ( 1C) t o Ar t i cl e
142 of t he Const i t ut i on ar e val i d and
consequent l y any amendment t o t he
Pr eambl e and Ar t i cl es 8, 48 and 56 of
346
t he Const i t ut i on must obser ve t he
f or mal i t i es pr ovi ded i n Cl auses ( 1A) ,
( 1B) and ( 1C) t o Ar t i cl e 142 of t he
Const i t ut i on. "
The l ear ned J udges, however , expr essed
separ at e opi ni ons. Md. J oynul Abedi n, J . ar gued
t hat f ai r , i ndependent and i mpar t i al el ect i on was
not possi bl e f or t he r eason t hat al t hough t he
Pr i me Mi ni st er used t o r un t he Gover nment dur i ng
t he i nt er r egnum and hel d t he gener al el ect i on t o
t he Par l i ament but t he el ect i on was not f r ee and
f ai r , i nasmuch as, t he Gover nment s men and
machi ner y wer e used by such Gover nment t o
i nf l uence t he el ect i on r esul t i n f avour of t he
pol i t i cal par t y t o whi ch t he Pr i me Mi ni st er
bel onged; t hi s was t he maj or f act or necessi t at i ng
t he passi ng of t he sai d Act f or engr af t i ng t he
Car e- t aker Gover nment syst em. The l ear ned J udge
f ur t her hel d t hat unl ess t he Second Pr ocl amat i on
( Fi f t h Amendment ) Or der , 1978 by whi ch cl ause ( 1A)
was i nser t ed t o Ar t i cl e 142 i s decl ar ed voi d by a
347
Cour t of l aw, t he same shoul d be hel d t o be val i d
and consequent l y any amendment i s f ound t o have
amended t he Pr eambl e and Ar t i cl es 8, 48 and 56,
t he amendi ng bi l l must be r ef er r ed t o f or a
r ef er endum bef or e i t i s assent ed t o by t he
Pr esi dent ; t hat t he l egi sl at ur e i n i t s wi sdom
pr ef er r ed r et i r ed J udges and t he r et i r ed Chi ef
J ust i ces f or di schar gi ng power s and f unct i ons of
Chi ef Advi sor i n t he Car e- t aker Gover nment and
t hat t he Par l i ament may br i ng any amendment t o t he
Const i t ut i on t o achi eve f or consol i dat i ng and
i nst i t ut i onal i zi ng t he democr acy i n t he count r y.
Md. Awl ad Al i , J . whi l e concur r i ng wi t h t he
above ar gument s added t hat t he necessi t y f or
f or mi ng Car e- t aker Gover nment was f el t i n t he
Par l i ament and by t he vot es of t wo t hi r d maj or i t y,
t he bi l l was passed, whi ch was a t empor ar y measur e
f or a l i mi t ed per i od. Thi s amendment i s t he
pr oduct of pol i t i cal st r ess and cr i si s; maj or
pol i t i cal par t i es st r uggl ed f or a syst emwher e al l
ci t i zens wi l l have t he equal oppor t uni t y t o
348
exer ci se t hei r vot i ng power t o el ect
r epr esent at i ves of t hei r own choi ce. I t i s f ur t her
added t hat t hi s was made on t he gener al wi l l of
t he peopl e. Wi n i n t he el ect i on of any candi dat e
or par t y by f oul means i s a def eat of democr acy,
dest r uct i on of democr acy whi ch i s agai nst t he
f undament al st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on. I f t he
peopl e r eal l y bel i eve i n democr acy and want t o
pr act i ce democr acy t her e i s no har m i f cer t ai n
pr ovi si ons l ai d down i n Ar t i cl es 48( 3) , 56 and
57( 3) of t he Const i t ut i on ar e suspended or kept i n
abeyance f or a per i od of t hr ee mont hs. The
i mpugned amendment has not added any new
pr ovi si on; i t has mer el y kept cer t ai n pr ovi si ons
i nef f ect i ve f or a l i mi t ed per i od and t hus t hi s
amendment i s an appar at us set i n t he body of t he
Const i t ut i on and t hat appar at us dur i ng t he per i od
of 90 days wi l l r egul at e cer t ai n pr ovi si ons of t he
Const i t ut i on whi ch syst em i s a pecul i ar and novel
pol i t i cal cont r i vance and i t i s an unpr ecedent ed
349
l egi sl at i on i n our l egi sl at i ve hi st or y si nce t he
f r ami ng of t he Const i t ut i on.
Mi r za Hossai n Hai der , J . whi l e endor si ng t he
above vi ews added t hat even i f democr acy i s t aken
as a basi c st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, t he
i mpugned amendment cannot be sai d t o be ul t r avi r es
t he Const i t ut i on si nce i mpr ovement i n t he
democr at i c syst em has been br ought by such
amendment ; f r ee and f ai r el ect i on i s an essent i al
post ul at e of democr acy and i f t he peopl e cannot
t r ust or keep f ai t h i n t he par t i san Gover nment or
i n t he syst em i n hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i on
t hen obvi ousl y an al t er nat i ve i s t o be l ooked f or
and t hus i t can not be sai d t hat t he amendment has
af f ect ed t he basi c f eat ur e of t he Const i t ut i on;
t hat t he cr i si s t hat cr eat ed i n t he pol i t i cal
ar ena i n pr act i ci ng democr acy has been sol ved,
because t he concept of car e- t aker Gover nment i s
i nher ent i n our Const i t ut i on and i n most of t he
count r i es, wher e democr acy i s i n pr act i ce,
par t i cul ar l y i n t he sub- cont i nent when t he
350
Par l i ament i s di ssol ved and t i l l next Par l i ament
i s f or med t he concept of Car e- t aker Gover nment i s
pr ovi ded f or i n t he Const i t ut i on. I t i s al so added
t hat under t he scheme of t he Const i t ut i on t he out
goi ng Pr i me Mi ni st er who l ost hi s char act er as an
el ect ed r epr esent at i ve i mmedi at el y wi t h t he
di ssol ut i on of t he Par l i ament cont i nues t o hol d
of f i ce al ong wi t h member s of out goi ng cabi net
t i l l t he next el ect ed Gover nment ent er s upon i t s
of f i ce; such cont i nuat i on bei ng f or a t empor ar y
per i od i s i n t he shape of i nt er i m Car e- t aker
Gover nment , not wi t hst andi ng t he f act t hat t he
out goi ng Pr i me Mi ni st er and t he cabi net l ose t hei r
char act er as peopl e' s r epr esent at i ve but t hey
cont i nue t o r et ai n t hei r af f i l i at i on wi t h t hei r
par t y. Accor di ng t o t he l ear ned J udge, under such
ci r cumst ances, hol di ng of an el ect i on i mpar t i al l y,
f r ee f r om i nf l uence or power under a par t i san
Gover nment becomes a r emot e pr oposi t i on.
We have hear d t he l ear ned Counsel f or t he
appel l ant and t he l ear ned Ami ci Cur i ae. I t i s t he
351
cont ent i on on behal f of t he appel l ant t hat
i mpugned amendment cannot be j ust i f i ed whi ch has
changed t he meani ng of , or modi f y t he basi c
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on i n i t s t enor and
ef f ect i veness or by keepi ng t hem i n abeyance,
t empor ar i l y or per manent l y; and t hat never t hel ess
t he i mpugned Act i n ef f ect has amended t he
pr eambl e and ot her ar t i cl es i ncl udi ng t hose
r equi r i ng r ef er ence of t he bi l l t o r ef er endum. On
t he ot her hand Mr . T. H. Khan, Dr . Kamal Hossai n,
Mr . Mahmudul I sl am, Mr . M. Ami r ul I sl am and Mr .
Rokonuddi n Mahmud have suppor t ed t he j udgment of
t he Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on, whi l e Dr . Zahi r , Mr .
Aj mal ur Hossai n and Mr . Mohsen Rashi d have ar gued
t hat t he i mpugned amendment has changed t he basi c
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on. Mr . Raf i q- ul - huq
whi l e ar gui ng i n f avour of t he amendment has
cr i t i ci sed t he pr ovi si on f or keepi ng t he f or mer
Chi ef J ust i ce or t he r et i r ed J udges of t hi s
Di vi si on as t he Chi ef Advi ser . Lear ned Chi ef
J ust i ce has ext ensi vel y r epr oduced t hei r
352
submi ssi ons i n hi s dr af t copy of t he j udgment and
i n or der t o avoi d r epet i t i on, I have r ef r ai ned
f r omr ei t er at i ng t hei r submi ssi ons.
On per usal of t he wr i t pet i t i on, t he i mpugned
j udgment and t he submi ssi ons of t he l ear ned
counsel , and t he Ami ci Cur i ae, t he subst ant i al
quest i ons i nvol ved f or our consi der at i on ar e:
1) whether the Constitution (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 1 of 1996)
ultra vires the Constitution; and
2) whether the provisions contained in
clauses (3) and (4) of Article 58C
relating to appointment of Chief
Adviser from amongst the retired
Chief Justices or from amongst the
retired Judges of the Appellate
Division retired last infringed the
independence of judiciary.
At t he out set , I woul d l i ke t o poi nt out t hat
i t i s al ways di f f i cul t and per haps pai nf ul when,
on account of pur el y pol i t i cal si t uat i ons i n t he
353
count r y, t he j udi ci ar y i s made t o i nt er vene and
r ender i t s opi ni on, whi ch i s f ound t o be
cont r over si al , mor e i n a count r y l i ke our s wher e
peopl e ar e except i onal l y i ndi vi dual i st i c and
subj ect i ve. The submi ssi on t hat t he peopl e have
f ai t h i n t he j udi ci ar y and t he j udi ci al
i nst i t ut i on, and t hus t he j udi ci ar y i s t he savi our
of t he si t uat i on i s not but par t i al l y cor r ect . I t
shoul d be r emember ed t hat t he j udi ci ar y cannot
sol ve al l t he pr obl ems of t he peopl esuch
expect at i on i s al so undesi r abl e. I t wi l l cr eat e a
f al se i mpr essi on and f al se i l l usi on t hat t he
J udges ar e a panacea f or al l i l l s i n soci et y.
Pol i t i ci ans and t he ci t i zens shoul d r eal i se t hat
t he pr obl ems conf r ont i ng t he count r y ar e so huge
t hat i t wi l l be an i l l usi ons i n t hei r mi nds t hat
t he j udi ci ar y can sol ve al l pr obl ems.
I t shoul d have t o be r emember ed t hat t he
j udi ci ar y i s not i n a posi t i on t o pr ovi de
sol ut i ons t o each and ever y pr obl em of t he st at e.
The pr obl em of t he day whi ch i s a bur ni ng i ssue
354
has t o be sol ved by t he pol i t i ci ans by usi ng t hei r
sol emn r esponsi bi l i t y and et hos, and not by
egoi sm. The pr obl em i s so massi ve t hat i t can be
sol ved on t aki ng i nt o consi der at i on t he hi st or i cal
backgr ound of achi evi ng l i ber at i on, democr acy and
t he Const i t ut i on. They shoul d not f or get t he past
hi st or y t hat whenever cr i si s comes, t hei r st r engt h
bot h mor al and physi cal have been gener at ed by t he
mass peopl e. Whi l e di scussi ng on t he
char act er i st i cs of t he I ndi an Const i t ut i on,
J enni ngs st at ed All Constitutions are the heirs
of the past as well as the testators of the
future. I n t hi s cont ext , Rowl and, J . of t he
Feder al Cour t i n Benoar i l al Shar ma, 1943 FCR96
obser ved, I do not see why historical facts
should be excluded from the purview. Such topics
as the history of legislation and the facts which
give rise to the enactment may usefully be
employed to interpret the meaning of the statute,
though they do not afford conclusive argument.
Accor di ngl y, f or under st andi ng t he const i t ut i onal
355
l aw of a count r y, one must have t o r ef er t o t he
l aws and t he pr i nci pl es t hat exi st out si de t he
Const i t ut i on, he must acquai nt wi t h t he hi st or i cal
backgr ound and al so r equi r e t o make a br i ef r evi ew
of t he Const i t ut i onal set - up i n t he pr ecedi ng
per i ods. Such hi st or i cal account woul d not onl y
enabl e us t o l ay t he l essons of t he past bef or e
t he f ut ur e, but t o see t he r emar kabl e achi evement
of t he Const i t ut i on agai nst i t s hi st or i cal
backgr ound. Thus i t wi l l be necessar y t o go t o
what i s known as Br i t i sh per i od si nce our
pol i t i cal i nst i t ut i on or i gi nat ed and devel oped
f r omt he Br i t i sh per i od .
The opt i mi st i c vi ews of Engl i sh Const i t ut i on
was wr i t t en by Bur ke i n 1791 and t hen Hal l am i n
1818, was i n t he quai nt l anguage of Geor ge t he
Thi r d, the most perfect of human formations; i t
was t o t hem not a mer e pol i t y t o be compar ed wi t h
t he Gover nment of any ot her st at e but , so t o speak
a secr et myst er y of st at esmanshi p; i t had not
been made but gr own ; i t was t he f r ui t not of
356
abst r act t heor y but of t hat i nst i nct whi ch ( i t i s
supposed) has enabl ed Engl i shmen, t o bui l d up
sound and l ast i ng i nst i t ut i ons, much as bees
const r uct a honeycomb, wi t hout under goi ng t he
degr adat i on of under st andi ng t he pr i nci pl es on
whi ch t hey r ai se a f abr i c mor e subt l ey wr ought
t han any wor k of consci ous ar t . ( St anhope, Li f e of
Pi t t , ) The Const i t ut i on was mar ked by mor e t han
one t r anscendent qual i t y whi ch i n t he eyes Engl i sh
f or ef at her s r ai sed i t f ar above t he i mi t at i ons,
count er f ei t s, or par odi es whi ch have been set up
dur i ng t he l ast hundr ed year s t hr oughout t he
ci vi l i zed wor l d; no pr eci se dat e coul d be named as
t he day of i t s bi r t h; no def i ni t e body of per sons
coul d cl ai mt o be i t s cr eat or s, no one coul d poi nt
t o t he document whi ch cont ai ned i t s cl auses; i t
was i n shor t a t hi ng by i t sel f , whi ch Engl i shmen
and f or ei gner s al i ke shoul d vener at e, wher e t hey
ar e not abl e pr esent l y t o compr ehend .
The sour ces of Engl i sh const i t ut i onal l aw may
be consi der ed f our f ol d, namel y- ( i ) Tr eat i es or
357
quasi - t r eat i es, i . e. t he Act s of uni on; ( i i ) The
common l aw; ( i i i ) Sol emn agr eement s, i . e. t he Bi l l
of Ri ght s; ( i v) St at ut es. ( Monsi eur Bout my,
Engl i sh t r ansl at i on, page 8) . I t s r esour ce i s t o
r ecur t o wr i t er s of aut hor i t y on t he l aw, t he
hi st or y, or t he pr act i ce of t he Const i t ut i on.
Const i t ut i onal l aw, as t he t er m i s used i n
Engl and, appear s t o i ncl ude al l r ul es whi ch
di r ect l y or i ndi r ect l y af f ect t he di st r i but i on or
t he exer ci se of t he sover ei gn power i n t he st at e.
( Hol l and, J ur i spr udence ( 10
t h
end, P 138- 139) . I t
i ncl udes al l r ul es whi ch def i ne t he member s of t he
sover ei gn power , al l r ul es whi ch r egul at e t he
r el at i on of such member s t o each ot her , or whi ch
det er mi ne t he mode i n whi ch t he sover ei gn power ,
or t he member s t her eof , exer ci se t hei r aut hor i t y.
I t s r ul es pr escr i be t he or der of successi on t o t he
t hr one, r egul at e t he pr er ogat i ves of t he chi ef
magi st r at e, det er mi ne t he f or m of l egi sl at ur e and
i t s mode of el ect i on.
358
The ot her set of r ul es consi st s of
convent i ons, under st andi ngs, habi t s, or pr act i ces
whi ch, t hough t hey may r egul at e t he conduct of t he
sever al member s of t he sover ei gn power , of t he
Mi ni st r y, or of ot her of f i ci al s, ar e not i n
r eal i t y l aws at al l si nce t hey ar e not enf or ced by
t he Cour t s. Thi s por t i on may be t er med t he
convent i ons of t he const i t ut i on or convent i onal
mor al i t y . Thus const i t ut i onal l aw consi st s of t wo
el ement s. The one el ement i s cal l ed t he l aw of
const i t ut i on i s a body of undoubt ed l aw; t he
ot her el ement i s convent i ons of t he const i t ut i on
consi st s of maxi ms or pr act i ces whi ch, t hough t hey
r egul at e t he or di nar y conduct of t he Cr own, of
Mi ni st er s, and of ot her per sons under t he
Const i t ut i on, ar e not i n st r i ct ness l aws at al l .
To t he l aw of t he Const i t ut i on bel ong t o t he
r ul e; t he ki ng can do no wr ong . Ther e i s no
power i n t he Cr own t o di spense wi t h t he obl i gat i on
t o obey t he l aw, t hi s negat i on or abol i t i on of t he
di spensi ng power now depends upon t he Bi l l of
359
Ri ght s; i t i s a l aw of t he Const i t ut i on and a
wr i t t en l aw. So agai n t he r i ght t o per sonal
l i ber t y, t he r i ght t o publ i c meet i ng, and many
ot her r i ght s, ar e par t of t he l aw of t he
Const i t ut i on, t hough most of t hese r i ght s ar e
consequences of t he mor e gener al l aw or pr i nci pl e
t hat no man can be puni shed except f or di r ect
br eaches of l aw pr oved i n t he way pr ovi ded by l aw.
To t he convent i ons; The ki ng must assent t o,
or can not vet o any bi l l passed by t he t wo Houses
of Par l i ament ; t he House of Lor ds does not
or i gi nat e any money bi l l ; when House of Lor ds act s
as a Cour t of Appeal , no peer who i s not a l aw
l or d t akes par t i n t he deci si ons of t he House;
Mi ni st er s r esi gn of f i ce when t hey have ceased t o
command t he conf i dence of t he House of commons; a
bi l l must be r ead a cer t ai n number of t i mes bef or e
passi ng t hr ough t he House of Commons. I t i s sai d,
t hese maxi ms never vi ol at ed and ar e uni ver sal l y
admi t t ed t o be i nvi ol abl e. Of const i t ut i onal
convent i ons or pr act i ces some ar e as i mpor t ant as
360
any l aws, t hough some may be t r i vi al , as may al so
be t he case wi t h a genui ne l aw.
The Const i t ut i on of t he Uni t ed St at es, on t he
ot her hand, i s r ecor ded i n a gi ven document t o
whi ch ever y one has access, namel y, the
Constitution of the United States established and
ordained by the people of the United States . The
ar t i cl es of t hi s const i t ut i on f al l i ndeed f ar
shor t of per f ect l ogi cal ar r angement , and l ack
absol ut e l uci di t y of expr essi on; but t hey cont ai n,
i s a cl ear and i nt el l i gi bl y f or m, t he f undament al
l aw of t he uni on. Thi s l aw i s made and can onl y be
amended or al t er ed i n a way di f f er ent f r om t he
met hod by whi ch ot her enact ment s ar e made or
al t er ed; i t st ands f or t h, t her ef or e, as a separ at e
subj ect f or st udy; i t deal s wi t h t he l egi sl at ur e,
t he execut i ve, and t he j udi ci ar y, and, by i t s
pr ovi si ons f or i t s own amendment , i ndi r ect l y
def i nes t he body i n whi ch r esi des t he l egi sl at i ve
sover ei gnt y of t he Uni t ed St at es.
361
One has t o ascer t ai n t he meani ng of t he
Ar t i cl es of t he Amer i can Const i t ut i on i n t he same
way i n whi ch he t r i es t o el i ci t t he meani ng of any
ot her enact ment . He must be gui ded by t he r ul es of
gr ammer , by hi s knowl edge of t he common l aw, by
t he l i ght t hr own on Amer i can l egi sl at i on by
Amer i can hi st or y, and by t he concl usi ons t o be
deduced f r om a car ef ul st udy of j udi ci al
deci si ons. The t ask, i n shor t , whi ch l ay bef or e
t he gr eat Amer i can comment at or s was t he
expl anat i on of a def i ni t e l egal document i n
accor dance wi t h t he r ecei ved cannons of l egal
i nt er pr et at i ons. I n t he Uni t ed St at es t he l egal
power s of t he Pr esi dent , t he Senat e, t he mode of
el ect i ng t he Pr esi dent and t he l i ke, ar e, as f ar
as t he l aw i s concer ned, r egul at ed whol l y by t he
l aw of t he Const i t ut i on. But si de by si de wi t h t he
l aw have gr own up cer t ai n st r i ngent convent i onal
r ul es, whi ch, t hough t hey woul d not be not i ced by
any Cour t , have i n pr act i ce near l y t he f or ce of
l aw. No Pr esi dent has ever been r e- el ect ed mor e
362
t han once; t he popul ar appr oval of t hi s
convent i onal l i mi t of whi ch t he Const i t ut i on knows
not hi ng on a Pr esi dent s r e- el i gi bi l i t y pr oved a
f at al bar t o Gener al Gr ant s t hi r d candi dat ur e.
Const i t ut i onal under st andi ngs have ent i r el y
changed t he posi t i on of t he Pr esi dent i al el ect or s.
They wer e by t he f ounder s of t he Const i t ut i on
i nt ended t o be what t hei r name denot es, t he
per sons who chose or sel ect ed t he Pr esi dent ; t he
Chi ef Of f i cer , i n shor t , of t he Republ i c was,
accor di ng t o t he l aw, t o be appoi nt ed under a
syst emof doubl e el ect i on. The power of an el ect or
t o el ect i s as compl et el y abol i shed by
const i t ut i onal under st andi ngs i n Amer i ca as i s t he
Royal r i ght of di ssent f r om bi l l s passed by bot h
Houses of by t he same f or ce i n Engl and.
Under a wr i t t en, as under an unwr i t t en
Const i t ut i on, we f i nd i n f ul l exi st ence t he
di st i nct i on bet ween t he l aw and t he convent i ons of
t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s t akes us t o t he ver y r oot
of t he mat t er . To under st and t he t r ue
363
Const i t ut i onal l aw, i t s pr oper f unct i on i s t o show
what ar e t he l egal r ul es, t hat i s t o say, r ul es
r ecogni sed by t he Cour t s whi ch ar e t o be f ound i n
sever al par t s of t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s
const i t ut i onal l aw or t he const i t ut i onal
convent i on or t he convent i onal r ul es had not been
al l owed t o gr ow i n Paki st an. Our l eader s commi t t ed
t o t he peopl e t o pr esent a moder n democr acy, a
Const i t ut i on wher e t he f undament al r i ght s of t he
ci t i zens wi l l be enshr i ned, t he democr acy wi l l be
f l our i shed and pr act i ced and t he r ul e of l aw wi l l
pr evai l but wi t hi n a shor t per i od of t i me af t er
par t i t i on t he peopl e f ound t he l eader s t r i ed t o
concent r at e power i nst ead of pr esent i ng a
Const i t ut i on and al so act ed agai nst t he spi r i t of
democr acy. The r ul l er s whi t t l ed down t he
convent i onal mor al i t y. No const i t ut i onal set up
ei t her t he Execut i ve or Par l i ament or El ect i on
Commi ssi on or t he j udi ci ar y was al l owed t o
f unct i on and t hi s wi l l be evi dent f r om t he
hi st or i cal backgr ound nar r at ed i n Yusuf Pat el V.
364
The Cr own, PLD 1955 FC 387, St at e V. Dosso s, PLD
1958 SC ( Pak. ) 533 and Asma J i l ani V. Gover nment
of t he Punj ab, PLD 1972 SC 139. The Gover nment of
I ndi a Act , 1935 pr ovi ded f or a f eder al
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment , t hough t he
Gover nor Gener al was t he r eal r eposi t or y of power
as t he r epr esent at i ve of t he Br i t i sh Sover ei gn. By
t he I ndi an I ndependence Act , 1947, I ndi a was
par t i t i oned i n t wo domi ni ons and t wo Const i t uent
Assembl i es f or t he t wo domi ni ons wer e const i t ut ed
whi ch f unct i oned unt i l t he adopt i on of t he
Const i t ut i on.
The Const i t uent Assembl y of Paki st an coul d not
enact t he Const i t ut i on because of t ussl e among
per sons i n power , such as, t he pol i t i ci ans,
bur eaucr at s and mi l i t ar y of f i cer s. I n 1950 Pr i me
Mi ni st er Li aquat Al i Khan, was mur der ed and t he
mur der er was ki l l ed on t he spot so t hat t he r eal
per sons behi nd t he mur der coul d not be t r aced out .
Khawaj a Nazi muddi n, who became t he Gover nor
Gener al on t he deat h of M. A. J i nnah, became t he
365
Pr i me Mi ni st er and Ghul am Mohammad became t he
Gover nor Gener al . I n Apr i l , 1953 Ghul am Mohammad
di smi ssed Khawaj a Ni zi muddi n and hi s Cabi net , and
he appoi nt ed Mohammad Al i as t he Pr i me Mi ni st er .
Ghul am Mohammad, a t i t ul ar head had no
Const i t ut i onal aut hor i t y t o di smi ss t he Pr i me
Mi ni st er . A dr af t Const i t ut i on had been pr epar ed
on t he basi s of t he Obj ect i ves Resol ut i ons on 25
t h

Oct ober , 1954. Ghul am Mohammad i ssued a
Pr ocl amat i on di ssol vi ng t he Const i t uent Assembl y
and r econst i t ut i ng t he cabi net wi t h Mohammad Al i
as t he Pr i me Mi ni st er and t wo ar my men wer e al so
i ncl uded i n t he sai d cabi net . Sect i on 19 of Act of
1935 conf er r ed power on t he Gover nor Gener al t o
di ssol ve i t s l egi sl at ur e. Tami zuddi n Khan,
chal l enged t he di ssol ut i on of t he Const i t uent
Assembl y by f i l i ng a wr i t pet i t i on on t he gr ound
t hat t he Gover nor Gener al had no power of
di ssol ut i on. The Si nd Chi ef Cour t f ound t hat t he
assent of t he Gover nor Gener al f or i nser t i ng
sect i on 223A i n t he Act of 1935 was not necessar y
366
f or t he val i di t y of t he amendment and decl ar ed
t hat t he Gover nor Gener al had no power t o di ssol ve
Const i t uent Assembl y.
I n an appeal f r om t he sai d j udgment , t he
Feder al Cour t of Paki st an by maj or i t y al l owed t he
appeal hol di ng t hat t he i nser t i on of sect i on 223A
was i nval i d f or want of assent of t he Gover nor
Gener al and t he Si nd Chi ef Cour t had no
j ur i sdi ct i on t o ent er t ai n t he wr i t pet i t i on.
( Paki st an Vs. Tami zuddi n Khan, 7 DLR( FC) 291) .
Pur suant t o such vi ews t aken i n Tami zuddi n, a
l ar ge number of Const i t ut i onal enact ment s of t he
Const i t uent Assembl y wer e f ound t o be i nval i d f or
want of t he assent . The Gover nor Gener al sought t o
val i dat e t hose Act s by i ndi cat i ng hi s assent
r et r ospect i vel y by an Or di nance. The Feder al Cour t
decl ar ed t hi s Or di nance ul t r a vi r es t he power of
t he Gover nor . I n Usi f Pat i l V. Cr own, 7
DLR( FC) 385, i n such si t uat i on, t he Gover nor
Gener al r esor t ed t o t he advi sor y j ur i sdi ct i on of
t he Feder al Cour t i n r ef er ence by Gover nor Gener al
367
t o f i nd a sol ut i on t o t he Const i t ut i onal deadl ock
cr eat ed by t he j udgment of t he Feder al Cour t i n
Tami zuddi n Khan.
The Feder al Cour t i nvoked t he doct r i ne of
necessi t y and evol ved a new pol i t i cal f or mul a f or
set t i ng up a Const i t uent Assembl y. The Feder al
Cour t f ound t he di ssol ut i on of t he Const i t uent
Assembl y by t he Gover nor Gener al val i d on t he
r easoni ngs t hat when t he Const i t uent Assembl y
f ai l ed t o gi ve a Const i t ut i on, t he Gover nor
Gener al coul d di ssol ve t he sai d Const i t uent
Assembl y. The Const i t uent Assembl y, t her eupon
adopt ed a new Const i t ut i on based on t he pr i nci pl e
of par i t y pr escr i bi ng a Feder al Par l i ament ar y
Gover nment wi t h t he Pr esi dent as i t s
Const i t ut i onal head. The Nat i onal Assembl y woul d
be composed of an equal number of member s f r omt he
t wo uni t s of East Paki st an and West Paki st an on
t he basi s of di r ect el ect i on. The Pr i me Mi ni st er
and t he cabi net woul d be r esponsi bl e t o t he
Feder al Legi sl at ur e. The Supr eme Cour t and t he
368
Hi gh Cour t s wer e gi ven t he power of j udi ci al
r evi ew. By t he Pr ocl amat i on of Mar t i al Law i n 1958
no el ect i on coul d be hel d under t he Const i t ut i on
of 1956. The Pr ocl amat i on of 7
t h
Oct ober , 1958
abr ogat ed t he Const i t ut i on and t he Pr esi dent
i ssued t he Laws Cont i nuance i n For ce Or der , 1958
whi ch pr ovi ded t hat not wi t hst andi ng t he abr ogat i on
of t he Const i t ut i on, t he count r y woul d be gover ned
as near l y as may be i n accor dance wi t h t he
abr ogat ed Const i t ut i on.
Under t he pr ovi si ons of Fr ont i er Cr i mes
Regul at i on sever al per sons wer e f ound gui l t y of
mur der and Mal i k Tot i Khan and Mehr ban Khan al ong
wi t h ot her s wer e f ound not gui l t y. The Deput y
Commi ssi oner r emanded t he case t o t he Counci l of
El der s but t he Counci l of El der s af t er keepi ng t he
case pendi ng f or some t i me expr essed t hei r
i nabi l i t y t o gi ve an opi ni on on t he gr ound t hat
t he par t i es had appr oached t hem and t hey di d not
open mi nds on t he quest i on. The case was t hen
r ef er r ed t o anot her Counci l of El der s, whi ch f ound
369
t he r espondent s gui l t y, wher eupon t he Deput y
Commi ssi oner convi ct ed t hem. The r espondent s t hen
moved a wr i t of habeas cor pus and cer t i or ar i i n
t he Peshawar Bench of t he Hi gh Cour t of West
Paki st an on t he gr ound t hat t he pr ovi si ons of
Fr ont i er Cr i mes Regul at i on enabl i ng t he execut i ve
aut hor i t i es t o r ef er cr i mi nal cases t o a Counci l
of El der s wer e voi d under Ar t i cl e 4 of t he
Const i t ut i on. Thei r cont ent i on was accept ed. On
appeal f r om t he sai d j udgment by t he St at e, t he
Supr eme Cour t i n St at e Vs. Dosso, 11 DLR SC 1 hel d
t hat t he pr oceedi ngs abat ed gi vi ng l egal
r ecogni t i on t o t he Mar t i al Law i t sel f by
descr i bi ng i t as a successf ul r evol ut i on.
The Const i t ut i on of Paki st an came i nt o
oper at i on on 7
t h
J une, 1962 i nt r oduci ng a syst em
whi ch was euphemi st i cal l y cal l ed a Pr esi dent i al
f or m of Gover nment even t hough t he nor mal checks
and bal ances of such a f or m of Gover nment t o
pr event one- man r ul e wer e not i ncor por at ed i n i t .
I t i s, i n f act , enact ed an aut hor i t ar i an r ul e by
370
one who occupi ed t he of f i ce of t he Pr esi dent Fi el d
Mar t i al Md. Ayub Khan. Under t he Const i t ut i on t he
Nat i onal Assembl y and t he Pr ovi nci al Assembl i es
wer e t o be el ect ed by t he member s of El ect or al
Col l ege who wer e t o be el ect ed by t he peopl e. The
member s of t he Nat i onal and Pr ovi nci al Assembl i es
wer e not r esponsi bl e t o t he peopl e. Peopl e
el ect i ng t he member s of t he El ect or al Col l ege had
no way of ensur i ng t hat t hei r wi shes woul d be
r ef l ect ed i n t he el ect i on of t he Pr esi dent and t he
member s of t he Nat i onal and Pr ovi nci al Assembl i es.
I n 1965 Ayub Khan got hi msel f r eel ect ed as t he
Pr esi dent of Paki st an. Ther e was gener al
i mpr essi on of t he peopl e t hat t he el ect i on was
r i gged. Shei kh Muj i bur Rahman st ar t ed a movement
i n t he t hen East Paki st an wi t h hi s 6- poi nt
pr ogr amme i n 1966 whi ch r ef l ect ed t he genui ne
gr i evances of t he peopl e of East Paki st an.
Towar ds t he end of 1968, agi t at i on was st ar t ed
al l over Paki st an by t he mai n pol i t i cal par t i es
agai nst t he despot i c r ul e of Ayub Khan and as a
371
r esul t of such agi t at i on, Ayub Khan wr ot e a l et t er
t o t he Commander - i n- Chi ef of ar my Yahya Khan t o
t ake over t he r ei n of Paki st an and he expr essed
hi s desi r e t o st ep down. Yahya Khan by a
Pr ocl amat i on i ssued on 26
t h
Mar ch, 1969 abr ogat ed
t he Const i t ut i on, di ssol ved t he Nat i onal and
Pr ovi nci al Assembl i es, and i mposed Mar t i al Law
t hr ough out Paki st an and pr omul gat ed t he
Pr ovi si onal Const i t ut i on Or der , 1969. Ther eaf t er ,
he f r amed Legal Fr ame Wor k Or der f or hol di ng
el ect i on. Under t he sai d Or der , Nat i onal and
Pr ovi nci al Assembl i es el ect i ons wer e hel d i n
December , 1970. Awami League l ed by Shei kh Muj i bur
Rahman whi ch won al most al l t he seat s i n East
Paki st an and hel d a cl ear maj or i t y i n t he Nat i onal
Assembl y. Z. A. Bhut t o who hel d maj or i t y seat s i n
West Paki st an r ef used t o at t end t he sessi on of
Nat i onal Assembl y at Dhaka and Yahya Khan
post poned t he sessi on si ne- di e.
J an Mohammad Dawood, a l awyer of Paki st an on
an anal ysi s of t he above cases expr essed hi s
372
opi ni on l uci dl y i n hi s book The Rol e of Super i or
J udi ci ar y i n Pol i t i cs of Paki st an t hus This
country was conceived as a liberal democratic
country by our founders and under the Government
of India Act, 1935, read with the Indian
Independence Act of 1947 passed by the British
Parliament, this country came into being as a
modern democracy. Unfortunately, within a short
period of time serious differences arose between
our political leaders as regards the nature of our
Constitution, the quantum of provincial autonomy,
the National Language which the country should
adopt and many other disputes of a Fundamental
nature, with the result that the First Constituent
Assembly which came into being on 11
th
of August,
1947, got bogged down on political mere.
Throughout this period of 45 years, every leader
of the country, whether Civil or Military, has
sworn by democracy but has acted against the
spirit of democracy and has tried his level best
to concentrate all the powers of the state in his
373
person. Unfortunately, we have not yet developed
a democratic culture characterized by
accommodation, tolerance, large-heartedness and
mutual respect- a culture in which everybodys
legitimate rights are secured and everyone not
only feels obliged to do his duty and discharge
his obligations according to Constitution and the
law, but is also ready at all times to account for
his actions and willingly submits himself for
accountability.........All our leaders who came to
power either through elections or by other dubious
means started to believe that they were
indispensable for the continued existence of the
country and that their exit from power would sound
the death-knell of Pakistan. They, therefore,
always tried to perpetuate themselves in power by
hook or by crook.
The f r amer s of t he Const i t ut i on and t he
hi st or y i t sel f have made t he Cour t t he ul t i mat e
ar bi t er of t he Const i t ut i on s meani ng as wel l as
t he sour ce of answer s t o a magni t ut e of quest i ons
374
about how t he t hen Paki st an, a compl ex count r y
woul d be gover ned but i t f ai l ed t o addr ess t he
cor e quest i on. The Supr eme Cour t of Paki st an i n
Dosso s case expr essed t hat t he pr oceedi ngs of
habeas cor pus abat ed and gave l egal r ecogni t i on t o
t he Mar t i al Law i t sel f by descr i bi ng i t as a
successf ul r evol ut i on and, t her ef or e, a f r esh l aw
cr eat i ng or gan. Ther eaf t er t he democr acy i n
Paki st an was t r ampl ed by t he mi l l i t ar y r ul l er s and
ul t i mat el y t hi s count r y became i ndependent . Thus,
i t i s i mpor t ant t hat t he publ i c under st ands how
t he Cour t car r i es out i t s r ol e.
The pol i t i cal epi sode i n Paki st an and t he
quot at i ons of t he aut hor af t er anal ysi ng t he
event s ar e sel f expl anat or y whi ch exposed nakedl y
t he pr of i ci ency of t he pol i t i ci ans and t hei r
t hr ust f or power . Though t he pol i t i ci ans spoke f or
democr acy, i n r eal i t y t hey had no f ai t h i n i t .
They had al so no l ove f or t he peopl e and t he
count r y ot her t han t he power . The second epi sode
of t he hi st or y i s t hat af t er t he el ect i on of 1970
375
when Bhut t o r ef used t o at t end t he sessi on of
Nat i onal Assembl y at Dhaka and t he Paki st ani
r egi me suppor t ed hi m, Shei kh Muj i bur Rahman
vi r t ual l y t ook over t he admi ni st r at i on i n East
Paki st an and t o meet t he event ual i t y, Yahya Khan
pr et ended t o t al ks wi t h t he i mpor t ant pol i t i cal
l eader s i n Dhaka, suddenl y i n t he mi dst of such
t al ks used mi l i t ar y f or ce i n t he mi d ni ght of 25
t h

Mar ch, 1971. The mi l i t ar y gunned down t housands of
i nnocent unar med per sons al l over East Paki st an,
commi t t ed genoci de and at r oci t i es whi ch coul d be
compar ed wi t h none ot her t han or gi es. I n t he back-
dr op of such br ut al i t y, Shei kh Muj i bur Rahman
decl ar ed i ndependence of Bangl adesh on 26
t h
Mar ch,
1971 and ur ged t he peopl e of Bangl adesh t o def end
t he honour and i nt egr i t y of Bangl adesh. The peopl e
of Bangl adesh t ook ar ms t o f i ght agai nst t he
Paki st ani J aunt a t o l i ber at e t he count r y and
ul t i mat el y at t he cost of t hr ee mi l l i on mar t yr s,
Bangl adesh got i t s i ndependence on 16t h December ,
1971.
376
The moot quest i ons i nvol ved i n t hi s appeal ar e
t o be consi der ed i n t he l i ght of t he above
hi st or i cal backgr ound, whet her t he i mpugned
j udgment conf l i ct s t he basi c f eat ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on or i n t he al t er nat i ve, such amendment
was made agai nst t he spi r i t of t he Const i t ut i on
and t he const i t ut i onal convent i on. I f t he answer
i s i n posi t i ve i t i s our dut y t o expr ess opi ni on
as t o how and why i t i s unconst i t ut i onal . The
Cour t has a speci al r esponsi bi l i t y t o ensur e t hat
t he Const i t ut i on wor ks i n pr act i ce.
The Pr ocl amat i on of I ndependence r ef l ect ed t he
t r ue f eel i ngs and emot i ons of t he peopl e. The
peopl e t ook ar ms agai nst t he Paki st ani r ul l er s f or
l i ber at i on of t he count r y agai nst expl oi t at i on.
Thi s has been r ef l ect ed i n t he begi nni ng of t he
Pr ocl amat i on t hat t her e was " f r ee el ect i ons" t o
el ect r epr esent at i ves f or t he pur pose of f r ami ng
t he Const i t ut i on but t he Paki st ani aut hor i t y
decl ar ed an unj ust and t r eacher ous war , and Shei kh
Muj i bur Rahman, t he undi sput ed l eader i n due
377
f ul f i l l ment of t he l egi t i mat e r i ght of sel f
det er mi nat i on of t he peopl e decl ar ed i ndependence
and ur ged t he peopl e t o def end t he honour and
i nt egr i t y of Bangl adesh. I t was al so poi nt ed out
i n unequi vocal t er ms t hat t he wi l l of t he peopl e
i s supr eme and t he i ndependence was decl ar ed t o
ensur e t he peopl e of Bangl adesh t o pr esent a
moder n democr at i c count r y wher e equal i t y, human
di gni t y and soci al j ust i ce wi l l be ser ved.
The f ol l owi ng day of Shei kh Muj i bur Rahman' s
r et ur n f r om Paki st ani i ncar cer at i on t he
Pr ovi si onal Const i t ut i onal Or der , 1972 was i ssued
on 11t h J anuar y, 1972. The Pr esi dent of t he
Republ i c havi ng r eal i sed t he mi schi ef commi t t ed by
t he Const i t uent Assembl y of Paki st an af t er
i ndependence i n 1947 t hat i t f ai l ed t o f r ame a
Const i t ut i on because of conf l i ct i ng i nt er est s,
i deol ogi es, and power st r uggl e, di d not wast e a
si ngl e moment and decl ar ed t hat t he Par l i ament ar y
f or m of Gover nment woul d be t he basi s f or r unni ng
t he count r y. Though he was swor n i n as t he
378
Pr esi dent of t he newl y bor n count r y i mmedi at e
af t er hi s r et ur n, agai n he was swor n i n as Pr i me
Mi ni st er al t hough t he Const i t ut i on was not f r amed
and t r ansact ed t he busi ness of t he Gover nment i n a
Par l i ament ar y f or m i n al l pr act i cal pur poses
dur i ng t he i nt er i m per i od. He const i t ut ed t he
Const i t uent Assembl y wi t h t he member s of Nat i onal
and East Paki st an Pr ovi si onal Assembl i es who wer e
el ect ed by t he peopl e of East Paki st an i n
December , 1970 f or dr af t i ng a Const i t ut i on. The
Const i t uent Assembl y t her eupon wi t hi n a shor t
per i od adopt ed a Const i t ut i on on 16t h December ,
1972. The pr eambl e of t he Const i t ut i on r eads:
" We, the people of Bangladesh, having
proclaimed our Independence on the 26th
day of March, 1971 and, through a
historic struggle for national
liberation, established the independent,
sovereign People's Republic of
Bangladesh;
379
Pleading that the high ideals of
nationalism, socialism, democracy and
secularism, which inspired our heroic
people to dedicate themselves to, and our
brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives
in, the national liberation struggle,
shall be the fundamental principles of
the Constitution;
Further pleading that it shall be a
fundamental aim of the State to realise
through the democratic process a
socialist society, free from
exploitation-a society in which the rule
of law, fundamental human rights and
freedom, equality and justice, political,
economic and social, will be secured for
all citizens;
Affirming that it is our sacred duty
to safeguard, protect and defend this
Constitution and to maintain its
supremacy as the embodiment of the will
380
of the people of Bangladesh so that we
may prosper in freedom and may make our
full contribution towards international
peace and co-operation in keeping with
the progressive aspirations of mankind;
In our Constituent Assembly, the
eighteenth day of Kartick, 1379 B.S.,
corresponding to the fourth day of
November, 1972 A.D., do hereby adopt,
enact and give to ourselves this
Constitution. "
The pr eambl e st ar t s wi t h t he expr essi on we ,
t he peopl e of Bangl adesh. The i ndependence of
Bangl adesh was achi eved not as a cour se but i t was
achi eved by t he peopl e t hr ough a hi st or i c st r uggl e
f or nat i onal l i ber at i on. The Const i t uent Assembl y
pl edged t hat t he f undament al ai m of t he st at e
shoul d be r eal i zed t hr ough democr at i c pr ocess
f r ee f r omexpl oi t at i on a soci et y i n whi ch t he r ul e
of l aw, f undament al human r i ght s and f r eedom,
equal i t y and j ust i ce, pol i t i cal , economi c and
381
soci al , wi l l be secur ed f or al l ci t i zens. The
supr emacy of t he Const i t ut i on was decl ar ed. The
f r amer s of t he Const i t ut i on descr i be t he
qual i t at i ve aspect s of t he pol i t y t he Const i t ut i on
i s desi gned t o achi eve. I n t hi s si t uat i on, t he
pr eambl e of t he Const i t ut i on and i n i t s r ol e
cannot be r el egat ed t o t he posi t i on of t he
pr eambl e of a st at ut e.
Thi s pr eambl e i s di f f er ent f r om ot her
Const i t ut i ons of t he gl obe whi ch r ef l ect ed t he
phi l osophy, ai ms and obj ect i ves of t he
Const i t ut i on and descr i bes t he qual i t at i ve aspect s
of t he Const i t ut i on as desi gned t o achi eve. The
pr eambl e decl ar es i n cl ear t er ms t hat al l power s
i n t he Republ i c bel ong t o t he peopl e. I t
emphat i cal l y decl ar es t o const i t ut e a sover ei gn
Peopl es Republ i c i n whi ch democr acy wi t h equal i t y
of st at us and of oppor t uni t y of al l ci t i zens i n
al l spher es of l i f e be ensur ed. Thei r exer ci se on
behal f of t he peopl e shal l be ef f ect ed onl y under
and by t he aut hor i t y of t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s
382
pr eambl e speaks of r epr esent at i ve democr acy, r ul e
of l aw and t he supr emacy of t he Const i t ut i on. The
begi nni ng of t he expr essi ons we t he peopl e means
t he machi ner i es and t he appar at us of t he
Republ i c, t hat i s, t he Execut i ve, t he Legi sl at ur e,
t he J udi ci ar y i ncl udi ng t he Pr esi dent and t he
Cabi net , t he di sci pl i nar y f or ces i ncl udi ng t he
ar my ar e subser vi ent t o t he wi l l of t he peopl e.
They ar e answer abl e t o t he peopl e f or ever y act i on
t aken. I f t hi s pr eambl e i s r ead al ong wi t h
Ar t i cl es 7 and 11, pr ovi si ons of Par t s I I I , I V, V
and VI , t her e i s no denyi ng t he f act t hat t he
sover ei gnt y of t he peopl e, t he f our i deal s, such
as, nat i onal i sm, soci al i sm, democr acy and
secul ar i smwhi ch i nspi r ed t he mar t yr s t o sacr i f i ce
t hei r l i ves, t he wi l l of t he peopl e, t he r ul e of
l aw, t he f undament al r i ght s of t he ci t i zens and
t he par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment ar e t he mai n
pi l l ar s of t he Const i t ut i on. The wi l l of t he
peopl e i s t o be expr essed t hr ough t hei r el ect ed
383
r epr esent at i ves i n t he admi ni st r at i on at al l
l evel s.
Thus, our pr eambl e cont ai ns t he cl ue t o t he
f undament al s of t he Const i t ut i on and t he basi c
const i t uent of our Const i t ut i on i s t he
admi ni st r at i on of t he Republ i c t hr ough t hei r
el ect ed r epr esent at i ves. These t wo i nt egr al par t s
of t he Const i t ut i on f or m a basi c el ement whi ch
must be pr eser ved and can not be al t er ed. The
Par l i ament has power t o amend t he Const i t ut i on but
such power i s subj ect t o cer t ai n l i mi t at i on whi ch
i s appar ent f r om a r eadi ng of t he pr eambl e. The
br oad cont our s of t he basi c el ement s and
f undament al f eat ur es of t he Const i t ut i on ar e
del i neat ed i n t he pr eambl e.
Chandr achud, CJ . whi l e expr essi ng vi ews on
pr eambl e of I ndi an Const i t ut i on i n Mi ner va Mi l l s
Lt d. V. Uni on of I ndi a, AI R 1980 S. C. 1789 st at ed:
"The preamble assures to the people of India a
polity where basic structure is described therein
as a Sovereign Democratic Republic". S. Ahmed, J .
384
i n Anwar Hossai n Chowdhur y Vs. Bangl adesh, 1989
BLD ( Speci al ) 1 ar gued t hat t he pr eambl e of our
Const i t ut i on i s somet hi ng di f f er ent f r om t hat of
or di nar y st at ut e and i t i s t he i nt ent i on of t he
maker s t he Const i t ut i on t hat i t i s t he gui de t o
i t s i nt er pr et at i on. M. H. Rahman, J . i n Anwar
Hossai n i s of t he opi ni on t hat t he pr eambl e i s not
onl y a par t of t he Const i t ut i on, i t now st ands as
an ent r enched pr ovi si on t hat can not be changed
and any amendment t o t he Const i t ut i on ' i s t o be
exami ned i n t he l i ght of t he pr eambl e' . I n Kul di p
Nayar V. Uni on of I ndi a, AI R 2006, 3127 i t has
been ar gued: "the edifice of democracy in the
country (India) rests on a system of free and fair
elections. These principles are discernible not
only from the preamble, which has always been
considered as part of the Constitution, but also
from its various provisions".
The basi c f eat ur e of t he Const i t ut i on i s t hat
al l power s bel ong t o t he peopl e. The pr eambl e
out l i nes t he obj ect i ves of t he whol e Const i t ut i on.
385
The peopl es par t i ci pat i on i n t he af f ai r s of t he
st at e ar e t hr ough t hei r el ect ed r epr esent at i ves.
Thi s i s an essent i al char act er i st i c of a
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment and i t i s t he
mai n f abr i c of t he syst em set up by t he
Const i t ut i on. An al t er at i on of t hi s mai n f abr i c
i s t o dest r oy i t al t oget her and i t can not
al t oget her be changed even f or a shor t per i od,
si mi l ar t o t hose convent i ons of t he Br i t i sh
Const i t ut i on t hat The Ki ng must assent t o, or
can not vet o any bi l l passed by t he t wo Houses of
Par l i ament , t he House of Lor ds does not
or i gi nat e any money bi l l ( A. V. Di cey- The Law of
t he Const i t ut i on) and t hose of t he Amer i can
convent i onal r ul es t hat No pr esi dent has ever
been r e- el ect ed mor e t han once.
Our Const i t ut i on est abl i shes pol i t i cal
i nst i t ut i ons desi gned t o ensur e a wor kabl e,
democr at i c f or m of Gover nment t hat pr ot ect s basi c
per sonal l i ber t i es; di vi des and separ at es power so
t hat no per son or of f i ce hol der can become t oo
386
power f ul ; ensur es a degr ee of equal i t y and
guar ant ees t he r ul e of l aw. The Const i t ut i on, by
cr eat i ng sever al gover nment al i nst i t ut i ons and
di vi di ng power among t hem, st r esses t he i mpor t ance
of consi der i ng t hose i nst i t ut i ons as par t of one
Gover nment , wor ki ng t oget her . Under t he
Const i t ut i on t her e i s a t hr eef ol d di st r i but i on of
power s, and t hose power s ar e co- ext ensi ve.
Ar t i cl e 7 says " All powers in the Republic
belong to the people ---- and their exercise on
behalf of the people shall be effected only under,
and by the authority of this Constitution".
Ar t i cl e 8 pr ovi des f or t he f undament al pr i nci pl es
of st at e pol i cy, Ar t i cl e 11 hi ghl i ght s t he
democr acy and human r i ght s of t he ci t i zens. Par t
I I I pr ot ect s t he f undament al r i ght s of t he
ci t i zens. Thi s Di vi si on hel d i n Anwar Hossai n
Chowdhur y t hat Ar t i cl e 7 of t he Const i t ut i on
decl ar es t he supr emacy of t he Const i t ut i on, t her e
must be some aut hor i t y t o mai nt ai n and pr eser ve
t he supr emacy of t he Const i t ut i on and t her e can be
387
no doubt t hat j udi ci ar y must be t hat aut hor i t y.
One of t he basi c f eat ur es of t he pr eambl e of our
Const i t ut i on i s t o saf eguar d, pr ot ect and def end
t he Const i t ut i on and t o mai nt ai n i t s supr emacy as
t he embodi ment of t he wi l l of t he peopl e of
Bangl adesh. One of t he f undament al pr i nci pl es
cont ai ned i n Ar t i cl e I I i s t hat t he Republ i c shal l
be a democr acy i n whi ch f undament al human r i ght s
and f r eedoms and r espect f or t he di gni t y and wor t h
of t he human per son be guar ant eed. The expr essi on
democr acy used i n t he ar t i cl e has been expl ai ned
t o t he ef f ect t hat ef f ect i ve par t i ci pat i on by t he
peopl e t hr ough t hei r el ect ed r epr esent at i ves i n
admi ni st r at i on at al l l evel s shal l be ensur ed.
The basi c concept under l yi ng t he sover ei gnt y
of t he peopl e i s t hat t he ent i r e body pol i t i c
becomes a t r ust ee f or t he di schar ge of sover ei gn
f unct i ons. I n a compl ex soci et y ever y ci t i zen can
not per sonal l y par t i ci pat e i n t he per f or mance of
t he af f ai r s of t he St at e, t he body pol i t i c
appoi nt s st at e f unct i onar i es t o di schar ge t hese
388
f unct i ons on i t s behal f and f or i t s benef i t , and
has t he r i ght t o r emove t he f unct i onar y so
appoi nt ed by i t i f he goes agai nst t he l aw of t he
l egal sover ei gn, or commi t s any ot her br each of
t r ust or f ai l s t o di schar ge hi s obl i gat i on under a
t r ust . The head of t he st at e i s chosen by t he
peopl e and has t o be assi st ed by a Counci l of
Mi ni st er s whi ch hol ds i t s meet i ngs i n publ i c vi ew.
They r emai n account abl e t o publ i c. I t i s,
t her ef or e, sai d t he gover nment becomes gover nment
of l aws and not of men, f or ; no one i s above t he
l aw. Al l power s l i e wi t h t he peopl e, not on any
par t i cul ar i ndi vi dual . Thi s t r ust concept of
gover nment f i l t er ed i nt o Eur ope t hr ough Spai n and
even as ear l y as 1685 J ohn Locke r ej ect ed Hobbes
l evi at han and pr opounded t he t heor y t hat
sover ei gnt y vest ed i n t he peopl e and t hey have t he
r i ght not onl y t o deci de as t o who shoul d gover n
t hem but al so t o l ay down t he manner of
gover nment , whi ch t hey t hought t o be t he best f or
t he common good. Gover nment was, t her ef or e,
389
accor di ng t o Locke essent i al l y a mor al t r ust whi ch
coul d be f or f ei t ed i f t he condi t i ons of t he t r ust
wer e not f ul f i l l ed by t he t r ust ee or t r ust ees, as
t he case may be.
Par t I V of t he Const i t ut i on vest s t he power of
t he Pr esi dent and t he Cabi net pr ovi di ng f or a
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment wi t h t he
Pr esi dent as t he Const i t ut i onal head i s el ect ed by
t he member s of Par l i ament . The member s of
Par l i ament ar e t o be di r ect l y el ect ed by t he
peopl e on t he basi s of adul t f r anchi se. The
Pr esi dent woul d appoi nt a member of Par l i ament who
commanded t he suppor t of t he maj or i t y of t he
member s of Par l i ament as t he Pr i me Mi ni st er and
woul d appoi nt Mi ni st er s on t he r ecommendat i on of
t he Pr i me Mi ni st er . The execut i ve power of t he
Republ i c i s vest ed wi t h t he Pr i me Mi ni st er and hi s
Cabi net who shal l be r esponsi bl e t o t he
Par l i ament . The Pr i me Mi ni st er and t he Cabi net
woul d cont i nue as l ong as t hey command t he suppor t
of t he maj or i t y of t he member s of Par l i ament .
390
I n a Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment t he
Pr i me Mi ni st er occupi es t he cent r al posi t i on. As
per Ar t i cl e 55, t her e shal l be a Cabi net f or
Bangl adesh havi ng t he Pr i me Mi ni st er at i t s head
and compr i si ng such Mi ni st er s as t he Pr i me
Mi ni st er shal l deci de. The execut i ve power of t he
Republ i c shal l be exer ci sed by or on t he aut hor i t y
of Pr i me Mi ni st er . The Mi ni st er s compr i si ng t he
Cabi net shal l be det er mi ned by t he Pr i me Mi ni st er
and t hey shal l hol d of f i ce dur i ng t he pl easur e of
t he Pr i me Mi ni st er , who can ask any Mi ni st er t o
r esi gn and i f such Mi ni st er di sobeys, he may
advi ce t he Pr esi dent t o t er mi nat e hi m. The t enur e
of t he Pr i me Mi ni st er , as per Ar t i cl e 57 of t he
Const i t ut i on, shal l become vacant ( a) i f he
r esi gns f r om of f i ce at any t i me or ( b) i f he
ceases t o be a Member of Par l i ament . Except
ot her wi se t han t he above t wo condi t i ons, t he Pr i me
Mi ni st er shal l cont i nue t o hol d of f i ce so l ong he
r et ai ns t he suppor t of maj or i t y of t he member s of
Par l i ament and he shal l be di squal i f i ed onl y when
391
hi s successor has ent er ed upon of f i ce i . e. t he
successor i s el ect ed. The Cabi net i s t he ul t i mat e
pol i cy and deci si on maki ng or gan of t he
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment i n whi ch t he
Pr i me Mi ni st er i s t he head. The Cabi net i s t hus i n
f ul l cont r ol over t he di r ect i on of t he publ i c
af f ai r s of t he count r y and i s i nst r ument al i n
f or mul at i ng t he pol i cy of t he admi ni st r at i on,
pi l ot i ng l egi sl at i on i n Par l i ament and cor r el at i ng
and super vi si ng al l admi ni st r at i ve act i ons. As t he
Cabi net i s composed of t he l eadi ng member s of t he
maj or i t y par t y i n Par l i ament , t he Cabi net
vi r t ual l y cont r ol s Par l i ament and t he Cabi net
r eal l y r uns t he show i n t he execut i ve and
l egi sl at i ve br anches. Ther ef or e, t hi s
Par l i ament ar y democr acy i s al so a basi c st r uct ur e
of t he Const i t ut i on whi ch cannot be whi t t l ed down
or changed even f or a shor t er per i od by t he
Par l i ament .
Under t he scheme of t he Const i t ut i on t he
Pr esi dent has t wo power s under Ar t i cl e 48( 3)
392
namel y; t he appoi nt ment of t he Pr i me Mi ni st er i n
accor dance wi t h Ar t i cl e 56( 3) and t he appoi nt ment
of t he Chi ef J ust i ce i n accor dance wi t h Ar t i cl e
95( 1) . Though t he Pr esi dent shal l t ake pr ecedence
over al l ot her per sons i n t he st at e, i n pr act i ce
he i s t he t i t ul ar head of t he St at e. Apar t f r om
t he above t wo power s, t he Pr esi dent shal l act i n
accor dance wi t h t he advi ce of t he Pr i me Mi ni st er .
I n t he l i ght of t hese const i t ut i onal
pr ovi si ons, l et us l ook at whet her t he i mpugned
Act vi ol at es t he basi c f eat ur e as wel l as dest r oys
t he st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on. The i mpugned
amendment i s t o be t est ed i n t he cont ext of t he
Const i t ut i onal scheme. Lear ned J udges wi t hout
deci di ng t he mai n i ssue i n di sput e di ver t ed t hei r
at t ent i on t owar ds t he hol di ng of f r ee and f ai r
par l i ament ar y el ect i on. As r egar ds t he power of
amendment of t he Const i t ut i on, Md. J oi nul Abedi n,
J . obser ves t hat t he Par l i ament may br i ng any
amendment t o t he Const i t ut i on t o achi eve f or
consol i dat i ng and i nst i t ut i onal i si ng democr acy.
393
Mr . Awl ad Al i , J . was of t he vi ew t hat Par l i ament
consi der i ng t he necessi t y f or t he syst em i n
exer ci se of i t s pr er ogat i ve power s passed t he bi l l
by t wo t hi r ds maj or i t y, who ar e r epr esent at i ves of
t he peopl e and i f t he peopl e r eal l y bel i eve i n
democr acy t her e i s no har m i f cer t ai n pr ovi si ons
of t he Const i t ut i on ar e suspended. Mi r za Hossai n
Hai der , J . i s of t he vi ew t hat democr acy bei ng t he
basi c st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, f or
i mpr ovement of t he democr at i c syst em, t her e i s no
bar t o maki ng such amendment . I f i nd f al l acy i n
t he ar gument s of t he l ear ned J udges.
The expr essi ons may be amended by way of
addi t i on, al t er at i on, subst i t ut i on or r epeal used
i n Ar t i cl e 142( 1) ( a) do not cover t he r i ght t o
abr ogat e or annul or change t he basi c f eat ur es or
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s power of
amendment must be const r ued i n such a manner so
as t o pr eser ve t he basi c f eat ur es or i n t he
al t er nat i ve, t hei r power does not i ncl ude i n
damagi ng or dest r oyi ng t he st r uct ur e and t he
394
i dent i t y of t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s i s why t hi s
Di vi si on has decl ar ed t he Const i t ut i on Ei ght h
Amendment , and t he Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on has al so
decl ar ed t he Const i t ut i on Fi f t h Amendment
ul t r avi r es t he Const i t ut i on whi ch was af f i r med by
t hi s Di vi si on. Ther ef or e, t he ar gument s t hat t he
Par l i ament has t he power t o amend t he Const i t ut i on
by t wo- t hi r ds of t he t ot al number of member s of
Par l i ament f or t he i mpr ovement i n t he
Par l i ament ar y democr at i c pr ocess ar e cont r ar y t o
t he st at ement s of l aw set t l ed by t hi s Di vi si on. I t
i s al so not cor r ect t o come t o t he concl usi on t hat
as t he Si xt h Par l i ament whi ch passed t he i mpugned
amendment havi ng been val i dl y const i t ut ed despi t e
non- par t i ci pat i on of al l ot her opposi t i on
pol i t i cal par t i es has sanct i t y of l aw si nce i t has
not been set asi de by a Cour t of l aw.
I t wi l l not be out of pl ace t o ment i on t hat
t he Par l i ament ar y el ect i on by whi ch t he Si xt h
Par l i ament was const i t ut ed was gener al l y per cei ved
as one hel d wi t hout par t i ci pat i on of t he peopl e
395
and t hat i s why, t he t hen Gover nment coul d not
cont i nue even f or a si ngl e day af t er passi ng of
t he sai d amendment . I f t he par amet er f or pr esumi ng
an el ect i on t o have t he sanct i t y and i f i t was
hel d f ol l owi ng t he pr ovi si ons of t he
Repr esent at i on of t he Peopl e Or der , 1972, t her e i s
no r eason f or not pr esumi ng t he Magur a bye-
el ect i on as one not hel d pr oper l y and l egal l y.
These ar e not at al l r el evant f or deci di ng t he
cor e quest i on as t o whet her t he i mpugned amendment
was const i t ut i onal or not . Assumi ng t hat al l t he
pol i t i cal par t i es par t i ci pat ed i n t he el ect i on and
suppor t ed t he amendment whi ch ar e not l egal
gr ounds and r el evant f or j ust i f yi ng t he amendment .
I f i t i s so, t her e was no r eason f or decl ar i ng t he
Const i t ut i on Fi f t h and Ei ght h amendment s
ul t r avi r es t he Const i t ut i on whi ch amendment s wer e
al so passed by t wo- t hi r ds of t he t ot al number of
member s of Par l i ament . What s mor e, i n t hose
Par l i ament ar y el ect i ons al l pol i t i cal par t i es had
par t i ci pat ed.
396
As per Const i t ut i on t hough t he Par l i ament has
power t o amend t he Const i t ut i on, i t has no power
t o change i t s basi c st r uct ur e. I f one put s
quest i on as t o what ar e t he basi c f r amewor ks of
our Const i t ut i on, he has t o dr aw on f act s of
hi st or y whi ch may admi t one answer . Ther ef or e
cer t ai n pr el i mi nar y consi der at i ons must be bor ne
i n mi nd i n or der t o eval uat e t he doct r i ne of t he
basi c st r uct ur e. Fi r st , what was t he geogr aphi cal
ar ea, and secondl y, who wer e t he peopl e, f or whom
t he Const i t ut i on was bei ng f r amed? when t he
Const i t uent Assembl y f i r st begun i t s wor k, t he
obj ect i ves r esol ut i on moved by Shei kh Muj i bur
Rahman show t he l engt hs t o whi ch t he member s wer e
pr epar ed t o hi ghl i ght t he hi st or i cal st r uggl e f or
l i ber at i on achi eved by t he peopl e of Bangl adesh
and secondl y, t he hi gh i deal s of nat i onal i sm,
soci al i sm, democr acy and secul ar i sm whi ch i nspi r ed
t he mar t yr s t o dedi cat e t hei r l i ves and t hi r dl y,
t o saf eguar d, pr ot ect and def end t he Const i t ut i on
and t o mai nt ai n i t s supr emacy as t he embodi ment of
397
t he wi l l of t he peopl e. I t i s t her ef or e, wr ong t o
say t hat t o achi eve democr acy, t he Par l i ament may
br i ng any amendment t o t he Const i t ut i on. Can t he
Par l i ament amend t he Const i t ut i on changi ng a
syst em t o t he Pr esi dent i al f or m of Gover nment f or
consol i dat i ng and i nst i t ut i onal i zi ng democr acy? I t
wi l l be agai nst t he spi r i t of t he Const i t ut i on. By
amendi ng t he Const i t ut i on t he Republ i c cannot be
r epl aced by Monar chy, Democr acy by Ol i gar chy or
t he j udi ci ar y cannot be abol i shed, al t hough t her e
i s no expr ess bar t o t he amendi ng power gi ven i n
t he Const i t ut i on.
Ther e i s no doubt t hat democr acy i s one of t he
basi c f eat ur es of t he Const i t ut i on but how t he
count r y wi l l be r un by a Gover nment whi ch i s not
democr at i cal l y el ect ed by t he peopl e? The
Const i t ut i on abhor s any syst emof gover nance ot her
t han a gover nment whi ch i s el ect ed by t he peopl e.
I n t heor y, t he Br i t i sh Par l i ament possessed t he
power t o r epeal gr eat char t er s of l i ber t y l i ke t he
Magna Car t a ( 1215) , t he Bi l l of Ri ght s ( 1688) and
398
t he Act of Set t l ement ( 1700) as easi l y as i t coul d
r epeal a Dog Act , but t hese gr eat char t er s have
r emai ned unchanged. The amendi ng power i s pr ovi ded
f or i n a Const i t ut i on t o secur e or der l y change by
r emedyi ng def ect s di scl osed i n t he wor ki ng of t he
Const i t ut i on, or by j udi ci al deci si ons ( I n t he
uni t ed St at es t he 11
t h
Amendment was enact ed t o
nul l i f y Chi shol m V. Geor gi a ( 1793) 2 Dal l as 419) ,
or by unf or eseen ci r cumst ances, or by
ci r cumst ances whi ch wer e f or eseen but not guar ded
agai nst . Ther ef or e, t he above opi ni ons ar e i n
di r ect cont r ast t o t he scheme of t he Const i t ut i on.
Though Md. J oynul Abedi n, J . concur r ed t he
vi ews ar gued i n Anwar Hossai n Chowdhur y and
Sr eemot i I ndi r a Nehr u Gandhi V. Raj Nar ai n, AI R
1975( SC) 2299, t hat democr acy i s a basi c f eat ur e
of our Const i t ut i on and t hat f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on i s an i next r i cabl e par t of t he democr acy
whi ch i s al so a basi c f eat ur e of our Const i t ut i on,
on a wr ong not i on obser ved t hat t he i mpugned
amendment was passed i n or der t o st r engt hen,
399
consol i dat e and i nst i t ut i onal i ze t he democr acy i n
Bangl adesh whi ch i s al so a basi c f eat ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on. I f t hat bei ng so, I f ai l t o
under st and how t he democr acy wi l l be st r engt hened,
consol i dat ed and i nst i t ut i onal i zed by amendi ng
Par t I V of t he Const i t ut i on? Thi s Chapt er cont ai ns
t he power s and f unct i ons of t he Execut i ve.
Supr emacy of t he Const i t ut i on as t he sol emn
expr essi on of t he peopl e, whi l e Democr acy,
Republ i can Gover nment , Uni t ar y St at e, Separ at i on
of Power s, I ndependence of t he J udi ci ar y,
Fundament al r i ght s ar e no doubt basi c st r uct ur es
of our Const i t ut i on. Ther e i s no di sput e about
t hei r i dent i t y. Pr i nci pl e of separ at i on of power s
means t hat t he sover ei gn aut hor i t y i s equal l y
di st r i but ed among t he t hr ee or gans and as such one
or gan cannot dest r oy t he ot her s. These ar e
st r uct ur al pi l l ar s of t he Const i t ut i on and t hey
st and beyond any change by a mandat or y pr ocess.
Somet i mes i t i s ar gued t hat t hi s doct r i ne of bar
t o change of basi c st r uct ur es i s based on t he f ear
400
t hat unl i mi t ed power of amendment may be used i n a
t yr anni cal manner so as t o damage t he basi c
st r uct ur es, i n vi ew of t he f act t hat ' power
cor r upt s and absol ut e power cor r upt s absol ut el y' .
I n Anwar Hosai n Chowdhur y, t he quest i on was
whet her by subst i t ut i ng Ar t i cl e 100 by t he
Const i t ut i on ( Ei ght h Amendment ) Act , 1988 f or t he
pur pose of set t i ng up Per manent Benches of t he
Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on the basic structures of the
Constitution has been altered and it seeks to
destroy the independence of judiciary and the
character role and effectiveness of the High Court
Division. The maj or i t y vi ew of t hi s Di vi si on i s
t hat Ar t i cl e 100( 5) pur por t s t o mean t hat t he
Pr esi dent has been empower ed t o r edet er mi ne by
execut i ve f i at t he t er r i t or i al j ur i sdi ct i on of t he
per manent Benches whi ch i n ef f ect r ender s t he
Const i t ut i onal pr ovi si ons i n Ar t i cl es 94, 95( 3) ,
101, 102 nugat or y and i r r econci abl e. The Hi gh
Cour t Di vi si on bei ng an i nt egr al par t of t he
Supr eme Cour t has l ost i t s or i gi nal char act er as
401
wel l as most of i t s t er r i t or i al j ur i sdi ct i on.
Amendment of t he Const i t ut i on means change or
al t er at i on f or i mpr ovement or t o make i t ef f ect i ve
or meani ngf ul and not i t s el i mi nat i on or
abr ogat i on. Amendment i s subj ect t o t he r et ent i on
of t he basi c st r uct ur es. The Cour t , t her ef or e, has
power t o undo an amendment i f i t t r ansgr esses i t s
l i mi t and al t er s a basi c st r uct ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on.
I n Kudr at - E- El ahi Pani r Vs. Bangl adesh, 44
DLR( AD) 319, Kudr at - E- El ahi and t hr ee ot her s had
chal l enged t he Const i t ut i onal val i di t y of t he
Bangl adesh Local Gover nment ( Upazi l a Par i shad and
Upazi l a Admi ni st r at i on Re- Or gani sat i on) ( Repeal )
Or di nance, 1991, on t he gr ound t hat t he Or di nance
i s i nconsi st ent wi t h Ar t i cl es 9, 11, 59 and 60 of
t he Const i t ut i on and as such i t i s voi d i n t er ms
of Ar t i cl e 7( 2) of t he Const i t ut i on. Must af a
Kamal , J . ar gued t he poi nt as under :
" Thirdly, to the extent that
Articles 59 and 60 prescribe manner
402
and method of establishing local
government, its composition, powers
and functions including power of
local taxation, the plenary
legislative power of Parliament to
enact laws on local government is
restricted pro tanto. The learned
Attorney-General submits that the
plenary power still remains
unaffected. I can not conceive of a
local government existing in terms of
Articles 59 and 60 and another
outside of it. That will make a
mockery of Articles 59 and 60 and
will be in direct conflict with
Article 7(1) of the Constitution,
namely, "All powers in the Republic
belong to the people, and their
exercise on behalf of the people
shall be effected only under, and by
the authority of, this Constitution".
403
If Parliament has to pass a local
government legislation, it has
conform to Articles 59 and 60, read
with Article 152(1). With Articles 59
and 60 the Constitution local
government legislation became very
much a subject matter of legislation
within the terms of the Constitution.
Parliament is not free to legislate
on local government ignoring Articles
59 and 60. "
I n Kesavananda Bhar at i , AI R 1973 S. C. 1461,
t he Supr eme Cour t of I ndi a by a maj or i t y hel d t hat
t hough by Ar t i cl e 368 Par l i ament i s gi ven power t o
amend t he Const i t ut i on t hat power cannot be
exer ci sed so as t o damage i t s basi c f eat ur es or so
as t o dest r oy i t s basi c st r uct ur e. Si kr i , C. J .
hel d t hat f undament al r i ght s conf er r ed by Par t I I I
of t he Const i t ut i on can not be abr ogat ed, t hough a
r easonabl e abr i dgement of t hose r i ght s can be
ef f ect ed i n publ i c i nt er est and t hat t he
404
f undament al i mpor t ance of t he f r eedom of t he
i ndi vi dual has t o be pr eser ved f or al l t i mes t o
come and i t coul d not be amended out of exi st ence.
I t i s f ur t her ar gued t hat t her e i s a l i mi t at i on on
t he power of amendment by necessar y i mpl i cat i on
whi ch was appar ent f r om t he r eadi ng of t he
pr eambl e; t hat t he expr essi on amendment i n
Ar t i cl e 368 means any addi t i on or change i n any of
t he pr ovi si ons of t he const i t ut i on wi t hi n t he
br oad cont our s of t he pr eambl e, made i n or der t o
car r y out t he basi c obj ect i ves of t he
const i t ut i on. Ther ef or e, ever y pr ovi si ons of t he
Const i t ut i on was open t o amendment pr ovi ded t he
basi c f oundat i on or st r uct ur e was not damaged or
dest r oyed. Shel at and Gr over , J J . wer e of t he
opi ni on t hat t he expr essi on amendment cont ai ns
i n Ar t i cl e 368 must be const r ued i n such a manner
as t o pr eser ve t he power of Par l i ament t o amend
t he Const i t ut i on, but not so as t o r esul t i n
damagi ng or dest r oyi ng t he st r uct ur e and i dent i t y
of t he Const i t ut i on. Ther e was t hus i mpl i ed
405
l i mi t at i on of amendi ng power of t he Par l i ament
f r om changi ng t he i dent i t y or any of t he basi c
f eat ur es of t he Const i t ut i on.
Hegde and Mukher j ee, J J . i n t he sai d case
obser ved t hat I ndi an Const i t ut i on i s a soci al
document , i s f ounded on t he soci al phi l osophy and
t hus i t has t wo f eat ur es: basi c and
ci r cumst ant i al . The basi c const i t uent r emai ned
const ant , t he l at er par t i s subj ect t o change. The
br oad cont our s, accor di ng t o t he l ear ned J udges,
of t he basi c el ement s and t he f undament al f eat ur es
ar e del i neat ed i n t he pr eambl e and t he Par l i ament
has no power t o change or abr ogat e t hose basi c
el ement s of f undament al f eat ur es. Accor di ng t o t he
l ear ned J udges, t he bui l di ng of a wel f ar e st at e i s
t he ul t i mat e goal of ever y Gover nment but t hat
does not mean t hat i n or der t o bui l d a wel f ar e
st at e, human f r eedoms have t o suf f er a t ot al
dest r uct i on.
I n Mi ner va Mi l l s Lt d. V. Uni on of I ndi a, AI R
1980 S. C. 1789, t he val i di t y of sect i ons 4 and 55
406
of t he const i t ut i onal 42nd Amendment r est s on t he
r at i o of t he maj or i t y j udgment i n Kesavananda
Bhar at i . By sect i on 4 of t he amendment Ar t i cl e 31C
of t he Const i t ut i on was amended by subst i t ut i ng
t he wor ds and f i gur es al l or any of t he
pr i nci pl es l ai d down i n par t I V f or t he wor ds
and f i gur es t he pr i nci pl es speci f i ed i n cl ause
( b) or cl ause ( c) of Ar t i cl e 30. Sect i on 55 of
t he amendment i nser t ed sub- sect i on ( 4) and ( 5) i n
Ar t i cl e 368 whi ch r ead t hus:
(4) No amendment of the constitution
(including the provisions of Part III)
made or purporting to have been made
under this article (whether before or
after the commencement of section 55 of
the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)
Act, 1976) shall be called in question on
any ground.
(5) For removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that there shall be no
limitation whatever on the constituent
407
power of parliament to amend by way of
addition, variation or repeal the
provisions of this constitution under
this article.
The pur pose of t hi s amendment by i nser t i ng
cl ause ( 5) i s t o r emove al l l i mi t at i ons on t he
amendi ng power whi l e cl ause ( 4) depr i ves t he
Cour t s t he power t o cal l i n quest i on any amendment
of t he Const i t ut i on. I t i s ar gued by Chandr achud,
C. J . t hat t he I ndi an Const i t ut i on i s f ounded on a
ni ce bal ance of power among t he t hr ee wi ngs of t he
st at e, namel y t he Execut i ve, t he Legi sl at ur e and
t he J udi ci ar y. I t i s t he f unct i on of t he J udges t o
pr onounce upon t he val i di t y of l aws. I f Cour t s ar e
t ot al l y depr i ved of t hat power t he f undament al
r i ght s conf er r ed upon t he peopl e wi l l become a
mer e ador nment because r i ght s wi t hout r emedi es ar e
wr i t i n wat er . A cont r ol l ed Const i t ut i on wi l l t hen
become uncont r ol l ed. The conf er ment of t he r i ght
t o dest r oy t he i dent i t y of t he Const i t ut i on
coupl ed wi t h t he pr ovi si on t hat no cour t of l aw
408
shal l pr onounce upon t he val i di t y of such
dest r uct i on seems a t r anspar ent case of
t r ansgr essi on of t he l i mi t at i ons on t he amendi ng
power . The Supr eme Cour t appr oved of t he maj or i t y
vi ews ar gued i n Kesavananda obser vi ng: Since the
Constitution had conferred a limited amending
power on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot
under the exercise of that limited power enlarge
that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a
limited amending power is one of the basic
features of our Constitution and therefore, the
limitations on that power cannot be destroyed. In
other words, Parliament cannot, under Article 368,
expand its amending power so as to acquire for
itself the right to repeal or abrogate the
Constitution or to destroy its basic and essential
features. The donee of a limited power cannot by
the exercise of that power convert the limited
power into an unlimited one. The Supr eme Cour t
decl ar ed sect i ons 4 and 55 of t he Const i t ut i on 42
nd

Amendment Act voi d.
409
Thi s Di vi si on appr oved of t he ar gument s i n
Kesavananda Bhar at i and Mi ner va Mi l l s Lt d. i n
Anwar Hossai n Chowdhur y, and i n a l at er case i n
Khandker Del war Hossai n and ot her s Vs. Bangl adesh
I t al i an Mar bl e wor ks Lt d. and ot her s, 18 BLT ( AD)
329 al so appr oved t he ar gument s i n Kesavananda. I n
Kesavananda s case t he Supr eme Cour t deal t wi t h
t he amendi ng power wi t h r ef er ence t o t he 24
t h

Amendment , and t he J udges appl i ed t hei r vi ews of
t he amendi ng power t o t est t he val i di t y of t he 25
t h

Amendment and t he 29
t h
Amendment . The 24
t h

Amendment amended Ar t i cl e 368 of t he Const i t ut i on
i n t he f ol l owi ng manner :
368(1) Notwithstanding anything in this
constitution Parliament may, in exercise
of its constituent power amend by way of
addition, variation or repeal any
provision of this constitution in
accordance with the procedure laid down
in this article.
410
These amendment s di spl aced t he r easoni ng on
whi ch Gol ak Nat h s case ( 1967) 2SCR 762) i s based.
The Const i t uent power i . e. t he abi l i t y t o f r ame
or al t er a Const i t ut i on as, t he Const i t uent
Assembl y, i nvol ved i n amendi ng a r i gi d
Const i t ut i on cannot be equat ed t o t he const i t uent
power i nvol ved i n f r ami ng i t . The sover ei gn
const i t uent power of f r ami ng a Const i t ut i on
consi st s of an undi f f er ent i at ed amal gamat i on of
Legi sl at i ve, Execut i ve and J udi ci al power s, whi ch
power s come i nt o exi st ence af t er a Const i t ut i on i s
f r amed, i s based upon a conf usi on of i deas. Those
who f r ame a Const i t ut i on possess l aw maki ng power
t o make a par t i cul ar ki nd of l aw namel y, t he
Const i t ut i on of t he count r y under whi ch i t i s t o
be gover ned. I f t hi s l aw maki ng power i s
unr est r i ct ed, because not subj ect t o l i mi t at i ons
i mposed by any ext er nal aut hor i t y, t he power i s
pl enar y. Such a l aw maki ng power i s not an
undi f f er ent i at ed mass of l egi sl at i ve, execut i ve
and j udi ci al power ; i t i s a l aw maki ng power . Ti l l
411
t hat power i s exer ci sed, i t i s not possi bl e t o say
whet her t he Const i t ut i on wi l l be t he supr eme l aw
or not f or , i f t he power i s exer ci sed t o enact a
f l exi bl e Const i t ut i on, t he Const i t ut i on wi l l not
be t he supr eme l aw i n t he sense t hat any l aw
cont r aveni ng i t s pr ovi si ons woul d be voi d.
But t hose who exer ci se t he l aw maki ng power
f or f r ami ng a Const i t ut i on, do not possess
l egi sl at i ve power i n t he sense of maki ng l aws f or
t he gover nance of t he count r y, or exer ci se
Execut i ve power t o admi ni st er t hose l aws and car r y
on t he day t o day Gover nment of t he count r y, or
exer ci se j udi ci al power i n t he cor r ect sense of
t he wor ds of ( Gr i f f i t h, C. J . i n Huddar t , Par ker
Pvt . Lt d. V. Moor ehead ( 1908- 09) 8CLR 330) ,
appr oved by Pr i vy Counci l , ( 1931) A. C. 275) ;
the power which every sovereign
authority must of necessity have to
decide controversies between its
subjects, whether the rights relate to
life, liberty or property. The exercise
412
of this power does not begin until some
tribunal which has power to give a
binding and authoritative division
(whether subject to appeal or not) is
called upon to take action.
Ar t i cl e V of t he U. S. Const i t ut i on cont ai ns
t wo expr ess l i mi t at i ons on t he amendi ng power ,
namel y,
Provided that no amendment which may be
made prior to 1808 shall, in any manner
affect the first and fourth clauses in
the ninth section of the first article;
and that no state, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the senate.
The f i r st l i mi t at i on has l ong ceased t o be
oper at i ve but t he second l i mi t at i on i s i n
oper at i on t i l l t oday. Sect i on 128 of t he
Aust r al i an Const i t ut i on cont ai ns t he f ol l owi ng
l i mi t at i ons:
413
No alteration diminishing the
proportionate representation of any state
in either House of the Parliament, or the
minimum number of representatives of a
state in the House of Representatives, or
increasing diminishing or otherwise
altering the limits of the state, or in
any manner affecting the provisions of
the Constitution in relation thereto,
shall become law unless the majority of
the electors voting in that state approve
the proposed law.
The Canadi an Const i t ut i on ( t he B. N. A. Act of
1867) when enact ed di d not conf er any power of
amendment on t he Feder al Par l i ament and coul d be
amended onl y by t he Br i t i sh Par l i ament ; but by
convent i on, r ecogni sed by t he St at ut e of
West mi nst er , 1931, t he power was not exer ci sed
wi t hout t he r equest of t he Domi ni on Par l i ament .
( Whear e, St at ut e of West mi nst er & Domi ni on St at us,
5
t h
Edi t i on, Page 178) . I n 1949 by t he BNA Act of
414
1949, l i mi t ed power of amendment was conf er r ed on
t he f eder al Par l i ament by i nser t i on of Sub- sect i on
( 1) of Sect i on 91. The Uni t ed St at es, Canada and
Aust r al i a ar e f eder at i ons of or i gi nal l y separ at e
st at es wi t h Const i t ut i ons of t hei r own. The U. S.
Const i t ut i on was dr af t ed by a convent i on and
r at i f i ed by t he r equi si t e number of st at es. The
Canadi an and Aust r al i an Const i t ut i ons wer e enact ed
by t he Br i t i sh Par l i ament . The l i mi t at i on of
Ar t i cl e V on t he amendi ng power i n t he US
Const i t ut i on has r emai ned unchanged f or over 200
year s wi t hout pr ovoki ng any r evol ut i on; t he
expr ess l i mi t at i on i n sect i on 128 of t he
Aust r al i an Const i t ut i on has r emai ned unchanged f or
96 year s. These t wo count r i es whi ch wer e decl ar ed
t o have st at us equal t o t hat of Uni t ed Ki ngdomdi d
not wi sh t o have t he power t o amend t hei r
Const i t ut i ons i ndependent l y of t he exi st i ng l aw.
The r eason f or br i ngi ng i nf er ences f r om t he above
i s t hat a member of t he Br i t i sh Commonweal t h,
enj oyi ng t he st at us of a sover ei gn st at e
415
i nt er nat i onal l y, was cont ent wi t h a l i mi t ed
amendi ng power , and was cont ent t o sacr i f i ce i t s
sover ei gnt y by l eavi ng t he amendi ng power t o be
exer ci sed, at i t s r equest , by t he Br i t i sh
Par l i ament because an unl i mi t ed power of amendment
mi ght have l ed t o a di si nt egr at i on of t he
f eder at i on.
The same concl usi on woul d f ol l ow f r om
consi der i ng whet her even i n t he case of a Supr eme
and sover ei gn Par l i ament , l i ke t hat of Uni t ed
Ki ngdom. I n t heor y, t he Br i t i sh Par l i ament can
enact any l aw, but i t has been sai d by Di cey t hat
t he combi ned i nf l uence bot h of t he ext er nal and
t he i nt er nal l i mi t s on l egi sl at i ve sover ei gnt y
st at ed by Lesl i e St ephen i n hi s Sci ence of Et hi cs
( 1882) , Page 143: Lawyers are apt to speak as
though the legislature were omnipotent, as they do
not require to go beyond its decisions. It is, of
course, omnipotent in the sense that it can make
whatever laws it pleases, inasmuch as, a law means
any rule which has been made by legislature. But
416
from the scientific point of view, the power of
the legislature is of course strictly limited. It
is limited, so to speak, both from within and from
without; from within, because the legislature is
the product of a certain social condition, and
determined by whatever determines the society; and
from without, because the power of imposing laws
is dependent upon the instinct of subordination,
which is itself limited. If a legislature decided
that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the
preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal;
but legislatures must go mad before they could
pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before
they could submit to it.
The above passage shows t hat i t i s not t he
i nabi l i t y of Par l i ament t o pass a l aw pr ovi di ng
f or t he mur der of bl ue- eyed babi es whi ch woul d
pr ovoke a r evol ut i on. On t he cont r ar y, t he
exer ci se of t he power t o pass such a l aw woul d
pr ovoke r evol ut i on. A l egi sl at i ve power whi ch
woul d be exer ci sed onl y i f l egi sl at or s go mad and
417
subj ect s become i di ot i c, does not , i n any r at i onal
sense, exi st at al l .
On an anal ysi s of t he aut hor i t i es we may
concl ude t hat t her e ar e r i gi d or f l exi bl e
Const i t ut i ons. A r i gi d Const i t ut i on i s one i n
whi ch t he power t o amend t he Const i t ut i on can onl y
be exer ci sed by t he speci al pr ocedur e pr escr i bed
f or i t , and not by t he pr ocedur e pr escr i bed f or
maki ng l aws under t he Const i t ut i on. The
di f f er ent i a bei ng f ound i n t he di f f er ent pr ocedur e
pr escr i bed f or t he exer ci se of Const i t uent power
as di st i ngui shed f r omt he pr ocedur e pr escr i bed f or
maki ng or di nar y l aws ( Kesavananda) . A f l exi bl e
Const i t ut i on i s one i n whi ch t he power t o amend
t he Const i t ut i on i s exer ci sabl e by t he same
pr ocedur e as i t pr escr i bed f or maki ng or di nar y
l aws. I n a f l exi bl e Const i t ut i on, t he di st i nct i on
bet ween l egi sl at i ve and const i t uent power i s
anal yt i c and f or mal , but i n r eal i t y and i n
subst ance t he di st i nct i on di sappear s si nce any l aw
passed under t he Const i t ut i on i f i nconsi st ent wi t h
418
t he pr ovi si ons of t he Const i t ut i on, t hose
pr ovi si ons so f ar t o t hat ext ent t o be decl ar ed
ul t r avi r es. Thi s di st i nct i on wi l l not be
appl i cabl e t o t he maki ng of a Const i t ut i on by t he
Const i t uent Assembl y whi ch was not subj ect t o
r est r ai nt by any ext er nal aut hor i t y f or , t he
f r ami ng of t he Const i t ut i on i nvol ves t he exer ci se
of const i t uent power and i s, not meant t o
di st i ngui sh const i t uent power f r om l egi sl at i ve
power as i n a r i gi d Const i t ut i on. Ther ef or e, we
may concl ude t hat t he power t o f r ame Const i t ut i on
i s a pr i mar y power , wher eas, a power t o amend a
r i gi d Const i t ut i on i s a der i vat i ve power and
subj ect at l east t o t he l i mi t at i ons i mposed.
Secondl y, l aws made under a r i gi d Const i t ut i on
as wel l as amendment of such Const i t ut i on can be
ul t r a vi r es i f t hey cont r avene t he l i mi t at i ons put
on t he amendi ng power by t he Const i t ut i on f or , t he
Const i t ut i on i s t he t ouchst one of t he val i di t y of
t he exer ci se of power s conf er r ed by i t . The
maj or i t y vi ews of t he apex Cour t s of t hi s sub-
419
cont i nent ar e t hat t he power of amendment t o t he
Const i t ut i on can not be exer ci sed so as t o dest r oy
or damage i t s essent i al el ement s or t he basi c
st r uct ur e. Ther e i s no doubt t hat t he
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment i s a basi c
st r uct ur e of our Const i t ut i on and t hus, t he
i mpugned amendment not onl y dest r oyed but al so
damaged t he Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment -
consequent l y t he sai d amendment woul d be
ul t r avi r es and voi d. Let us now exami ne how t he
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment has been damaged
by t he i mpugned amendment .
As obser ved above, t he f r amer s of t he
Const i t ut i on have adopt ed t he syst em of
Par l i ament ar y execut i ve. Ar t i cl e 58B has been
added by t he i mpugned amendment pr ovi di ng t hat t he
Car e- t aker Gover nment shal l ent er upon of f i ce
af t er t he Par l i ament i s di ssol ved by r eason of
expi r at i on of i t s t er m t i l l t he dat e on whi ch a
new Pr i me Mi ni st er ent er s upon hi s of f i ce. Ther e
i s t ot al ambi gui t y i n t he pr ovi si on i n t hat
420
not hi ng has been ment i oned ei t her i n Ar t i cl e 58B
or anywher e i n Chapt er 11A as t o who woul d r un t he
Gover nment i f t he Par l i ament i s di ssol ved
ot her wi se t han by r eason of expi r at i on of i t s
t er m. I f Par l i ament i s di ssol ved on t he
r esi gnat i on of t he Pr i me Mi ni st er or f or any ot her
r eason and i f t he Pr esi dent i s unabl e t o appoi nt
anot her Pr i me Mi ni st er i n accor dance wi t h Ar t i cl e
58( 4) , t he Const i t ut i on, as i t st ands af t er
amendment , i s si l ent about t he f or m of Gover nment
under whi ch t he el ect i on of t he member s of
Par l i ament wi l l be hel d. None of t he l ear ned ami ci
cur i ae has been abl e t o cl ar i f y t he poi nt on t he
quer y of t he Cour t and f r ankl y concedes t hat t her e
i s def ect i n t he amendment .
I t i s t o be not ed t hat pr i or t o t he i mpugned
amendment t he posi t i on of cl ause ( 3) of Ar t i cl e
123 was as under :
(3) A general election of members of
Parliament shall be held
421
(a) in the case of a dissolution by
reason of the expiration of its term,
within a period of ninety days
proceeding such dissolution; and
(b) in the case of a dissolution
otherwise than by reason of such
expiration, within ninety days after
such dissolution;
Provided that the persons elected at a
general election under sub-clause (a)
shall not assume office as members of
Parliament except after the expiration of
the term referred to therein.
Af t er t he Thi r t eent h Amendment t hi s cl ause was
subst i t ut ed as under :
(3) A general election of members of
Parliament shall be held within ninety
days after Parliament is dissolved,
whether by reason of the expiration of
its term or otherwise than by reason of
such expiration .
422
The di f f er ence bet ween t hese t wo pr ovi si on i s
t hat under t he pr evi ous pr ovi si on t he gener al
el ect i on was r equi r ed t o be hel d bef or e t he expi r y
of t he t er mof f i ve year s or wi t hi n ni net y days i n
any ot her case of di ssol ut i on and t he newl y
el ect ed member s of Par l i ament coul d not assume
of f i ce bef or e t he expi r at i on of t he t er m of f i ve
year s, wher eas, under t he amended pr ovi si on, t he
gener al el ect i on wi l l be hel d af t er t he expi r y of
t he t er m, t hat i s t o say, af t er cessat i on of t he
t er m of f i ve year s. Thus we f i nd t hat even af t er
t he di ssol ut i on of t he Par l i ament and cessat i on of
t he of f i ce of t he member s of Par l i ament , t he
member s of Par l i ament wi l l be abl e t o at t end
Par l i ament i n vi ew of Pr ovi so t o Ar t i cl e 58 A.
Ther ef or e, t her e i s no gai nsayi ng t he f act t hat
t he pr ovi so t o Ar t i cl e 58A and cl ause ( 3) of
Ar t i cl e 123 ar e i nconsi st ent wi t h cl ause ( 4) of
Ar t i cl e 72.
Ar t i cl e 72( 4) of t he Const i t ut i on pr ovi des
t hat i f af t er di ssol ut i on bef or e hol di ng t he next
423
gener al el ect i on of t he member s of Par l i ament , t he
Pr esi dent i s sat i sf i ed t hat owi ng t o t he exi st ence
of a st at e of war i n whi ch t he Republ i c i s
engaged, i t i s necessar y t o r ecal l Par l i ament , t he
Pr esi dent shal l summon t he Par l i ament t hat has
been di ssol ved t o meet . Suppose, af t er di ssol ut i on
of Par l i ament a Car e- t aker Gover nment has been
appoi nt ed and i mmedi at e t her eaf t er , t he count r y i s
engaged i n a war or t her e i s exi st ence of a st at e
of war . The Pr esi dent wi l l be l ef t wi t h no
al t er nat i ve but t o summon t he Par l i ament . Then
what woul d be t he f at e of Car e- t aker Gover nment ?
As soon as t he Pr esi dent woul d summon t he
Par l i ament , t he Pr i me Mi ni st er and hi s Cabi net
woul d assume t he Gover nment . The Par l i ament
t her eupon woul d cont i nue t o f unct i on under t he
pr ovi si ons t o t he pr ovi so t o cl auses ( 3) and ( 4)
of Ar t i cl e 72 f or at l east si x mont hs af t er t he
cessat i on of t he war . The per sons hol di ng t he
of f i ce under t he Car e- t aker Gover nment syst em
woul d al so cont i nue i n of f i ce wi t hout any power
424
poi nt i ng f i nger s i n unequi vocal t er ms t hat t hi s
amendment ul t r avi r es t he Const i t ut i on f or , i f t he
car e- t aker Gover nment has no aut hor i t y or power t o
t ake any deci si on i n an emer gent si t uat i on of t he
count r y t hen how i t s ot her act s, deeds, t hi ngs and
t r ansact i ons r el at i ng t o t he af f ai r s of t he st at e
par t i cul ar l y deal i ng wi t h f i nance can be sai d t o
be j ust i f i ed.
Ther e i s al so no di sput e t hat t he pr ovi si ons
cont ai ned i n Chapt er I I A ar e i n di r ect conf l i ct
wi t h Ar t i cl es 55 and 57. The Legi sl at ur e at t empt ed
t o meet t he consequence by i nser t i ng Ar t i cl e 58A
i n Par t I I whi ch al so has f ai l ed t o addr ess t he
pr obl em. I t pr ovi ded t hat except t he pr ovi si ons of
cl auses ( 4) ( 5) and ( 6) of Ar t i cl e 55, t he ot her
pr ovi si ons i n Chapt er - I I , Par t - I V, shal l not appl y
dur i ng t he per i od i n whi ch Par l i ament i s
di ssol ved. A pr ovi so has been added aut hor i zi ng
t he Pr esi dent t o summon Par l i ament t hat has been
di ssol ved t o meet t he event ual i t y pr ovi ded i n
Ar t i cl e 72( 4) . What ' s mor e, i f t he Par l i ament i s
425
di ssol ved how t hen t he di ssol ved Par l i ament shal l
be summoned by t he Pr esi dent i s not cl ear i n
pr esence of t he Car e- t aker Gover nment ? The
expr essi on ' di ssol ve' accor di ng t o Chamber s
di ct i onar y, New Edi t i on, i s t o t er mi nat e or
di smi ss ( t he assembl y such as Par l i ament ) . Af t er
t he t er mi nat i on of t he Par l i ament whi ch ceased t o
exi st i f t he Pr esi dent summons Par l i ament , t he
di ssol ved Cabi net woul d r evi ve and i n t hat
event ual i t y, t he cabi net woul d exer ci se al l
Execut i ve power s of t he Gover nment .
Cl ause ( 2) t o Ar t i cl e 58B pr ovi des t hat t he
Car e- t aker Gover nment shal l be col l ect i vel y
r esponsi bl e t o t he Pr esi dent . Thi s pr ovi si on i s
agai nst t he spi r i t of t he Par l i ament ar y f or m of
Gover nment enshr i ned i n Ar t i cl es 55( 2) , 55( 3) and
58( 2) f or , t he Car e- t aker Gover nment woul d be
conver t ed i nt o one aki n t o t he Pr esi dent i al f or m
of Gover nment dur i ng t he i nt er r egnum per i od.
Ar t i cl e 58C pr ovi des f or t he composi t i on of t he
Car e- t aker Gover nment and appoi nt ment of Advi ser s
426
et c. Cl ause ( 3) of Ar t i cl e 58C pr ovi des t hat t he
Pr esi dent shal l appoi nt as Chi ef Advi ser who among
t he r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ces of Bangl adesh r et i r ed
l ast or f r om amongst t he r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ces
r et i r ed next bef or e t he l ast Chi ef J ust i ce or f r om
among t he r et i r ed J udges of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on
r et i r ed l ast i n case no r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ces ar e
avai l abl e or wi l l i ng t o hol d t he of f i ce of Chi ef
Advi ser . Thi s pr ovi si on i s vague, i ndef i ni t e and
l acki ng par t i cul ar s as t o t he mode of sel ect i ng
t he Chi ef Advi ser . Whenever a di sput e woul d ar i se
i n t he pr ocess of sel ect i ng a par t i cul ar r et i r ed
Chi ef J ust i ce, t her e i s scope f or exer ci si ng
ar bi t r ar y power by t he Pr esi dent .
Suppose a pol i t i cal par t y has opposed agai nst
t he appoi nt ment of a par t i cul ar r et i r ed Chi ef
J ust i ce, t hen t he quest i on wi l l ar i se about t he
appoi nt ment as per pr ovi so t o cl ause ( 3) of
Ar t i cl e 58C. I f t her e i s obj ect i on agai nst t he
sel ect i on of anot her r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ce who
r et i r ed next bef or e t he l ast Chi ef J ust i ce by
427
anot her pol i t i cal par t y t hen t he Pr esi dent has no
opt i on ot her t han t o exer ci se power t o appoi nt t he
Chi ef Advi ser f r om amongst t he r et i r ed J udges of
t he Appel l at e Di vi si on. I f si mi l ar obj ect i ons ar e
r ai sed by t he pol i t i cal par t i es i n r ot at i on
agai nst r et i r ed J udges of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on
t hen t her e woul d ar i se a deadl ock, chaos and
conf usi on i n t he pr ocess of sel ect i ng t he Chi ef
Advi ser .
Cl ause ( 5) of Ar t i cl e 58C has aut hor i zed t he
Pr esi dent under such event ual i t y t o appoi nt Chi ef
Advi ser f r om amongst t he ci t i zens of Bangl adesh
af t er consul t at i on wi t h maj or pol i t i cal par t i es.
I f no consensus i s r eached amongst t he maj or
pol i t i cal par t i es t o sel ect a ci t i zen f or t he j ob,
t he Pr esi dent woul d assume t he f unct i on of t he
Chi ef Advi ser under cl ause ( 6) of Ar t i cl e 58C. The
Pr esi dent i s el ect ed by t he member s of Par l i ament
of a pol i t i cal par t y whi ch commands t he suppor t of
t he maj or i t y and t her ef or e, t he Pr esi dent
pr act i cal l y bel ongs t o a par t i cul ar pol i t i cal
428
par t y. Thus apar t f r om ambi gui t y i n t he sel ect i on
pr ocess, t he pur pose f or whi ch t he syst emhas been
i nt r oduced wi l l be bound t o f r ust r at e i n such
event ual i t y. Thi s has happened i n t he pr ocess of
sel ect i ng t he Chi ef Advi ser of t he l ast Car e- t aker
Gover nment . The Pr esi dent wi t hout exhaust i ng t he
pr ocedur es pr ovi ded f or i n cl auses ( 4) and ( 5)
assumed t he of f i ce of Chi ef Advi ser under cl ause
( 6) but he f ai l ed t o cont i nue by r eason of hi s
par t i san act i vi t i es and ot her causes. Fur t her
mor e, i f t he Pr esi dent assumes hi msel f as t he
Chi ef Advi ser under t he amended scheme of t he
Const i t ut i on, t hi s wi l l be t ur ned i nt o a
Pr esi dent i al f or m of Gover nment . Such assumpt i on
of power wi l l be i n conf l i ct wi t h t he basi c
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, par t i cul ar l y t he
Pr eambl e and Ar t i cl es 48( 3) , 55, 56 and 58( 2) .
Ther e i s, t her ef or e, no gai n sayi ng t he f act t hat
t he syst em i nt r oduced by t he i mpugned amendment
can be t er med as hot ch- pot ch syst em and t he same
vi ol at es t he ent i r e scheme of t he Const i t ut i on.
429
Cool y i n hi s Tr eat i se on Const i t ut i onal
Li mi t at i ons says A constitution is the
fundamental law of a State, containing the
principles upon which the Government is founded,
regulating the division of the sovereign powers,
and directing to what persons each of these powers
is to be confined, and the manner in which it is
to be exercised. The f undament al pr i nci pl e
under l yi ng a wr i t t en Const i t ut i on i s t hat i t not
onl y speci f i es t he per sons or aut hor i t i es i n whom
t he sover ei gn power s of t he St at e ar e t o be vest ed
but al so l ays down f undament al r ul es f or t he
sel ect i on or appoi nt ment of such per sons or
aut hor i t i es and above al l f i xes t he l i mi t s of t he
exer ci se of t hose power s. Thus t he wr i t t en
Const i t ut i on i s t he sour ce f r om whi ch al l
gover nment al power emanat es and i t def i nes i t s
scope and ambi t so t hat each f unct i onar y shoul d
act wi t hi n hi s r espect i ve spher e. No power can,
t her ef or e, be cl ai med by any f unct i onar y whi ch i s
not t o be f ound wi t hi n t he f our cor ner s of t he
430
Const i t ut i on nor can anyone t r ansgr ess t he l i mi t s
t her ei n speci f i ed.
Though i t i s pr ovi ded i n Ar t i cl e 58D t hat the
Non-party Care-taker Government shall discharge
its functions as an interim Government and shall
carry on routine functions .... i n r eal i t y t he
l ast t wo car e- t aker Gover nment s t r ansact ed
busi ness l i ke el ect ed Gover nment s. I mmedi at e af t er
t aki ng oat h, Mr . J ust i ce Lat i f ur Rahman, t he Chi ef
Advi ser had changed al most t he ent i r e
admi ni st r at i on whi ch r ai sed quest i on as t o t he
modal i t y of such act i on. On quer y about
j ust i f i cat i on of such pr ompt st ep t aken by t he
Chi ef Advi ser at a t i me bef or e t he composi t i on of
t he Car e- t aker Gover nment as per Ar t i cl e 58C, Dr .
Kamal Hossai n, l ear ned Ami cus Cur i ae has dr awn our
at t ent i on t o a book wr i t t en by hi m under t he name
|<<|<< <<|<< || |< <| and submi t t ed t hat t he
st eps t aken wer e j ust i f i ed as woul d be evi dent
f r omhi s book. Thi s submi ssi on pr oved t hat J ust i ce
Lat i f ur Rahman t r ansact ed some af f ai r s of t he
431
Republ i c whi ch wer e out si de t he scope of Ar t i cl e
58D and t hat he had t r i ed t o j ust i f y hi s act i on by
wr i t i ng a book, t he r el evant por t i ons ext r act ed
t her ef r omar e as under :
Ze mi v B Avwg Avgvi gYvj qmn h mggYvj q Avgvi
Aaxb _vKe mme gYvj qi mwPe`i e`wj i Av`k Rvwi
Ki j vg| ( Page- 91)
c_gZt ZveavqK mi Kvi i cavb wnme Avgvi nvZ h m mgq
i qQZvi cwZwUgyZK i Zi mv_ KvR j vMvbvGes mj Avwg
wbR cPyi nvgI qvKKi B GmwQ| ( i bi d)
KvRB kc_ MnYi ci 8wUi Zc~YmwPe chvq i `e`j Kwi |
Avwg AvM_KB wni Ki wQj vg h, cavbgxi cmmwPe RvI qv`yj
Kwi gKI Avwg H i v B i `e`j Ki e, Kvi Y i Zc~Y c` Zwi Z i `e`j
Ki vi GKUvBwZevPK dj I ckvmbi Dci coe ej Avgvi AvM_K ai Yv
wQj | ( Page- 92)
`ycyi weGbwci Pqvi cvmb eMg Lvj `v wRqv I mf vcwZgj xi
m`me` Avgvi mv_ mvvr Ki b| wZwb c_gB 15 Ryj vB Avgvi kc_ MnY
Abyvb DcwnZ bv_vKvi Kvi Y wekl Y Ki b Ges cavb Dc`vnI qvq
AvgvK Awf b`b Rvbvb| eMg wRqvwKQywel q wekl f ve Avgvi weePbvi
RbD vcb Ki b | hgb, AvI qvgxj xMi 5 eQi kvmbvgj Zvu`i bZv
432
Kgx`i I ci h Abvq AZvPvi I wg_vgvgj vnqQZvi weei Y `b|
ZvQvovwZwb Zvui e e ej b h, my wbevPbi Rb AvBbkLj vi DbwZ,
Aea ADvi , wPwZ mvmx`i MdZvi , wbevPb Kwgkbvi mwdDi i ngvbi
Acmvi Y I ckvmb evcK i `e`j Ki Z ne| wZwb Avi I Awf gZ e
Ki b h, AvI qvgxj xMmi Kvi we`vqi c~egyZckvmbK `j xqKi Y Ki
evcK i `e`j Ki QGes Zv`i bZvKgx`i K Xvj vI f ve AvMqvi
j vBm c`vb Ki Q| GQvovI `k cPyi Aea AAvQmj vDvi Ki v
cqvRb| Gme wel q ZveavqK mi Kvi `p c`c bvwbj Ges BmyKZ
AMqvi j vBm evwZj bvKi j my wbevPb evnZ ne| Avwg Zvu`i e e
bj vg Ges G wel q `Le ej geKi j vg| eMg wRqvwekl f ve Zvui
gZ i vRbwZK D kcYvw`Z nq AvI qvgxj xMmi Kvi hme nqi vwbg~j K
gvgj vZvui `j i bZvKgx`i wei `vqi Ki Qmj vcZvnvi bvnj
Zvu`i c wbevPb Ki vme ne bvej Dj L Ki b| Avgvi mvgb Avi I
Dj L Ki b h, weGbwc I RvUmsMVbi bZvKgx`i GKGKRbi wei
50/60wUi ekxgvgj vgvK gvi qQ| Zvi vwbevPb AskMnY Ki e bvwK
cwZw`b KvUwMq gvgj vgv gvq nvwRi vw`e? kvBLyj nvw`m, dRj yj nK
Avwgbx, Qv `j bZvbvwmi w b wcUymn Avi vAbK bZvKgxi wei Gi Kg
e gvgj vAvQej Dj L Ki b| G mggvgj vchvj vPbvKi vi Rb
Abyi va Rvbvb| ( Pages- 106- 7)
433
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434
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|| |<| :<| -<|, |< ||- << <| << =<
:| ||< < <|< |< ||< <<
<<|< ||< | <|< |< | <<
<||< <<| '-< <<||< :<|<|< |< :| ||<
<|< ||<
:<, ||< <|<||< -, :--| ||< |< ::c , o|
||< (|< |-<) c: =< :| |<| ||< -:- <| | |<
< < || -| |< | | = < |< <<| <|<| <|<| | :<, |<
c || -| =< <||< || ||/|< ( Pages-
207- 8)
The above quot at i ons ar e sel f expl anat or y.
When t her e ar e l oophol es and ambi gui t i es i n t he
Const i t ut i on, t her e wi l l al ways be scope f or
abusi ng t he power by t he execut i ve t aki ng such
l oophol es as t he basi s f or exer ci si ng abusi ve
power . Thi s has been nakedl y exposed dur i ng t he
l ast Car e- t aker Gover nment . Thi s vi ol at i on wi l l
cont i nue so l ong t hi s syst em i nt r oduced by t he
i mpugned amendment wi l l r emai n i n t he
Const i t ut i on. Accor di ng t o Ar t i cl e 58D, t he Car e-
435
t aker Gover nment shal l car r y on t he r out i ne
f unct i ons with the aid and assistance of persons
in the services of the republic. The quest i on
woul d necessar i l y ar i se bef or e t he composi t i on of
t he Gover nment how t he Chi ef Advi ser t ook such
deci si on wi t hout t he assi st ance of t he per sons i n
t he ser vi ces of t he Republ i c? Af t er t he
Const i t ut i on of t he sai d Gover nment , i t
const i t ut ed a commi ssi on headed by a J udge of t he
Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on f or hol di ng i nqui r y and
submi t t i ng r epor t i n r espect of cases i nst i t ut ed
agai nst per sons on pol i t i cal consi der at i on. The
sai d commi ssi on submi t t ed r epor t and pur suant t o
such r epor t huge number of cases wer e wi t hdr awn
f r om t he pr osecut i on and many under t r i al
pr i soner s wer e r el eased f r om t he cust ody pr i or t o
t he Par l i ament ar y el ect i on. Thi s deci si on of t he
Gover nment was appar ent l y vi ol at i ve t o Ar t i cl e
58D, i nasmuch as, t her e i s speci f i c pr ohi bi t i on i n
t he f unct i oni ng of t he Gover nment t hat i t shal l
not make any pol i cy deci si on . As r egar ds t he l ast
436
Car e- t aker Gover nment , t her e i s no doubt t hat i t
had per f or med l i ke an aut hor i t ar i an r ul er f or mor e
t han t wo year s. These wer e possi bl e onl y because
t he syst em was i nt r oduced i n such a vague,
i ndef i ni t e and unconst i t ut i onal manner t hat t her e
i s ever y possi bi l i t y of t r ansact i ng t he busi ness
of t he Gover nment i n a Pr esi dent i al f or m of
Gover nment as exi st ed pr i or t o t he amendment of
t he Const i t ut i on by t he Const i t ut i on ( Twel f t h
Amendment ) Act , 1991.
We not i ced t hat t he l ast Pr esi dent assumed t he
of f i ce of t he Chi ef Advi ser wi t hout exhaust i ng t he
al t er nat i ve pr ovi si ons pr ovi ded i n t he pr ovi so t o
cl ause ( 3) , cl auses ( 4) and ( 5) of Ar t i cl e 58C.
What s mor e, Ar t i cl e 83 pr ovi des t hat no t ax shal l
be l evi ed or col l ect ed except by or under t he
aut hor i t y of an Act of Par l i ament and cl ause ( 1)
of Ar t i cl e 89 pr ovi des t hat So much of t he annual
f i nanci al st at ement s as r el at es t o expendi t ur e
char ged upon t he Consol i dat ed Fund may be
di scussed i n, but shal l not be submi t t ed t o t he
437
vot e of Par l i ament . We not i ced t hat t he l ast
Car e- t aker Gover nment passed budget s, spent money
out t he Consol i dat ed Fund and passed Money Bi l l s
whi ch r el at e t o i mposi t i on of t ax, bor r owi ng of
money, r ecei pt of moneys on account of t he
Consol i dat ed Fund or t he Publ i c Account of t he
Republ i c et c. wi t hout pl aci ng, di scussi ng and
passi ng i n t he Par l i ament . These wer e t r ansact ed
wi t hout sanct i on of t he pr ovi si ons of t he
Const i t ut i on. I t was possi bl e onl y because t he
Car e- t aker Gover nment i s not answer abl e t o t he
Par l i ament and t he peopl e. The quest i on of abuse
of t he pr ovi si ons of t he Const i t ut i on or t he
pr ovi si ons of t he i mpugned Act come onl y when t he
pr ovi si ons ar e cont r ar y t o t he exi st i ng pr ovi si ons
of t he Const i t ut i on. Under t he Par l i ament ar y
syst em i s i t possi bl e on t he par t of t he
Gover nment t o pass a Money Bi l l wi t hout pl aci ng i t
bef or e t he Par l i ament or i s i t possi bl e t o l evy
t ax or col l ect money except by or under t he
aut hor i t y of t he Act of Par l i ament ? The si mpl e
438
answer i s i n negat i ve. I f t hese act s, t hi ngs,
deeds and t r ansact i ons ar e not t aken due t o t he
f aul t of t he i mpugned amendment , t her e wi l l be
not hi ng on ear t h whi ch can be cal l ed as i l l egal or
unconst i t ut i onal ?
Accor di ng t o Di cey, under t he Br i t i sh
Const i t ut i on, r evenue once r ai sed by t axat i on was
i n t r ut h and i n r eal i t y a gr ant or gi f t by t he
Houses of Par l i ament t o t he Cr own. Such gr ant s as
wer e made t o Char l es t he Fi r st of J ames t he f i r st
wer e moni es t r ul y gi ven t o t he ki ng. He was, as a
mat t er of mor al dut y, bound, out of t he gr ant s
made t o hi m, as out of her edi t ar y r evenue, t o
def r ay t he expenses of t he Gover nment . . . . . . not a
penny of r evenue can be l egal l y expended except
under t he aut hor i t y of some Act of Par l i amnt .
( Page 202- 203 The Law of t he Const i t ut i on) .
Secondl y, t hi s has nakedl y f ocused t hat t hough t he
Par l i ament and t he cabi net ar e di ssol ved by r eason
of expi r at i on of i t s t er m, i t s r epr esent at i ve
char act er subsi st t i l l t he dat e on whi ch a new
439
Pr i me Mi ni st er ent er s upon of f i ce af t er t he
const i t ut i on of t he Par l i ament . Thi r dl y, t he
scheme of our Const i t ut i on does not af f or d t o r un
t he Gover nment wi t hout t he peopl es par t i ci pat i on-
i t has not r ecogni sed any syst em ot her t han t he
Par l i ament ar y f or mof Gover nment .
Ther e i s no doubt t hat t her e ar e
i nconsi st enci es bet ween Ar t i cl es 56( 4) and 58A
whi ch t end t o cl oud t he or der , l engt h and t he
manner of gover nance by t he Car e- t aker Gover nment
i nt r oduced by t he i mpugned amendment . Thi s
amendment pr ovi di ng f or Car e- t aker Gover nment i s
not onl y ul t r a vi r es t he democr at i c char act er but
al so t he scheme of t he Const i t ut i on. I n democr at i c
pol i t y af t er di ssol ut i on of Par l i ament t he
i ncumbent cabi net i s ent r ust ed wi t h t he r ol e of
i nt er i m Gover nment . Mi r za Hossai n Hai der , J . was
conf used wi t h t he concept of i nt er i m Gover nment
af t er t he di ssol ut i on of Par l i ament under t he
unamended scheme of t he Const i t ut i on and t he Non-
par t y car e- t aker Gover nment i nt r oduced by t he
440
i mpugned amendment . The Pr i me Mi ni st er does not
l ose her r epr esent at i ve char act er even af t er t he
di ssol ut i on of t he Par l i ament as i s evi dent f r om
cl ause ( 4) of Ar t i cl e 56, cl ause ( 3) of Ar t i cl e
57, and cl auses ( 3) , ( 4) and ( 5) of Ar t i cl e 72.
But under t he l at t er pr ovi si on, t he count r y i s
bei ng r un by a Gover nment whi ch i s not
Par l i ament ar y; r at her i t i s al most aki n t o t he
Pr esi dent i al f or m or a di ar chy syst em not
answer abl e t o t he peopl e.
What s mor e, as ar gued and conceded by al l
si des, democr acy i s one of t he basi c f eat ur es of
t he Const i t ut i on. Thi s democr acy means t he
Par l i ament ar y f or mof democr acy as wi l l be evi dent
f r om Chapt er I I , par t I V, of t he Const i t ut i on and
t hi s syst em has been r epl aced even f or a shor t er
per i od t o gover n t he count r y by per sons ot her t han
t he el ect ed r epr esent at i ves by t he i mpugned Act .
I f we r ead t he expr essi on democr acy used i n t he
pr eambl e and Ar t i cl es 8 and 11, wi t h cl auses ( 2)
and ( 3) of Ar t i cl e 48, cl auses ( 2) and ( 3) of
441
Ar t i cl e 55, cl auses ( 2) and ( 3) of Ar t i cl e 57 and
cl ause ( 4) of Ar t i cl e 58 i t wi l l appear t hat t he
execut i ve power of t he Gover nment wi l l be r un by a
Cabi net wi t h t he Pr i me Mi ni st er at i t s head. The
pr ovi si ons of Ar t i cl e 56( 4) and 57( 3) cl ear l y
i ndi cat e t hat t he r epr esent at i ve char act er of t he
Gover nment wi l l cont i nue as per scheme of t he
Const i t ut i on even af t er t he di ssol ut i on of t he
Par l i ament and t he Pr i me Mi ni st er shal l cont i nue
unt i l hi s successor ent er s upon of f i ce. Thus,
Ar t i cl es 58B and 58C vi ol at e Ar t i cl es 56( 4) and
57( 3) of t he Const i t ut i on. Si mi l ar l y cl ause ( 2) of
Ar t i cl e 58B i s i nconsi st ent wi t h cl ause ( 3) of
Ar t i cl e 48 and Ar t i cl e 55. The addi t i on of t he
wor ds and such l aw shal l , dur i ng t he per i od i n
whi ch t her e i s a Non- Par t y Car et aker Gover nment
under ar t i cl e 58B, be admi ni st er ed by t he
Pr esi dent i n Ar t i cl e 61 by t he amendment
cont r avenes Ar t i cl e 55 of t he Const i t ut i on.
As per unamended Ar t i cl e 61 of t he
Const i t ut i on, t he Supr eme command of def ence
442
ser vi ces shal l vest i n t he Pr esi dent and such
exer ci se of power shal l be r egul at ed by l aw. Af t er
amendment , dur i ng t he per i od of Car e- t aker
Gover nment , t he def ence ser vi ces be admi ni st er ed
by t he Pr esi dent , who shal l r et ai n t he por t f ol i o
of t he Mi ni st r y of Def ence. Ther ef or e, t he
Pr esi dent shal l exer ci se t he execut i ve power of
t he Republ i c whi ch i s bei ng exer ci sed by t he Pr i me
Mi ni st er under Ar t i cl e 55( 2) , al t hough i t i s sai d
i n cl ause ( 3) of Ar t i cl e 58B t hat t he Chi ef -
Advi ser shal l exer ci se t he execut i ve power i n
accor dance wi t h t he advi ce of t he Non- Par t y Car e-
Taker Gover nment whi ch i s not i n par i - mat er i a
wi t h Ar t i cl e 55( 2) i n vi ew of cl ause ( 2) of
Ar t i cl e 58B, whi ch pr ovi des t hat t he Car e- t aker
Gover nment shal l be col l ect i vel y r esponsi bl e t o
t he Pr esi dent . Under t he pr esent st r uct ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on t he Pr esi dent i s not i n t r ue sense i s
t he r epr esent at i ve of t he peopl e i n t he sense t he
Pr esi dent s of Uni t ed St at es of Amer i ca and Fr ance
ar e bei ng el ect ed by t he peopl e. He i s el ect ed by
443
t he member s of t he Par l i ament and t her ef or e he i s
not answer abl e t o t he peopl e and t he Par l i ament
f or hi s act s. Bef or e t he subst i t ut i on of Chapt er -
I , Par t - I V by t he Const i t ut i on ( Twel f t h Amendment )
Act , 1991 t he Pr esi dent was t he r epr esent at i ve of
t he peopl e. Ther ef or e he can not per f or m
exer ci se power t hat i s bei ng per f or med by t he
Pr i me Mi ni st er as per cl ause ( 2) of Ar t i cl e 55 as
per scheme of t he Const i t ut i on. What s mor e, under
t he Par l i ament ar y syst em t he cabi net shal l be
col l ect i vel y r esponsi bl e t o t he Par l i ament whi ch
i s r epl aced by t he Pr esi dent under t he amendment ,
t hat i s t o say, t he Car e- t aker Gover nment shal l
be col l ect i vel y r esponsi bl e t o t he Pr esi dent . The
Execut i ve exer ci ses i t s power on democr at i c
pr i nci pl es but t he amendment br i ngs t o a syst emof
aut hor i t ar i an r ul e. Thi s syst em has al so r ever t ed
t o a syst em whi ch f unct i oned pr i or t o t he
Const i t ut i on ( Twel f t h Amendment ) Act , 1991,
agai nst whi ch syst em al l pol i t i cal par t i es except
one st r uggl ed and unani mousl y br ought i nt o t he
444
change i n t he Par l i ament ar y syst em by a
const i t ut i onal amendment .
The Br i t i sh Const i t ut i on i s an unwr i t t en
Const i t ut i on, and i t i s based on t he doct r i ne of
t he supr emacy of t he Br i t i sh Par l i ament . I t s mai n
f eat ur e was a cabi net f or m of r epr esent at i ve
Gover nment wi t h a Monar ch as i t s const i t ut i onal
head. That f or m had been adapt ed by t he Br i t i sh
Par l i ament i n enact i ng t he f eder al const i t ut i ons
of Canada and Aust r al i a, and had been adopt ed i n a
modi f i ed f or m f or t he f eder al Gover nment of I ndi a
envi saged i n t he Gover nment of I ndi a Act , 1935.
Thi s Di vi si on has hel d t hat our Const i t ut i on i s
based on t he West mi ni st er model of Cabi net
Gover nment , i ncor por at i ng most of i t s
char act er i st i c f eat ur es. So i s t he opi ni on of t he
Supr eme Cour t of I ndi a i n r espect of i t s f eat ur es.
The gr adual i nt r oduct i on of r epr esent at i ve
Gover nment had f i nal i zed i n Br i t i sh I ndi a wi t h t he
wor ki ng of t he Cabi net f or m of r epr esent at i ve
Gover nment . And t he st udy of , and admi r at i on f or ,
445
t he const i t ut i onal hi st or y of Engl and made t he
Br i t i sh f or m of Gover nment , adapt ed t o a
r epr esent at i ve char act er Const i t ut i on, appear t o
be t he most appr opr i at e f or m of Gover nment under
our Const i t ut i on. Thi s f or m of Gover nment has
demanded hi gh st andar ds of char act er and conduct
f r om t he member s of Par l i ament , t he j udi ci ar y and
t he ci vi l ser vi ce. Our f oundi ng f at her s bel i eved
t hat t hose hi gh st andar ds of char act er and conduct
woul d be mai nt ai ned under our Const i t ut i on. Thi s
was t he r esul t of t he cour se whi ch pol i t i cal and
economi c st r uggl e had t aken bef or e t he
i ndependence of t he count r y.
I t wi l l not be out of pl ace t o ment i on her e
t hat t hough t he Const i t uent Assembl y had t he l egal
power t o enact t he Const i t ut i on, t he pr eambl e of
our const i t ut i on, f ol l owi ng t he Amer i can exampl e.
Ther e i s no gai nsayi ng t he f act t hat our
Const i t ut i on embodi es Par l i ament ar y cabi net syst em
of Gover nment on t he Br i t i sh model and t hat t he
Pr esi dent cor r esponds t o t hat of t he sover ei gn i n
446
t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom who i s t he f or mal head of t he
Gover nment and must act on t he advi ce of t he
cabi net . The l egi sl at i ve pr ocedur e i n r espect of
f i nance, t he pr ovi si on f or a Consol i dat ed Fund,
t he secur i t y and t he super vi si on of t he st at e and
st at e publ i c account s by an i ndependent
Compt r ol l er and Audi t or Gener al , al l f ol l ow t he
Br i t i sh model . The cour t must gat her t he spi r i t of
t he Const i t ut i on f r om t he l anguage used, and what
one may bel i eve t o be spi r i t of t he Const i t ut i on
cannot pr evai l i f not suppor t ed by t he l anguage,
whi ch t her ef or e must be const r ued accor di ng t o t he
wel l - est abl i shed r ul es of i nt er pr et at i on
uni nf l uenced by an assumed spi r i t of t he
Const i t ut i on. ( Keshavan Madhava Menon V. Bone
( 1951) SCR 228)
Thi s new syst emi nt r oduced by t he amendment i s
not t he sol ut i on f or hol di ng and conduct i ng f r ee
and f ai r Par l i ament ar y el ect i ons whi ch wi l l be
appar ent f r om t he pr ocess of sel ect i ng t he Chi ef
Advi ser f or t he l ast Par l i ament ar y el ect i on. The
447
syst em i s vague, i ndef i ni t e and f aul t y f or whi ch
t he nat i on has swal l owed an aut hor i t ar i an r egi me
whi ch r ul ed t he count r y f or mor e t han t wo year s on
t he pl ea of combat i ng cor r upt i on and pol i t i cal
r ef or ms whi ch was not t he obj ect f or br i ngi ng t he
syst em. I n f act a despot i c Gover nment r ul ed t he
count r y. Ther e i s no guar ant ee t o r ecur t he
si mi l ar nat ur e of Gover nment i n each and ever y
occasi on af t er t he Par l i ament woul d be di ssol ved
so l ong t hi s syst em subsi st s. No nat i on enshr i nes
a syst em whi ch i s sel f conf l i ct i ng, undemocr at i c
and di ar chy i n a soci al document l i ke t he
Const i t ut i on. The syst em was t aken i ni t i al l y as a
t est case as ar gued by t he l ear ned J udges but as a
mat t er of f act , t her e i s not hi ng i n t he amendment
t o suggest t hat t he syst emwoul d r un f or a l i mi t ed
per i od. The syst em f ai l ed t o sat i sf y t he much
desi r ed goal and t hi s i s t he r i ght t i me t o bur r y
i t up f i nal l y f or t he sake of democr acy.
I t i s ar gued by Mr . Far ooqui t hat t he i mpugned
amendment not onl y damaged t he Republ i can and
448
Democr at i c char act er of t he Const i t ut i on but
al so changed t he democr at i c spi r i t of t he
Gover nment . Mr . Mahmudul I sl am, on t he ot her hand,
cont ended t hat when t he head of t he st at e i s a
her edi t ar y monar ch, i t i s cal l ed monar chy, t hough
t he monar ch may not be sover ei gn, but t i t ul ar ,
when t he head of t he st at e i s el ect ed by t he
peopl e, t he st at e i s cal l ed Republ i c and t he
Const i t ut i on i s sai d t o have pr ovi ded a Republ i can
Gover nment . I t i s f ur t her cont ended t hat Ar t i cl e
48( 1) havi ng pr ovi ded t hat t he Pr esi dent wi l l be
t he head of t he st at e t o be el ect ed by t he peopl es
r epr esent at i ves, t he Thi r t eent h Amendment has
not i nt r oduced any pr ovi si on whi ch can be sai d t o
have al t er ed Ar t i cl e 48( 1) i n any manner .
Democr acy bei ng a vague t er m and i t s connot at i on
var i es f r omper son t o per sons, t hough t he i mpugned
amendment suspends r epr esent at i ve Gover nment f or a
shor t i nt er r egnum, i t ensur es oper at i on of
democr acy i n t he count r y and democr acy has t o be
449
suspended f or a l i t t l e whi l e f or ul t i mat e sur vi val
of democr acy, i t i s f i nal l y ar gued.
I t seems t o me i nconsi st ency i n t he ar gument s
of t he l ear ned ami ci cur i ae. The Republ i can and
Democr at i c f or m of Gover nment i s di scer ni bl e f r om
t he hi st or i cal backgr ound, t he pr eambl e and
Ar t i cl es 11, 142 and Par t I V of t he Const i t ut i on.
I t may be r emember ed t hat t he sour ce of power and
t he power gr ant ed by t he Const i t ut i on f or a
speci f i c pur pose i s t he Const i t ut i on, t he hi ghest
l aw of t he count r y. Mr . Mahmudul I sl am has
conf used t he poi nt i n i ssue by submi t t i ng t hat t he
i mpugned amendment has not i nt r oduced any
pr ovi si on whi ch can be sai d t o have al t er ed t he
manner of el ect i on of t he Pr esi dent . I f we r ead
t he Const i t ut i on as a whol e, t her e i s no r oom f or
doubt t hat i t pr of esses t o be Democr at i c and
Republ i can i n char act er whi ch has been di smant l ed
by t he Thi r t eent h Amendment by maki ng det ai l ed
pr ovi si on f or r unni ng t he Gover nment si mi l ar t o
t he Pr esi dent i al f or mdur i ng t he shor t i nt er r egnum
450
af t er t he Par l i ament i s di ssol ved. The Car e- t aker
Gover nment as per Ar t i cl e 58B( 2) shal l be
col l ect i vel y r esponsi bl e t o t he Pr esi dent . Mr .
Mahmudul I sl amhi msel f conceded t hat t he democr acy
has been suspended f or a shor t per i od by t he
i mpugned amendment . Mr . T. H. Khan ar gued t hat t he
poi nt i n di sput e i s a pol i t i cal i ssue whi ch can
onl y be r esol ved i n t he Par l i ament . On t he
quest i on of pol i t i cal i ssue I have di scussed
ear l i er and I f ul l y agr ee wi t h t he l ear ned Ami cus
Cur i ae t hat Cour t s shoul d not adj udi cat e upon or
t o i nt er f er e wi t h pol i t i cal i ssues. But by t he same
t i me i t must be r emember ed t hat t hi s Cour t bei ng t he
guar di an of t he Const i t ut i on, i t has t he
r esponsi bi l i t y t o see t hat t he Const i t ut i on i s not
vi ol at ed f r om any cor ner . I f t he Cour t f i nds t hat t he
Const i t ut i on i s vi ol at ed i t shal l st r uck down t o t he
ext ent of t he i nconsi st ency. Thi s has been done
pr evi ousl y al so.
I t i s emphat i cal l y ar gued by Dr . Kamal Hossai n
t hat i n t he i nt er est of democr acy, t hi s amendment
451
has been made, and t he democr acy has a cor e val ue
and i t shoul d not be i nt er pr et ed i n a si mpl i st i c
manner . I n t hi s connect i on Dr . Hossai n has dr awn
our at t ent i on t o t he Magur a by- el ect i on epi sode
hel d i n 1996. Dr . Hossai n cont ended t hat af t er
t hi s by- el ect i on peopl e l ost conf i dence i n
democr acy. I f i nd no f or ce i n t he cont ent i on of
Dr . Hossai n f or , even af t er i nt r oduct i on of t he
syst em al l par l i ament ar y bye- el ect i ons wi l l be
hel d under t he pol i t i cal par t y i n power . Then al l
t hese el ect i ons wi l l be r i gged but i n r eal i t y al l
bye- el ect i ons under t he pol i t i cal par t i es i n power
ar e bei ng hel d and accept ed by t he peopl e at l ar ge
f ai r l y and peacef ul l y wi t h t he except i on of one or
t wo as poi nt ed out .
Whi l e endor si ng t he vi ews of Dr . Hossai n, Mr .
Mahmudul I sl am added t hat t he expr essi on
' democr acy' i s a ver y vague and el ast i c t er m and
i t s connot at i on var i es f r om per sons t o per sons.
Mr . I sl am goes on sayi ng t hat even Russi a cl ai ms
i t sel f t o be t he t r ue democr acy but i n r eal i t y
452
aut hor i t ar i an r ul e i s bei ng pr act i sed. I n
el abor at i ng hi s ar gument , Mr . I sl am has expl ai ned
t he democr at i c char act er of a st at e. I t i s sai d,
wi t h t he pr esent si ze of even t he smal l est st at e
does not per mi t di r ect par t i ci pat i on of t he peopl e
i n t he gover nance of t he st at e and i t has been
r epl aced by t he par t i ci pat i on of t he peopl e
t hr ough t hei r el ect ed r epr esent at i ves. I t i s
cont ended, Ar t i cl es 7 and 11 cl ear l y i ndi cat e t hat
t he Const i t ut i on cont empl at es r epr esent at i ve
Gover nment , t hat i s, r ul e of t he peopl e t hr ough
t hei r el ect i ve r epr esent at i ves. Democr acy has i t s
own def i ci enci es- i t car r i es wi t hi n i t t he seed of
i t s own dest r uct i on. I n t hi s connect i on Mr . I sl am
ar gues, emer gence of Hi t l er oper at i ng wi t hi n t he
r egi me of t he t hi r d Republ i c of Ger many of f er s t he
best exampl e.
I t i s f ur t her cont ended, Par et o, Mi t chel and
Mosca, t he t hr ee not abl e pol i t i cal phi l osopher s of
I t al i br ut al l y exposed t he def i ci ency of democr acy
whi ch l ed t o t he emer gence of f asci sm i n I t al i .
453
Accor di ng t o t he l ear ned counsel , dest r uct i on of
democr acy was goi ng t o t ake pl ace i n our count r y.
Democr acy t hr ough t he r epr esent at i ves of t he
peopl e i s possi bl e when t her e i s f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on. Magura by-election which offered the
example of worst form of rigging. All parties
other than party in power protested and took to
the street. There was serious erosion in the law
and order situation. Public works came to a stand
still. 'Parliament's tenure came to an end and an
election without participation of the major
political parties except BNP took place l ear ned
counsel ar gued. I f ai l t o under st and why he has
ci t ed t hose exampl es whi ch can not be t he basi s
f or changi ng one of t he basi c f eat ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on? Except t he Magur a epi sode, whi ch was
a del i ber at e act of a pol i t i cal par t y i n power as
submi t t ed, t he ot her exampl es exposed t he
char act or of aut hor i t ar i ans who r ul ed di f f er ent
count r i es of t he gl obe i n t he name of democr acy.
454
I t i s emphat i cal l y ar gued by Mr . Mahmudul
I sl am t hat i f t he i mpugned amendment i s decl ar ed
unconst i t ut i onal , one maj or pol i t i cal par t y wi l l
not par t i ci pat e i n t he next par l i ament ar y
el ect i on. Mr . I sl am i n hi s wr i t t en ar gument al so
expr essed hi s anxi et y and submi t t ed wi t h
ci r cuml ocut i on t hat f or t he i nt er est of democr acy
t he syst em i nt r oduced by t he amendment shoul d be
r et ai ned. Mr . Raf i que- ul - Haque echoed t he above
vi ew. These candour submi ssi ons nakedl y exposed
t he mot i ve behi nd t he def endi ng t he amendment even
at t he cost of di sgr aci ng a soci al document l i ke
t he Const i t ut i on. The l ear ned Ami ci wer e
suppor t i ng t he amendment f or accommodat i ng a
par t i cul ar pol i t i cal par t y t o par t i ci pat e i n t he
next Par l i ament ar y el ect i on. These submi ssi ons
suggest t hat t hough t hi s amendment conf l i ct s wi t h
t he basi c f eat ur es of t he Const i t ut i on i t shoul d
be r et ai ned f or t hat pur pose. Thi s i s compl et el y a
pol i t i cal i ssue. Mr . T. H. Khan al so ar gued t hat
t hi s i s t ot al l y a pol i t i cal i ssue whi ch shoul d be
455
r esol ved by t he Par l i ament al one and not by t he
Cour t . Mr . T. H. Khan i n cour se of hi s ar gument
al so submi t t ed t hat t he i ssue i nvol ved i n t he
appeal i s compl et el y a pol i t i cal i ssue whi ch
shoul d not be deci ded by t hi s Di vi si on and i t can
onl y be deci ded by t he Par l i ament .
J udges wi l l or di nar i l y f i nd t hat t he l aw i s
f i ne as i t i s. But when t hey f i nd t hat i t i s not ,
t he l aw i nt ends f or t hemt o do somet hi ng about i t .
The J udges must appl y t hei r r eason and exper i ence
i n t he at t empt t o achi eve j ust i ce. That i s t hei r
r ol e and t hei r r esponsi bi l i t y t o t he l aw, t o t he
j udi ci al i nst i t ut i on, t o t he publ i c and t o t he
l i t i gant s. I f l aw i s vi ol at ed, t he Cour t s ar e set
t hi ngs r i ght and t hi s i s al ways t he case. Dur i ng
t he second wor l d war when Engl and was i nvol ved i n
war , Lor d At ki n whi l e di sposi ng of a habeas cor pus
pet i t i on ar gued t hat l aw speaks t he same l anguage
dur i ng t he t i me of war as i n peace . J udi ci al
r evi ew i s i nt ended t o keep t he publ i c body wi t hi n
l i mi t s of i t s aut hor i t y. Thi s power i s exer ci sed
456
t o r ei n i n any unbr i dl ed execut i ve act i on. Thi s i s
t he basi c f eat ur e of t he Const i t ut i on.
I n t he connect i on I woul d l i ke t o r epr oduce
t he obser vat i ons of Si r J ohn Lat ham, C. J . , ( 1951)
83 CLR page 148 as under :
I am aware that it is sometimes said
that legal questions before the High
Court should be determined upon
sociological grounds political,
economic or social. I can understand
Courts being directed (as in Russia and
in Germany in recent years) to determine
questions in accordance with the
interests of a particular political
party. There the Court is provided with
at least a political standard. But such a
proposition as, for example, that the
recent Banking case (1948) 76 C.L.R.I.)
should have been determined upon
political grounds and that of Court was
wrong in adopting an attitude of
457
detachment from all political
considerations appears to me merely to
ask the Court to vote again upon an issue
upon which parliament had already voted
or could be asked to vote, and to
determine whether the nationalisation of
banks would be a good thing or bad thing
for the community. In my opinion the
Court has no concern whatever with any
such question. In the present case the
decision of the Court should be the same
whether the members of the Court believe
in communism or do not believe in
communism?
A. T. M. Af zal , J . i n Anwar Hossai n Chowdhur y
obser ved In answering the ultimate question
involved in these cases i.e. scope of the
Parliaments power of amendment of the
Constitution, the Courts only function is to
examine dispassionately the terms of the
Constitution and the law without involving itself
458
in any way with all that I have indicated above.
Neither politics, nor policy of the government nor
personalities have any relevance for examining the
power of the Parliament under the Constitution
which has to be done purely upon an interpretation
of the provisions of the Constitution with the
help of legal tools. I f ul l y agr ee wi t h t he above
obser vat i on. The Cour t exer ci ses i t s power of
r est r ai nt i n r el at i on t o i nt er f er ence of pol i t i cal
i ssues. The r ol e of t he Cour t s i n a democr acy,
car r i es hi gh r i sks f or t he J udges and f or t he
publ i c. Cour t s may i nt er f er e i n advi sedl y i n
publ i c admi ni st r at i on. A di st i nct i on shoul d be
dr awn bet ween ar eas wher e t he subj ect - mat t er l i es
wi t hi n t he exper t i se of t he Cour t s and t hose whi ch
wer e mor e appr opr i at e f or deci si on by
democr at i cal l y el ect ed and account abl e bodi es.
Cour t s shoul d not st ep out si de t he ar ea of t hei r
i nst i t ut i onal compet ence. The exer ci se of
pol i t i cal power i s not wi t hi n t he pr ovi nce of t he
j udi ci al depar t ment .
459
Mi r za Hossai n Hai der , J . al so poi nt i ng f i nger s
at Magur a by- el ect i on obser ved t hat af t er t he
r i gged by- el ect i on, i t s af t er mat h f ol l owed by mass
r esi gnat i on of al l opposi t i on par t y member s of t he
Fi f t h Par l i ament and t he boycot t of t he Si xt h
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on t hat pr oved t hat f r ee and
f ai r el ect i on cannot be hel d under t he super vi si on
of t he r ul i ng par t y. Accor di ngl y, al l pol i t i cal
par t i es came f or war d wi t h t he sol ut i on f or
over comi ng t he same t hr ough t he Const i t ut i onal
pr ocess of Non- par t y car e- t aker Gover nment .
Lear ned J udges of t he Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on di d
not di sput e t hat t he El ect i on Commi ssi on i s not
i ndependent r at her obser ved t hat t he Commi ssi on i s
suf f i ci ent l y st r ong and i ndependent i n mat t er s of
i t s oper at i on and deci si on maki ng. That bei ng t he
admi t t ed posi t i on, why t hen t he by- el ect i on of
Magur a per cei ved gener al l y as r i gged, and why t he
r esul t of Si xt h gener al Par l i ament ar y el ect i on
wi t hout par t i ci pat i on by t he peopl e of t he count r y
was decl ar ed by t he El ect i on Commi ssi on? The Hi gh
460
Cour t Di vi si on di d not at al l adver t i t s at t ent i on
i n t hat r egar d. The answer t o t hese quest i ons i s
t hat t he per sons const i t ut i ng t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on wer e not i ndependent t hey wer e
par t i san. They f ai l ed t o per f or m t hei r
Const i t ut i onal obl i gat i ons. I t i s because of l ack
of t r anspar ency i n t he sel ect i on pr ocess of t he
member s of Commi ssi on. The i ndependence of
El ect i on Commi ssi on i n t he ul t i mat e anal ysi s
depends upon t he qual i t y of per sons who man t he
Commi ssi on. Ther e ar e al l egat i ons agai nst t he
Execut i ve i n sel ect i ng t he Commi ssi on Member s. I f
t he sel ect i on pr ocess i s t r anspar ent and neut r al
per sons ar e appoi nt ed, t he el ect i on wi l l be hel d
f r ee and f ai r even under a pol i t i cal Gover nment .
Ther e i s no di sput e t hat democr acy st ands f or
t he act ual , act i ve and ef f ect i ve exer ci se of power
by t he peopl e. Accor di ng t o Schumpet er , democr acy
i s ' t he abi l i t y of a peopl e t o choose and di smi ss
a Gover nment ' . Gi ovanni Sar t or i echoed t he i dea
st at i ng t hat democr acy i s a mul t i - par t y syst em i n
461
whi ch t he maj or i t y gover ns and r espect s t he r i ght
of mi nor i t y. Our democr acy i s si mi l ar t o t he above
t heor i es. I f we l ook t owar ds t he gl obe, we f i nd
si mi l ar t o our s, par t i cul ar l y i n Canada, Aust r al i a
and I ndi a. Ther e ar e, however , di ssi mi l ar i t y i n
many r espect s. Ar undhat i Ray, a wr i t er and
col umni st i n an ar t i cl e Democr acy debased wr ot e,
Democracy the modern worlds holy cow, is in
crisis. And this crisis is a profound one. Every
kind of outrage is being committed in the name of
democracy. It has become little more than a hollow
word, a pretty shell, emptied of all content or
meaning. It can be whatever you count it to be.
Democracy is the Free worlds whore willing to
dress up dress down, willing to satisfy a whole
range of taste, available to be used and abused at
will. In countries of the first world, too, the
machinery of democracy has been effectively
subverted. Politicians, media barons, Judges,
powerful corporate lobbies, and government
officials are imbricated in an elaborate underhand
462
configuration that completely undermines the
lateral arrangement of checks and balances between
the constitution, courts of law, parliament, the
administration and perhaps most important all, the
independent media that forms the structural basis
of a parliamentary democracy. Increasingly, the
implication is neither subtle nor elaborate.
Ther ef or e, t he bat t l e t o r ecl ai m democr acy i s
goi ng t o be di f f i cul t one.
I n R. C. Poudyal V. Uni on of I ndi a, AI R 1993
S. C. 1804, whi l e di scussi ng on democr acy i n t he
cont ext of I ndi an Const i t ut i on, i t has been
ar gued, t he unal t er abl e f undament al commi t ment s
i ncor por at ed i n a wr i t t en Const i t ut i on ar e l i ke
t he soul of a per son not amenabl e t o a
subst i t ut i on by t r anspl ant or ot her wi se. And f or
i dent i f yi ng what t hey ar e wi t h r ef er ence t o a
par t i cul ar Const i t ut i on, i t i s necessar y t o
consi der , besi des ot her f act or s, t he hi st or i cal
backgr ound i n whi ch t he Const i t ut i on has been
f r amed, t he f i r m basi c commi t ment s of t he peopl e
463
ar t i cul at ed i n t he cour se of and by t he cont ent s
of t hei r st r uggl e and sacr i f i ce pr ecedi ng i t , t he
t hought pr ocess and t r adi t i onal bel i ef s as al so
t he soci al i l l s i nt ended t o be t aken car e of .
These di f f er f r om count r y t o count r y. The
f undament al phi l osophy, t her ef or e, var i es f r om
Const i t ut i on t o Const i t ut i on.
I t i s f ur t her st at ed, a Const i t ut i on has i t s
own per sonal i t y and as i n t he case of a human
bei ng, i t s basi c f eat ur es can not be def i ned i n
t he t er ms of anot her Const i t ut i on. The expr essi on
' Democr acy' and ' Republ i c' have conveyed not
exact l y t he same i deas t hr ough out t he wor l d, and
l i t t l e hel p can be obt ai ned by r ef er r i ng t o
anot her Const i t ut i on f or det er mi ni ng t he meani ng
and scope of t he sai d expr essi ons wi t h r ef er ence
t o t he Const i t ut i on. When we under t ake t he t ask of
sel f - appr ai sal , we can not af f or d t o f or get our
mot t o of t he ent i r e wor l d bei ng one bi g f ami l y and
consequent commi t ment t o t he cause of uni t y whi ch
made t he peopl e suf f er deat h, dest r uct i on and
464
devast at i on on an unpr ecedent ed scal e f or
r epl aci ng t he f or ei gn r ul e by a democr at i c
Gover nment on t he basi s of equal st at us f or al l .
The f act t hat t hey l ost i n t hei r ef f or t f or a
uni t ed i ndependent count r y i s not r el evant i n t he
pr esent cont ext , because t hat di d not shake t hei r
f ai t h i n democr acy wher e ever y per son i s t o be
t r eat ed equal , and wi t h t hi s f i r m r esol ve, t hey
pr oceeded t o make t he Const i t ut i on. An
examination of the provisions of the Constitution
does not leave room for any doubt that this idea
has been kept as the guiding factor while framing
the Constitution. 'Democracy' and 'republic' have
to be understood accordingly" i t has been f i nal l y
concl uded.
I n my opi ni on, t he above ar gument s ar e mor e
appl i cabl e i n t he cont ext of t he hi st or i cal
backgr ound f or achi evi ng our i ndependence. We
f ought t went y f our year s f or democr acy and agai nst
economi c expl oi t at i on by Paki st ani despot i c
r ul er s, and ul t i mat el y we got i ndependence at such
465
cost whi ch no nat i on coul d sacr i f i ce i n t he manner
we had sacr i f i ced. On t he ni ght of 25t h Mar ch,
1971 t he most vi ol ent and br ut al act of pol i t i cal
r epr essi on i n Sout h Asi an hi st or y t ook pl ace.
Tanks and ar mor ed per sonnel car r yi ng t he Paki st an
Ar my r umbl ed t hr ough Dhaka. I t was r emember ed as
' Kal Rat r i ' and on t he f i r st ni ght al one t housands
wer e ki l l ed i n t he i ndi scr i mi nat e f i r i ng and
shel l i ng. I t was a bar bar i c at t ack on t he unar med
ci vi l i ans.
The qual i t y of democr acy has been expl ai ned i n
t he pr eambl e whi ch does not onl y secur e t he
equal i t y of oppor t uni t y but t he st at us of al l t he
ci t i zens- t hi s equal i t y pr i nci pl e i s cl ear l y
envi saged i n par t s I I and I I I of t he Const i t ut i on.
Par l i ament ar y democr acy envi sages ( a) t he
r epr esent at i on of t he peopl e, ( b) t he
r esponsi bi l i t y of t he Gover nment and ( c) t he
account abi l i t y of t he Cabi net t o t he Par l i ament
under Ar t i cl e 55( 3) . Thi s i s t he di r ect l i ne of
aut hor i t y f r om t he peopl e t hr ough t he Par l i ament
466
t o t he Execut i ve Gover nment . The f unct i oni ng of
democr acy depends upon t he st r engt h and
i ndependence of each of i t s or gans. Legi sl at ur e
and Execut i ve, t he t wo f acet s of peopl e s wi l l ,
have al l t he power s i ncl udi ng t hat of f i nance. I t
i s apt t o obser ve her e t hat i t i s a shame f or t he
nat i on t hat a pol i t i cal par t y whi ch can r un t he
Gover nment f or f i ve year s wi l l not al l ow a
Const i t ut i onal or gan of t he st at e t o conduct t he
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on i n accor dance wi t h l aw. I t
i s al so a di sgr acef ul f or such a pol i t i cal par t y
whi ch st and i n t he way i n hol di ng a f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on i n t he count r y. No sel f - r espect nat i on
can even i magi ne t hat such pol i t i cal par t y i n
power whi ch wi l l r un t he Gover nment f or f i ve year s
wi l l not be abl e t o pr esent a f r ee and f ai r
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on. I f i t does not al l ow t o
hol d a f ai r el ect i on i t has no mor al r i ght t o r un
a pol i t i cal Gover nment i n t he count r y.
I t i s st at ed by Dr . A. S. Anand, CJ . i n S. R.
Chandhur i V. St at e of Punj ab, AI R 2001 S. C. 2707
467
" The character and content of Parliamentary
democracy in the ultimate analysis depends upon
the quality of persons who man the Legislature as
representative of the people. It is said
elections are the barometer of democracy and the
contestants the lifeline of the Parliamentary
system and its set up" . The ver y concept of
r esponsi bl e Gover nment and r epr esent at i ve
democr acy si gni f i es t he Gover nment by t he peopl e,
f or t he peopl e, and of t he peopl e. The sover ei gn
power whi ch enj oi ns t he peopl e i s exer ci sed on
t hei r behal f by t he r epr esent at i ves. I n a
Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment , t he sover ei gnt y
r emai ns wi t h t he peopl e, who del egat e t hi s
aut hor i t y t hr ough t hei r r epr esent at i ves, t he
member s of Par l i ament , who r et ai n r epr esent at i ve
char act er unt i l t he Par l i ament i s di ssol ved. The
sour ce of power has been cl ear l y i ndi cat ed by
expr essi ng t he wor ds i n t he openi ng of t he
pr eambl e ' we t he peopl e of Bangl adesh' . Thus, t he
wi l l of t he peopl e cannot be subj ugat ed, af f r ont ed
468
or subor di nat ed t o a per son who i s not peopl e s
r epr esent at i ve.
The ent i r e scheme of our Const i t ut i on i s such
t hat i t ensur es t he sover ei gnt y and i nt egr i t y of
t he count r y as a Republ i c and t he democr at i c way
of l i f e by Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment . I n
P. V. Nar asi mha Rao V. St at e ( 1998) 4 SCC 626, i t
has been obser ved Parliamentary democracy is part
of basic structure of the Constitution. It is
settled law that in interpreting the
Constitutional provision the Court should adopt a
construction which strengthens the foundational
feature of the Constitution" . I n Kul di p Nayar V.
Uni on of I ndi a, AI R 2006 3127, t he vi ews expr essed
i n P. V. Nar asi mha Rao' s case wer e r epr oduced as
under :
" As mentioned earlier, the object of
immunity conferred under Article 105(2)
is to ensure the independence of
individual legislators. Such independence
is necessary for healthy functioning of
469
the system of Parliamentary functioning
of the system of Parliamentary democracy
adopted in Constitution. Parliamentary
democracy is a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution" .
I n democr acy al l per sons headi ng publ i c bodi es
can cont i nue pr ovi ded t hey enj oy t he conf i dence of
t he per sons who compr i se such bodi es. Thi s i s t he
essence of democr at i c r epubl i cani sm. I n Bhanumat i
V. St at e of Ut t ar Pr adesh ( 2010) 12 SCC 1, i t has
been ar gued:
" Any head of a democratic institution
must be prepared to face the test of
confidence. Neither the democratically
elected Prime Minister of the country nor
the Chief Minister of a State is immune
from such test of confidence under the
Rules of procedure framed under Articles
118 and 208 of the Constitution
(corresponding to Article 75 of our
Constitution). Both the Prime Minister of
470
India and Chief Ministers of several
States heading the council of Ministers
at the centre and several states
respectively have to adhere to the
principles of collective responsibilities
to the respective houses in accordance
with Articles 75(3) and 164(2) of the
Constitution" .
I n Kesavananda Bhar at i ( AI R 1973 SC 1467) ,
Si kr i , CJ . expr essed t he vi ew t hat ' Republ i can and
democr at i c' f or m of Gover nment i s one of t he
f eat ur es const i t ut i ng t he basi c st r uct ur e of t he
Gover nment . J agamohan Reddy, J . i n t he same case
expr essed t hat t he edi f i ce of I ndi an Const i t ut i on
i s bui l t upon and st ands on sever al pops whi ch, i f
r emoved woul d r esul t i n t he Const i t ut i on
col l apsi ng and whi ch i ncl ude t he pr i nci pl e of
' Sover ei gn Democr at i c Republ i c' and ' Par l i ament ar y
democr acy' a pol i t y whi ch i s based on a
' r epr esent at i ve syst em' .
471
I n Uni on of I ndi a V. Associ at i on f or
Democr at i c Ref or ms ( 2002) 5 SCC 244, t he Supr eme
Cour t of I ndi a r ei t er at ed t he ear l i er vi ews
obser vi ng:
" (a) One of the basic structures of our
Constitution is 'republican and
democratic form of Government; (b) the
election to the House of the people and
the Legislative Assembly is on the basis
of adult suffrage, that is to say, every
person who is citizen of India and who is
not less than 18 years of age on such
date as may be fixed in that behalf by or
under any law made by the appropriate
legislature and is not otherwise
disqualified under the Constitution
....".
I f we t r ul y want t o pr esent a f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on t o t he nat i on, we have t o see f i r st t he
per son or i nst i t ut i on whi ch i s r eposed wi t h such
t ask, and secondl y t he per son hol di ng t he
472
Execut i ve power of t he Republ i c i s account abl e t o
t he peopl e ot her wi se one day we wi l l f i nd t hat t he
Republ i c i s i n t he hands of an aut hor i t ar i an
agai nst whom we f ought many a t i mes f or t he
peopl e s f r eedom, equal i t y, j ust i ce and democr acy.
I f we l ook t owar ds t he gl obe, we f i nd t hat
di f f er ent democr at i c count r i es have made
pr ovi si ons pr escr i bi ng t he l aws and f or ums f or
hol di ng f r ee and f ar e el ect i on. I n Uni t ed Ki ngdom
wher e a Par l i ament ar y el ect i on pet i t i on i s t r i ed
by t wo J udges on t he r ot a i n accor dance wi t h t he
Repr esent at i on of t he Peopl e Act , 1949. Sect i on 5
of Ar t i cl e 1 of t he U. S. Const i t ut i on pr ovi des
t hat each House ( Senat e and t he House of
Repr esent at i ves) shal l be t he J udge of t he
el ect i ons, r et ur ns and qual i f i cat i ons of i t s own
member s.
Sect i on 47 of t he Aust r al i an Const i t ut i on
pr ovi des t hat unt i l t he Par l i ament ot her wi se
pr ovi des, any quest i on r espect i ng t he
qual i f i cat i on of a senat or or of a member of t he
473
House of Repr esent at i ves, or r espect i ng a vacancy
i n ei t her House of Par l i ament , and any quest i on of
a di sput ed el ect i on t o ei t her House, shal l be
det er mi ned by t he house i n whi ch t he quest i on
ar i ses. Ar t i cl e 55 of t he J apanese Const i t ut i on
st at es t hat each House shal l J udge di sput es
r el at ed t o qual i f i cat i ons of i t s member s. However ,
i n or der t o deny a seat t o any member , i t i s
necessar y t o pass a r esol ut i on by a maj or i t y of
t wo- t hi r ds or mor e of t he member s pr esent . Ar t i cl e
46 of t he I cel and Const i t ut i on pr ovi des t hat t he
Al t hi ng i t sel f deci des whet her i t s member s ar e
l egal l y el ect ed and al so whet her a member i s
di squal i f i ed. Ar t i cl e 64 of t he Nor wegi an
Const i t ut i on st at es t hat t he r epr esent at i ves
el ect ed shal l be f ur ni shed wi t h cer t i f i cat es, t he
val i di t y of whi ch shal l be submi t t ed t o t he
j udgment of t he St or t hi ng.
Ar t i cl e 59 of t he Fr ench Const i t ut i on pr ovi des
t hat t he Const i t ut i onal Counci l shal l r ul e, i n t he
case of di sagr eement , on t he r egul ar i t y of t he
474
el ect i on of deput i es and senat or s. Ar t i cl e 41 of
t he Ger man Feder al Republ i c Const i t ut i on st at es
t hat t he scr ut i ny of el ect i ons shal l be t he
r esponsi bi l i t y of t he Bundest ag. I t shal l al so
deci de whet her a deput y has l ost hi s seat i n t he
Bundest ag. Agai nst t he deci si on of t he Bundest ag
an appeal shal l l i e t o t he Feder al Const i t ut i onal
Cour t . Det ai l s shal l be r egul at ed by a f eder al
l aw. Accor di ng t o Ar t i cl e 66 of t he I t al i an
Const i t ut i on, each Chamber deci des as t o t he
val i di t y of t he admi ssi on of i t s own member s and
as t o cases subsequent l y ar i si ng concer ni ng
i nel i gi bi l i t y and i ncompat i bi l i t y. I n Tur key,
Ar t i cl e 75 pr ovi des i nt er al i a t hat i t shal l be
t he f unct i on of Supr eme El ect i on Boar d t o r evi ew
and pass f i nal j udgment on al l i r r egul ar i t i es,
compl ai nt s and obj ect i ons r egar di ng el ect i on
mat t er s dur i ng and af t er el ect i ons. The f unct i ons
and power s of t he Supr eme El ect i on Boar d shal l be
r egul at ed by l aw. Ar t i cl e 53 of t he Mal aysi an
Const i t ut i on Pr ovi des t hat i f any quest i on ar i ses
475
whet her a member of a House of Par l i ament has
become di squal i f i ed f or member shi p, t he deci si on
of t hat House shal l be t aken and shal l be f i nal .
I n I ndi r a Nehr u Gandhi V. Raj Nar ayan, AI R
1975 SC 2299, t he maj or i t y vi ews i n Kesavananda
Bhar at i have been appr oved obser vi ng: " democratic
set-up was part of basic structure of the
Constitution. Democracy postulates that there
should be periodical elections, so that people may
be in a position either to re-elect the old
representatives or, if they so choose, to change
the representatives and elect in their place other
representatives. Democracy further contemplates
that the elections should be free and fair, so
that the voters may be in a position to vote for
candidates of their choice. Democracy can indeed
function only upon the faith that elections are
free and fair and not rigged and manipulated, that
they are effective instruments of ascertaining
popular will both in reality and form and are not
476
mere rituals calculated to generate illusion of
defence of mass opinion" .
I n Mohi nder Si ngh Gi l l V. Chi ef El ect i on
Commi ssi oner , AI R 1978 SC 851, whi l e speaki ng on
t he phi l osophy of el ect i on i n a democr acy i t was
ar gued:
" ....(2)(a) The Constitution
contemplates a free and fair election and
vests comprehensive responsibilities of
superintendence, direction and control of
the conduct of elections in the Election
Commission. This responsibility may cover
powers, duties and functions of many
sorts, administrative or other, depending
on the circumstances.
(b) Two limitations at least are laid
on its plenary character in the exercise
thereof. Firstly, when Parliament or any
State Legislature has made valid law
relating to or in connection with
elections, the Commission, shall act in
477
conformity with, not in violation of,
such provisions but where such law is
silent Article 324 is a reservoir of
power to act for the avowed purpose of,
not divorced from, pushing forward a free
and fair election with expedition.
Secondly, the commission shall be
responsible to the rule of law, act bona-
fide and be amenable to the norms of
natural justice insofar as conformance to
such canons can reasonably and
realistically be required of it as
fairplay-in-action in a most important
area of the Constitutional order viz.
elections.
I n Kul di p Nayar ( Supr a) t he ar gument s i n S.
Raghbi e Si ngh Gi l l V. S. Gur char an Si ngh Tahr a
( 1980) Supp SCC 53 have been appr oved: " An act to
give effect to the basic feature of the
Constitution adumbrated and boldly proclaimed in
the preamble to the Constitution viz. the people
478
of India constituting into sovereign, socialist,
secular, democratic republic, has to be
interpreted in a way that helps achieve the
Constitutional goal. The goal on Constitutional
horizon being of democratic republic, a free and
fair election, a fountain spring and cornerstone
of democracy, based on universal adult suffrage is
the basic. The regulatory procedure for achieving
free and fair election for setting up democratic
institution in the country is provided in the Act
......". The above vi ews have been suppl ement ed i n
Ki hot o Hol l ohau V. Zachi l l hu, 1992 Supp( 2) SCC 651
obser vi ng t hat democr acy i s a par t of basi c
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, and r ul e of l aw,
and f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons ar e basi c f eat ur es of
democr acy.
I n or der t o achi eve f r ee and f ai r el ect i on,
t he i nst i t ut i onal i zat i on of democr at i c i nst i t ut i on
i s a pr econdi t i on. Unl ess democr at i c i nst i t ut i on
i s made st r ong no el ect i on can be sai d t o have
hel d f r eel y and f ai r l y. The pr i mar y f unct i on f or
479
hol di ng an el ect i on i n a congeni al at mospher e
depends upon such i nst i t ut i on whi ch i s vest ed wi t h
t he r esponsi bi l i t i es f or such t ask. Thi s
i nst i t ut i on has been gi ven t he r esponsi bi l i t i es of
super i nt endence, di r ect i on and cont r ol of t he
conduct of el ect i ons, and not on t he Execut i ve
Gover nment i n Par t I V of t he Const i t ut i on. I n
Kesavananda Bhar at i ( Supr a) i t i s ar gued t hat l ack
of adequat e l egi sl at i ve wi l l t o f i l l t he vacuumi n
l aw f or r ef or mi ng t he el ect i on pr ocess i n
accor dance wi t h t he l aw wi l l af f ect t he f r ee and
f ai r el ect i on. The obj ect i ve of set t i ng up of an
El ect i on Commi ssi on i s t o achi eve a f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on bei ng conduct ed by an i ndependent body.
The secondar y f unct i on i s t he qual i t y of per sons
who man t he El ect i on Commi ssi on.
Par t VI I of t he Const i t ut i on pr ovi ded f or t he
el ect i ons and t he El ect i on Commi ssi on i s vest ed
wi t h t he t ask. Ar t i cl e 118 pr ovi des f or t he
est abl i shment of El ect i on Commi ssi on whi ch shal l
be i ndependent i n t he exer ci se of i t s f unct i ons.
480
The t enur e and t he r emoval of an El ect i on
Commi ssi oner has been saf eguar ded under t hi s
pr ovi si on. The power s and f unct i ons of t he
El ect i on Commi ssi on i s pr ovi ded i n Ar t i cl e 119. I t
i s pr ovi ded i n cl ause( 3) of Ar t i cl e 123 t hat a
gener al el ect i on of member s of Par l i ament shal l be
hel d ( a) i n t he case of di ssol ut i on by r eason of
t he expi r at i on of i t s t er m, wi t hi n a per i od of
ni net y days pr ecedi ng such di ssol ut i on; and ( b) i n
t he case of a di ssol ut i on ot her wi se t han by r eason
of such expi r at i on, wi t hi n ni net y days af t er such
di ssol ut i on. Ar t i cl e 124 aut hor i ses t he Par l i ament
t o pr omul gat e l aw maki ng pr ovi si on wi t h r espect t o
al l mat t er s r el at i ng t o or i n connect i on wi t h
gener al el ect i ons t o Par l i ament . The openi ng wor ds
used i n Ar t i cl e 119 t o t he ef f ect t hat t he
super i nt endence, di r ect i on and cont r ol of t he
pr epar at i on of t he el ect or al r ol l s f or al l
el ect i ons mani f est l y suggest t hat t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on i s vest ed wi t h al l power s f or hol di ng
f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons of member s of
481
Par l i ament . I f t he Execut i ve or t he Par l i ament
r eal l y want ed t o hol d a f r ee and f ai r
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on, Par t VI I of t he
Const i t ut i on shoul d have t o be amended empower i ng
such power t o t he El ect i on Commi ssi on whi ch i s
conduci ve f or hol di ng a f r ee and f ai r
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on.
I t i s t hus obvi ous t hat t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on i s composed of t he Chi ef El ect i on
Commi ssi oner and ot her El ect i on Commi ssi oner s i f
appoi nt ed f or hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons.
Ar t i cl e 118 i s couched i n si mi l ar l anguage of
cl ause( 2) of Ar t i cl e 324 of t he Const i t ut i on of
I ndi a. Ahmadi , CJ . i n T. S. Seshan V. Uni on of
I ndi a, ( 1995) 4 SCC 611 on const r uct i on of Ar t i cl e
324( 2) obser ved: "It is crystal clear from the
plain language of the said clause (2) that our
Constitutional-makers realised the need to set up
an independent body or commission which would be
permanently in session with at least one officer,
namely, the CEC, and left it to the President to
482
further add to the Commission such number of ECs
as he may consider appropriate from time to time.
Clause (3) of the said Article makes it clear that
when the Election Commission is a multi-member
body the CEC shall act as its Chairman. What will
be his role as a Chairman has not been
specifically spelt out by the said article and we
will deal with this question hereafter. Clause (4)
of the said article further provides for the
appointment of RCs to assist the Election
Commission in the performance of its functions set
out in clause (1). This, in brief, is the scheme
of Article 324 insofar as the Constitution of the
Election Commission is concerned.
Pr ovi so t o Cl ause ( 5) of Ar t i cl e 118 pr ovi des
t hat an El ect i on Commi ssi oner shal l not be r emoved
f r om hi s of f i ce except i n t he l i ke manner and on
t he l i ke gr ounds as a J udge of t he Supr eme Cour t .
The I ndi an cor r espondi ng pr ovi si on has been
pr ovi ded i n t he pr ovi so t o cl ause ( 5) of Ar t i cl e
324. I t has been f ur t her pr ovi ded t hat " t he
483
condi t i ons of ser vi ce of t he Chi ef El ect i on
Commi ssi oner shal l not be var i ed t o hi s
di sadvant age af t er hi s appoi nt ment " . The El ect i on
Commi ssi on shoul d be equi pped wi t h al l f aci l i t i es
and shoul d al so be al l owed t o f unct i on
i ndependent l y. I t shoul d be al l owed t o devel op as
an i nst i t ut i on. To r est or e t he peopl es conf i dence,
r i ght per sons f or t he of f i ce of t he Chi ef El ect i on
Commi ssi oner and ot her member s shoul d be appoi nt ed
upon consul t at i on wi t h t he al l maj or pol i t i cal
par t i es. Even under t he pr esent Car e- t aker
Gover nment syst em i f i mpar t i al per sons ar e not
appoi nt ed i n t he Commi ssi on, no gener al el ect i on
wi l l be hel d f ai r l y and i mpar t i al l y.
Consi der i ng t hese pr ovi si ons i t has been
ar gued i n T. S. Seshan ( Supr a) " These two
limitations on the power of Parliament are
intended to protect the independence of the CEC
from political and/or executive interference" . The
expr essi on ' conduct of el ect i ons' i s wi de
ampl i t ude whi ch woul d i ncl ude power t o make al l
484
necessar y pr ovi si ons f or conduct i ng f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on. To mai nt ai n t he pur i t y of el ect i ons and
i n par t i cul ar t o br i ng t r anspar ency i n t he
el ect i on pr ocess i n Associ at i on of Democr at i c
Ref or ms ( Supr a) , Shah, J . concl uded:
The jurisdiction of the Election
Commission is wide enough to include all
powers necessary for smooth conduct of
elections and the word elections is
used in a wide sense to include the
entire process of election which consists
of several stages and embraces many
steps.
The limitation on plenary character of
power is when the Parliament or State
Legislature has made a valid law relating
to or in connection with elections, the
Commission is required to act in
conformity with the said provisions. In
case where law is silent, Article 324 is
a reservoir of power to act for the
485
avowed purpose of having free and fair
election. Constitution has taken care of
leaving scope for exercise of residuary
power by the Commission in its own right
as a creature of the Constitution in the
infinite of situations that may emerge
from time to time in a large democracy,
as every contingency could not be
foreseen of anticipated by the enacted
laws or the rules.
Fr om t he above ar gument s and t he
const i t ut i onal pr ovi si ons, t he f i r st and f or emost
t hi ng t o be l ooked i nt o i s t hat t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on shoul d be pr ot ect ed f r om pol i t i cal
i nf l uence or i nt er f er ence. Ther e shoul d be
t r anspar ency i n t he sel ect i on pr ocess. The
Commi ssi on shoul d be const i t ut ed wi t h t he per sons
who ar e per cei ved t o be i mpar t i al . Ther ef or e t he
ar gument s t hat t he Car e- t aker Gover nment syst em
has been i nt r oduced wi t h t he mai n obj ect i ve t o
hol d f r ee, f ai r and peacef ul gener al el ect i on t o
486
t he par l i ament i s based on mi sconcept i on of l aw.
The ar gument s t hat conf i dence of t he peopl e i n t he
El ect i on Commi ssi on was er oded by i t s hol di ng of
an el ect i on gener al l y per cei ved not t o be f r ee and
f ai r whi ch r esul t ed i n a ser i ous Const i t ut i onal
cr i si s, t he Thi r t eent h Amendment t o t he
Const i t ut i on was made t o r est or e t he peopl es
conf i dence i n t he democr at i c pr ocess i s devoi d of
subst ance on t he Const i t ut i onal as wel l as
j ur i spr udent i al poi nt of vi ew. I f t he pol i t i cal
i nst i t ut i on l i ke The Execut i ve cont ai n i n Par t
I V of t he Const i t ut i on can ensur e f r ee and f ai r
el ect i ons f or ef f ect i ve par t i ci pat i on by t he
peopl e, t hen t her e i s no need f or pr ovi di ng an
i ndependent El ect i on Commi ssi on i n t he
Const i t ut i on. The Const i t ut i on- maker s ent r ust ed
wi t h t he t ask f or conduct i ng el ect i ons upon t he
El ect i on Commi ssi on and not upon t he execut i ve
Gover nment f or t r ansact i ng t he busi ness of hol di ng
a f r ee and f ai r el ect i on.
487
The f ur t her ar gument s t hat t he Thi r t eent h
Amendment i nt r oduced t he Car e- t aker Gover nment so
as t o enabl e t he El ect i on Commi ssi on t o hol d a
mor e f r ee and f ai r el ect i on and t o pr omot e
ef f ect i ve par t i ci pat i on by t he peopl e ar e cont r ar y
t o t he t enet of t he Const i t ut i on. The i mpugned
amendment has been i nser t ed i n Par t - I V under t he
headi ng ' The Execut i ve' of t he Const i t ut i on. For
hol di ng el ect i on i ndependent l y t he Const i t ut i on
pr ovi ded Ar t i cl es 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
124, 125 and 126 i n Par t VI I under t he headi ng
' El ect i ons' and t he cor r espondi ng l aws f r amed f or
t he pur pose.
For achi evi ng t he Const i t ut i onal mandat es f or
hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i on, i t has been
pr ovi ded i n Ar t i cl e 126 t hat t he Execut i ve
aut hor i t i es shal l ' assist the Election Commission
in the discharge of its functions'. Similar
language has been used in Part VI in Article 112
of the Constitution which states 'All authorities,
executive and judicial, in the republic shall act
488
in aid of the Supreme Court'. The Execut i ve
aut hor i t i es act i n ai d of t he Supr eme Cour t
whenever a di r ect i on or an or der or a decl ar at i on
i s made by i t si nce t he Supr eme Cour t of
Bangl adesh has been i nvest ed wi t h t he power t o
i nvest i gat e and puni sh f or any cont empt f or
vi ol at i on of such or der or di r ect i on or
under mi ni ng i t s aut hor i t y, whi ch power i s l acki ng
i n t he El ect i on Commi ssi on.
I n t he Repr esent at i on of t he Peopl e Act , 1951
( I ndi a) , t he Regi onal Commi ssi oner or t he Chi ef
El ect or al of f i cer of t he st at es has been
aut hor i sed t o ask f r om ( a) ever y l ocal aut hor i t y
( b) ever y uni ver si t y est abl i shed by t he Cent r al or
Pr ovi nci al Act , ( c) a Gover nment company, and ( d)
any ot her i nst i t ut i on, concer n or under t aki ng
whol l y or subst ant i al l y by f unds pr ovi ded di r ect l y
or i ndi r ect l y by t he Cent r al or Pr ovi nci al
Gover nment t o make avai l abl e t o any Ret ur ni ng
Of f i cer such st af f as may be necessar y f or t he
per f or mance of dut i es i n connect i on wi t h an
489
el ect i on under sect i on 159. Sect i on 160 aut hor i ses
r equi si t i on of pr emi ses, vehi cl es f or el ect i on
pur pose. Sect i on 146 has i nvest ed t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on wi t h t he power s t o make i nqui r y
r el at i ng t o any compl ai nt i f made by af f i davi t and
i t can exer ci se t he power s of a ci vi l Cour t whi l e
t r yi ng a sui t under t he Code of Ci vi l Pr ocedur e
and on enqui r y i f i t i s f ound t hat any of f ence
descr i bed i n sect i ons 175, 178, 180, 228 of t he
I ndi a Penal Code has been commi t t ed by any per son,
t he Commi ssi on may, af t er r ecor di ng t he f act s
const i t ut i ng t he of f ence f or war d t he case t o a
Magi st r at e havi ng j ur i sdi ct i on t o t r y t he same. I t
has al so been pr ovi ded t hat any pr oceedi ng bef or e
t he Commi ssi on shal l be deemed t o be a j udi ci al
pr oceedi ng wi t hi n t he meani ng of sect i ons 193 and
228 of t he Penal Code.
Si mi l ar pr ovi si ons as cont ai ned i n sect i on 146
shoul d be i ncor por at ed i n Chapt er VI of t he
Repr esent at i on of t he Peopl e Or der , 1972. The
El ect i on Commi ssi on shoul d be al l owed t o t ake
490
penal act i ons agai nst Gover nment ser vant s
ent r ust ed wi t h el ect i on r esponsi bi l i t i es i f t hey
vi ol at e i t s or der or di r ect i on, and t he publ i c
admi ni st r at i on al ong wi t h t he pol i ce
admi ni st r at i on shoul d be pl aced under t he
Commi ssi on dur i ng t he el ect i on per i od. The
Commi ssi on shoul d be gi ven f ul l power t o t r ansf er
any Gover nment ser vant dur i ng t he i nt er r egnum
per i od. The El ect i on Commi ssi on shoul d al so be
af f or ded al l st af f and empl oyees accor di ng t o i t s
r equi r ement and whi l e any Gover nment of f i cer or
empl oyee i s gi ven on deput at i on t o t he Commi ssi on
or i s ent r ust ed wi t h el ect i on r esponsi bi l i t y, such
of f i cer or empl oyee shoul d have t o be gui ded by
t he di sci pl i nar y r ul es of t he El ect i on Commi ssi on.
We achi eved our f r eedomand got a Const i t ut i on
at t he cost of mi l l i ons of mar t yr s wi t h a vi ew t o
enj oyi ng t he f r ui t s of a hi st or i c st r uggl e f or
nat i onal l i ber at i on. The Execut i ve i s under
obl i gat i on t o assi st t he El ect i on Commi ssi on i n
di schar ge of i t s f unct i ons f or maki ng t he
491
Const i t ut i on a cl ass apar t f r om ot her
Const i t ut i ons of compar abl e descr i pt i on. I t i s a
mani f est at i on of what i s cal l ed t he peopl e s
power . I t i s di f f i cul t t o concei ve t hat t he
Execut i ve aut hor i t i es wi l l not f ol l ow a di r ect i on
or or der of t he El ect i on Commi ssi on i n t he
i nt er est of hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons, whi ch
i s a basi c f eat ur e of t he Const i t ut i on. I f t he
' Execut i ve' si ncer el y desi r es t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on t o hol d f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons, i t i s
t hei r dut y t o see what ar e t he l oophol es i n par t
VI I of t he Const i t ut i on and t he l aw pr omul gat ed by
t he Par l i ament i n exer ci se of power s under Ar t i cl e
124 and t o make such amendment s whi ch ar e
pr act i cal l y necessar y f or pr esent i ng t he el ect i ons
of t he member s of Par l i ament gener al l y per cei ved
t o be f r ee and f ai r f or ef f ect i ve par t i ci pat i on by
t he peopl e.
Md. J oynul Abedi n, J . ar gued t hat t he el ect i on
l aws i n t he count r i es of t he subcont i nent show
t hat t he El ect i on Commi ssi on of Bangl adesh i s
492
suf f i ci ent l y st r ong and i ndependent i n mat t er s of
i t s oper at i on and deci si on maki ng. I t has
f i nanci al aut onomy whi ch i s al l t he mor e i mpor t ant
f or di schar gi ng i t s f unct i ons i ndependent l y. I f
t hat bei ng t he posi t i on, t he ar gument s of Md.
J ai nul Abedi n, J . t hat t he Car e- t aker Gover nment
syst em was i nt r oduced f or hol di ng f r ee, f ai r and
i mpar t i al el ect i on t o t he Par l i ament i s sel f
cont r adi ct or y. Lear ned J udge agai n ar gued t hat t he
st at us of El ect i on Commi ssi on and t he el ect or al
syst em i n Bangl adesh, i s by f ar sound and
ef f i caci ous. The onl y i mpor t ant f act or t hat needs
t o be l ooked at and consi der ed i s t o ensur e t hat
t he per sons i n aut hor i t y and t he l eader s of
pol i t i cal par t i es must have r eal and cl ear
concept i on of democr acy and i t s val ues and nor ms.
Thi s can be achi eved, l ear ned J udge ar gued, by not
mer e aut hor i zi ng of t he same but by i ni t i at i ng i t s
pr act i ce and t r ue cul t ur e and r el i gi ousl y
pr act i ci ng t he same at al l l evel i n t he nat i onal
l i f e and body pol i t y. The l ear ned J udge goes on
493
sayi ng t hat pol i t i cal l eader s ar e hol di ng host age
t o speci al i nt er est gr oups and t hi s i n t ur n
compel s t he l eader s t o make cor r upt deci si on and
consequent l y var i ous democr at i c and i mpor t ant
i nst i t ut i ons i n t he count r y ar e i ncr easi ngl y
becomi ng dysf unct i onal .
Md. Awal d Al i , J . ar gued t hat t he f i r st
essent i al of a democr at i c Const i t ut i on i s t hat t he
ent i r e peopl e must be pr esent ed i n t he l egi sl at ur e
by t hei r nomi nee t o be el ect ed per i odi cal l y by
t hem. Lear ned J udge added t hat i f t he peopl e
r eal l y bel i eve i n democr acy and want t o pr act i ce
democr acy t hen Ar t i cl es 48( 3) , 56 and 57( 3) of t he
Const i t ut i on shoul d be suspended or kept i n
abeyance f or t he per i od of t hr ee mont hs. Lear ned
J udge al so ar gued t hat t he El ect i on Commi ssi on
must be made mor e power f ul and i ndependent by
maki ng appr opr i at e l egi sl at i on. I f i nd f al l acy i n
t he ar gument s of t he l ear ned J udge. Ther e ar e
conf l i ct i ng ar gument s whi ch ar e appar ent f r om t he
above obser vat i ons.
494
Mi r za Hossai n Hai der , J . , on t he ot her hand,
ar gued t hat f or t he sake of pr act i ci ng democr acy
necessar y amendment s can be made t o t he
Const i t ut i on. The l ear ned J udge t hen ar gued t hat
t he El ect i on Commi ssi on cr eat ed under t he
Const i t ut i on i s a hi gh Const i t ut i onal aut hor i t y
char ged wi t h t he dut y of ensur i ng f r ee, f ai r and
i mpar t i al el ect i on and t he pur i t y of t he el ect or al
pr ocess. To ef f ect uat e t he Const i t ut i onal
obj ect i ves and pur pose, i t i s t o dr aw upon al l
i nci dent al and anci l l ar y power f or hol di ng f r ee
and f ai r el ect i on. Devel opment s may al so be made
i n t hi s sect or f or i t s pr oper f unct i oni ng
dependi ng on t he r equi r ed necessi t y. But man made
si t uat i on, i t i s ar gued, i nt ended t o det er or
obst r uct hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i on shoul d be
st er nl y deal t wi t h. The l ear ned J udges admi t t ed
t hat t he El ect i on Commi ssi on i s i ndependent and
st r ong enough t o r epr esent f r ee and f ai r
el ect i ons, and t hat t he el ect i on l aws shoul d be
495
made mor e ef f ect i ve by maki ng appr opr i at e
amendment s f or t he pur pose.
Ther e i s appar ent i nconsi st ency i n t he
ar gument s of t he l ear ned J udges whi l e mai nt ai ni ng
t he i mpugned amendment . I f t he exi st i ng l aws ar e
not suf f i ci ent t o equi p t he Commi ssi on wi t h t he
power s f or pr esent i ng a f ai r el ect i on, t hose l aws
shoul d be amended or new l aws be pr omul gat ed, and
t he cor r espondi ng pr ovi si ons cont ai ned i n Par t - VI I
of t he Const i t ut i on shoul d i n case of necessi t y be
amended. The l egi sl at ur e i nst ead of t aki ng st eps
i n t hat r egar d i nt r oduced a hot ch- pot ch syst em
di smant l i ng t he Par l i ament ar y f or m of Gover nment
even f or a shor t t i me, whi ch i nst ead of addr essi ng
t he i ssue pr oper l y compl i cat ed t he gover nance of
t he count r y l eadi ng t o chaos and conf usi on. The
i nst i t ut i on set up under t he Const i t ut i on shal l
seek t o gi ve ef f ect t o democr acy whi ch i s t o be
sust ai ned by adul t suf f r age, f undament al r i ght s
and i ndependent j udi ci ar y.
496
Ther e i s no di sput e t hat a Const i t ut i on i s a
l i vi ng i nst r ument and t hat i t gr ows wi t h t he
passage of t i me but by t he same t i me, i t shoul d
not be i gnor ed t hat t he Par l i ament cannot amend
t he Const i t ut i on accor di ng t o i t s vol i t i on or t o
t he det r i ment of t he Par l i ament ar y syst em of t he
Gover nment onl y because t he member s wi sh t o change
t he syst em. I t shoul d be r emember ed t hat t he
r epr esent at i ves of t he peopl e can not dest r oy
essent i al el ement of i t s basi c st r uct ur e as ar gued
by t he l ear ned J udges. I t i s absol ut el y wr ong i n
assumi ng t hat Par l i ament may br i ng any amendment
t o achi eve i t s goal f or i nst i t ut i onal i si ng t he
democr acy. The Par l i ament has t he power t o amend
t he Const i t ut i on but subj ect t o cer t ai n
l i mi t at i ons as wi l l be di scussed l at er on. Ever y
Const i t ut i on i s f ounded on some soci al and
pol i t i cal val ues. Legal r ul es ar e i ncor por at ed t o
bui l d a st r uct ur e of t he pol i t i cal i nst i t ut i on
ai med at r eal i zi ng and ef f ect uat i ng t hose val ues.
497
Const i t ut i onal pr ovi si ons cannot be i n
col l i si on wi t h each ot her and cer t ai nl y cannot be
vague, i l l def i ned and i ndef i ni t e. Ther e can not
be a pr ovi si on i n a Const i t ut i on whi ch wi l l l ead
t he count r y i nt o chaos, conf usi on and anar chy and
a democr at i c Republ i c can not be conver t ed by t he
Par l i ament t o a aut hor i t ar i an r egi me f or achi evi ng
somet hi ng whi ch coul d have been achi eved by ot her
means. The scheme envi saged by t he Const i t ut i on
does not per mi t t he Par l i ament t o encr oach upon
t he ar ea r eser ved by Ar t i cl e 55. Const i t ut i on i s
an el abor at e document . I t embodi es a l i st of
f undament al r i ght s and a number of Di r ect i ve
Pr i nci pl es of St at e pol i cy. A good number of
pr ovi si ons have been i ncl uded t o avoi d some of t he
di f f i cul t i es whi ch wer e exper i enced i n t he wor ki ng
of ot her Const i t ut i ons. Det ai l ed pr ovi si ons
r el at i ng t o t he wor ki ng of var i ous i nst i t ut i ons
set up under t he Const i t ut i on have been i ncl uded,
mai nl y wi t h a vi ew t o avoi di ng di f f i cul t i es whi ch
498
a newl y bor n Democr at i c Republ i c mi ght exper i ence
i n wor ki ng of t he Const i t ut i on ef f i ci ent l y.
Al l Gover nment or gans and i nst i t ut i ons owe
t hei r or i gi n t o t he Const i t ut i on and der i ve t hei r
power s f r om i t s pr ovi si ons. These or gans and
i nst i t ut i ons enj oy onl y such power s as ar e
conf er r ed on t hem and f unct i on wi t hi n l i mi t s
demar cat ed by t he Const i t ut i on. Par l i ament i s no
except i on and, unl i ke Br i t i sh Par l i ament , can not
cl ai m unl i mi t ed power s. I t must f unct i on wi t hi n
i t s l i mi t s and i t s act i ons ar e subj ect ed t o
j udi ci al scr ut i ny. I t has gi ven power t o amend
Const i t ut i on, but t he power t o amend must be
exer ci sed wi t hi n t he bounds of t he Const i t ut i on.
Besi des conf or mi ng t o t he pr ocedur es l ai d down f or
t he pur pose, t he power t o amend shoul d not be
exer ci sed so as t o dest r oy or abr ogat e t he basi c
st r uct ur e or f r ame wor k of t he Const i t ut i on. Mr .
Muhammad Mohsen Rashi d i n t he cont ext of t he
mat t er has ar gued t hat t her e cannot be a pr ovi si on
i n a Const i t ut i on whi ch br i ngs t he count r y t o t he
499
pr eci pi ce and l eaves i t t o f i nd i t s pat h
t her eaf t er . The per sons i n power changed a secr et
document l i ke t he Const i t ut i on whi ch shoul d not
pr ovi de a syst em not sui t ed t o t he ai ms and
aspi r at i ons of t he peopl e. Such i nconsi st enci es
seem pet t y but i n pr act i ce ar e capabl e of r ui ni ng
t he f abr i c of peacef ul democr acy i n t hi s count r y.
Const i t ut i on i s t he Supr eme l ex i n our count r y
i s beyond t he pal e of any cont r over sy. Al l or gans
of t he st at e der i ve t hei r aut hor i t y, j ur i sdi ct i on
and power s f r om t he Const i t ut i on and owe
al l egi ance t o i t . Thi s i ncl udes, t he j udi ci ar y,
t he execut i ve and t he l egi sl at ur e. To ar r i ve at
t he r eal meani ng, i t i s al ways necessar y t o get an
exact concept i on of t he ai m, scope and obj ect of
t he whol e Act of Par l i ament . I n wor ds of Si r
Edwar d Coke t he pr i nci pl es t o be consi der ed ar e:
( 1) what was t he l aw bef or e t he Act was passed;
( 2) what r emedy Par l i ament has appoi nt ed, and ( 3)
t he r eason of t he r emedy.
500
The Par l i ament ar y Syst em of Gover nment abhor s
absol ut i sm and i t bei ng t he car di nal pr i nci pl e
t hat no one howsoever l of t y, can cl ai m sol e
aut hor i t y gi ven under t he Const i t ut i on, mer e co-
or di nat e const i t ut i onal st at us or even t he st at us
of exal t ed Const i t ut i onal f unct i onar i es, does not
di sent i t l e t hi s Di vi si on f r om exer ci si ng i t s
j ur i sdi ct i on of j udi ci al r evi ew of act i ons whi ch
par t ake t he char act er of changi ng t he syst em of
t he Gover nment . The l egi sl at ur e undoubt l y has
pl enar y power s but such power s ar e cont r ol l ed by
t he basi c concept s of t he Const i t ut i on and can be
exer ci sed wi t hi n t he l egi sl at i ve f i el ds al l ot t ed
t o i t s r espect i ve j ur i sdi ct i on. I t shoul d be
r emember ed t hat t he basi s of such power i s t he
Const i t ut i on. No or gan of t he st at e can cl ai m
sover ei gnt y or supr emacy over t he ot her . Each
or gan has t o f unct i on wi t hi n i t s f our cor ner s of
t he Const i t ut i onal pr ovi si ons. The doct r i ne of
Par l i ament ar y sover ei gnt y as i t obt ai ns i n Engl and
501
does not pr evai l i n Bangl adesh except t o t he
ext ent pr ovi ded f or by t he Const i t ut i on.
Dr . Kamal Hossai n ar gued t hat t he Rul e of l aw
has t o be r i gor ousl y mai nt ai ned and t hat cal l s f or
a t r ul y i ndependent j udi ci ar y t o uphol d t he
Const i t ut i on and t he l aw and t o exer ci se power s of
j udi ci al r evi ew whenever an el ect i on i s seen t o
become unf ai r due t o l ack of neut r al i t y and
i mpar t i al i t y of t hose, who ar e ent r ust ed wi t h t he
Const i t ut i onal and l egal r esponsi bi l i t y f or
ensur i ng t hat i t i s f r ee and f ai r . I ndependence
of t he j udi ci ar y i t sel f has t o pr ovi de checks on
t he Car e- t aker Gover nment t o ensur e t hat
i ndependence i s not i nf r i nged. As obser ved
ear l i er , t he j udi ci ar y cannot sol ve al l t he
pr obl ems of t he peopl e or t he St at e. I f an
el ect i on i s hel d unf ai r t he Cour t wi l l exer ci se
power s of j udi ci al r evi ew of t he r esul t of such
el ect i on i f a pr oper pet i t i on i s f i l ed by an
aggr i eved per son but t he j udi ci ar y cannot assume
t he r ol e of t he Execut i ve or t he El ect i on
502
Commi ssi on f or ensur i ng t he neut r al i t y f or hol di ng
a Par l i ament ar y el ect i on. Thi s i s t he f unct i on of
a par t i cul ar or gan of t he St at e. Dr . Hossai n has
r ef er r ed t o t he case of Secr et ar y Mi ni st r y of
Fi nance Vs. Md. Masdar Hossai n, 52 DLR( AD) 82, i n
whi ch, t hi s Di vi si on ar gued on t he poi nt of
i ndependence of j udi ci ar y as under :
" The independence of the judiciary, as
affirmed and declared by Articles 94(4)
and 116A, is one of the basic pillars of
the Constitution and can not be
demolished, whittled down, curtailed or
diminished in any manner whatsoever,
except under the existing provision of
the Constitution. It is true that this
independence, as emphasized by the
learned Attorney General, is subject to
the provision of the Constitution, but we
find no provision in the Constitution
which curtails, diminishes or otherwise
abridges this independence. Article 115,
503
Article 133 or Article 136 does not give
either the Parliament or the President
the authority to curtail or diminish the
independence of the legislation or rules.
What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly."
I f ai l t o under st and why Dr . Hossai n has
r ef er r ed t o t he above deci si on whi ch does not
suppor t hi s vi ews. Dr . Hossai n submi t t ed t hat t he
Thi r t eent h Amendment was al r eady par t of t he
Const i t ut i on when i t was expr essl y st at ed by t hi s
Di vi si on i n t he Masdar Hossai n case t hat t her e i s
no pr ovi si on i n t he Const i t ut i on whi ch cur t ai l s
t he i ndependence of j udi ci ar y. Suppl ement i ng t he
above ar gument s, Mr . Mahmudul I sl am added t hat
t her e i s no pr ovi si on i n t he Const i t ut i on whi ch
cur t ai l s t he i ndependence of J udges of t he
super i or Cour t . Mr . I sl am has r ef er r ed t o a
Canadi an Supr eme Cour t deci si on i n Wal t er Val ent e
V. The Queen, ( 1985) 2SCR 673, wher ei n i t was
f ound J udi ci al i ndependence i s a " foundational
504
principle" of the Constitution reflected in
section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of rights
and Freedoms, and in both ss.96-100 and the
preamble to the Constitution Act,
1867...........It serves to safeguard our
Constitutional order and to maintain public
confidence in the administration of justice......
Judicial independence consists essentially in the
freedom to render decisions based solely on the
requirement of laws and justice.
Mr . I sl am ar gues t hat t he j udi ci ar y be l ef t
f r ee t o act wi t hout i mpr oper i nt er f er ence f r omany
ot her ent i t y i . e. t he Execut i ve and Legi sl at i ve
br anch of t he Gover nment not i mpi nge on t he
essent i al aut hor i t y and f unct i on. Accor di ng t o Mr .
I sl am, t her e i s not hi ng i n t he Const i t ut i on whi ch
can be even r emot el y sai d t o be i nt er f er i ng wi t h
t he adj udi cat i ve f unct i ons of t he J udges of t he
Supr eme Cour t . Fur t her mor e, t he pr ovi si on of t he
Supr eme J udi ci al Counci l f ur t her secur es t he
t enur e of ser vi ce of t he J udges of t he Supr eme
505
Cour t . Mr . I sl am has r ef l ect ed one si de of t he
coi n i gnor i ng t he ot her si de. Lear ned Ami cus
Cur i ae f ai l s t o consi der t hat t he i ndependence of
j udi ci ar y wi l l not onl y be af f ect ed but al so put
t he j udi ci ar y as a whol e i nt o cont r over sy i f t he
syst em of sel ect i on of t he Chi ef Advi sor f r om
amongst t he r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ces or r et i r ed
J udges of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on i s r et ai ned and
ul t i mat el y t he publ i c per cept i on t owar ds t he
j udi ci ar y wi l l be bound t o er ode.
Mr . I sl amhi msel f admi t t ed t hat t he of f i ce of
t he Chi ef Advi sor i s a dangl i ng car r ot bef or e t he
J udges of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on whi ch shal l
pr event t hem f r om di spensi ng j ust i ce i mpar t i al l y.
However , accor di ng t o Mr . I sl am t hi s woul d not be
t r eat ed as somet hi ng whi ch i nt er f er es wi t h t he
adj udi cat i ve f unct i ons of a J udge or cur t ai l s hi s
ser vi ce f aci l i t i es or af f ect s hi s t enur e i n any
manner . Accor di ng t o Mr . I sl am, t he J udges have
t aken oat h t o do r i ght t o al l manner of peopl e,
wi t hout f ear or f avour , af f ect i on or i l l wi l l . I f
506
a J udge r ef r ai ns f r om passi ng t he r i ght j udgment
l est t he Gover nment wi l l be angr y wi t h hi m and
shal l not appoi nt hi m as Chi ef Advi sor af t er hi s
r et i r ement , i t has not hi ng t o do wi t h t he
per f or mance of hi s dut y as a J udge and i t can not
be sai d t hat he was pr event ed f r om doi ng t he
r i ght . Accor di ng t o Mr . I sl am, i f a Chi ef J ust i ce
or a J udge of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on r et i r es, he
ceases t o be a member of j udi ci ar y. By hi s
appoi nt ment as Chi ef of t he Car e- t aker Gover nment
t he j udi ci ar y i s not i n any way be i nvol ved.
Bef or e I deal wi t h t he ar gument s, I woul d l i ke
t o r epr oduce a passage quot ed by Dr . Hossai n i n
hi s wr i t t en ar gument f r oma j udgment of US Supr eme
Cour t t hat ext r act ed f r om Tagor e Law Lect ur es,
1959 as under :
" The judiciary has no arm or police
force to execute its mandates or compel
obedience to its decrees. It has no
control over the purse strings of
Government. Those two historical sources
507
or power rests in other hands. The
strength of the judiciary is in the
command it has over the hearts and minds
of men. That respect and prestige are the
product of innumerable judgments and
decrees, a mosaic built from the
multitude of cases decided. Respect and
prestige do not grow suddenly; they are
the products or time and experience. But
they flourish when Judges are independent
and courageous. "
I n Abdul Bar i Sar ker Vs. Bangl adesh and
ot her s, 46 DLR( AD) 37, a r et i r ed J udge of t he Hi gh
Cour t Di vi si on was appoi nt ed chai r man of t he Cour t
of Set t l ement on cont r act basi s f or one year but
wi t hi n t hr ee mont hs hi s cont r act was cancel l ed. He
chal l enged t he or der of cancel l at i on by a wr i t
pet i t i on. Ar t i cl e 99 pr ohi bi t ed appoi nt ment of a
r et i r ed J udge i n any of f i ce of pr of i t i n t he
ser vi ce of Republ i c. Thi s pr ohi bi t i on was l i f t ed
by an amendment made i n 1976. The pur pose behi nd
508
t hi s pr ohi bi t i on was t hat t he hi gh posi t i on and
di gni t y of a J udge shoul d be pr eser ved and
r espect ed even af t er r et i r ement and i f any
pr ovi si on was made f or hol di ng of of f i ce af t er
r et i r ement t hen, a J udge whi l e i n ser vi ce of t he
Supr eme Cour t mi ght be t empt ed t o be i nf l uenced i n
hi s deci si ons i n f avour of t he aut hor i t i es keepi ng
hi s eyes upon a f ut ur e appoi nt ment . I n t he cont ext
of Ar t i cl e 99 t hi s Di vi si on obser ved: " The purpose
behind this prohibition was that the high position
and dignity of a Judge of the Supreme Court should
be preserved and respected even after his
retirement. Further that if any provision was made
for holding of office, after retirement, then a
Judge while in service of the Supreme Court might
be tempted to be influenced in his decisions in
favour of the authorities keeping an eye upon a
future appointment. "
R. C. Rahot i , C. J . i n an ar t i cl e publ i shed on
22nd Febr uar y, 2005 on Canons of J udi ci al Et hi cs
obser ved ' i ndependence' and ' i mpar t i al i t y' ar e
509
most cr uci al concept s. The t wo concept s ar e
separ at e and di st i nct . ' I mpar t i al i t y' r ef er s t o a
st at e of mi nd and at t i t ude of t he Cour t whi l e
i ndependence r ef er s not onl y t o t he st at e of
mi nd or at t i t ude, but al so t o a st at us or
r el at i onshi p t o ot her s par t i cul ar l y t o t he
execut i ve br anch of Gover nment t hat r est s on
obj ect i ve condi t i ons or guar ant ees. I n K.
Veer aswami V. Uni on of I ndi a ( 1991) , 3 SCC 655,
t he concept of j udi ci al i ndependence has been
descr i bed: To keep the stream of justice clean
and pure the Judge must be endowed with sterling
character, impeccable integrity and upright
behaviour. Erosion thereof would undermine the
efficacy of the rule of law and the working of the
constitution itself. The Judges of higher
echelons, therefore, should not be mere men of
clay with all the frailties and foibles, human
failings and weak character which may be found in
those in other walks of life. They should be men
of fighting faith with tough fibre not succeptible
510
to any pressure, economic, political or of any
sort. The actual as well as the apparent
independence of judiciary would be transparent
only when the office-holders endow those qualities
which would operate as impregnable fortress
against surreptitious attempts to undermine the
independence of judiciary. In short, behaviour of
the Judge is the bastion for the people to reap
the fruits of the democracy, liberty and justice
and the antithesis rocks the bottom of the rule of
law............They are required to uphold the
constitution and the laws without fear that is
without fear of executive; and without favour
that is without expecting a favour from the
executive. ( emphasi s added) .
Peopl e s expect at i on of ' i ndependence' and
' i mpar t i al i t y' i n t he j udi ci ar y i s much hi gher
t han any ot her or gan. The soci et y has got a r i ght
demand, bet t er gover nance f r om t he j udi ci ar y. The
j udi ci ar y i n ever y pol i t y has been pr ovi ded wi t h
sever al i mmuni t i es under t hei r r espect i ve
511
Const i t ut i ons t o ensur e t hei r smoot h and i mpar t i al
f unct i oni ng. I f t he j udi ci ar y by i t s per f or mance
and conduct does not meet t he expect at i on f or
whi ch such Const i t ut i onal pr ot ect i on has been
pr ovi ded, t he j udi ci ar y wi l l be r educed t o any
ot her or gan of t he st at e. When t he l ast
Par l i ament ar y el ect i on was schedul ed t o be hel d
under t he Car e- t aker Gover nment , a r et i r ed Chi ef
J ust i ce was t o t ake of f i ce as Chi ef Advi sor as per
cl ause ( 3) of Ar t i cl e 58C. Ther e was pr ot est
agai nst hi s appoi nt ment by one pol i t i cal par t y on
t he gr ound t hat he was a par t i san Chi ef J ust i ce.
Ther e was much agi t at i on whi ch cul mi nat ed i nt o
unt ol d i nci dent s, st r i kes, vi ol ences and
ul t i mat el y t he sai d l ear ned Chi ef J ust i ce decl i ned
t o assume t he of f i ce of Chi ef Advi sor but i n t he
mean t i me, t he nat i on had t o f ace l ot of
suf f er i ngs. I f he was not i mpar t i al as al l eged,
t hen what woul d have been t he f at e of t he
pr onouncement s made by hi m when he was a J udge i n
bot h t he Di vi si ons of t he Supr eme Cour t ?
512
The sel ect i on pr ocess pr ovi ded f or i n cl auses
( 3) and ( 4) of Ar t i cl e 58C and t he pr ovi sos i s so
vague t hat t her e i s scope f or t he Pr esi dent t o
exer ci se ar bi t r ar y di scr et i onar y power . Lear ned
counsel appear i ng on behal f of t he appel l ant and
ami ci cur i ae conceded t hat af t er t he i nt r oduct i on
of t he syst em, t her e i s scope f or t he Execut i ve t o
i nt er f er e wi t h t he admi ni st r at i on of j ust i ce and
t o pol i t i ci ze t he j udi ci ar y par t i cul ar l y at t he
t i me of el evat i ng a J udge i n t he Appel l at e
Di vi si on keepi ng eyes upon hi s f ut ur e appoi nt ment
as Chi ef Advi sor af t er r et i r ement . Thi s woul d
gr avel y under mi ne t he i ndependence of j udi ci ar y,
f or a J udge of t he Hi gh Cour t Di vi si on woul d t hen
be wor ki ng const ant l y under t he appr ehensi on t hat
i f he does not f al l i n l i ne wi t h vi ews of t he
Execut i ve or del i ver s j udgment s not t o i t s l i ki ng
he woul d not be el evat ed t o t he Appel l at e
Di vi si on. The J udges ar e made of st er ner st uf f ,
some J udges may on account such appr ehensi on, be
513
i nduced, ei t her consci ousl y or del i ber at el y; t o do
t hat whi ch pl eases t he Execut i ve.
To aver t any i nj ur y i f t hey ar e compet ent , i t
woul d not be di f f i cul t f or t hem t o f i nd ar gument s
t o j ust i f y t hei r act i on i n f al l i ng i n l i ne wi t h
t he wi shes of t he Execut i ve i t woul d al so shake
t he conf i dence of t he peopl e i n t he admi ni st r at i on
of j ust i ce i n cases wher e t he Gover nment i s a
par t y. I n vi ew of t he above, I f i nd i t appr opr i at e
t o quot e an obser vat i on of Ganvi l l ee Aust i n i n
The Const i t ut i on; cor ner st one of a nat i on"
( 1972) .
If the beacon of the judiciary is to
remain bright, court must be above
reproach, free from coercion and from
political influence.
Ther e i s no gai nsayi ng t he f act t hat by t he
Const i t ut i on ( Four t eent h Amendment ) Act , 2004,
Ar t i cl e 96( 1) was amended and t he r et i r ement age
of t he J udges had been i ncr eased t o 67 year s f r om
t he age of 65. A Sect i on of ci vi l soci et y and
514
l awyer s r ai sed eyebr ows quest i oni ng t he
t r anspar ency and pr opr i et y of such amendment ,
whi ch accor di ng t o t hemwas, i n f act , done l ooki ng
t owar ds a par t i cul ar J udge t o head t he of f i ce of
t he Car e- t aker Gover nment . Thi s appr ehensi on
i t sel f i s i nj ur i ous t o j udi ci ar y. Ther e has been
consi st ent pr essur e f r om t he Gover nment ser vant s
and t he J udges of l ower j udi ci ar y t o i ncr ease t he
r et i r ement age on t he r easoni ng t hat t he l i f espan
of t he ci t i zens of t he count r y has i ncr eased and
t her ef or e, at l east t he r et i r ement age shoul d be
i ncr eased t o 60 year s. Despi t e such demand, t he
Gover nment r ai sed t he r et i r ement age of t he J udges
of t he Supr eme Cour t abr upt l y wi t hout i ncr easi ng
t he r et i r ement age of t he ot her J udges and
empl oyees of t he Republ i c. Thi s i ncr ease of t he
r et i r ement age of t he J udges speaks vol ume as t o
t he mot i ve of t he Execut i ve Gover nment .
I f t hi s syst em i s al l owed t o cont i nue t he
appr ehensi on i n t he mi nds of t he peopl e cannot be
sai d t o be exagger at ed and t her e wi l l be
515
l i kel i hood of pol i t i ci zi ng t he hi gher j udi ci ar y
t hi s wi l l cer t ai nl y er ode t he peopl e' s per cept i on
t owar ds t he i ndependence of j udi ci ar y. So, I f ul l y
agr ee wi t h t he opi ni on expr essed i n K. Veer aswami
t hat J udges of t he hi gher echel ons shoul d have
been wi t hout expect i ng a f avour f r om t he
execut i ve and t hat t hey shoul d be kept f r om
pol i t i cal i nf l uence i f t he beacon of j udi ci ar y i s
t o r emai n br i ght .
To hol d t he gener al el ect i on of t he member s of
Par l i ament peacef ul l y, f ai r l y and i mpar t i al l y, t he
onl y sol ut i on i s t o st r engt hen t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on. Besi des, t he of f i cer s of t he publ i c
admi ni st r at i on and t he l aw enf or ci ng agenci es who
ar e di r ect l y and i ndi r ect l y i nvol ved i n t he
pr ocess of Par l i ament ar y el ect i on shoul d be pl aced
under t he El ect i on Commi ssi on wi t h f ul l power s t o
t ake penal act i ons agai nst t hem i n case of
di sobedi ence of i t s or der s and di r ect i ons dur i ng
t he per i od f r om t he dat e of submi ssi on of t he
nomi nat i on paper t i l l t he dat e of f i nal
516
publ i cat i on of t he el ect i on r esul t s i n t he
of f i ci al Gazet t e. Ther e i s no di sput e i n t hi s
r egar d and Md. J oynul Abedi n, J . had r ecommended
10 poi nt s f or el ect or al r ef or m. Md. Awl ad Al i , J .
was al so of t he vi ew t hat : The El ect i on
Commi ssi on must be made mor e power f ul and
i ndependent by maki ng appr opr i at e l egi sl at i on.
Mi r za Hussai n Hai der , J . echoed t o t he above vi ews
and obser ved Devel opment s may al so be made t o
t hi s sect or f or i t s pr oper f unct i oni ng dependi ng
on t he r equi r ed necessi t y. Dr . Kamal Hossai n
suggest ed t he f ol l owi ng pr oposal f or st r engt heni ng
t he El ect i on Commi ssi on f or hol di ng f r ee and f ai r
el ect i on.
" The appointment of the Chief
Election Commissioner and Election
Commissioners should be made after
consultation with the opposition parties
and with sections of society which enjoy
public respect and confidence. The
Election Commission should also have the
517
full control and command over the law
enforcing agencies and defense service
personnel".
Dr . Zahi r al so made t he f ol l owi ng suggest i on:
The Election Commission should be made
all powerful, and the voter list should
be made electronically, and if necessary
by going from house to house three months
before the election with notice to all
political parties and accompanied by
their representatives to update the
list."
Now, i f t he f unct i ons of t he Execut i ve ar e
assi gned t o t he J udges of t he hi gher j udi ci ar y
even t hough r et i r ed t hen t he j udi ci ar y wi l l be
t aken i n di sr eput e al l t he t i me. The Execut i ve
Gover nment and t he pol i t i cal par t i es ar e r equi r ed
t o see how t he t r ansi t i on of power has t o be made
peacef ul l y af t er a f r ee and f ai r el ect i on of t he
member s of Par l i ament . I f t he exi st i ng l aw and t he
pr ovi si ons cont ai ned i n Par t VI I of t he
518
Const i t ut i on ar e not adequat e and suf f i ci ent t o
pr esent t o t he nat i on f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons by
t he El ect i on Commi ssi on, necessar y amendment s
shoul d be made i n t hat r egar d so t hat t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on can pr esent a f r ee and f ai r el ect i on.
I f i nd f or ce t o t he suggest i on of Dr . Hossai n
f or st r engt heni ng t he El ect i on Commi ssi on. By t he
same t i me, I f i nd subst ance i n t he cont ent i on of
Mr . Mohsen Rashi d t hat i f a pol i t i cal par t y can
r un a Gover nment f or f i ve year s and t her eaf t er , i f
i t f ai l s t o co- oper at e wi t h t he El ect i on
Commi ssi on i n hol di ng f r ee and f ai r el ect i ons, i t
i s a mat t er of shame t o t he nat i on t hat t he peopl e
who el ect ed t hei r r epr esent at i ves and t r ust ed t hem
as t r ust ees coul d not be t r ust ed f or hol di ng f r ee
and f ai r el ect i ons. I t i s t hei r i nabi l i t y t o
per f or m r esponsi bi l i t i es r eposed upon t hem and t o
r ect i f y t hei r mi sdeeds, t he J udges shoul d not be
dr agged on i n t he pol i t i cal ar ena, whi ch i s not
i t s appr opr i at e f i el d t o deal wi t h t he Execut i ve.
The Const i t ut i on has del i neat ed t he r ol es of t he
519
Execut i ve, of t he J udi ci ar y and t he Legi sl at ur e.
The Pr esi dent of I ndi a on t he occasi on of Gol den
j ubl ee cel ebr at i on of t he Supr eme Cour t of I ndi a
on 28
t h
J anuar y, 2000 sai d:
the judiciary in India has become the
last refuse for the people and the future
of the country will depend upon
fulfillment of the high expectations
reposed by the people in it.
The Const i t ut i on does not pr ohi bi t over l ap of
f unct i ons, but i n f act pr ovi des f or some over l ap
as a Par l i ament ar y democr acy. What i t pr ohi bi t s
i s such exer ci se of f unct i on of t he ot her br anch
whi ch r esul t s i n wr est i ng away of t he r egi me of
Const i t ut i onal account abi l i t y. I n Ram J awaya Kapur
V. St at e of Punj ab, AI R 1955S. C. 549, t he Supr eme
Cour t of I ndi a obser ved:
The Indian Constitution has not indeed
recognised the doctrine separation of
powers in its absolute rigidity but the
functions of different parts or branches
520
of the Government have been sufficiently
differentiated and consequently it can
very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption by one
organ or part of the state of functions
that essentially belong to another. The
executive indeed can exercise the powers
of departmental or subordinate
legislation when such powers are
delegated to it by the legislature.
Bar on Mont esqui eu f or ensur i ng t he l i ber t y of
t he subj ect r eal i sed t hat t her e coul d be
oppr essi on by means of t he l aw, as wel l as,
out si de i t and t hat i s why i n hi s Book XI , On The
Engl i sh Const i t ut i on i n Chapt er VI , had made mor e
pr act i cal r ecommendat i ons f or t he or gani sat i on of
Gover nment . He ar gued on t he doct r i ne of
separ at i on of power s. He begi ns wi t h a
cl assi f i cat i on of t he f unct i ons of Gover nment . He
ar gued by st i pul at i ng t hat t her e shoul d be t hr ee
br anches or agenci es of Gover nment t o cor r espond
521
t o t he t hr ee f unct i ons: When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty ...........Again, there is no liberty if
the power of judging is not separated from the
legislative and executive. If it were joined with
the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for
the Judge would then be the legislator. If it were
joined to the executive power, the Judge might
behave with violence and oppression. There would
be an end to everything, if the same man or the
same body, whether of the nobles or of the
people, were to exercise those three powers, that
of enacting laws, that of executing public
affairs, and that of trying crimes or individual
causes.
Mont esqui eu s ar gument cl ear l y expr essed t he
t hr ee agenci es shoul d per f or m t hei r r espect i ve
f unct i ons of t he Gover nment separ at el y. That i s
cer t ai nl y t he essence of t he doct r i ne i . e. one
522
agency of t he Gover nment shoul d not be per f or mi ng
t he f unct i on appr opr i at e t o anot her . He al so gave
some suppor t t o t he not i on of t her e bei ng checks
and bal ances by whi ch t he br anches of t he
Gover nment mi ght l egi t i mat el y i nf l uence or even
i mpose cer t ai n l i mi t s on each ot her s act i ons. The
doct r i ne of t he separ at i on of power s was t her ef or e
put f or war d as a pr escr i pt i on of what ought t o be
done f or t he pr omot i on of cer t ai n val ues, and t he
quest i on of i t s val i di t y i s a quest i on of
pol i t i cal t heor y.
I hope t hat t he expect at i on of t he peopl e
shoul d not be di mi ni shed by br i ngi ng t he J udges t o
t he act i vi t i es of t he execut i ve. As r egar ds t he
power of amendment of t he Const i t ut i on, B. H.
Chowdhur y, J . i n Anwar Hosai n Chowdhur y, ( 1989) BLD
( SPL) 1 ar gued t hat i ndependence of t he j udi ci ar y,
a basi c st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, i s al so
l i kel y t o be j eopar di zed or af f ect ed by some of
t he ot her pr ovi si ons i n t he Const i t ut i on; The
doctrine of basic structure is a new one and
523
appears to be an extension of the principle of
judicial review. Although the U.S. Constitution
did not expressly confer any judicial review.
Marshall CJ held in Marbury V. Madison, (1803) I
Cranch 137, that the court, in the exercise of its
judicial functions, had the power to say what the
law was, and if it found an Act of Congress
conflicted with the Constitution it had the duty
to say that the Act was not law. Though the
decision of Marshall CJ is still being debated the
principle of judicial review has got a wide
acceptance not only in the countries that are
under the influence of common law but in civil law
countries as well. I n t hat case i t was r ul ed t hat
i t was i nher ent i n t he nat ur e of j ur i di cal power
t hat t he Const i t ut i on i s r egar ded as t he Supr eme
l aw and any l aw or Act cont r ar y t o i t or
i nf r i ngi ng i t s pr ovi si ons i s t o be st r uck down by
t he Cour t i n t hat t he dut y and f unct i on of t he
Cour t i s t o enf or ce t he Const i t ut i on. The
Const i t ut i on of Uni t ed St at es does not conf er any
524
power on t he Supr eme Cour t t o st r i ke down l aws but
t he Supr eme Cour t of Uni t ed St at es r ul ed so.
Shahabuddi n, J . i n Anwar whi l e concur r i ng wi t h
t he above vi ews ar gued, even i f t he ' const i t uent
power ' i s vest ed i n t he Par l i ament t he power i s a
der i vat i ve one and t he mer e f act t hat an amendment
has been made i n exer ci se of t he der i vat i ve
const i t uent power wi l l not aut omat i cal l y make t he
amendment i mmune f r om chal l enge. I n t hat sense
t her e i s har dl y any di f f er ence whet her t he
amendment i s a l aw, f or i t has t o pass t hr ough t he
or deal of val i di t y t est . " Sover ei gnt y" bel ongs t o
t he peopl e and i t i s a basi c st r uct ur e of t he
Const i t ut i on. Ther e i s no di sput e about i t , as
t her e i s no di sput e t hat t hi s basi c st r uct ur e
cannot be wi ped out by amendat or y pr ocess.
However , i n r eal i t y, peopl e' s sover ei gnt y i s
assai l ed or even deni ed: under many devi ces and
' cover - ups' by hol der s of power , such as, by
i nt r oduci ng ' cont r ol l ed democr acy' , basi c
democr acy or by super - i mposi ng t her eupon some
525
ext r aneous agency, such as a Counci l of El der s or
of Wi seman. I f by exer ci si ng t he amendi ng power
peopl e' s Sover ei gnt y i s sought t o be cur t ai l ed i t
i s t he Const i t ut i onal dut y of t he Cour t t o
r est r ai n i t and i n t hat case i t wi l l be i mpr oper
t o accuse t he Cour t of act i ng as ' super -
l egi sl at or s' .
The power of J udi ci al r evi ew of a
const i t ut i onal pr ovi si on cannot be r est r i ct ed. The
Super i or Cour t s can st r i ke down a l aw on t he
t ouchst one of t he Const i t ut i on. The nat ur e of
j udi ci al power and i t s j ur i sdi ct i on ar e al l al l i ed
concept s and t he same can never be t aken away. I t
i s t he f unct i on of t he J udges of t he hi ghest Cour t
t o pr onounce upon t he val i di t y of l aws. Thi s Cour t
has t he power t o i nt er pr et any pr ovi si on of t he
Const i t ut i on or any l egal i nst r ument , even i f t hat
par t i cul ar pr ovi si on i s a pr ovi si on whi ch seeks t o
oust t he j ur i sdi ct i on of t hi s Cour t . Many Fr amer s,
Feder al i st s expect ed t he undemocr at i cal l y sel ect ed
Cour t , at l east on occasi on, t o st r i ke down
526
st at ues i t bel i eved wer e i n conf l i ct wi t h t he
Const i t ut i on. J ames Madi son, f or exampl e, poi nt ed
out t hat Bi l l of r i ght s woul d pr ot ect i ndi vi dual s
f r omabuse by maj or i t y. And he i mmedi at el y added:
Independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the legislative or executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for the Constitution
by the declaration of rights. (James Madison,
speech in Congress proposing Constitutional
Amendments in James Madison writings 437, 449)
Al exander Hami l t on wr ot e t he same i n The
Feder al i st Paper s t hat Const i t ut i on s l i mi t at i ons
can be pr eser ved i n pr act i ce i n no ot her way t han
t hr ough t he medi um of Cour t s of J ust i ce, whose
dut y i t must be t o decl ar e al l act s cont r ar y t o
t he mani f est t enor of t he Const i t ut i on voi d
ot her wi se al l r eser vat i ons of par t i cul ar r i ght s or
527
pr i vi l eges woul d amount t o not hi ng ( Feder al i st -
78) . Hami l t on sai d, i nt er pr et at i on of t he l aws i s
t he pr oper and pecul i ar pr ovi nce of t he Cour t s .
J ames I r edel l , J . el abor at ed on Hami l t on s ar gument
assumi ng t he need f or an i nst i t ut i on t hat woul d
have t he power t o st r i ke down an unconst i t ut i onal
l aw. I r edel l , J . concl uded t hat t he Cour t s must
have t he power of j udi ci al r evi ew. They may abuse
t he power , but one can f i nd saf eguar ds agai nst
abuse i n t he t r anspar ency of t he j udi ci al pr ocess,
whi ch al l ows t he publ i c t o assess t he mer i t s of
t he j udi ci al deci si on and t he J udges own desi r e
t o mai nt ai n a st r ong j udi ci al r eput at i on.
J ai nul Abedi n, J . t hough not i ced t he
obser vat i ons of Sahabuddi n, J . i n Anwar Hossai n
t hat any amendment of t he Const i t ut i on i s subj ect
t o t he r et ent i on of t he basi c st r uct ur es and t he
Cour t has power t o undo an amendment i f i t
t r ansgr esses i t s l i mi t s and al t er s basi c
st r uct ur e of t he Const i t ut i on, however , obser ved
t hat Ar t i cl e 48( 3) has suspended f or a l i mi t ed
528
per i od, t hat Ar t i cl e 58E has not amended Ar t i cl e
48, t hat unl ess cl ause ( 1A) of Ar t i cl e 142 i s
decl ar ed voi d, i t shoul d be hel d val i d and t hat
t he i mpugned amendment has not amended t he
pr eambl e. Ther e i s appar ent i nconsi st ency i n t he
above opi ni on. I t may be obser ved t hat cl auses
( 1A) , ( 1B) and ( 1D) of Ar t i cl e 142 whi ch wer e
added by t he Second Pr ocl amat i on Or der No. I V of
1978 had been decl ar ed ul t r avi r es t he Const i t ut i on
by t hi s Di vi si on i n t he Const i t ut i on Fi f t h
Amendment case.
Md. Awl ad Al i , J . obser ved t hat t he i mpugned
amendment has not amended any Pr ovi si on of t he
Const i t ut i on and t hus i t has not been r equi r ed t o
r ef er t o a r ef er endumunder Ar t i cl e 142( 1A) . Mi r za
Hussai n Hai der , J . i s of t he opi ni on t hat t he
i mpugned amendment has not vi ol at ed Ar t i cl e
142( 1A) and al so not ul t r a vi r es t he Const i t ut i on.
The subst ance of t he opi ni ons of t he l ear ned
J udges i s t hat t he i mpugned amendment has not
amended t he pr eambl e, Ar t i cl es 8, 48 and 56 of t he
529
Const i t ut i on and t hus, t he amendment i s not voi d
and t hat t he i mpugned amendment has not dest r oyed
t he basi c st r uct ur es of t he Const i t ut i on. These
obser vat i ons ar e i nconsi st ent , i nasmuch as, i t has
al so been obser ved " unl ess t hi s amendment namel y
cl ause ( 1A) i s decl ar ed voi d by a Cour t of l aw t he
same shoul d be hel d t o be val i d. Consequent l y i f
any amendment i s f ound t o have amended t he
pr eambl e, Ar t i cl e 8, 48 and 56 of t he
Const i t ut i on, t he amendi ng Bi l l must be r ef er r ed
f or r ef er endum bef or e i t i s assent ed by t he
Pr esi dent " .
The maj or i t y ar t i cl es of our Const i t ut i on ar e
ai med at f ur t her i ng t he goal s of soci al , pol i t i cal
and economi c r evol ut i on by est abl i shi ng t he
condi t i ons necessar y f or i t s achi evement s. That i s
why, t he Par l i ament can not dest r oy i t s i dent i t y
mer el y because t hey have t he r equi r ed number of
member of Par l i ament t o change i t s i dent i t y. I n
t he manner t he Const i t ut i onal convent i ons of
Engl and so al so t hose of t he Amer i can convent i onal
530
r ul es whi ch ar e bei ng f ol l owed f or over cent ur i es
wi t hout al l owi ng t o di sment l e t hem t r eat i ng t hem
as const i t ut i onal bi ndi ngs, i n t he l i ke manner we
ar e bound t o per ser ve t he f undament al f eat ur es of
our Const i t ut i on. The f r amewor k of t he
Const i t ut i on must sur vi ve any amendment made t o
i t . To ascer t ai n t he meani ng of a par t i cul ar
pr ovi si on of a st at ut e or Const i t ut i on, i t must
not r ead i n i sol at i on. Fi r st of al l t he i nt er nal
cont ext whi ch i ncl udes t he pr eambl e shoul d be
r ead. I f t he i nt er nal cont ext can not r esol ve t he
vagueness, r esor t may be had t o t he ext er nal
cont ext whi ch i ncl udes t he hi st or y l eadi ng t o t he
enact ment and t o t he pr oceedi ngs of t he
Par l i ament . I f one has t o ascer t ai n t he t r ue
meani ng of t he Const i t ut i on, he must be gui ded by
t he r ul es of gr ammer , by hi s knowl edge of t he
hi st or i cal backgr ound and by t he concl usi ons t o be
deduced f r om a car ef ul st udy of t he j udi ci al
deci si ons.
531
Ther ef or e I endor se t he vi ews of t he l ear ned
Chi ef J ust i ce t hat t he Const i t ut i on ( Thi r t eent h
Amendment ) Act , 1996 vi ol at es t he basi c f eat ur es
of t he Const i t ut i on and accor di ngl y i t has been
l egal l y decl ar ed voi d. I al so endor se t he vi ews
expr essed i n t he j udgment pr epar ed by t he l ear ned
Chi ef J ust i ce i ncl udi ng i t s oper at i ng par t . Bef or e
par t i ng wi t h, consi der i ng t he bur ni ng i ssue of t he
day, I am of t he vi ew t hat t he next t wo
Par l i ament ar y el ect i ons may be hel d under t he
exi st i ng syst em i n t he l i ght of t he above
obser vat i ons subj ect t o t he condi t i on t hat t he
sel ect i on of t he Chi ef Advi ser may be made not
f r omamong t he r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ces r et i r ed next
bef or e t he l ast r et i r ed Chi ef J ust i ce or t he
r et i r ed J udges of t he Appel l at e Di vi si on r et i r ed
l ast i n accor dance wi t h Cl auses ( 3) and ( 4) of
Ar t i cl e 58C. I t i s hoped t hat t he Par l i ament shal l
pr omul gat e necessar y l aws, dur i ng t hi s per i od and
i f necessar y, t o amend t he Const i t ut i on f or
i nst i t ut i onal i zi ng and equi ppi ng t he El ect i on
532
Commi ssi on t o conduct f r ee and f ai r Par l i ament ar y
el ect i ons i ndependent l y.
J.
Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah, J: I have had the privilege of going
through the judgments proposed to be delivered by my Lord, the Chief
Justice pronouncing the majority view and my learned brother, Muhammad
Imman Ali, J. I regret that I could not agree with the findings, the reasoning
and the decision given by my Lord, the Chief Justice as to the
unconstitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment and also giving direction
upon the Parliament to amend the Constitution in a particular way as stated
in the concluding portion of the judgment in order to hold the 10
th
and 11
th

general elections of members of Parliament under the Non-Party Care-taker
Government.
Though I am in agreement with my learned brother Muhammad
Imman Ali, J as to the finding given by him that the Thirteenth Amendment
was neither illegal nor ultravires the Constitution and does not destroy any
basic structures of the Constitution, but with respect I could not agree with
his finding that the Non-Party Care-taker Government system has become
unworkable due to the improper exercise of power of the President under
Article 58C(3), (4), (5) and (6) which led to the unnatural and
unconstitutional State of affairs in 2007 and in order to avoid recurrence
of such a situation, the mode of setting up of the interim Government, by
whatever name it may be called, is to be replaced by another system.
In view of the above, I find no other alternative but to give my own
view points as to the constitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment as
533
challenged before the High Court Division, which will appear from the
Rule issuing order in the course of my discussions and findings hereinafter.
This appeal has arisen out of a certificate given by a Full Bench of
the High Court Division on 04.08.2004 under article 103 of the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (the Constitution) in
Writ Petition No.4112 of 1999.
The background of giving the certificate by the Full Bench of the
High Court Division is as follows:
Mr. M. Saleem Ullah, deceased, an Advocate of this Court, filed the
writ petition before the High Court Division challenging the Constitution
(Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act I of 1996) (annexures-A, A1 to
the writ petition) as ultravires the Constitution. The writ-petitioner also
sought a Rule upon the respondents to show cause as to why the previous
actions and deeds done or taken in any manner in pursuance of the
impugned (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as
the Thirteenth Amendment) should not be ratified and condoned as
transactions past and closed. The Rule was issued in the following terms:
Let a Rule Nisi be issued upon the respondents calling upon them to
show cause as to why the impugned Constitution, (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act, 1996 (the Act I of 1996) (Annexure-A& A-1
to the writ petition) should not be declared to be ultra vires of the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and of no legal
effect and/or pass such other for further order or orders as to this
Court may deem fit and proper.
In the writ petition, the writ-petitioner stated, inter alia, that he was a
practising Advocate of the Supreme Court Bar Association and it was his
sacred duty as a citizen to safeguard and defend the Constitution and to
maintain its supremacy as the embodiment of the will of the people of
Bangladesh. The petitioner was also the Secretary General of the
534
Association for Democratic and Constitutional Advancement of
Bangladesh (ADCAB) which had been working for peoples awareness to
guard the violation of the Constitution and the rule of law. The main
contention of the petitioner in challenging the Thirteenth Amendment
passed by the Sixth Parliament introducing the concept of non-
representative government in the Constitution, was that the same was
ultravires the Constitution being violative of democracy, a basic and
fundamental structure of the Constitution and also being violative of the
mandatory provisions of article 142(1)(1A) of the Constitution. Although
the said amendment was passed by the Parliament disregarding the
Constitution, the President assented to it on 28
th
March, 1996 without
referring the question to a referendum as required under article 142(1)(1A)
of the Constitution to ascertain and assess the opinion of the people as to
whether the impugned Act in the form of bill should be assented to as the
same amended articles 48 and 56 of the Constitution.
Originally the writ petition was filed impleading Bangladesh,
represented by the Secretary, Ministry of law and Parliamentary Affairs;
Secretary, Jatiya Sangsad and the Chief Election Commissioner. After the
issuance of the Rule, one Mr. Amanullah Kabir was added as respondent
No.5 as an intervener. Thereafter the General Secretary, Bangladesh
Awami League and the Secretary General of Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) were added as respondent Nos.6 and 7 respectively. Respondent
Nos.1, 5 and 6 contested the Rule by filing affidavits-in-opposition
separately.
Respondent No.1, Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs by filing an affidavit-
535
in-opposition denied the statements made in the writ petition that the 13
th

Amendment incorporating articles 58A, 58B, 58C, 58D and 58E by way of
amendment to the Constitution introducing the concept of Non-Party Care-
taker Government, was violative of the basic and fundamental structures of
the Constitution i.e. the democracy and the democratic system of
government as enshrined in the Constitution. It was asserted that the 13
th

Amendment is, intra vires the Constitution. Free and fair election is
indispensable for the running of democracy and there cannot be any
democracy without giving the people free hand in electing their
representatives. But the experience showed that Parliamentary election
held during the period the party government remains in power is visited
with unlawful and illegal use of the government machinery by the party in
power affecting the fairness of the election, the manifestation of which
was amply demonstrated in Magura by-election held in 1994. As a result,
the then opposition political parties demanded Non-Party neutral Care-
taker Government while the general parliamentary election is held and the
impugned Act was passed pursuant to the said demand and it can easily be
seen that induction of the Non-Party neutral Caretaker Government is not
negative of democracy, rather it is an aid of democracy. The Thirteenth
Amendment has not amended articles 48 and 56 of the Constitution, but
has merely provided additional measures to be operative during a very
short period when the general parliamentary election would be held. Even
though it is assumed without conceding that the Thirteenth Amendment has
effected amendment of articles 48 and 56 of the Constitution as they stand
now, there was no necessity of holding a referendum inasmuch as the
provisions of clause (1A) to article 142(1) for holding a referendum is
536
ultravires the Constitution as this clause was not introduced in the
Constitution by an Act of Parliament, but it was introduced by a Martial
Law Proclamation in 1978 by a Martial Law Administrator. The Thirteenth
Amendment was passed to preserve and ensure democracy and effective
participation of the people in the affairs of the Republic and it is incorrect
to say that the exercise of government power for the interregnum period as
envisaged by the impugned Act is destructive of democratic values. There
was no illegality in holding the last general election and as such, the
question of condonation or of legalisation under the doctrine of State
necessity does not arise. The impugned act was passed on the demand of
the party now in power and the impugned Act being a valid amendment of
the Constitution the question (sic) repealing the impugned Act does not
arise. The Non-Party Care-taker Government during the period of general
parliamentary election is a settled question and accepted by the people and
all parties. The petitioner is a mere busy-body and is trying to unsettle the
settled issues which may create commotion in the polity and in such
situation, it is clear that this petition has not been made bonafide. (The
affidavit-in-opposition was sworn by the then Secretary, Ministry of Law,
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs on the 4
th
day of April, 2000).
Respondent No.5, Amanullah Kabir, in his affidavit-in-opposition,
contended, inter alia, that the petitioner had no locus standi to file the writ
petition. He was not aggrieved by the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. He was a mere busy-body and the writ petition was nothing
but an abuse of the process of the Court. The Thirteenth Amendment is not
ultravires the Constitution. The concept of Care-taker Government has
been incorporated in the Constitution with a view to institutionalise
537
democracy in Bangladesh. The impugned Thirteenth Amendment has been
made not in violation of article 142(1)(1A) of the Constitution. The
Thirteenth Amendment has not amended articles 48 and 56 of the
Constitution. In any view of the matter, article 142(1)(1A) is intravires the
Constitution. Bangladesh is a Westminister type democracy under the
written Constitution. Free and fair election is an essential pre-requisite of a
democracy. Unless a free and fair election is ensured, democracy cannot
survive. For various reasons, democracy is twilit affair in Bangladesh.
Democratic process was thwarted many times. With the exception of 1954
elections, all elections in this country under a party government were not
free and fair. There were widespread allegations of vote rigging and
manipulation of the elections by the party in power in the Parliament
election held in 1973, 1979, 1986, 1988 and February, 1996. As a result of
the sad and unhappy experiences of unfair elections under a party
government, the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh in 1984 for the first time
raised the demand of holding Parliamentary elections under a Care-taker
Government. Gradually, all opposition political parties of the country
agreed to this demand which became a popular issue and after the fall of
the then Government in 1990, Parliamentary elections for the first time
were held under a Care-taker Government in February, 1991. Thereafter,
by the Thirteenth Amendment, the concept of Care-taker Government was
incorporated in the Constitution with a view to institutionalise democracy.
The Care-taker Government is an aid of democracy which is one of the
basic pillars of the Constitution. Assuming but not conceding that the
impugned Thirteenth Amendment has amended articles 48 and 56 of the
Constitution, temporary suspension of any provision of the Constitution is
538
not an amendment within the meaning of article 142 of the Constitution.
The provision of article 142(1)(1A) together with other provisions of the
Constitution introduced by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979
is not void and inoperative inasmuch as the Fifth Amendment was
necessitated by the Fourth Amendment which destroyed the concept of
democracy and the rule of law. There was no necessity to go through any
referendum under article 142(1)(1A) of the Constitution. The question of
giving go-by to Parliament and President by the introduction of the non-
elected and non-representative Government, does not arise at all. The
concept of Care-taker Government has been misunderstood and
misinterpreted by the petitioner, the sole intention of which is to preserve
and protect democracy by ensuring the effective participation of the people
in running the affairs of the Government for all time to come. Because of
the introduction of the Care-taker Government for the brief period of 90
days, the fragile democracy in Bangladesh has survived. The concept of
Care-taker Government has been introduced in the Constitution to protect
and safeguard democracy. It is designed to be an aid of democracy and not
for its destruction. It was a popular demand. People have accepted it. It is
for the greater interest of the public good of the country. It is wholly
constitutional. The petitioner being a busy-body has filed the application
with the malafide intention of destroying the democracy of the country.
In the affidavit-in-opposition of respondent No.6, General Secretary,
Bangladesh Awami League, it was contended, inter alia, that Bangladesh
Awami League is a political party which has been spearheading the
struggle of the people of Bangladesh towards establishing a democratic
polity. The struggle for democracy stems from the very inception of the
539
party itself. The party actively participated in the language movement
followed by various struggles and demand for general election during those
days in Pakistan. It led the alliances to the provincial election in 1954 on
the basis of 21 points programme which included the social, political and
economic rights of the people of the then East Pakistan including the
demand for holding election on the basis of universal adult franchise and
autonomy and proper representation of the then East Pakistan. Though
Juktofront led by Awami League had a sweeping victory by defeating the
Muslim League the fruits of the election could not be enjoyed by the
people of the then East Pakistan because of imposition of Governors rule
under section 92A of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was further
followed by the repression and detention of the leaders of Awami League
and thousands of political activists in the country. The Governor General
took over the power by dissolving the Central Ministry and the Constituent
Assembly. Such unconstitutional steps were challenged in the Court. Again
Awami League helped to bring about a Constitution in which democracy
and an election through which a responsible accountable Government
could be formed. But instead of having an election under the provisions of
1956 Constitution, Martial Law was imposed in October, 1958;
Constitution was abrogated and no election was held in Pakistan until 1970.
In the meanwhile, Awami League advanced the six points programme, first
point is: holding free and fair election on one person one vote basis. An
election was won in 1970. Awami League held the majority seats. Though
Awami League prepared a draft Constitution on the basis of six points
programme, the Constituent Assembly was not allowed to sit and an unjust
war was inflicted to cleanse Bengali nation and its aspiration. Bangabandhu
540
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the elected representative having
overwhelming majority gave a clarion call to drive out the occupying
forces and declared independence of Bangladesh in the early hours of 26
th

March, (past midnight of 25 March), 1971 on the basis of which
proclamation of independence was made on 10
th
April, 1971 along with
Law Continuance Enforcement Order. Following victory over the
Pakistani occupying forces on 16
th
December, 1971 the Constituent
Assembly of Bangladesh consisting of all elected representatives framed
the Constitution of Bangladesh in which emphasis was given again on
democracy and democratic polity. In order to ensure democratic
governance, a free and fair election is a sine qua-non. The process of
election and electoral machinery went through gross abuse during the
period of martial law starting from yes/no vote upto the election of
Parliament. Election lost its credibility and through the so-called election
unconstitutional usurpers tried to legitimise their unconstitutional
usurpation in a pattern followed by both Martial Law regimes by adopting
the so-called Fifth and Seventh Amendments passed by the Parliament
brought into existence through rigged election. In 1990, all political parties
joined a mass movement which resulted in resignation of the regime known
as autocratic regime. General Ershad had to resign on the face of the
mass upsurge. He handed over power, as per the demand of the alliances of
all political parties, to the then Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Shahabuddin
Ahmed. The Government headed by the then Chief Justice brought about a
concept of neutral caretaker government introduced on the basis of public
demand in order to restore credibility to election for ushering in an elected
Government through free and fair election. The nature and the manner of
541
the struggle for democracy has taken different shapes in different countries
at different times of their development. The struggle for democracy is not
a one-act play, but an expression of a continuing urge for freedom, a
freedom to choose and in the process to empower the people. This
struggle, being the main theme of the political struggle of Bangladesh, was
manifested during Pakistan era, sometimes through language movement,
sometimes through resistance movement against autocracy, sometimes
through electoral campaign and at times through the struggle for autonomy,
having reached its climax in the war of independence, all having a common
thread and objectivity, forming the mainstream of struggle culminating in
an independent Bangladesh. The ideals and aspirations, the basic norms
and the values for which the valiant freedom fighters laid down their lives,
are embodied in the Constitution. The second phase of the struggle is: to
defeat the forces hijacking the State power, subverting the constitutional
and democratic process and to restore democratic process on the
constitutional rail. The respondent has further been struggling to protect,
sustain and cherish the constitutional sovereignty and integrity and thereby
to establish rule of law and the right to choose through a free and fair
election. Since the birth of Bangladesh, there have been two major
collapses of the constitutional regime, once with the killing of
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1975 and the other with the
dislodging of- an elected Government, in 1982. Independence was won in
1971 and a Constitution was given to the people through their elected
representatives in 1972 under the leadership of the father of the nation.
With his fall, the Constitution and the democracy fell. So fell, the rule of
law and human rights fell as well.
542
The second part of the struggle for restoration of constitutional
process and a democratic polity through free, fair electoral process, was led
by Sheikh Hasina as President of the party since her return from exile in
1982. The history of this struggle, a saga of our brave people, needs to be
appropriated in the perspective of a main theme, that is, the process through
which people struggle for their own empowerment while the political
struggle helps creating the environment for the people to exert their rights
and for the fulfilment of their democratic rights and aspirations. This can
be sustained only through a free and fair election which is fundamental
feature of democracy. The concept of neutral caretaker government as
envisaged by the people is a government which will be solely and
exclusively committed to the empowerment of the electorates free from
fear and pressure of muscle and money power, so that they can freely
choose the government they want. After the government was sworn in in
1991, Parliament passed the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution in
order to restore parliamentary democracy. But due to the gross abuse of the
electoral process in the past, the party which went to power in 1991 also
indulged in same kind of abuse, first in Mirpur by-election and then in
Magura by-election. People of Bangladesh, having experienced the gross
abuse, rigging, corrupt practices in election process and having confidence
in the Supreme Court and in free and fair election under the former Chief
Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, raised their voices in order to ensure free and
fair election under a neutral caretaker government, to become part of a
continuing constitutional dispensation. The demand started for the
introduction of neutral caretaker government as a feature in the
Constitution. But the Government, in power in 1996, without giving any
543
heed to such demand, held a so-called election on 15
th
February, 1996
which was boycotted by all opposition political parties. People en-mass
boycotted the so-called election. The Government showed over 60% turn
up of voters in the so-called election. The election was rejected en-mass by
the people and the nation. This led to 23 days of non-cooperation
movement, finally culminating in the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution hurriedly prepared and passed by the short
lived Parliament introducing a Care-taker Government to be headed, if
available by the immediate past Chief Justice of Bangladesh. On 31 March,
1996 a Care-taker Government was formed, of which the former Chief
Justice was made the Chief Adviser. The interim Government, thus evolved
in Bangladesh is the outcome of a political and historical process stated
hereinabove. This arose out of mass movement ultimately having
constitutional recognition by way of the Thirteenth Amendment. Under the
consecutive martial law, the electoral process was destroyed as evidenced
in 1979 and 1986. Election was perceived as a necessary compulsion for
the usurper in order to get a three-fourths majority to legitimize themselves.
Those regimes, then to ensure the legitimization process in order to give
the civilian look, played every possible trick to ensure three-fourths
majority. In the process, they prepared a rigging manual for election which
was known as made-up election by involving the entire administration. The
destruction and weakness of the electoral system was not only witnessed
under the unconstitutional regime, but the similar weakness surfaced during
a democratic regime as evidenced in Mirpur by-election and Magura by-
election and the latest in Dhaka-10 by-election held on 1
st
July, 2004. All
544
these abuses and derelictions justify holding of election under a neutral
caretaker government.
The respondent further contended that the neutral government, as
envisaged in the Thirteenth Amendment, is a short term administrative
mechanism and procedure for ensuring a full term truly elective,
representative and democratic government, which, as experienced, cannot
be accomplished by a partisan government, howsoever, elected. During the
days of the neutral caretaker government installed as per the Thirteenth
Amendment, the President, being elected and the government operated by a
Council of Advisers being responsible to the President, the representative
character of the Government as a whole is not totally lost. In the absence of
neutral caretaker government as envisaged in the Thirteenth Amendment,
in the original dispensation, the period assigned for preparation and holding
election and installing a new government, the Parliament stands dissolved,
the Prime Minister of the dissolved Parliament ceases to have
accountability to their constituents and the Cabinet is asked to continue as
the interim government, remains bereft of representative character and
accountability to the Parliament. In other words, had there been no
Thirteenth Amendment, the interim government, otherwise operating in the
period and set for preparation and holding the election and installing the
newly elected Parliament and the government, would have been non-
representative and non-accountable in the same way and manner as the
caretaker neutral government as envisaged in the Thirteenth Amendment.
The only difference between the caretaker government as under the
Thirteenth Amendment and the interim government of the period otherwise
for preparation and holding the election and installing the newly elected
545
government, is that the former is non-partisan and neutral and hence
capable of ensuring free and fair election while the latter is not as
experienced in the past. The caretaker neutral government under the
Thirteenth Amendment operates within the ambit of representative
responsibility of the President for aiding the Election Commission in
holding free and fair election and is not necessarily entitled and competent
to bring about substantial policy changes which remain within the domain
of the government to be elected. Such a government, therefore, cannot be
said to be a negation of the principle of democratic governance chosen by
the people of their free will from time to time. There is no reference to
articles 8, 48 or 56 or to the Preamble, in the bill introducing the
Amendment, hence there was no need or occasion for sending it to
referendum. Therefore, the President was not expected to get the bill
examined whether the bill had any connection remote or otherwise, with
articles 48 and 56 nor the Constitution contemplates such scrutiny which
cannot be resolved without a referendum perhaps by sending it to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, nor the question
was ever raised at the relevant time either in the Parliament or outside.
After two consecutive elections having been held and about eight years
having elapsed in the meanwhile the matter cannot now be reopened nor
process reversed. Article 48 cannot be interpreted in such manner to create
an obligation on the President which the President is not competent to
perform. Since the bill, on the face of it, did not mention about amendment
to articles 8, 48 and 56 or to the Preamble of the Constitution, there was no
scope for sending it to referendum. There is no reference to any of the
entrenched provisions as made in article 142(1)(1A). The President was
546
expected to follow the procedural part as far as the requirement so
warranted. Other than that Parliament was competent to pass an
amendment bill and it was so brought about by the Thirteenth Amendment
with two-thirds majority. The respondent joins issue with the petitioner as
to the democracy being the corner stone of the Constitution and it is not to
give a go-by to the system of a neutral caretaker government as formed.
This is not in order to introduce a non-elected, non-representative
government as alleged. But this has been brought in order to reinforce a
truly democratic government to be ushered in through a free and fair
election. It became a necessity, in a nascent democracy, an Election
Commission without the institutional support and with poor law enforcing
agencies, becomes vulnerable to power, pressure, money and muscle, Non-
Party Care-taker Government headed by immediate past former Chief
Justice was conceived. There is, however, need for improving the system
by introducing further checks and balances in selecting the members of the
Care-taker Government and its working mechanism to ensure that it does
not induce any erosion to the concept of independence of judiciary. But the
need for a caretaker government has become a constitutional necessity
from the historic experience of the major political parties as shared with
others and the electorate in general. Without a credible election, democracy
becomes a mockery and in the process of establishing democratic polity as
a whole; exercise of the governmental powers for the interregnum (i.e. 90
days period of caretaker government) cannot be destructive of the
democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, as a matter of fact, this
interregnum reassures and reaffirms the democratic continuity and
succession of power through democratic process by ensuring free and fair
547
election. Magura by-election did not bring about or threaten any
constitutional chaos as alleged, but the rigging of the by-election resulted in
complete loss of credibility in the electoral process. Awami League along
with all other political parties in the opposition reached a consensus that in
order to hold free and fair election neutral caretaker government was an
imperative and the entire people were mobilised behind this demand and
the concept received a universal acclamation by way of consensus. The
writ petition has been filed in order to reverse the course of constitutional
history purporting to destablise democratic polity. So, what the Parliament
would shy away from, the petitioner purports to get done through judicial
pronouncement. This being a political issue fulfilling a historic need ought
not to be so interfered with and a system discarded as it does not, in any
way, derogate the democratic norm and practice, but Thirteenth
Amendment provides a promise and a pledge of a neutral caretaker
government. This, as expected, ought to be able to deliver a free and fair
election, determined by the political will of the people, being the same
constitutional command as being determined by the political will of the
people.
The writ-petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-
opposition filed by respondent No.1 only reiterating the statements made in
the writ petition and stating further that it was not correct that he had no
locus standi to file the writ petition. It was not correct that during the
period the party Government remains in power is visited with unlawful and
illegal use of the Government machinery by the party in power affecting
the fairness of the election. It cannot be tacitly declared by the impugned
Amendment that elected and chosen representatives of the people in the
548
Parliament, who form the Government, are constitutionally inept, corrupt
and not reliable and incompetent to run the affairs of the Republic during
the general election in the country. The writ-petitioner also denied that the
impugned Act was passed to preserve and ensure democracy, and effective
participation of the people in the affairs of the Republic. The petitioner
denied the further statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition that Non-
Party Care-taker Government during the period of general parliamentary
election is a settled question and accepted by the people and all parties.
The general election to the Seventh Parliament was held under the colour
of the Thirteenth Amendment coupled with the doctrine of necessity, but
nevertheless, the impugned Act remains invalid.
The petitioner also filed two supplementary affidavits one on the 9
th

day of April, 2000 and the other on the 6
th
day of July, 2004. In the first
supplementary affidavit, the petitioner took an additional ground in support
of the main writ petition. In the second supplementary affidavit, it was
stated, inter alia, that under the amended Constitution by the impugned
Act, former Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Mohammad Habibur Rahman took
office as the Chief Adviser of the Care-taker Government, and after
announcement of the election result, Begum Khaleda Zia, the Chairperson
of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) termed the elections as elections of
rigging. The second general elections were held in 2001 under the Care-
taker Government of former Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Latifur Rahman who
took oath of office on 28.02.2001 at 7:30 p.m. and within a few hours at
night there was an administrative reshuffle even without forming his Care-
taker Government under article 58C of the amended Constitution. Sheikh
Hasina, President of Bangladesh Awami League, was critical and vocal;
549
she termed the assumption of the office of Care-taker Government as a
civilian coup (detats) and termed Justice Latifur Rahman a betrayer and
persona non grata. She gave statements to the press on different
occasions claiming vote-rigging disputing the neutrality of the former
Chief Justice. In his defense, the former Chief Justice maintained that he
had a home work before he took office, giving an impression that his
executive mind was, however, working since before his assumption of
office. The Chief Adviser of Care-taker Government has assumed a
political character, and the major political parties of the country have
developed a sense of political maneuvering in the appointment of Judges
keeping an eye on who will reign on the eve of the general elections. The
Supreme Court Bar Association raised its voice through a resolution dated
28.07.2002 against political appointments of Judges, when three
Additional Judges of the High Court Division appointed during Awami
League governance were not confirmed in 2002. The Government ignoring
the recommendation of the Chief Justice did not confirm six Additional
Judges of the High Court Division in 2003 who were appointed by the
predecessor Government, protesting which the Supreme Court Bar
Association by its resolution dated 21.02.2003 decided to assemble at the
entrance of the Supreme Court building on 22.02.2003. The Executive
Committee by its resolution dated 03.07.2003 decided to abstain from
attending the Courts of both the Divisions of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh on 05.07.2003 in order to uphold the independence of
judiciary and as a mark of protest against the lack of transparency in the
process of appointment and confirmation of Judges and repeated action of
the Government subjecting such process of appointment and confirmation
550
to undue political influence, interference.... In order to resolve the crisis
eight senior Advocates of the Supreme Court, namely: Dr. Kamal Hossain,
late lamented Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Dr. M. Zahir, Mr. Abdul Malek, Mr.
Mahmudul Islam, Mr. Mainul Hossain and Mr. Ajmalul Hossain made a
joint statement wherein they urged that independence of judiciary is a
fundamental pillar and an integral part of the basic structures of the
Constitution and the appointment of Judges is related with independence of
judiciary. They deprecated the introduction of party politics in the matter of
appointment of Judges and lastly appealed for a solution on the basis of
recommendation made by the Chief Justice. The political view of the
government also reflected in appointing the Judges of the Appellate
Division. Discussion was being made openly when the government
appointed a Judge in the Appellate Division superseding Mr. Justice Syed
Amirul Islam, the senior most Judge of the High Court Division. The Bar
in its General meeting held on 13.07.2003 viewed that the Chief Justice
would fail his constitutional duty in the event the Chief Justice
recommends any Judge other than Mr. Justice Syed Amirul Islam, or more
that (sic) one Judge with him for appointment in such vacancy of the
Appellate Division which will occur in August, 2003. The Bar further
decided to refrain from felicitating the newly appointed Judge of the
Appellate Division. The Senior Advocates of the Supreme Court Bar
Association made a joint Memorandum wherein they expressed their
concern that the present system for judicial appointment is liable to be
abused by the executive, has been abused in the past and is being abused
by the present executive in making appointments of Additional Judges of
the High Court Division, the appointment of permanent Judges of the High
551
Court Division, and appointment of Judges to the Appellate Division....
this crisis... irreparably damage our judicial system and the independence
of judiciary. The Bar in its General meeting held on 26.07.2003
unanimously approved and adopted the said Memorandum in presence of
the Senior Advocates, namely: Mr. Shawkat Ali Khan, Mr. Shafique
Ahmed, Mr. Abdul Baset Majumder, Mr. Ajmalul Hossain, Mr. A.B.M.
Nurul Islam, Mr. Rafique-ul Huq, Mr. Khondker Mahbub Hossain, Mr.
Muhammad Ayenuddin, Mr. Humayun Hossain Khan and other learned
Members of the Bar. Parliament by the Fourteenth 14
th
Amendment of the
Constitution extended the service period of the Judges by two years. The
Main opposition Awami League and other opposition parties linked this
amendment to accommodation of the former Chief Justice K.M. Hassan as
Chief Adviser of the next Care-taker Government.
These are all pleadings of the respective parties.
The Thirteenth Amendment was first challenged by one Syed
Mashiur Rahman by filing Writ Petition No.1729 of 1996. A Division
Bench comprising Mr. Justice Md. Mozammel Haque and Mr. Justice M.A.
Matin summarily rejected the writ petition mainly on the ground that the
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment did not fall within the definition of
alteration, substitution or repeal of any provision of the Constitution and as
such, it was not an amendment as contemplated under article 142 of the
Constitution. The learned Judges observed as follows:
Since the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment Act, as it
appears to us, do not come within definitions of alternation,
substitution or repeal of any provision of the Constitution and since
for temporary measures some provisions of the Constitution will
remain ineffective, we do not find any substance in the submission of
the petitioner that Article 56 of the Constitution had been in fact
amended by Thirteenth Amendment Act. It appears that those
552
provisions were made only for a limited period for 90 days before
holding general election after dissolution of the Parliament. We find
that no unconstitutional action was taken by the legislature and as
such we do not find any reason to interfere with Thirteenth
Amendment Act. We do not find any merit in the application. It is
summarily rejected.
This order was reported in 17BLD, 55.
Later, the petitioner of Writ Petition No.4112 of 1999 challenged the
Thirteenth Amendment as ultravires the Constitution and the Rule was
issued in the terms as quoted at the beginning of this judgment. A Division
Bench of the High Court Division comprising Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur
Rahman and Md. Abdul Awal, JJ, after hearing the learned Advocate for
the writ-petitioner and Mr. Fida M. Kamal, learned Additional Attorney
General for respondent No.1 and Mr. M. Amirul Islam for respondent No.6
passed an order on 21.07.2003 stating that since they could not agree with
the order passed in the case of Syed Muhammad Mashiur Rahman,
reported in 17 BLD 55, on the validity of the impugned Act, the matter
should be sent to the learned Chief Justice for a reference to a decision by a
Full Bench as required under rule 1 of Chapter VII of the High Court
Division Rules and accordingly, they sent the same to the learned Chief
Justice. The Division Bench while expressing their views on the point
whether the Thirteenth Amendment, in fact, amended articles 48 and 56 of
the Constitution refrained from considering the question whether the same
was violative of any basic structures of the Constitution. The learned Chief
Justice by his order dated 16.06.2004 constituted a Full Bench with
3(three) learned Judges of the High Court Division, namely: (a) Md. Joynul
Abedin, J (b) Md. Awlad Ali, J and (c) Mirza Hossain Haider, J to resolve
the issue. The prcis reference made to the Full Bench was as follows:
553
Having regard to the gravity and importance of the issues raised in
the writ petition, including that of destruction of basic structure of
the Constitution, we are of the opinion that the Full Bench, if
constituted, should decide all issues raised in the writ petition and
particularly the issue whether the Act 1/96 has caused amendment in
the provisions of Articles 48(3) and 56 of the Constitution requiring
assent thereto through referendum as contemplated by (sic) 142(1A),
(1B) and (1C) of the Constitution.

After hearing the writ petition, the Full Bench by the judgment and
order dated the 4
th
of August, 2004 discharged the Rule without any order
as to cost and at the same time gave certificate to appeal to this Division
under article 103(2)(a) of the Constitution on the prayer made by Mr. M. I.
Farooqi, learned Counsel for the writ-petitioner. The Full Bench while
discharging the Rule held as follows:
(i) The writ petition was maintainable.
(ii) The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (the
Act No.1 of 1996) is valid and constitutional.
(iii) The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 has
not amended the Preamble, articles 8, 48 and 56 of the
Constitution and it was, therefore, not required to be
referred to referendum.
(iv) The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 has
not affected or destroyed any basic structure or feature of
the Constitution, particularly the democracy and the
independence of judiciary.
(v) Clauses (1A), (1B) and (1C) to article 142 of the
Constitution are valid and consequently any amendment to
the Preamble and Articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution
must observe the formalities provided in clauses (1A), (1B)
and (1C) to Article 142 of the Constitution.

The Full Bench was presided over by Md. Joynul Abedin, J. Though
the two other learned Judges agreed to the conclusion and the result of the
Rule, each of them gave their own reasonings by writing separate
judgments in holding the views as stated hereinbefore. Because of the
certificate given by the Full Bench in the above backdrop, the writ-
petitioner, Mr. M. Saleem Ullah filed the appeal in question. The appellant
also filed Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.596 of 2005 which was
554
tagged to be heard along with the appeal. In the meantime, Mr. M. Saleem
Ullah died and in his place Mr. Md. Ruhul Quddus, Advocate and then Mr.
Abdul Mannan Khan were substituted. And presently, the appeal and the
leave petition are being prosecuted by Mr. Abdul Mannan Khan. And
accordingly, both the appeal and the leave petition have been heard
together and are disposed of by this judgment.
Concise statement has been filed on behalf of the appellant in
compliance with rule 1, Order XIX of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
(Appellate Division) Rules, 1988. In the concise statement, nothing new
has been stated other than the grounds on which the Thirteenth Amendment
was challenged before the High Court Division.
Respondent No.1 has also filed concise statement in compliance with
rule 2 of Order XIX of the above mentioned Rules praying for dismissal of
the appeal. In the concise statement of the respondent, no new point has
been taken or urged other than the points taken and urged in the affidavit-
in-opposition filed before the High Court Division. In the concise statement
4(four) reasons have been taken, reason No.I relates to referendum under
article 142(1)(1A) of the Constitution which has lost its legal force in view
of the judgment passed by this Division in Civil Petition for Leave to
Appeal Nos.1044 and 1045 of 2009 arising out of judgment and order
dated 29
th
August, 2005 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition
No.6016 of 2000 name of the parties being Bangladesh Italian Marble
Works Limited-vs-Government of Bangladesh and others commonly
known as Fifth Amendment case. Reason Nos.II, III and IV are as follows:
II. Because, the member of the Parliament being elected for a
certain period and Prime Minister being the member of the
Parliament is being requested by the President to continue till
555
the next government enter into the office for this period is not
as a public representative, thus argument of the writ petitioner
that the Caretaker Government being not elected by the people
cannot be continued to run the Country is not a valid argument
and thus not tenable.
III. Because, democracy is one of the basic feature of the
Constitution and for effective running and practice of the
democracy the Constitution having been amendment(sic)
incorporating System of Caretaker Government, same can not
be treated as unconstitutional.
IV. Because the Articles of the Constitution having not been
amended on the other hand some Articles have been added
without changing the form of Government or system for
running the State, the claim of the appellate(sic) that by 13
th

Amendment the basic feature of the Constitution has been
changed is not correct.

As constitutional points of great public importance are involved in
the appeal and the leave petition, Mr. T. H. Khan, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Mr.
Rafique-ul Huq, Dr. M. Zahir, Mr. Mahmudul Islam, Mr. Rokanuddin
Mahmud and Mr. Ajmalul Hossain, were appointed as amici curiae to
assist the Court. Though Mr. M. Amirul Islam represented respondent No.6
before the High Court Division, he was also appointed as an amicus curiae.
Mr. M. I. Farooqui, learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant and
leave petitioner, has submitted that by the Thirteenth amendment, two basic
structures of the Constitution, namely, democracy and independence of
judiciary have been destroyed. Therefore, the amendment is liable to be
declared ultra vires the Constitution. He has elaborated his argument by
submitting that by the Thirteenth Amendment article 48, a key-stone of the
Constitution, has been amended. He, by referring to clause (2) of article 55
has submitted that because of the Thirteenth Amendment, the provisions of
article 55 shall remain suspended and thus the mandate of the people, who
elected the Prime Minister, has been taken away and thus the supremacy of
556
the people has been undermined; by inserting article 58A in the
Constitution except clauses (4), (5) and (6) of article 55, all other
provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution have been made ineffective
during the Non-Party Care-taker Government and thus what was grafted in
the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, has been done away with.
Mr. Farooqui has further submitted that the Thirteenth Amendment, in fact,
has amended the preamble and articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution.
Therefore, before assenting to the bill by the President, the same was
required to be sent to a referendum under article 142(1)(1A) of the
Constitution, but that was not done and thus the Thirteenth Amendment
was made without following the constitutional mandate and as such, the
same is liable to be declared ultravires the Constitution. He has further
submitted that because of the Thirteenth Amendment, the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government has been brought into the Constitution in
place of the elected representatives of the people and thereby the Republic
and the democratic structure of the Constitution which were engrafted in
the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, have been given a go-by;
during the Non-party Care-taker Government the executive power of the
Republic shall vest in the Chief Adviser, an unelected person for 90
(ninety) days and thereby the mandate as given in article 7 of the
Constitution that All powers in the Republic belong to the people shall be
nowhere, but the Full Bench while finding the Thirteenth Amendment
intravires the Constitution has failed to consider this aspect of the case in
its true perspective.
Mr. Farooqui has further submitted that in the Thirteenth
Amendment provisions for appointment of the retired Chief Justices of
557
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division as Chief Adviser of the
Caretaker Government having been made, the independence of judiciary
has been impaired, as in view of their chances to become the Chief Adviser
of the Care-taker Government, while in service they might be tempted to be
influenced in their decision in favour of the authority keeping an eye upon
a future appointment; the provisions for making the retired Chief Justices
and the retired Judges of this Division as the Chief Adviser of the Non-
Party Care-taker Government by the Thirteenth Amendment has politicised
the office of the Chief Justice making it vulnerable to all sorts of
maneuvering and political attacks and by such provisions, separation of
powers, another basic structure of the Constitution, has also been
destroyed, but the learned Judges of the High Court Division wrongly
found that the impugned amendment has not impaired the independence of
judiciary and separation of powers. He has further submitted that by
amending article 61 of the Constitution, the concept of two executives, that
is, a dyarchy has been injected in the Constitution whereas the framers of
the Constitution conceived only one executive to be headed by the Prime
Minister and this has also added to the destruction of the Republic
character of the Constitution; with reference to article 58C he has argued
that succession to the office of the Chief Adviser starts from clause (3)
thereof and if the succession fails and eventually, the President takes over
as the Chief Adviser then he has a chance to become autocratic and in that
case, the democratic character of the Republic shall totally be destroyed
and on that count the Thirteenth Amendment does not also stand to
scrutiny. Mr. Farooqui has further submitted that in case the President is
compelled to summon the Parliament under the situation as contemplated
558
in clause (4) of article 72 of the Constitution during the tenure of the Non-
party Care-taker Government, there shall be an anomaly causing
uncertainty in the country what would happen to the immediate Prime
Minister and thus the country shall run in vacuum, but the Full Bench has
failed to consider this aspect of the case in considering the vires of the
Thirteenth Amendment. He, by referring to the developments, which took
place during the last Care-taker Government during the period 2006-2008,
which have been brought to the notice of this Division by filing an
application under the head An application for bringing on record the
developments during the last Care-taker Government of the period 2006-
8, has further submitted that the Non-Party Care-taker Government failed
to work, so there is no reason to keep it in the Constitution. He, by referring
to article 58D, has further argued that the said newly inserted article shows
that the Non-Party Care-taker Government shall discharge its functions as
an interim Government and shall carry on the routine functions of such
Government with the aid and assistance of persons in the services of the
Republic; and except in the case of necessity for the discharge of such
functions, it shall not make any policy decision, but in an emergency such
as, on foreign policy matter, there cannot be anything as routine functions
and decision has to be given immediately, so Non-Party Care-taker
Government suffers from lack of proper authority to take decision on
policy matter and as such, is not an effective system of governance for 90
days and for such lack of power on such Government, the country may
suffer. Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment cannot stand in the
Constitution and the same has to be declared ultravires the Constitution.
559
Mr. Farooqui in support of his contentions has referred to the cases
of Jamil Haque and others-vs-Bangladesh and others, 34 DLR(AD) 125,
Mujibur Rahman-vs-Government of Bangladesh 44DLR(AD) 111, Abdul
Bari Sarker-vs-Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of
Establishment and others 46 DLR(AD) 37, Secretary, Ministry of Finance-
vs- Md. Masdar Hossain and others 20 BLD(AD) 104=52 DLR(AD) 82,
Anwar Hossain Chowdhury-vs-Government of Bangladesh, represented by
the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, 41DLR(AD)165=BLD special
issue, Ruhul Quddus, Advocate-vs-Justice M.A. Aziz 60 DLR, 511.
Mr. Farooqui has also referred to the correspondence between
President Roosevelt and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States of America which took place in 1942 as was reproduced in
an article written by Mr. M.A. Mutaleb, Advocate, Mymensingh Bar
Association in 29 DLR.
Mr. Muhammad Mohsen Rashid, learned Counsel, appearing for the
appellant and petitioner with the leave of the Court has made submissions
in line with Mr. M.I.Farooqui and has further added that by the impugned
amendment, the role of the people of Bangladesh has been denied for 90
days, as during this period the country shall be governed by the unelected
people and by such constitutional dispensation, the supremacy of the
people as enshrined in article 7 as well as the preamble of the Constitution
has been impaired, therefore, the impugned Thirteenth Amendment is
liable to be declared ultravires the Constitution. Mr. Mohsen Rashid has
relied upon the case of Kesavananda Bharati-vs-State of Kerala, AIR 1973
(SC) 1467 in addition to the cases relied upon by Mr. Farooqui.
560
Although, as per the precedence, the learned Attorney General was
supposed to argue first, he opted to argue last. Accordingly, I have noted
the submissions of the amici curiae first as per their seniority and then the
learned Attorney General.
Mr. T. H. Khan has submitted that points raised by the appellant in
the appeal as well as in the leave petition have been correctly answered by
the Full Bench comprising 3(three) learned Judges upon lengthy
discussions and as such, the impugned judgment and order does not call for
any interference by this Division. Mr. Khan has further submitted that
before striking down the Thirteenth Amendment, the history behind
passing it, has to be taken into consideration and also to see why the then
Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was approached to become the Acting
President of the country in 1990 when the autocrat General Ershad had to
resign as a result of mass movement. He has further submitted that the
Constitution of any country is not a revelation and is amendable to
amendment to suit the need of the people and the State, and the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution was brought in the Constitution to
strengthen democracy and not to destroy it, because the concept of interim
Government as provided in articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the Constitution
failed to work to ensure free, fair, impartial and credible general election of
members of Parliament. He has further submitted that election is the
vehicle of democracy as without wheels a vehicle cannot move, similarly
without free and fair election democracy cannot work. To ensure the
democratic right of the people, the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted and
thus, to empower them to select their own representatives. The main
purpose behind the introduction of the concept of Non-party Care-taker
561
Government in the Constitution was to have a free, fair and impartial
general election of members of Parliament. He referred to the great saying
of Sir Winston Churchill:
At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man,
walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross
on a little bit of paper no amount of rhetoric or voluminous
discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of
the point.

and submitted that the concept of Care-taker Government has been brought
in the Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment to ensure the right of vote
of the little man of Churchill; under the concept of Non-Party Care-taker
Government 3(three) general elections of members of Parliament have
already been held and the people by participating in those three elections,
on a large scale, elected their representatives to form the government and
thus, they have accepted the system. So, the question of declaring the
Thirteenth Amendment as ultravires the Constitution does not arise at all.
Mr. Khan has also submitted that the provisions made in the Thirteenth
Amendment making the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the
retired Judge of this Division eligible to be the Chief Adviser has, in no
way, impaired the independence of judiciary; article 96(2) of the
Constitution has ensured that no Judge shall be removed from his office
except in accordance with the provisions as stipulated in clauses (3)-(7)
thereof. Therefore, the tenure of a Judge being fully secured, the Chief
Justice or Judge of this Division who is supposed to be the Chief Adviser
after retirement has no reason to be apprehensive of his office and as such,
there is no reason to be influenced or allured to perform the judicial
function as a sitting Judge in favour of the authorities keeping an eye upon
562
such future appointment. Mr. Khan has lastly suggested that since the
Prime Minister has already spoken about the amendment of the
Constitution very soon the matter may be left to the Parliament to reform
Non-Party Care-taker Government, if any. However, he contended that
Non-Party Care-taker Government is a must for sustaining democracy, a
basic structure of the Constitution, so the Thirteenth Amendment has to
stay in the Constitution.
Dr. Kamal Hossain has submitted that this Court has a special role to
play as a guardian of the Constitution and in interpreting any provision of
the Constitution, this Division should not approach in a mechanical way
and should keep in mind that the constitutional process is carried on and
extra-constitutional force does not get chance to intervene in the
matter. He has further submitted that the Constitution is a living document
and must be durable and at the same time, it has to be responsive to the
need of the people keeping intact its basic structures and interpretation has
to be given to give life to it. He has further submitted that the
constitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment has to be looked into
keeping in view the whole scheme of the Constitution, the aspiration of our
forefathers as well as the object and reason in passing the same; it was
through a historic liberation struggle that we won our right to make a
Constitution, the dreams which were woven into the constitutional
demands were those of a democratic political order in which power would
truly belong to the people to be exercised through a sovereign parliament,
composed of representatives elected on the basis of universal adult
franchise through free and fair elections, free from manipulation by money
563
and muscle and would be totally committed to end exploitation through
implementing programme for fundamental economic and social change,
but that was impaired because general election of members of Parliament
under the party Government lost all its credibility and in the name of
election what happened could not be said to be election. Dr. Hossain re-
called the situation under which the then autocrat President General Ershad
had to resign in 1990 and Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, the then Chief
Justice had to take over the office of the Acting President of the country
who had held a fair and impartial election of members of Parliament, and
then Magura-2 by-election held on 20.03.1994 and the movement by all the
political parties and the members of the civil society to evolve a method
and mechanism to hold free and fair election and then the consensus of all
the political parties of the mechanism of Non-Party Care-taker Government
as a life-saving of the Constitution and the party in power which came to
power through the election of members of Parliament held on 15.02.1996
passed the Thirteenth Amendment by two-thirds majority with the sole
motive to hold free, fair and impartial general elections of members of
Parliament so that the people can choose their representatives who in turn
would form the government and thus the peoples supremacy as enshrined
in article 7 of the Constitution has been ensured and successive elections
have already been held under the new dispensation and thus, the people
have accepted the mechanism. So, the question of declaring the Thirteenth
Amendment ultravires the Constitution does not arise at all. He has further
submitted that the approach which the apex court should adopt is to
recognize that the impugned amendment was made in the context of the
situation which prevailed in 1996 and the experience of holding free, fair
564
and impartial general election of the members of Parliament held in 1990
when Chief Justice, Shahabuddin Ahmed was the acting President of the
country. He has further submitted that understanding from the broader
aspect, the legitimacy of the Sixth Parliament which passed the Thirteenth
Amendment cannot be challenged as the next Parliament was known as
Seventh Parliament and although all major political parties boycotted the
election held on 15.02.1996, the Thirteenth amendment was passed by the
Sixth Parliament as consensus of all parties including the party in power
and they also participated in the subsequent elections.
Dr. Kamal Hossain has further submitted that the argument that the
amendment of article 61 of the Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment
has created dyarchy and given dictatorial powers to the President is
tendentious and show lack of understanding of a constitutional mechanism
adopted by consensus to meet the widely shared concern to supplement the
Election Commissions capacity to ensure free and fair election. He
concluded by saying that the Thirteenth Amendment has not, in any way,
impaired democracy, the Republic character of Bangladesh and the
independence of judiciary as well as separation of powers.
In support of his contentions, Dr. Hossain referred to the cases of
Secretary Ministry of Finance-vs-Md. Masdar Hossain and others 52
DLR(AD) 82, S.P.Gupta V.M. Tarkunde, J. L. Kalra and others, AIR 1982
(SC) 149, Abdul Bari Sarkder-vs- Bangladesh and others 46 DLR(AD) 32,
Constitutional Law of Bangladesh by Mr. Mahmudul Islam, Second
Edition pages 25 and 29, page 14 of Amarta Sens, The Argumentative
Indian Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identical, Picador, 1
st

565
Edition, 2006 and page 73 of Chapter III, The politics of Wealth of Al
Gores, The Assault on reason, The Penguin Press (USA), 2007.
Mr. Rafique-ul Haque has submitted that the concept of Non-Party
Care-taker Government is contrary to the basic structures of the
Constitution, but it is an evil necessity in order to ensure free and fair
general elections of members of Parliament. He has further submitted that
there was provision for Care-taker Government in the Constitution itself for
holding general election of members of Parliament when the Parliament is
dissolved; under articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the Constitution, the Prime
Minister and the other Ministers continue till election is held and the new
Prime Minister enters upon his office. But the concept of Non-Party Care-
taker Government was introduced in 1996 in a very critical situation in the
country; people lost confidence in the then Government as to the general
election of members of Parliament and accordingly, it was proposed that
the Non-Party Care-taker Government should be formed. At the relevant
time, BNP was in power, the demand was from all the other political
parties to have a Non-Party Care-taker Government for the purpose of
holding free, fair and impartial general election of members of Parliament
and after series of discussions such idea was approved as a consensus
including the party in power and accordingly, the Thirteenth Amendment
was passed by the Members of Sixth Parliament. Mr. Haque has further
submitted that though the concept of Non-Party Care-taker Government is
contrary to the basic structures of the Constitution, if the same is abolished
then 1/11 may come again, so he has submitted that the system should be
continued. He has made a categorical submission that even if the highest
Court declares the Thirteenth Amendment as illegal, the BNP will not
566
participate in election, then again there will be chaos in the country like,
1996. Mr. Haque opposes the involvement of judiciary directly with the
Non-Party Care-taker Government because it has raised an apprehension in
the mind of the litigant people that in view of such provision whether they
can expect free, fair and impartial decision from the Judges and there is
also a chance of unhealthy competition of superseding the senior Judge. He
has further submitted that in order to hold free and fair election, Election
Commission should be strengthened with wide powers. He has also given a
suggestion as to the formation of a Caretaker Government without the
retired Chief Justice of Bangladesh and the retired Judge of this Division as
the Chief Adviser.
Dr. M. Zahir, echoing with the submission of Mr. Rafique-Ul Haque,
has submitted that the Non-Party Care-taker Government is against the
basic structures of the Constitution. The concept of Non-Party Care-
taker Government is a natural stigma/| on the honesty of all political
parties and the elected Government of this country. He, however, by
referring to the Care-taker Government of Australia, has suggested a
modality of a Care-taker Government instead the present one with
10(ten) persons, 5(five) each to be nominated by the leader of the house
and the leader of the opposition respectively in presence of the President
who will form the Caretaker Government. He has further suggested that in
selecting the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Commissioners,
the system as followed in India may be adopted. He has also suggested that
at the time of election, the Army must be under the Command of the
Election Commission and before election voters list must be prepared
within a period of 30(thirty) days.
567
Mr. M. Amir-ul Islam, has submitted that merely holding an
election, cannot give legitimacy to the result of the election unless the
process of such election is transparent. He has further submitted that our
past experience shows that the election held under the political Government
was not free and fair and the people who are the supreme authority to
decide their representatives could not exercise their right of adult franchise
because their votes were hijacked by muscle power and money. By
referring to the Proclamation of Independence, the Preamble and article 7
of the Constitution, Mr. Islam has submitted that people are the master to
select their representatives to form the Government and to ensure that free
and fair election is a must; free and fair election is no less a fundamental
right than the other fundamental rights and the political justice has to be
ensured by the State to its citizens for which the country has been liberated
and that political justice can be ensured through a free and fair election
which the people of this country could not exercise in the past in the
election held under the political government and as a consequence of the
peoples movement and then on the basis of consensus, the Thirteenth
Amendment was passed by the Sixth Parliament. He has further submitted
that in our Constitution as well as many other Constitutions such as India
and Pakistan, there are provisions for interim government to carry on with
the administration for the period in between the dissolution of Parliament
and till the successor enters upon office on the basis of next election of
Parliament. In this regard, he referred to clause (3) of article 72 of the
Constitution and submitted that after the dissolution of Parliament the
tenure of the elected Government expires and then the elected Government
which remains in power ceases to have been elected and representative
568
character. So, there is nothing wrong in the mechanism of Non-Party Care-
taker Government to be manned by the unelected people for 90 (ninety)
days and the objection raised by the appellant against the system is mere
technicality and the introduction of Non-party Care-taker Government in
the Constitution has not, in any way, destroyed democracy, a basic feature
of the Constitution. He has further submitted that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not come into the Constitution in an easy way and it was
the outcome of the peoples movement which, in fact, had its root in
Magura by-election. In this regard, he traced back the history behind
enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment as detailed in the affidavit-in-
opposition filed on behalf of respondent No.6 before the High Court
Division and he continued to submit that by the Thirteenth Amendment, the
boat of democracy, which was about to sink, was salvaged and the peoples
right to vote freely and fairly has been restored. So, in effect the democratic
right of the people has been protected rather than destroyed. Mr. Islam has
further submitted that the Thirteenth Amendment has no constitutional
problem, the same having been passed on consensus by all political parties
including the party in power. Mr. Islam has lastly contended that the
Thirteenth amendment, in no way, has impaired democracy and
independence of the judiciary at all and therefore, the question of declaring
the same ultravires the Constitution does not arise at all. However, he, like
Mr. T.H.Khan, has suggested that improvement may be made in the system
in the experience of the last 3(three) Care-taker Government, but that must
be on the basis of consensus amongst the political parties as was reached in
1996.
569
Mr. Amirul Islam in support of his submissions has referred to the
cases of Election Commission, represented by the Chairman (Chief
Election Commissioner) vs-Alhaj Advocate Mohammad Rohmat Ali M.P.
and others 26 BLD (AD) 121, Marbury vs- Madison 1 Crunch 137 (1803)
and Dred Scott-vs- Sondford, 19 Howard 393 (1857).
Mr. Mahmudul Islam, at the very outset, has submitted that the
constitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment has to be examined
accepting that there is no Fifth Amendment in the Constitution. He has
further submitted that constitutionality of a provision of the Constitution
cannot be decided without considering the context behind passing the
same. Mr. Mahmudul Islam like the other amici curiae: Mr. T.H. Khan, Dr.
Kamal Hossain, Mr. Amirul Islam, recalled the incidents and the other
experiences which the people of the country had in the elections held under
the political Government in the past including Magura-2 by-election and
the movement of all opposition political parties including the civil society
and then the people at large for a mechanism for holding the general
election of members of Parliament in a free and fair manner; democracy
and democratic process as contemplated in the Constitution can only be
possible when there is free and fair election; but things came to such a pass
that rigging, in the election by the party in power, became the rule rather
than an exception and Magura by-election offered the example of worst
form of rigging; all opposition political parties other than the party in
power protested and took to the street, there was serious erosion in the law
and order situation, public works came to a standstill; in the meantime,
Parliaments tenure came to an end and an election without participation of
the major political parties except BNP took place, and after much haggling,
570
a political accord was reached which resulted in the Thirteenth Amendment
and a reasonably free and fair election took place for constitution of the
Seventh Parliament and all these efforts were made to save democracy and
to keep the constitutional process going on. Mr. Islam referred to a similar
situation which prevailed in Pakistan in March, 1977, when Bhuttos party
won the general election with a thumping majority, opposition parties
alleged massive rigging in the election, there was passionate agitation and
disturbance resulting in loss of lives, inter-party negotiations failed on the
issue of an interim authority with adequate powers to supervise fresh
election. As a result, the Army Chief of Staff imposed Martial Law; the
difference between the two situations is obvious he submitted. In our
country, the parties agreed to have election during the regime of neutral
Care-taker Government during the period of general election of members
of Parliament and thus saved democracy from the imposition of Martial
Law, while in Pakistan democracy suffered because of failure to agree on
the issue of Care-taker Government.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam has further submitted that this Division has a
responsibility to see the likely consequences if the Thirteenth Amendment
is declared ultravires; if the Thirteenth Amendment is held invalid today, it
is almost certain that the opposition parties will not participate in the
election and then democracy will be a far cry; it is true that the provisions
of the Thirteenth Amendment suspends representative Government for
short interregnum, but ensures operation of democracy in the country. He
has further submitted that in social engineering, there is no panacea which
can cure all political maladies in all places, and for all times, what suits
Great Britain may not suit Bangladesh. In the present context of the
571
political maturity of the people of Bangladesh, in his opinion, there is no
alternative to holding election under a Care-taker Government to preserve
the democratic character of the Constitution and the country and
democracy has to be suspended for a little while for its ultimate survival. In
a representative democracy like ours, people select their representatives in
a free and fair election and we tried to do so in the English way, but failed
and then came the Thirteenth Amendment. He has further submitted that
when the Head of the State is elected by the people, either directly or
indirectly, the State is called a Republic and the Constitution is said to have
provided a Republic character. Article 48(1) clearly provides that the
President will be the Head of the State and he shall be elected by the
peoples representatives in Parliament in accordance with the law made by
Parliament in this behalf. The Thirteenth Amendment has not introduced
any provision which can be said to have altered article 48(1) in any manner
and therefore, by the Thirteenth Amendment the Republican character of
the Constitution has not been changed. In a representative democracy, it is
the people who select their representatives in an election held in a free and
fair manner and if the Non-Party Care-taker Government system goes then
money and muscle power will rule in the election and in the process, the
thugs and the thieves will get elected and thus, the democracy will again be
a far cry and thus the supremacy of the people as enshrined in article 7 of
the Constitution will be nowhere. He has further submitted that he does not
see any impediment for the learned Judges to perform the judicial functions
independently and thus, impairing the independence of judiciary because of
the Thirteenth Amendment. He, by referring to a decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court as quoted in the Book titled Canadian Constitutional Law,
572
Fourth Edition, has submitted that security of tenure, financial security and
Administrative independence are the 3(three) core characteristics or
essential conditions of judicial independence and that it is a pre-condition
to judicial independence that they be maintained and be seen by a
reasonable person who is fully informed of all the circumstances to be
maintained and the Constitution has guarded all the above 3(three)
conditions, so the argument that by the Thirteenth Amendment, the
independence of judiciary has been destroyed, has no factual and legal
basis.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam has further submitted that the Thirteenth
Amendment has not made any provision for appointment of the sitting
Chief Justice of Bangladesh or a sitting Judge of this Division as the
Chief Adviser and when a Judge retires, be it the Chief Justice or the
Judge of this Division, he ceases to be a part of judiciary and by the
appointment of a retired Chief Justice or Judge of this Division as the
Chief Adviser, the judiciary will not, in any way, be involved. He
continued to submit that unless any Court or its presiding officer goes for
judicial legislation or is entrusted with some core Administrative work
question of impingement of another basic structure of the Constitution,
separation of powers, cannot be alleged. Mr. Mahmudul Islam has
further submitted that if the Thirteenth Amendment is struck down free
and fair election of Parliament shall be an illusion and in the process the
democracy shall get a set back. Non-Party Care-taker Government
system must be there because of the social and political situation of our
country. He has further submitted that a law cannot be declared invalid
because it can be abused and if there is any abuse of the law, judiciary is
573
there to adjudicate such abuse; some imaginary or etherial idea such as a
Chief Justice or a Judge of this Division who has chance to become the
Chief Adviser may be allured and for some reason may be influenced by
the highest executive and may become partisan and may act in a manner
subservient to the Government and thus, the independence of judiciary may
be impaired, shall not make a law invalid and he has submitted that the
Thirteenth Amendment is, in no way, ultravires the Constitution.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam has lastly submitted that in the recent past the
power to constitute caretaker government had been abused, but merely for
such abuse, the 13
th
Amendment cannot be held unlawful and measures are
to be taken to prevent such abuse rather than abolition of the system
introduced by the amendment; reform of the provisions of law to prevent
its abuse is the combined function of the Executive and the Legislature and
not of the Judiciary and that endeavour is at present being done by a
Special Committee of Parliament and therefore, there is no need to disturb
the committee. Mr. Islam in support of his contentions has referred to the
cases of Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangaldesh-vs-
Md. Masdar Hossain and others 20BLD(AD)104 =52DLR(AD)82 and
Walter Valente-vs-Her Majesty the Queen, (1985) 2 R.C.S 673.
Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud has submitted that the Thirteenth
Amendment was the outcome of the emotion of the entire nation. He re-
called the circumstances which prevailed in the country before passing the
Thirteenth Amendment prompting the Sixth Parliament to pass the same. A
Care-taker Government system was already in the Constitution; after the
tenure of Parliament expired, the Government in power continued to hold
the office of Prime Minister until his successor entered upon the office and
574
if such system was acceptable, there was no reason to declare the
Thirteenth Amendment ultravires the Constitution as the existing system
has simply been replaced by the Non-Party Care-taker Government to
ensure free, fair and impartial general election of members of Parliament.
He has further submitted that in the Constitution, there is a scheme as to
how democracy shall work and be practised and to understand that if article
7 of the Constitution is read with the preamble of the Constitution, it will
appear that people is supreme and all powers belong to them and the
Thirteenth Amendment is based on article 7 of the Constitution as it has
ensured peoples participation in the general election of members of
Parliament to select their own representatives to form the Government in a
free and fair election which became simply impossible under the political
Government. In this regard, he continued to submit that the people of the
country have already witnessed the benefit of the Thirteenth Amendment as
in the 3(three) elections held under the Non-party Care-taker Government,
they could go to the polling centers and cast their votes freely without any
influence of money and muscle. He has also made an oblique reference to
the elections previously held under the political government by saying that
previously no Government in power was ousted through election process
which could not happen in a democracy and if the margin of votes are
taken into account, then it will be seen the election under the party in
power was not free and fair. And only after the introduction of Thirteenth
Amendment in the Constitution, the party in power was ousted because
they did not secure necessary numbers of seats of members of Parliament
to form the Government. He has further submitted that independence of
judiciary is definitely a basic structure of the Constitution and by the
575
Thirteenth amendment, the independence of judiciary has not, at all, been
impaired. Part-VI of the Constitution has dealt with judiciary and this part
has no connection with the legislature and the executive and the Thirteenth
Amendment has, in no way, touched the functioning either of the Chief
Justice of Bangladesh or the Judges of this Division or any Judge of the
High Court Division independently. He elaborated his submissions by
pointing out that the executive only gives appointment of the Judges and
then they have no control over them and the Judges perform their functions
independently and a Judge can be removed by the Supreme Judicial
Council only after following the procedure as laid down in clauses (3) to
(7) of article 96 of the Constitution. He has further pointed out that no
guideline has been prescribed in the Constitution as to what would amount
to gross misconduct and the procedure to be followed in the matter of
inquiry by the Supreme Judicial Council and it is the prerogative of the
Supreme Judicial Council to decide what would amount to such gross
misconduct of a Judge and what procedure would be followed by it in
holding the inquiry. He has further submitted that Parliament has no power
to constitute the Bench to hear a case and it is the Chief Justice who
constitutes the Bench. The power of judicial review of this Court also has,
in no way, been affected or touched by the Thirteenth Amendment. And he
posed a question, then how has the independence of judiciary been
impaired? It is the mere hypothetical feeling of the writ-petitioner that the
independence of judiciary has been impaired without giving due attention
to the constitutional provisions which have ensured the independence of the
Judges to dispense justice to the litigant people, as per their oath, they have
taken. To head the Non-Party Care-taker Government by the retired Chief
576
Justice and the retired Judge of this Division was the only choice of the
people who were fighting to have a free and fair election and no other post
or person was acceptable to the people and, in fact, the choice of the post of
retired Chief Justices and the retired Judge of this Division rescued the
situation and such device could neither be said to be undemocratic nor
destructive of the independence of judiciary; the people of this country has
got the highest respect and faith in the judiciary which is reflected in their
demand when they ask for judicial inquiry to find out the truth of any
incident of public importance and in fact, the Judges of the Supreme Court
or the members of the Subordinate Judiciary conduct such inquiries. He
drew our attention to the fact that Chief Justice, Shahabuddin Ahmed after
having performed as the Acting President of the country came back to the
judiciary and again performed as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and
retired as such, but nobody could question his neutrality and impartiality as
a Judge; what Chief Justice, Shahabuddin did is that he stayed back in the
cases which were decided during his time as Acting President. And this
fact itself, prima-facie, shows how a Judge performs his adjudicative
functions with independence and impartiality keeping his oath in mind. The
post of Chief Adviser is a political office, so there is a chance of criticism,
but it is the retired Chief Justice or the retired Judge of this Division, as the
case may be, who will hold the office. Therefore, the criticism of the Chief
Adviser, if there be any, shall, in no way, have any impact upon the
Judiciary and Independence of the sitting Judges as they will be performing
their functions as per their oath which they took after their appointment.
Lastly, Mr. Mahmud echoed the voice of Mr. Mahmudul Islam that
it is not correct to say that during the Non-Party Care-taker Government,
577
the country will be run totally by unelected people because the President to
whom the Non-Party Care-taker Government shall be collectively
responsible is the person elected and therefore, neither the Republican
character of the country nor the democracy will be absent during the short
period of 90(ninety) days, so the question of declaring the 13
th
Amendment
as ultravires the Constitution does not arise at all.
Mr. Ajmalul Hossain has made submissions in line with Mr. M.I.
Farooqui, Mr. Mohsen Rashid and Dr. M. Zahir. He has very strongly
echoed with them that the Thirteenth Amendment has destroyed the
3(three) basic structures of the Constitution, namely: the democracy, the
independence of judiciary and the separation of powers. He has, however,
very frankly stated that as he was not present in Bangladesh during the
period when the Thirteenth Amendment was passed, so he had/has no idea
about the scenario which was there in the country as submitted by Mr.
T.H.Khan, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Mr Rafique-ul Haque, Mr. M. Amirul
Islam, Mr. Mahmudul Islam and Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud. He has further
submitted that by making the Election Commission more powerful and
independent, free, fair and impartial general elections of members of
Parliament can be ensured under the political government, the Non-Party
Care-taker Government as introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment for
holding such election is not, at all, necessary and the same be struck down.
He has referred to a number of cases in support of his contentions under
7(seven) heads viz (a) Democracy, (b) Separation of power, (c)
independence of judiciary, (d) Rule of law (e) Judicial Review, (f) Court to
follow principle and (g) No reference to political party in the Constitution.
The cases are (1) R.C. Poudyal-vs-Union of India and others, AIR
578
1993(SC) 1804, S.R. Chaudhuri-vs- State of Punjab and others, AIR 2001
(SC)2707; Peoples Union of Civil Liberties vs-Union of India, AIR
2003(SC) 2363, Kuldip Nayar vs-Union of India, AIR 2006(SC)3127,
Keshavananda Bharati -vs-State of Kerala, AIR 1973 (SC)1461, Indira
Gandhi vs-Raj Narayan, AIR 1975 (SC) 2299; Union of India vs-
Association for Democratic Reforms, AIR 2002 (SC) 2112; Samatavs-
State AP, AIR 1997 (SC) 3297; Valsamma Paul vs-Cochin University,
AIR 1996 (SC) 1011, the 5
th
Amendment case, Special Reference No.1 of
2009, 15 BLC (AD) 1, Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan vs-State, 60 DLR (AD)
49, Indira Gandhi-vs-Raj Narayan, AIR 1975 (SC) 2299, Ram Jawaya vs-
State of Punjab, Air 1955 (SC) 549, Sultana Kamal vs-Bangladesh, 14
BLC, 141, Anwar Hossain Chowdhury-vs- Government of the Peoples
Republic of Bangladesh and others, 41DLR(AD) 165, Golak Nath vs-
State of Punjab, AIR 1967 (SC) 1643; Idrisur Rahman (Md) and others
vs- Bangladesh, 61 DLR 523, Kanhival Lal vs- Trenedi; AIR 1986 (SC)
11.
Mr. Mahbubey Alam, learned Attorney General, appearing for
respondent No.1, has supported the Thirteenth Amendment by saying that
the then ruling party was compelled to go for the amendment in the face of
the popular demand from the political parties and the civil society. The
learned Attorney General has further submitted that the constitutional
changes took place because of historical events and the same thing
happened in passing the Thirteenth Amendment in the backdrop of
Magura-2 by-election and the past experience of the other elections held
under the political party in power. He referred to the system of the
Government working in Japan and Bhutan by saying that Monarchy is
579
there, but democracy is being practised. Mr. Attorney General has further
submitted that the Republican character of a country is lost only when a
dictator comes to power, because of the introduction of Non-party Care-
taker Government by the Thirteenth Amendment, Republican character of
the Constitution and the country has not been destroyed, rather it has
strengthened democracy; the President being an elected person and during
the Non-Party Care-taker Government, he remains as the Head of the State
and the Non-Party Care-taker Government collectively remain responsible
to him, so the Republican character of Bangladesh is, in no way, affected.
He, by referring to the Indian Constitution, has submitted that Indias
President has the power to impose its rule in any State in case of necessity
and in fact, in the past Presidents role in some States of India was
imposed, but that, in no way, destroyed its democratic character. He has
also submitted that the Thirteenth Amendment has not at all touched Part-
VI of the Constitution which has dealt with judiciary and by making
provisions for the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired
Judges of this Division to become the Chief Adviser, the independence of
judiciary has not at all been impaired. In conclusion, he prayed for
dismissing the appeal and the leave petition.
Before I proceed to examine the constitutionality of the Thirteenth
Amendment, I want to make a few things clear. These are:
(a) From the impugned judgment, it is clear that the points argued on
behalf of the writ-petitioner before the High Court Division were:
(i) Since by inserting articles 58A and 58B-58E in the
Constitution by the Thirteenth

Amendment democracy, a
basic structure of the Constitution, has been destroyed,
the same is void and is liable to be declared ultravires the
Constitution.
580
(ii) The impugned Act having amended articles 48 and 56 of
the Constitution was liable to be sent to referendum as
envisaged in article 142(1)(1A) of the Constitution but it
was not done. Hence the Thirteenth Amendment is liable
to be declared ultravires the Constitution.
(iii) Article 58C(3) and (4) having provided for the retired
Chief Justice of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this
Division to become the Chief Adviser of the Non-Party
Care-taker Government has in effect impaired the
independence of judiciary inasmuch as such position
tends to make a Judge act in a manner subservient to the
Government.
(b) But, before this Division, a new point, namely, that by making
provisions in the Thirteenth Amendment for the retired Chief
Justices of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division to
become the Chief Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker Government,
separation of powers, another basic structure of the Constitution, has
also been destroyed, has been argued.
(c) From the impugned judgment, it further appears that on behalf of
the contesting respondent Nos.1, 5 and 6, the then Attorney General
Mr. Hasan Arif, Mr. Abdur Razzaque and Mr. M. Amirul Islam
respectively made submissions supporting the constitutionality of the
Thirteenth Amendment providing for the Non-Party Care-taker
Government in the Constitution. It further appears that although the
BNP got itself added as respondent No.7, neither filed any affidavit-
in-opposition nor contested the Rule, but fact remains that during the
hearing of the Rule, it was in the government.
(d) The impugned judgment further shows that the learned Attorney
General further contended that because of insertion of articles 58A-
58E in the Constitution articles 48 and 56 of the Constitution were
not amended. Therefore, the impugned Act was not required to be
581
sent to referendum as envisaged in article 142 (1)(1A). The learned
Attorney General also argued the point of locus standi of the
petitioner to file the writ petition and that the writ petition was not
maintainable being hit by the principle of res-judicata.
(e) The learned Attorney General and Mr. Abdur Razzaque further
argued that even prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, there was a
caretaker system in the Constitution and in that the Prime Minister
was allowed to run the Government on the dissolution of Parliament
till the general election of members of Parliament was held and the
Parliament was constituted although he (the Prime Minister) ceased
to be an elected representative of the people on the dissolution of
Parliament.
(f) Mr. M. Amirul Islam, however, argued that the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government might not be, any longer, considered
as a full proof mechanism and it might be required to be replaced by
an even more efficacious and effective system for holding a free,
fair, peaceful and independent general elections of members of
Parliament provided that a consensus is again reached in this regard
by the peoples representatives. He suggested that the nation might
even think of a National Government as an alternative beneficial
system to Non-Party Care-taker Government. He further submitted
that since the impugned Act did not directly amend the preamble and
articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution there was no requirement to
send the same to referendum as required under article 142(1)(1A) of
the Constitution and the impugned Act is valid.
582
(g) The two amici curiae appointed by the High Court Division,
namely, Mr. Rafique-ul Haque and Mr. Abdul Wadud Bhuinya also
argued that the impugned Act, not having directly amended the
preamble and articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution, was not
required to be sent to referendum as envisaged in clause (1A) of
article 142(1) of the Constitution and the impugned Act is valid and
constitutional. However, Mr. Rafique-ul Haque syllogistically
argued that the provisions made in the Thirteenth Amendment for the
retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this
Division to head Non-Party Care-taker Government as the Chief
Adviser, have affected and impaired the independence of judiciary
and he suggested that the representatives of the people should put
their heads together again to find a suitable mechanism for
obtaining free, fair and independent election without involving the
Judges and the Chief Justice in the process in particular.
(h) From the above, it is clear that neither the learned Advocate for
the writ-petitioner nor the then learned Attorney General appearing
for respondent No.1, nor the learned Advocates for respondent Nos.5
and 6 and the amici curiae appointed by the High Court Division
ever raised any question that democracy and independence of
judiciary are not the basic structures of the Constitution. It is also to
be noted that none raised any question either before the High Court
Division or before this Division as to the power of judicial review of
the High Court Division under article 102 of the Constitution and
this Division under article 103 in striking down a constitutional
provision or amendment brought in the Constitution if the same is
583
found to have impaired or destroyed any of the basic or fundamental
structures of the Constitution.
(i) Mr. T. H. Khan and Mr. Mahmudul Islam never argued before
this Division that this Division should refrain from deciding the
constitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment; they simply
suggested that the matter of reform in the Non-Party Care-taker
Government system, if any, should be left to the Parliament
submitting with force that there is no alternative to the system of
Non-Party Care-taker Government as introduced by the Thirteenth
Amendment to ensure the democratic right of the people and to
empower them to elect their own representatives in a free, fair and
impartial elections of members of Parliament.
(j) All the 3(three) learned Judges of the Full Bench in unequivocal
terms have said that democracy and independence of judiciary are
the two basic structures of the Constitution.
The learned Judges of the Full Bench in coming to the conclusions
as noted hereinbefore gave their reasoning as follows:
Md. Joynul Abedin J: The petitioner had locus standi to file the
writ petition and the same was not barred by the principle of res
judicata; the impugned Act has not amended the preamble and
articles 8, 48, 56 and 142 of the Constitution requiring reference of
the said Bill to referendum as required by clause (1A) of article
142(1) thereof; amendment cannot be made by implication or as a
consequence; operation of article 48(3) of the Constitution has been
suspended for a limited period and as such, it cannot be said that
article 58E has amended the article; the impugned Act was passed to
strengthen, consolidate and institutionalise democracy in
Bangladesh; the concept of Caretaker Government was very much in
the Constitution as apparent from articles 57(3) and 58(4) thereof
and in view of article 58A as incorporated in the Constitution that
shall remain suspended when the Non-Party Care-taker Government
under Chapter IIA is formed; the original concept of Caretaker
Government run by the Prime Minister could not ensure free and fair
election of members of Parliament for the reason that although the
584
Prime Minister used to run the Government during the interregnum
and held the general election to the Parliament, but the election
was not free and fair inasmuch as the Government men and
machinery were used by such Government to influence the election
result in favour of the political party to which the Prime Minister
belonged; clause (1A) of article 142(1) as brought in the
Constitution in 1978 is valid and part of the Constitution; it is widely
known and appreciated that the Judges and the Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh are not only most learned persons, but
also by virtue of their training and holding of such high office, they
are normally considered to have attained and acquired a status and
image of upright, qualified, impartial and independent persons in the
contemporary time; the legislature, therefore, in its wisdom preferred
them as persons of high moral and impartial character and dignity
and high calibre and most capable for discharging the powers and
functions as adviser and the Chief Adviser in the Non-Party
Caretaker Government; We therefore do not find any reason or
justification to question, suspect or undermine the wisdom of the
legislature in this regard; no system should be taken to be a fool-
proof one and it is up to the parliament in future to bring any
amendment to the Constitution to achieve the end for consolidating
and institutionalising democracy in the country. But till then, since
we find the impugned Act valid and constitutional, the present
constitutional dispensation i.e. the non-party caretaker government
system for holding free, fair and peaceful election to the parliament
must be retained.
Md. Awlad Ali, J: The Thirteenth Amendment as enacted by the
parliament which is under challenge is the outcome of the consensus
of the political parties; major political parties and also the small
parties struggled for a system where all citizens, may be an indigent,
under-privileged and a citizen having enough wealth and power will
have the equal opportunity to exercise his voting power to elect
representatives of his or their own choice in the election of
parliament; theoretically the Thirteenth Amendment is also based on
the general will of the peoples demand or popular demand, was
accepted and people agreed to adopt and practice the system as
envisaged therein; no segment of people opposed the Thirteenth
Amendment and it was enacted in aid of democracy not in
derogation of democracy as enshrined in the Constitution; if we
really believe in democracy and want to practice democracy then
what is the harm if certain provisions as laid down in Articles 48 (3),
56 and 57(3) of the Constitution are suspended or kept in abeyance
for a period of three months, because the people wanted a system
where democratic norms for free and fair election would be adhered
to; in the scheme of the impugned legislation, it is well thought out
plan which is based on the political consensus that a retired Chief
Justice shall hold the office of the Chief Adviser and in case of non-
availability of such person alternatives are mentioned there in the
relevant articles; the Thirteenth Amendment is an apparatus set in the
body of the Constitution and that apparatus during the period of 90
days will regulate certain provisions of the Constitution i.e. it will
585
keep certain provisions ineffective and after general election and
constitution of a new parliament the apparatus itself will become
inoperative and the articles contained in Chapter IIA will remain as
dead articles until the dissolution of parliament for the purpose of
holding general election; the Thirteenth Amendment has not
amended any provision of the Constitution and as such, Act 1 of
1996 was not required to be referred to a referendum as
contemplated in clause (1A) of article 142(1) of the Constitution; if
after dissolution of parliament general elections to parliament are
held under the party Government or in the system that existed in the
Constitution the voting power may be monopolised by a sectional
interest or interests at the expense of the rest of the citizens.
Mirza Hussain Haider, J: Through the constitutional process of
Non-Party Caretaker Government free will of the people for
exercising their fundamental right of casting vote in the general
election has contributed to the establishment of democracy in its true
meaning, as such, the people of Bangladesh with such amendment
came up with a popular slogan ||< :| || |< <|< | |< w`e; the
people have accepted the concept of Non Party Caretaker
Government which has given the real meaning to the term
Democracy and the democratic process as a whole; Thirteenth
Amendment has actually strengthened and improved the system of
holding free, fair and impartial elections by which the people can
exercise their fundamental rights freely in electing the government.
So, if democracy is taken as a basic structure of the Constitution the
Thirteenth Amendment cannot be said to be ultravires since
improvement, which is permissible, has been brought in the system;
neither the long title nor the amendment itself shows that there was
any breach of the provision of article 142 as a whole; in view of the
provisions as incorporated in the impugned Act the provision of
referendum as in article 142(1A) was not attracted; with the
dissolution of parliament out going Prime Minister loses his
character as an elected representative; holding of an election
impartially free from influence or power under a partisan
Government becomes a remote proposition as they continue to retain
their affiliation with their party; moreover they are also eligible to
participate in the ensuing election. Chapter-II and chapter-IIA are
alternative to each other, one will exist in the absence of the other,
when one operates the other remains suspended; the concept of
suspension of certain articles of the Constitution including the
enforcement of fundamental rights, has already been provided
explicitly in the Constitution itself under certain situation as in
articles 141B and 141C of Part-IXA of the Constitution; keeping
certain provisions ineffective or suspended for a particular period,
for the sake of the others and thereby allowing the people to exercise
their fundamental rights or electing the democratic government
freely and fairly cannot be termed as unconstitutional; the Parliament
by its absolute majority rightly passed the amendment in question
with full consent of all the political parties making provisions of the
retired Chief Justices as the head of the Non-Party Care-taker
Government; it is not correct that the Thirteenth Amendment has
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brought about an allurement for the Judges or interference in the
judiciary; an impartial Non-Party Care-taker Government can only
be headed by a person who had been heading the impartial judiciary,
the Chief Justice of the country, upon whom the people have full
trust and confidence.

In the above backdrop, I do not consider it at all necessary to discuss
about the power of judicial review of the High Court Division under article
102 of the Constitution and of this Division in appeal under article 103
thereof arising out of such proceeding. I proceed on the premise that by
now it is well settled by this Division as well by the other apex Courts of
the sub-continent and those of the United States of America and the Great
Britain that the superior Court in exercising its power of judicial review
can see the constitutionality or vires of an Act passed by Parliament
bringing an amendment to the Constitution by way of addition, alteration,
substitution or repeal by Act of Parliament and can very well strike down
an Act or a constitutional provision if the same is found to have impaired or
destroyed any of the basic or fundamental structures of the Constitution. In
this regard, I consider one authority enough, namely, the case of Anwar
Hossain Chowdhury-vs-Government of the Peoples Republic of
Bangladesh and others 41 DLR(AD)165=BLD Special issue, 1989 to rely
on for the proposition.
In view of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant
in the appeal and the leave petition, the learned Attorney General for
respondent No.1 as well as the amici curiae, the pleadings of the respective
parties and the findings given by the Full Bench as noted hereinbefore, the
questions to be decided in this appeal and the leave petition are:
(i) whether the Thirteenth Amendment has amended the preamble
and articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution,
(ii) whether, in view of insertions of article 58A in Chapter-II and
articles 58B-58E by opening a new chapter, Chapter IIA under
the head Non-Party Care-taker Government in Part IV of the
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Constitution, democracy, a basic structure of the Constitution,
has been destroyed or impaired,
(iii) whether, by making provisions for the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division to head the
Non-Party Care-taker Government as the Chief Adviser in the
Thirteenth Amendment, the independence of judiciary and
separation of powers, the basic structures of the Constitution,
have been impaired or destroyed.
(iv) whether, by amending article 61 of the Constitution by the
Thirteenth Amendment, the concept of two executives, that is,
a dyarchy has been injected in the Constitution during the
period of Non-Party Care-taker Government.
(v) whether, in view of the provisions of article 58D as inserted in
the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution that the Non-
Party Care-taker Government shall discharge its functions as
an interim Government and shall carry on the routine functions
of such Government with the aid and assistance of persons in
the service of the Republic and, except in case of necessity for
the discharge of such functions, it shall not make any policy
decision, shall suffer from any lack of jurisdiction to make
policy decision in an emergency such as on foreign policy
matter.
However, the questions as formulated hereinbefore, are not discussed
serially and there may be overlapping.
To answer the questions, I consider it very pertinent and relevant to
see first the meaning of the term/word democracy as used in the
Constitution. Although, the term/word democracy has been used in the
Preamble and in articles 8 and 11 of the Constitution, the same has not
been defined or interpreted anywhere in the Constitution. It is most
necessary because the whole argument, by the learned Counsel for the
appellant and petitioner, the learned Attorney General for respondent No.1
and the amici curiae, is centered around democracy; democracy is also
referable to articles 48 and 56 of the Constitution.
Democracy is probably the most emotionally provocative term/word
in the worlds political vocabulary. In other words, it is not so easy a
term/word to decipher and there cannot be one definition to give a full and
complete meaning of democracy. Even the communist Russia claims itself
588
to be the only true democracy. Even then we have to see the meaning and
the implication of the term/word democracy in the context of our
constitutional dispensation; the constitutionality of the Thirteenth
Amendment would largely depend upon the understanding of this
term/word. As per Oxford English Dictionary democracy means 1. a
system of government in which all the people of a country can vote to elect
their representatives. As per Blacks Law Dictionary, democracy means
Government by the people, either directly, or through representatives. As
per Chambers Dictionary, democracy is a form of government in which
the supreme power is vested in the people collectively, and is administered
by them or by officers appointed by them, the common people; a state of
society characterised by recognition of equality of rights and privileges for
all people; political, social or legal equality.
Various statesmen and political thinkers have defined democracy in
various ways. The definitions of democracy by leading authorities may be
grouped under two major ideas or schools of thought. One holds that
democracy means simply a particular form of Government a form in
which the people or the many exercise political control. The other view
is that democracy is much more than a mere form or system of
government; that it is, first and foremost, a philosophy of human society, a
way of life, a set of ideals and attitudes motivating and guiding the
behaviour of members of a society toward one another, not only in their
political affairs, but also in their economic, social and cultural relationships
as well. The term/word democracy is of Greek origin, and its formal
meaning is rule by the multitude, supports the narrower definition given
above. Lord Bryce defined democracy as follows:
589
I use the word in its old and strict sense, as denoting a Government
in which the will of the majority of qualified citizens rules, taking
the qualified citizens to constitute at least three-fourths, so that the
physical force of the citizens coincides (broadly speaking) with their
voting power.
According to Harold J, Laski the essence of the democratic idea is
the effort of men to affirm their own essence and to remove all barriers to
that affirmation. He stressed the demand for equality-economic and
social, as well as political-as the basis of democratic development. He
believed that so long as there is inequality, there cannot be liberty. R.M.
Maclver indicated the difficulty of separating democracy as a form of
Government from democracy as a way of life, when he said:
we do not define democracy by its spirit, since democracy is a
form of government... But men have struggled toward democracy not
for the sake of the form but for the way of life that it sustains.
Justice Mathew said Democracy means the rule of majority. As per Sir
Ivor Jenning democracy is the vesting of the political power in free and
fair election.
Democracy is both: a form of Government and a philosophy of
living together. It is, indeed, a government in which the people or a
majority of them possess the power of final decision on major questions of
public policy. However, such a government exits not as an end in itself but
as means towards more important ends. Those ends are difficult, if not
impossible, to enumerate in any exhaustive fashion, each new era in
human, affairs brings new problem, new needs and new goals for
democracy. However, a truly democratic nation constantly strives toward
the good life for all its inhabitants; the maximum of individual liberty
consistent with general security, order, and welfare; the widest possible
opportunities for all, to the end that men may become as nearly equal as
their native capacities will allow; the fullest development of each human
590
personality; and the active participation of the largest possible number of
citizens in the process of Government. To quote A.D. Lindsay the end of
democratic government is to minister to the common life of society, and to
remove the disharmonies that trouble it; Abrahma Lincoln the great
President of the United States of America said in his Gattesberg address
ours is a government of the people, by the people, for the people. In this
address of Abrahman Lincoln the minimum content of a government has
been spoken of. And such a minimum content of a government is possible
only when the people will have a chance to exercise their right of adult
franchise in a free, fair and impartial election. And the election must be so
as Mr. T.H.Khan stressed that Sir Winston Churchills little man must be
able to walk into the little booth with a little pencil to make a little cross on
a little bit of paper freely and fairly. And if the little man cannot walk into
the little booth with the little pencil to make his little cross on a little bit of
paper to select his own representative then the democracy shall be a far cry
and shall be in the Constitution only for the psychological satisfaction of
the people of this country. Win in the election of a particular candidate or
party by foul means such as by manipulation, coercion, intimidation and
exerting undue influence upon the Government machinery is a defeat and
destruction of democracy which is the fundamental structure of the
Constitution for which our martyrs shed their blood with aspiration that
they will get a society free from all kinds of exploitation and their
fundamental rights will be ensured. Democracy cannot have permanent
form or shape and is still an evolving theory of governance and it will vary
from country to country and nation to nation. However, in a compact way,
it can be said that democracy is the rule of majority elected by the people
591
for a specified period upon exercising their right to vote in a free and fair
election for their well being in all fields: economic, social and political and
for their good governance as well.
I do not want to make this judgment more voluminous unnecessarily
by deliberation on the question as to whether democracy is one of the basic
structures of the Constitution or not, because there can be no argument that
democracy is not a basic structure of our Constitution. Moreover, as
pointed out hereinbefore, the learned Counsel for the appellant and
petitioner, the learned Attorney General and the amici curiae, have not
raised any such absurd question before us. And all made their submissions
accepting that democracy is a basic structure of our Constitution. The High
Court Division also held that democracy is a basic structure of our
Constitution. I am also not oblivious of the well settled legal proposition
that while deciding a case, a Court shall not embark upon unnecessary
academic discussions and shall confine itself within the issues, which will
crop up from the pleadings of the respective parties. (see the cases of
Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir-vs-Bangladesh and another, 44DLR(AD)319,
Bangladesh and others-vs-Md. Idrisur Rahman and others,
17BLT(AD)231, Moudud Ahmed, Moulana Matiur Rahman Nizami, Mrs.
Sheikh Hasina Alias Sheikh Hasina Wazed-vs- Md. Anwar Hossain
Khan(dead) and others, 28BLD(AD)81 and Mr. Mahamudul Alam Montu-
vs-Sanwar Hossain Talukder and others, BLD1990(AD)237.)
Taking it as an accepted position that democracy is a form of
government chosen by the people of a country for their good governance
and well being and that it is the rule of majority elected by the people for a
specified term upon exercising their right of vote in a free and fair election,
592
let us see what form of government was given by our Constituent
Assembly in the Constitution and what the position of such form of
Government was in the Constitution when the Thirteenth Amendment was
enacted on 25
th
of March, 1996 and assented to by the President on
28.03.1996.
In the original Constitution which was adopted, enacted and given to
ourselves by the Constituent Assembly, it was the parliamentary form of
government. In Part IV like the present state of the Constitution, there were
two chapters, Chapter-I and Chapter-II. Chapter I dealt with the President.
A combined reading of articles 48-54 of Chapter-I shows that the President
was not vested with the executive power like the present constitutional
dispensation. Provisions were made for election of the President by
members of Parliament. Chapter II dealt with the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet. Clause (1) of article 55 provided that there shall be a Cabinet for
Bangladesh having the Prime Minister at its head and comprising also such
other Ministers as the Prime Minister may from time to time designate.
Clause (2) of article 55 provided that the executive power of the Republic
shall, in accordance with the Constitution, be exercised by or on the
authority of the Prime Minister. In the present context, clauses (2) and (4)
of article 56 of the original Constitution are very relevant. But I consider it
better to quote the entire article which is as follows:
56. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister, and such other Ministers,
Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers as may be determined by the
Prime Minister.
(2) The appointments of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, and
of the Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, shall be made by the
President:
Provided that, subject to clause (4), no person shall be eligible
to be so appointed unless he is a member of Parliament.
593
(3) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of
Parliament who appears to him to command the support of the
majority of the members of Parliament.
(4) A Minister who at the time of his appointment is not a member of
Parliament shall, unless elected as a member of Parliament within a
period of six months from the date of such appointment, cease to be
a Minister.
(5) If occasion arises for making any appointment under clause (2)
or clause (3) between a dissolution of Parliament and the next
following general election of members of Parliament, the persons
who were such members immediately before the dissolution shall be
regarded for the purpose of this clause as continuing to be such
members.

Reading together clauses (2) and (4) of article 56, it prima-facie
appears that under the original dispensation of the Constitution, one could
become a Minister without being a member of Parliament and could remain
so for a period of 6(six) months if he was not elected as member of
Parliament within the said period.
The above system of government continued till passing of the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 which was assented to by the
President on the 25
th
January, 1975. Instead of parliamentary form of
government, presidential form of government was introduced by this
Amendment. Chapters I and II of Part IV of the Constitution were
substituted as a whole making the President all powerful to be elected in
accordance with law by direct election and the post of Vice-President was
created to be appointed by the President. The executive authority of the
Republic was vested in the President to be exercised either directly or
through officers, subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. In
Chapter II under the head- The Council of Ministers, it was provided as
follows:
58. Council of Ministers.(1) There shall be a Council of
Ministers to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his
functions.
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(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by
the Council or a Minister to the President shall not be inquired into
in any court.
(3) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint from among the
members of Parliament or persons qualified to be elected as
members of Parliament, a Prime Minister and such other Ministers,
Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers as he deems necessary:
Provided that a Minister of State or Deputy Minister shall not
be a member of the Council.
(4) The President shall preside at the meetings of the Council or may
direct the Vice-President or Prime Minister to preside at such
meetings.
(5) The Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the
President.
(6) A Minister may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the President.
(7) In this article, Minister includes a Prime Minister, Minister of
State and Deputy Minister. and
(b) Chapter III shall be omitted (Chapter III dealt with local
Government)

Reading of the above article as introduced by the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution shows that to become the Prime Minister, the Minister,
the Minister of State and the Deputy Minister, it was not necessary to be a
member of Parliament; it was sufficient to be qualified to be a member of
Parliament and the Prime Minister and the other Ministers used to hold the
office during the pleasure of the President.
Then again, in 1991, the Constitution was amended by the
Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991 and instead of presidential
form of government, parliamentary form of government was re-introduced
vesting the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and then
came the Thirteenth Amendment introducing the Non-Party Care-taker
Government. And we are to test the constitutionality of the Thirteenth
Amendment bearing in mind the parliamentary form of Government as
introduced in the Constitution in 1991 by the Twelfth Amendment and not
the Parliamentary form of Government which was adopted, enacted and
595
given by the Constituent Assembly on the eighteenth day of Kartick 1379
B.S. corresponding to 4
th
day of November, 1972.
To comprehend the constitutional scheme of democracy and the
democratic process as were given by the Constituent Assembly and then by
the Parliament by the Fourth Amendment and the Twelfth Amendment
respectively and to see whether the Thirteenth Amendment has destroyed
or impaired such democracy and democratic process, we have to consider
the Preamble, articles 7, 8, 11, 55 and 56 of the Constitution along with
articles 65 and 72 as they stand today in view of the judgment passed by
this Division in the Fifth Amendment case. We have also to consider article
123(3) of the Constitution as it stood before the Thirteenth Amendment in
juxtaposition with article 123(3) as it stands today with the other articles as
mentioned above. We have also to bear in mind that this Division has a
special role as the guardian of the Constitution and in interpreting any
provision of the Constitution, this Division has to see that the constitutional
process is carried on and extra-constitutional force does not get a chance to
interfere in the matter. In interpreting the above constitutional provisions,
we are also to bear in mind the principle of constitutional interpretation that
every part of the Constitution from the Preamble to the last schedule is the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. And every provision
of the Constitution is essential and all these provisions must exist in
harmony and there cannot be any conflict between any provision of the
Constitution and no provision will be subordinate to the other. The
construction of one part throws light on the other part and the construction
must hold a balance between all parts thereof. It is also to be presumed that
all provisions of the Constitution are harmonious and by no stretch of
596
imagination, one provision of the Constitution can be in conflict with the
others as the framers of a written Constitution could never intend for such
conflict and anomaly.
The preamble, articles 7, 8, 11, and 56 read as follows:
PREAMBLE
We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our independence
on the 26
th
day of March, 1971 and, through a historic struggle for
national liberation, established the independent, sovereign Peoples
Republic of Bangladesh;
Pledging that the high ideals of nationalism, socialism,
democracy and secularism, which inspired our heroic people to
dedicate themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives
in, the national liberation struggle, shall be the fundamental
principles of the Constitution;
Further pledging that it shall be a fundamental aim of the
State to realise through the democratic process a socialist society,
free from exploitation- a society in which the rule of law,
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice,
political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens;
Affirming that it is our sacred duty to safeguard, protect and
defend this Constitution and to maintain its supremacy as the
embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh so that we may
prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards
international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive
aspirations of mankind;
In our Constituent Assembly, this eighteenth day of Kartick,
1379 B.S., corresponding to the fourth day of November, 1972 A.D.,
do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.

7. (1) All powers in the Republic belong to the people, and their
exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only under,
and by the authority of, this Constitution.
(2) This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will
of the people, the supreme law of the Republic, and if any other
law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to
the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
8. (1) The principles of nationalism, socialism, democracy and
secularism, together with the principles derived from them as set out
in this Part, shall constitute the fundamental principles of state
policy.
(2) The principles set out in this Part shall be fundamental to the
governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the State in the
making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the
Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the
basis of the work of the State and of its citizens, but shall not be
judicially enforceable.
11. The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human
rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the
597
human person shall be guaranteed, and in which effective
participation by the people through their elected representatives in
administration at all levels shall be ensured.
56. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister, and such other Ministers,
Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers as may be determined by the
Prime Minister.
(2) The appointments of the Prime Minister and other Ministers,
and of the Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, shall be made by
the President:
Provided that not less than nine-tenths of their number shall be
appointed from among members of Parliament and not more than
one-tenth of their number may be chosen from among persons
qualified for election as members of Parliament.
(3) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of
Parliament who appears to him to command the support of the
majority of the members of Parliament.
(4) If occasion arises for making any appointment under clause
(2) or clause (3) between a dissolution of Parliament and the next
following general election of members of Parliament, the persons
who were such members immediately before the dissolution shall be
regarded for the purpose of this clause as continuing to be such
members.

The preamble of the Constitution unequivocally speaks that along
with other high ideals, democracy inspired our heroic people to dedicate
themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in the national
liberation struggle and shall be one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution. The preamble has further pledged that it shall be a
fundamental aim of the State to realise through the democratic process a
socialist society, free from exploitation-a society in which rule of law,
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political,
economic and social, will be secured for all citizens. Article 7 has
mandated that all powers in the Republic belong to the people and their
exercise, on their behalf, shall be effected only under, and by the authority
of, the Constitution. People, as used in the article, definitely connote the
nation: the inhabitants of this country, the general population and the
citizens of this country. In the modern system of democracy, because of
598
the size of the population in a State like ours, it is impossible to practise
democracy as it originated and was practised in the City State of Greece
where the whole body of citizens used to form the Assembly, which was
vested with the supreme authority. Freedom and rule of law were the two
aspects of the City State. The Athenians called no man their master. Then
came the question of general will or will of the people as propagated by
Jean Jacques Rousseau in his book The Social Contract. The general will
is the application of human freedom to political institution. In the modern
state in a nation of any size, this principle has now been firmly established
for choosing a certain number of agents or representatives who are
numerous enough to speak for the whole people and few enough to meet at
one place. The first essential of a democratic constitution is that the entire
people must be represented in the legislature by their nominee to be elected
periodically by them. The object, being the popular will, should be
reflected in the legislature. The same political concept has been enshrined
in article 7 of our Constitution which says all powers in the Republic
belong to the people and the Constitution is the solemn expression of the
will of the people. If we see the language of the latter part of clause (1) of
article 7 and their exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only
under, and by the authority of, this Constitution, it will appear that power
on behalf of the people shall be exercised under a mechanism provided in
the Constitution itself. More significantly article 7 does not say about
democracy, but it is article 8 which says about democracy and article 11
says that the Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human
rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of human persons
shall be guaranteed and in which effective participation by the people
599
through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be
ensured.
Part-IV of the Constitution has dealt with the Executive. In this part
there are five chapters. Chapter-I has dealt with the President. Article 48(1)
has stated that there shall be a President of Bangladesh who shall be elected
by members of Parliament in accordance with law. Clause (2) thereof has
provided that the President shall, as Head of the State, take precedence over
all other persons in the State, and shall exercise the powers and perform the
duties conferred and imposed on him by the Constitution and by any other
law. Clause (3) has stated that in the exercise of all his functions, save only
that of appointing the Prime Minister pursuant to clause (3) of article 56
and the Chief Justice pursuant to clause (1) of article 95, the President shall
act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. Proviso to clause
(3) has stipulated that the question whether any, and if so what, advice has
been tendered by the Prime Minister to the President shall not be enquired
into in any court. Other clauses of article 48 have dealt with the provisions
as to the qualifications to be the President. The other articles, namely, 49-
54 have dealt with the term of office of the President; Presidents
immunity; procedure of impeachment of the President; removal of the
President on ground of incapacity and the provision for discharging the
functions of the President by the Speaker if a vacancy occurs in the office
of the President or if the President is unable to discharge the functions of
his office on account of his absence, illness or any other case.
Chapter II of Part IV has dealt with the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet. Clause (1) of article 55 has mandated that there shall be a Cabinet
for Bangladesh having the Prime Minister at its head and comprising also
such other Ministers as the Prime Minister may from time to time
600
designate. Clause (2) of article 55 has in clear terms stipulated that the
executive power of the Republic shall, in accordance with the Constitution,
be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime Minister. Clauses (3) (4)
(5) and (6) of article 55 are as follows:
(3) The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament.
(4) All executive actions of the Government shall be expressed to be
taken in the name of the President.
(5) The President shall by rules specify the manner in which orders
and other instruments made in his name shall be attested or
authenticated, and the validity of any order or instrument so attested
or authenticated shall not be questioned in any court on the ground
that it was not duly made or executed.
(6) The President shall make rules for the allocation and transaction
of the business of the Government.

Article 56(1) as quoted hereinbefore has provided that there shall be
a Prime Minister, and such other Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy
Ministers as may be determined by the Prime Minister. Article 56(2) has
mandated that the appointment of the Prime Minister, and other Ministers
and of the Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers, shall be by the
President, provided that not less than nine-tenths of their number shall be
appointed from among members of Parliament and not more than one-tenth
of their number may be chosen from among persons qualified for election
as members of Parliament. Articles 57 and 58 have provided for the tenure
of the office of the Prime Minister and the tenure of office of other
Ministers.
Part V has dealt with the Legislature. In this part, there are 3(three)
Chapters. Chapter-I has dealt with Parliament. First article of this Chapter
is article 65. Clause (1) of article 65 has mandated that there shall be a
Parliament for Bangladesh (to be known as the House of the Nation) in
which, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, shall be vested the
601
legislative powers of the Republic provided that nothing in this clause shall
prevent Parliament from delegating to any person or authority, by Act of
Parliament, power to make orders, rules, regulations, bye-laws or other
instruments having legislative effect. Clause (2) of article 65 is of
paramount importance which says that Parliament shall consist of three
hundred members to be elected in accordance with law from single
territorial constituencies by direct election and, for so long as clause (3) is
effective, the members provided for in that clause; the members shall be
designated as Members of Parliament. I consider it profitable to quote
clause (2) of article 65 for ready reference which reads as follows:
(2) Parliament shall consist of three hundred members to be elected
in accordance with law from single territorial constituencies by
direct election and, for so long as clause (3) is effective, the members
provided for in that clause; the members shall be designated as
Members of Parliament.

Clause (3) of article 56 of the Constitution has clearly mandated that
to be a Prime Minister one must be a member of Parliament who shall
appear to the President to command the support of the majority of members
of Parliament. And definitely, the only way to be a member of Parliament
is through an election to be held in accordance with law as provided in
clause (2) of article 65 as quoted above.
Now, if we go back to article 7 of the Constitution and place the
same in juxtaposition with article 55 of the Constitution, it will appear that
the powers on behalf of the people of the Republic shall be exercised by the
Prime Minister and his other colleagues of the Cabinet through rules of
business to be made by the President, who heads the State. So it is the
people of the Republic who do govern themselves through their elected
representatives.
602
As already stated hereinbefore, in the preamble of the Constitution,
there is specific reference to democracy and the democratic process; in
article 7 there is no reference to democracy; in article 11, it has been
specifically stated that the Republic shall be a democracy. In none of these
articles, there is any reference to election which is specifically mentioned
in sub-article (2) of article 65 of the Constitution. Article 122(1) has
mandated that the elections to Parliament shall be on the basis of adult
franchise. Article 122(2) has detailed who shall be entitled to be enrolled
on the electoral roll for a constituency delimited for the purpose of election
to the Parliament. In this regard, it is also necessary to consider the
Proclamation of Independence which was made on 10
th
of April, 1971 from
Mujibnagar, the first document which set forth the constitutional
background of Bangladesh. The proclamation reads as follows:
Proclamation of Independence
The Proclamation of Independence dated 10
th
April, 1971 issued
from Mujibnagar reads:
Whereas free elections were held in Bangladesh from 7
th
December,
1970 to 17
th
January, 1971 to elect representative for the purpose of
framing a Constitution,
.........................................................................................................
And
Whereas General Yahya Khan summoned the elected representatives
of the people to meet on 3
rd
March, 1971 for the purpose of framing a
Constitution,
And
Whereas the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and illegally
postponed for indefinite period,
............................................................................. ...........................
And
603
Whereas the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war and
committing genocide and by other repressive measures made it impossible
for elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh to meet and frame a
Constitution and give to themselves a Government,
And
Whereas the people of Bangladesh by their heroism, bravery and
revolutionary fervour have established effective control over the territories
of Bangladesh,
We, the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, as
honour bound by the mandate given to us by the people of Bangladesh
whose will is supreme duly constituted ourselves into a constituent
Assembly, and having held mutual consultations, and in order to ensure for
the people of Bangladesh equality, human dignity and social justice;
declare and constitute Bangladesh to be sovereign Peoples Republic
and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made by
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and
do hereby affirm and resolve till such time as a Constitution is
framed, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be President of the
Republic and Syed Nazrul Islam shall be the Vice-President of the
Republic, and that the President shall be Supreme Commander of all the
Armed Forces of the Republic,
shall exercise all the Executive and Legislative powers of the
Republic including the power to grant pardon,
shall have the power to appoint a Prime Minister and such other
ministers as he considers necessary,
shall have the power to levy taxes and expend monies,
shall have the power to summon and adjourn the constituent
Assembly, and
do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people of
Bangladesh an orderly and just government,
We the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh do
further resolve that in the event of there being no President or the President
being unable to enter upon his office or being unable to exercise his powers
604
due to any reason whatever the Vice-President shall have and exercise all
the powers, duties and responsibilities herein conferred on the President.
......................................................................................................
We further resolve that this Proclamation of Independence shall be
deemed to have come into effect from 26
th
day of March, 1971.
We further resolve that in order to give effect to this instrument we
appoint Prof. Yusuf Ali, our duly constituted Potentiary, to give to the
President and Vice-President oaths of office.
(Proclamation of Independence has been quoted from the Eight
Amendment judgment).
Bangladesh emerged as an independent country on 16
th
December,
1971 when the national liberation struggle ended. Provisional Constitution
of Bangladesh Order, 1972 was promulgated on the 11
th
day of January,
1972 whereupon Justice Abu Sayed Chowdhury became the President and
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (as in the gazette) assumed the office of the Prime
Minister. Thus, clear shift had been made to the future constitutional
framework from the presidential system to Parliamentary system. Then the
Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh Order, 1972 (P.O. 22 of 1972) was
promulgated on 23
rd
March, 1972 for the functioning of the Constituent
Assembly. Paragraph 7 of the Order stated The Assembly shall frame a
Constitution for the Republic. In paragraph 1 of the Fourth Schedule to
the Constitution it was mentioned upon the commencement of this
Constitution, the Constituent Assembly, having discharged its
responsibility of framing a Constitution for the Republic, shall stand
dissolved. As already stated hereinbefore on the eighteenth day of Kartick,
1379 B.S. corresponding to the 4
th
day of November, 1972 A.D., our
Constituent Assembly chose parliamentary form of Government vesting the
605
executive power of the Republic upon the Prime Minister. By article 151 of
the Constitution P.O.22 of 1972 was expressly repealed.
Proclamation of Independence which has been quoted hereinbefore
clearly referred to the free elections that were held in Bangladesh from
the 7
th
day of December, 1970 to the 17
th
day of January, 1971 to elect the
representatives for the purpose of framing a Constitution and also referred
to the circumstances under which elected representatives failed to meet on
the 3
rd
day of March, 1971 to frame a Constitution and to give themselves a
form of government. And in fact, it is the peoples representatives who
were elected in the free and fair election held from the 7
th
day of
December, 1970 to the 17
th
day of January, 1971 for the purpose of framing
a Constitution. And they formed the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh
by virtue of the provisions of P.O.22 of 1972 to frame a Constitution for
the Republic, who adopted, enacted and gave to ourselves the Constitution
which came into operation on the 16
th
day of December, 1972.
To make the people of Bangladesh powerful and sovereign in its true
sense as envisaged in article 7 of the Constitution their right to choose their
own representatives to form the Government through the exercise of their
right of adult franchise is to be ensured, which is only possible in a free,
fair and impartial election. In the absence of free, fair and impartial
election, the democracy will be a far cry and the peoples powers or their
supremacy will only remain in the document named the Constitution of the
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. Had there been no free elections in 1970
as mentioned in the Proclamation of Independence, the people of this soil
would not have got the chance to elect their own representatives for the
purpose of framing a Constitution and then possibly they would not have
606
the mandate to declare independence and to give to ourselves a democratic
Constitution after the country was liberated from the occupation forces. As
discussed hereinbefore, presently ours is a Parliamentary form of
Government introduced in 1991 by the Twelfth Amendment of the
Constitution. In other words, it can be said parliamentary executive form of
Government. It will be a mockery to say that all powers of the Republic
belong to the people unless they get a chance to practise democracy, that is,
the right to choose their own representatives in a free, fair and impartial
general election of members of Parliament as provided in article 65(2) of
the Constitution.
The entire Part-VII of the Constitution has been devoted to elections.
In this part, there is no chapter. It starts with article 118. This article says
that there shall be an Election Commission for Bangladesh consisting of a
Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election
Commissioners, if any, as the President may from time to time direct, and
the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election
Commissioners (if any) shall, subject to the provisions of any law made in
that behalf, be made by the President. Clauses (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of
article 118 have dealt with as to who shall act as the Chairman of the
Commission, the term of office of an Election Commissioner, the
independence of the Commission, the condition of service of Election
Commissioners and the manner of removal of an Election Commissioner
from his post respectively. In article 119 functions of the Election
Commission have been enumerated. It is better to quote the article as a
whole for ready reference:
607
119.(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the
preparation of the electoral rolls for elections to the office of
President and to parliament and the conduct of such elections shall
vest in the Election Commission which shall, in accordance with the
Constitution and any other law-
(a) hold elections to the office of President;
(b) hold elections of members of Parliament;
(c) delimit the constituencies for the purpose of elections to the
office of President and to Parliament; and
(d) prepare electoral rolls for the purpose of elections to the office of
President and to Parliament;
(2) The Election Commission shall perform such functions, in
addition to those specified in the foregoing clauses, as may be
prescribed by this Constitution or by any other law.

The other articles of the part, namely, 120-125 have dealt with the matters
such as staff of Election Commission, what shall be the electoral roll for
the Constituency, qualifications for registration as voter, time for holding
elections, power of Parliament to make provisions as to elections, validity
of election law and elections. Article 126 has mandated that it shall be the
duty of all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the
discharge of its functions.
The fact that the Constitution speaks about democracy and also
election of members of Parliament by direct election in accordance with
law and article 11 of the Constitution specifically says that the Republic
shall be a democracy in which effective participation by the people through
their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured
free and fair election of members of Parliament is a must to achieve those
goals. In the context, it is important and pertinent to see what the impact of
election is in a democracy, particularly in a parliamentary form of
Government like ours as today.
Like democracy, election has not been defined in anywhere in the
Constitution though election has been used in many articles such as:
608
articles 65(2), 66(2), 67(1), 70(1), 71(2), 72(4), 74(1)(2), 119)1), 122(1),
123(1)(2)(3)(4), 124, 125 of the Constitution. Election has also not been
defined in the Representation of the People Order, 1972(hereinafter
referred to as the RPO, 1972) under which election of members of
Parliament is held. And that being the position, we have to fall back upon
the dictionary meaning of election. As per Oxford English Dictionary, 7
th

edition, election means the process of choosing a person or a group of
people for a position, especially a political position, by voting; election is
an occasion on which people officially choose a political representative or
government by voting. As per Chambers Dictionary, election means the
act of electing or choosing, the public choice of a person for office, usu. by
the votes of a constituent body; free will; the exercise of gods sovereign
will in the predetermination of certain persons to salvation (theol); those
elected in this way (bible). As per Blacks Law Dictionary, election
means 3.The process of selecting a person to occupy an office (usu. a
public office) membership, award or other title or status of members of
Parliament. If we consider the above dictionary meaning of election along
with article 122 of the Constitution, it will appear that the election process
should be such that peoples right of choice through adult franchise to
select their own representatives in the Parliament, i.e. members of
Parliament, should not, in any way, be hindered and obstructed.
Election of what type? Election dominated by muscle power,
money, rigging and manipulation and exertion of undue influence upon the
Government machinery; a farcical election where peoples vote will be
hijacked by putting undue pressure and coercion and threat and thus to give
scope to the thugs and thieves to get elected as submitted by Mr.
609
Mahmudul Islam to rule the country for long 5(five) years, that is, minus
the mandate of the people, or a free, fair and impartial election and thus,
ensuring peoples right to choose their own representatives to be governed
as mandated in article 7 read with articles 122 and 65(2) of the
Constitution. Free and fair election is a must for the sustenance of
democracy and the democratic process. In the case of Sreemati Indira
Gandhi-vs- Raj Narayan, AIR1975 (SC) 2299 it was held: free and fair
election is also a basic structure of the Indian Constitution and by majority
view, the amendment brought in the Indian Constitution by the Thirty
Ninth Amendment was declared unconstitutional, as it violated the
principle of free and fair election. In the case of Election Commission, In
Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (2002) 8 SCC 237, (Gujrat Assembly
Election Matter) Mr. Justice V.N. Khare observed that
It is no doubt true that democracy is a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution and periodical free and fair election is the
substratum of democracy. If there is no free and fair periodical
election, it is the end of democracy and the same was recognised in
M.G. Gill-vs-Chief Election Commissioner thus: (SCC p 419, para 12.)
12. A free and fair election based on universal adult franchise is the
basic, regulatory procedures vis-a-vis the repositories of functions
and the distribution of legislative, executive and judicial roles in the
total scheme directed towards the holding of free elections, are the
specifics ... The super authority is the Election Commission, the
kingpin is the Returning Officer, the minions are the presiding
officers in the polling stations and the electoral engineering is in
conformity with the elaborate legislative provisions.

In the same reference, Arjit Pasayat, J also observed that free, fair
and periodical elections are the part of the basic structure of the
Constitution of India (in short the Constitution). In a democracy, the little
man-voter-has overwhelming importance and cannot be hijacked from the
course of free and fair elections.
610
108. Democracy and free and fair election are inseparable twins.
There is almost an inseverable umbilical cord joining them(emphasis
given). The little mans ballot and not the bullet of those who want to
capture power (starting with booth-capturing) is the heartbeat of
democracy. Path of little man to the polling booth should be free and
unhindered, and his freedom to elect a candidate of his choice is the
foundation of a free and fair election. Sir Ivor Jennings rightly said In
democracy political power rests in free elections.
Reading the Proclamation of Independence along with the Preamble
and articles 7, 8, 11, 56, 65(2) and 122 of the Constitution as discussed
above, I find myself in respectful agreement with the views of the Indian
Supreme Court and hold that like democracy, free and fair election is also a
basic structure of our Constitution; democracy and free and fair election are
so inextricably mixed with each other that one cannot be separated from the
other. Minus free and fair election, democracy cannot be conceived of and
practised in its true sense. If there is no free and fair election then the
people shall be defrauded of their sovereign powers as envisaged in article
7 of the Constitution engrafted by the Constituent Assembly. Free and fair
election can be compared with the heart of a human body, if heart fails a
man dies, so without free and fair election, the democracy would
automatically die. Mr. T.H.Khan has also rightly said that free, fair and
impartial election is the vehicle of democracy; the learned Attorney
General, amici curiae, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Mr. M. Amirul Islam, Mr.
Mahmudul Islam and Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud echoed the same voice of
Mr. T. H. Khan. To give effect to the constitutional mandate as envisaged
in article 7 of the Constitution that all powers in the Republic belong to the
611
people; free, fair and impartial election has to be ensured and that is how
the democracy and the democratic process shall be carried out, which is the
main theme of our Constitution. Otherwise, the martyrs who sacrificed
their lives in the national liberation struggle shall be betrayed.
In the above backdrop, we are to examine the core question whether
democracy, a basic structure of the Constitution, has been destroyed or
impaired by the 13
th
Amendment as argued by Mr. M.I. Farooqui, Mr.
Mohsen Rashid and 3(three) amici curiae: Mr. Rafique-ul Huq, Dr. M.
Zahir and Mr. Ajmalul Hossain. But, before I consider it, it is very essential
and relevant to see what Constitution is and when a Constitution can be
amended.
In all cases except that of the United Kingdom, the fundamental
provisions of the governmental system are set forth in a document or set of
documents which, as a document, is called the Constitution. A Constitution
is different from statutes in nature and character. It is an organic
instrument; it grows with the passage of time. It is general in its statements,
while a statute is generally specific. Unlike a statute which is liable to
revisions to meet different situations, a Constitution is intended to be
permanent and to cover all situations of the unfolding future regarding the
political organisation of a nation. Above all, it is a document under which
laws are made and from which laws derive their validity. Every
Constitution is founded on some social and political values and legal rules
are incorporated therein to build a structure of political institutions aimed
to realise and effectuate those values. Therefore, the legal rules
incorporated in the body of a Constitution cannot be interpreted in isolation
from those social and political values and the purposes which emerge from
612
the scheme of the Constitution. That is why Lord Wilberforce in Fisher
held that though the rules of statutory interpretation will generally be
applicable, the Court has to take as a point of departure for the process of
interpretation a recognition of the character and origin of the Constitution.
Need for recognition of the character and origin arises for giving purposive
interpretation of a Constitution. (Mahamudul Islam, Constitutional Law of
Bangladesh, Mallick Brothers, Dhaka, Second Edition, Pages 25 and 29.)
Bangladesh is a Republic and the Constitution is its supreme law
being the solemn expression of the will of the people and this has been
firmly asserted in article 7 of the Constitution when it says ... and if any
other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the
extent of the inconsistency, be void.
Mr. T. H. Khan and Dr. Kamal Hossain have rightly submitted that
the Constitution is a living document and must be durable and at the same
time, it has to be responsive to the need of the people keeping intact its
basic structures and interpretation has to be given to give life to it. Though
a Constitution is meant to be permanent, all changing situations cannot be
anticipated or envisaged; amendment may be necessary to adopt to future
development; provisions are thus made in the Constitution itself to respond
to the dynamics of the changing circumstances, that is why the Constituent
Assembly incorporated article 142 in the Constitution. In the case of PV
Naransimha Rao-vs-State CBI/SIE (1998) 4SCC, 626 Justice S.C. Agarwal
observed that parliamentary democracy is a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution which cannot be altered. But improvement of the system
alone is permissible. In the case of Golaknath and others vs-State of
Panjab and another (1967) 2 SCR, 762 Justice R.G. Bachawal observed
613
that A static system of law is the worst tyranny that any constitution
can impose upon a country. An unamenable constitution means that
all reforms and progress are at a standstill.
I conclude by saying that Constitution can be amended by way of
addition, alteration, substitution or repeal by Act of Parliament to respond
to the dynamics of the changing circumstances and as per the need of
the people and to strengthen and institutionalise the basic structures and
features of the Constitution, but not by destroying or impairing such
structures and features.
Let us see what is in the Thirteenth Amendment. To have a ready
reference, I consider it necessary to quote the entire Act which is as
follows:
:oo: < :
An Act further to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.
Whereas it is expedient further to amend certain provisions of the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh for the purposes
hereinafter appearing.
It is hereby enacted as follows:
1. Short title.This Act may be called the Constitution (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act, 1996.
2. Insertion of new article 58A in the Constitution. In the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, hereinafter
referred to as the Constitution, after article 58, the following new
article shall be inserted, namely:-
58A. Application of Chapter. Nothing in this Chapter, except
the provisions of article 55(4), (5) and (6), shall apply during the
period in which Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved;
Provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter IIA,
where the President summons Parliament that has been dissolved to
meet under article 72(4), the Chapter shall apply.
3. Insertion of new Chapter IIA in the Constitution. In the
Constitution, in Part IV, after Chapter II, the following new Chapter
shall be inserted, namely:-
CHAPTER IIA-NON PARTY CARE-TAKER GOVERNMENT
58B. The Non-Party Care-taker Government.(1) There shall be
a Non-Party Care-taker Government during the period from the date
614
on which the Chief Adviser of such government enters upon office
after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved by reason of
expiration of its term till the date on which a new Prime Minister
enters upon his office after the constitution of Parliament.
(2) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall be collectively
responsible to the President.
(3) The executive power of the Republic shall, during the period
mentioned in clause (1), be exercised, subject to the provisions of
article 58D(1), in accordance with this Constitution, by or on the
authority of the Chief Adviser and shall be exercised by him in
accordance with the advice of the Non-Party Care-taker
Government.
(4) The provisions of article 55(4), (5) and (6) shall (with the
necessary adaptations) apply to similar matters during the period
mentioned in clause (1).
58C. Composition of the Non-Party Care-taker Government,
appointment of Adviser, etc.(1) The Non-Party Care-taker
Government shall consist of the Chief Adviser at its head and not
more than ten other Advisers, all whom shall be appointed by the
President.
(2) The Chief Adviser and other Advisers shall be appointed within
fifteen days after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved, and
during the period between the date on which Parliament is dissolved
or stands dissolved and the date on which the Chief Adviser is
appointed, the Prime Minister and his cabinet who were in office
immediately before Parliament was dissolved or stood dissolved
shall continue to hold office as such.
(3) The President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who
among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired last and who
is qualified to be appointed as an Adviser under this article:
Provided that if such retired Chief Justice is not available or is
not willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall
appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Chief
Justices of Bangladesh retired next before the last retired Chief
Justice.
(4) If no retired Chief Justice is available or willing to hold the office
of Chief Adviser, the President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the
person who among the retired Judges of the Appellate Division
retired last and who is qualified to be appointed as an Adviser under
this article:
Provided that if such retired Judge is not available or is not
willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall
appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Judges of
the Appellate Division retired next before the last such retired Judge.
(5) If no retired Judge of the Appellate Division is available or
willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall, after
consultation, as far as practicable, with the major political parties,
appoint the Chief Adviser from among citizens of Bangladesh who
are qualified to be appointed as Advisers under this article.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, if the
provisions of clauses (3), (4) and (5) cannot be given effect to, the
615
President shall assume the functions of the Chief Adviser of the
Non-Party Care-taker Government in addition to his own functions
under this Constitution.
(7) The President shall appoint Advisers from among the persons
who are-
(a) qualified for election as members of Parliament;
(b) not members of any political party or of any organisation
associated with or affiliated to any political party;
(c) not, and have agreed in writing not to be, candidates for the
ensuing election of members of Parliament;
(d) not over seventy-two years of age.
(8) The Advisers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of
the Chief Adviser.
(9) The Chief Adviser or an Adviser may resign his office by writing
under his hand addressed to the President.
(10) The Chief Adviser or an Adviser shall cease to be Chief Adviser
or Adviser if he is disqualified to be appointed as such under this
article.
(11) The Chief Adviser shall have the status, and shall be entitled to
the remuneration and privileges, of a Prime Minister, and an Adviser
shall have the status, and shall be entitled to the remuneration and
privileges, of a Minister.
(12) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall stand dissolved on
the date on which the Prime Minister enters upon his office after the
constitution of new Parliament.
58D. Functions of Non-Party Care-taker Government.(1) The
Non-Party Care-taker Government shall discharge its functions as an
interim government and shall carry on the routine functions of such
government with the aid and assistance of persons in the services of
the Republic; and, except in the case of necessity for the discharge of
such functions it shall not make any policy decision.
(2) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall give to the Election
Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for
holding the general election of members of Parliament peacefully,
fairly and impartially.
58E. Amendment of article 61 of the Constitution.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in articles 48(3), 141A(1) and
141C(1) of the Constitution, during the period the Non-Party Care-
taker Government is functioning, provisions in the Constitution
requiring the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister or
upon his prior counter-signature shall be ineffective.
4. Amendment of article 61 of the Constitution.- In the
Constitution, in article 61, after the word law at the end, the
commas, words and figure and such law shall, during the period in
which there is a Non-party Care-taker government under article 58B,
be administered by the President.
5. Amendment of article 99 of the Constitution.-In the
Constitution, in article 99, in clause (1), after the words quasi-
judicial office, the words or the office of Chief Adviser of
Adviser shall be inserted.
616
6. Amendment of article 123 of the constitution.-In the
Constitution, in article 123, for clause (3) the following shall be
substituted, namely:-
(3) A general election of members of Parliament shall be held
within ninety days after Parliament is dissolved, whether by reason
of the expiration of its term or otherwise than by reason of such
expiration.
7. Amendment of Article 147 of the Constitution.-In article 147, in
clause (4),-
(a) for sub-clause (b) the following sub-clause shall be
substituted, namely:-
(b) for sub-clause (d) the following sub-clause shall be
substituted, namely:-
(d) Minister, Adviser, Minister of State or Deputy Minister,
8. Amendment of article 152 of the Constitution.- In the
Constitution, in article 152, in clause (1)-
(a) after the definition of the expression administrative unit:, the
following definition shall be inserted namely:-
Adviser means a person appointed to that office under article 58C;
(b) after the definition of the expression the capital the following
definition shall be inserted, namely:-
Chief Adviser means a person appointed to that office made article
58C.
(section 9 of the Act has not been quoted as the same has dealt with
the Third Schedule to the Constitution regarding oath of office and oath of
secrecy to the Chief Adviser and the Advisers).

A cohesive reading of the various provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment shows that Non-Party Care-taker Government was introduced
by the Thirteenth Amendment to give all possible aid and assistance to the
Election Commission that may be required for holding the general elections
of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially. And to that
end, the provisions, in the Constitution requiring the President to act on the
advice of the Prime Minister or his prior counter-signature as provided in
articles 48(3), 141(1) and 141(c)(1), have been made ineffective during the
period of functioning of Non-Party Care-taker Government.
Now, a question arises when the framers of the Constitution have
clearly mandated in article 126 of the Constitution that it shall be the duty
617
of all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the
discharge of its functions then what the necessity of having a Non-Party
Care-taker Government to assist the Election Commission to hold the
general election of members of Parliament is as introduced in the
Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment. To answer the question, we
have to see the context and the historical background behind the enactment
of the Thirteenth Amendment as rightly submitted by Mr. T. H. Khan, Dr.
Kamal Hossain, Mr. M. Amirul Islam, Mr. Mahamudul Islam, Mr.
Rokanuddin Mahmud and lastly, the learned Attorney General. In this
regard, it will not be out of place to see the constitutional scheme in our
Constitution as to the amendment of the provision of the Constitution and
in enacting and amending the ordinary law. Article 142 has been specially
incorporated in Part X of the Constitution under the head AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION empowering the Parliament to amend the
provision of the Constitution by way of addition, alteration, substitution or
repeal by Act of Parliament. Clause (a)(ii) of article 142(1) has clearly
provided that no Bill for amendment of the Constitution shall be presented
to the President for assent unless it is passed by the votes of not less than
two-thirds of the total number of members of Parliament, whereas an Act
amending a statute other than the Constitution can be passed by a simple
majority of the votes of the members present and voting. This will be
clearer if we have a look at article 75(1)(b) with article 80(1)(2) and (3) of
the Constitution which read as follows:
75(1) Subject to this Constitution
(a) .....................................
(b) a decision in Parliament shall be taken by a majority of the
votes of the members present and voting, but the person presiding
618
shall not vote except when there is an equality of votes, in which
case he shall exercise a casting vote;
80. (1) Every proposal in Parliament for making a law shall be made
in the form of Bill.
(2)When the Bill is passed by Parliament it shall be presented to
the President for assent.
(3) The President, within fifteen days after a Bill is presented to
him, shall assent to the Bill or declare that he withholds assent
therefrom or, in the case of a Bill other than a Money Bill, may
return it to Parliament with a message requesting that the Bill or any
particular provisions thereof be reconsidered and that any
amendments specified by him in the message be considered; and if
he fails so to do he shall be deemed to have assented to the Bill at the
expiration of that period.

From the above constitutional provisions, it is clear that if Parliament
passes a Bill for making a law by a majority of the votes of the members
present and voting and the Bill is presented to the President, he shall have
no choice but to assent to the Bill within 15(fifteen) days unless he declares
that he withholds assent therefrom or, in the case of a Bill other than a
Money Bill, may return it to Parliament with a message requesting that the
Bill or any particular provisions thereof be reconsidered and that any
amendments specified by him in the message be considered.
The above constitutional scheme of amendment of the Constitution
shows that the framers of the Constitution wanted that the provision of the
Constitution should be amended only when two-thirds of the total number
of members of Parliament passes the same. The inner intention of the
framers of the Constitution is that the provision of the Constitution should
not be subjected to frequent amendments like an ordinary law, because to
have two-thirds majority of the total number of members of Parliament is
not that easy.
The historical background behind introducing the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution by the Thirteenth
Amendment has been vividly stated in the affidavits-in-opposition filed by
619
respondent Nos.1, 5 and 6, particularly respondent No.6. The sum and
substance of the affidavits are that there were widespread allegations of
vote rigging and manipulation of the election results by the party in power
in 1973, 1979, 1986, 1988 and lastly in 1996; because of the unhappy
experiences of the unfair elections under party Government, the demand
for holding Parliamentary elections under a neutral caretaker Government,
was raised by one party and gradually all the opposition political parties of
the country agreed to this demand and after the fall of the then autocrat
General Ershad in 1990, elections of members of Parliament for the first
time were held under a Care-taker Government on 27.02.1991, wherein
Chief Justice, Shahabuddin Ahmed was the acting President. The party
which went to power in 1991 also indulged in the same kind of abuse in the
election process firstly: in Mirpur by-election and then in Magura by-
election. People of Bangladesh having experienced the gross abuse,
rigging, corrupt practices in the election process and having confidence in
the Supreme Court and also having confidence in free and fair election
under the former Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed raised the demand for
introducing the concept of neutral caretaker government in the Constitution
in order to ensure free, fair and impartial election. But the Government in
power in 1996 held the general elections of members of Parliament on 15
th

February, 1996 which was boycotted by all the political parties in
opposition which led to 23 days non-cooperation movement. From the
affidavit-in-opposition of respondent No.6, it is also apparent that all the
opposition political parties including respondent No.6, Bangladesh Awami
League and the people of all walks of life joined the demand of holding the
elections of members of Parliament under a neutral caretaker government
620
and the concept received a universal acclaim and eventually, all political
parties including the party in power reached a consensus for the
introduction of Non-Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution.
From the pleadings of the respective parties and the submissions of
the majority of the amici curiae and the learned Attorney General, it is clear
that the elections held in this country under the political government, that
is, party in power were never free, fair and impartial. The elections held
under the political government were tainted with manipulation, rigging and
hijacking, the only philosophy was to win the election by whatever means
and it reached its pit-bottom in the by-election of Magura. Manipulation of
the election result by way of rigging, use of money and muscle power and
also influencing the administration became the rule rather than an
exception in the general elections held under the party in power. In the
elections held under the political party in power whosoever was the little
man of Mr. Churchill, he could not walk into the little booth with a little
pencil to make a little cross on a little bit of paper. So, not only the
political parties but also the whole nation was united for a device to ensure
their right of adult franchise to elect their own representatives in a free and
fair election which is the main theme of the Proclamation of Independence,
the preamble and articles 7, 8, 11, 65(2) and 122 of the Constitution and
that was achieved on the basis of discussions and consensus finally
culminating in the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment with the sole
motive to hold a free, fair, peaceful, impartial and credible general election
of members of Parliament majority of whom will ultimately form the
Government. In this regard, I may reproduce a portion of the discussions
made in the Parliament when the Bill on the Thirteenth Amendment was
621
placed in the Parliament particularly the statement made by the then Law
Minister as quoted in the judgment of Awlad Ali, J.
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Care-taker Government ' |< || << - < <<|< |<| ||-
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In the context, I would also like to draw the attention to the
deliberations of the members of Parliament in the Parliament when the
Thirteenth Amendment bill was placed in the Parliament as have been
quoted in the judgment delivered by my learned brother Muhammad
Imman Ali, J.
From the above, it is also clear that the necessity of introducing the
Non-Party Care-taker Government was felt by the members of Parliament
and after discussions in the Parliament by the votes of two-thirds majority
the Thirteenth Amendment was passed on the 25
th
day of March, 1996. So,
practically the Thirteenth Amendment was passed as per the will and
demand of the people. And through this newly formulated constitutional
device 3(three) consecutive successful general elections of members of
Parliament were held, which were widely acclaimed both at home and
abroad as free, fair and credible neutral election except the respective
political party which failed to secure majority seats in Parliament to form
the Government.
One may ask a question as to whether opposition political parties had
any locus standi or standing to make any such demand and reach on a
consensus with the party in power to introduce the system of Non-party
Care-taker Government culminating the passing of the Thirteenth
622
Amendment. The political parties are not something foreign or strange to
our Constitution. Our Constitution has recognised the political parties very
much unlike the Indian Constitution. In article 152, political party has been
defined as follows:
Political Party includes a group or combination of persons who
operate within or outside Parliament under a distinctive name and
who hold themselves out for the purpose of propagating a political
opinion or engaging in any other political activity.

And a group or combination of persons as mentioned above definitely
include the people as envisaged in article 7 of the Constitution.
Political party has also been recognised in the RPO, 1972. In clause
(xiva) of article 2 of the RPO, 1972 political party has been defined as
political party means a political party as defined in article 152(1) of the
Constitution. Provisions have been made in Chapter VIA of the Order,
1972 for registration of political parties with the Election Commission, on
fulfilling certain conditions as detailed in the Chapter, cancellation of such
registration under certain circumstances, to finalise nomination of
candidate by central parliamentary board of the party in consideration of
panels prepared by the members of Ward, Union, Thana, Upazila or
District Committee as the case may be, of concerned constituency,
including receipt of donations or grants from any person, company, group
of companies or non-government organization. In Chapter III of the RPO,
1972 under the head Election, provisions have been made for nomination to
the election of members of Parliament by a registered political party, the
allocation of symbol to the contesting candidate set up by a registered
political party. In Chapter IIIA under the head ELECTION EXPENSES
provisions have been made for maintaining proper account by every
political party of all its income and expenditure for the period from the date
623
of publication of notification for submission of nomination paper under
article 11(1) till the completion of elections in all constituencies in which it
has set up candidates and such account shall show clearly the amount
received by it as donation above taka five thousand from any candidate or
any person seeking nomination or from any other person or source giving
their names and addresses and the amount received from each of them and
the mode of receipt, and the submission of expenditure statement giving
details of the expenses incurred or authorised by it in connection with the
election of its candidates for the period from the date of publication of the
notification under clause (1) of article 11 of the RPO till the completion of
elections in all constituencies to the Commission for its scrutiny within
90(ninety) days of the completion of election in all constituencies and the
consequences of such failure. In this regard, we must also recall a historical
fact which took place in 1990. When General Ershad resigned from the
post of President as the result of mass movement, on the request of three
Main Political Alliances and parties of the country, the then Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed agreed to accept the post of Vice-
President and thus to take the reins of neutral and impartial Government as
its head and he acted as the Acting President till the establishment of the 5
th

Parliament and then on the basis of assurance given by the three Main
Political Alliances that after having run the Government temporarily till the
establishment of an elected democratic Government through a free, fair and
impartial election to Parliament, he would be allowed to return to the office
of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh the Constitution (Eleventh Amendment)
Act, 1991 (Act 24 of 1991) was passed allowing him to resume the duties
and responsibilities of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. So, the existence of
political parties and their role in our national life and politics cannot be just
denied and ignored. For giving permanent and meaningful shape to
democracy the people of the country or the political parties on the basis of
624
consensus reached amongst them may agree to a type of interim
Government as happened in the instant case under the name Non-Party
Care-taker Government as introduced in the Thirteenth Amendment. We
should not be obsessed only with the term/word democracy without seeing
its real meaning and implication in the constitutional scheme as discussed
hereinbefore.
Discussions and consensus are also very important components for
the sustenance of democracy. And it was a very laudable and good instance
and gesture in the political arena of our country which is beset with rivalry
and mudslinging that the party in power and the opposition political parties
could come to such a consensus. Noble laureate, Amarta Sen in his book
The Argumentative Indian, Writings on Indian History, Culture and
Identity, Picador 1
st
Edition, 2006 has rightly said
Public reasoning includes the opportunity for citizens to participate
in political discussions and to influence public choice. Balloting can
be seen as only one of the ways- albeit a very important way- to
make public discussions effective, when the opportunity to vote is
combined with the opportunity to speak and listen, without fear. The
reach- and effectiveness- of voting depend critically on the
opportunity for open public discussion.
A broader understanding of democracygoing well beyond the
freedom of elections and ballotshas emerged powerfully, not only
in contemporary political philosophy, but also in the new disciplines
of social choice theory and public choice theory influenced by
economic reasoning as well as by political ideas. In addition to the
fact that open discussions on important public decisions can vastly
enhance information about society and about our respective
priorities, they can also provide the opportunity for revising the
chosen priorities in responses to public discussions. Indeed, as James
Buchanan, the founder of the contemporary discipline of public
choice theory, has argued: the definition of democracy as
government by discussion implies that individual values can and
do change in the process of decision-making. The role of the
argumentative tradition of India applies not merely to the public
expression of values, but also to the interactive formation of values,
illustrated for example by the emergence of the Indian form of
secularism ...

As stated hereinbefore, the appointment of Chief Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed as the Vice-President of the country was also made
625
on the basis of consensus of all opposition political parties plus the civil
society and other eminent citizens of the Country, under whose Acting
presidentship a free and fair general election of members of Parliament was
held on 27.02.1991. Similarly on the basis of consensus of all political
parties who represented in the Parliament including the party in power
the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution was passed by the Fifth
Parliament introducing the parliamentary form of Government, as it
stands today, in the Constitution.
It is also very pertinent to state that when the Rule of the writ
petition was heard by the Full Bench of the High Court Division on
20.06.2004, 30.06.2004, 06.07.2004, 07.07.2004, 13.07.2004, 14.07.2004,
20.07.2004 and 21.07.2004 the then learned Attorney General, Mr. Hasan
Arif as the highest law officer of the country supported the Thirteenth
Amendment as it is now being supported by Mr. Mahbubey Alam, the
incumbent Attorney General which fact also shows no change of mind
and stand of the two successive Governments as to the necessity of
Non-Party Care-taker Government for holding the general elections of
members of Parliament in a free, fair and impartial manner which was
introduced in the Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment.
It would not be out of context to say that those are the political
parties who participate in the general elections of members of
Parliament by nominating their own candidates and by giving their
political manifesto and programme and after the election is over, the
President in exercise of his power under article 56(3) of the
Constitution, appoints a member of Parliament who appears to him to
command the support of the majority of the members of Parliament and
626
our experience shows that it is always the Chief of a political party who
commands such support and is elected as leader of the parliamentary
party and thus, becomes the Prime Minister. And the political party
which secures the next highest number of seats in the Parliament always
elects its President/Chairman/ Chairperson as the leader of its
parliamentary party and he sits in the opposition Bench in the Parliament
as the leader of the opposition. If we just see the formation of present
Government and the Ninth Parliament, the things will be clear. In the last
general elections of members of Parliament, Bangladesh Awami League
and its allies won the majority of seats in the Parliament and Sheikh
Hasina, the President of Bangladesh Awami League was invited by the
President to form the Government and accordingly, she formed the
Government and became the Prime Minister of the country. BNP secured
the second highest number of seats in Parliament and its Chairperson,
Begum Khaleda Zia having been elected as leader of its parliamentary
party became the leader of opposition. So, how can we undermine and
ignore the consensus reached between the political party in power and all
opposition political parties in 1996 as to the necessity of introduction of
Non-Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution culminating the
passing of the Thirteenth Amendment terming the same to be the result of
political agitation or movement like any other political issue which might
be agitated by a particular political party or group? No question can be
raised now as well, as to the competence of the Sixth Parliament which
passed the Thirteenth Amendment. It cannot also be unnoticed that not
only the legislative Acts but also the executive and the administrative
actions carry the presumption of constitutional validity and an elected
627
Parliament cannot be held to be illegally constituted merely because the
opposition political parties boycotted the elections of the Sixth Parliament;
the Sixth Parliament must legally be taken to have been validly constituted
as the election thereof was not set aside following the provisions of the
Constitution and the RPO, 1972. On the contrary, all political parties
accepted the Thirteenth Amendment passed by the Sixth Parliament and
they and the people at large participated in three subsequent general
elections of members of Parliament held following the provisions of the
Thirteenth Amendment. More significantly the Seventh Parliament was
constituted on the basis of the general election of members of Parliament
held under the Non-Party Caretaker Government after dissolution of the
Sixth Parliament.
In my view, such a move by the political party in power and the
opposition political parties was a very positive and healthy sign in the
political arena of our country where there is always an environment of
animosity and adversarial feeling. I am constrained to say that animosity
and adversarial atmosphere amongst the political parties is so high in
degree that when one political party goes to power, the leader of opposition
in the Parliament is determined not to sit together and even not to meet
each other on the occasion of national events. The people of this country
expect that this kind of consensus as was reached in 1991, on the issue of
re-introducing parliamentary form of Government from the Presidential
form and then in 1996, on the issue of introduction of Non-Party Care-taker
Government in the Constitution for ensuring free, fair and impartial general
election of members of Parliament always, takes place on all national
issues between the party in power and the parties in opposition and if that
628
happens definitely, our country shall be the role model of democracy and
shall prosper as well.
With this background, let us examine whether the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government introduced in the Constitution by the
Thirteenth Amendment by adding a new article in Chapter I and by adding
a new Chapter as Chapter-IIA and by inserting therein articles 58B-58E as
quoted hereinbefore in Part-IV is in conformity with the constitutional
scheme of democracy or not.
To win in the election of a particular candidate or party by foul
means viz by manipulation, coercion, intimidation and exerting undue
influence upon the government machinery is surely a defeat and destruction
of democracy which is the fundamental structure of the Constitution for
which our martyrs sacrificed their lives with aspiration that they will get a
society free from all kinds of exploitation and their fundamental rights
shall be ensured. Free and fair election goes with the basic structure of
the Constitution very much as discussed hereinbefore. And free and fair
election is a precondition for choosing or selecting peoples
representatives and thus to materialise the main theme of article 7 of the
Constitution that all powers belong to them. Democracy becomes
meaningful only when a man, no matter how small his power is, can
cast his vote freely in a fair election. In this context, at the risk of
repetition, I consider it beneficial to quote Sir Winston Churchill:
At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man,
walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross
on a little bit of paper no amount of rhetoric or voluminous
discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of
the point.
From the above famous quotation of Sir Winston Churchill, we can
easily say that in order to accept an election as free and fair, the test would
be whether a little man could walk into the polling centre with a little
pencil and exercise his right of adult franchise by putting a little cross on
629
the little bit of paper (ballot paper) freely without any influence or pressure.
In other words, the most important question is whether an adult citizen
could exercise his right of franchise freely and fairly without any
inducement, fear, influence or any other compelling circumstances and if
that could not be, then the whole process of the rule of majority becomes
questionable and in the process, peoples empowerment as envisaged in
article 7 of the Constitution becomes jeopardized. Therefore, to practice
democracy and to give it an institutional shape, it is imperative that
periodic, free and fair elections are conducted. And in the absence of such
election democracy would be only in theory and not in practice and that
would ultimately lead to destruction of democracy.
One may argue that if election of a particular polling centre or more
than 1(one) centre of a constituency or the constituency as a whole is not
held fairly, freely and peacefully and the voters are not allowed to cast their
votes as per their own choice and in the process, the election results are
rigged or manipulated, then that would be the violation of the election laws
which can be taken care of by terming the same as election dispute and the
defeated candidates shall have the chance to take the dispute to the Election
Tribunal, to be formed by the Election Commission, but for such violation
of election laws in holding the election or an election dispute cannot justify
the introduction of Non-Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution.
But, that argument does not hold good for the simple reason that the
context and the history behind the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment
as discussed hereinbefore has shown that rigging in the election by using
muscle power, money and manipulation of result by the party in power
by exerting undue influence upon the Government machinery, became
630
the rule rather than an exception in the general elections of members of
Parliament held under the political party in power. We should not forget
that general elections of members of Parliament in our country is held in
a day and if by resorting to massive rigging and exerting undue influence
upon the administration, election results are manipulated and thus, the
party in power secures majority seats in Parliament and forms the
Government then it would be meaningless to take the election dispute to
the Election Tribunal which is also time consuming. And through such
manipulated result, the party in power shall merrily rule the country
though it had no such mandate from the people, which will be against the
spirit of article 7 of the Constitution.
By the Thirteenth Amendment, in Chapter II of Part-IV after article
58, a new article as article 58A has been inserted keeping article 58
intact. By this new article, except the provisions of article 55(4), (5) and
(6), nothing of the Chapter has been made applicable during the period
in which Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved. By the amendment,
a new Chapter, namely, Chapter IIA has been inserted after Chapter II in
Part IV under the head CHAPTER IIA-Non-Party Caretaker
Government. And in this Chapter, articles 58B-58E have been inserted
providing for the system of Non-Party Care-taker Government during
the period from the date on which the Chief Adviser of such
Government enters upon office after Parliament is dissolved or stands
dissolved by reason of the expiration of its term till the date on which a
new Prime Minister enters upon his office after the constitution
of Parliament, providing amongst others that the executive power of
the Republic to be exercised by or on behalf of the authority of the
631
Chief Adviser. Article 58C has provided for the composition of the
Non-Party Care-taker Government to be headed by the Chief Adviser
from amongst the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh or the retired
Judges of this Division, as the case may be, as provided in clauses
(3)(4)(5) and lastly the President himself as the Chief Adviser and 10
(ten) other Advisers to be appointed by the President, the period
within which the Chief Adviser and other Advisers shall be appointed
by the President, the qualification for appointment as the Advisers,
appointment to be made by the President or resignation of the Chief
Adviser and the Advisers, cessation of the post of Chief Adviser and
the Advisers, the status and entitlement of the Chief Adviser and other
Advisers, the dissolution of Non-Party Care-taker Government.
Article 58D has provided the functions of Non-Party Care-taker
Government. In this article, there are two clauses: clause (1) has stated
that the Non-Party Care-taker Government shall discharge its
functions as an interim government and shall carry on the routine
functions of such government with the aid and assistance of persons in
the service of the Republic; and except in the case of necessity for the
discharge of such functions, it shall not make any policy decision. In
clause (2), it has been categorically sated that the Non-Party Care-
taker Government shall give to the Election Commission all possible
aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general
election of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.
By article 58E, the provisions of articles 48(3), 141A(1) and
141C(1) of the Constitution, have been made ineffective during the
period of functioning of the Non-Party Care-taker Government. So,
632
as already detailed hereinbefore, the solemn purpose for which Non-Party
Care-taker Government has been brought in the Constitution by way of
insertions of articles 58B-58D, is to hold the general elections of members
of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.
As a corollary to the point, we are also to examine whether such
concept of discharging the functions as an interim Government by the Non-
Party Care-taker Government manned by unelected people is foreign or
alien to our Constitution. If we passionately consider the provisions of
articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the original Constitution as given by the
Constituent Assembly and the said two articles as they stand today along
with article 72(3) thereof, we would find that such concept was engrafted
in the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly as well as by the
Parliament which reintroduced the parliamentary form of Government in
1991. And although till date the form of Government has been changed
twice (in 1975 and 1991) those provisions remained unaltered. The said
articles run thus:
57(3). Nothing in this article shall disqualify Prime Minister for
holding office until his successor has entered upon office.
58(4). If the Prime Minister resigns from or ceases to hold office
each of the other Ministers shall be deemed also to have resigned
from office but shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter,
continue to hold office until his successor has entered upon office.

But, unfortunately, as has been discussed hereinbefore, the original concept
of interim Government to be headed by the outgoing Prime Minister, could
not ensure free and fair general elections of members of Parliament.
In this context, it is also necessary to consider article 123(3) of the
Constitution, as it stood before the Thirteenth Amendment, and as it stands
today, after the Thirteenth Amendment.
Before the Thirteenth Amendment, article 123(3) was as follows:
633

(3) A general election of members of Parliament shall be held
(a) in the case of a dissolution by reason of expiration of its
term, within the period of ninety days preceding such
dissolution; and
(b) in the case of dissolution otherwise than by reason of such
expiration, within ninety days after such dissolution;
Provided that the persons elected at a general election under
sub-clause (a) shall not assume office as members of Parliament
except after the expiration of the term referred to therein.
The present article 123(3) stands as follows:
(3) A general election of members of Parliament shall be held
within ninety days after Parliament is dissolved, whether by reason
of the expiration of its term or otherwise than by reason of such
expiration.

Actually, article 123 has dealt with the time for holding elections of the
President and the members of Parliament. The marginal note of article 123
is Time for holding elections. This article has nothing to do with the
interim Government as was contemplated in article 57(3) and 58(4) of the
Constitution before the Thirteenth Amendment and the Parliament. Article
123(3) which stood before the Thirteenth Amendment as quoted
hereinbefore was engrafted by the Constituent Assembly and it remained
unaltered till the Thirteenth Amendment was passed. If we carefully read
article 123(3), as it stood before the Thirteenth Amendment, it will appear
that the legislature conceived of two exigencies as to the time for holding
general election of members of Parliament. One, under clause (3)(a), that
is, to hold general election of members of Parliament in the case of a
dissolution by reason of expiration of its term, within the period of 90 days
preceding such dissolution and the other, under clauses(3)(b), that is, in the
case of dissolution otherwise than by reason of such expiration, within 90
days after such dissolution. A proviso was also added to clause (3) to the
effect that the persons elected at a general election under sub-clause (a)
shall not assume office as members of Parliament except after the
634
expiration of the term referred to therein. A further reading of clause (3) of
un-amended article 123 read with articles 57(3) and 58(4), it appears that
the interim Government, as thought of by the Constituent Assembly and by
the 5
th
Parliament which introduced the system of parliamentary form of
Government, is relatable to sub-clause (3)(b) of article 123. Mr. Farooqui,
by referring to the proviso to clause (3) of un-amended article 123, tried to
argue that the legislature having clearly provided that the persons elected at
a general election shall not assume office as members of Parliament except
after the expiry of the term referred to therein shows that Parliament would
exist even after election. But Mr. Farooqui failed to notice that the framers
of the Constitution thought of both situations, that is, holding of election of
members of Parliament before expiry of the term of Parliament as provided
in article 72(3) and the holding of such election after the Parliament stands
dissolved either after the expiry of the period of five years from its first
meeting or the Parliament is dissolved by the President as contemplated in
article 57(2) of the Constitution. It further appears that proviso to clause (3)
of the un-amended article 123 was added because as per article 72(3) the
term of Parliament is 5(five) years from the date of its first meeting. So, if
the election of members of Parliament is held before the expiry of the said
period of 5(five) years as contemplated in article 123(3)(a) naturally the
right of the sitting members of Parliament shall continue till the period of
5(five) years expires. Mr. Farooqui has also overlooked that article 123
is in Part VII of the Constitution which has exclusively dealt with
elections without having any reference to Part IV of the Constitution as
well as Part V. Mr. Farooqui also failed to take notice the context in
enacting the Thirteenth Amendment introducing the concept of Non-
635
Party Care-taker Government. As the political party in power failed to
secure the holding of general election of members of Parliament in a
free, fair and impartial manner and thus, to ensure peoples real
representation in the Parliament, the Non-Party Care-taker Government
was introduced on the basis of consensus of all and accordingly present
article 123(3) was substituted providing for holding general election of
members of Parliament only after dissolution of Parliament whatever may
be the cause of such dissolution which is quite in conformity with the
provisions of un-amended article 123(3)(b) and also article 72(3) of the
Constitution. If we give a mechanical meaning to the proviso to clause (3)
of the un-amended article 123 that the legislature wanted to have general
election of members of Parliament only within their term, then sub-clause
(b) of clause (3) thereof would become absolutely nugatory vis-a-vis the
other provisions of the Constitution such as articles 57(3), 58(4) and 72(3)
which is inconceivable in interpreting the provisions of a written
Constitution. In this regard, I also want to make it very clear that clause (4)
of article 56 is relatable to the interim Government and it has nothing to do
with the un-amended article 123(3), because 56(4) speaks about the period
between a dissolution of Parliament and the next following general election
of members of Parliament and in the clause, the legislature has used the
words the persons, who were such members immediately before the
dissolution, shall be regarded for the purpose of this clause, as continuing
to be such members. In the clause, it has not been stated that Parliament
shall be deemed not to have been dissolved. The legislature has not said so
rightly, because if they had said so, it would have created disharmony with
the other provisions of the Constitution as already discussed hereinbefore.
636
Mr. M. I. Farooqui, Mr. Muhammad Mohsen Rashid and Mr.
Ajmalul Hossain, argued with all the force at their command that during
the Non-Party Care-taker Government:there remain no people, there exists
no democracy. On their such submission, I posed a question to them
whether the Prime Minister or other Ministers remain as elected
representatives and the Cabinet remain responsible to Parliament even after
the Parliament stands dissolved after the expiry of its term of 5(five) years
from the date of its first meeting as mandated in article 72(3) or if at the
advice of the Prime Minister before expiry of the period of 5(five) years,
Parliament is dissolved by the President pursuant to the provisions of
clause (2) of article 57. They were unable to give any clear and satisfactory
answer or explanation, they simply relied upon the proviso to clause (3)
and clause (4) of article 72 of the Constitution and article 56(4) thereof. I,
for myself, tried to get the answer and I found the answer in the negative.
With the dissolution of Parliament, either under article 72(3) or under
article 57(2) of the Constitution, as the case may be, members of
Parliament cease to be elected representatives of the people, so also the
Prime Minister and his other Cabinet colleagues, and since no Parliament
exists after its dissolution, they are not also responsible to Parliament. After
dissolution of Parliament, the character of the Prime Minister and his other
Cabinet colleagues is the same as that of the Chief Adviser and the
Advisers respectively, because the words dissolved and dissolve
respectively, as used in the two articles, connote to separate or treat up
and disperse, to terminate or dismiss an assembly, such as parliament,
to officially end a parliament, to terminate, disperse (Oxford
Dictionary, 7
th
Edition, Samsad English to Bengali Dictionary, Fifth
Edition). This will be more clear if we see the Bengali version of the
words dissolved and dissolve used articles 72(3) and 57(2) of the
Constitution. In both articles in Bengali, it has been stated as . . .
||<| <|<: . . . ||'<| |< The meaning of the Bengali words
637
||<| <|<: ||'<| |< as used in the two articles do not
require any explanation or elaboration to understand their implication
as to position of the Prime Minister and the other Ministers after the
Parliament is dissolved, because the words are self composed having no
ambiguity. In this regard, the language of article 57(3) is very
important. This article says that nothing in the article shall disqualify
the Prime Minister for holding the office until his successor has
entered upon office. The article has not said that the Prime Minister shall
continue to be a member of Parliament until his successor
has entered upon office. Moreover, a constitutional provision cannot be
read in isolation and has to be read along with other related articles keeping
in view the constitutional scheme as has been discussed above.
After dissolution of Parliament when the Prime Minister and his
other colleagues in the Cabinet were allowed to hold the office of the Prime
Minister and the Ministers respectively until their successors entered upon
office under articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the Constitution; their position is
equal to that of a Chief Adviser and the Advisers as provided in the scheme
of Non-Party Care-taker Government. If after the dissolution of Parliament,
the incumbent Prime Minister who ceases to be the elected representative
of the people can continue as the Prime Minister why the Chief Adviser
and the other Advisers would not be able to perform the routine functions
of the Government whose main job is to give assistance to the Election
Commission that may be required for holding the general election of
members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.
Clauses (3) and (4) of article 72 read as follows:
72(3). Unless sooner dissolved by the President, Parliament shall
stand dissolved on the expiration of the period of five years from the
date of its first meeting:
Provided that at any time when the Republic is engaged in
war the period may be extended by Act of Parliament by not more
638
than one year at a time but shall not be so extended beyond six
months after the termination of the war.
72(4). If after a dissolution and before the holding of the next general
election of members of Parliament the President is satisfied that
owing to the existence of state of war in which the Republic is
engaged it is necessary to recall Parliament, the President shall
summon the Parliament that has been dissolved to meet.
If we closely examine the proviso to clause (3) and clause (4) of
article 72, it would appear that those provisions have been made only to
meet the extreme extraordinary situations, that is, in case the Republic is
engaged in war. Be that as it may, the legislature has made the said
provisions because, if the Republic is engaged in war, its territorial
sovereignty shall be at stake. But, that is again a very very remote situation.
And I sincerely believe and hope that our beloved motherland, the Republic
is never engaged in war and we maintain good relationship with all
neighbours. We already struggled for our national liberation in 1971 and
our three million people sacrificed their lives at the hand of the occupation
force and their allies and our women were dishonoured, so we cannot
afford any war in future because war destroys human civilization and
causes human miseries and sufferings to the extreme.
It is to be noted that by inserting article 58A in Chapter-II of Part IV
of the Constitution, except clauses (4), (5) and (6) of article 55 thereof, all
other provisions of the Chapter have been made inapplicable during the
period in which Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved and by the
proviso to article 58A Chapter II, as a whole, has been made applicable
notwithstanding anything in Chapter IIA where the President summons
Parliament that was dissolved to meet the situation under article 72(4).
Again, this provision has been made only to meet the situation which may
arise in case the Republic is engaged in war. But, because of this
provision of summoning the Parliament, it cannot be said that other than
the state of war, the Parliament shall be deemed to continue even after its
639
dissolution and thus, members of Parliament continue as the elected
representatives of the people with the dissolution of Parliament to fit in
the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant and petitioner and
amicus curiae, Mr. Ajmalul Hossain as noted hereinbefore. The
argument that even after the Parliament is dissolved Bengali version
being . . . ||<| <|<, ||'<| |< the Prime Minister and
his other colleagues continue to be the elected representatives of the
people and they remain responsible to Parliament because of proviso to
clause (3) and clause (4) of article 72, is absolutely fallacious and bereft
of logic and reminds me of a very popular Bengali saying that || ||
|< | '|| |<
In this regard, I consider it necessary to discus the relevant
provisions of the Constitution to have a clear understanding about
Parliament. Parliament has been defined in article 152 of the Constitution
as follows:
Parliament means the parliament for Bangladesh established by
article 65
So, as of necessity, we are to fall back upon article 65 of the Constitution.
If we closely examine article 65 as a whole with X-ray vision, it will
appear that Parliament as conceived of by the Constituent Assembly and
continued to remain so till date is that it shall consist of three hundred
members to be elected in accordance with law from single territorial
constituencies by direct election. Thus, it is clear that Parliament, as
conceived of in the Constitution, is a Parliament Member who shall be
elected by the people in a free and fair election. If the candidates, in the
general elections of members of Parliament, get themselves elected by use
640
of muscle power, coercion, threat, intimidation, money and exerting undue
influence on the Government machinery, which became the rule rather than
an exception in the elections with the party Government in power, as
interim Government provided in articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the
Constitution, they cannot be called peoples representatives and Parliament
consisting of such members of Parliament cannot be called a Parliament
within the meaning of clause (1) of article 65. And such Parliament cannot
have true representation of the people within the meaning of article 7 of the
Constitution. Can a member of Parliament commanding the support of the
majority of members of such Parliament have the mandate to rule the
country for 5(five) years as the Prime Minister? My answer is an emphatic,
no. In this context, I am constrained to refer to the Sixth Parliament:
election to the Sixth Parliament was held on 15.02.1996 which was
boycotted by the major political parties in opposition and as per the
affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent Nos.1 and 6, it appears that
election was not free and fair and consequently that Parliament did not last
and was dissolved on 30
th
March, just after 42(forty two) days of the
election. Had there been no consensus between the party in power and all
other opposition political parties to pass the Thirteenth Amendment and
then to dissolve the Sixth Parliament (if it continued), could it be said that
it had true representation of the people and the Prime Minister so appointed
by the President on the basis of such election be the Prime Minister in true
sense? Again, the obvious answer will be, no.
We should not confuse between two things, democracy and
Parliament. Free and fair election is part of democracy and a fundamental
structure of the Constitution. And Parliament is the product of democratic
641
process through a free and fair election. So, in the absence of free and fair
election, Parliament cannot have real legitimacy and in such Parliament,
people will have no representation. We should not also have any special
fascination and love for the Parliament if its members are not elected by the
people in a free and fair election and thus, do not have a true representation
to the people.
As discussed above, the interim government, as conceived of by the
Constituent Assembly and then re-introduced by the Twelfth Amendment
as provided in article 57(3) and 58(4) of the Constitution, totally failed to
ensure free and fair general election of members of Parliament, so the
concept of interim government through a Non-Party Care-taker
Government, has been introduced in the Constitution on the basis of
consensus and that, in no way, clashes with democracy rather it has
strengthened democracy and the democratic process as conceived of in the
Constitution and has not destroyed or impaired democracy in any manner.
It is also very pertinent to state that Part IV which deals with the
executive, as it stands today, is not the one given by the Constituent
Assembly. The present Part IV is the dispensation given by the Fifth
Parliament by the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution and this was
also done on consensus of all political parties. Now, if we recall the
original Part-IV given by the Constituent Assembly which has been quoted
hereinbefore, it would appear that in clause (4) of article 56 clear
provisions were made for appointment of non Parliament member as
Minister by the President on condition that he had to be elected within
6(six) months, which prima-facie proves that even the Constituent
Assembly in their wisdom thought of inclusion of non-Parliament
642
Members to become the member of the Cabinet and allow such member
of the Cabinet to continue for a period of 6(six) months without being
member of Parliament; when the Constituent Assembly made
provisions for making a citizen as Minister without being member of
Parliament and allowed him to continue as such for 6(six) months then
why the Chief Adviser and the Advisers cannot continue for 90(ninety)
days. Moreso, in the present dispensation of Part IV, in article 56(2),
there is clear provision for appointment as Ministers, Ministers of State
and Deputy Ministers from amongst the non members of Parliament by
the President upto one-tenth of the total number of the Ministers, the
Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers from amongst the members
of Parliament. The provision for making the non members of
Parliament as the Ministers, the Ministers of State and the Deputy
Ministers has been made by the legislature in their wisdom possibly on the
idea that in case the Republic needs the assistance of the expertise
knowledge of a citizen, it can get his service. It will be quite relevant to
mention that presently there are two Cabinet Ministers and one State
Minister who are not members of Parliament and they are holding
important portfolios. They are Mr. Shafique Ahmed, Mr. Dilip Barua and
Mr. Yeasef Osman and the Ministriesthey are manningare Ministry of
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, the Ministry of Industries and the
Ministry of Science and Technology respectively. In this regard, it is also
very relevant to say that the writ petitioner did not challenge the proviso to
clause (2) of article 56 which has provided for appointment of non
members of Parliament as Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy
Ministers. Besides, in the original Constitution in clause (3) of article 65
clear provision was made for fifteen reserved seats exclusively for women
643
members who shall be elected according to law by members of Parliament
which now by way amendment stands at 45. Be that as it may, the very
concept of appointment of non-parliament members as Minister, Minister
of State and Deputy Minister being there in the original Constitution as
well as in the present dispensation of the Constitution, I do not see
anything wrong in making unelected people as the Chief Adviser and the
Advisers to constitute the Non-Party Care-taker Government for 90
(ninety) days only. The objection of the writ-petitioner, in that respect,
appears to me absolutely psychological and objection for the sake of
objection.
From the discussions made above, it is clear that the 13
th

Amendment was a historical necessity under the changed socio political
condition of our country for giving a complete meaning of democracy and
also for making the existing provisions of interim government meaningful
and more effective and to make the people sovereign as enshrined in article
7 of the Constitution.
I do not also find any substance in the submission of Mr. M. I.
Farooqui, Mr. Moshen Rashid and amicus curiae, Mr. Ajmalul Hossain that
for 90 (ninety) days democracy will be totally absent in the Republic and
the people will be nowhere inasmuch as the President who remains as the
Head of the State during the Non-Party Care-taker Government and to
whom the Non-Party Care-taker Government shall be collectively
responsible, is really not an elected person. The argument that the President
not being elected by the direct vote by the people, he cannot be accepted as
true representative of the people, cannot be accepted as valid, because, if
we accept such argument then 4(four) articles of the Constitution shall
644
become redundant or otherwise nugatory which is unthinkable in case of a
written Constitution. We must remember that every provision of the
Constitution is essential and in harmony with the other provisions.
Let us see the relevant articles in the Constitution in this regard. In
article 152, the President has been defined as follows:
The President means the President of Bangladesh elected under
this Constitution or any person for the time being acting in that
office.

In article 152, there is no reference to direct or indirect election. It has
simply said elected.
Article 48(1) of the Constitution has said that there shall be a
President of Bangladesh who shall be elected by members of Parliament in
accordance with law. Article 119 has clearly provided, amongst others, that
one of the functions of the Election Commission is the superintendence,
direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for election to
the office of President and also to conduct and hold the election of the
office of President in accordance with the Constitution and any other law.
Article 123(1)(2) has provided time for holding election to the post of
President within the period of ninety to sixty days and ninety days
respectively under two different situations: one, in the case of a vacancy in
the office of President occurring by reason of the expiration of his term of
office and the other, in the case of a vacancy in the office of President
occurring by reason of death, resignation or removal of the President.
Proviso to clause (1) of article 123 has further provided that if the term
expires before the dissolution of the Parliament by the members of which
he was elected, the election to fill the vacancy shall not be held until after
the next general election of members of Parliament, but shall be held
645
within thirty days after the first sitting of Parliament following such general
election. And the law for holding the election of the office of President, as
it stands today, is <|| |<| , :oo: which was enacted repealing
President Election Ordinance, 1978. In this law as well, no reference has
been made as to the indirect election.
From the above mentioned articles of the Constitution and the law, it
is apparent that the legislature has not made any difference between direct
and indirect election in respect of the election of the President, therefore,
we should not endeavour to make any such difference. So, when the
President has been described as a person elected in the Constitution how
we can say otherwise. In view of the above, my irresistible conclusion is
that the President being elected and the Government operated by a Council
of Advisers during the period of Non-Party Care-taker Government being
collectively responsible to him, the representative character of the
Government is not at all lost; so also the democracy of the people. And the
President being elected, he must be given due constitutional weight and
value.
The submission of Dr. M. Zahir that the concept of Non-Party Care-
taker Government introduced in the Constitution by the Thirteenth
Amendment for holding the general elections of members of Parliament, is
a natural stigma/| for the nation and also the party in power, because the
elected member of Parliament who commands the support of the majority
of members of Parliament, who acts as a Prime Minister for 5(five) years,
cannot be trusted for the period from the time of dissolution of Parliament
and till his successor yet enters upon office, is bereft of any logic as well as
factual backing, because the term of Parliament is five years from the date
646
of its first meeting and natural mandate of the people is only for five years
and after the expiration of 5(five) years when Parliament stands dissolved,
the mandate comes to an end. Article 57(3) only provided that the outgoing
Prime Minister would not be disqualified for holding office, yet his
successor entered upon office. The Constitution has not given any mandate
to the Government in power or the Prime Minister to hold the election of
members of Parliament. It is the Election Commission which has been
given the charge/function to hold the elections of the President and
members of Parliament as clearly provided in article 119 of the
Constitution. So, why it should be a natural stigma/| upon the nation or
upon the political party in power if the general elections of members of
Parliament are held under the Non-Party Care-taker Government after
dissolution of Parliament when the Prime Minister ceases to have the
representative character and to whom no mandate was given by the people
to hold general elections of members of Parliament. I do not see any
reason, for the Prime Minister, his other Cabinet colleagues and the party in
power to take it as a stigma/| to have the general election of members of
Parliament under the Non-Party Care-taker Government or to be
embarrassed or think themselves inept, corrupt and incompetent as stated in
the supplementary affidavit filed by the writ-petitioner. Rather if the party
in power under the leadership of the Prime Minister has done good things
for the people, it should leave the office and face the people to facilitate the
holding of free and fair general election of members of Parliament and get
re-elected and then again form the government with the mandate of the
people. Strange thing is that nothing has been said by respondent No.1,
Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and
647
Parliamentary Affairs about the stigma/| in its affidavit-in-opposition
filed before the High Court Division and in the concise statement filed
before this Division in holding the general election of members of
Parliament under the Non-Party Care-taker Government as submitted by
Dr. M. Zahir. The submission of Dr. Zahir is self defeating as he himself
suggested a modality of interim care-taker Government for holding the
general election of members of Parliament by giving a reference to the
Australian system.
Every nation and country has its own pride and prejudice and has the
right to decide what the form of government including the interim one
should be. As, in the Constitution itself, there was a form of interim
government which failed to ensure free and fair general election of
members of Parliament, on the basis of consensus, the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government was introduced by the Thirteenth
Amendment and that worked well and under the system, 3(three) elections
have already been held with the mass participation of the people and thus,
the people have accepted the mechanism and therefore, I do not see any
reason to reverse the same after 15(fifteen) years. If there is any natural
stigma/| on our nation, it is: corruption, but the holding of general
election of members of Parliament under Non-Party Care-taker
Government is not. In fact, corruption is taking the shape of a menace; all
development works are being hindered because of corruption for which
good governance is also suffering a setback. Because of corruption, the
bulk of the poor people of the country are deprived of their due share in the
development of the country. And we all should create social awareness
against corruption as well as put resistance against corruption.
648
We cannot bring a mechanism in the Constitution keeping in mind
the socio economic condition of the United States of America or the Great
Britain or Japan and even India and any other country as well. We must
evolve a system of our own to suit our own need in the socio economic
condition of our country. What suits the United States of America, Great
Britain, Japan, India and any other country may not suit us. Yes, this is
true, in the United States of America, Great Britain and Japan, even during
the world war, no concept of non-party interim caretaker government was
introduced to hold the election of the President and members of Parliament
respectively. But the fact remains in those 3(three) developed countries, no
situation like ours such as vote rigging and manipulation of election results
by exerting undue influence upon the Government machinery by the party
in power ever happened. Can we compare our GDP with the GDP of the
United States of America, Great Britain and Japan? If not, why should we
be so jubliant to follow them in the matter of election only? In India also
the democratic process never suffered. No Martial Law was imposed. Our
democracy is still in a nascent condition. It needs more nurturing. The
context, as discussed above, shows that in the socio economic condition of
our country, the holding of general election of members of Parliament
under the Non-Party Care-taker Government is a must and the learned
amici curiae: Mr. T. H. Khan, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Mr. M. Amirul Islam,
Mr. Mahmudul Islam, Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud and even Mr. Rafique-ul
Haque, who said that the system is contrary to the basic structures of the
Constitution and the learned Attorney General have also submitted that
there is no alternative of Non-Party Care-taker Government to hold the
general election of members of Parliament for the empowerment of the
people as envisaged in article 7 of the Constitution and to institutionalise
649
democracy. In deciding the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Constitution, the context cannot be ignored.
Mr. Hasan Arif, the then learned Attorney General, who appeared
before the High Court Division in 2004 on behalf of respondent No.1,
while the writ petition was heard, the party in power was BNP did not
make any such complaint of stigma/| as submitted by Dr. M. Zahir.
Similarly, before this Division the incumbent Attorney General has not
made any such complaint. Thus, it is clear that neither of the two respective
learned Attorney Generals made any complaint as to the stigma/| faced
by the two successive Governments before the foreign dignitaries, foreign
nations and foreigners because of the introduction of the system of Non-
Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution for holding the general
election of members of Parliament on dissolution of Parliament. Had there
been any such situation or feeling of stigma/| by the Governments
before the foreign nations, foreign dignitaries or the foreign nationals at
private or State level on the question of holding of general election of
members of Parliament under the Non-Party Care-taker Government, then
definitely that fact would have been brought by respondent No.1 in the
affidavit-in-opposition filed before the High Court Division as well as in
the concise statement filed before this Division. Dr. M. Zahir and Mr.
Ajmalul Hossain, who are very widely travelled persons, also failed to say
any of their personal experience and produce any material whatsoever
before us to show that the introduction of the system of Non-Party Care-
taker Government in the Constitution has, in no way, brought any
adverse impact or embarrassment upon a citizen of this country including
themselves or the Government. Dr. Kamal Hossain an internationally
reputed lawyer has seriously opposed the submission of Dr. Zahir and
650
submitted that leaders of many countries enquired upon him to know about
the Non-Party Care-taker Government system introduced in our
Constitution for holding the general elections of members of Parliament
with approval. Mr. M. Amirul Islam and Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud who
are also widely travelled persons on being asked as to whether they had
faced any embarrassment abroad or in this country to any foreign national
because of introduction of the system of Non-Party Care-taker Government
during the general election of members of Parliament in the Constitution,
they replied in the negative.
The difference between the interim Government, which was in the
Constitution prior to the 13
th
Amendment vide articles 57(3) and 58(4) and
the Non-Party Care-taker Government introduced by the Thirteenth
Amendment, is that notwithstanding the fact that the outgoing Prime
Minister and his Cabinet colleagues lose their representative character, they
continue to retain their very strong and open affiliation with their party and
they also contest in the election with their party manifesto and political
programme and use all their amenities as the Prime Minister and the
Ministers during the election and thus, the Administration becomes
vulnerable to their influence in spite of the fact that article 126 of the
Constitution has mandated that It shall be the duty of all executive
authorities to assist the Election Commission in the discharge of its
functions. Whereas, in the latter case, the Chief Adviser shall be a person
not related to politics and the other Advisers shall be appointed by the
President from amongst the persons who are not members of any political
party or, of any organisation associated with or, affiliated to any political
party. Clause (c) of sub article (7) of article 58C has clearly mandated that
651
the Advisers must agree in writing not to be candidates for the ensuing
election of members of Parliament. And naturally, they will have no reason
to be partisan with any political party.
Which is more honourable, dignified and prestigious to go to power
with the mandate of the people in a free and fair election or to go to power
in a rigged election with manipulated result? I am of the view that, if a
political party goes to power and forms the Government having the
mandate of the people in a free, fair and impartial election, it will have
more image and more respectability to rule the country for five years than
to go to power and form the Government in a rigged and manipulated
election result dominated by money and muscle power and also by exerting
undue pressure upon the Government machinery.
Let us see whether the Thirteenth Amendment has destroyed the
Republican character of Bangladesh or the Constitution because of the
introduction of the Non-Party Caretaker Government in the Constitution.
When the Head of the State is a hereditary monarch, it is called
monarchy, the monarch may not be sovereign, but titular. Great Britain,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan fall into this category though
these States are undoubtedly democratic. When the Head of the state is
elected by the people either directly or indirectly, the State is called a
Republic and the Constitution is said to have provided a Republican
government. In article 152 of our Constitution, it has been said the the
Republic means the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. So we need not
take the help of any other authority. Our Constitution originally provided in
article 48(1) that there shall be a President of Bangladesh, who shall be
elected by members of Parliament in accordance with the provisions
652
contained in the second schedule, so also now with the exception that in
place of in accordance with the provisions contained in the second
schedule now it is in accordance with law. Present article 48(2) has
provided that the President shall, as Head of State, take precedence over all
other persons in the State, and shall exercise the powers and perform the
duties conferred and imposed on him by the Constitution and by any other
law. Same was the article 48(2) in the original Constitution. The Thirteenth
Amendment has not introduced any provision, which can be said to have
altered or affected article 48(I)(2), in any manner. Thus, the office of the
President still remains to be elected by members of Parliament in
accordance with law and therefore, both the State and Constitution retains
its Republican character notwithstanding the Thirteenth Amendment.
Another point to be addressed is: whether insertions of articles 58A,
58B-58E in the Constitution, can be regarded as amendment of the
Constitution within the meaning of article 142 and whether, by such
insertions, the Preamble and articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution have
been amended.
We have seen the Thirteenth Amendment Bill which was placed in
the Parliament. The very Bill reads as follows:
A
BILL
further to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

In the preamble of the Bill, it has been stated that whereas it is
expedient further to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh for the purpose hereinafter appearing; It
further shows that in the short title of the Bill, it has been clearly stated that
653
This Act may be called the Constitution (thirteenth Amendment) Act,
1996. And after the bill was passed and assented to by the President, the
heading, the Preamble and the short title of the Act read as follows:
An Act further to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of
the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh
Whereas it is expedient further to amend certain provision of the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh for the purposes
hereinafter appearing.
It is hereby enacted as follows:
1. Short title. This Act may be called the Constitution (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act, 1996
Thus, it is clear that the legislature themselves placed the Bill in the
Parliament for amendment of certain provisions of the Constitution. And
after the Bill was passed and assented by the President in the Preamble of
the Act it has been stated whereas it is expedient further to amend certain
provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.
From the Act, it further appears that besides incorporating a new
article in Chapter II as article 58A after article 58, a new Chapter as
Chapter-IIA by inserting articles 58B-58E in Part-IV has been added in the
Constitution, the Act has also amended articles 61, 99, 123, 147 and 152
thereof; necessary amendments have also been made in the Third Schedule
to the Constitution.
As per Blacks Law Dictionary, amend means
1. To make right; to correct or rectify; <amend the order to fix a
clerical error> 2. To change the wording of; specif, to formally alter
(a statute, constitution, motion, etc.) by striking out, inserting, or
substituting words <amend the legislative bill>.
In the same Dictionary, amendment has been connoted as:
1.A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute,
constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif, a change
made by addition, deletion or correction; esp. an alteration in
wording....2. The process of making such a revision
The word amendment came for consideration in the case of Anwar
Hossain Chowdhury; the two learned Judges of this Division, gave their
valued opinion on the subject. Badrul Haider Chowdhury, J (as he then
was) expressed his opinion as follows:
654
216. The term amendment implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed
Shahabuddin Ahmed, J (as he then was) expressed his views as
follows:
417. . . Amendment of Constitution means change or alteration for
improvement or to make it effective or meaningful and not its
elimination or abrogation. Amendment is subject to the retention of
the basic structure. The Court, therefore, has power to undo an
amendment if it transgresses its limit and alters a basic structure of
the Constitution.

Article 142 of the Constitution, as it stood on the date on which the
Thirteenth Amendment was passed, empowered the Parliament to amend
any provision of the Constitution by way of addition, alteration,
substitution or repeal by Act of Parliament provided that (i) no Bill for
such amendment thereof shall be allowed to proceed unless the long title
thereof expressly states that it will amend a provision of the Constitution;
(ii) no such Bill shall be presented to the President for assent unless it is
passed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
members of Parliament. Clause (1A) to article 142(1) which was inserted
by the second Proclamation (Fifteenth) Order, 1978 (Second Proclamation
Order IV of 1978) required that notwithstanding anything contained in
clause (1) thereof if any such Bill was passed which sought to amend the
preamble or any provision of articles 8, 48 or 56 or article 142 itself, the
same is presented to the President for assent, the President shall within
the period of seven days after the Bill is presented to him cause to be
referred to a referendum the question whether the Bill should or should
not be assented to. In view of the judgment passed in the case of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution by this Division, clause (1A) is
no more in the Constitution. So the question of requirement for sending
655
the Bill for referendum by the President within the period of seven
days after the Bill was presented to him whether the Bill should or
should not be assented to as argued by Mr. Farooqui lost all its legal
importance and implication and as such, the same does not require
any further deliberation. Insertions of articles 58A and 58B-58E in
the Constitution, are definitely amendment of the Constitution within the
meaning of article 142 of the Constitution, but those read with the
amendments of articles 61, 99, 123, 147, 152 and Third Schedule to the
Constitution, in no way, amended the preamble and articles 8, 48 and 56 of
the Constitution as vehemently argued by Mr. Farooqui.
What has been done by the Legislature, is that by inserting articles
58A-58E in the Constitution, the provisions of articles 48(3) and 56 of the
Constitution, have been suspended or made ineffective during the period of
Non-Party Care-taker Government. If we look at Part IXA of the
Constitution, it will appear that the concept of suspension or making
ineffective of certain articles of the Constitution, is not something new and
it is very much akin to the Constitution. It is very relevant to state that Part
IXA was not in the original Constitution adopted, enacted and given by the
Constituent Assembly and this Part was incorporated in the Constitution by
Act XXIV of 1973, that is, by the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act,
1973. Article 141A of this part has empowered the President to issue a
Proclamation of Emergency if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
in which the security or economic life of Bangladesh or any part thereof, is
threatened by war or external aggression or internal disturbance. In original
article 141A there was a proviso to the effect provided that such
656
Proclamation shall require for its validity, the counter signature of the
Prime Minister.
And then the said proviso was omitted by the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act No.11 of 1975) and again by the Constitution
(Twelfth Amendment) (Act No.XXVIII of 1991) proviso was added which
is as follows:
Provided that such Proclamation shall require for its validity the
prior counter signature of the Prime Minister.

Article 141B has provided that while a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, nothing in articles 36-40 and 42, shall restrict the power of the
State to make any law or to take any executive action, which the State
would, but for the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution, be
competent to make or to take. Article 141C has further provided that while
a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may, on the
written advice of the Prime Minister, by order, declare that the right to
move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part
III of the Constitution, as may be specified in the order, and all proceedings
pending in any Court for the enforcement of the right so specified, shall
remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation is in force
or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order. It is pertinent to
note that in the original article 141C, the words on the written advice of
the Prime Minister were not therein and the same were added by the
Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991. In this regard, it is also
pertinent to state that when Part IXA was inserted in the Constitution
parliamentary form of Government was very much in vogue.
657
Therefore, keeping of certain provisions of the Constitution
ineffective or suspended for certain period of time for the sake of the others
as has been done by the Thirteenth Amendment, is not alien to the
Constitution. By inserting article 58A in Chapter I after article 58 of Part-
IV except the provisions of article 55(4), (5) and (6) all other provisions of
the Chapter have been made inapplicable during the period in which
Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved to enable the people to exercise
their constitutional right for electing their own representative in a free and
fair election and such a device is no way in clash with the scheme of the
Constitution.
Let us examine whether, by the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly
by incorporating article 58C in the Constitution and by amending article 99
thereof making provisions for the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and
the retired Judges of this Division to become the Chief Adviser, the
independence of judiciary has been destroyed.
Mr. M. I. Farooqui and Mr. Mohsen Rashid have argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment has infringed the independence of judiciary. Mr.
Rafique-ul Haque and Mr. Ajmalul Hossain as amici curiae have also
submitted that by making provisions for the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division to become the Chief
Adviser, the judiciary has been brought under public criticism and thus, the
independence of judiciary is being impaired. The reason of their such
argument is that because of the scope of the retired Chief Justices and the
retired Judges of this Division to become the Chief Adviser, the
appointment of Chief Justice and other Judges of this Division, is being
658
politicised and the Judges, who have a chance to become the Chief
Adviser, may be allured by the dangling carrot.
To decide the point, I consider it necessary to see what is meant by
judicial independence? Independence of judiciary is not an abstract concept
and it has to be understood keeping in view the constitutional provisions.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam has pointed out that depending on what we actually
mean by the expression judicial independence; there are many things in
the Constitution which can be said to curtail judicial independence. It can
be said that the appointment of Judges by the executive curtail the judicial
independence; one may argue that enactment of procedure of the Court by
the legislature curtail the judicial independence of Judges to dispense true
justice and so forth. But jurisprudentially, the expression judicial
independence has a definite meaning. And this was considered by this
Division in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Finance-vs-Md. Masdar
Hossain and others, 52 DLR(AD) 82. When the said case was decided the
Thirteenth Amendment was very much in operation. In that case, Chief
Justice Mustafa Kamal observed that:
The independence of the judiciary, as affirmed and declared by
Articles 94(4) and 116A, is one of the basic pillars of the
Constitution and cannot be demolished, whittled down, curtailed or
diminished in any manner whatsoever, except under the existing
provisions of the Constitution. It is true that this independence, as
emphasised by the learned Attorney General, is subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, but we find no provision in the
Constitution which curtails, diminishes or otherwise abridges this
independence. Article 115, Article 133 or Article 136 does not give
either the Parliament or the President the authority to curtail or
diminish the independence of the subordinate judiciary by recourse
to subordinate legislation or rules. What cannot be done directly,
cannot be done indirectly.
In that case, this Division found that there was no provision in the
Constitution which curtails the independence of the Judges of this Court.
659
And indeed the Thirteenth Amendment deals only with the Chief Justice
and the Judges of this Division. In the judgment a decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court in the case of Walter Valente-vs-Her Majesty the Queen
(1985) 2 RCS 673, was cited with approval to show the essential conditions
of judicial independence. The citation reads as follows:
... Security of tenure because of the importance traditionally
attached to it, is the first of the essential conditions of judicial
independence for purposes of section 11(d) of the Charter. The
essentials of such security are that a Judge be removed only for
cause, and that cause be subject to independent review and
determination by a process at which the Judge affected is afforded a
full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security of tenure for
purposes of section 11(d) is a tenure, whether until an age of
retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative task, that is
secure against interference by the Executive or other appointing
authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.
In a later decision, in the case of British Columbia-vs-Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd (2005) 2SCR 473, 2005 SCC 49, 25 7 DLR(4
th
) 193
the Canadian Supreme Court held:
(44). Judicial independence is a fundamental principle of the
Constitution reflected in s.11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, and in both ss.96-100 and the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867 ...It serves to safeguard our constitutional
order and to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice...
(45). Judicial independence consists essentially in the freedom to
render decisions based solely on the requirements of the law and
justice ... It requires that the judiciary be left free to act without
improper interference from any other entity... i.e., that the
executive and legislative branches of government not impinge on
the essential authority and function ...of the court...
(46). Security of tenure, financial security and administrative
independence are the three core charactertics or essential
conditions of judicial independence... It is a precondition to judicial
independence that they be maintained, and be seen by a reasonable
person who is fully informed of all the circumstances to be
maintained ...
(47). However, even where the essential conditions of judicial
independence exist, and are reasonably seen to exist, judicial
independence itself is not necessarily ensured. The critical question
is whether the court is free, and reasonably seen to be free, to
perform its adjudicative role without interference, including
660
interference from the executive and legislative branches of
government....

Let us see whether the conditions of judicial independence as laid
down by the Canadian Supreme Court and as approved by this Division in
the case of Secretary, Ministry of Finance-vs-Md. Masdar Hossain are
present in our Constitution. Article 96 of the Constitution has specifically
provided about the tenure of office of Judges of this Court. Article 96(1)
has provided that subject to the other provisions of the article a Judge shall
hold office until he attains the age of 67 (sixty seven) years (at the relevant
time it was 65 (sixty five) years); article 96(2) has clearly provided that a
Judge shall not be removed from office except in accordance with the
provisions of the article mentioned thereafter; article 96(3) has provided
that there shall be a Supreme Judicial Council, which shall consist of the
chief justice of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges. Provided that
if, at any time, the Council inquiring into the capacity or conduct of a Judge
who is a member of the Council, or a member of the Council is absent or is
unable to act due to illness or other cause, the Judge who is next in
seniority to those who are members of the Council shall act as such
member. The more important thing is that guilty of gross misconduct one
of the grounds on which a Judge shall by order of the President, be
removed on being reported to him by the Supreme Judicial Council has not
been defined, that is, it is the Supreme Judicial Council which will decide
what would amount to gross misconduct. Not only that full authority has
been given to the Council to regulate its procedure for the purpose of an
enquiry under the article. Thus, the executive has not been given any
authority to meddle with the functions of the Supreme Judicial Council.
From the above, it is clear that tenure of a Judge of this Court (both the
661
Divisions) is fully secured and a Judge is free to perform his adjudicative
role without any interference from the executive and the legislative branch
of the Government.
Article 147 of the Constitution has guaranteed the remuneration,
privileges and other benefits, of the Judges of the Supreme Court by an Act
of Parliament. And the Parliament has already passed an Act, namely, The
Supreme Court Judges (Remuneration and Privileges) Ordinance, 1978 as
amended from time to time.
So far as the administrative independence is concerned that has also
been given to the Supreme Court. Article 113 of the Constitution has
clearly provided that appointments to the staff of the Supreme Court shall
be made by the Chief Justice or such Judge or officer of the Supreme Court
as he may direct, and shall be made in accordance with rules made with the
previous approval of the President by the Supreme Court. Article 113(2)
has further provided that subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament
the conditions of service of members of the staff of the Supreme Court
shall be such as may be prescribed by rules by that Court. Article 107 of
the Constitution has given the Supreme Court the power to make Rules for
regulating the practice and procedure of each of its divisions and of any
court subordinate to it subject to any law made by Parliament.
The Thirteenth Amendment has not at all touched the provisions of
the Constitution as discussed above and thus, to impair the 3(three)
conditions of the independence of judiciary. In this context, Mr. T. H.
Khan, Mr. Mahmudul Islam and Mr. Rokanuddin Mahamud have rightly
pointed out that after the appointment of a Judge by the Executive, it does
not have any control upon the Judges, in any manner, and the Judges are to
662
perform their adjudicative functions according to their oath. So, I do not
see any impediment on the Chief Justice and the Judges of both Divisions
of this Court to do their adjudicative functions independently because of
the Thirteenth Amendment.
The judiciary depends for its effectiveness on the public confidence
that it enjoys as was expressed by a distinguished Judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America:
The judiciary has no army or police force to execute its mandates or
compel obedience to its decrees. It has no control over the purse
strings of Government. Those two historical sources or power rests
in other hands. The strength of the judiciary is in the command it has
over the hearts and minds of men. That respect and prestige are the
product of innumerable judgments and decrees, a mosaic built from
the multitude of cases decided. Respect and prestige do not grow
suddenly; they are the products of time and experience. But they
flourish when judges are independent and courageous.
To earn public confidence Judges must, in the last analysis, have the
moral and intellectual fiber which must sustain their own spirit of judicial
independence, as is wisely acknowledged by Venkataramian, J in the case
of S.P. Gupta and others-vs- President of India and others AIR 1982 (SC)
152 in the following language:
But if the judiciary should be really independent something more is
necessary and that we have to seek in the judge himself and not
outside. A judge should be independent of himself. A judge is a
human being who is a bundle of passions and prejudices, likes and
dislikes, affection and ill-will, hatred and contempt and fear and
recklessness. In order to be a successful judge these elements should
be curbed and kept under restraint and that is possible only by
education, training, continued service and cultivation of a sense of
humility and dedication to duty. These curbs can neither be brought
in the market nor injected into human system by the written or
unwritten laws. If these things are there even if any of the protective
measures provided by the Constitution and the laws go, the
independence of judiciary will not suffer. But with all these
measures being there still a judge may not be independent. It is the
inner strength of judges alone that can save the judiciary.
In this case, Bhagwati J said:
663
if there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the
Constitution, it is the principle of the rule of law and under the
Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of
keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and
thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective.

Bhagwati, J further said that:
the Judges must uphold the core principle of the rule of law which
says-be you ever so high, the law is above you.

In the case of Anwar Hossain Badrul Haider Chowdhury, J (as he
then was) after quoting the above observations of Bhagwati in the case of
S.P. Gupta commented:
This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital
for the establishment of real participatory democracy, maintenance
of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice
to the vulnerable sections of the Community. It is this principle of
independence of the judiciary which must be kept in mind while
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

In the said case (S.P. Gupta) Bhagwati, J also said that:

what is necessary is to have Judges who are prepared to fashion
new tools, forge new methods, innovate new strategies and evolve a
new jurisprudence who are judicial statesmen with a social vision
and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of
commitment to the Constitution with a activist approach and
obligation for accountability, not to any party in power nor to the
opposition.... We need Judges who are alive to the socio-economic
realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear from
every eye, who have faith in the Constitutional values and who are
ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional
objectives.

He quoted the eloquent words of Justice Krishna Iyer:
Independence of the judiciary is not genu-flexcion; nor is it
opposition to every proposition of Government. It is neither judiciary
made to opposition measure nor Governments pleasure.
In the context of our Constitution as discussed above, the Chief
Justice and the Judges of both Divisions are absolutely free to perform their
adjudicative functions independently without any interference whatsoever
from the executive and the legislative branch of the Government. And the
Thirteenth Amendment, in no way, has even attempted to interfere with
such functions of the Judges. But to make the judiciary really independent;
664
it would largely depend upon mental strength and uprightness of a Judge to
perform his adjudicative functions according to his oath. A Judge must
have firm commitment in the constitutional values to administer justice. A
Judge must be independent of himself first and should have the
independent spirit and values to overcome all odds which he might face on
his way to discharge his adjudicative functions. And those cannot be
injected into a Judge from outside.
The point that by making provision for the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the Judges of this Division to become the Chief Adviser of
Non-Party Care-taker Government, the appointments in those posts are
being politicised and the office of Chief Adviser has become a dangling
carrot and that because of such dangling carrot, the Chief Justice of
Bangladesh or the Judges of this Division, who are expected to become the
Chief Adviser, may not discharge their adjudicative functions/duties freely,
fairly and impartially or one will try to supersede the other so that one can
be the last Chief Justice and that the Judge who is expected to be the last
Chief Justice may not, at all, be influenced for his post. But, in the mind of
the people, there is always apprehension that in view of such provision
whether they can expect free, fair and impartial decision from the highest
judiciary of the country. And that Mr. X is protecting the interest of the
party in power only, because he wants to be the last retiring Chief Justice
before the election, is based on total hypothesis, speculation and
imagination and ifs and buts. The above noted point is based on the
possible argument that the incumbent Government, as part of its election
strategy, might seek to appoint and promote its preferred Judges as the
Chief Justice and the Judges of this Division in a pre-determined plan to
665
ensure that he or she occupies the position of immediate past Chief Justice
and thus, becomes the Chief Adviser and such manipulation may create
instability within the highest judiciary, can very well be guarded against by
the office being respected by the Executive on the one hand, and by those
who are part of the judiciary when exercising their judicial powers strictly
observing and maintaining strict neutrality, and not being susceptible to
influence from any quarters.
The vires of an amendment to the Constitution or the provision of a
Constitution cannot be adjudged or decided on the basis of ifs and buts and
on etherial question as raised by the learned Counsel of the appellant and
petitioner and the amicus curiae, Mr. Rafique-ul Haque. It has also to be
borne in mind that an Act passed by the Parliament carries the presumption
of constitutional validity unless it can be shown that the same impairs and
destroys any of the basic structures of the Constitution and offends any of
the fundamental rights as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. And, on
such speculative, imaginary and etherial question article 58C of the
Constitution and amendment to article 99, making provisions for the retired
Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the Judges of this Division as the Chief
Adviser, cannot be declared ultravires.
However, the argument, as indicated hereinbefore, is also not
historically correct. The concept of Non-Party Care-taker Government was
brought in the Constitution through the Thirteenth Amendment only on 25
th

March, 1996 when the Bill relating thereto was passed in the Parliament
and finally on 28
th
March 1996 when the President assented to the bill and
was gazetted on that very date. But prior to that no body thought of
introducing the concept of Non-Party Care-taker Government in the
666
Constitution. Supersession also took place: first supersession took place on
13.08.1976 when Justice Debesh Chandra Bhattacharjja was elevated to the
Appellate Division superseding Justice Ruhul Islam. Then again on
26.12.1985 when Justice M.H. Rahman (as he then was) and Justice
A.T.M. Afzal (as he then was) were elevated to the Appellate Division
superseding justice A.R.M. Amirul Islam Chowdhury and Justice Md.
Habibur Rahman. Justice A.R.M. Amirul Islam Chowdhury and Justice
Md. Habibur Rahman were elevated as a Judge of the High Court Division
on 24.11.1973 and 20.12.1975 respectively and they were confirmed on
11.11.1975 and 20.12.1977 respectively, whereas Justice M.H. Rahman
and Justice A.T.M. Afzal were elevated to the High Court Division on
08.05.1976 and 15.04.1977 respectively and they were confirmed on
08.05.1978 and 14.04.1979 respectively. Was there any dangling carrot in
1976 and in 1985? The answer is, no. It is also necessary to keep on
record that thereafter Mr. Justice A.R.M. Amirul Chowdhury and Mr.
Justice Habibur Rahman were superseded by the other Judges. Had Mr.
Justice A.R. M. Amirul Isalm Chowdhury not been superseded, he had
every possibility to be retired as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh on
01.03.1996, whereas Justice M.H. Rahman retired on 01.05.1995 as the
Chief Justice of Bangladesh and became the first Chief Adviser of the Non-
Party Care-taker Government under the new constitutional dispensation
brought by the Thirteenth Amendment. Of course, there were other
suppersessions as well after the concept of Non-Party Care-taker
Government was introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment on 28
th
of
March, 1996. Some Judges, who were not superseded, were not elevated to
the Appellate Division in spite of the fact that there were vacancies. I do
667
not consider it necessary to name all those Judges, as one may say that
those Judges might not have been elevated for political consideration
keeping in view the post of the Chief Adviser, but I am constrained to
mention the name of Mr. Justice Syed Amirul Islam whose name has been
specifically mentioned in the supplementary affidavit filed by the writ
petitioner before the High Court Division. One thing I must say very
emphatically that among the superseded Judges including Mr. Justice Syed
Amirul Islam (when superseded he was the senior most Judge of the High
Court Division), there were Judges who by no calculation, had the chance
to become the Chief Justice and thus, had no chance to become the Chief
Adviser. The superseded Judges and the Judges, who were not elevated to
this Division in spite of the vacancies, retired as Judges of the High Court
Division with frustration and pain in their hearts for no fault of their own.
Had they been elevated to this Division, they would have retired with the
dignity of a Judge of this Division and with the attending benefits. Thus, it
is clear that it is not the post of Chief Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker
Government for which Judges were superseded or not elevated and may in
future be superseded and not elevated to this Division, but it is the
perception of the Executive which prevailed and may prevail in future in
appointing Judges to this Division as well as the Chief Justice of
Bangladesh.
We should not forget that the Judges take oath to do right to all
manner of people, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. If a Judge
does not pass the right judgment, the Government will be angry with him
and shall not appoint him as the Chief Adviser after his retirement; if the
Judge commits breach of his oath, has nothing to do with the performance
668
of his duties as a Judge and it cannot be said that he was prevented from
doing justice. Mr. Mahmudul Islam has rightly submitted that the
Executive has the discretion to allot a housing plot to the Judges of the
Supreme Court, it cannot be said that this discretion interferes with the
performance of the Judges adjudicative role. In this regard, I reiterate the
statement of the Supreme Court of Canada that the critical question is
whether a Judge is free in performing his adjudicative role without
interference from the executive and the legislative branch of the
Government and the answer with reference to the provisions of the
Thirteenth Amendment must be in the affirmative.
I am also constrained to say that neither the learned Counsel for the
appellant and petitioner nor Mr. Rafique-ul Haque could refer to any single
adjudicative function before us to show that the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh, who became the Chief Advisers and the other retired Chief
Justices or the retired Judges of this Division, who had the chance to
become the Chief Adviser, while in office, ever performed any adjudicative
function showing any biasness or leniency towards the Government in
power to justify their submission that because of the dangling carrot, they
acted in a particular way in breach of their oath. I could not persuade
myself to agree with the submission of Mr. Farooqui and Mr. Rafique-ul
Haque that because of the dangling carrot of the Chief Adviser, the Chief
Justice, who heads the judiciary, would not perform his adjudicative
functions independently according to his oath. We should not also forget
that before becoming the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, a Judge has to
perform his adjudicative functions in both Divisions for quite a number of
years and during these years, he is trained to be honest, neutral and
669
impartial. Similarly, when a Judge retires from this Division, he also
performs his adjudicative functions for quite a number of years with the
same training and mental make up.
The post of Chief Justice is also not less honourable, dignified and
prestigious than that of the Chief Adviser. I do not find any logic behind
the etherial submission that while holding the post of high office of the
Chief Justice, he will be biased in performing his adjudicative functions in
favour of the Government because of his chance to become the Chief
Adviser for 90(ninety) days only and that too to perform routine functions.
This sounds to me simply ridiculous, humiliating and very much disturbing
as well. If that is the perception of the Bar, the future of the judiciary must
be bleak.
From the Full Bench judgment (Mirza Hossain Haider, J), it appears
that Mr. Rafique-ul Haque, who was also appointed as amicus curiae by the
Full Bench, took a different stand before the High Court Division on the
question of retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh to become the Chief
Adviser. Before the High Court Division, he opined that:
the Chief Justice while in his office cannot be allured nor can he be
appointed as Chief Adviser, the question of such appointment arises
only when he retires from that office. It is the office of the Chief
Justice upon whom faith and trust of the people rests. Thus, a person
having held the position of Chief Justice, he is ideally suited for the
independent, impartial and trustworthy office of the Chief Adviser of
the impartial Non-party Caretaker Government and has thus been
selected for holding the said office.
But, in this Division, he shifted his position and took the stand that because
of the Thirteenth Amendment, the last retiring Chief Justice who has a
chance to become the Chief Adviser, the people have a perception that they
may not get impartial Justice on which I have already given my finding
hereinbefore.
670
From the judgment of Mirza Hossain Haider, J, it further appears
that Mr. Haque produced the copy of the text of the debate held on the
Thirteenth Amendment Bill in the Parliament wherein it has been
categorically emphasized by all members present that:
the judicial system of the country and the judiciary is always
impartial and the judiciary is performing its duty impartially. As
such an impartial Non-party Caretaker Government can only be
headed by a person who had been heading the impartial judiciary, the
Chief Justice of the country, upon whom the people have full trust
and confidence (the quotation is in the judgment of the High Court
Division).
In the judgment delivered by my learned brother Muhammad Imman
Ali, J, the entire deliberations made in the Parliament on the Thirteenth
Amendment Bill by the then Law Minister, have been quotedwhich
substantiates the English version as quoted in the judgment of Mirza
Hossain Haider, J. These together show the trust and faith of members of
Parliament upon the judiciary and the Chief Justice of Bangladesh who
heads the judiciary.
A Chief Justice or the Judge of this Division, after his retirement,
goes out of his office, so the question of influencing the judiciary by them
does not arise at all. The post of Chief Adviser is a political post, so the
possibility of criticism is there, but it is the retired Chief Justice or the
retired Judge of this Division, as the case may be, who will hold the office.
Therefore, the criticism of the Chief Adviser, if there be any, shall, in no
way, have any impact upon the judiciary and the independence of the
sitting Chief Justice and the other Judges of this Division who are oath
bound to perform their adjudicative functions without fear and favour,
affection or ill will and according to law.
671
The Non-Party Care-taker Government, in exercise of the executive
functions of the Republic, shall assist the Election Commission that may be
required to hold free, fair and impartial general elections of members of
Parliament. And, if, for any reason, the prospective Chief Adviser feels that
he has any bias towards a particular political party for which he may wish
to win the election, in that case he should not accept the office of Chief
Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker Government as such bias or leaning
will frustrate the will of the people and the concept of Non-Party Care-
taker Government.
Be that as it may, the legislature in their wisdom have preferred the
retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division
as persons of high moral and impartial character with dignity and capable
for discharging the powers and functions of the Chief Adviser of the Non-
Party Care-taker Government, I do not find any reason or justification to
question, the wisdom of the legislature in this regard. I fully agree with
Awlad Ali, J that in the scheme of the impugned legislation, it is a well
thought out plan that a retired Chief Justice shall hold the office of Chief
Adviser. It has also transpired from the pleadings of the respective parties,
the submissions of the majority of the amici curiae and deliberations of the
Parliament that the decision to make the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division as the Chief Adviser
was based on political consensus as well as the demand of the whole
nation.
In this regard, I also consider it very relevant to refer to Act 24 of
1991 which is as follows:
:oo: < --
An act further to amend the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of
the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh
672

WHEREAS in the face of the country-wide popular upsurge for
over-throwing the illegal and undemocratic government and giving
democracy an institutional shape the then President was compelled to
tender resignation;
AND WHEREAS after the historic success of the students, peasants,
workers, employees, the people in general, the Main Political Alliances and
parties and all professional organisations, regardless of their political
affiliation, belief and leanings, the three Main Political Alliances and
parties made an ardent call to the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Mr. Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed to take the reins of a neutral and impartial
government as its head;
AND WHEREAS the then President appointed Chief Justice Mr.
Shahabuddin Ahmed as Vice-President in the vacancy caused by the
resignation of the then Vice-President and tendered his resignation to him;
AND WHEREAS upon a positive assurance of the three Main
Political Alliances and parties of the country to the effect that after having
run the government temporally till the establishment of an elected
democratic government through a free, fair, and impartial election to
Parliament he would be eligible to return to the office of the Chief Justice
of Bangladesh and with the noble purpose of restoring democracy the Chief
Justice, on the 21
st
day of Agrahayan, 1397 B.S. corresponding to the 6
th

day of December, 1990, assumed the onerous responsibility of running an
impartial government as Acting President;
AND WHEREAS during the period in which Chief Justice Mr.
Shahabuddin Ahmed exercised the powers and performed the functions of
the President in his capacity as Vice-President, a Parliament comprising
peoples representatives and a peoples government have been established
through a free, fair and impartial election;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make provisions for ratification
and confirmation of the appointment of Chief Justice Mr. Shahabuddin
Ahmed as Vice-President, the exercise and performance by him of all
powers and functions of the President acting as such and all laws and
Ordinances made by him and acts and things done and all actions taken by
him in that capacity and for his return to the office of the Chief Justice of
Bangladesh in accordance with the assurances of the people and the Main
Political Alliances and parties.
I t is hereby enacted as follows:
1. Short title This Act may be called the Constitution (Election
Amendment) Act, 1991.
2. Amendment of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution In the
Constitution, in the Fourth Schedule, after paragraph 20, the following new
paragraph 21 shall be added, namely:
21. Ratification and confirmation of the appointment of Vice-
President, etc. (1) The appointment of, and the administration of
oath to the Chief Justice of Bangladesh as Vice-President on the 21
st

day of Agrahayan, 1397 B.S. corresponding to the 6
th
day of
December, 1990, and the resignation tendered to him by the then
President and all powers exercised, all laws and Ordinances made
and all orders made, acts and things done, and actions taken, or
purported to have been made, done or taken by the said Vice-
President acting as President during the period between the 21
st
day
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of Agrahayan, 1397 BS corresponding to the 6
th
day of December,
1990, and the date of commencement of the Constitution (Eleventh
Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No.XXIV of 1991) (both days
inclusive) or till the new President elected under article 48(1) of the
Constitution has entered upon his office(whichever is later), are
hereby ratified and confirmed and declared to have been validly
made, administered, tendered, exercised, done and taken according
to law.
(2) The said Vice-President shall, after the commencement of the
Constitution (Eleventh Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No.XXIV of
1991), and after the new President elected under this Constitution
has entered upon his office, be eligible to resume the duties and
responsibilities of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and the period
between the 21
st
day of Agrahayan, 1397 BS corresponding to the
6
th
day of December, 1990 and the date on which he resumes such
duties and responsibilities shall be deemed to be the period of
actual service within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Supreme
Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Ordinance, 1982
(Ordinance No.XX of 1982).
Act 24 of 1991 as quoted hereinbefore reveals the fact of an ardent
call in 1990 made by the political parties and all professional organisations
regardless of their political affiliation, belief and leanings to the then Chief
Justice of Bangladesh, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed to take the reins of a
neutral and impartial government as its head till the establishment of an
elected democratic Government through a free, fair and impartial election
to Parliament and not to anybody else. I must say that along with the ardent
call to the Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed to take the reins of a neutral
and impartial Government as its head with the positive assurance of the
three Main Political Alliances and parties of the country that after having
run the Government temporarily till establishment of an elected democratic
Government, he would be eligible to return to the office of the Chief
Justice of Bangladesh and then the implementation of such assurance by
passing Act 24 of 1991 by the Fifth Parliament on the basis of consensus is
unique and in a class by itself and I am sure such an example cannot be
found anywhere in the world. So, the trust, faith and confidence of the
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people is always carried by the judiciary, the office of the Chief Justice and
the persons holding such office. And the neutrality to the office of Chief
Justice is such that when Chief Justice, Shahabuddin Ahmed, resumed the
duties and responsibilities of the office of Chief Justice of Bangladesh, he
stayed back in the cases which were decided during his time as Acting
President. As per section 57 of the Evidence Act, this Division has to take
judicial notice amongst others: the course of proceedings of Parliament and
of any Legislature, which had the power to legislate in respect of territories,
now comprised Bangladesh.
Parliament by two-thirds majority having passed the Thirteenth
amendment on the basis of consensus of all making provision for
appointment of the former Chief Justices of Bangladesh as the head of the
Non-party Caretaker Government as the first option, which unequivocally
shows the trust, faith and confidence in the judiciary as well as in the high
office of Chief Justice as the symbol of fairness and impartialityif any
question is raised at allit would be the duty of the legislature to come up
with a different and better device to select or appoint an appropriate person
in the key post of the Chief Adviser and that must be again on the basis
of consensus of all political parties as was done in 1996. In this regard,
Mr. T. H. Khan, Mr. M. Amirul Islam and Mr. Mahmudul Islam rightly
submitted that the matter of reform of the Non-Party Care-taker
Government should be left to the Parliament. Moreover, the Thirteenth
Amendment, being already found to be constitutional a part of it, cannot
be looked into separately.
The observations made by this Division, in the case of Abdul Bari
Sarker-vs-Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of
675
Establishment and others, 46 DLR(AD) 37 and in the Eighth Amendment
case that the purpose behind the prohibition in the original article 99 of
the Constitution against the appointment of a retired Judge in any office of
profit in the service of the Republic, was that high position and dignity of a
Judge of the Supreme Court should be preserved and respected even after
his retirement and that if any provision was made for holding of office of
profit after retirement, a Judge while in the services of the Supreme
Court might be tempted to be influenced in his decision in favour of the
authorities keeping his eye upon a future appointment, does not help Mr.
Farooqui to substantiate his argument that the amending article 99 of the
Constitution read with article 58C making provision for the retired Chief
Justices or the Judges of this Division to become the Chief Adviser, has
destroyed the independence of judiciary. The appointment of Chief Adviser
of the Non-Party Care-taker Government cannot, in its truest sense, be said
to be an appointment in any office of profit in the service of the Republic
and this appointment cannot be equated with any other appointment in any
office of profit of the Republic. The appointment of a retired Chief Justice
or the retired Judge of this Division as the Chief Adviser is absolutely
different from the appointment as was made in the case of Abdul Bari
Sarker. From the pleadings of the parties and the submissions of the
majority of the amici curiae, it is prima-facie clear that the provision for
appointment of the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired
Judges of this Division as the Chief Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker
Government, was incorporated in the Constitution by the Thirteenth
Amendment on the consensus of all political parties including the party in
power and also on the basis of popular demand of the people in general and
676
in fact, it was the demand of the whole nation. So, the post of Chief
Adviser cannot be compared with a particular post of office of profit in any
particular department of the Republic, as was in the case of Abdul Bari
Sarker. Such provision was incorporated in the Constitution to see that
constitutional process of democratic polity continues as well as to salvage
the country from the possible extra-constitutional interference as submitted
by Mr. T. H. Khan, Dr. Kamal Hossain, Mr. Mahmudul Islam and Mr.
Rokanuddin Mahmud. According to Mr. M. Amirul Islam by the
Thirteenth Amendment, the boat of democracy which was about to sink
was salvaged and the peoples right to vote freely and fairly has been
restored. Another broad fact we cannot forget is that the judgment in the
Eighth Amendment case was passed by this Division on the second day of
September, 1989 and thereafter, Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was
appointed as the Vice-President of the Republic on the basis of consensus
of all 3(three) political alliances after General Ershad resigned from the
post of President as the result of mass movement and eventually, he (Chief
Justice, Shahabuddin Ahmed) performed as the Acting President of the
country under whom the first ever free and fair general elections of
members of Parliament were held. Similar is the case in choosing the
retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division
as the Chief Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker Government. There are
instances of appointment of the sitting Chief Justice and the sitting Judge in
Great Britain as Ambassador and Minister respectively during the period of
grave national emergency. Lord Reading, while he was the Chief Justice of
England, was appointed as an Ambassador in Washington and Lord
Macmillan another sitting Judge was appointed as a Minister of
677
Information during the world war. In both cases, the said Judges resigned
from their judgeships and they did not receive any pension. And, in the
case of Non-Party Care-taker Government it is not the sitting Chief Justice
and the sitting Judge of this Division but the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of this Division who have been made
eligible to be the Chief Adviser and that has been done, as submitted by the
above mentioned amici curiae to save the country from possible extra-
constitutional interference, that is, from the imposition of Martial Law.
Mr. M. I. Farooqui, Mr. Mohsen Rashid and Mr. Ajmalul Hossain
submitted that free, fair and impartial election can very well be held
without Non-Party Care-taker Government, by strengthening the Election
Commission giving it more powers. They further submitted that holding of
free and fair election can also be ensured by reforming the Election
Commission and the electoral system. They stressed that if that is done, the
necessity of holding the elections of members of Parliament under the Non-
Party Care-taker Government, at all, would not be necessary. But, I find the
submission devoid of reality. The reality is that in an election held under
the party in power, notwithstanding that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
lose their character of the peoples representatives, they continue to retain
their strong and open affiliation with their party and also participate in the
election and they do not give institutional support to the Election
Commission that may be required to hold the general elections of members
of Parliament in a free, fair and peaceful manner. So, holding of election in
a free, fair and impartial manner under a partisan Government, becomes a
remote proposition. Even though this fact is admitted in the affidavit-in-
opposition of respondent Nos.1 and 6, the thing will be clear if we recall
678
the historical fact which took place in 1991 and 1994. When Chief Justice,
Shahabuddin Ahmed was the Acting President, general elections of
members of Parliament were held on 27.02.1991. At that time, Justice
Mohammad Abdur Rouf, at that time a sitting Judge of the High Court
Division, was appointed as the Chief Election Commissioner (he was
appointed on 25.12.1990), Justice Syed Mesbahuddin Hossain and another
sitting Judge of the High Court Division, Justice Naimuddin Ahmed, were
appointed as the Election Commissioners (Justice Syed Mesbahuddin
Hossain was appointed on 28.12.1990 and Justice Naimuddin Ahmed was
appointed on 16.12.1990) and the election observers termed the election
held on 27.02.1991 as free, fair and impartial. After the general election,
Justice Naimuddin Ahmed came back to the High Court Division. But
Justice Mohammad Abdur Rouf continued to act as the Chief Election
Commissioner. Mirpur by-election was held on 03.02.1993 under the
political Government. But the Election Commission headed by Justice
Muhammad Abdur Rouf could not hold the election fairly, freely and
impartially. The candidate of the party in power Syed Mohammad Moshen
was declared elected. The defeated candidate of the opposition, Mr. Kamal
Ahmed Mamjumder, raised allegations of vote rigging and manipulation of
election result. Thus, the by-election under the party Government was
questioned very much as not free, fair and impartial. Then, the by-election
of Magura was held on 20.03.1994. In this by-election, there were also
serious allegations of rigging and manipulation and the Election
Commission headed by Justice Muhammad Abdur Rouf, which had
successfully held the general election of members of Parliament on
27.02.1991, under the Acting Presidentship of Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed
679
in a free, fair and impartial manner, failed to hold the by-elections of
Mirpur-Magura in a free, fair and impartial manner and thus, proved that
election under the political party in power, was not possible in spite of the
mandate given by article 126 of the Constitution that it shall be the duty of
all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the discharge
of its functions.
At the risk of repetition, I say that, in fact, Magura by-election gave a
turning point in the democratic process in the political history of
Bangladesh and the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment for holding the
general elections of members of Parliament under the Non-party Care-taker
Government (and by now 3(three) elections have already been held). Yet,
for holding the general election of members of Parliament under the Non-
party Care-taker Government, more steps may be taken to strengthen the
Election Commission. Care and caution must be exercised in appointing
the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Commissioners so that the
person with high morality, integrity, uprightness and sagacity may be
invariably chosen for the said office. The Election Commission must be
made more powerful. We have noticed that by this time, many reformative
steps have already been taken in the process of holding the general election
of members of Parliament by incorporating necessary amendments in the
RPO, 1972, such as registration of political parties, submission of accounts
of the expenditure of election by the political parties and by the candidates,
establishment of Electoral Enquiry Committee to ensure the prevention and
control of pre-poll irregularities.
In this context, I am also constrained to say that even if elections in 1
(one), 2(two) or more by-elections of members of Parliament, are held
680
peacefully and fairly under the political party in power that, in no way,
guarantees that the party in power, during the holding of next general
elections of members of Parliament, would maintain its neutrality staying
its hands off in exerting undue influence on the Government machinery and
would assist the Election Commission in the discharge of its functions for
holding the election in a free, fair and impartial manner, because by losing
in 1(one), 2(two) or more seats in the by-elections of members of
Parliament, the party in power loses nothing if it is in power with two-
thirds or three-fourths majority. Similarly, holding elections of the local
bodies by the Election Commission, under the political party in power in a
free and fair manner, does not make any difference, because by holding
such election, a political party does not go to power.
Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud has rightly said that the people of the
country have already witnessed the benefit of the Thirteenth Amendment,
as in the 3(three) general elections of members of Parliament held under
the Non-Party Care-taker Government, they were able to go to the polling
centers and cast their votes freely without any influence of money and
muscle power. I also find his submission quite logical when he said that
previously no Government in power was ousted through election process,
which could not happen in a democracy and it is only after the introduction
of the Non-Party Care-taker Government by the Thirteenth Amendment in
the Constitution that the party in power was ousted because they did not
secure necessary seats of the members of Parliament to form the
Government.
Another point raised by Mr. Farooqui needs to be addressed. The
point is that by amending article 61 of the Constitution, the concept of two
681
executives, that is, a dyarchy has been injected in the Constitution whereas
the framers of the Constitution conceived of only one executive to be
headed by the Prime Minister and this has also added to the destruction of
the democratic character of the Constitution; in view of the provision of
article 58C(6) of the Constitution if the succession fails, eventually the
President takes over the functions of the Chief Adviser, then he has a
chance to become autocratic and in that case also, the democratic character
of the Republic shall be totally destroyed. The submission of Mr. M. I.
Farooqui, appears to me tendentious and demonstrates his unwillingness to
give due importance to the short term constitutional mechanism on the
basis of consensus of all to ensure free and fair general elections of
members of Parliament, which was not possible in the election with the
political party in power. Be that as it may, if we see article 61 in its original
form it would appear that the supreme command of the defence services
of Bangladesh is vested in the President and the exercise thereof shall be
regulated by law. By the Thirteenth Amendment, it has been added that
and such law shall, during the period in which there is a Non-Party Care-
taker Government under article 58B, shall be administered by the
President. The President, being the Head of the State and being elected
according to the provisions of the Constitution and the law, I do not see
anything wrong in authorising him to exercise the power of supreme
command of the defence services of Bangladesh by administering law by
him during the Non-Party Care-taker Government. Merely, because the law
regulating the exercise of power of the supreme command of the defence
services during the period of Non-Party Care-taker Government, be
administered by the President, he does not become an autocrat. Moreso,
682
article 58B(3) has clearly provided that during the period of Non-Party
Care-taker Government, the executive power of the Republic shall be
exercised in accordance with the Constitution, by or on the authority of the
Chief Adviser and shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice
of the Non-Party Care-taker Government.
So far as the possibility of the President to assume the functions of
the Chief Adviser under clause (6) of article 58C is concerned, it is the last
and the remotest option and before that there are as many as five options
and if that happens, then also the President has no chance to be autocratic
as the head of Non-Party Care-taker Government, because his functions
will be confined to the routine functions and he cannot make any policy
decision, except in the case of necessity. Furthermore, there shall be 10
other Advisers and the President is also oath bound to act according to law.
These are hypothetical questions raised by the appellant out of his own
imagination have no practical impact on the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and thus no chance to destroy the democracy.
In this regard, I also feel the necessity to consider another important
article, namely: article 93 of the Constitution. Only one amendment was
brought to this article by the Proclamations (Amendment) Order, 1977
(Proclamations) by omitting the words Parliament is not in session but
that omission is no more because of the judgment passed in the Fifth
Amendment case and now, the said words have again been restored. All
other provisions of clauses (1)(2)(3) and (4) of the article, remained same
since the Constitution came into operation on 16
th
December, 1972. This
article has authorised the President to make and promulgate such
Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him to be required when
683
Parliament is not in session, if he is satisfied that circumstances exist,
which render immediate action necessary. This article has not spoken of
any advice of the Prime Minister, as a pre-condition to make and
promulgate such ordinance. So, the power of the President in making and
promulgating the Ordinance remains same during the Non-Party Care-taker
Government as under the elected Government. In view of the above, I do
not find any substance in the submission of Mr. M. I. Farooqui that because
of amendment of article 61, the President has chance to be autocrat and a
dyarchy has been created.
The submission of Mr. M.I.Farooqui that the Non-Party Care-taker
Government suffers from lack of authority to make any policy decision and
for such lack of authority, the country may suffer particularly, on foreign
policy matter which may require prompt decision, is also devoid of any
merits. Because, in article 58D clear authority has been given to the Non-
Party Care-taker Government to make policy decision on policy matter if it
is necessary; we cannot also forget that the whole scheme of the Non-Party
Care-taker Government is a short term constitutional administrative
mechanism and procedure for ensuring full term truly elected
representative government. However, though the legislature mandated that
Non-Party Care-taker Government shall carry on the routine functions and
it shall not make any policy decision, took care to authorise it to make
policy decision in case of necessity, so it cannot be said that Non-Party
Care-taker Government is absolutely bereft of total lack of authority to
make policy decision in case of necessity. Therefore, the people and the
country have nothing to suffer.
684
Equally, I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. M. I.
Farooqui as to the possible anomaly and uncertainty as to post of the Prime
Minister in case the President summons the dissolved Parliament under
article 72(4) of the Constitution. Because the legislature while enacting the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution took care of such situation by
adding a proviso to article 58A to the effect that provided that,
notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter IIA, where the President
summons Parliament that has been dissolved to meet under article 72(4)
this Chapter shall apply. So, with the summoning of the dissolved
Parliament Under article 72(4) Chapter II along with article 56(4) shall
automatically be revived and then the President shall have the authority to
appoint the Prime Minister in exercise of his power under article 56(3)
thereof from amongst the persons who were the members of dissolved
Parliament. Therefore, no anomaly and uncertainty as to the post of Prime
Minister would arise.
The last point of attack on the Thirteenth Amendment by the
appellant, is that by making the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and
the retired Judges of this Division as the Chief Adviser, separation of
powers, another basic structure of the Constitution, has been impinged. But
I do not find any logic behind this argument. In the Thirteenth
Amendment, no provision has been made for the sitting Chief Justice of
Bangladesh or a sitting Judge of this Division to hold the office of Chief
Adviser. When a Chief Justice or a Judge of this Division retires, he ceases
to be a member of the judiciary. By such appointment, the judiciary shall,
in no way, be involved. I fail to understand how the question of
impingement of the basic structure of separation of powers, may arise
685
when no provision has been made in the Thirteenth Amendment for the
sitting Chief Justice or Judge of this Division to become the Chief Adviser
or the Adviser. Apart from this, the Constitution does not prescribe
separation of powers in the real sense of the term. What the Constitution
has done, can properly be described as broad distribution of powers among
the three organs of the Government, namely: the Legislature, the Executive
and the Judiciary. In spite of division of powers,
Legislature performs some executive and some judicial functions.
Executive performs some legislative functions and some functions of
judicial nature. Judiciary also performs some functions of legislative and
executive in nature. So, unless any Court or its presiding officer goes for
judicial legislation or is entrusted with some core administrative work,
question of impingement of separation of powers does not arise at all.
I find considerable force in the argument of Mr. Mahmudul
Islam that an Act cannot be declared invalid on the ground that the
same has been abused or there is chance of abuse if the same passes the test
of a valid statute. The test of a valid statute has also been provided in the
Constitution itself vide clause (2) of article 7 and article 26. The test of
validity of an amendment to the Constitution is that the same does not
impair or destroy the basic and fundamental structures of the Constitution.
Mr. Farooqui, by referring to the events which took place during the period
2006-2008, has tried to justify that the introduction of Non-Party Care-
taker Government has failed as the President himself assumed the
functions of Chief Adviser when the main opposition political party
refused to accept the immediate past Chief Justice, Justice K.M. Hassan as
686
the Chief Adviser, but the President, ultimately, had to resign from the post
and Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed was appointed as the Chief Adviser of the
Non-Party Caretaker Government which remained in power for more than
two years though the said government was supposed to be in power for only
90(ninety) days.
From the above, it is clear that the Thirteenth Amendment was abused.
A reading of the provisions of article 58C, which has dealt with the
composition of the Non-Party Care-taker Government, shows that the
assumption of functions of the Chief Adviser by the President, is the last
option and before that there are as many as 5(five) options. Unfortunately,
the then President for the reasons best known to him, did not exercise the
other options as provided therein when Chief Justice K. M. Hasan declined
to accept the post of Chief Adviser on the objection of the opposition
political parties and he himself assumed the functions of the Chief Adviser.
Legislature, in its wisdom, has kept so many options for the post of Chief
Adviser if the first option, that is, the immediate past retired Chief Justice
declines to accept the post, but the President did not exercise those options.
Is it the fault of the Thirteenth Amendment? The answer is obvious. If there
was any fault, it is the fault of the President who was oath bound to follow
the Constitution. Definitely, when the Thirteenth Amendment was passed,
it became the part of the Constitution. So the President had no option but to
follow it. The occurrences which happened during the period of 2006-2008,
cannot be attributed to the Thirteenth Amendment and for such
occurrences, the same cannot be declared ultravires.
687
The last Non-Party Care-taker Government could stretch their tenure
beyond ninety days because of the fact that although, according to article
123(3) as amended by the Thirteenth Amendment, general election of
members of Parliament is required to be held within 90(ninety) days after
the Parliament is dissolved, whether by reason of the expiration of its term
or otherwise than by reason of such expiration, no consequence has been
provided therein if election is not held within the said period. Further in
view of the language of article 58B(I) to the effect: There shall be a Non-
Party Care-taker Government during the period from the date on which the
Chief Adviser of such Government enters upon office after Parliament is
dissolved or stands dissolved by reason of expiration of its term till the
date, on which a new Prime Minister enters upon his office after the
constitution of the Parliament. There is scope of extension of the period of
Non-Party Care-taker Government till the date on which a new Prime
Minister enters upon his office after the constitution of Parliament. And
taking that advantage of the state of the above constitutional provisions, the
Non-Party Care-taker Government, headed by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed,
formed under the circumstances as stated in the application filed by the
appellant under the head for bringing on record the developments during
the last Caretaker Government of the period 2006-8, continued for more
than two years. But, fact remains, the main purpose for which the Non-
Party Care-taker Government was formed, that is, to give the Election
Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for
holding the general elections of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly
and impartially, was duly given by the Non-Party Care-taker Government
and because of such assistance, the people could exercise their right of
688
adult franchise freely without fear of muscle power, coercion, intimidation
and influence of money and the present Parliament is the result of the said
election. And except the political party, which could not secure necessary
number of seats of Parliament to form the Government, none raised any
complaint as to any biasness of the Non-Party Care-taker Government in
assisting the Election Commission for holding the general election of
members of Parliament in a free, fair and peaceful manner. So, it is no use
of blaming the Thirteenth Amendment. However, in the light of the
above experience, necessary amendments may be made in articles 123(3)
and 58B, so that the Non-Party Caretaker Government cannot
extend/stretch its period beyond 90 daysIf there is headache, one should
see the doctor for its cause and to take medicine as per doctors advice to
get rid of such headache, if necessary to go for operation in the head, if so
advised by the Doctor, but the head cannot be cut off as sought to be
argued by the learned Counsel for the appellantso, the law, the wanting in
the law can very well be taken care of by making necessary amendment
through discussions and by way of consensus as was reached in 1991 and
1996.
I cannot also ignore the apprehensions expressed by the two
responsible Senior citizens of the country, who are also former Attorney
Generals, namely: Mr. Rafique-ul Haque and Mr. Mahmudul Islam, in their
verbal and written submissions. Mr. Rafique ul Haque in his written
submission stated that:
It is very clear that even if the highest court declares the Thirteenth
Amendment as illegal the BNP will not participate in the election.
He also made verbal submission that though the concept of Non-
Party Care-taker Government is contrary to the basic structures of the
689
Constitution, it cannot be abolished now, if the same is abolished then 1/11
may come again.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam in his written submission stated that:
Today if the Thirteenth Amendment is held invalid, it is almost
certain that the opposition parties will not participate in the election
and democracy will be a far cry.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam, in his written submission, has also made a
reference to the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in 1977. Although
Bhuttos party won the general election with a thumping majority in
March, 1977, opposition parties alleged massive rigging in the election
giving rise to street agitation and disturbance resulting in loss of lives as
inter party negotiation failed on the issue of an interim authority with
adequate powers to supervise fresh election, the then Army Chief of Staff
imposed Martial Law. But, because of the consensus amongst the parties in
our country, the imposition of Martial Law was avoided and the boat of
democracy which was about to sink was salvaged. And for this, tribute
must be paid to our political leaders who showed their farsightedness,
maturity and sincerity that the democratic process through the short term
constitutional administrative mechanism continues in the country and in the
process democratic polity be established to ensure peoples supremacy as
enshrined in article 7 of the Constitution.
If the apprehensions of the two responsible senior citizens of the
country become true, in the event the Thirteenth Amendment is declared
ultravires the Constitution then it would surely give rise to political chaos
in the country which again would lead to a situation that occurred in 1996
as emerged from the pleadings of the respective parties and the
submissions of the majority amici curiae and in that event, it shall have a
serious impact on our economy and in the process, democracy and
690
democratic polity shall suffer; the country will be put back instead of going
forward with prosperity. But, we cannot afford all these, particularly when
the people have accepted the mechanism by participating in the 3(three)
general elections of members of Parliament in large scale.
It is true that an Act passed by the Parliament amending the
Constitution, cannot get seal of validity from this Division if the same
injures or impairs the basic structures of the Constitution. But I have
already found that the Thirteenth Amendment has, in no way, affected or
impaired the basic structures of the Constitution. In this context, I do not
see any reason to declare the Thirteenth Amendment ultravires the
Constitution. It also appears to me that the issue of holding the general
election of members of Parliament under Non-Party Care-taker
Government is a settled one, so there is no reason to reverse the same after
all these years.
The decisions cited by Mr. Ajmalul Hossain on 7 heads mostly from
Indian Jurisdiction as have been noted while taking note of his submissions
relate to the proposition that democracy is a fundamental structure of the
Indian Constitution and also as to the power of judicial review of the
superior Court in striking down an Act bringing amendment to the
Constitution if the same impairs or destroys any of the basic structures of
the Constitution. As I have already observed at the beginning of this
judgment, no body disputed, either before the High Court Division or
before this Division, that democracy is not a basic structure of our
Constitution and that in exercising power of judicial review under article
102 of the Constitution and under article 103 thereof, has no power to
strike down an amendment to the Constitution if the same impairs or
691
destroys the basic or fundamental structures of the Constitution. I did not
feel it necessary to consider those decisions. The other decisions referred to
by Mr. M. I. Farooqui also not being relevant in the context I have not
considered those.
The context in enacting the Thirteenth Amendment as detailed in the
affidavits-in-opposition filed by respondent Nos.1, 5 and 6 particularly
respondent No.6 and as argued by the learned Attorney General and the
majority of amici curiae as discussed hereinbefore, prima-facie, shows that
the same was required under the changed circumstances, for giving a
complete meaning and true practice of democracy and also for making the
existing provisions of interim Caretaker Government meaningful and more
effective and thus, to ensure the empowerment of the people as envisaged
in article 7 of the Constitution.
Democracy, which was uncompromisingly fought for and achieved
by the people of Bangladesh in 1990, much after the struggle of liberation
and independence, by throwing aside the yoke of the autocratic rule, is a
form of Government. Representative democracy, in which the powers of
the majority are exercised within the constitutional framework, is known as
constitutional parliamentary democracy. Such democracy requires to be
nourished, sustained and consolidated through right culture, instillation and
inculcation of certain democratic norms and values in the persons in
authority and the Government as well as in the political parties. The
important and overriding democratic values and principles lie in the
exhibition of tolerance and respect for the view of others embraced with
indivisible allegiance, loyalty and patriotism for the country. Politics of
confrontation and violence being anathema to real democratic culture,
692
values, norms and practice must be shunned at any cost. The democratic
and political culture is another important and indispensable factor in
establishing democratic society and good governance in the country. Every
democratic political party should not only be committed, but must also be
seen to be committed to cherish and practise sound and healthy culture.
But, unfortunately, these are absent in our political arena. And presently, it
is animosity and rivalry which are reigning in the political climate of our
country. We hope that in course of time the climate and culture of
animosity and rivalry which are reigning in our political arena will very
soon come to an end and a climate of co-existence with respect for each
other, their leaders and political ideology, will soon be established. If these
are achieved then free, fair and impartial election will not any more be a
distant goal under the party in power. But till such time, there is no
alternative of holding the general election of members of Parliament under
Non-Party Care-taker Government to continue the democratic polity and
thus to establish the sovereignty of the people as conceived of in article 7
of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly reflecting the aspirations
of our forefathers and for which our martyrs shed their lives in the
liberation struggle in 1971.
The whole purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment is to give the
people a constitutional safeguard for exercising their right of adult
franchise freely, free from any muscle power, intimidation, inducement,
duress or threat in selecting their own representatives, who will form the
Government, for their governance for long 5(five) years. If the Non-Party
Care-taker Government system goes then money and muscle power will
again rule in the election and in addition the party in power as experience
693
showed will resort to undue influence upon the Government machinery to
rig the elections and manipulate the results and in the process, democracy
will again be a far cry and thus the supremacy of the people as enshrined in
article 7 of the Constitution shall be only in the document, namely, the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.
As I have already stated, hereinbefore, free and fair election is an
inextricable part of democracy, a basic structure of our constitution.
Without free and fair election democracy can never be practised in its true
sense. The Thirteenth Amendment has, in fact, ensured holding of free,
fair, impartial and credible general election of members of Parliament and
by such election, the people can exercise their right of adult franchise in
electing members of Parliament who will ultimately form the Government
as provided in article 55 of the Constitution. So, introducing the concept of
Non-Party Care-taker Government in the Constitution by the Thirteenth
Amendment, the democracy, the independence of judiciary and separation
of powers, in no way, have been affected or impaired. In fact, the
Thirteenth Amendment has strengthened and institutionalised democracy.
The Thirteenth Amendment as passed by the Sixth Parliament is
intravires but not ultravires the Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment
has become a constitutional necessity.
Lastly, as has already been held hereinbefore, the High Court
Division in exercising its power of judicial review under article 102 of the
Constitution and this Division under article 103 thereof, can very well
declare an amendment brought to the Constitution by an Act of Parliament
ultravires the Constitution if the same impairs or destroys any of the basic
structures of the Constitution. But in exercising the power of judicial
694
review, neither the High Court Division nor this Division can give direction
to the Parliament to amend the void Act in a particular manner. If this is
done, that will be self contradictory and shall also be a transgression into
the legislative power of the Parliament as provided in article 65(1) of the
Constitution and shall also be against the constitutional scheme of broad
distribution of powers among the 3(three) organs of the Government,
namely: legislative, executive and judiciary. Similar view has been
expressed by the Indian Supreme Court in the cases of Suresh Seth-vs-
Commissioner, Indore Municipal Corporation and others,
AIR2006(SC)767; Bal Ram Bali and another-vs-Union of India, AIR 2007
(SC) 3074; State of Jammu & Kashmir-vs-A.R. Zakki and others, AIR
1992(SC) 1546; Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association Etc-vs-
Union of India & another, AIR 1990, (SC) 334; Narinder Chand Hem Raj-
vs-Lt.Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh, AIR
1971(SC)2399; A.K. Roy Etc-vs-Union of India and another AIR 1982,
710; Union of India(Uoi)-vs-Prakash P. Hinduja and another, AIR 2003,
(SC), 2612 and the State of Andhra Pradesh and another-vs-T. Gopal a
Krishna Murthi and others AIR 1976 (SC) 123.
I could not also subscribe to the majority view that after an Act of
Parliament amending the Constitution is declared ultravires the
Constitution, the same can be given life in any form whatsoever. However,
only the actions which were taken under the void law can be condoned.
Such an exercise is also not contemplated in article 104 of the Constitution.
Of course, in exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court
Division as well as this Division can make observations in respect of a
matter which comes to its notice in course of hearing, be it amendment of
695
any provision of the Constitution or any other Act or legislation or any
other matter. In this regard, I cannot but refer one thing that in the short
order passed on 10.05.2011 allowing the appeal by majority view, it was
simply stated:
(1) ...................................................................................
(2)......................................................................................
(3) The elections of the Tenth and the Eleventh Parliament
may be held under the provisions of the above mentioned
Thirteenth Amendment on the age old principles, namely:
quod alias no est licitum, necessitas licitum facit (That which
otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful), salus populi
suprema lex (safety of the people is the supreme law) and
salus republicae est suprema lex (safety of the State is the
Supreme law).
The parliament, however, in the meantime, is at liberty to
bring necessary amendments excluding the provisions of
making the former Chief Justices of Bangladesh or the Judges
of the Appellate Division as the head of the Non-Party Care-
taker Government.
But, in the concluding portion of the judgment and in clause (12) of the
summary under paragraph 44, the learned Chief Justice has added the
following:
(2) |<<|<< <<|< <<| '< |<|| ||< ' |<| '|
- |<, <|<, '< |<| |<, ', |||<|, |<|<
|<|'< |<|| |<<|< basis structure =< = <|< |<<<|< <
<||<< < <| <<| -<|
(12) |<|< |<| | -<|< :, ||< < |<<| (discretion)
|<, <| <| (reasonable periond) <, <|, --(|<<||) | -
<, ||<| :<| <||< -<, <, |<| <<| || <|<|<
'- | <<| < <<| || | <|< '- << << <|-
< |||<< |<|< <|< |<|| <|<<,

696
The above additions as to the formation of the |<<|<< <<|< are not in
conformity with the short order passed on 10.05.2011.
To Sum up:
(1) The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. Above
all it is a document under which laws are made and from which
laws derive their validity.
(2) We should not be obsessed with the term/word democracy
without trying to see what it means and what its relationship
with the free and fair general election of members of
Parliament and what the constitutional scheme is in that
respect.
(3) Democracy has not been defined anywhere in the
Constitution though this has been used in the Preamble and in
articles 8 and 11 of the Constitution. In a compact way, it can
be said that democracy is the rule of majority elected by the
people for a specified term upon exercising their right to vote in
a free and fair election for their well being in all fields:
economic, social and political and for their good governance as
well.
(4) Democracy and free and fair election is inextricably mixed.
Like democracy, free and fair election is also a basic structure
of the Constitution. Without free and fair election, democracy
can never be practised in its true sense.
(5) Like democracy, election has not been defined in anywhere
in the Constitution though election has been used in many
articles such as: articles 65(2), 66(2), 67(1), 70(1), 71(2), 72(4),
74(1)(2), 119)1), 122(1), 123(1)(2)(3)(4), 124, 125 of the
Constitution. Election has also not been defined in the
Representation of the People Order, 1972(hereinafter referred
to as the RPO, 1972) under which election of members of
Parliament is held. And that being the position, we have to fall
back upon the dictionary meaning of election. As per Oxford
English Dictionary, 7
th
edition, election means the process of
choosing a person or a group of people for a position,
especially a political position, by voting; election is an
occasion on which people officially choose a political
representative or government by voting. As per Chambers
Dictionary, election means the act of electing or choosing,
the public choice of a person for office, usu. by the votes of a
constituent body; free will; the exercise of gods sovereign will
in the predetermination of certain persons to salvation (theol);
those elected in this way (bible). As per Blacks Law
Dictionary, election means 3.The process of selecting a
person to occupy an office (usu. a public office) membership,
award or other title or status of members of Parliament. If we
consider the above dictionary meaning of election along with
697
article 122 of the Constitution, it will appear that the election
process should be such that peoples right of choice through
adult franchise to select their own representatives in the
Parliament, i.e. members of Parliament, should not, in any way,
be hindered and obstructed.
(6) It will be a mockery to say that all powers of the Republic
belong to the people as enshrined in article 7 of the
Constitution unless the people get chance to practise
democracy, that is, they can exercise their rights of adult
franchise in selecting their own representatives in a free, fair
and impartial general elections of members of Parliament; the
13
th
Amendment has ensured the said rights of the people and
thus, has strengthened and institutionalised democracy and has
not destroyed democracy.
(7) We should not confuse between two things, democracy and
Parliament. Free and fair election is part of democracy and a
fundamental structure of the Constitution. And Parliament is
the product of democratic process through a free and fair
election. So, in the absence of free and fair election, Parliament
cannot have real legitimacy and cannot be said to be sovereign
as well and in such Parliament, people will have no
representation. We should not also have any special fascination
and love for the Parliament if its members are not elected by
the people in a free and fair election and thus, do not have a
true representation to the people.
(8) Parliament as conceived of by the framers of the
Constitution is a Parliament consisting of 300 members to be
elected from single territorial constituency; election as referred
to in article 65(2) of the Constitution definitely refers to free,
fair and peaceful election; if the candidates in the general
election of members of Parliament get themselves elected by
use of muscle power and money, coercion, threat, intimidation
and exerting undue influence on the Government machinery,
they cannot be called peoples representatives and Parliament
consisting of such members cannot be called a Parliament in its
true sense within the meaning of clause (1) of article 65 of the
Constitution and such Parliament cannot materialise the
aspirations and the dreams of our forefathers and the martyrs
who sacrificed their lives in the liberation struggle in 1971.
(9) With the dissolution of Parliament either under article
57(2) or 72(3) of the Constitution, the members of Parliament
including the Prime Minister and his other colleagues, in the
Cabinet, cease to be elected representatives of the people and
they no more remain responsible to the Parliament and thus to
the people, therefore, the character of the unelected Chief
Adviser and the Advisers of Non-Party Care-taker Government
is same as that of the Prime Minister and his other Cabinet
colleagues after the dissolution of Parliament. The argument
that even after the dissolution of Parliament, the Prime Minister
and his other colleagues continue to be elected representatives
of the people because of proviso to clause (3) of un-amended
698
article 123 and article 72(4) of the Constitution is absolutely
fallacious and bereft of logic inasmuch as if such argument is
upheld then articles 57(3), 58(4), 72(3) and clause 3(b) of un-
amended article 123 shall be rendered nugatory which is
inconceivable in interpreting a written Constitution.
(10) Political parties are not strange in our Constitution like the
Indian Constitution. Article 152 of the Constitution has
recognised very much political party. Reading the definition of
political party as given in the Constitution along with the
provisions of the Representation of the People Order, 1972,
political parties cannot be isolated from the people as used in
article 7 of the Constitution and their role in our political and
national life cannot also be denied. Therefore, the consensus
reached amongst the political parties (party in power and
opposition political parties) on the question of holding general
elections of members of Parliament under the Non-Party Care-
taker Government cannot be ignored just as the outcome of
political agitation or like any other political demand made by
any political party on a factional issue. We cannot also forget
the historical fact that in 1990 when General Ershad resigned
from the post of President as the result of mass movement, it is
the three Main Political Alliances and parties who along with
others, that is, all professional organisations regardless of their
affiliation, belief and leanings made the then Chief Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed agreeable to accept the post of Vice-
President and thus to take the reins of a neutral and impartial
Government as its head with the positive assurance that after
having run the Government temporarily till the establishment
of an elected democratic Government through a free, fair and
impartial election to Parliament, he would be eligible to return
to the office of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and then after
the establishment of Parliament on the basis of general election
of members of Parliament Act 24 of 1991 was passed to give
effect to the said assurance allowing him to resume the
responsibilities of the office of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh,
on the basis of consensus which is unique and class by
itself and I am sure such an example cannot be found
anywhere in the world
(11) There will be no anomaly as to the premiership of the
Republic in case the dissolved Parliament is summoned by the
President under article 72(4) of the Constitution, because of the
proviso to article 58A and article 56(4) of the Constitution.
(12) The system of interim Government was already there in
the Constitution vide articles 57(3) and 58(4) of the
Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment has only brought
some change in its formation under the name: Non-Party Care-
taker Government for holding the general election of members
of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially and thus,
democracy, in no way, has been impaired.
(13) The provision for appointment of non-members of
Parliament as Ministers, was provided in article 56(4) in the
699
original Constitution which was enacted, adopted and given by
Constituent Assembly. Article 56(2) of the present
Constitutional dispensation has also provided for appointment
of non-parliament members as Ministers up to one-tenth of the
total number of the Ministers appointed from amongst the
members of Parliament. Therefore, there is no constitutional
problem in the Thirteenth Amendment making provision for
unelected persons to be the Chief Adviser and the Advisers.
Presently, there are two Cabinet Ministers and one Minister of
State in the Cabinet who are not members of Parliament.
(14) The Thirteenth Amendment is a short term constitutional
administrative mechanism and procedure for ensuring a full
term truly democratically elected Government, which has been
experienced, cannot be accomplished by a partisan Government
howsoever elected, the question of declaring the same ultra
vires the Constitution does not arise at all.
(15) The President who heads the Republic is elected and if it
is held otherwise than articles 48(1), 119(1)(a), 123(1) and 152
of the Constitution shall be rendered nugatory and in
interpreting a written Constitution that is absurd. The
Government operated during the period of Non-Party Care-
taker Government being collectively responsible to the
President, the representative character of the Government is not
at all lost; there remain democracy and the people.
(16) During the period of Non-Party Care-taker Government,
the President who is elected, remains as the head of the State.
So, the Republic character of the State and the Constitution is
not lost.
(17) By making provision for the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of the Appellate Division to
be the Chief Adviser, independence of judiciary has not at all
been destroyed or impaired, because three core or essential
conditions of judicial independence such as: (i) security of
tenure (ii) financial security and (iii) administrative
independence which are inherent in our Constitution have not,
in any way, been affected or impaired by the Thirteenth
Amendment.
(18) No provision having been made in the Thirteenth
Amendment for the sitting Chief Justice or the sitting Judge of
the Appellate Division for appointment as the Chief Adviser,
separation of powers, has not been impinged. After a Judge
retires be it the Chief Justice or the Judge of the Appellate
Division, he ceases to be a part of the judiciary.
(19) The post of Chief Adviser is a political office, so there is
possibility of criticism, but it is the retired Chief Justice or the
retired Judge of the Appellate Division, as the case may be, who
will hold the office, therefore, the criticism of the Chief Adviser,
if any, shall in no way have any impact upon the independence
of judiciary and the adjudicative functions of the Judges
independently
700
(20) The etherial argument that because of the provisions made
in the Thirteenth

Amendment to make the Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the Judges of the Appellate Division as Chief
Adviser, the appointment of Chief Justice and elevation to the
Appellate Division is being politicised is not also historically
correct, because in 1976 and in 1985 when the concept of
holding general elections of members of Parliament under the
Non-Party political Government was not even thought of, there
were supersessions in appointing Judges to the Appellate
Division (detailed given in the body of the judgment). It is the
perception of the executive which plays the vital role in the
appointment of a Judge to the Appellate Division and the Chief
Justice as well and not the post of Chief Adviser.
(21) The observations made by this Division, in the case of
Abdul Bari Sarker (46 DLR(AD) 37) and in the Eighth
Amendment case that the purpose behind the prohibition in the
original article 99 of the Constitution against the appointment of
a retired Judge in any office of profit in the services of the
Republic, was that high position and dignity of a Judge of the
Supreme Court should be preserved and respected even after his
retirement and that if any provision was made for holding office
of profit after retirement, a Judge while in the services of the
Supreme Court might be tempted to be influenced in his
decision in favour of the authorities keeping his eye upon a
future appointment, does not help the appellant to substantiate
his argument that the provisions made in the Thirteenth
Amendment for appointment of the retired Chief Justices of
Bangladesh and the retired Judges of the Appellate Division as
Chief Adviser, has destroyed the independence of judiciary. The
post of Chief Adviser of Non-Party Care-taker Government
cannot, in its truest sense, be said to be an appointment in any
office of profit in the service of the Republic of Bangladesh. The
appointment of a retired Chief Justice and the retired Judge of
the Appellate Division as the Chief Adviser is absolutely
different from the appointment as was made in the case of Abdul
Bari Sarker. From the pleadings of the parties and the
submissions of the majority of the amici curiae, it is prima-facie
clear that the provision was incorporated in the Constitution by
the Thirteenth Amendment on the consensus of all political
parties including the party in power and also on the basis of
popular demand of the people in general and in fact, it was the
demand of the whole nation. So, the post of Chief Adviser
cannot be equated with a particular post of office of profit in any
particular department of the Republic. Such provision salvaged
the boat of democracy which was about to sink. We should not
forget that after the judgment was passed in the Eighth
Amendment case (judgment was passed on 02.09.1989) Chief
Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was appointed as the Vice-
President of the Republic on the basis of consensus of the
3(three) Main Political Alliances after General Ershad resigned
from the post of President as a result of the mass movement and
701
he (Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed) performed as the acting
President of the Republic under whom the first ever free and fair
general election of members of Parliament was held on
27.02.1991.
(22) The submission, that because of the dangling carrot of the
post of Chief Adviser, the Chief Justice and the Judges of the
Appellate Division may be allured not to discharge their
adjudicative functions impartially and may be biased towards
the Government in power is absolutely imaginary, hypothetical,
and etherial and on such submission, the Thirteenth Amendment
cannot be declared invalid. Neither the learned Counsel for the
appellant and petitioner nor Mr. Rafique-ul Haque could refer to
any single adjudicative function before us to show that the
retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh, who became the Chief
Advisers and the other retired Chief Justices or the retired
Judges of the Appellate Division, who had the chance to become
the Chief Adviser, while in office, ever performed any
adjudicative function showing any biasness or leniency towards
the Government in power to justify their submission that
because of the dangling carrot, they acted in a particular way in
breach of their oath.
(23) The post of Chief Justice of Bangladesh is not less
honourable or prestigious than that of the Chief Adviser. So
there is no logic behind the submission that while holding the
high office of Chief Justice, the Chief Justice will be biased
towards the incumbent Government in performing his
adjudicative functions because of his chance to become the
Chief Adviser for only 90(ninety) days and that too to perform
routine functions. Such submission sounds to me simply
ridiculous, humiliating and disturbing as well. If that is the
perception of the Bar, the future of the judiciary must be bleak.
(24) The legislature in their wisdom having preferred the
retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh and the retired Judges of
the Appellate Division as Chief Adviser of Non-Party Care-
taker Government, I do not find any reason or justification to
question the wisdom of the legislature in this regard. If any
question is raised at allit would be the duty of the legislature
to come up with a different and better device to select or
appoint an appropriate person in the key post of Chief Adviser
and that must be again on the basis of consensus of all political
parties as was done in 1996.
(25) The High Court Division in exercising its power of
judicial review under article 102 of the Constitution and the
Appellate Division under article 103 thereof can declare an
amendment to the Constitution by an Act of Parliament
ultravires the Constitution if the same impairs or destroys the
basic structures of the Constitution. But in exercising such
power of judicial review, neither the High Court Division nor
the Appellate Division can give direction to the Parliament to
amend the void Act in a particular manner. If this is done, that
will be self contradictory and shall also be a transgression into
702
the legislative power of the Parliament and shall also be against
the constitutional scheme of broad distribution of powers
among the 3(three) organs of the Government, namely:
legislative, executive and judiciary. After an Act of Parliament
amending the Constitution is declared ultravires the
Constitution the same cannot be given life in any form
whatsoever, however, only the actions which were taken under
the void law can be condoned. Such an exercise is also not
contemplated in article 104 of the Constitution. Of course, in
exercising the power of judicial review the High Court Division
as well as this Division can make observations in respect of a
matter which comes to its notice in course of hearing, be it
amendment of any provision of the Constitution or any other
Act or legislation or any other subject.
(26) An Act amending the Constitution cannot be declared
ultravires the Constitution on the ground that the same has
been abused or there is chance of abuse, if the same does not
impair or destroy the basic and fundamental structures of the
Constitution. The events which occurred in 2006-2008 show
that the Thirteenth Amendment was abused. But those could
not be attributed to the Thirteenth Amendment. The then
President did not exercise the five options before he assumed
the functions of Chief Adviser under clause (6) of article 58C
as inserted by the Thirteenth Amendment for the reasons best
known to him. If there was any fault, it was the fault of the
President. So, it is no use of blaming the law.
(27) The context behind the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment has shown that rigging in the general elections of
members of Parliament by using muscle power and money and
manipulation of the election results by exerting undue influence
upon the Government machinery by the party in power, became
the rule rather than an exception and the little man of Sir
Winston Churchill could not walk into the little booth with his
little pencil to put a little cross on a little bit of paper (ballot
paper) freely as submitted by Mr. T. H. Khan.
(28) The Constitution can be amended by way of addition,
alteration, substitution or repeal by Act of Parliament to
respond to the dynamics of the changing circumstances as
per the need of the people and to strengthen and
institutionalise the basic structures and features of the
Constitution, but not by destroying or impairing such
structures and features.
(29) By inserting article 58A in Chapter II and by opening
a new Chapter being Chapter IIA in Part IV and inserting
therein articles 58B-58E, the Constitution has been
amended but those read with the amendments of articles
61, 99, 123, 147, 152 and the Third Schedule to the
Constitution, in no way, amended the Preamble and articles
8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution.
(30) The last Non-Party Care-taker Government could stretch
703
its tenure beyond 90(ninety) days because of the fact that
although according to article 123(3) as amended by the
Thirteenth Amendment, general election of members of
Parliament is required to be held within 90(ninety) days after
the Parliament is dissolved whether by reason of the expiration
of its term or otherwise than by reason of such expiration no
consequence has been provided therein if election is not held
within the said period. Further in view of the language of
article 58B(1) that There shall be a Non-Party Care-taker
Government during the period from the date on which the
Chief Adviser of such Government enters upon office after
Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved by reason of
expiration of its terms till the date on which a new Prime
Minister enters upon his office after the constitution of the
Parliament. There is clear scope to stretch the period till the
date on which the new Prime Minister enters upon his office
after the constitution of Parliament. And taking that advantage
of the state of the above constitutional provisions the last Non-
Party Care-taker Government continued for more than 2(two)
years. But the fact remains that the Non-Party Care-taker
Government gave all possible assistance to the Election
Commission that was required for holding the general elections
of members of Parliament in a free, fair and impartial manner
which is the product of the 9
th
Parliament. In the light of the
above experience, necessary amendments may be made in
articles 123(3) and 58B so that Non-Party Care-taker
Government cannot extend its period beyond 90 (ninety) days
and the general election of members of Parliament is held
within the said period; the wanting in the law can very well be
taken care of by making necessary amendments through
discussion and by way of consensus as was reached in 1991
and 1996.
(31) The political party in power as interim Government failed
to secure the holding of general election of members of
Parliament in a free, fair and impartial manner and thus, to
ensure peoples real representation in the Parliament, so Non-
Party Care-taker Government was introduced in the
Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment on the basis of
consensus of all political parties and also the demand of the
people in general and by now 3(three) general elections of
members of Parliament have already been held and the people
participated in those elections in large scale and thus, accepted
the system and as such, there is no reason to reverse the same
after fifteen years.
(32) If Non-Party Care-taker Government system goes off then
money and muscle power will again rule in the election and in
addition the party in power as experience showed, will resort to
exert undue influence upon the Government machinery to rig
the election and manipulate the results and in the process,
democracy will again be a far cry and thus, the supremacy of
the people as enshrined in article 7 of the Constitution shall be
704
nowhere.
(33) The holding of elections in 1(one), 2(two) or more by
elections of members of Parliament in a free, fair and peaceful
manner under the political party in power, in no way,
guarantees that the party in power during the next general
election of members of Parliament will not exert its undue
influence upon the Government machinery and shall give
institutional support to the Election Commission that may be
required for holding the general election of members of
Parliament in a free, fair and impartial manner, as mandated by
article 126 of the Constitution, because by losing in 1(one),
2(two) or more seats in the by-elections of Parliament, the party
in power loses nothing if it is in power with two-thirds or three-
fourths majority. Similarly, holding elections to the local
bodies by the Election Commission under the political party in
power in a free and fair manner, does not make any difference,
because by holding such elections a political party does not go
to power.
(34) Discussions and consensus are very important components
for the sustenance of democracy. No system is foolproof, so
amendment in the form of Non-Party Care-taker Government,
if any, may be made in the Constitution on the basis of
discussions and consensus among the political parties as was
done in 1996.
(35) Animosity and adversarial atmosphere amongst the
political parties is so high in degree that when one political
party goes to power, the leader of opposition in Parliament is
determined not to sit together and even not to meet each other
on the occasion of national events. General election of
members of Parliament cannot be held under political party in
power, so long this persists and presently, there is no
alternative of Non-Party Care-taker Government to hold
general election of members of Parliament in a free, fair and
peaceful manner.
(36) General elections of members of Parliament in our country is
held in a day and if by resorting to massive rigging and exerting
undue influence upon the Government machinery, election results
are manipulated by the party in power and thus, it succeeds in
securing majority seats in Parliament and forms the Government,
then it would be meaningless to resort to the election dispute to the
Election Tribunal which is also time consuming.
(37) The difference between the interim Government, which was in
the Constitution prior to the Thirteenth Amendment vide articles
57(3) and 58(4) and the Non-Party Care-taker Government
introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment, is that notwithstanding
the fact that the outgoing Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues
lose their character as the peoples representative, they continue to
retain their strong and open affiliation with their party and they also
contest in the election with their party manifesto and political
programme and use all their amenities as the Prime Minister and the
Ministers during the election and thus, the Administration becomes
vulnerable to their influence and they succeed to manipulate the
705
election results. Whereas, in the latter case, the Chief Adviser shall
be a person not related to politics and other Advisers shall be

appointed by the President from amongst the persons who are not
members of any political party or, of any organisation associated
with or, affiliated to any political party. And naturally, they do not
have any reason to be partisan with any political party.
(38) Every Nation and country has its own pride and prejudice
and has the right to decide what form of Government including
the interim one should be. As, in the Constitution, there was a
form of interim Government, which failed to ensure free and
fair general election of members of Parliament and in the
historical back ground as discussed in the body of the
judgment, Non-Party Care-taker Government was introduced in
the Constitution and we have already got the dividend thereof
that the people, at large, were able to go to the polling centres
and could cast their votes freely without any fear. Yet, for
holding the general election of members of Parliament under
the Non-party Care-taker Government, more steps may be
taken to strengthen the Election Commission. Care and caution
must be exercised in appointing the Chief Election
Commissioner and the other Commissioners so that the person
with high morality, integrity, uprightness and sagacity may be
invariably chosen for the said office. The Election Commission
must be made more powerful. We have noticed that by this
time, many reformative steps have already been taken in the
process of holding the general election of members of
Parliament by incorporating necessary amendments in the
RPO, 1972, such as registration of political parties, submission
of accounts of the expenditure of election by the political
parties and by the candidates, establishment of Electoral
Enquiry Committee to ensure the prevention and control of pre-
poll irregularities.
(39) By amending article 61 of the Constitution to the effect
that and such law shall, during the period in which there is a
Non-Party Care-taker Government under article 58B, be
administered by the President, no dyarchy has been created.
Such argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is
tendentious and is bereft of non-consideration that the
Thirteenth Amendment is a short term constitutional
administrative mechanism to secure full term truly
democratically elected Government. In the original article 61, it
was clearly provided that the supreme command of the defence
services of Bangladesh shall vest in the President and the
exercise thereof shall be regulated by law. The President being
elected, there is no wrong in administering such law by him for
a very short period of 90(ninety) days. Moreover, article
58B(3) has clearly provided that the executive power of the
Republic shall, during the period of Non-Party Care-taker
Government be exercised, subject to the provisions of article
58D(1) in accordance with the Constitution, by or on the
706
authority of Chief Adviser and in accordance with the advice of
the Non-Party Care-taker Government.
(40) The President has no chance to be an autocrat in case he
assumes the functions of Chief Adviser, as he shall have to
discharge such functions in accordance with the advice of the
Non-Party Care-taker Government, that is, other 10

(ten)
Advisers. Besides the President is also oath bound to act in
accordance with the Constitution and the law. Article 93 of the
Constitution which empowers the President to make and
promulgate Ordinance, when the Parliament is not in session
under the circumstances as stated therein, has not said anything
about the prior advice of the Prime Minister in making and
promulgating any such Ordinance, so the power of the
President in making and promulgating the Ordinance is same in
both form of Governments.
(41) The provision, for summoning a dissolved Parliament as
provided in clause (4) of article 72, has been made by the
legislature keeping in mind the extreme extraordinary
circumstances only, that is, if the Republic is engaged in war
and that provision, in no way, can be interpreted to fortify the
argument that even after dissolution of Parliament under article
57(2) or clause (3) of article 72, the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet colleagues remain responsible to Parliament and thus
to the people. If that argument is upheld then it will create
disharmony with the other provisions of the Constitution such
as articles 57(2)(3) and 58(4) and un-amended article 123(3)(b).
(42) In article 123(3) as it stood before the Thirteenth
Amendment, the legislature took care of two situations, one: to
hold the general election of members of Parliament within the
period of 90 days preceding the dissolution of Parliament by
reason of the expiration of its term and the other within 90 days
after the dissolution of Parliament otherwise than by reason of
such expiration as contemplated in clause (a). Since elections
of members of Parliament under the political party in power as
interim Government as provided in articles 57(3) and 58(4) was
done away with under the concept of Non-Party Care-taker
Government by the Thirteenth Amendment only one situation,
that is, holding general election of members of Parliament
within 90 days after the dissolution of Parliament whether by
reason of the expiration of its term or otherwise than by reason
of such expiration has been provided which is quite in
conformity with sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of un-amended
article 123. Proviso to clause (3) of the un-amended article 123
that the persons elected at a general elections under sub-clause
(a) shall not assume office as members of Parliament except
after the expiration of the term referred to in clause (a), was
quite logical because if election is held within 90 days
preceding the dissolution of Parliament as provided in clause
(3)(a) of article 123, the members who were elected for 5(five)
years from the date of first meeting, remain as members of
Parliament till expiration of their term and that, in no way, can
707
justify the argument that even after the dissolution of
Parliament, the same continues.
(43) There will be no dearth of power on the part of Non-Party
Care-taker Government to make any policy decision in case of
necessity for discharging its routine functions in view of the
provision made in article 58D of the Constitution and therefore,
the State has no chance to suffer in case any emergent situation
arises to make any decision on foreign policy as argued by the
learned Counsel for the appellant.
(44) The submission of Dr. M. Zahir that concept of Non-Party
Care-taker Government introduced in the Constitution by the
Thirteenth Amendment for holding the general elections of
members of Parliament, is a natural stigma/| for the nation
and the political party in power because the elected member of
Parliament, who commands the support of the majority of
members of Parliament to act as the Prime Minister for 5(five)
years cannot be trusted for the period from the time of
dissolution of Parliament and till his successor yet enters upon
the office, is bereft of any logic as well as factual backing,
because the term of Parliament is 5 years from the date of its
first meeting and the mandate of the people is only for 5(five)
years and after the expiry of 5(five) years when the Parliament
stands dissolved mandate comes to an end. Dr. M. Zahir and
Mr. Ajmalul Hossin who are very widely travelled persons
failed to say any of their experience and produce any material
whatsoever before us to show that due to the introduction of the
system of Non-Party Care-taker Government in our
Constitution has, in any way, brought any adverse impact or
embarrassment upon a citizen of this country including
themselves or the Government. Dr. Kamal Hossain an
internationally reputed lawyer seriously opposed the said
submission of Dr. M. Zahir and submitted that the leaders of
many countries enquired to him about the Non-Party Care-taker
Government system introduced in our Constitution for holding
the general election of members of Parliament with approval.
Mr. M. Amirul Islam and Mr. Rokanuddin Mahmud who are
also widely travelled persons on being asked as to whether they
had any embarrassment abroad or in this country to any foreign
national because of the introduction of the system of Non-Party
Care-taker Government during the general election of members
of Parliament in the Constitution, they replied in the negative.
(45) Article 57(3) of the Constitution provided that nothing, in
the article, shall disqualify the outgoing Prime Minister for
holding office, yet his successor entered upon the office. The
Constitution has not given any mandate to the Prime Minister
to hold the general election of members of Parliament. It is the
Election Commission which has been given the charge/function
for holding the elections of the President and the members of
Parliament. So, why it should be a natural stigma//| upon the
nation or upon the Prime Minister if general election of
members of Parliament is held under the Non-Party Care-taker
708
Government after the dissolution of Parliament when the Prime
Minister ceases to have the representative character. I do not
see any reason for the Prime Minister, his other Cabinet
colleagues and the party in power to take it as a stigma/| to
have the general election of members of Parliament under Non-
Party Care-taker Government. Neither the learned Attorney
General has said about any such stigma/| in his submission
nor anything has been said in the concise statement filed by
respondent No.1 (Bangladesh represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs) in that
respect. Had the Government felt any such thing in course of its
governance, the same would have definitely been said in the
concise statement. It is to be further stated that no such thing
was stated in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent
No.1 in the High Court Division as well. The submission of Dr.
M. Zahir is self defeating, as he himself suggested a modality
of interim Government for holding the general election of
members of Parliament by giving a reference to the Australian
system. If there is any natural stigma/| on our nation, it is:
corruption, but the holding of general elections of members of
Parliament under Non-Party Care-taker Government is not. In
fact, corruption is taking the shape of a menace; all
development works are being hindered because of corruption
for which good governance is also suffering a setback. Because
of corruption, the bulk of the poor people of the country are
deprived of their due share in the development of the country.
And we all should create social awareness against corruption as
well as put resistance against corruption.
(46) The concept of suspension of certain articles of the
Constitution including the enforcement of fundamental rights,
has already been provided explicitly in the Constitution itself
under certain situations as contemplated in articles 141B and
141C of Part-IXA of the Constitution. Thus, keeping certain
provisions of the Constitution ineffective or suspended for a
particular period, for the sake of others to facilitate the people
to exercise their right of adult franchise or electing the
democratic Government in a free and fair general election of
members of Parliament as provided in the Thirteenth
Amendment is not alien to the Constitution and such a device
is, no way, in conflict with the scheme of the Constitution. The
words on the written advice of the Prime Minister, by order
were not therein in the original article 141C and the same were
added by the Constitution (twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991. It is
pertinent to state that when Part-IXA was inserted in the
Constitution Parliamentary form of Government was very
much in vogue.
(47) Question cannot be raised now as to the competence of
the Sixth Parliament which passed the Thirteenth Amendment.
It cannot be unnoticed that not only the legislative Acts but also
the executive and the administrative actions carry the
presumption of constitutional validity and an elected
709
Parliament cannot be held illegally constituted merely because
the opposition political parties boycotted the elections of the
Sixth Parliament; the Sixth Parliament must legally be taken to
have been validly constituted because the election was not set
aside following the provisions of the Constitution and the
Representation of the People Order, 1972. Besides, all parties
and the people participated in 3(three) subsequent general
elections of members of Parliament and thus accepted the
Thirteenth Amendment. More significantly the Seventh
Parliament was constituted on the basis of the general election
of members of Parliament held under the Non-Party Care-taker
Government after dissolution of the Sixth Parliament.
(48) If the apprehensions (apprehensions have been detailed in
the body of the judgment) of the two responsible senior citizens
of the country, who are also former Attorney Generals, namely:
Mr. Rafique-ul Haque and Mr. Mahmudul Islam become true in
the event the Thirteenth Amendment is declared ultravires the
Constitution then it would surely give rise to political chaos in
the country which again would lead to a situation that occurred
in 1996 as emerged from the pleadings of respective parties and
the submissions of the majority amici curiae and in that event,
it shall have a serious impact on our economy and in the
process, democracy and democratic polity shall suffer; the
country will be put back instead of going forward with
prosperity. But, we cannot afford all these, particularly when
the people have accepted the mechanism by participating in the
3(three) general elections of members of Parliaments in large
scale; in fact, the holding of general election of members of
Parliament under the Non-Party Care-taker Government is a
settled one.
(49) In the short order passed on 10.05.2011 allowing the
appeal by majority view, it was observed . . . The parliament,
however, in the meantime, is at liberty to bring necessary
amendments excluding the provisions of making the former
Chief Justices of Bangladesh or the Judges of the Appellate
Division as the head of the Non-Party Care-taker Government.
But, in the concluding portion of the judgment and in clause
(12) of the summary under paragraph 44, the learned Chief
Justice, has specifically observed in the form of direction that:
|<<|<< <<|< <<| '< |<|| ||< ' |<| '|
- |<, <|<, '< |<| |<, ', |||<|, |<|<
|<|'< |<|| |<<|< basis structure =< = <|< |<<<|< <
<||<< < <| <<| -<|, (12) |<|< |<| | -<|< :,
||< < |<<| (discretion) |<, <| <| (reasonable
period) <, <|, --(|<<||) | <, ||<| :<| <||< -<, -
<, |<| <<| || <|<|< '- | <<| < <<| || |
<|< '- << << <|< |||<< |<|< <|< |<||
<|<< These are not in conformity with the short order.
(50) The Thirteenth Amendment as passed by the Sixth
Parliament is intravires but not ultravires the Constitution as
the same has not, in any way, destroyed or impaired:
710
democracy, independence of judiciary and separation of
powers, the fundamental structures of the Constitution. The
Thirteenth Amendment has become a constitutional necessity.

I find no merit in the appeal and the leave petition. Accordingly, the
appeal and the leave petition are dismissed.
J.
Nazmun Ara Sultana, J.: I have had the advantage of going
through the judgments proposed to be delivered by A. B. M.
Khairul Haque, the learned Chief Justice, Md. Abdul Wahhab
Miah, J. and Muhammad Imman Ali, J. I concur with the
judgment and order passed by my brother, Md. Abdul Wahhab
Miah, J.
J.

Syed Mahmud Hossain, J.: I have had the advantage of
going through the judgments proposed to be delivered by A. B. M.
Khairul Haque, the learned Chief Justice, Md. Abdul Wahhab
Miah, J. and Muhammad Imman Ali, J. I concur with the
judgment and order passed by the learend Chief Justice.
J.

Muhammad Imman Ali, J.: By the judgment and the short order
pronounced on 10.05.2011 the majority of the Honble Judges sitting in
this Division allowed the instant appeal, which arose out of Writ Petition
No. 4112 of 1999. In the order it was declared that the Constitution
(Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act No. 1 of 1996) was prospectively
declared void and ultra vires the Constitution. It was further declared that
711
the election of the Tenth and Eleventh Parliament may be held under the
provision of the above mentioned Thirteenth Amendment and that
Parliament in the meantime was at liberty to bring necessary amendment
excluding the provision of making the former Chief Justices of Bangladesh
or the Judges of the Appellate Division as the head of the Non-Party
Caretaker Government.
As I could not agree with the majority decision of my learned
brothers, I shall, with the utmost respect, express my own humble views in
the following opinion.
On 28.03.1996 the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996
(Act No.1 of 1996), (hereinafter referred to as the Thirteenth Amendment)
was promulgated. By Section 2 a new Article 58A was introduced in the
Constitution and by Section 3 a new Chapter IIA was introduced under the
title Non-Party Caretaker Government. In this way Articles 58A, 58B,
58C, 58D and 58E were inserted in the Constitution. The Thirteenth
Amendment was initially challenged in Writ Petition No.1729 of 1996.
That writ petition was summarily rejected on the ground that the provision
of the impugned Act did not fall within the definition of alteration,
substitution or repeal of any provision of the Constitution and as such it
was not an amendment as contemplated under Article 142 of the
Constitution. The selfsame Thirteenth Amendment was again challenged in
Writ Petition No. 4112 of 1999 (the instant writ petition) contending that
the said Act was ultra vires the Constitution. In view of the earlier writ
petition, which had been rejected summarily, the Division Bench of the
High Court Division considering the instant writ petition referred the same
to the Honble Chief Justice stating its opinion that since important issues
712
were raised in the writ petition, including that of destruction of the basic
structure of the Constitution, a full Bench, if constituted, should decide all
issues raised in the writ petition and particularly the issue whether the Act
No.1 of 1996 has caused amendment in the provision of Articles 48(3) and
56 of the Constitution requiring assent thereto through referendum as
contemplated by Articles 142(1A), (1B) and (1C) of the Constitution. A
full Bench was constituted, and on 25.01.2000 Rule was issued upon the
respondents to show cause as to why the impugned Constitution
(Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act No.1 of 1996) (Annexures-A
and A-1 to the writ petition) should not be declared to be ultra vires of the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and of no legal effect
and / or pass such other or further order or orders as to this Court may seem
fit and proper.
The Full Bench comprising three Honble Judges of the High Court
Division, after hearing the parties as well as two amici curiae and also
considering the various affidavits and papers submitted by the parties,
discharged the Rule. However, considering that the case involved a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, the
High Court Division granted a Certificate under Article 103(2)(a) of the
Constitution. In addition the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner filed
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.596 of 2005.
The Full Bench of this Division comprising seven Honble Judges
heard the learned Advocates on behalf of the parties as well as eight amici
curiae. Four of the Honble Judges, including the Honble Chief Justice of
Bangladesh who has authored the judgment of the majority, were of the
view that the appeal should be allowed finding that the impugned Act No.1
713
of 1996 was ultra vires the Constitution, but at the same time held that in
spite of the Thirteenth Amendment Act, 1996 being illegal, only the
ensuing Tenth and Eleventh General Elections may be held, if so
considered by Parliament, under the Caretaker Government system. It was
also observed that Parliament in implementing the judgment of the majority
may amend the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 or may
formulate a new Act, on condition that in the Caretaker Government
system no retired Chief Justice or retired Judge of the Appellate Division
shall be involved; the Caretaker Government will consist of only elected
members of the Parliament; and from the date of declaration of the election
schedule to the date of announcement of election result public
administration, i.e., all persons in the administration connected with the
election process shall remain under the control of the Election
Commission. It is noted that the last two conditions were not in the short
order announced on 10.05.2010.
With due respect of my leaned and noble brothers, I fail to
understand how any Court of law can countenance the continuation of a
constitutional provision which has been declared illegal and ultra vires the
Constitution by the highest Court of the country.
Keeping such proposition in mind let me proceed to my opinion.
At the outset, I must say that thankfully I need not deal with the
factual aspects of this case as those have been dealt with most elaborately
by the Honble Chief Justice in his judgment delivering the majority view.
With respect, I would say that the judgment is a magnum opus which deals
with the matters arising in this case in extreme detail by copious reference
to numerous judgements and treatise from various parts of the world, which
714
have been rendered most eruditely in the mother tongue, although, again
with respect, I cannot agree that the Bangla erudition will reach the masses
in the far-flung corners of the country, and whether every man sitting in his
village hut or even townhouse will be able to read and understand the
contents thereof.
Since the majority judgment contains vast and exhaustive research
material, I may be forgiven for referring to some of the quotations made
therein.
There are a number of points, which, in my view, are beyond any
controversy or doubt and require no argument in their support:
(i) All powers under the Constitution, including the
Constitution itself emanate from the people;
(ii) Bangladesh is a Republic having a President and a
Parliamentary democratic system of government
headed by the Prime Minister with a single uni-
cameral legislature known as the House of the Nation;
(iii) The Supreme Court has amongst its other duties, also
the duty to interpret the law and the Constitution;
(iv) Parliament has the duty to enact laws, including the
power to amend the Constitution;
(v) the Executive implements the laws so promulgated
and the judiciary has a supervisory function to see that
the laws promulgated by Parliament are in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and that the
implementation and interpretation of the law is
consistent with the Constitution; and
715
(vi) The Judges of the Supreme Court are oath-bound to
protect, uphold and preserve the Constitution. Above
all it is the duty of the judiciary to protect the
constitutional and other legal rights of the people.
The citations and observations made above (in the majority
judgment) which lay down the principle to the effect that Parliament has
power to make laws and to amend the Constitution have withstood the test
of time. In spite of such power, Parliament still remains subservient to the
law which it enacts and to the Constitution. The judiciary may give
interpretation of any law or the Constitution. Having done so, it becomes
subservient to the view taken by it. There is no gainsaying also that the
Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land and any law which is
inconsistent with the Constitution, to the extent of inconsistency is void. It
also goes without saying that according to Article 7 of the Constitution all
powers in the Republic belong to the people and that the Constitution is the
solemn expression of the will of the people. Article 11 provides for
effective participation of the people in the governance of the country
through their elected representatives.
Most extravagant references have been made to numerous authorities
in order to establish the principles that it is the power of the people which
has created the Constitution; the Constitution is supreme; the demand of
the people is for sustained democratic values; the power and the authority
of the Supreme Court to ensure the right of the people in accordance with
the Constitution; the indelibility of the basic structure of the Constitution
etc. The real question in the case before us is whether the amendment
brought about by the Thirteenth Amendment has affected the basic
716
structures of the Constitution and eroded the democratic character of
governance.
The provision for amendment of the Constitution is found in Article
142 of the Constitution which allows amendment and provides how the
amendment will take place. In my view, we need look no further than the
decision of this Division in the case of Anwar Hossain Chowdhury Vs.
Bangladesh reported in BLD (1989) (Special Issue) 1, wherein
Shahabuddin Ahmad, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined as follows:
People after making a Constitution give the Parliament
power to amend it in exercising its legislative power
strictly following certain special procedures.
M H Rahman, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined as follows:
I am fully aware that when the Court examines the
constitutionality of an amendment of the Constitution
the initial presumption of validity is heavily in favour of
the amendment and that the legislature deserves full
deference in view of the doctrine of separation of
power.
The questions that arose before the High Court Division in the
instant case were as follows:
(1) Whether the incorporation of Articles 58A to 58E of
the Constitution by virtue of the impugned Act can be
considered as an amendment to the Preamble, Articles 8,
48 and 56 of the Constitution or at least to Articles 48 and
56 requiring approval thereof of the people by means of
717
the referendum before the assent of the President as
contemplated under Clause (1A) of the Article 142.
(2) Whether the impugned Act having brought about the
above amendment is destructive of the democracy which
is one of the fundamental structures of the Constitution.
(3) Whether the amendment of Article 142 by adding
Clauses (1A), (1B) and (1C) thereto by the Second
Proclamation (Fifteenth Amendment) Order, 1978 can be
said to be a valid constitutional amendment.
It may be stated here that in view of the judgement in Khondker
Delwar Hossain etc. Versus- Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd.
and others, VI (B) ADC (2010) 1, (the Fifth Amendment case) declaring
the Second Proclamation (Fifteenth Amendment) order, 1978 to be ultra
vires the Constitution, the requirement of any referendum has been
obviated. Thus the only point out of the three points agitated before the
High Court Division, which still required consideration was whether the
Thirteen Amendment was destructive of democracy which is on of the
fundamental structures of the Constitution. Other questions which arose
incidentally were whether democracy and independence of the judiciary are
basic features of our Constitution, and free and fair election being an
inextricable part are also features of the Constitution.
As stated earlier, there can be no doubt that democracy, free and fair
election, which is a part and parcel of democracy, and the independence of
the judiciary are basic structures of the Constitution. The moot question is
whether the Thirteenth Amendment has undermined or destroyed those
basic structures.
718
All three Honble Judges of the High Court Division came to the
conclusion that the amendment introducing the Non-Party Caretaker
Government is an apparatus or device which for a period of 90 (ninety)
days would keep certain provisions of the Constitution suspended or
ineffective. After the expiry of that period that apparatus itself would
become ineffective. By a unanimous decision, the High Court Division
held that the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 was valid
and constitutional, the said Act did not amend the Preamble, Articles 8, 48
and 56 of the Constitution and there was, therefore, no requirement for a
referendum; the Act has not affected or destroyed any basic structure or
feature of the Constitution, particularly the Democracy and Independence
of the Judiciary; and clauses (1A), (1B) and (1C) of Article 142 of the
Constitution are valid and consequently any amendment to the Preamble
and Articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution must observe the formalities
provided in clauses (1A), (1B) and (1C) of the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that Md. Awlad Ali, J. in his separate opinion,
while concurring with the lead judgement, pointed out that by Martial Law
Proclamation one of the main pillars of the Constitution, namely
secularism, was destroyed and such destruction of basic pillar or basic
structure by Martial Law Proclamation was done by the Second
Proclamation (Fifth Amendment) Order, 1978 (Second Proclamation Order
No. IV of 1978) and the proclamation order or orders was ratified and
confirmed by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979 and that was
made part of the Constitution. His Lordship went on to say that the
insertion of clause (1A) of Article 142 was not a legislative act and
Parliament had no power under Article 142 of the Constitution to change
719
the basic structure. Md. Awlad Ali J. observed that nobody had challenged
such destruction of the basic feature of the Constitution by a Martial Law
authority and that such changing the basic pillar of the Constitution would
be decided by the citizen of the country, by the future generation. We can
now see the foresight of Md. Awlad Ali, J. since the Fifth Amendment Act
was indeed challenged and has since been declared ultra vires the
Constitution and with it has gone all those amendments made by the
Martial Law Authorities.
We have to appreciate that the Constitution is the expression of the
will of the people. Consciously the provision has been put in place for
amendment of the Constitution by way of Article 142. Naturally, such
provision is essential and reflects the supremacy of the will of the people.
The absence of any provision for amendment would effectively diminish
the power of the people. At the same time, it cannot be denied that any
amendment by a Military authority is unlawful, since that is not a reflection
of the will of the people. It was held in the case of Bangladesh Italian
Marble Ltd. and ors-vs-Government of Bangladesh and ors. (2010) BLD
(Spl) (HCD) 1, per A.B.M. Khairul Haque, J. (as his Lordship then was),
There is no such law in Bangladesh as Martial Law and there is also no
such authority as Martial Law Authority. ... Conversely, therefore, any
amendment made by the representatives of the people can be accepted as
lawful amendment, so long as it is within the provision of Article 142 of
the Constitution and reflects the will of the people. The rigidness of the
Constitution cannot be allowed to numb the senses of the people nor stifle
its will. The people must be allowed to extricate themselves from any
difficult situation or cater for any exigency arising by amending provisions
720
of the Constitution, as and when necessary. The very Constitution which is
made by the people for the people cannot be allowed to paralyse the
people. In order to weigh the validity or the necessity of any amendment, it
must be established whether it was for the benefit of the people or whether
the amendment would curtail their democratic right in any way to their
detriment.
Theories propounded internationally and accepted globally have a
place in our deliberations when we consider legal principles generally.
However, those principles must be looked at in the context of the situation
facing our country at the relevant time. In order to appreciate the necessity
of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it is necessary to look at
the background which led to the promulgation of the said amendment.
It is a known fact that for almost a decade starting from 1982 the
country was under autocratic rule. The public was disgruntled to the extent
that there were open demonstrations against that regime, which became an
everyday affair. Such open confrontation resulted in the ouster of the
autocratic regime by public action. An extra-ordinary situation prevailed in
the country at that time. The people by their power rid themselves of the
shackles of dictatorship. There was euphoria. Then there came the need to
re-establish democracy. In order to hold a fair election the then sitting
Chief Justice of the country was appointed as Vice President at which point
in time the then President tendered his resignation and then Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed became acting President of the country. He appointed
other independent members to continue the functions of the interim
Government. It may be remembered that at that time the provision of an
interim Government, though in a different form, existed in Article 56(4)
721
whereby in the interim period between a dissolution of Parliament and the
next following general election of Members of Parliament, the persons who
were such members immediately before the dissolution were regarded for
the purpose of this clause as continuing to be such members, and under
Article 58(4) the Prime Minister and other Ministers continued to hold
office until their successors entered upon office. Indisputably free and fair
elections were held under acting President Shahabuddin Ahmed, who
thereafter resumed his position as Chief Justice, and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (B.N.P.) came into power in February 1991 with a
mandate to govern for five years. Soon there developed dissatisfaction with
the way in which the ruling party and its allied political parties were
running the country. Agitation filled the streets. Once again, public demand
grew to form a Non-Party-Caretaker Government so that free and fair
elections could be held. The party in power was not amendable to the
oppositions demand for a Non-Party-Caretaker Government. A group of
eminent citizens attempted to barter a consensus amongst the party in
power and the leading party in opposition in order to create an acceptable
interim Government for the purpose of holding free and fair elections. The
details of the dialogue between the leader of the opposition and the sitting
Prime Minister mustered by the group of five eminent persons, of whom
the leading personality was the eminent jurist, Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, may be
found in the book entitled The Ishtiaq Papers published in 2008 by the
University Press Limited. The culmination of the discussions and dialogues
was the ultimate formulation of the Thirteenth Amendment Act.
However, as appears to be the natural phenomenon in this country,
the losing party had characterised the 1991 election as having been subtly
722
rigged. Similarly the party which was in power immediately before the
1996 election lost and claimed that the election held under the newly
created Non-Party Caretaker Government was manipulated with help from
the civil administration. The tables turned and in 2001 again the losing
party, which had been in power up to the dissolution of Parliament, lost and
claimed that the election was crudely rigged. In 2008 the losing party
claimed that the election was fixed by the Caretaker Government and
Election Commission with backing from the foreign powers and
engineered with the help of digital means. Rare is the occasion when the
losing party gracefully accepts defeat in any election, local or national.
It must not be forgotten that the Non-party Caretaker system grew
out of the political parties distrust for one another. Continuation of that
system has progressively increased and hardened the level of that
distrusting mentality, to the extent that one party accused the other of
establishing a certain engineering mechanism to choose the next head of
the Care-Taker Government. There is doubt whether this mentality will be
outgrown in the foreseeable future. Hence, there has to be means of
achieving at least a minimum level of neutrality in the election period for
democracy to sustain.
Summary of arguments on behalf of the appellant
1. The system of Care-Taker Government is illegal and ultra vires
the Constitution
2. It is undemocratic
3. It is contrary to the independence of the Judiciary
Legality of the Amendment
723
The duty of Judges is to decide any matter brought before them in
the light of the existing law and all the attending facts and circumstances
relevant to the matter in hand. I may respectfully quote P.N. Bhagwati J. in
S.P. Gupta V. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149, We have to examine
the arguments objectively and dispassionately without being swayed by
populist approach or sentimental appeal. ....... We have therefore to rid our
mind of any pre-conceived notions or ideas and interpret the Constitution
as it is, not as we think it out to be.
Any law promulgated by Parliament for the benefit of the people
must by definition be good. As Mr. Mahmudul Islam, learned Counsel
appearing as amicus curiae, submitted: it has to be noticed that not only
legislative acts but also executive and administrative actions carry the
presumption of constitutional validity. It cannot be conceived that
Parliament is empowered to enact bad laws. Disobedience of the law or
improper application or interpretation of it does not make that law illegal or
bad. It has been argued that the cause of the undesirable events which took
place on 1/11 (2007) was the Thirteenth Amendment. The simple answer
to this is that, those events occurred because the then President did not
follow the letter of the Constitution relating to appointment of the Chief
Adviser of the Non-Party Care-Taker Government. It may be recalled that
without exhausting all the procedures in Article 58C(3), (4) and (5) he
himself assumed the post of Chief Adviser of the Care-Taker Government.
It is to be remembered that the success of any law lies not in its
promulgation, but in its implementation, which was absolutely absent at
that time. In a Constitutional democracy, no one is above the Constitution
and the law. Each person in authority or holding any position of power has
his power circumscribed by the Constitution. Even the President of the
724
country having some constitutional prerogatives must act in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution. By the end of 2006, when the time
came to form the Care-Taker Government, the President was obliged to
follow the clearly delineated path detailed in Article 58C(3), (4) and (5)
before he himself assumed the functions of the Chief Adviser under Article
58C(6). The fact that he did not exhaust the procedures under sub-articles
(3), (4) and (5) was challenged in Writ Petition Nos. 11263 of 2006 and
11470-2 of 2006. However, those petitions were not allowed to see the
light of day. On the day when the petitions were moved before the High
Court Division an application was filed by the Government before the
Honble Chief Justice with a prayer to constitute a Special Division Bench
under Rule 1(iii) of Chapter II of Part-1 of the High Court Rules. The then
Chief Justice in his wisdom did not constitute any Special Division Bench.
On the other hand he arbitrarily stayed further hearing of those matters. At
this juncture one recalls the quotation from the case of Asma Jilani V.
Government of Punjab, PLD SC 139: The Courts undoubtedly have the
power to hear and determine any matter or controversy which is brought
before them, even if it be to decide whether they have the jurisdiction to
determine such a matter or not. The superior Courts are, as is now well
settled, the Judges of their own jurisdiction.
The function of the Chief Justice is to administer justice when he is
sitting in Court as a Judge. He, along with his brother Judges, has the right
to decide in favour of or against any contention of the parties to the action.
He is merely one of the arbiters. He also has the additional task of
administering the day to day activities of the Courts under his jurisdiction.
The question remains as to whether any Chief Justice has the authority to
725
prevent any legal action from being moved before the High Court Division,
to be thwarted or shelved for any reason. Can the Chief Justice usurp the
function of the High Court Division and prevent any cause being
adjudicated? The Chief Justice cannot sit alone and cause the unnatural
demise of a live petition. Looking at the situation philosophically, as did
Md. Awlad Ali J., when the instant matter was before the High Court
Division, it remains to be seen whether any hearty citizen will feel
aggrieved enough to bring the matter before the High Court Division.
The pertinent question in the case before us is whether the people
can curtail their own democratic right for any period when the country will
be governed on a day to day basis by a group of persons who were not
elected by them. It has to be borne in mind that the Thirteenth Amendment
came at a time when the people at large had lost faith in the ability of the
elected members of the Parliament to hold a free and fair election. The
opposition alliance demanded a Non-Party Care-Taker Government to hold
the general election because they had no faith and trust in the neutrality of
the ruling party to hold a fair election, which is a precondition for sustained
democracy. From experience it was seen that the party who was last in
power exerted undue influence over the civil administration at the time of
election resulting in rigging of the polls. As a result of the agitation of the
opposition and their supporters the party in power introduced the Bill for
amendment in Parliament which was ultimately passed. The preamble to
the Bill provide as follows:
Whereas it is expedient to make further amendment in the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh for
the purposes hereinafter appearing;
726
...............................................................................................
...............................................................................
The statement of object and reasons for the amendment is stated at
the end of the Bill as follows:
Whereas it is expedient to make further amendment in the
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh for
the object of constituting Non-Party Care-Taker
Government in order to aid and assist the Election
Commission in holding more free, fair and impartial
general election of members of Parliament, as well as
performing the functions conferred on it under the
Constitution, this Bill introduced, by virtue of Article 142
of the Constitution, for the amendment of the relevant
Provisions thereof with a view to achieving the above
object.
Thus, it is quite clear that the amendment was enacted by Parliament
through the will of all the people of this country, both those represented by
the party in power and those represented by the parties in opposition. Such
an act of Parliament can be said to be extra-ordinary, inasmuch as it reflects
not only the will of the majority under a democratic system, nor just the
will of the two thirds of the House of Parliament which is required for
amendment of the Constitution, but in this case the amendment was a
reflection of the will of the whole Nation. Hence, the amendment cannot be
said to be unlawful. When the whole of the Nation demands passage of a
particular provision, it cannot be said to be undemocratic. And when such a
process and change was triggered by the political distrust, as noted above,
727
the alternative cannot be continuation of the outgoing party during the
interim period. Hence, the elusive neutrality cannot realistically be
achieved through continuation of the party in power during the election
process. An alternative is crucial for continued sustainability of the
democratic system.
Democratic character
It has been argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant that
during the period when the Non-Party Care-Taker Government is in power,
Democratic Rule is abrogated since the persons in the helm of power
governing the country for the 90 (ninety) days period are not
representatives of the people. In this connection it may be observed that
during any interim period between the dissolution of the Parliament and the
entering into office of the next elected Parliament the representatives who
continue to govern the country are not strictly elected representatives. It
should be borne in mind that this happens only once in every five years.
The Prime Minister and other Members of Parliament are elected to
represent their constituents for a period of 5 (five) years from the day when
they enter into office till the day of dissolution of Parliament at the end of
that period of 5(five) years or earlier if the elected representatives lose the
mandate of the people and Parliament is dissolved by the President. Thus to
think that the Prime Minister and the Ministers who continue after the
dissolution of Parliament to hold office are the representatives of the
people is a fallacy. Moreover, history of this country tells us that the party
in power who continue after the dissolution of Parliament are, according to
the losers in the election, unable to hold free and fair election to full
satisfaction and invariably the party in opposition alleges undue influence
728
and unfair means exerted by the party last in power upon the civil
administration during the election process. This is a common phenomenon
both in case of national elections and local elections. The fact remains that
the losing candidates cannot take their defeat gracefully. However, that
cannot mean that all elections are ipso facto unfair. It would be
uncharitable to say that the former Chief Justices, who headed the previous
Care-Taker Governments, did not hold fair elections simply because those
who had been defeated complained of rigging of the polls.
The Democratic character of our Parliament is unlike those of other
countries, inasmuch as our system allows for unelected persons to be made
technocrat Ministers and allows participation of female Members of
Parliament who are not directly elected by the people to govern the
country. Thus, in any event, ours is not strictly a true democracy since non-
elected persons are able to take part directly in the governance of the
country. Those technocrat Ministers and female members in the reserved
seats do not represent any members of the public. However, this state of
events is permitted by the Constitution and, therefore, can be said to reflect
the will of the people. Hence, if the people can choose by provision in the
Constitution to be governed by non-elected Ministers, and indirectly
elected members, then there can be no harm in the people wanting to be
governed by non-elected persons for a period of 90 (ninety) days, knowing
full well that they choose to do so in the belief that they will thereby
achieve a free and fair Parliamentary election which is the fundamental
basis for democracy, a basic features of our Constitution.
One other aspect of the amendment may be considered here. It is not
a requirement of the Non-Party Care-Taker Government to take part in the
729
election process save and except to give to the Election Commission all
possible aid and assistance as provided by Article 58D(2). In my view, it is
clearly a misconception to think that the Non-Party Care-Taker
Government is in place to hold the election. In the Statement of objects
and reasons for the amendment as stated in the amendment Bill placed
before Parliament, it was stated that the amendment in the Constitution was
for the object of constituting non party Care-taker Government in order to
aid and assist the Election Commission in holding free, fair and impartial
general election of members of Parliament, as well as performing the
functions conferred on it under the Constitution ..... The amendment after
passage through Parliament provides in Article 58D (1) that the Non-Party
Care-Taker Government shall discharge its functions as an interim
Government and shall carry on the routine functions of such Government
with the aid and assistance of persons in the services of the Republic.
Article 58D (2) provides that the Non-Party Care-Taker Government shall
give to the Election Commission all possible aid and assistance
(emphasis added) that may be required for holding the general election of
members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially. It is undoubtedly
the Election Commission which is mandated to hold the general election. In
this regard, I may refer to the deliberations which took place in Parliament
when the Bill was placed before it. The relevant portions of the debate are
reproduced below:
msm` weZK24k gvP, 1996
[msweavb ( qv`k mskvab ) wej , 1996]
730
evwi vi Rwgi Dw b mi Kvi (gx, AvBb, wePvi I msm` wel qK gYvj q)t
gvbbxq xKvi , AvRK GB wej wUD vcb I weePbvi AvMAvcbvi mvgb AvgvK
Gi Dci GKwU outline Dcvcb Ki Z nQ|
GB wej wUGKwUAZg~j evb wQj | AvRK Avgv`i GB ms` 300 Rb
m`mmvavi Y f vUvi `i direct f vUwbevwPZ nQb Ges Zuvi vAvi I 30 Rb gwnj vm`m
wbevwPZ Ki Qb| GB wbevPb Aeva, myyI wbi cf ve Abyvbi j Avgv`i msweavb
wbevPb Kwgkb i qQ| Ges GB wbevPb KwgkbK mvnvhI mnvqZvKi vi RbGes msweavb
AwcZ h gZvi qQ, mB gZv cqvMKi `vwqZcvj bi RbGKwUwb`j xq ZveavqK
mi Kvi , non-party caretaker government MVb wbq Avgv`i Avj vPbvKi Z nQGes
GUvi Rb GB wej D vwcZ nqQ| Avi mB j Avgv`i h msweavb i qQ, mB
msweavbi wekl GKUvcwi eZb Ki Z nQGes Avgv`i K mLvb GKUvbZyb chapter
mwbek Ki Z nQ| hnZy GKUvbZyb wb`j xq ZveavqK mi Kvi Zi xKi Z nQ, Ges
msweavb GKUvbZyb chapter mwbek Ki Z nQ, mnZy msweavbi wewf bAbyQ`
mskvab Ki Z nQ, A_vr AbKj vmskvabxAvbvi cqvRbxqZv`Lvw`qQ|
wgvi xKvi , GB wej wUD vcbi ci Avgi vAvgv`i msm` m`m`i msMAvj vc
Avj vPbvKi wQ| Zuvi vAbK GZ mskvabxw`Z Pvb| Avcbvi AwdmZuvi vmBme
mskvabxsubmit Ki Qb| Avwg AvRK gvUvgywUf ve GB nvDmwel qwUi GKwUKvVvgv
`uvo Ki vZ PvwQ|
wgvi xKvi , GB h wb`j xq ZveavqK mi Kvi it will be absolutely in the
impersonal functioning of the state. Kvi I gyLi w`K Pq evKvb cvwUi w`K
Pq Avgi vGB wb`j xq ZveavqK mi Kvi Zi x Ki wQbv| Avgi v wb`j xq ZveavqK
mi Kvi Zi x Ki wQ hvZ f wel Z GKwUAeva, myy Ges wbi c wbevPb nq, hvZ Kvi I
Kvb I Ri Avcw bv_vK, wekl Kvb `vexbv_vK, KDhvZ ej Z bvcvi h, f vU
wi wMs nqQ, mB wbwg AvR GB wej wU D vcb Ki vnqQGes AvRK weePbvi Rb
GmQ|
731
wgvi xKvi , Avgv`i `k h RywWwmqvwi , wePvi wef vM, GUvK Avgi v memgq
Aeva I wbi c `LwQGes GUvAeva I wbi cf ve KvR Ki hvQ| mBRbwb`j xq
wbi c ZveavqK mi Kvi i cavb wnme Avgi vevsj v`ki Appellate Division Gi
chief justice A_evevsj v`ki Ex-chief justice-K chief Adviser wnme
wbqvM`vbi K_vej wQ Ges Zvi 10 Rb Adviser _vKeb| Ges whwb mekl
Appellate Division _K Aemi MnY Ki Qb, c_g ZuvKB Abyi va Ki vne GB
ZveavqK mi Kvi i cavb nI qvi Rb| wZwb hw` i vwR bvnb Ges Zuvi hw` qualification bv
_K _vK Zvnj Zuvi AvM whwb Aemi M nY Ki Qb ZuvK Abyi va Ki vne| Zuvi I hw`
Kvqvwj wdKkb bv_vK Ges wZwbI hw` i vwR bvnb Zvnj Zuvi AvMwhwb Aemi MnY
Ki Qb ZuvK Abyi va Ki vne| GBf ve Avgi vgvbymvi Abyi va Ki Z _vKe, hZY bv
Avgi vcvB| wKkZnQ, eqm72 eQi i ekx nZ cvi e bv| hw` cv b cavb wePvi cwZ
bvcvI qvhvq ZLb Avcxj wef vMi Aemi cv wePvi cwZ hvi vi qQb meKwb _K i Ki v
ne| c_g meKwb `Lvne, Zuvi hw` qualification _vK Ges wZwb hw` mwZ `b
Zvnj ZuvK ZveavqK mi Kvi i cavb Dc`vwnmve wbhy Ki vne| Ges Zuvi ci vgkgZ
cwmWUevKx10 Rb Dc`vwbqvMKi eb| GgbI nZ cvi h, h mg Aemi cv
wePvi K i qQb Zuv`i wf Zi I hw` KvDK cvI qvbvhvq Zvnj `ki GKRb cLvZ
bvMwi K evLvZbvgvbvMwi K whwb `, i vcwi Pvj bvi gZvi qQGes whwb Aeva I myy
wbevPb cwi Pvj bvKi vi RbAvvf vRb, mi Kg j vKK cwmWUAvnvb Ki eb wb`j xq,
wbi c I ZveavqK mi Kvi i cavb Dc`v nI qvi Rb| ZvZI hw` cvI qvbvhvq Zvnj
Avgi v`ki GKRb bvMwi K hvi `ZvI Awf Zv i qQwhwb i vcwi Pvj bvKi Z cvi b,
whwb wbevPb Ki Z cvi b| mvaxb Aeva, Ges wbi c Ges hvi integrity m Kvi I Kvb
ckbB, ZuvK gnvgvbi vcwZ cavb Dc`vwnmve wbqvMKi eb| evKx10 Rb Dc`v
wbq cavb Dc`v3 gvmi RbKvR Ki eb| 3 gvmi wf Zi wbevPb hvZ nq, Zvi Rb
wbevPb KwgkbK mvnvhKi eb| Kvi Y wbevPbUvKi e wbevPb Kwgkb| GLvb mi Kvi i Kvb
nvZ bvB|
732
AvRK mi Kvi wbevPb Pvj vQ, ckhLb DVQ, Avgi v wekl f ve gb Ki wQh,
Rbmg GKwU wb`j xq, ZveavqK mi Kvi GKv cqvRb| ZLb GB wb`j xq ZveavqK
mi Kvi wbevPb KwgkbK h_vh_f ve mvnvhI mnhvwMZvKi e hvZ Aeva Ges wbi c
wbevPb nZ cvi |
I would emphasise the assertion of the Honble Minister presenting
the Bill in Parliament that the [non-party care-taker government] will be
absolutely in the impersonal functioning of the state. And its purpose
would be to ensure free, fair and impartial elections in the future.
Clearly there is a difference between aiding and assisting the
Election Commission and holding the election. In my view, the problem is
in thinking that the Care-taker Government would hold or oversee the
elections. This is clearly a misconception. If one looks carefully at the
Constitutional provision, it is evident that the interim governments duty is
to carry out the day to day function of managing the affairs of the Republic,
and except in the case of necessity for the discharge of such functions it
shall not make any policy decisions. It, therefore, has no function in
holding the elections. The only function it has in connection with the
election is to give to the Election Commission all possible aid and
assistance that may be required for holding the general election of members
of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially. (Art. 58D (2)]
That the Care-taker Government has very limited power is further
exemplified by Article 58E, which provides that, Notwithstanding
anything contained in Articles 48(3), 141A(1) and 141C(1) of the
Constitution, during the period the Non-Party Caretaker Government is
functioning, provisions in the Constitution requiring the President to act on
the advice of the Prime Minister or upon his prior counter signature shall
733
be ineffective. Hence, it would not be correct to think that the head of the
Care-taker Government would be stepping in the shoes of the out-going
Prime Minister.
It should also be noted that there is an interim arrangement even
before the interim Care-taker Government comes into being. Article 58C(2)
provides that the Chief Adviser and other Advisers shall be appointed
within fifteen days after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved, and
during the period between the date on which Parliament is dissolved or
stands dissolved and the date on which the Chief Adviser is appointed, the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet who were in office immediately before
Parliament was dissolved or stood dissolved shall continue to hold office as
such.
So, for up to 15 days the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who are no
longer elected members or ceased to be s, will continue to hold office as
they had done prior to the dissolution of Parliament, until the date on which
the Chief Adviser is appointed. And for the remaining period from that
time on till the date on which a new Prime Minister enters upon his office
after the constitution of Parliament, the Care-Taker Government will carry
out the executive functions of the State for the limited purpose as
mentioned in Article 58D(1). Lest we forget, it is the people who chose to
adopt this system for a period of 75 to 90 days after every five years; and
they did so with a view to ensure free and fair elections which would
sustain their democratic powers. Of course, they must also have had
previous bad experiences in the back of their minds.
Independence of the Judiciary
The contention in essence is that because the head f the Care-Taker
Government would be chosen from the last retired Chief Justice, or the
retired Chief Justice previous to him, this leaves open the possibility that
734
the Honble Chief Justice who would be in line to become the last or
penultimate retired Chief Justice might be tempted to be influenced in his
decisions in favour of the party in power, keeping his eyes upon the future
appointment. To this end, Mr. M I Farooqui made his submission with
reference to the decision in Abdul Bari Sarker V. Bangladesh, 46 DLR
(AD) 37. He contended that Article 99 of the Constitution should be
restored putting a total ban on appointment of a retired Judge to any public
office whatsoever.
By reference to Secretary, Ministry of Finance V. Md. Masdar
Hossain and others, 20 BLD (AD) 104, learned Counsel submitted that the
independence of the judiciary could not be curtailed or diminished in any
manner whatsoever, except under the existing provisions of the
Constitution. Learned Counsel also referred to a number of instances where
judges of the United States and England refrained from taking extra-
judicial posts while holding judicial office or after retirement.
Dr. M. Zahir, appearing as amicus curiae submitted that the concept
of Care-Taker Government was a natural stigma on the honesty of all
political parties presupposing that the outgoing party cannot be relied upon
to conduct a fair election. He submits that this is an honest confession by
admittedly unreliable politicians about their dishonesty or unreliability in
the matter of elections. Drawing on the countrys experience in 2007-2008,
he submitted that the provisions relating to the non-party Care-Taker
Government read with Article 141A-141C is a dangerous combination
which could derail democracy and the rule of law for an indefinite period,
not limited to the 90-days Care-taker Government.
735
However, one should not be oblivious of the intrinsically skeptical
and suspecting nature of political parties in Bangladesh, which led to the
creation of the Care-Taker Government concept in the first place. It was the
distrust of opposing political leaders which created a stalemate in 1996, as
exposed by the Ishtiaque Papers, which culminated in the Care-Taker
Government system. Moreover, the system of Care-Taker Government
should not be blamed for its inadequacies, which were indeed a result of
the corruption of that system by none other than the political parties, which
are alleged to have manipulated that system to achieve their political ends.
It is alleged by one political party that the other party while in government
extended the age of superannuation of Supreme Court Judges from 65
years to 67 years so that the last retiring Chief Justice would be a man of
their choice, favouring their political ideology. That in my view is a slur
not only on the political parties, but also on the office of the Chief Justice.
No God-fearing Judge, let alone the Chief Justice, having a grain of
conscience in him would remain the man of choice of my political party
after taking oath as a Judge. It would be fanciful thinking on the part of the
political parties to consider any Judge to be their man of choice.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the Judges of the Supreme Court
have no hand in altering the age of retirement of Judges, or in the
supersession of Judges. If any mischievous calculation is made, then it is a
done by the politicians and not the Judges.
Dr. Zahir observes that the concept of a Chief Justice being above
politics and above controversy has been abandoned. But we find his view
that everyone including a retired Chief Justice has the same mentality of
being politically partial, to be rather uncharitable, especially from someone
who has spent his whole life of practice as a lawyer before those every
736
Chief Justices, who by no means have shown partiality in their judgments.
Every individual in any democratic society should have a political view,
but that view is personal and any member of the judiciary should not allow
his views to influence his judgement. That would be highly unethical,
contrary to the Code of conduct, and would be totally unacceptable.
The provision for an interim government for when Parliament is
dissolved exists under Article 56(4) read with Article 57(3). The Non-party
Care-Taker Government was introduced in 1996 because the Government
then in power failed to hold a free and fair election as demonstrated by the
by-election in Magura and the farcical general election that followed. As
Mr. Huq, learned Counsel appearing as amicus curiae observes, the people
lost confidence in the then Government and at that critical point in time a
Non-Party Care-Taker Government was a necessity. However, his view
that such necessity or importance no longer subsists appears to be short-
sighted. It cannot be imagined that while the same political parties and
politicians remain, the deep-rooted distrust that they bore against each
other will have disappeared. Perhaps such necessity will persist until a
viable alternative system, acceptable to all concerned parties, is developed.
And that can only arise if there is consensus.
Mr. Rafiqul Huq observes that there is a provision in the Thirteenth
Amendment for the last retired Chief Justice or other Judges to be involved
as Chief Adviser or Advisers of the Non-Party Care-Taker Government.
But this has raised apprehension in the minds of the people that the Chief
Justice or Judges who are expected to be Chief Justices and remain the last
retired Chief Justice are not discharging their duties impartially or
supersession is taking place in order to make one or the other Judge as the
last retiring Chief Justice. He submitted that this kind of apprehension in
737
the mind of the people affects the respect for the highest judiciary. The
apprehension is that this kind of manipulation is done with the aim that the
last retiring Chief Justice of choice may serve the interests of the party in
power as the Chief Adviser.
However, this apprehension presupposes that the Chief Adviser and
the Care-Taker Government will have the power to influence the election
process. As pointed out earlier, the Care-Taker Government is not
mandated by the Constitution to have any activity in the election process,
save and except to aid and assist the Election Commission. It appears that a
cloud is being created by imagining non-existent powers of the Care-Taker
Government and then assuming improper exercise of those powers in order
to denigrate the system. At this juncture one may suggest that, in order to
allay any misapprehension there should be a clear declaration that the Care-
Taker Government or interim Government has no function in the holding
of elections. With respect, one may also accept the suggestion made by Dr.
Zahir that it is necessary to strengthen the Election Commission so that it
can conduct the elections fairly and impartially without having to turn to
the Care-Taker Government for support. The Election Commission itself
may be given the authority to commandeer all necessary assistance and
support from the civil administration. It will have at its disposal adequate
numbers of members of the civil administration for the purpose of aiding
and assisting in the election process. And only these civil administrative
personnel will be under the control of the Election Commission. Equally,
the services of the disciplined forces may be sought from the President,
should it be felt necessary by the Election Commission for proper
management of the election process.
738
Mr. Huq went on to argue that the non-party Care-Taker
Government is still necessary because the party in power and the main
opposition are not behaving in the proper direction. They are critising
each other without respect for other. Well, that takes us back to square one
where the Care-Taker Government was created due to the mutual distrust
of the opposing political forces. Perhaps, some such system of neutral
interim Government will remain a necessity until the political parties learn
to trust each other, at least for the three months necessary for holding
general elections. If the Election Commission is given sufficient strength
and authority to conduct the elections independently, with all aid and
assistance at their command, then it would matter little as to who was
heading the Care-Taker Government.
Mr. Huq has suggested that the judiciary should be kept out of the
political arena. That is the best way to keep the Judges from being
stigmatized due to no fault of their own. But one should reflect upon the
need to involve the judiciary at the inception of the Care-Taker
Government concept. The judiciary commands high respect now as it did
then, when it was felt that only a Judge of the highest judiciary could be
trusted to be impartial. This was the feeling of all political parties and
hence the whole nation. The feeling persisted during the next two general
elections. It was the subsequent alleged calculated manipulation of the
retiring age of Supreme Court Judges for political ends that led to the
maligning of the system of Care-Taker Government.
Again, going back to the empowered Election Commission, the
limelight would be taken away from the head of the Care-Taker
Government when the notion is obliterated from the minds of the people
739
that the Care-Taker Government has any function in conducting the
elections. It would be immaterial whether the head of the Care-Taker
Government was a retired Chief Justice or any other person of immaculate
repute and personality.
With respect, I find good sense in the suggestion from Mr. Huq that
the interim government should comprise an equal number of eminent or
prominent persons nominated by the opposing political parties. This would
give a balanced team who would check each other in their day to day
activities during the relatively short period of two and half months when
elections are conducted by the Election Commission. Of course, two
opposing forces, no matter how mundane their activities, would require an
umpire, especially in the charged atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Who better to act as umpire than a retired Judge who would have spent
his working life on the Bench as an umpire? As I perceive the situation,
so long as the umpire realises that the function of the interim government
is only to carry out the day to day decisions in relation to running the
country and strictly no involvement in the election process, he should be
able to deter the other members of his team from delving in or interfering
with the activities of the Election Commission. Of course, that is not to say
that an impartial head of the interim government cannot be chosen from
civil society. What is important is to ensure political neutrality of the
person and his ability to control warring political stalwarts, who might
justifiably be suspected of delving into the election process. Allegations of
powerful Ministers and politicians visiting local constituencies, even when
prohibited by law during the time of election, are not uncommon. It is most
essential to allow the Election Commission to maintain the timeframe laid
740
down for the election without let, hindrance or interference from any
quarter. That can be achieved only if the Election Commission is given all
necessary powers and independence in the conduct of the elections. Mr.
Huq goes on to state that the non-party Care-Taker Government is not in
conformity with the fundamental structure of out Constitution, though he
did say earlier that the system was still necessary. He pointed out that the
Election Commission in India has been made powerful and independent,
and neutral persons have been selected to form the Election Commission.
Our Election Commission has been able to prove its transparency and
neutrality in holding the general elections of 2008 and local elections. He
suggested that we must have a powerful Election Commission its own
budget.
Mr. Mahmudul Islam, on the other hand, firstly submitted that the
impugned Amendment does not infringe the Republican character of the
State / Constitution. The office of the President still remains to be filled up
by the peoples representatives and the Constitution retains its Republican
character notwithstanding the Thirteenth Amendment. He further submitted
that all efforts were made before the Thirteenth Amendment to save
democracy and that if it is held invalid, it is almost certain that the
opposition parties will not participate in the election and democracy will be
a far cry. He added that it is true that the provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment suspend representative government for a short interregnum,
but the Amendment ensures operation of democracy in the country. He
submitted that there was no alternative to holding election under a Care-
Taker government to preserve the democratic character of the Constitution
and the country. Democracy has to be suspended for a little while for
741
ultimate survival of democracy. With regard to the independence of the
judiciary being affected by the Thirteenth Amendment, he submitted that if
a judge passes a judgment for receiving any favour or due to fear of
government action, the judge commits breach of his oath; it has nothing to
do with the performance of his duty as a judge. By the appointment of a
retired Chief Justice or a judge of the Appellate Division the judiciary is
not in any way involved.
Mr. T. H. Khan and Dr. Kamal Hossain, learned Counsel appearing
as amici curiae submitted in support of the contention that the Thirteenth
Amendment was not illegal or ultra vires the Constitution as there was a
national consensus supporting electoral reforms to ensure free and fair
elections and for that purpose the citizens may make informed choices.
They also suggested supplementing the powers of the Election Commission
to discharge its constitutional mandate. Both learned Counsel were
infavour of retention of the system of Care-Taker Government since it was
introduced following broad social and political consensus, which was a
change brought about by the people to protect their rights to have effective
participation in a free and fair election process. Mr. T. H. Khan submitted
that if Part IXA of the Constitution does not destroy democracy, then Part
IIA likewise does not do so.
Mr. M Amirul Islam, learned Counsel appearing as amicus curiae,
made submissions in support of the legality of the Amendment, but
emphasized the need to have a powerful Election Commission, and above
all a correct Electoral Roll. He submitted that in 2006 the Election
Commission failed to prepare an up to date voters list and the then
President took over the position of Chief Adviser. His action was
742
challenged in the High Court Division, but the Chief Justice stayed the
matter.
Mr. Ajmalul Hossain, learned Counsel appearing as amicus curiae
submitted that the Thirteenth Amendment is ultra vires the Constitution as
it infringes the democratic nature of the Constitution since Article 7, Part I
and Part II contemplate that the country should be governed by elected
representatives of the people. Referring to the turn of events in 2006 he
suggested that because the political party in opposition did not wish to have
an election under the last retired Chief Justice, they took their agitations to
the streets and as a result there was a Care-Taker government supported by
the army for two years which destroyed the fundamental rights and rule of
law.
It must be pointed out that what happened in 2006 was not a
consequence of the legality or otherwise of the Thirteenth Amendment, but
the failure of the then President to comply with provisions of the
Constitution. He did not exhaust the options in Article 58C(3), (4) and (5),
before declaring himself the Chief Adviser, which was in fact challenged
before the High Court Division, as we note from the submissions of Mr. M
Amirul Islam.
Mr. Rokan Uddin Mahmud, learned Counsel appearing as amicus
curiae also submitted in favour of the legality of the Thirteenth
Amendment. He referred to the convention whereby after the dissolution of
the British Parliament, the outgoing Prime Minister continues until the new
Prime Minister takes up his post. But during this interim period he remains
unelected. A similar provision exists in our Constitution under Article
743
58(4). He submitted that if by such provision democracy is not infringed
then Article 58B cannot infringe democracy.
Mr. Muhammad Mohsen Rashid, learned Counsel appearing for the
appellant made submissions challenging the legality and vires of the
Amendment. At the same time he admitted that the country was coming
out of crisis and it made sense to install a Care-Taker Government which
could hold free and fair election it was only then that this form of
Government aided in installing democracy. He however, gave the
example of India thus, In India the Election Commission was strengthened
by a single man, Mr. T. N. Seshan. This man is individually responsible for
changing the face of the Election Commission and today there are more
than one billion beneficiaries of such an independent Election Commission.
Currently the execution of elections under the Election Commission is such
that no one dares to raise a voice or a finger towards that institution whilst
having a Care-Taker Government which facilitates the holding of free and
fair elections.
The learned Attorney General made submissions in favour of the
Amendment pointing out that the Constitution allows non-elected Ministers
and Women Members of Parliament who are not elected by the people. He
adverted to the necessity of appointment of non-elected persons for the
sake of holding free and fair elections. He submitted that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not alter the basic structures of the Constitution.
Thus it is seen that the majority of the amici curiae were of the view
that the Thirteenth Amendment is not ultra vires the Constitution but many
of them were of the view that it cannot survive in the present form. There
was general consensus that the Election Commission needs to be given full
744
independence and more power in order that it may hold free and fair
elections.
Certainly, the Care-Taker Government system conceived in
Bangladesh was quite unique and served its purpose well at the time. The
system has been given a bad reputation due to political manipulation.
However, a system of interim Government is not unknown and is in
operation in many developed and less developed countries of the world. In
any democracy there has to be an opportunity for the people to air their
views periodically. Hence, elections are held after a stipulated period.
Unless the outgoing government holds election during the pendency of its
term of office, there will necessarily be a gap between dissolution of
Parliament and the sitting of a new Parliament. Any party in power will
always wield its might. In the context of our political rivalry, we cannot
seriously expect the party in power to abstain from exerting unfair
influence during elections. Hence, no fair election can be held while any
particular party is still in power. Therefore, there is obvious need for a
neutral interim Government. Mr. Huqs suggestion to allow the non-party
Care-Taker Government to hold elections is fraught with the same dangers
as existed under the Care-Taker Government resulting from the Thirteenth
Amendment. What is necessary, with respect, is to totally do away with the
notion that the Care-Taker Government is formed to hold elections. A
careful reading of the Thirteenth Amendment would expose the fact that
the Care-Taker Government is meant only for day to day Government of
the country and has no express or implied power to act in relation to the
elections, but only to aid and assist the Election Commission. With the
745
realisation that the Care-Taker Government or the Chief Adviser of the
Care-Taker Government has no power or function with regard to the
elections, the need for manipulations and adjustments for that post will be
obviated. In such a situation no aspersions would be cast on the person
appointed as the Chief of the neutral interim Government. As for
appointment of the head of the interim Government, the suggestion to have
the last three Chief Justices to select the Chief Adviser, is likely to lead to
similar calculative manipulations as in the past. A better solution might be
to allow the political parties to suggest five names, excepting ones which
have held post in any political party; and any name found common be
chosen to head the interim Government.
At this juncture, I would also suggest that the choice of the words
Care-Taker Government gives the impression of a helpless situation,
which may have been apt at the relevant time in 1996 when we needed the
care. However, the term neutral interim Government would appear to
be apposite for the period in between dissolution of one Parliament, to be
replaced by another.
Finally, I would venture to say that in a democratic society no law
can be inscribed in stone. Society does not exist in solid state nor in inertia
and cannot be expected to go into stagnation. The need for change arises
every day in one form or another. Ours is a fragile democracy and the
interim period between the dissolution of Parliament and the sitting of the
next Parliament is the Achilles heel of that system. In 1996 there was
clearly the need for a solution to a political quagmire. The people needed a
way out, which they found in the form of the Non-Party Care-Taker
746
Government. The system worked to a great extent for two terms. For
reasons which are alluded to above, the system became unworkable. Again,
the people must be allowed to decide the solution to the problem. That can
only be done through dialogue in Parliament by their elected
representatives. The suggestions made above are mere suggestions. The
Supreme Court or the Judges do not make law and it is not their mandate to
do so. The Supreme Court has the authority given by the Constitution to
declare any law to be ultra vires the Constitution. The Court may travel to
the extent of recommending that Parliament should consider enacting a
particular legal provision to cater for a given problem which has been
brought to its notice, but that does not extend to law-making power.
In conclusion, I find that the Thirteenth Amendment was neither
illegal nor ultra vires the Constitution and does not destroy any basic
structures of the Constitution. The Republican and Democratic character of
the Constitution was no more infringed after the Thirteenth Amendment
than it had been before the Non-Party Care-Taker Government system was
introduced. However, the system has become unworkable due to the
improper exercise of power of the President under Articles 58 C(3), (4), (5)
and (6), which led to the unnatural and unconstitutional state of affairs in
2007. In order to avoid recurrence of such a situation, the mode of setting
up of the interim Government, by whatever name it may be called, is to be
replaced by another system. It is fully within the power of the people to
change the system which will serve them and sustain their democratic
rights. It has to be borne in mind and that no system can ever be foolproof.
Nevertheless, whatever new system is introduced, it will have to be
acceptable to the people for it to have durability. As discussed above, the
747
people make their will known by exercising their democratic right through
their elected representatives in Parliament.
With the above observations, the appeal is disposed of, without
however, any order as to costs.

J.

Order of the Court

1. By majority judgment, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment and order of the High Court Division is set-aside.
2. The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act,1996 (Act 1 of
1996), is ultra vires the Constitution and hereby declared
void prospectively.
3. The Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.596 of 2005 is
accordingly disposed of.
4. The Government is hereby directed to pay honorarium of
Tk.20,000/- to each of the Junior Advocates of the learned
amici curiae.
5. There shall be no order as to costs.

C.J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
J.

The 10
th
May,2011.
/Rezaul/B.R.
/Approved for Reporting/