A handful of overmighty subjects exercised a disproportionate influence on the events of the wars of the roses. Successful overmighty subjects were also idols of the multitude. The wars were a series of factional struggles and civil wars between roughly 1450 and 1500.
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156383277 Michael Hicks Bastard Feudalism Overmighty Subjects and Idols of the Multitude During the Wars of the Roses
A handful of overmighty subjects exercised a disproportionate influence on the events of the wars of the roses. Successful overmighty subjects were also idols of the multitude. The wars were a series of factional struggles and civil wars between roughly 1450 and 1500.
A handful of overmighty subjects exercised a disproportionate influence on the events of the wars of the roses. Successful overmighty subjects were also idols of the multitude. The wars were a series of factional struggles and civil wars between roughly 1450 and 1500.
Bastard Feudalism, Overmighty Subjects and Idols of the Multitude during the Wars of the Roses MICHAEL HICKS King Alfreds College, Winchester Abstract A handful of overmighty subjects exercised a disproportionate inuence on the events of the Wars of the Roses. This article considers how and why. Circumstances were certainly propitious. Not only did the greatest noblemen command exceptional resources of their own, albeit always less than the king, but they deployed the principal military commands against the crown and sought to enlist the populace on their side. Successful overmighty subjects were also idols of the multitude. Generally they failed and almost all died viol- ently. Their misfortunes, a recovery of royal power and the disappearance of the desire to disturb the realm all help to explain the demise of their type. T he Wars of the Roses is the label applied by historians to a series of factional struggles and civil wars between roughly 1450 and 1500. Over so long a period the personnel and issues changed. The wars were not a succession of rounds fought between Lancaster and York, the red and white roses, on issues of dynastic principle. What the wars denitely did have in common was the capacity of leading subjects to threaten and even dethrone the incumbent monarch. English kings were successfully deposed ve times. There were many other serious attempts. Contemporaries such as the Crowland Continuator attributed much of the responsibility to a series of overmighty subjects and idols of the multitude. Chief Justice Fortescue, the foremost political theorist of his day, discussed the topic on several occasions. Doubting the public spirit of the magnates, Fortescue sought to exclude them from government by constitutional means. A section of his Governance of England on the perils that mowe falle to a king by ovur mighti subgiettes explains how noblemen with more resources than a king aspired to thastate of a prince and found it more fesable to rebel, since the peopul will go with hym The Historical Association 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. This article has beneted from comments made at the Conference on Lordship and Clientage in England and France at York University in 1996 and at the Cambridge University Graduate Medieval Seminar in 1997 and from the advice of the anonymous referees of this journal. MICHAEL HICKS 387 The Historical Association 2000 hat beste may sustene and rewarde hem. It was essential that the kynges lyveloode, above such revenues as shulne be assigned for his ordinari charges, biene gretter thanne the lyveloode of the grettest lorde in Englonde, but such was not the case: some indeed were double so mighti as theire olde prince. There was no gretter perile for a prince thanne tahave a subgiet equilopolente to hym selfe. 1 Though a minority view in his own day, Fortescues arguments appealed strongly to such Victorian constitutional historians as James Gairdner, Charles Plummer, Bishop Stubbs and William Denton, who attributed much of the blame to the great nobility and their enormous retinues, and to their twentieth-century successors. 2 Such arguments were summarily dismissed by K. B. McFarlane in his 1964 Raleigh lecture to the British Academy. Only undermighty kings had anything to fear from overmighty subjects, he proclaimed. And if he [the king] were undermighty, his personal lack of tness was the cause, not the weakness of his ofce and its resources. 3 Though the causes of royal undermightiness have been much explored and even disputed, 4 McFarlanes downgrading of the signicance of the magnates has been generally accepted. This article contends that there were indeed over- mighty subjects during the Wars of the Roses. It seeks also to explain how and why. This article does not explain why the Wars of the Roses happened or why they lasted so long. The circumstances that enabled overmighty subjects to ourish are obviously relevant, however. One factor was the weakness of contemporary kings. That four kings were dislodged, one twice, was not because they were all decient in character, but was at- tributable in part to international, nancial and dynastic weaknesses. After a period of anomalous ascendancy, England was again a minor player on the international stage. England suffered more than a dozen invasions across the sea and the Scottish borders, usually backed by foreign powers, and those invasions of 1460, 1470, 1471 and 1485 were successful. Royal revenues diminished to about half those of Richard II or Henry V. Ordinary expenses remained. All the monarchs lacked the spare resources to throw against external threats and to maintain the armies and eets necessary to deter, prevent or defeat invasions. Finally, kings could not count on their subjects against invasions and rebellions. Calls for government reform, at their strongest before 1461, were sup- plemented thereafter and ultimately supplanted by rival dynastic claims. 1 Crowland Chronicle Continuations 14591486, ed. Nicholas Pronay and John Cox (1986) [here- after Crowland Continuations], p. 147; The Politics of Fifteenth-century England: John Vales Book, ed. M. Lucille Kekewich et al. (Stroud, 1995) [hereafter Vales Book], pp. 2357. 2 Michael Hicks, Richard III and his Rivals: Magnates and their Motives during the Wars of the Roses (1991), pp. 35. This view culminated in Robin L. Storeys massively documented End of the House of Lancaster (1966). 3 K. B. McFarlane, The Wars of the Roses, England in the Fifteenth Century (1981), pp. 2389. 4 See, for example, A. J. Gross, K. B. McFarlane and the Determinists: The Fallibilities of the English Kings, c.1399c.1520, The McFarlane Legacy: Studies in Late Medieval Politics and Society, ed. R. H. Britnell and A. J. Pollard (Stroud, 1995) [hereafter McFarlane Legacy], ch. 3. 388 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 All the kings after 1461 were usurpers of doubtful legitimacy whose authority was suspect in the face of rival titles. 5 It was difcult to guard against external invasions that could fall (and did) anywhere around the coastline of England and Wales or against dynastically unreliable sub- jects whose identity and geographical concentrations were uncertain or concealed. Such issues form the context within which overmighty subjects operated and which permitted them to ourish. This article concentrates on a succession of magnates (great noblemen) as listed below: 145061: Richard, duke of York (ex. 1460); his heir Edward, earl of March and duke of York who succeeded as King Edward IV (1461 83); and the two Neville earls, Richard, earl of Salisbury (k. 1460) and his son Richard, earl of Warwick (k. 1471), the kingmaker. 146971: Warwick and his son-in-law, Edward IVs brother, George, duke of Clarence (ex. 1478). 147183: Clarence; his brother Richard, duke of Gloucester, later Richard III (14835); and Henry Stafford, duke of Buckingham (ex. 1483). 14835: Thomas Lord Stanley, later earl of Derby (d. 1504), and Sir William Stanley (ex. 1495). 14851509: The De La Poles, the brothers John, earl of Lincoln (k. 1487) and Edmund, earl of Suffolk (ex. 1513). Not all of these noblemen possessed all the criteria outlined below, certainly not the De La Poles, and not all can be regarded as successful examples of their type. Endeavour rather than success is the necessary criterion for selection. Opposition to the crown, a willingness to disturb the realm and a track record for doing so are all essential qualications. There were at all times other magnates with the power to upset the realm who lacked the desire to do so and who featured rather as lions under the throne. Some obvious examples are Humphrey, duke of Buckingham (k. 1460), John Howard, duke of Norfolk (k. 1485), and after 1485 Thomas, earl of Derby, Jasper Tudor, duke of Bedford (d. 1495) and Thomas Howard, earl of Surrey (later duke of Norfolk, d. 1524). William, duke of Suffolk (k. 1450) and William Lord Hastings (ex. 1483) carried little weight apart from the court. All these leading gures are speci- cally excluded from this study. The overmighty subject is a phenomenon that does not begin or end with the Wars of the Roses. Fortescue himself identied Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester (d. 1265) as an earlier instance. 6 Thomas of Lancaster (ex. 1322) and Roger Mortimer, earl of March (d. 1330) were perhaps the most conspicuous examples before the term came into vogue. John Dudley, duke of Northumberland (ex. 1554), lord protector to Edward VI and kingmaker to Lady Jane Grey, is a later instance. The 5 As pointed out by Dr Helen Castor. 6 Vales Book, p. 236. MICHAEL HICKS 389 The Historical Association 2000 conditions of the Wars of the Roses were especially propitious for the activities of overmighty subjects. I The Wars of the Roses were fought between kings and the heads of the greatest noble houses, the magnates. How did the latter raise their armies? The traditional answer is through bastard feudalism: through those men bound to them by ties of service whom they deployed upon the battleeld. The nobility were able to raise whole armies through combining the reti- nues that every nobleman possessed. Retinues combined the members of the noble household, the tenants of their lands, members of the gentry or extraordinary retainers, accompanied by their own households and ten- ants; and, perhaps for hostilities only, others (who could be numerous) identied only by a lords livery and badges. Existing chains of command, within the household, on the estate, through the sub-retinues of extra- ordinary retainers, enabled them to be mustered quickly and deployed in battle. Bastard feudalism has been dened as the set of relationships with their social inferiors that provided the English aristocracy with the man- power they required. 7 It is thus a label applied to a series of mechanisms. The same mechanisms modied or different mechanisms delivered man- power at other times. In this period the male members of the household were bound to their lords by particularly intimate ties and may indeed have been recruited for their military potential. For the tenants, who made up the bulk of the rank and le, obedience may have counted for more than loyalty and could commonly be assumed. The extraordinary retainers were commonly gentry, aristocratic landlords, lords and heads of house- hold on a smaller scale and men of local standing, who were retained by private contracts such as indentures, beneted from fees and good lord- ship, and who were expected to bring their own dependants with them whether in peace or war. A lord always had his household with him: a great lord such as Clarence might recruit it from all over his far-ung estates. 8 Tenants and estate ofcials, however, were distinctly local re- sources. It is not particularly difcult to plot on maps the location of estates and thus of the retinues of many lords, as Chris Given-Wilson has done; 9 contemporaries were clear about the local roots of particular lords and their spheres of inuence. Extraordinary retainers might reinforce a noblemans power in his area of strength, such as Warwick on the west March in the early 1460s, 10 though a noblemans natural ascendancy could 7 Michael Hicks, Bastard Feudalism (1995) [hereafter Hicks, Bastard Feudalism], p. 1. For what follows, see ibid., pp. 4368. 8 Michael Hicks, False, Fleeting, Perjurd Clarence: George Duke of Clarence 144978 (rev. edn., Bangor, 1992) [hereafter Hicks, Clarence], pp. 1689. 9 Chris Given-Wilson, English Nobility in the Late Middle Ages (1987), pp. xiixxii. 10 Michael Hicks, Warwick the Kingmaker (Oxford, 1998) [hereafter Hicks, Warwick], pp. 237, 241. 390 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 ensure dominance and dependence without such formal ties. Alternatively, they could extend a lords authority into areas beyond his own estates where otherwise he was weak. All aristocrats nobility, gentry and indeed the king engaged in bastard feudal relationships, some both as lords and men, and enjoyed these resources to widely varying degrees. Bastard feudalism was power. England was a mixed monarchy in which power was shared between crown and aristocracy. Undoubtedly the nobility, and still more obviously the nobility and gentry together, commanded far more manpower than the king. Admittedly the household and estates of the king were larger than those of any individual, but he could not maintain direct personal links with all his servants and tenants, who often indeed had other stronger associations in the shires, and inevitably his dependants were widely dis- persed rather than conveniently concentrated. His moral authority as king to everyone gave him a prime claim to everyones allegiance: theoretically everybodys retainers were his own. This was his strongest card in pre- venting and defusing rebellion; sufcing for Henry VI at Ludford in 1459, though less effective in this era than before and after. In practice, the nobility and gentry did not ever combine all their resources against the crown. The only occasions when almost everyone appeared on the same side, as in 1459 and 1470, was in support of a king who had apparently won. Even the greatest of English magnates could not compare with the great feudatories of contemporary France such as the dukes of Brittany and Bourbon or of other federal states where the nobility actually ruled whole provinces. The incomes of even the richest of English magnates, York, Warwick or Buckingham, were only a fraction of those of any king. A king should therefore have been able to cope easily with any of them without recourse to his moral authority. It was therefore in alliances, as factions, that recalcitrant nobles made their power count. Substantial numbers of noblemen were involved in most of the set-piece battles, though it was not always the largest army that won. Kings regnant were defeated by forces containing fewer peers at the rst battle of St Albans (1455), Northampton (1460), Towton (1461) and Bosworth (1485). But the wars were not merely or perhaps even pre- dominantly about pitched battles. There were three other more common scenarios where the moral supremacy of the king could be overcome by force: by exploiting surprise, by coercive petitioning and by passive re- sistance. In each case kings could be placed at a disadvantage vis--vis their subjects or reduced to equal terms. To negotiate, as Edward IV complained, was to disturb the proper relationship between the king who commanded and condescended and the subject who should obey, solicit and supplicate. Not to bend, however, was to precipitate further conict and bloodshed. It was only in the last quarter of his reign, after the destruction of Clarence, that Edward was able to confront his greatest subjects and challenge them to their faces. 11 11 Crowland Continuations, p. 147. MICHAEL HICKS 391 The Historical Association 2000 Bastard feudalism had a role in every scenario. Manpower was needed for the eld of battle, for ambushes and stratagems, for forceful petition- ing and passive resistance. Bastard feudal mechanisms, exploited skilfully, could deliver manpower in varying numbers and equipped for different tasks quickly, secretly and efciently. Yet they could not be taken for granted, as Henry Vernon demonstrated in 1471 when both Warwick and Clarence were disappointed in support that they had taken for granted. 12 Buckingham suffered the same experience in 1483: the Staffords were unpopular with their Welsh tenants and at odds with the Vaughans of Tretower. 13 Competence mattered too. All Yorks advantages proved to no avail when ambushed at Wakeeld in 1460. Of course, bastard feudalism was not the sole source of men. As Anthony Goodman has shown, corporate towns supplied contingents for the main campaigns, small in number both individually and in sum total, but well organized and well equipped. There were also the much more numerous shire levies raised by commissions of array. 14 In theory they were available only to existing authorities, the government of the day, to which they constituted a massive resource, though one that was relatively slow to deploy. They were more useful for defence than for attack. Such commissions were also important in turning out bastard feudal retinues of almost every type. Commissions of array gave royal support to the levy of troops. They gave a legality and a legitimacy to such levies and ensured that they were compatible with a retainers primary allegiance to the crown: a theoretical and legal priority that was often a reality. But not always. In 1460, 1470 and 1471 noblemen led such levies into the oppos- ing camp. It was in shrewd distrust of Warwicks real motives that his west midlanders declined to muster in the spring of 1470. 15 One of the principal obstacles for even the overmightiest of subjects was to reassure his retainers and shire levies of his loyalty. Without such reassurance, they could not be successfully recruited nor safely employed, with potentially fatal consequences. II The various scenarios did not depend for effectiveness on the deployment of all or even large sections of the nobility. The same result could be achieved by individuals or small groups of nobles who were able to con- centrate overwhelming force in particular places or at particular times. Bastard feudal lords were not all equal. The income tax returns of 1436 reveal a steep pyramid from a horde of minor gentlemen on around 12 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Duke of Rutland (1888) [hereafter HMC Rutland], i. 4. 13 Carole Rawcliffe, The Staffords, Earls of Stafford and Dukes of Buckingham 13941521 (Cam- bridge, 1978) [hereafter Rawcliffe, Staffords], pp. 334. 14 Anthony Goodman, Wars of the Roses (1981), pp. 2023. 15 Ibid., p. 140; Chronicle of the Rebellion in Lincolnshire, 1470, ed. John G. Nichols, Camden Miscellany (1847) [hereafter Chron. Lincolnshire], i. 11. 392 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 10 a year, through the wealthiest gentry and poorest barons on a few hundred pounds a year to the richer earls on anything between 1,200 and 2,500 and the greatest magnates far above that level. At his peak Richard, duke of York may have enjoyed 5,800 net from his lands, his brother-in-law Humphrey, duke of Buckingham 5,020, and Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick 4,400. Of the two Nevilles, Salisbury and his mother were assessed at 1,903 in 1436 but were actually worth much more, and Warwick, ultimately, may have been in receipt of 12,000, much of it from other sources. Clarences income has been estimated at 3,400 in 1467, 6,000 in 1473, and 4,500 in 1478. 16 Probably his brother Gloucester had rather more. Though of the same class, the magnates were several times wealthier than their greatest peers and several hundredfold more than the parish gentry. York could outspend half a dozen earls or a dozen barons. The different ranks were expected to live in the style appropriate to their station. This meant that the bottom levels of each rank spent their whole income maintaining their status: manning households, buying attire, keeping horses, offering hospitality, equipping chapels, collecting jewels, and resourcing retainers to the numbers and quality commen- surate with their status. To be a poor duke like Henry Holland, duke of Exeter, 17 a poor earl or a poor baron was to be under constant nancial strain with little to spare for other things. John, duke of Suffolk, as poor as dukes could be, did not attend the parliament of 1471 because he could not procure an escort or household splendid enough. 18 The De La Poles indeed were never overmighty in bastard feudal terms. A York, Warwick the kingmaker or Clarence could afford more of everything. York owned a jewelled collar worth 4,000 marks (2,666 13s 4d), twice the endow- ment of a duke, and paid fees of 900, more than the qualifying income for an earl. Buckinghams household in 1444 cost him 2,200 and Clarences riding household of 188 alone was three times as numerous as that of Lord Grey of Ruthin or that of Lord Howard in 1467. 19 That the smaller resources of a lesser peer were so largely committed and that the magnates had much more free for disposal exaggerated the differences between their incomes. Their spending power and credit far exceeded even that of their immediate inferiors. To take Warwick the kingmaker as an example, we know of substan- tial retinues that he brought from the west midlands and south Wales to 16 Hicks, Warwick, pp. 19, 227; Hicks, Clarence, pp. 2, 164. 17 Michael Stanseld, John Holland, Duke of Exeter and Earl of Huntingdon (d. 1447) and the Costs of the Hundred Years War, Prot, Piety and the Professions in Later Medieval England, ed. Michael Hicks (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 105, 111, 115; T. Brynmor Pugh, Richard Duke of York and the Rebellion of Henry, Duke of Exeter, in May 1454, Historical Research [hereafter HR], lxiii (1990), 24951; Simon J. Payling, The Ampthill Dispute: A Study in Aristocratic Lawlessness and in the Breakdown of Lancastrian Government, English Historical Review, civ (1989), 8834. 18 Stonor Letters and Papers 12901483, ed. Charles L. Kingsford (Camden Society, 3rd series, xxix, xxx, 1919) [hereafter Stonor Letters], i. 117. 19 Hicks, Clarence, pp. 2, 169; Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, pp. 45, 47. MICHAEL HICKS 393 The Historical Association 2000 the Leicester parliament and against Cade in 1450, against York in 1452, to the PercyNeville feud in Yorkshire in 1453, to parliament early in 1454, and to the rst battle of St Albans in 1455. In 1483 John Rous observed of Henry, duke of Buckingham that so many men had not worn the same badge since Richard Neville, earl of Warwick. Warwicks badge of the bear and ragged staff was reportedly everywhere in London and Calais in 14701. Warwicks household was just as impressive. The which Erle, we are told, was evyr hadd in Grete ffavour of the commonys of this lond. By Reson of the excedyng howsold which he dayly kepid In alle Cuntrees where evyr he sojournyd or laye. His retinue was remark- able: After that the Erle of warwyke toke to hyme in fee as many knyghtys, squyers, and gentylmenne as he might, to be strong. Warwick in short was retaining additional gentry in the late 1460s for political purposes, just as earlier, in 14612, he was recruiting northerners at out to ght the Lancastrians and Scots in the west March. His estate records have largely disappeared, but his accounts for Warwick in 14512 reveal several new appointments and annuities; so do those for Middleham in 14656. And he maintained, besides, his own train of ordnance and his own squadron of ships, second among contemporary Englishmen only to that of the fabled Bristolian William Canynges. 20 Warwick was not alone. Following the battle of Heworth in 1453, 710 retainers and tenants of the Percies were indicted: their conquerors, the Nevilles, did not have less. Clarence carried 4,000 men across to Edward IV in 1471. Their father York was recruiting more gentry by indenture in September 1460 to assist his bid for the crown. Buckingham took on new men in 1483, including those of the executed Lord Hastings. 21 Such magnates commanded much greater resources than ordinary earls and dukes like the De La Poles. By choosing the right moment, they could make them count for even more. Though the Stanleys dominated Lan- cashire and Cheshire, they were notorious for their careful decisions: they did not act in 1459 and 1470 when circumstances appeared unpromising and it was only their carefully disguised casting vote in 1485 that dem- onstrated an overmightiness that was not to be repeated. In practice, of course, it was almost impossible to deploy all ones resources. As they derived from lands, and lands derived from the accidents of inheritance, they were too widespread. York was the greatest magnate in Wales and Ireland and had signicant estates in East Anglia, Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire, and south Yorkshire. Warwicks principal concentrations were in Cumberland and the west riding, the west midlands, south Wales, and central southern England, other manors being scattered thinly across 20 Hicks, Warwick, pp. 4450, 812, 89, 93, 11516, 227, 237, 2501, 265, 304; John Warkworth, Chronicle of the First Thirteen Years of King Edward IV, ed. John O. Halliwell (Camden Society, 1839), vi. 34. 21 Historie of the Arrivall of Edward IV in England and the Finall Recouerye of his kingdome from Henry VI, ed. J. Bruce (Camden Society, i, 1838) [hereafter The Arrivall ], p. 11; Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War, ed. Michael C. E. Jones and Simon K. Walker, Camden Miscel- lany, xxx (Camden Society, 5th series, 1994), iii. 1645; Stonor Letters, ii. 161. 394 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 almost every other county. Initially basing himself at Tutbury in Stafford- shire, Clarence came to commute from Warwick via Tewkesbury to Tiverton in Devon. 22 The Yorkists had to manage without their northern retainers in 14601 and Warwick failed to join up with his Kentish sup- porters in 1471. Almost all overmighty subjects, however, had another advantage over other noblemen that set them apart. They were massively subsidized by the crown. All noblemen sought royal patronage to enhance their status, reputa- tions, incomes and/or inheritances. These ranged from the great honorary ofces, such as steward or great chamberlain of England, through min- isterial posts such as lord treasurer and posts at court to military com- mands, custodies of estates and estate ofces. Most if not all noblemen at some time were constables of royal castles and stewards of royal estates that enabled them to exercise royal authority and patronage in the locality and brought in small but not insignicant accretions to their incomes. The political value of Yorks constableships in south Wales far exceeded the fees of 40 with which he was compensated with an annuity in 1457. 23 Such ofces could be sinecures. More important and long-lived magnates could amass a portfolio of such ofces. No previous magnate had ever enjoyed such a massive grant of ofces in Wales as Henry, duke of Buckingham in 1483. He was appointed chief justice and chamberlain of north and south Wales and constable and steward of every castle and lordship of the crown and duchy of Lancaster. The fees alone ran to hundreds of pounds. 24 Wales was still governed as a border region in which marcher lords and their ofcers enjoyed exceptional powers. Buckingham alone was to replace the council of Wales. He would have appointed deputies who owed their advancement to himself and would have governed through them. He had little time to make his possession into a reality. Of his two predecessors, William, earl of Pembroke led a Welsh force to disastrous defeat at Edgecote in 1469 and Anthony, earl Rivers was restricted to 2,000 men as escort for the young Edward V in 1483. Far more signicant were the roles of the Nevilles, Percies and Gloucester as wardens of the marches towards Scotland. As the kings represen- tatives they too were entitled to the obedience of the kings subjects in the borders, whom on occasion they committed to domestic politics, and exercised marcher law over them. These ofces were sources of prestige and essential components in their regional hegemonies. Wardens were entitled to substantial pay from the crown even in peacetime which they sought to maximize. From a nadir of 983 in 1443 still one and a half times the income of an earl the Nevilles managed to increase their peacetime pay as wardens in the west to 1,250 by 1455, as much as 22 Hicks, Clarence, pp. 15, 168, 179. 23 Calendar of the Patent Rolls, 145261 [hereafter CPR], pp. 245, 340. 24 CPR, 147685, pp. 34950, 361; Robert Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster (1953), i. 6402, 648; Rawcliffe, Staffords, p. 31. MICHAEL HICKS 395 The Historical Association 2000 Salisburys net income from land in 1436. This was also Gloucesters rate. Unlike their Percy rivals, the Nevilles had particular revenues appropri- ated for their salaries and ensured that they were paid. Henry VI and Edward IV gave priority to funding the armaments that were subsequently used against them. The wardens paid their lieutenants only one-third to deputize. 25 To be fair, we cannot properly study their budgets, and any balance received into their coffers could have been counter-acted by building works at Carlisle and other castles and the high level of fees on their estates. Warwick would certainly have lived poorly since only 75 per cent of income remained to cover all other expenses after payment of fees! 26 Wardens were expected to recruit their own forces; indeed in 1468 the wardens were explicitly exempted from new legislation on retaining. 27 They drew recruits almost exclusively from the north, from Durham and Yorkshire as well as the borders, which enabled them to patronize and dominate well beyond the strict bounds of their military commands. In time of war, the sums were doubled: there were wars with Scotland when the enhanced sums were due in 14614 and 14803, but there were also obviously extra costs, not least the feeing of a gunner and other retainers. Warwicks brother John, earl of Northumberland was being paid 6,000 a year in 1464. 28 At such times the wardens were more likely to reside in person and take command. Salisburys northerners were brought south to ght at St Albans and were marched across the mid- lands to Blore Heath, where they defeated the royal army of Lords Audley and Dudley, and the rout at Ludford. Warwick, who had been lieutenant of the north in the early 1460s, raised the men of Richmondshire for the Edgecote campaign in 1469, tried again in March 1470 and succeeded in August; a local contingent was at Barnet on 14 April and Richmondshire and Carlisle were in arms again later in 1471. 29 Warwicks son-in-law Gloucester also beneted from a near-monopoly of ofcial authority, a substantial subsidy and the advantage of being the obvious avenue of royal patronage to build up his power in the north and arrogate to him- self lordship over the northern peerage even including the earls. He too was lieutenant of the north. In 1483 parliament granted him the heredi- tary wardenship of the west March and palatine authority in Cumberland and as much of Scotland as he could conquer. His northern army over- awed court and capital in June 1483. 30 It was the connections that he had 25 Robin L. Storey, Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland 13771489, EHR, lxxxiii (1957) [hereafter Storey, Wardens], 6057; idem, The End of the House of Lancaster (2nd edn., Gloucester, 1986), pp. 11617. 26 Anthony J. Pollard, The Northern Retainers of Richard Nevill, Earl of Salisbury, Northern History, xi (1976), 645. 27 Michael Hicks, The 1468 Statute of Livery, HR, lxiv (1991), 21. 28 Storey, Wardens, 615n. 29 Anthony J. Pollard, Lord FitzHughs Rising in 1470, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, li (1979), 1705; HMC Rutland, i. 4; Hicks, Warwick, pp. 116, 163, 2767, 285, 295; The Arrivall, i. 312; Chron. Lincolnshire, 16; CPR, 14617, pp. 21416, 277. 30 Michael Hicks, Richard III: The Man Behind the Myth (1991) [ hereafter Hicks, Richard III ], pp. 536, 5962, 73. 396 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 forged as gurehead of Richard IIIs council of the north that John, earl of Lincoln sought to mobilize for the Stoke campaign in 1487. Support- ing such military commands was nancially burdensome for kings as well as politically dangerous. To some extent Edward IV and Richard III, and more systematically Henry VII, sought to make the borders self- supporting and to squeeze the prots out of the posts. Warwick was also captain of Calais from 1455, keeper of the seas from 1457, and warden of the Cinque Ports and constable of Dover from 1460. Together these constituted a constellation of military and maritime ofces that made him particularly powerful in the south-east, in Kent and Sussex which provisioned Calais, and also in the west country which appears to have furnished much of the shipping. Almost all the crowns customs revenues were appropriated to him to defend the seas and Calais. He was contracted to raise ships and seamen and to enlist a personal crew (bodyguard) 300 strong at royal expense. 31 We know about his ships and their masters. 32 What little we know about the chief ofcers of Calais, recipients of protections and those pardoned in 1471 suggests that around a core of longstanding retainers (Worsley, Gate) Warwick recruited on a national basis. Apart from a handful of residents of Calais (Whetehill) and others who were French (Duras, Galet), we know of Otters and Colts from Yorkshire, Blounts from Derbyshire, Wrottesleys from Staffordshire, and a Courtenay of Powderham from Devon. 33 Though regrettably poorly documented, the Calais garrison was probably the most valuable patron- age available to any contemporary nobleman and brought service and loyalty to its captain personally at the same time as diminishing resources available to the crown. Apart from his substantial salary from Calais, Warwick surely retained a margin from the 3,000 he enjoyed as keeper of the seas, and from the perquisites and 300 that he drew as warden and constable. Unfortunately, we cannot know how he spent them. 34 Most of this money was actually paid; not only was Warwick reimbursed, unlike his immediate predecessors as captain of Calais, he also received the rst instalment of 1,742 in advance. 35 His credit even in exile was sufcient for him to borrow 3,580 from the staplers. 36 Such authority had been available to previous holders of these ofces, but they had not held them in combination, had seldom resided, had usually regarded them as sinecures to be exercised by deputy, and had suffered from non-payment that had provoked repeated mutinies.York had never secured admittance to Calais at all. The enormous arrears of pay (58,000) were paid off before Warwick took up ofce and the 31 Hicks, Warwick, pp. 13848. 32 Ibid., pp. 2501. 33 Ibid., pp. 248, 252; CPR, 146777, pp. 2902. 34 CPR, 14617, p. 45; Hicks, Warwick, p. 141; Gerald L. Harriss, The Struggle for Calais: An Aspect of the Rivalry of Lancaster and York, EHR, lxxv (1960), 45. 35 Hicks, Warwick, p. 141. 36 Michael K. Jones, Edward IV, the Earl of Warwick, and the Yorkist Claim to the Throne, HR, lxx (1997), 34252, esp. 3512. MICHAEL HICKS 397 The Historical Association 2000 customs were appropriated for future wages which, though quickly in arrears, were blamed on the government and not the captain. The earl resided almost continually at Calais from 1457 to 1460 and visited frequently thereafter, when he remained closely interested through his deputies and diplomats. The earls attacks on foreign shipping brought action and prots to the garrison, mariners and Kentish suppliers and earned himpopularity in maritime and mercantile circles throughout London and the south-east. Warwick was thus the most powerful magnate for many years in south- eastern England. King Henry found it impossible to dismiss him. 37 Warwick was also unique in that he applied such forces to English politics. He brought a substantial escort of 600 to the Loveday of St Pauls in 1458 and invaded England from Calais in 1459, 1460 and 1469. He was received and joined by the Kentishmen and admitted by the Lon- doners on each occasion. Exiled in 1459, Warwick returned to Calais and made it into his base and his springboard for invasion. Though some would not support him against his allegiance, deserting him at Ludford and holding the castle of Guines for the king, most of the garrison backed him and lynched former colleagues who fell into their hands. Besides Calais, Warwick had his eet, which enabled him to deny supplies and reinforcements to Guines. It carried him to Ireland, forced the lord admiral to avoid battle, twice raided Sandwich to the destruction of the kings expeditionary forces, and nally conveyed him to England. When history repeated itself in 1470, the exiled Warwick was unable to secure entrance to Calais, but the bastard of Fauconberg carried his ships across to the earl. It was these ships that gave Warwick mobility, independence and initiative, that won him publicity and discounted the supposition that he was nished, promoted the rupture between France and Burgundy that made his return to England possible, and nally conveyed his army to their bridgehead. In 1471 Calais was to be the earls base for a war of aggression against Burgundy. 38 The men of Calais and Kent joined Fauconbergs Kentish rising against Edward IV in the aftermath of Warwicks death. 39 Richard, duke of York illustrates some of the same points. His appoint- ments as lieutenants of France and Ireland and captain of Calais brought him prestige and political credibility. Nominally they brought him sub- stantial incomes 2,000 from Ireland which were seldom paid: failing payment, in 1450 he threatened to lay down ofce, and the enormous debts that he accrued, which caused him considerable embarrassment, were attributable at least in part to expenditure that the crown could not refund. 40 Residence in Ireland, where he made both friends and enemies, 37 Hicks, Warwick, pp. 1545. 38 Ibid., pp. 133, 1623, 177, 2767; Hicks, Clarence, p. 35. 39 The Arrivall, pp. 339. 40 T. Brynmor Pugh, Richard Plantagenet (141160), Duke of York, as the Kings Lieutenant in France and Ireland, Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society, ed. John G. Rowe (Toronto, 1986), pp. 1256; Paul A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York 141160 (Oxford, 1988) [hereafter Johnson, York], pp. 5464, 6970. 398 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 brought him a reputation and a following there that was to stand him in good stead. In 1450 he was to re-enter England in deance of royal wishes and take command of the reformers. In 1459 he ed to Ireland, turned his nominal lieutenancy into real political control and made Ireland into the base for his return. The Irish parliament accepted him. He executed his principal rival, received Warwick and planned his conquest of England, and duly returned unmolested to the mainland when victory was won. 41 His second son Clarence, also lieutenant but non-resident, considered exploiting his fathers popularity by eeing to Ireland in 1470, but decided against it. Yorks supposed grandson and Clarences supposed son, Lam- bert Simnel, was accepted at his own valuation in Ireland. It was from there with an Irish force that he launched his ill-fated Stoke campaign. Yet Yorks most important royal ofces were his three protectorates of England: in 14545, the creation of parliament during Henry VIs insanity; briey in 14556, again the creation of parliament; and in 1460 under the Act of Accord that assured him the throne after Henry VIs death and rule during his life. The ofce of lord protector was not a regency, but was supposedly limited to leadership in defence and of the council which York certainly took on. Moreover, the protectorate enabled York to secure preference at the exchequer and to bestow ofce on him- self and his allies. He was licensed to recruit retainers at public expense. Royal authority was used to still his opponents. He held judicial sessions supposedly in the interests of justice, but also to strike at his enemies: followers of the Percies were indicted for their feud with his Neville allies, and Thomas Lord Egremont was ned to his utter ruin. Parliament was induced to rehabilitate York and his co-conspirators of 1452 and to sanc- tion an ofcial version of the battle of St Albans that rehabilitated the Yorkists and placed the blame on their foes. A draconian act of resump- tion was intended to dispossess the queen, the kings half-brothers and their adherents. 42 Moreover, York was to be paid the rate for the job. In 14546 he was awarded 2,000 marks (1,333 6s 8d) a year. In 1460, when he was acknowledged additionally as heir apparent, the duke was to re- ceive 10,000 marks (6,666 13s 4d) and his elder sons 4,000 marks (2,666 13s 4d) and 1,000 marks (666 13s 4d) respectively. 43 The Act of Accord bestowed on him the moral high ground, made him into the ruler, gave him possession of the administration, capital and all the resources of the crown. Though insufcient to save York, they gave the initiative to his son, whom Queen Margaret tried and failed to dislodge, and made it possible for him to become king. Similarly, the protectorate placed Gloucester in control of resources and events. It enabled him to act as a king and to make himself king. Most overmighty subjects were not only the greatest of bastard feudal lords, but were also directly subsidized by the crown. It was as warden 41 Johnson, York, pp. 196201, 21011. 42 Ibid., pp. 133, 1414, 163, 1723; Hicks, Warwick, p. 125. 43 Rolls of Parliament, ed. J. Strachey et al. (6 vols., 1777) [hereafter Rolls of Parliament], v. 244. MICHAEL HICKS 399 The Historical Association 2000 of the west March in 1455, as captain of Calais and keeper of the seas in 1460, as kings lieutenants in the north, and as lords protector that Salisbury, Warwick, Gloucester, York and even Lincoln intervened so decisively in politics. Henry VI hesitated to destroy such great men and Edward IV dared not do so until after the fall of Clarence. York, War- wick, Simnel, Lincoln and Warbeck all used bases overseas beyond the kings reach from where their invasions could be launched; Clarence might have done the same. They were of interest to foreign powers that were prepared to back them. It was as protector of England and captor of the resources of the crown that York in 1460, his son in 1461, and Gloucester in 1483 sought to complete their revolutions. III The Wars of the Roses were not merely a contest in which the greatest bastard feudal lords overwhelmed hordes of their lesser neighbours. Edward IVs execution of his brother Clarence in 1478 was signicant, the Crowland Continuator records, because henceforth he could rule at his pleasure now that all those idols had been destroyed to whom the eyes of the common folk, ever eager for change, used to turn in times gone by. They regarded the earl of Warwick, the duke of Clarence and any other great man who withdrew from the royal circle as idols of this kind. 44 It is easy to see that the Continuator had in mind York in the 1450s and Warwick in the late 1460s, both of whom removed themselves or were excluded from court. York claimed to have been excluded from court and to be seeking only an audience with the king in 1450, 1452, 1455 and 1459; whether he was indeed exiled to Ireland remains unsub- stantiated and a matter of academic debate. Several times what was at issue was his inability to dominate rather than his exclusion. Warwicks breach with the court in the late 1460s culminated in similar claims in his manifesto of 1469. That the Continuator saw Clarence as the last does not mean that there were no more in future. Anyway his remark can apply only up to when he was writing, in 1486. It is perhaps surprising that he omitted the future Richard III and his henchman Buckingham, the old royall blode of this realme, who both courted public opinion and were allegedly rarely at court. 45 The case for the exclusion of Buckingham is strong: royal blood and a Wydeville wife had not secured him the ofces and inuence that he might have expected. So, too, is that for Lincoln, who lost the preferments and expectations that he had enjoyed under King Richard. Gloucesters supposed exclusion, however, may derive from the duke himself and deserves no credence. If Gloucester was absent in 44 Crowland Continuations, p. 147. 45 Dominic Mancini, Usurpation of Richard III, ed. C. A. John Armstrong (2nd edn., Gloucester, 1984) [hereafter Mancini, Usurpation], pp. 645; York House Books 146090, ed. Lorraine C. Attreed (2 vols., Stroud, 1991), p. 714. 400 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 the north, it was his own preference and on his own business and did not prevent his presence at parliament or at family rites of passage. 46 For bastard feudalism, royal subsidies and foreign intervention were not enough to make subjects overmighty. Warwicks victories in 1460 and 1471 were not built on bastard feudal power nor, in the latter case, on Calais and the Cinque Ports. When the Yorkists in 1459 and Warwick in 1471 relied purely on bastard feudal resources, they failed. In 1450 York was able to present himself as the spokesman of an almost univer- sal movement of parliamentary and popular unrest. When the Yorkists invaded from Calais in 1460, they were carried forward by a wave of popu- lar enthusiasm that swept them inexorably into the city and to their tri- umph at Northampton. When Warwick invaded in 1470, he was joined by an extraordinary mass of people whereas King Edward was left almost alone. Even Edwards victory in 1471, both in his ofcial verses and his ofcial history, was achieved against the odds, in the teeth of popular will, and was deservedly ascribed to Gods judgement. Even after Warwicks defeat and death, the bastard of Fauconberg was able to raise the Kentish towns and countryside against the king. On occasion the people turned out in overwhelming and potentially decisive numbers. 47 No wonder that overmighty subjects thought the people to be worth courting. York in 1450, Warwick in 1460, Edward IV in 1461,Warwick and Clarence in 146971, Gloucester and Buckingham in 1483, all ap- pealed successfully over the heads of kings and politicians for popular support. This could take the form of mass demonstrations and mass recruitment to armies, of reassurance and of the disarming of potential opposition. Usually it required professions of loyalty that were tendered in the most public and solemn manner, though from 1461 loyalty could be pledged to the dynastic rival of the current king. When such profes- sions were discredited, for York in 1460 and Gloucester in 1483, there was a dangerous loss of popular support. 48 Several of the criteria for idols of the multitude have been discussed. All were of the blood royal: from Jack Cade in 1450 onwards the people always navely reposed their faith in lordys of his ryal blode over par- venues of lower nature . . . broughte up of noughte. 49 The Mortimer name and Yorkist legitimacy justied the participation in and domina- tion of government by York and all his sons. 50 All idols had been excluded from their rightful say in political issues or at least claimed to have been so excluded; all distanced themselves from and criticized the government of the day. Idols thus had much in common with the political saints of 46 Michael Hicks, Richard Duke of Gloucester: The Formative Years, Richard III: A Medieval Kingship, ed. John Gillingham (1993), p. 24. 47 Hicks, Warwick, pp. 3001, 31112. 48 Ibid., pp. 21112; Hicks, Richard III, pp. 1279. 49 Conated from Isobel M. W. Harvey, Jack Cades Rebellion of 1450 (Oxford, 1991) [hereafter Harvey, Cades Rebellion], p. 187; Vales Book, p. 188. 50 Harvey, Cades Rebellion, p. 191; Rolls of Parliament, v. 3789. MICHAEL HICKS 401 The Historical Association 2000 which Archbishop Richard Scrope was perhaps the last example. 51 They had to appeal for popular support. How they did this is for the most part hidden from us: we have the propagandist letters and manifestos that they circulated and sometimes second-hand reports, but seldom what they said. Yorks crucial audience with King Henry and the tumultuous events of the ensuing parliamentary session surely witnessed several speeches, but none of them is recorded. Little is known of Warwicks address to con- vocation in 1460 and nothing of any other speeches. Several speeches are reported of the young Edward IV, who made the crucial oration prior to his election and spoke at length from the throne in Westminster Hall, in each case to his committed supporters. Though the Crowland Continu- ator speaks of Clarences mastery of popular eloquence, we know of no instance outside the royal council when this was employed, nor, but for his testimony, that the duke was an idol of the multitude at all! Contem- poraries credited to Buckingham the orchestration of Gloucesters acces- sion, in particular his nomination and acclamation at the Guildhall. We know of no public speeches by Gloucester. Persuasive though he was, he, like his father, may have been an insider, at his most effective in council and behind closed doors, who enlisted public opinion by carefully crafted public letters and ceremonial symbolism. The bulk of the illiterate commons must surely have been aroused by the spoken word, yet this need not have been through formal speeches. Ceremonial and display had its place: it was by these arts, observed Mancini, that Richard acquired the favour of the people. 52 The people to be addressed were seldom if ever together in one place; if they were, it was the result of earlier recruitment. What the idols had to say and to offer was commonly disseminated in written manifestos that could be read and cried. We possess many manifestos, open letters and verses written by various oppositions to government and to supporters in the south between 1450 and 1483. Regrettably we cannot know how many copies there were or how widely they were distributed. They were care- fully tailored to their audiences. Every government of the Wars of the Roses was charged with evil counsel, cronyism, indebtedness, scality, neglect of justice, disregard and overriding of the commonweal. Each manifesto additionally cited specic abuses, ranging from the catalogue of scal and judicial abuses in Jack Cades Kent, the earl of Wiltshires bloody assize at Newbury and the Wydevilles pursuit of Sir Thomas Cook, to the sexual debauchery of Edward IV and the infanticide and incest of his brother. 53 That in every instance support was indeed secured 51 These are discussed in Simon K. Walker, Political Saints in Later Medieval England, The McFarlane Legacy, pp. 77106. 52 Mancini, Usurpation, pp. 645. 53 Vales Book, pp. 20422; An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V and Henry VI, ed. J. S. Davies (Camden Society, 1856), lxiv. 90; Rolls of Parliament, vi. 2401. For com- mentary, see additionally John L. Watts, Ideas, Principles and Politics, The Wars of the Roses, ed. Anthony J. Pollard (Basingstoke, 1995) [hereafter Watts, Ideas, Principles and Politics], p. 119; Hicks, Richard III, pp. 83, 1469. 402 OVERMIGHTY SUBJECTS AND THE WARS OF THE ROSES The Historical Association 2000 suggests that the right note was struck. The accuracy or justice of such charges seems hardly to be relevant and takes no apparent account of the reconstruction of authority, probity and solvency from the nadir of 1450. At all times there was a common fund of popular grievances, whether legitimate or misdirected, to which appeal could be made and which could be trusted to secure support. Idols of the multitude knew how to arouse and channel it. Kings feared it. In destroying Empson and Dudley, was not Henry VIII identifying himself with critics of his fathers regime and harnessing popular support just as Henry VII himself and Richard III had done? Whether the idols of the multitude really shared these grievances, really lusted for reform or were merely manipulating public opinion is not the point of this article. It was not necessary to believe ones own propa- ganda. 54 Even Richard III made a serious attempt to align himself with judicial and nancial reform. The essential point is that overmighty sub- jects were able to represent such popular feeling and thus add it to the resources at their command. If popular enthusiasm could not be kept in the eld indenitely, it could be translated in the short term into such numbers that no king or bastard feudal army could resist. No govern- ment during this period, however well intentioned or reforming, was exempt from such threats. It was popular hostility to all the governments of the Wars of the Roses and popular receptiveness to such appeals that gave real opportunities to overmighty subjects. It was a passing phase that perhaps began in 1450, ebbed away sometime after 1485, and deserves a fuller explanation than can be essayed here. IV These great men were of several different types. Fortescue himself accepted that they could even be righte good for the londe as long as they aspire to noon higher degree or estate and cited as example John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster (d. 1399), the greatest of medieval English noblemen. 55 The Stanleys were of this type. They possessed the means to be overmighty, but they lacked the desire. Their instinct for self- preservation kept them out of the limelight and enabled them repeatedly to escape commitment. They were not royal and were never candidates for the crown themselves. If it were not for their decisive intervention at Bosworth, they would not qualify for discussion at all. The De La Poles, by contrast, lacked the normal qualications for overmightiness of per- sonal resources, ofces or popular appeal. They mattered solely because of the Yorkist blood that made them candidates for the crown, that appealed to dynastic legitimists and foreign powers, and that made them pawns in the games of others. It did not allow them the independence or 54 Watts, Ideas, Principles and Politics, p. 117. Wattss paper has redened the terms and signi- cance of political debate. 55 Vales Book, p. 237. MICHAEL HICKS 403 The Historical Association 2000 choices of York or Warwick. They occurred at a late stage when the wars had assumed a wholly dynastic character that was not the case before. Most truly overmighty subjects combined the attributes of the Stanleys and the De La Poles, admittedly in varying proportions. Overmighty subjects were born not made. All were princes of the blood royal, lords of great inheritances and/or estates, possessed of a concomi- tant pride of lineage and sense of superiority. Almost all held high military commands or vice-regal ofce. They had to be good communicators, able to win and persuade their peers, masters of the spoken and written word, experts in public relations and skilful propagandists. They were the ablest as well as the greatest of the English nobility. Moreover they were con- vinced of their capacities to rule more effectively than the government and were prepared to go to considerable lengths and to take great risks in order to achieve power. Their ambition and assertiveness, appropriately described as a lust for power, contrasts sharply with the caution, even cowardice, of many of their peers. With such leaders and such resources, their chances of success were really quite favourable. All the overmighty subjects except the De La Poles staged one successful coup dtat. Seiz- ing power without taking the crown, however, never worked, or worked only in the short term. Such coups led only to further attempts that added further risks. Having tasted power, neither York, nor Warwick, nor Buck- ingham was content to retire. The very characteristics that had made them successful also rendered them inexible and unable to compromise. The alternatives, further coups or even usurpation of the crown, raised the stakes and guaranteed no more certain rewards. Of all the overmighty subjects and idols of the multitude, only Edward IV was to escape a violent death. If the type disappears, it was not merely less propitious cir- cumstances and diminished volatility among the people that contributed, but also an unwillingness among the great to expose themselves and their families to almost certain disaster. Albeit a short-lived phenomenon, the overmighty subject did indeed play a central and frequently decisive role during the Wars of the Roses.