RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW

U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL
JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO
G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, En Banc (Carpio, J.)

The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through the AFP Anti-
Graft Board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General
Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant
on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment
stated in the warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly, communications equipment,
land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized.

In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the said
equipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the money because
she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a recommendation that Ramas
be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.
Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic or Petitioner) filed a Complaint against Ramas and Dimaano.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano; and
2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW
U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section 2 of E.O
No. 1, i.e.:
AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence; or:

AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before PCGG could have jurisdiction.

In this regard, Petitioner argues that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos
because he was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, which enabled him to receive
orders directly from his commander-in-chief.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with
former President Marcos.

In the case of Republic v. Migrinio, it was held that applying the rule in statutory construction of
ejusdem generis, the term subordinate refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO
No. 2.

Applying the foregoing, Ramas position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with
the rank of Major General does not make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for
purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that
he was a close associate of the former President, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of the former President were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by his complicity with the former President in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by the former Presidents acquiescence in his own accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW
U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

In fact, while the AFP Board Resolution states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379, said Resolution ends with a
finding of violation of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
This absence of relation proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific
and limited purpose, and necessarily, its powers must be construed to address such specific and
limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that
Ramas accumulated the properties in question in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-
in-chief.

Such omission is fatal. It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO
No. 1 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim also deserves no merit.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive.
The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim
jurisdiction over a case.

Petitioner argues that at the time the search and seizure was conducted, a revolutionary
government was operative by virtue of Proclamation No. 1, which withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. It was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the resulting government was a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.

Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained
in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW
U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent
right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system
of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional
methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.
It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and
from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration
did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
right of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under
the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.

Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in
the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with
its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW
U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004


Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The
warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized.
The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had no legal basis
to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We
thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.