DCMTA

Leader: Kyle Moshinsky

Deputy: Ethan Schubert
The Rest: Reid Eckert, William
Osborn, Joseph Smith, Turner
Horne (KIA)
District of Columbia
Metropolitan Transit
Authority (DCMTA)

Who we are
The DCMTA's mission is "to plan, develop,
build, finance, and operate a balanced
regional transportation system in the
national capital area."*
Our Task Force is focused on policy,
operations and safety as well any potential
liability issues facing the agency as a
result of recent events.
Mission Statement
*http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/
Policy failures in the maintenance and
security departments, as well as poor policy
enforcement are to blame for the crash of
Blue 17 and Orange 8.
BLUF

Map of DC Metro crash
Recreation of the crash
What were the downfalls of the Maintenance Department?
Mr. Smith signed paperwork to allow Blue 17 to run with two extra cars
without proper authorization.
Brake system was not working properly.
Maintenance workers were injured working off site (vents 22 and 24)
without DCMTA authorization.
Maintenance Department
What were the downfalls of the Security Department?
Allowed "unidentified packages" to remain in maintenance closet for
over two weeks before discovering they were filled with lethal amounts
of Cyanide.
Allowed an employee who had been terminated to obtain a valid
company I.D.


Security Department
There were two major incidents that should have been properly
investigated:
o March 5th-- 5 I.D.'s went missing at the end of Douriri's shift.
o March 8th-- I.D. office left open, laminator left running.
Same date as the forged ID's creation date.
After these incidents Rahim Douriri was put on the clean-up crew but
still had access to the I.D. office.
I.D. Department
Unfortunate series of events:
o Brake line failure
o Misplaced ID's
o Policy ineffectiveness
Maintenance checks
Speaking notes--> ****(Operator calls for extra cars,
maintenance doesn't check them first)****
Miscommunication among departments
o Alarm failures
o Stations overpopulated...
Japanese PM used metro.
Added stress to workers.

ACH 1 - Accidental
ACH 2 - Robbery
DCMTA was not at fault with the crash of blue 17
and orange 8.

The crash was an act of terrorism, aiding the robbery
by distracting authorities while criminals escaped.

Possible assassination attempt on the Japanese
Prime Minister.
Combination of policy failures:
Security:
o Access was granted to former employees with fake
ID's.
o Failure to secure access to ID making room.
Operations:
o Misplacement of important paperwork
Maintenance:
o Rushed by Operations to add extra cars to train, without
proper inspections.
o Brake-line and Alarm malfunctions.
Safety Policy:
o steps to ensure safety of the train and its passengers
were not followed or enforced
ACH 3 - What we think happened
We believe that a lack of oversight in various departments led to the Crash
of Blue 17 and Orange 8. This, in combination with poor policy and policy
enforcement led to the loss of equipment and life. Following this failure, the
DCMTA will rewrite new policies and enforce them.

New proposed policies:
Daily PMCS (preventive maintenance checks and services) to ensure
efficient and safe travel for our customers
More frequent random drug testing and thorough background checks
for potential new hires
Heightened security and more controlled access
Electronic data logs of maintenance and recommended services
Limited access to sensitive areas for lower level personnel
Final Hypothesis
Conductor of Blue 17, Quentin Jones died of a
codeine overdose

Maintenance workers were doing unauthorized work
on ventilation shafts.

Rahim Douriri is suspected to have created forged
IDs that may have been related to the crash.

Backpacks filled with HCN were found along the
tracks after the crash.

Information for other agencies
Questions?