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Challenges to Russia in Central Asia
Stephen J. Blank
Version of record first published: 31 Oct 2011.
To cite this article: Stephen J. Blank (2011): Challenges to Russia in Central Asia, American Foreign Policy Interests: The
Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 33:5, 209-221
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Challenges to Russia in Central Asia
Stephen J. Blank
ABSTRACT Russia seeks to reintegrate Central Asia around its power and
authority and to that end deploys all the instruments of power available
to it. However, it also faces several challenges in Central Asia. Some of those
challenges to its policy stem from the possibility of terrorism or a Taliban
victory in Afghanistan. Others come from the prospect of potential domes-
tically generated instability in Central Asia that could be the result of a suc-
cession of domestic crises or due to the inuence of events like the Arab
Spring of 2011. Another set of challenges come from other major actors like
China and the United States who have important if not vital interests in
Central Asia and who can block Russian ambitions there. At the same time
Central Asian states can either resist Russia on their own in some cases or
alternatively can form tactical alliances with governments like China or
the United States. This essay investigates those challenges to Russia and their
implications for Central Asian security.
KEYWORDS Central Asia; China; energy; Kyrgyzstan; Russia; Turkmenistan;
Uzbekistan
INTRODUCTION: RUSSIAN GOALS AND POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
No single article can encompass the totality of Russias policy toward and
involvement with Central Asia, especially if we consider the depth and velo-
city of changes occurring in Central Asia.
1
Nevertheless, we can identify
Russias objectives, policy instruments, and the challenges that are emerging
to Russias major goals in Central Asia. Indeed, as of mid-summer, 2011 we
can discern at least ve often inter-related challenges to Moscows policies
in Central Asia. Since 1993 when Boris Yeltsin rst demanded a Russian
sphere of inuence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), that
goal has been uppermost in Russian foreign policy and repeatedly
reafrmed by Yeltsins successors, including President Dimitry Medvedev.
2
Russia strives to secure Central Asia from foreign liberalism or Islamic
revolution, while ensuring Central Asias susceptibility to its commercial,
political, energy, and military inuence. Moscow is also fashioning sup-
posedly multilateral economic and military policy instruments, the Eurasian
Economic Community (EURASEC) and a customs union with these states
and in the military sphere the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). The CSTO is being upgraded to provide not just a pretext for
The views expressed here do not
represent those of the U.S. Army,
Defense Department, or the U.S.
Government.
Dr. Stephen J. Blank has served at the
U.S. Army War Colleges Strategic Studies
Institute as an expert on the Soviet bloc
and the post-Soviet world since 1989.
Prior to that he was Associate Professor
of Soviet Studies at the Center for
Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and
Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and
taught at the University of Texas, San
Antonio, and at the University of
California, Riverside. Dr. Blanks current
research deals with proliferation and the
revolution in military affairs and energy
and security in Eurasia. His two most
recent books are Russo-Chinese Energy
Relations: Politics in Command (2006)
and Natural Allies?: Regional Security in
Asia and Prospects for Indo-American
Strategic Cooperation (2005). He holds
a B.A. in History from the University of
Pennsylvania and an M.A. and Ph.D. in
History from the University of Chicago.
American Foreign Policy Interests, 33:209221, 2011
Copyright # 2011 NCAFP
ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2011.620513
209
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Russian military bases in Central Asia but also
grounds for intervention there in case of political
difculties. Meanwhile Moscow is attempting to
maintain extensive military connections with Central
Asia.
3
Moscow transacts most of its business with
these governments on a bilateral basis to maximize
its power toward them. It seeks control over their
energy pipelines to the greatest degree possible
and has long tried to compel them to accept below
market prices for those products. Russia also sees
itself as an intercessor between these states and inter-
national organizations whether they are the G-8,
NATO, or the G-20. Thus its ambassadors and leaders
have been too frequently ready to say openly that
post-Soviet states sovereignty is open to question
implying that Moscow does not fully accept their
independence and is ready to question it when the
occasion presents itself.
4
A critical Russian goal is stability, that is, the con-
tinuation of the Central Asian domestic status quo
where they can resist upheavals like those of the
Arab Spring. That status quo comprises a relationship
where Central Asian states look to Moscow to uphold
their domestic authority while it seeks not just to
preserve their stability but also to induce them to
emulate its domestic practices to promote stability
through repression. A recent study of Kyrgyz and
Kazakh counterterrorism legislation openly links
these two sets of laws that are increasingly repressive
in the absence of much terrorist activity to these
states perception of Russia as a reference group,
that is, a state that has created the basis for persuad-
ing them to internalize its legislation.
5
Russias coun-
terterrorism legislation, which serves as a template
for countries like Kazakhstan, is thus a potent instru-
ment for repressing democratic and autonomous
political activity in Russia and Central Asia.
6
Thus Russia seeks to revive a new solar system
where smaller states revolve around it. According
to Fedor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global
Affairs, in 2009,
Russia is the natural center of power among the former
Soviet republics. Most of them are going through serious
economic recessions, but they have no need to turn any-
where else but Moscow for assistance. The list of those
that have already applied to Russia for aid in one form
or another includes Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus,
Ukraine, and nations belonging to the Eurasian Economic
Community. Other neighboring states will probably make
similar requests in the months ahead. The amounts of
money that Moscow has promised in aid have not put a
serious dent in its reserve fund, but the temptation to offer
more money as a way of strengthening Russias geopoliti-
cal standing has been thwarted by the crisis. All the same,
the resurgence of Russias inuence in neighboring coun-
tries with which Moscow has strong historical and cultural
ties is consistent with the overall global tendency towards
regionalization.
7
Lukyanov rightly cited Russias belief that the econ-
omic crisis that began in 2008 gave it an opportunity
to oust the EU and US from the post-Soviet world
and strengthen its own position in the region.
8
And
Moscow continues to use its economic powers in
Central Asia to enforce compliance with its policy
desiderata.
9
Not surprisingly, however, these policies
evoke resistance not only from Central Asian govern-
ments where possible or where they feel it is desir-
able, they also evoke foreign and foreign-backed
challenges (e.g., from China and the United States).
CHALLENGES TO RUSSIAN POLICY
The rst threat to Russias Central Asian policies is
terrorism. Should the Taliban prevail in Afghanistan
that would become the paramount threat to Russian
and Central Asian regimes. This explains Russian and
Central Asian cooperation with the U.S. and NATO
campaign, most particularly expressed in the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), that has
become an ever more important supply route for
the United States and NATO. But there is a second
aspect of the current situation in Afghanistan that
poses a serious challenge to Russian goals for Central
Asia. The U.S. decision to begin withdrawing its
troops in Afghanistan in 2011, and NATOs parallel
decision has intensied regional concerns for the
future.
10
On the one hand Moscow wants those troops
gone but simultaneously it believes that the Afghan
government cannot prevail as its representative in
Afghanistan, Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, sees the
situation there as steadily worsening.
11
Moreover,
Washington wants to retain its bases in Afghanistan,
and presumably in Manas, Kyrgyzstan. Moscow
rmly objects to any future U.S. bases in Central Asia
because those bases negate its ambition to become
the unchallenged security manager of an exclusive
sphere of inuence in Central Asia. Therefore foreign
bases are unacceptable. Already in 2003 Russian
Ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, stated
210 American Foreign Policy Interests
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that the U.S. bases in Central Asia were redundant
since Russia played the major stabilizing role there.
Their only utility was in contributing to the antiterror
campaign in Afghanistan and should be terminated
once that role ends.
12
Thus Moscow remains torn
between desiring to see the United States stabilize
Afghanistan, wanting the United States to leave,
and fears of what happens in Afghanistan and
Central Asia if the Taliban successfully occupies the
ensuing vacuum.
The second challenge is the deep Russian and
Central Asian fear that an Arab scenario will materia-
lize in one or more Central Asian states. Twenty years
after the fall of Communism at least two of Central
Asias states may fairly be described as failing states
(i.e., Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), while Paul
Quinn-Judge of the International Crisis Group
believes that Uzbekistan is not far behind.
13
Indeed,
a succession crisis there, which he deems inevitable
given the absence of any discernible plan or order
for succession to 72-year-old President Islam
Karimov could throw Uzbekistan into a tailspin
characteristic of such states. But even if Uzbekistan
is not currently failing, it, like all the other Central
Asian states except Kyrgyzstan, is a strong autocratic
despotism all of whom share many characteristics of
what Max Weber called patrimonial or even in some
cases Sultanistic states.
Therefore we should be alert to the possibility of
state failure in one or more Central Asian states.
Indeed, it could happen almost suddenly without
warning. A recent analysis of North Korea reminds
us that the more repressive and articially main-
tained the regime is the more sudden and precipi-
tous is its fall.
14
Likewise, the worse the level of
oppression (e.g., state violence as in Uzbekistan),
is, the greater is the nightmare upon liberation.
15
This could happen in one or more Central Asian
states. Indeed, even if these states have many
resources for survival, the response of their leaders
and of Moscow and Beijing to the possibility of
reform at home and in Central Asia betrays these
leaders and governments perception of their own
fundamental instability and illegitimacy. Despite the
imposing facade of state strength, Eurasian
authoritarian or despotic regimes are and remain
fundamentally unstable.
Certainly Moscow fears that this is the case. On
April 13, 2011 Russias anxiety about the possibility
of the Arab revolutions spreading to Central Asia
was the topic of a public discussion in the Duma.
Members of the Duma and Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigory Karasin called on these states to make timely
reforms from above lest they be swept away like
those in North Africa. Since Russias goals are
stability, without which these states cannot draw
closer to Russia, he recommended that they form a
civil society from above, foster international and
inter-religious peace, that leaders take responsibility
for the populations standard of living, and develop
education and work with youth.
16
In other words,
Karasin called on Central Asian leaders to emulate
Moscows own efforts to build a Potemkin democ-
racy. Clearly this is not enough and no mention is
made of economic development or freedom or genu-
ine political reform. Russia will apparently only toler-
ate cosmetic reforms and it is doubtful that Central
Asian leaders will even approach those limits,
let alone transcend them. Indeed, only Kazakhstans
President Nursultan Nazarbayev acted in this manner
and he pre-empted Moscow (as seen below).
What is equally important here is that Central
Asian leaders believe in this proposition and act on
it. Moscow and Tashkent are particularly alert to this
possibility happening in Uzbekistan. Therefore they
both are apparently acting together, if not with other
Central Asian governments, to forestall any such out-
come. On April 14, 2011 when President Medvedev
came to Tashkent, Karimov told him that,
I am convinced that everything happening in Uzbekistan
in terms of ensuring the regions security and stability,
the current events in North Africa and the Middle East
and the emerging situation in Afghanistan are all issues
that Russia and Uzbekistan cannot disregard, primarily
from the perspective of synchronizing our positions and
conducting an open exchange of views on the situation
and the issues to be addressed in the nearest future.
17
Medvedev tellingly replied that,
With regard to current international issues, you are absol-
utely right: the world is facing very serious challenges.
This year began with the so-called Arab Spring, which
has created a completely new situation in the Middle East
and North Africa. In all likelihood, the international conse-
quences of what has happened there will persist over a
considerable period of time. We are certainly interested
in ensuring that these events follow a clear and predictable
scenario, because we are bound by numerous invisible
threads with these countries, not only economic relations
and trade, but also extensive humanitarian and cultural
ties. They can be very positive or they can become quite
complicated, and sometimes even destructive. Therefore,
Volume 33, Number 5, 2011 211
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it is essential for us to discuss everything that relates to our
closest neighbors, to ensure that we protect the national
interests of our states and our nations. Russia has always
held an open position in this area, we have discussed in
detail nearly all key issues over the telephone, decided
on the steps we will take and coordinated our foreign pol-
icy in many respects. I think this is extremely valuable, and
it is a reection of trust we have developed between our
states. We intend to continue in this vein in the future,
and I am very pleased that we are going to hold such
consultations once again now.
18
Medvedev further stated, We are interested that
(future) events develop along scenarios that are
understandable and predictable for us.
19
Both
Moscow and Tashkent, to judge from their leaders
statements, charge that the Arab revolutions were
instigated by outside unnamed actors who sought
access to Arab energy resources.
20
Thus Medvedev
discussed plans to undermine Russia by fomenting
revolutions. In March 2011 he stated that,
Look at the current situation in the Middle East and the
Arab world. It is extremely difcult and great problems still
lie ahead. In some cases it may even come to the disinte-
gration of large, heavily populated states, their break-up
into smaller fragments. The character of these states is
far from straightforward. It may come to very complex
events, including the arrival of fanatics into power. This
will mean decades of res and further spread of extrem-
ism. We must face the truth. In the past such a scenario
was harbored for us, and now attempts to implement it
are even more likely. In any case, this plot will not work.
But everything that happens there will have a direct
impact on our domestic situation in the long term, as long
as decades.
21
These statements clearly apply to the United States
and Europe as Russian ofcials still publicly claim
that the United States had and still has a conscious
plan that it has implemented to promote revolutions
to democratize Central Asia.
22
In this context either unrest or succession crises
could become not only a common threat in Central
Asia, but also in each country such crises could well
be the major threat to the stability of the state, not
just the current regime. In turn that crisis could then
possibly create an opening for a genuine Islamic
movement to attempt to seize power. Alternatively
though it does not seem likely right now, in the
future one or more of these states could fall prey to
a form of unrest analogous to what we now see in
the Arab world.
23
While some analysts do not believe
such revolutions are likely, it would appear that at
least some of these rulers have reason for concern.
24
Based on statistical analysis Ralph Clem recently
wrote that,
The empirical data available suggest a very close t
between socioeconomic conditions in Egypt and Tunisia
on the one hand and the ve Central Asian countries on
the other, especially with regard to the youthfulness
of the population. In other respects and in some countries,
the pre-conditions associated with political unrest are
even more problematic in Central Asia than in North
Africa. Certainly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are
assessed to be more corrupt and less free than either Egypt
or Tunisia. However, Kazakhstan ranks higher than any of
the North African or Central Asian countries in the human
development indices and is less corrupt and freer than any
of its neighbors. Recognizing that none of these measures
capture perfectly the reality on the ground, and that other,
non-quantiable inuences can be crucial to political out-
comes, and if conventional wisdom regarding the impor-
tance of these structural factors is correct in the Egyptian
and Tunisian cases, then this comparison with Central Asia
portends turbulence ahead, particularly for Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan.
25
Consequently, these governments are acting either
singly or collectively to stop the spread of democ-
racy. In Uzbekistan we see a further crackdown on
mobile Internet media along with denials by govern-
ment agencies throughout the area that revolution is
possible. Indeed, Uzbekistan has taken control over
cellular companies there instructing comnpanies to
report on any suspicious actions by customers and
on any massive distributions of text messages
through their cellular lines.
26
Azerbaijan too has
attacked Facebook and Skype.
27
We also see that
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have instituted news
blackouts of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.
28
Such moves emulate the draconian laws put in
place by Russia, China, and, Iran, and Kazakhstan
as a result of the earlier color revolutions of
200305, the Iranian elections and Xinjiang uprisings
of 2009, and Chinas move to intensify its already
harsh controls on the Internet in 2011.
29
These harsh
moves against electronic media come on top of
reports charging that press freedom in Eurasia is at
its lowest ebb in over a decade.
30
Meanwhile, in
Azerbaijan, where unrest has been growing since late
2010 in response to the regimes moves to crack
down on dissent and Islamic agitation (not necessrily
the same thing), large demonstrations have occurred.
Thus the Azeri government, seeing the failure of
earlier tactics, is now trying to work with inuential
Western media outlets to change public opinion so
that it will believe no changes are expected even as
212 American Foreign Policy Interests
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mild criticism is tolerated. Similarly, the government
will organize tours from Western elites to perusade
people that the West is cooperating with Baku, and
the regime will raise pensions, salaries, and social
services while either coopting or suppressing the
opposition.
31
In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev initiated an instant
election rather than a palpably stage-managed refer-
endum to give him life tenure because that latter
option was too egregious a move in the current cli-
mate. That election indicates just how malleable the
states constitution and judicial systems are in the
face of a determined autocrat who feels there is no
one he can entrust with succession and fears that
other alternatives would backre as they would have
coincided with the Arab revolution that bitterly
denounced comparable dynasticism and corruption
in the Middle East. But Kazakhstan is hardly alone
in demonstrating that malleability. Even if we accept
that Kyrgyzstan has made important strides forward
in democracy since its revolution in 2010, Kyrgyzstan
remains perched precariously on the brink of ungov-
ernability and subject at any times to mass unrest,
either ethnic or political, as its own ofcials admit.
And while its leaders claim to be building democ-
racy, this only applies to the ornamental or dignied
parts of the state not its effective governing aspects.
In Kyrgyzstan these effective aspects of governance
are often carried out not just on the basis of regional,
clan, tribal, or ethnic afliation, or by the govern-
ment, but also by thinly disguised criminal enter-
prises.
32
It is barely a consolidated state and a
cautionary example to all of its neighbors who
believe that it exemplies all the dangers and none
of the benets of democracy. Tajikistan, although
clearly an autocracy, is on the verge of economic
and presumably political collapse.
33
Likewise, these states often emulate Russian prac-
tices and legislation relevant to the possibility of
autonomous political action by the population. The
numerous reports of the Russian authorities fears
of social unrest during a time of economic crisis,
the governments adoption of new repressive mea-
sures to deal with them, and the strengthening of
the CSTOs capability to intervene in Central Asian
states suggests that a strong effort will be made to
suppress any sign of political unrest in both Russia
and Eurasia at the rst moment lest it connect with
growing economic grievances.
34
Indeed, Russia has
also recently enacted many new regulations designed
to forestall and repress any expression of mass unrest
due to the economic crisis. And new legislation to
silence the media even more is currently being pro-
posed.
35
Such actions betray a traditional Russian
(not just Soviet) military-police approach not only to
terrorism, but also to the whole question of internal
dissent and regime stability. Thus Andrei Soldatov
observes that the FSB and Ministry of Interior
(MVD) reacted to these revolutions in Tunisia and
Egypt by proposing to amend the criminal code to
make the owners of social networks responsible
for all content posted on their sites and to force
them to register with the state. Although they were
rebuffed, this request typies the common mentality
to be found among police states in meeting this
challenge.
36
Central Asian regimes will likely follow
Moscows lead here rather than liberalize their
regimes.
The third challenge facing Moscow is that Central
Asian states, with twenty years of independence
behind them, and a genuine record of success in
pursuing multivector foreign policies are pursuing
ever more independent policies. These trends under-
score the fact that Moscows ability to maintain an
exclusive sphere of inuence in the CIS as a whole,
and not just Central Asia is steadily declining and
not only in Central Asia.
37
Several commentators
openly state that Moscow is now losing out at least
economically if not in overall military and geopoliti-
cal terms to China in Central Asia and to foreign
competition more generally in the CIS.
38
Indeed, Central Asian states growing indepen-
dence poses three other sets of inter-related prob-
lems for Moscow beyond the sheer difculty of
controlling them on an individual basis. First, in
many cases these states desire for independent poli-
cies has led to a diminution of Russian cultural inu-
ence and presence in their domestic politics and
culture through the nationalization of media, school
systems, and so on.
39
Second, because in many
instances these states are rivals with each other and
actually represent the greatest foreign policy threats
to each others security, any state wishing to be their
security manager, like Russia, must become involved
in all these disputes. Consequently it is very difcult
for Russia to steer a policy course in these disputes
among Central Asian states that does not undermine
its relationship with them. Finally, the very fact that
Volume 33, Number 5, 2011 213
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these states can act increasingly independently in
their external affairs allows them the opportunity to
join with Washington, Beijing, Brussels, or other
actors to thwart Russian policies that are inimical to
their interests.
Kazakhstans enlargement of its sphere of inde-
pendent discretion by its careful multivector poli-
cies exemplies this trend.
40
But it is not alone.
Other states successful resistance to Moscow exem-
plies their ability both to defend themselves and
to obtain foreign backing for that defense that coun-
ters Russian pressure to subordinate them (e.g.,
Turkmenistan). Since 2006 Turkmenistans and other
Central Asian states leverage regarding prices has
increased as other pipeline options besides Russia
became available to them and as Russias continuing
dependence on cheap Central Asian gas to subsidize
its own inefcient and overly subsidized domestic
energy economy while meeting surging European
and Asian demand grew.
Although Turkmenistan has not yet sufciently
prevailed on Moscow to pay European prices for
the gas it ships westward, its receipts have clearly
grown as Russian demand for its gas grew. Thus
when the current economic crisis hit in 200809
Moscow had committed itself to paying $300=tcm
to Central Asian producers in the belief that it could
charge Europe $380400=tcm. The global economic
crisis ended that, forcing Moscow to buy Central
Asian gas at a loss, a growing and increasingly unaf-
fordable burden for Gazprom. Moscow sought to cut
the price it paid but Turkmenistan held to its con-
tract. Then in April 2009 a mysterious explosion in
the pipeline to Russia that Turkmenistan blamed on
Russia led to a cessation of all shipments throughout
2009.
As the international economic crisis gained steam and glo-
bal demand for energy resources dropped dramatically,
Gazprom could no longer afford to buy gas at these high
prices. But it was unthinkable to raise this issue with
Kazakhstan, and political relations with Uzbekistan were
too delicate to back out of the deal (which meant gas
through the Prikaspiyskii pipeline-author). Therefore it
was Turkmenistan by default that had to take the blow
alone. The explosion on the pipeline near the
Turkmen-Uzbek border in April inicted little material
damage, but it was used as a pretext to put a complete
stop to all Turkmen gas imports. The ow was restored
in November after Turkmen President Gurbanguly
Berdimukhammedovs visit to Moscow, but Russia bluntly
refused to honor the take-or-pay provision in the
contract.
41
Moscow also reduced the amount of Turkmen gas
that it would take in in 2010. Gazprom had been
ready to buy over 50 bcm from Turkenistan in
20102012 at a price of $375=tcm but it scaled back
its purchases to 10.5 bcm and wanted to pay Turkme-
nistan about $220240=tcm, the same price it seeks
from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Russia believed
that this pressure would force Turkmenistan, to
relent on the high prices for which it had contracted
with Moscow in 2008.
42
However Turkmenistan
employed its new leverage with China to obtain a
$3 Billion loan from Beijing for the development of
Turkmenistans South Iolotan gas eld with an esti-
mated 414 trillion cubic meters.
43
Turkmenistan
raised the amount of gas it will export to China
through the pipeline from 30 bcm to 40 bcm and
granted it the rights to South Iolatan to pay off the
loan.
44
Chinas readiness to help Turkmenistan
escape Russian threats has clearly paid off, not just
in the rapid construction of this pipeline but also in
gaining subsequent contracts and even more gas
supplies. Thus in December 2009 a consortium com-
prising CNPC, South Korean, and UAE companies
won contracts to develop the eld in South Iolotan.
45
By 2012 China will receive 60 bbcm of gas annually
from Turkmenistan, more than Russia gets.
46
Turkmenistan subsequently extended its diversi-
cation policy by builidng a new pipeline to Iran to
provide it with 20bcm of gas even though Turkmeni-
stan is only shipping 8 bcm annually. So Turkmenistan
will likely increase its ablity to supply Iran, and further
diversify its customer base.
47
Meanwhile, shortly after
the pipeline to China opened Gazprom and
Turkmenistan negotiated an agreement to end the
acrimony that had poisoned relations between them
in 2009. But clearly Russia lost this round to both
Turkmenistan and China and by implication other
Central Asian producers like Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have won. Russian ofcials have tried to
put a good face on this deal, signalling their uncon-
cern, touting the resumption of gas supplies from
Turkmenistan, and reiterating that the new pipeline,
by annually shipping 40bcm of gas to China, will pre-
clude Turkmenistan from supplying the EUs rival
Nabucco pipeline.
48
However, this Russian argument
only holds water if one believes that Turkmenistan
holds much less gas than it claims to possess and that
the Gaffney-Cline report of 2009 suggesting vast
reserves is wrong or fraudulent.
49
214 American Foreign Policy Interests
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Actually Moscows behavior shows that it fully
understands who won this round. In late December
2009 it reached agreement with Ashkhabad to buy
30 bcm annually of Turkmen gas starting in 2010
and to build a new pipeline to link untapped gas
reserves in eastern Turkmenistan with the Prikaspiys-
kii pipeline.
50
Nevertheless Chinas primacy in the
Central Asian gas market is undoubtedly a blow to
Russia with long-lasting consequences.
51
As one
newspaper report suggested,
Strengthening of Chinas economic positions will inevi-
tably boost its political inuence and eventually transform
China into the leader of the whole region and the true
master in the regional structures like the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. With Russias silence signifying
consent, Central Asian hydrocarbons ow eastward at an
ever increasing rate. The impression is that Russia
accepted it. Fierce battles for the Turkmen gas with the
paper Nabucco rather than with the actual gas pipeline
to China plainly show the true scope of Moscows ambi-
tions. The Kremlin lacks either strength or willingness to
put up a ght for Central Asia. It nds protection of its
positions in the European gas market a more rewarding
occupation.
52
Moreover, as of mid-2011 Turkmenistan is still
successfully resisting Russian pressure to impose a
gas price that exploits Turkmenistan for Russias
benet.
53
And this episode has signicant political conse-
quences. China no longer must approach Russia as
gas supplicant. Instead it has a superior bargaining
position because it does not depend on Russia for
gas despite its growing demand. Despite the
RussoChinese agremeents of 2009 to build pipelines
to ship China 68 bcm of gas, Russia neither has the
money to build the pipelines, nor possibly the
gasas it closed many elds due to the current
crisisunless China lends it the money to reactivate
pipelines, wells, and elds that were shut down in
2009 due to the economic crisis. Indeed China
already produces 76 bcm of gas a year and consumes
only about 80 bcm with Australian LNG making up
the difference. So it really does not need Russian
gas anytime soon, especially as it will get 40 bcm
from Turkmenistan.
54
Moreover, neither side has
yet agreed on prices so their agreements are merely
declarations in principle, not hard contracts. And to
judge from previous negotiations, no agreement is
imminent, despite Russian claims to the contrary.
55
If anyting we can expect hard bargaining on prices
because China will demand below market prices
and Russia will demand market prices in a classic
confrontation between supplier and buyer. Russia
needs this pipeline and its revenues more than China
does, and therefore the TurkmenChina pipeline
could ultimately contribute to expanding Chinas
increasingly visible ascendancy over Russia, not just
in Central Asia, but in East Asia as well.
The fourth challenge confronting Moscow is that
in its effort to be Central Asias undisputed security
manager it must now mediate disputes among these
states and must also walk a narrow line lest it irretrie-
vably embitter one or another state. We see this in
disputes over water that are critical to Central Asias
economic well-being. In January 2009 Russian
President Medvedev, desiring to consolidate Russian
access to Uzbekistans gas and oil, supported
Tashkent by denouncing those who seek cheap gas
and backed Uzbekistans President Karimov when
he talked of the need for Russia to inuence
Tajikistan to desist from building the Rogun dam to
take account of Tashkent while Uzbekistan was
squeezing Tajikistan in a crisis.
56
Medvedev appar-
ently then backed away from previous support for
Rogun and other projects and said that Russia would
not support any regional hydroelectric project unless
they took into account every states interest.
57
This
enraged the Tajik government which then promptly
cancelled President Rahmons visit to Moscow, can-
celled broadcasting licenses for the only available
Russian television channel, launched media attacks
on Russia, and approached both Washington and
international nancial institutions for help.
58
Not sur-
prisingly, and especially in view of Tajikistans pre-
carious internal and economic situation, Rahmonov
succeeded in winning more resources from these
institutions for poverty relief.
59
Kyrgyzstan also raised the alarm about being
betrayed by Russia for whom Uzbekistan is clearly
the key player besides Kazakhstan in Central Asia.
60
The visible increase in tension between Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan on the one hand and with Russia
on the other forced some rethinking of positions.
Iran jumped in to offer support for the Rogun dam
and Tajikistan moved to counter the blackouts
caused by Uzbek policies by taking more water to
produce electricity, aiming at Uzbek agriculture.
61
At the same time both Dushanbe and Tashkent were
unhappy with Moscows assistance to Kyrgyzstan in
February 2009 to oust the United States from
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Manas, another sign of regional rivalries. Neverthe-
less Moscow warned Dushanbe not to question its
policies.
62
Despite this warning Tajikistan upped the pres-
sure, making noises about Russias non-observance
of many agreements, including the one to nance
Rogun, and its base in Tajikistan, implying that it
might ask Russia to leave and bring in the United
States. In other words, from February 2009 on
Tajikistan, exactly as our theory would predict,
started pressuring Russia to rescue it and put pres-
sure on Uzbekistan or face the possibility of its look-
ing to the West by greater fulllment of promises of
aid and transfer of resources.
63
Uzbekistan duly
backtracked, resuming electricity exports from
Tajikistan and advocating internationalizing the
problem. Specically it demanded publicly that solu-
tions to water problems take into account the inter-
ests of all states (by which it means, of course,
primarily its interests). In urging rational and effec-
tive use of water resources in the region based on
universal international norms, it has urged the UN
to organize a process to examine all hydro-energy
projects on trans-border rivers and resolve all the
issues on the basis of mutual understanding, con-
structive dialogue, and consensus among the par-
ties.
64
Thus Tashkent even announced its
willingness even to invest in Tajik hydroelectric pro-
jects but linked this to consideration for Uzbek inter-
ests.
65
This volte-face may have been motivated by
the concurrent announcement of large-scale Russian
aid to Kyrgyzstan in order to oust the United States
from Manas. In return for Kyrgyzstans assent to the
ouster, Russia also promised large-scale aid to the
Kambarata hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, signi-
fying its move backward from consideration for
Uzbek interests above others and forcing Karimov,
or so it is alleged, to make gestures toward Bishkek
and Dushanbe.
66
Russia, having determined to be the dominant
regional power, has learned that it must therefore
maneuver carefully around these regional controver-
sies. Its primary aim is to prevent anyone from defect-
ing to the West or China, and in particular to lock up
energy supplies insofar as possible. Most likely for
that reason it supported Uzbekistans claim on hydro-
power in return for signing contracts to ship Uzbek
gas westward. But in so doing it angered Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, forcing it to rebalance and subsidize
them.
67
Tajikistan duly reacted to Russian support
for Uzbekistan by pressuring Uzbekistan with water
and Russia with defection, leading the former to warn
about impending water crises, and the latter to nd a
solution that transferred sufcient resources to
Tajikistan while not inciting Uzbekistan too far.
68
As a result of these moves and countermoves and
despite Russias displeasure with Tajikistans maneu-
verings back and forth among Washington, Beijing,
and Moscow, Russia resumed negotiations with
Tajikistan, leading to agreements by July 2009. It
appears that in return for a promise of support from
Moscow for Rogun, both sides will negotiate the
issue of Tajikistan charging rent for the base pos-
sessed by the Russian Armys 201st division there.
Moscow also agreed that while it would nance
Rogun, the project must be delayed to allay Uzbek
concerns and in return both sides agreed to jointly
operate the Sangtuda hydroelectric plant instead.
69
Thus Tajikistan and Russia found their way to a
compromise solution where once again foreign
(i.e., Russian resources) buttressed the domestic
standing of Tajikistans regime while giving Moscow
its leading position in Central Asia. Still, this episode
shows just how costly that ambition is for Moscow to
sustain and how hard it is for local governments to
keep up the game in a time of economic crisis.
Indeed, the consequences of this episode were
not long in coming. These games with Tajikistan
drew Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan closer together
because of their shared interests in ensuring they
get water from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Because
Tajikistans wasteful use of water led to blackouts
in Kazakhstan in early 2009 on February 26, it left
the unied electrical energy system of Central Asia,
thereby negatively affecting the ow of electricity
to Kyrgyzstan.
70
This move obviously represents a
step away from regional integration, which many
believe is the only answer to these linked problems
of water, electricity, energy, and so on.
71
Neither did this compromise really overcome
TajikUzbek differences, especially in view of
Tajikistans continuing poor economic performance.
Thus in MayJune 2009, due to nonpayment of
debts, Uzbekistan again halved gas shipments to
Tajikistan.
72
As a result Rahmonov urged his people
to stockpile food for two years reserve.
73
Clearly this
situation illustrates how the game is being played in
Central Asia and Russias enmeshment in its own net.
216 American Foreign Policy Interests
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Finally, as we have seen, the fth challenge to
Russia is foreign competition either directly or in tan-
dem with a Central Asian govenrment. The crisis sur-
rounding the 2010 pogroms against Uzbeks in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan, illustrates this point. Even before the
ethnic rioting began on June 1011, Russian gures
announced that Russia and Uzbekistan had agreed
that they should intervene to stabilize the situation
in Kyrygyzstan.
74
But Uzbekistan had, in fact, refused
to do so. Indeed, President Karimov openly stated
that Kyrgyzstans problems were exclusively its
own internal affair and that the violence and insta-
bility were being fomented from outside, that is,
probably Russia, a view shared as well by the Tajik
media.
75
Instead Karimov turned to China. We can see this
from the communiques of his meetings with
President Medvedev and Hu Jintao as they arrived
for the SCO summit on June 1011. The com-
munique with Medvedev was correct but formal.
On the other hand Karimovs meeting with Chinese
President Hu Jintao was entirely something else. A
fulsome communique extolling the millennium of
relations between Uzbekistan and the Celestial
Kingdom (signicantly not the Peoples Republic of
China) came at the start of this meeting followed
by a statement that both presidents then conducted
an extensive review of regional and geopolitical
issues that could only emphasize the issue of
Kyrgyzstans stability.
76
In these discussions, President Hu Jintao offered a
six point formula for SinoUzbek relations in which
point six called on both countries to intensify multi-
lateral coordination to safeguard both states com-
mon interests and stated that both countries must
work together against the threats to security in
Central Asia. Karimov openly welcomed these pro-
posals, suggesting quite strongly not just that
Uzbekistan was leaning away from Moscow toward
Beijing, not least because of Moscows unceasing
efforts to obtain a second military base in the
Ferghana valley around Osh so that it could control
that valley.
77
It also appears that not only did
Uzbekistan object to unilateral Russian intervention
in Kyrgyzstan, it also obtained Chinas support for
this position both in the SCO and in the CSTO where
China is not a member, but also where a clear-cut
Chinese policy aligned to that of Uzbekistan, would
carry weight.
Possibly Russia simply lacks the necessary forces
to conduct a peace support operation (to use the
U.S. term) in Kyrgyzstan, or does not want to have
to choose between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks, a
standard practice in Russian peacemaking opera-
tions, or that the mission was murky, protracted,
costly, and uncertain at best. Nevertheless troops
were apparently ready to go to Kyrgyzstan and at
least some leaders in Moscow were interested in
carrying out this operation.
78
Nonetheless it appears
quite likely that the combined SinoUzbek oppo-
sition in both the CSTO and SCO was important
here. Thus this episode marks the rst time China
has been able to gain a real partner if not ally in
the CSTO to block Russian policies there.
Meanwhile it cemented its relationship with
Uzbekistan by signing agreements on enhanced
economic, trade, and security cooperation.
79
Indeed, an energy deal calls on Uzbekistan to ship
10 bcm of gas to China that was previously pro-
mised to Russia.
80
And a security accord appeared
in 2011.
81
Thus China has signaled both its ability
and readiness to play a larger role in Central Asia
and especially in Kyrgyzstan.
Simultaneously the United States has strengthened
its position in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan through its military base, the NDN, and
promise of enhanced economic ties with Uzbeksitan
and other Central Asian states. Moscow continuously
attacks the United States, whom it suspects of trying
to frustrate its return as a great power and of trying to
promote democratic revolutions in these countries.
But it also faces Chinas unrelenting commercial
advances that have now made it Central Asias largest
trading partner. While cooperation with China across
Asia is essential for any Russian government,
Moscow is also trying to limit Chinese power by
bringing India into the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and forging its customs union, which
will greatly limit the ow of Chinese goods into
Central Asia.
82
Moscows quest for military bases in
Central Asia is also not merely an anti-American
maneuver, but also intended to keep China, who
has previously expressed an interest in bases there,
out.
83
Nonetheless as Moscows position weakens it
has been forced to say that Chinas economic power
does not threaten it there even though it plainly does
not believe that.
84
And this many-sided struggle
among all the great powers for inuence and access
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in Central Asia will surely continue if not grow in
intensity as the United States winds down its military
presence in Afghanistan.
CONCLUSIONS
Central Asian governments face numerous security
threats from within and without, the Taliban, home-
grown terrorists, inter-state rivalry among the Central
Asian states themselves, and so on. But while one of
those threats is the rivalry among the great powers
for strategic inuence over these states that subordi-
nates them and reduces their actual sovereignty,
independence, and even potentially territorial integ-
rity, we should not lose sight of the ongoing Russian
threat. Despite the reset policy with Washington,
Moscow still rejects long-term cooperation with the
United States in Central Asia, yet it is becoming
increasingly unable to hold these states together as
a sphere of its exclusive inuence. Nevertheless, as
the example of the new customs union shows, it con-
tinues to chase after the mirage of empire in Central
Asia even as it refuses to do what is necessary at
home to strenghten its overall political and economic
capacity to play the great power role it so clearly
covets.
As the evidence presented here clearly shows,
Russia is falling ever more behind China in its ability
to invest real resources and gain cooperation even
though Central Asian governments universally fear
China.
85
If present trends continue into the long
term it is quite conceivable that the best Russia
can hope for is to be the gendarme for Chinese
investments in Central Asia and its younger
brother there, a thoroughly unappetizing role for
Russia. Unfortunately that is not the worst possible
outcome. By continuing to pursue the will-o-the-
wisp of empire Russia is systematically undermining
the capacity of these states to meet contemporary
economic and political challenges while essentially
trying to keep them in a state of neo-colonial back-
wardness for its own benet. This is, sad to say, an
old script, and we know how it ends. If Russia is
truly concerned about Central Asian security then
time is running out for it to change its strategy and
foster the regions sovereign entry into the contem-
porary world. Otherwise Russia will either be
Chinas gendarme or sitting atop a volcano or series
of volcanos that will inevitably explode because of
the pressure imposed by Russian neo-imperialism
and myopia. In Central Asia and elsewhere
Moscow claims a great power status but it has
neither the necessary vision nor capabiity to effect
the responsible leadership the region might actually
support. Here as elsewhere, to quote Robert
Legvold, Russia seeks status, not responsibility.
86
Ultimately that quest, given Russias capabilities
and Central Asian realities, can only end in a violent
confrontation from which nobody will benet.
Notes
1. In this article Central Asia denotes the ve ex-Soviet republics
that became independent in 1991, not Afghanistan. This is
for purely heuristic reasons. So whenever Central Asia is
mentioned it will not include Afghanistan which will be
mentioned separately.
2. Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels
Channel One, Russia, NTV, August 31, 2008, http://www.
kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82916_
206003.shtml
3. Sebastien Peyrouse, Russia-Central Asia: Advances and
Shortcomings of the Military Partnership, in Central Asian
Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia, ed. Stephen
J. Blank (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, 2011), 134.
4. Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels
Channel One, Russia, NTV; Stephen Blank, The Values Gap
Between Moscow and the West: the Sovereignty Issue,
Acque et Terre, no. 6 (2007), 914 (Italian), 9095 (English);
Pavel Baev, Turning Counter-Terrorism Into Counter-
Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages
Turkmenistan, Paper Presented to the World Slavic
Congress, Berlin, July 2528, 2005; Roy Allison, Strategic
Reassertion in Russias Central Asia Policy, International
Affairs, LXXX, no. 2 (2004), 277293; Moscow, Interfax, in
English, March 20, 2009, Open Source Center, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (Henceforth FBIS SOV), March
20, 2009; Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 10, 2009, FBIS
SOV, March 10, 2009.
5. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism Policies in Central
Asia (Abingdon and New York, 2011).
6. Ibid., 53.
7. Fedor Lukyanov, Learning the Skills of Being a Regional
Power, Moscow Times, March 18, 2009.
8. Stanislav Secrieriu, Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis:
Greater Compliance of Resilient Self-Condence, CEPS
Policy Brief, no. 192, June 23, 2009, 6, www.ceps.be.
9. Dushanbe, Asia-Plus, in Russian, March 30, 2011, FBIS SOV,
March 30, 2011; Stephen Blank, Tajikistan: Rahmon Facing
Pressure on All Sides, Eurasia Insight, March 29, 2011,
www.Eurasianet.org
10. OSC Report, Russian, Central Asian Reaction to Obama
Speech Limited, Skeptical, FBIS SOV, June 28, 2011.
11. Vladimir Radyuhin, SCO: 10 Years of Evolution and
Impact, The Hindu, June 14, 2011, http://www.thehindu.
com/opinion/lead/article2101857.ece?css=print
218 American Foreign Policy Interests
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12. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War:
U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War Col-
lege, 2004), 21.
13. Paul Quinn-Judge, Conventional Security Risks To Central
Asia: A Summary Overview, Paper Presented to the Confer-
ence, Energy, Environment, and the Future of Security in
Central Asia, Understanding the Security Implications of
Critical Energy and Environmental Issues, Rome, October
1516, 2009.
14. Robert D. Kaplan and Abraham M. Denmark, The Long
Goodbye: The Future North Korea, World Affairs CLXXIV,
no. 1 (May=June, 2011), 1213.
15. Ibid.
16. Sokhranit Stabilnost v Tsentralnoi Azii- Uchastniki
Parlametnariskikh Situatsii v Gosdume, www.duma.gov.
ru/news/273/71937/print=yes, April 13, 2011.
17. Visit to Uzbekistan, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2380,
June 14, 2011.
18. Ibid.
19. Medvedev To KarimovLeave Ofce Voluntarily,
Chaihana, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 15, 2011.
20. Richard Orange, Uzbek President Accuses the West of
Funding Arab Revolts, The Telegraph, May 10, 2011, www.
te.graph.co.news/worldnews/asia/uzbekistan/8505104/Uzbek-
president-accuses-
21. Dmitry Medvedev Held a Meeting of the National Anti-
Terrorism Committee in Vladikavkaz, http://eng.kremlin.
ru/transcripts/1804, February 22, 2011.
22. S. Nikolaev, Central Asia in Geopolitics: the American Vec-
tor, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (2011), 5762.
23. Ralph S. Clem, From the Arab Street to the Silk Road: Impli-
cations of the Unrest in North Africa for the Central Asian
States, Eurasian Geography and Economics LII, no. 2
(2011), 228241.
24. Yevgeny Shestakov, Could the Revolutionary Fervor in
North Africa Reach the Former Soviet Central Asian States?,
The Telegraph, April 1, 2011; Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Will
the Revolutions in the Middle East Have an Impact on Uzbeki-
stan,? Eurasia Insight, www.eurasianet.org, February 4,
2011; Georgiy Voloshin, Dont Expect Mideast-Style Revol-
ution in Central Asia, Global Asia VI, no. 1 (Spring 2011),
http://globalasia.org/1.php?c=e379
25. Clem, op. cit., 234.
26. Murat Sadykov, Uzbekistan Tightens Control Over Mobile
Internet, Eurasia Insight, March 15, 2011, www.eurasia-
net.org; Fyodor Lukyanov, Learning From Libya and
Singapore, Russia in Global Affairs, January 25, 2011,
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Learning-from-Libya-and-
Singapore-15124; Anti-Revolution Agenda: Seize the
Control Over Cellular Companies, www.neweurasia.net/
cross-regional-and-blogosphere/anti-revolution-agenda-seize
the- control-over cellular-companies, March 15, 2011;
Uzbekistan Zashchishchaeyet Seti Peredachi Dannykh ot
Buntovtsikov, www.uznews.net, March 17, 2011.
27. Azerbaijan Puts Skype in Its Sights, Eurasia Insight, May 4,
2011, www.euraisanet.org
28. Muhammad Tahir, Governments Move To Thwart Arab
Spring in Central Asia, Human Rights Society In Uzbekistan,
Blog Archive, http://en.hrsu.org/2011/04/28/in-the-arab-
world-from-getting-a-foothold/, April 28, 2011, and Eurasia
Insight, April 28, 2011; Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Will the
Revolutions in the Middle East Have an Impact on Uzbeki-
stan? Eurasia Insight, www.eurasianet.org, February 4,
2011.
29. China Creates Agency to Regulate Cyberspace, New York
Times, May 5, 2011, www.nytimes.com
30. Heather Maher, Report: Press Freedom At Lowest Ebb in
More Than a Decade, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty,
May 5, 2011.
31. Baku, Azadilq, in Azeri, April 27, 2011, FBIS SOV, April 29,
2011.
32. Reuel R. Hanks, Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Conundrums of Eth-
nic Conict, National Identity, and State Cohesion, Journal
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies XIII, no. 2 (June, 2011),
177187; Kathleen Collins, Kyrgyzstans Latest Revol-
ution, Journal of Democracy XX, no. 2 (July 2011),
150163; Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central
Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime and Corruption in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Washington and Uppsala:
CACI&SRSP Silk Road Paper), October 2006; Kyrgyzstans
Powerful Criminal Gangs, Janes Intelligence Digest,
February 26, 2009, http://wwwd.janes.com/subscribe/jid/
doc
33. Quinn-Judge, op. cit.
34. Peyrouse, op. cit., 134.
35. Viktor Khanayev, Mass Quality Added to Mediums of Infor-
mation, Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, in Russian,
February 24, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 24, 2011.
36. Jim Sciutto, The Police State Playbook: An Introduction,
World Affairs Journal, JulyAugust, 2011, http://www.
worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2011-JulyAugust/abstracts/
Sciutto.html
37. Rajan Menon, A Farewell to Russia, Foreign Policy, July 12,
2011, http://uaobserver.blogspot.com/2011/07/farewell-to-
russia-by-rajan-menon.html.
38. Dmitri Trenin, Russian Foreign Policy: Modernization or
Marginalization?, Anders Aslund, Sergei Guriev, and
Andrew C. Kuchins, eds., Russia After the Global Economic
Crisis (Washington and Moscow: Peterson Institute for
International Economics and Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, and Moscow, New Economic School,
2010), 187200; Vladimir Skosyrev, Russias Inuence in
Central Asia is Declining, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Online, in Russian, April 27, 2011, FBIS SOV, April 27,
2011.
39. D. Kimbrell, Kazakh Schools Getting Kazakhied,
Eurasia Insight, July 9, 2011; In Central Asia, Russian Wave
Ebbs Away, Russia Beyond the Headlines, June 17, 2011.
40. Richard Weitz, Kazakhstan and the New International Politics
of Eurasia (Washington, DC: Central Asia Caucasus Institute,
Silk Road Paper, 2008).
41. Pavel Baev, China Trumps Gazprom, Moscow Times,
December 17, 2009.
42. Turkmenistan: Gazprom to Make Cutback on Gas Pur-
chases, Eurasia Insight, November 24, 2009, www.eurasia-
net.org; Baev, op. cit.
43. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, May 29, 2009, FBIS SOV,
May 29, 2009.
44. Chemen Durdiyeva, China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan Launch Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline, Cen-
tral Asia Caucasus Analyst, January 20, 2010.
45. Beijing, China Daily Online, in English, December 31, 2009,
FBIS SOV, December 31, 2009.
Volume 33, Number 5, 2011 219
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46. ChinaLends $4.1BlntoGas-richTurkmenistan, Chinamining.
org, April 27, 2011, http://www.chinamining.org/News/
2011-04-27/1303884705d44981.html
47. Russia, China, and Iran to Forge a New Energy Axis This
Year, www.asianews.it, January 8, 2010.
48. FBIS SOV, December 14, 2009; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in
English, December 22, 2009, FBIS SOV, December 22, 2009.
49. Energy Superpower Emergesin the Caspian, http://
www.peakoil.com/modules.php?name=News&le=article&
sid=43522, October 18, 2008; Turkmenistan Gas Reserves
Revealed, www.kommersant.com, October 15, 2008; Regis
Gente, TURKMENISTAN: ASHGABAT ENERGY-RESERVE
CONTROVERSY CONTINUES TO FLARE, http://eurodialogue.
org/energy-security/Turkmenistan-Ashgabat-Energy-Reserve-
Controversy-Continues-To-Flare (accessed January 18,
2010).
50. Isabel Gorst, Russia Welcomes End to Gas Dispute, Finan-
cial Times, December 22, 2009, www.ft.com
51. FBIS SOV, December 22, 2009.
52. Alexander Gabuyev, Cost of the Matter, Moscow,
Kommersant, December 23, 2009, FBIS SOV, December
23, 2009.
53. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Turkmenistan Weekly Roundup,
Eurasia Insight, April 14, 2011.
54. Warmer Ties For Russia, China With Big Gas Deals,
www.cbsnews.cm/storis/2009/10/14/ap/asia/main5384036,
October 14, 2009.
55. The RussiaChina Gas negotiations will be the subject of a
future article by the author.
56. Moscow, Vesti TV in Russian, January 23, 2009, FBIS SOV,
January 23, 2009; Moscow, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian,
January 23, 2009, FBIS SOV, January 23, 2009.
57. Farangis Najibullah, Trip Cancellation Fuels Rumors of Rift in
Tajik-Russian Relations, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty,
February 2, 2009.
58. Falkowski and Jarosieiwcz, op. cit.
59. Tajikistan: Dushanbe On the Edge of InstabilityReport,
Eurasia Insight, February 18, 2009; Ulrich Speck, Tajik Presi-
dent, in Brussels, Looks to Boost Relations with EU, NATO,
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 9, 2009.
60. Medvedev in Uzbekistan-Russia Sends Contradictory Sig-
nals to Central Asia, CES Commentary, www.osw.waw.pl.
January 28, 2009.
61. Sergei Medrea, Energy Update-Tajikistan: An Eye For an
Eye? Eurasia Insight, January 28, 2009; Iran to Take Part
in Construction of Tajik Power Plant, Dushanbe, Asia-Plus
Website, February 6, 2009, from Lexis-Nexis; Tajikistan:
Dushanbe Threatens Uzbekistan with Water Cut-Off,
Eurasia Insight, January 27, 2009.
62. Alexander Reutov, Rogun Hydroelectric Power Station Pro-
duces First Electricity in Relations Between Dushanbe and
Moscow, Moscow, Kommersant Online, in Russian, January
29, 2009, FBIS SOV, January 29, 2009; Bishkek, Bishkek
Press Club, in Russian, February 4, 2009, FBIS SOV February
4, 2009.
63. Dushanbe, Asia-Plus in Russian, February 5, 2009, FBIS SOV,
February 5, 2009; Viktoriya Panlova, Dushanbe Will
Present Moscow with Bill: Russian Military Base Covers
Tajikistan From South, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in
Russian, February 20, 2009, FBIS SOV, February 20, 2009,
Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, July 24, 2009, FBIS SOV, July
24, 2009; Alexander Reutov, Ermomali Rahmonov has Put
Russian Out of Work, Moscow, Kommersant Online, in
Russian, July 24, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 24, 2009; Alexander
Gabuyev, Tajikistan Has Requested Reinforcements for the
Russian military, Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, July
30, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 30, 2009.
64. Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, April 14, 2009, FBIS SOV, April
14, 2009; Uzbekistan: Tashkent Resumes Electricity Exports
to Afghanistan, Eurasia Insight, January 27, 2009.
65. Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan: Is Tashkent Reaching Out to
Dushanbe? Eurasia Insight, February 26, 2009; Dushanbe:
Khovar Online, in Russian, February 16, 2009, FBIS SOV,
February 16, 2009.
66. Parshin, op. cit.
67. Open Source Center Feature-Uzbekistan-Russia: Karimov,
Medvedev Both Achieve Goals At Meeting, OSC Report,
FBIS SOV, November 24, 2008January 28, 2009.
68. Tashkent, Narodnoye Slovo, in Russian, March 6, 2009, FBIS
SOV, March 6, 2009.
69. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, July 30, 2009, FBIS SOV, July
30, 2009; Aliya Samigullina, Money For Bases, Moscow,
Gazeta.ru, in Russian, July 30, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 30,
2009; Tajikistan: Russian President Medvedev Arrives in
Dushanbe for Talks, Eurasia Insight, July 30, 2009; Alexan-
der Gabuyev, Preliminary Lack of Agreement. Dmitry
Medvedev Decides To consider Emomali Rahmonovs Visit
Preparatory, Moscow, Kommersant Online, in Russian,
February 25, 2009, FBIS SOV, February 25, 2009; Sergei
Blagov, Russia Seeks To Boost ties with Tajikistan, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, August 4, 2009.
70. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, February 26, 2009, FBIS
SOV, February 26, 2009.
71. Almaty, Aykyn Apata, in Kazakh, April 30, 2009, FBIS SOV,
April 30, 2009.
72. Dushanbe, Avesta, in Russian, June 16, 2009, FBIS SOV,
June 16, 2009; Moscow, Interfax, May 20, 2009, FBIS
SOV, May 20, 2009.
73. Dushanbe, Tajik Television First Channel, in Tajik, July 27,
2009, FBIS SOV, July 27, 2009.
74. Russia and Uzbekistan to Bring Stability to Kyrgyzstan,
http://rt.com/Politics/2010-06-08/russia-uzbekistan-stabilize-
kyrgyzstan.html, June 8, 2010.
75. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, June 19, 2010, FBIS SOV,
June 19, 2010; Caversham, BBC Monitoring, in English, June
19, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 19, 2010; Tashkent, Uzbek Tele-
vision Service, in Uzbek, June 18, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 18,
2010.
76. Uzbekistan-China: Toward Enhancing Cooperation, June
10, 2010, http://www.gov.uz/en/press/politics/5730
77. Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese, June 9, 2010,
FBIS SOV, June 9, 2010.
78. Mikhail Zygar and Konstantin Gaaze, The Russians are Not
Coming, Moscow, Russky Newsweek Online, in Russian,
June 22, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 22, 2010; Moscow, Ekho
Moskvy, June 14, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 14, 2010; Simon
Shuster, Why Isnt Russia Intervening in Kyrgyzstan? Time,
June 16, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1997055,00.html
79. Open Source Center, OSC Feature, Uzbekistan, China
Pledge New Stage of Bilateral Relations, Tashkent: Jahon,
June 910, 2010, FBIS SOV June 10, 2010; Moscow, Inter-
fax, in English, April 23, 2010, FBIS SOV, April 23, 2010;
Tashkent, UzReport.com, in English, June 11, 2010, FBIS
220 American Foreign Policy Interests
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SOV, June 11, 2010; Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, in
Chinese, June 9, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 9, 2010.
80. D. Podolsky, Uzbekistan Intends to Sell China 10 Billion Cubic
Meters of Gas, Previously Promised Russia, http://thereareno-
sunglasses.wordpress.com/2010/06/25/uzbekistan-intends-to-
sell-china-gas-previously-promised-to-russia/, June 25, 2010.
81. President Islam Karimov Completes State Visit to China,
Uzbekistan Today, April 22, 2011, http://www.ut.uz/eng/
today/president_islam_karimov_completes_state_visit_to_
china.mgr
82. SCO Summit in Astana to Sum Up Organizations Activities
Over Decade, ITAR-TASS, June 15, 2011, http://www.
itar-tass.com/en/c142.html
83. Vladimir Mukhin, Poslednaya Nabrosok na Iuge,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 8, 2005.
84. Kremlin Aide: Chinas Economic Activities in SCO Nations
No Threat to Russia, Beijing, Xinhua, in English, June 15,
2011, FBIS SOV, June 15, 2011.
85. Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, China As a
Neighbor: Central Asian Perspectives and Strategies (Stock-
holm: Institute for Security, Development and Policy,
2009).
86. Robert Legvold, The Russian Question, Vladimir
Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security
Agenda (Oxford; Oxford University Press for the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1997), 67.
Volume 33, Number 5, 2011 221
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