The Iiskala et al article describes high level collaborative processes as co-construction
of meaningful knowledge. They note that these processes are more likely to occur in situations where the peers in the group are roughly at the same proficiency level and can carry our similar actions, share common goals, and work together. This made me wonder if it is appropriate to group students on different levels of proficiency. This practice was encouraged in my education classes, and we were even told to group the students ourselves (instead of allowing students to pick their own groups) so that each group of students would have various levels of students. The reasoning for this grouping was that high level students could help low level students on the task at hand. Perhaps in order to promote deeper metacognitive skills, students of the same proficiency level should work together. Unfortunately, the study by Iiskala did not include low proficiency children, so it is not known whether or not grouping these children would result in co-construction of meaningful knowledge. My prediction is that it would not. Also, mixing proficiency levels might overload the high level students. They may be able to explain cognitive procedures to the low level students, but then the high level students may miss the chance to reflect metacognitively throughout the problem solving process. One of my peers did a similar study of physics TAs pedagogical content knowledge using the Force Concept Inventory (FCI). He asked individual TAs to mark the answers to the FCI as a student, choosing the most commonly chosen incorrect answer. Then he asked the TAs to complete the same task in groups. Within the groups, the TAs became significantly better at choosing the most commonly chosen incorrect answer. Even though the TAs were from many different countries, co-construction of meaningful pedagogical content knowledge occurred. I liked the point in the Efklides article about how metacognitive processes can be associated with affect. That is, the awareness of a feeling of difficulty becomes a cue that the response might not be correct, and a persons confidence decreases even if the outcome of processing is correct. Also, a person can feel highly confident even if the outcome of cognitive processing is incorrect, just because the solution/response was produced quickly. We have noted in physics, students who get an exam returned to them do not dwell on looking at the answers they got wrong to understand them correctly because it pains them to look at the wrong answer. I believe the same thing happens as students take an exam. I have done think aloud interviews and I can see that students will get hung up on one problem, spend many minutes trying to solve it and get nowhere, and eventually take a guess and move on because they do not want to feel a decrease in confidence. And in fact, some of the answers they give conflict with prior answers which shows, to me at least, that by being affectively distracted, they were not able to self-regulate during a test. So it is possible that affect can interfere with metacognition or even inhibit it in some cases. For upper level students, it is possible that they are so used to feeling confident in their answers that they want to avoid feeling underconfident and this inhibits self-regulation.