Emotions in Organizations: A Multi-Level Perspective: Neal M. Ashkanasy

EMOTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS:
A MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE
Neal M. Ashkanasy
ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the study of emotions in
organizations. Research, however, has been hampered by the ephemeral
nature of emotions and a lack of an integrated multi-level model. This
article therefore presents a ve-level model of emotions in organizations.
At the lowest level is within-person variation, dened in terms of affective
events theory. Levels of the model then proceed through individual, dyadic
relationship, group, and organization-wide perspectives. The article also
outlines the neurophysiological processes that underlie the experience,
perception, and communication of emotion; it concludes with a discussion
of implications for research and practice.
INTRODUCTION
Although the study of emotions in work settings is not new (see Mastenbroek,
2000; Weiss & Brief, 2001, for historical overviews), empirical research in this
eld has been slow to enter the mainstream of organization science. This situation
began to change, however, following publication in 1983 of Hochschilds The
Managed Heart, and accelerated in 1995 following Ashforth and Humphreys
(1995) Reappraisal. Today the level of interest is at a high point, as evidenced in
the raft of books (Ashkanasy, H artel & Zerbe, 2000; Ashkanasy, Zerbe & H artel,
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Strategy
Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 2, 954
Copyright 2003 by Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1016/S1475-9144(03)02002-2
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10 NEAL M. ASHKANASY
2002; Fineman, 1993, 2000; Lord, Klimoski & Kanfer, 2002; Payne & Cooper,
2001) and special issues of journals (Fisher &Ashkanasy, 2000; Fox, 2002; Weiss,
2001) that have appeared over the last two years. Simultaneously, there has been a
rise in interest in studying emotions in social psychology (see, for example, Forgas,
2001), much of this buoyed by advances in our understanding of neuropsychology
(see, for example, Damasio, 1999; Dolan, 2000; LeDoux, 2000). Although this
research is still in development, it is becoming clear that emotion dimensions
pervade the entire spectrum of human behavior and interaction, including orga-
nizations. Mumby and Putnam (1992) characterized this as a shift in perspective
from bounded rationality (cf. Simon, 1976) to bounded emotionality (see
also Martin, Knopoff & Beckman, 2000). In particular, recent advances in
emotional research have spanned all levels of organizational analysis. This article,
therefore, presents a multi-level theory of emotions in organizations, extending
across ve levels, from the within-person level to the idea of emotional climate
and culture in organizations.
One of the reasons that organization science has been so belated in researching
emotions is because of the inherently ephemeral and idiosyncratic nature of
emotion. How is it possible to study systematically a concept that can vary
so widely and unpredictably within each of us? One moment we are sad, the
next elated. One moment we can be fearful, the next triumphant. Not only that,
but emotions appear to be manipulable. As Hochschild (1983) so poignantly
illustrated, people can even be paid to display emotions different from the one
they are actually experiencing (see also Fineman, 2001). In this article, I argue that
this is exactly what makes the study of emotions so vital and interesting. Recent
advances in research methodology, such as the experience sampling method
(ESM; see Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983),
have allowed us to study systematically these dynamic phenomena. Consequently,
I present in this article a ve-level model of emotions in organizations. The
rst level in this model, however, is not the ubiquitous individual level, but
within-person, and involves the temporal variations in mood and emotion that
people experience every day of their lives. The remaining levels in the model
proceed through the individual level, to interpersonal relationships, to groups,
and then to organizations. The ve levels are illustrated in Fig. 1, showing
the topics salient at each level.
Although this article presents a multi-level model that spans micro and macro
dimensions of organizational behavior, emotions are intensely personal. As a con-
sequence, much discussion is devoted to the micro-level nature of emotions how
individuals experience, perceive, communicate, and manage their own and others
emotions. In this respect, after rst dening emotion, I proceed to a description of
some of the recent ndings on the biological bases of emotions. This establishes
Emotions in Organizations 11
Fig. 1. Five Levels of Emotions in Organizations.
a foundation for discussion of emotion at each level of the model, including the
means of researching this topic. I conclude the article with a discussion of the
implications of emotions at multiple levels for research and practice.
DEFINING EMOTIONS
One of the most frustrating issues confronting writers and readers in the emotion
literature is the diversity of denitions and overlapping terms (see Oatley &
Jenkins, 1992). Terms such as emotion, mood, affect, and feelings appear to be
used almost interchangeably by some authors. Indeed, there is ongoing debate in
the literature about the very underpinnings of emotions and related terms (see, for
example, Eisenberg, 2000; Izard, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1991; Zajonc,
1980, 1984, 1985). For example, while Lazarus (1991) argued that emotions are
initiated by cognitions, contemporaneously Zajonc (1985) argued that emotions
are essentially visceral reactions and therefore constitute antecedents, rather than
consequences of cognition. Since the 1980s, however, the consensus has emerged
that emotions involve an interaction of cognitive and non-cognitive neural systems
(see Bloom, Lazerson & Hofstadter, 1985; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Dalton,
2000; Fischer, Shaver & Carnochan, 1990). In this respect, emotion is seen as an
integration of innate, adaptive subsystems, derived from the evolutionary needs
of survival (LeDoux, 1995a; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Table 1. Simplied Emotional Hierarchy (Adapted from Fischer et al., 1990).
Super-ordinate Component Basic Component Subordinate Component
Positive Love Fondness
Infatuation
Joy Bliss
Contentment
Pride
Negative Anger Annoyance
Hostility
Contempt
Jealousy
Sadness Agony
Grief
Guilt
Loneliness
Fear Horror
Worry
The interactive model would therefore seem to provide an appropriate platform
for a denition of emotion. Working from this model, Izard (1993) cited a taxon-
omy developed by Fischer, Shaver and Carnochan (1990) as the basis for dening
emotion (see Gray & Watson, 2001 for a similar taxonomy). Fischer et al. dene
emotion as a discrete, innate, functional, biosocial action and expression system
(p. 84), and posit that emotions are determined by three distinct categorical
components (see Table 1). The rst, called the superordinate category, involves
a functional appraisal of events as either advancing or hindering the organisms
explicit or implicit goals. The second component, referred to by Fischer et al. as
the basic level, categorizes emotion under ve broad labels: love and joy are cate-
gorized under the superordinate heading of positive emotion (goal advancement),
while anger, sadness, and fear are under the superordinate heading of negative
emotion (goal hindrance). The third level denes the subordinate category, which
Fischer et al. describe as manifest in prototypical scripts. These scripts comprise
sets of predetermined behavioral responses used to express emotions in particular
circumstances. Fischer et al. note that there are a great number of scripts, and
that these develop over a lifetime of experience and social learning. For example,
open expression of joy may be appropriate in celebratory circumstances, but may
be circumscribed in other situations (e.g. learning of an inheritance following the
death of a family member).
In the organizational context, Basch and Fisher (2000) have demonstrated
that, with only a few exceptions, employees experience nearly the full range of
emotions in their workplace, together with emotions more specic to the work
environment. In descending order of frequency of occurrence, they found that
employees report feeling positive emotions of pleasure, happiness, pride, enthu-
siasm, relief, optimism, affection, and power. The negative emotions reported
by Basch and Fisher, again in descending order of frequency, were frustration,
worry, disappointment, annoyance, anger, unhappiness, embarrassment, sadness,
disgust, hurt, fear, and bitterness. More recently, Lazarus and Cohen-Charash
(2001) list anger, anxiety, guilt and shame, envy and jealousy, hope, happiness/joy,
pride, compassion, and love as instances of discrete emotions that are found in
workplace settings.
Basch and Fisher (2000) demonstrated further that emotions in the workplace
are tied to specic events (cf. Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Consistent with
Fischer et al. (1990), it appears that organizational members react to events in
terms of learned behavioral scripts (cf. Fischer et al., 1990). More particularly,
Gioia and Poole (1984) argue that, in organizational contexts, it is these scripts
that constitute the detailed range of responses that organizational members have
at their disposal to cope with organizational reality. According to Izard (1993), the
scripts are made up of uniquely identiable combinations of behavioral, cognitive,
and emotional reactions to environmental stimuli. Considerable controversy
exists, however, about the mechanisms underlying elicitation of scripts and the
specic nature of emotional scripts.
An alternative denition, based on the evolutionary theory of emotion, is based
on the idea that emotions such as fear and disgust motivate us to avoid statistically
regular threats in the environment. In this respect, Damasio (1994) differentiates
between primary emotions, the evolved emotions needed for survival and based
on the limbic system of the brain, and secondary emotions, where the neocortex
processes information at a higher level (see below for further discussion of
brain processes). Secondary emotions are less genetically derived than primary
emotions and develop progressively over the lifetime of the organism.
Finally, emotions also include a motor component that is derived from, but
distinct from, mental functions (see Damasio, 1994, 1999; Fischer et al., 1990;
Izard, 1993). These motor components involve facial expressions, posture,
vocalizations, head and eye movements, and muscle action potential (Izard,
1992). Associated with them are physiological responses that are caused by the
effects of emotions on the autonomic and endocrine systems of the organism.
They include heartbeat, sweat glands, blood pressure, and respiration. From the
evolutionary perspective, activation of these systems has adaptive value in dealing
with threats in the environment. Bloom et al. (1985) and LeDoux (1995b) also
point out that the survival advantages offered by the autonomic and endocrine
responses to threat also include increased blood ow to the skeletal muscles and
suppressed reactivity to pain. The resulting improvements in the effectiveness of
the motor system help to reduce physical damage to the organism.
Summatively, and based on the neurophysiological evidence, Ashkanasy,
H artel and Zerbe (2000) dened emotions in terms of endogenous and exogenous
inputs to particular neural systems, leading to internal and external manifestations
of emotion. The internal manifestations of emotion include the subjective feelings
experienced by the individual subject to the emotion-eliciting stimulus, which the
individual cognitively interprets. The external manifestations of emotion include
respiration rate, facial expression, and posture. Importantly, it is the external
manifestations of emotion that are subject to interpretation both by the individual
affected and by observers in the environment.
As the reader can see, the foregoing attempts to dene emotion have led
inevitably into the murky interior of the human brain. Indeed, understanding of
emotions requires an appreciation of the neural processes that drive emotional
reactions.
Neurological and Biological Bases of Emotions
What makes emotions unique is that they are only partially under our control.
Indeed, I suspect that this property is what has made the study of emotions
such an anathema to organizational scholars. Simon (1976) went so far as
to refer to emotions pejoratively as irrational or even arational behavior, and
suggested that attempts to study emotions using the usual approaches are
inherently problematical. At the same time, the new emotions-cognition research
has shown that it is erroneous to try to study any aspect of human thought or
behavior without addressing the emotions. Damasio (1994) referred to this as
Descartes error. He argues that our cognitive and emotional systems in the
brain work more closely together than had been realized previously, and that
reasoning is dependent on what he terms somantic markers in the physical
body.
The critical connection point of the physiological and neurological systems re-
sides in the limbic system in the brain. Damasio (1998) points out that this is what
drives our emotional responses. The principal components of the limbic system
comprise the (anterior) cingulate cortex, the amigdaloid nuclei (which comprise
two amygdalae), and the hypothalamus. Damasio (1998; see also Dalton, 2000)
has shown that, rather than the limbic system acting in an integrated fashion as
was once thought (see MacLean, 1952), the different limbic components actually
act independently in respect to each emotion. Moreover, recent research has
suggested that the limbic systemis not the only mechanismof emotion, although it
does account for many of the basic emotional pathways in the brain (see Damasio,
1998). In this account, the emotion systems of the brain comprise a complex
system of neural pathways connected to nuclei distributed throughout the human
brain. There is little wonder, then, that the nature and sources of emotions are
still mostly undiscovered.
Largely through the work of Joseph LeDoux (Armony & LeDoux, 2000;
LeDoux, 1995a, b, 1996, 1998, 2000), we now have a good deal of understanding
about one emotion, however: fear. LeDoux (1995a) argues that fear is the most
fundamental of emotions from an evolutionary perspective, because fear is the
basic mechanism of self-preservation for every species. Further, because fear is
so crucial for survival, LeDoux (1995a) argues that it provides the most incisive
insights into the emotional brain. Fear is also an emotion that can operate both
internally or externally to our sensory systems. Thus, fear can result from a
perception of something in the environment that represents danger. Alternatively,
our own memories and experiences can teach us to be fearful of or anxious about an
as-yet-unseen danger. LeDoux showed that the amygdalae are the central proces-
sors of the fear system. LeDoux (1995a) describes how the emotional signicance
of external and internal stimuli is processed in the brain between the neocortex,
the amygdala, and the limbic system. Figure 2 illustrates the four basic neural
pathways. Pathways 2, 3, and 4 involve cortical processing and memory prior to
activation of the amygdala. Pathway 1, however, provides direct links between
the thalamus and the amygdala and between the amygdala and the perceptive
cortices. It is this link that represents LeDouxs major discovery that some neural
pathways actually bypass neocortical processing. In addition, LeDoux found that
connections between the amygdala and the cortex are reciprocal, although the two
amygdalae send out many more connections to the cortex than they receive back.
This explains why it is so difcult for fear to be unlearned through cortical input,
and why it is so much more difcult for us to control our fear reactions than it is
for fear to take control of our cognitive functions (see Armony & LeDoux, 2000;
LeDoux, 1995a, b).
The centrality of the amygdalae has been further underlined by McEwan
(1995), who points out that they also connect to the part of the brain controlling
autonomic, respiratory, cardiovascular, facial, and neuro-endocrinal responses.
For example, the amygdalae inuence hypothalamal-pituitary-adrenal activity
through projections to the paraventricular nucleus and the bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis, itself implicated in anxiety (Davis & Lee, 1998). Thus, the amygdalae
are implicated in the adrenal steroid stress response and hypothalamic control
of the autonomic system generally. Another function, the freezing response, a
tendency to freeze with fear, is controlled through amygdalic projections to the
central gray (LeDoux, 1995a, 2000; McEwan, 1995).
Fig. 2
Fear Circuits in the Brain. Note: Neural circuits involved in fear. Four pathways are iden-
tied. Abbreviations: LEM (lemniscual nuclei), EX (extralemniscal areas), LH (lateral
hypothalamus), RVL (rostral ventral lateral medulla), BNST (bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis), PVN (paraventricular hypothalmus). Source: LeDoux (1995a). With permis-
sion, from the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 46 1995 by Annual Reviews
www.annualreviews.org
Evidence for the neural basis of emotions other than fear and anger is not as
forthcoming, however. Damasio (1998) points out, for example, that the amygdalae
are denitely not involved in all emotions. Positive emotions and the negative
emotion of disgust are processed in pathways that do not link to the amygdalae at
all. The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis is associated with anxiety and has similar
output paths to the amygdala (Davis &Lee, 1998). Recently, Tomarken and Keener
(1998) and Gotlib, Ranganath and Rosenfeld (1998) have provided evidence that
left frontal hypoactivity, as measured by EEG, is linked to depression, a mood
disorder, and to emotion and the amygdalic function (Drevets & Raichle, 1995).
The foregoing discussion of the role of the amygdala and its association with
the primitive emotion of fear illustrates another important point: Our emotions are
not always under control. As noted earlier, the neural circuits that are inuenced
by the amygdala control our cardiovascular, respiratory, autonomic, facial, and
endocrine responses. The important point here is that these responses are initiated
preconsciously and have internally knowable and externally visible visceral
outcomes. Further, since fear, as a primary emotion, is also involved in secondary
emotions such as apprehension, it is also likely that some of our secondary
emotional responses occur publicly and prior to conscious control.
Finally, I reiterate that the primacy of the fear emotion is not misplaced. Indeed,
in organizational settings, fear appears to be an important motivator. LeDoux
(1996, 1998) notes, for example, that there is strong biological evidence of a
specic mono-polar reaction to fear. Further, writers such as Flam (1993), Funlop
and Rivkin (1997), and Mirvis and Sales (1990) have noted the central role that
fear plays in organizational settings. In particular, fear can be conceptualized as
a positive force in the context of Lewins eld theory (see also Cartwright, 1976;
Funlop & Rivkin, 1997); it shocks actors to shift cognitive gears from automatic
(or culturally ingrained) to conscious (or malleable) processes via what Schein
(1979) calls the process of disconrmation. In this instance, LeDouxs focus on
fear clearly has implications in the wider organizational setting, an idea I shall
develop later in this article.
Although not as advanced as our knowledge of negative emotions such as fear
and anger, there is nevertheless evidence that positive emotions are similarly
based on deeply seated neuropsychological mechanisms. Alice Isen has long
championed the idea that mild positive affect is associated with creative decision
making (Isen, 1993, 1999), including that in organizational settings (Isen &
Baron, 1991). More recently, Isen and her colleagues (see Ashby, Isen & Turken,
1999) have argued that this process is mediated by the neurotransmitter dopamine.
In their theory, dopamine levels in the brain are increased as a result of positive
emotions, and the presence of this neurotransmitter in the anterior cingulate
cortex is responsible for more creative and exible cognitions. Although yet to
be specically tested, the dopamine theory presented by Ashby and colleagues is
convincingly argued and suggests that, like negative emotions, positive emotions
are mediated by deeply seated neuropsychological processes, largely beyond
our conscious control.
I have provided a brief overviewof the biological basis of emotions. In particular,
recent and ongoing research by neurobiologists such as Damasio and LeDoux, and
especially the latest imaging research (e.g. see Dolan, 2000), is doing much to clear
away the mystery surrounding human emotional responses. Although there is still
a long way to go before we have full understanding of these processes, we know
enough now to tell us that the emotion-generating parts of the brain can no longer
be ignored by researchers of human behavior in organizational settings or, for
that matter, any other setting. The neural pathways associated with emotion are
complex and have a profound effect on a wide range of human behavior. It is
these emotional responses that provide the foundation for the next part of this
article: discussion of emotions as a within-person phenomenon, the rst level of
the multi-level model.
EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 1: WITHIN-PERSON
As argued earlier, what makes emotion a unique and challenging variable in
organizational behavior is its dynamic nature. Unlike many of the variables that
have traditionally been studied in organizational behavior, such as personality,
attitudes, and beliefs, emotions and affective states change rapidly from day
to day, and even from moment to moment. This has introduced a heretofore
under-represented level in organizational behavior the within-person, or
temporal, level. Analysis at this level presents all the usual challenges of multi-
level analysis, especially in how to combine data at different levels of analysis
(see Fisher, 2000a).
I deal with two aspects of within-person emotion in organizational settings.
The rst is based on affective events theory, or AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996),
which holds that emotional states at work are determined by the occurrence
of discrete work events, especially the everyday hassles and uplifts that we
all experience in our working lives. These events generate specic emotional
reactions that are hypothesized to inuence behavior and attitudes. The second
area concerns the role of mood in workplace settings. Unlike the direct cause-
and-effect nature of AET, mood is a more diffuse state and is likely to change
more slowly. Nonetheless, as a form of affective state, mood is still ephemeral
and changing.
Affective Events Theory
AET was derived initially from the realization that job satisfaction is not really
an affective state, but rather a set of job-related attitudes (see Fisher, 2000b;
Weiss, 2002). Although Organ and Near (1985) addressed this point over 15
years ago, Fisher and Weiss make the point that most modern characterizations
of job satisfaction continue incorrectly to equate job satisfaction with affect.
They argue that job satisfaction and affect, although related, are conceptually and
operationally distinct constructs, and should be treated as such in organizational
behavior theory (see also Wright & Staw, 1999).
Consistent with the case I have made earlier concerning the biological bases
of emotion, AET is predicated on the proposition that employees behavior and
performance at work are not so much determined by attitudes and personality, but
rather by moment-by-moment variations in the way they feel at work (see Fisher,
2000b; Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 1999). Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) argue in
particular that events and conditions in the workplace environment constitute
affective events, and that it is these events that ultimately determine moods and
emotions. Such emotions and moods can lead to the formation of more long-term
attitudes, reected in low job satisfaction and low affective commitment, or even
a propensity to leave the organization. Conversely, accumulation of positive affect
can lead to positive attitudes, including job satisfaction, and productive work (see
Wright, Bonnett & Sweeney, 1993; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). The seminal
contribution of AET is that, for the rst time in the OB literature, an attempt
has been made to tackle the ongoing, temporally varying processes that underlie
behavior in organizations.
AET is still under development, but it is the rst true multi-level model of
emotions in organizations. At the between-person level (and as I discuss later),
personal dispositional variables such as trait affectivity (Watson &Tellegen, 1985)
affect the formation of positive and negative emotions. At the organizational level,
the model in its present conguration (viz., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) takes
into account aspects of the work environment, including job characteristics, role
stressors, and requirements for emotional labor (discussed later in this article).
Research into AET is progressing but has yet to be published extensively in
the peer-reviewed literature, although results that are emerging to date (e.g. see
Fisher, 2000b; OShea, Ashkanasy, Gallois & H artel, 1999, 2000a, b; Weiss et al.,
1999) are encouraging. Results of these studies have supported the central tenet
of AET: that emotional reactions to events at work mediate subsequent attitudinal
and behavioral responses to the events.
One aspect of ongoing controversy, however, concerns the conceptual nature
of emotions in social settings and is salient to AET. Basch and Fisher (2000), for
example, present emotions as discrete states including, for example, joy, pride,
fear, anger, and disgust. Others, such as Russell and Feldman-Barrett (1999),
refer instead to core affect. Based on Watson and Tellegens (1985) affect
circumplex (see Fig. 3), Russell and Feldman-Barrett propose that core affect is
based on dimensions of pleasantness and activation. In the original Watson and
Tellegen model, however, affect is based on dimensions of positive and negative
affect. Russell and Carroll (1999a, b) argue that the basic dimension is the rotated
axes or dimensions of activation and pleasantness (see Watson & Tellegen, 1999,
Fig. 3
The Circumplex Model of Affect. Source: Watson and Tellegen (1999). With permission,
from the American Psychological Association 1999.
for a response to Russell and Carroll). Carver (2001) has subsequently argued
that the two positions can be reconciled using a functionalist perspective, where
each dimensional model is appropriate to different behavioral conditions, based
on an incentive focus or a threat-avoidant focus.
Similar to Carver (2001), I argue that adoption of the appropriate model of
emotion is contingent on the question being addressed. Gray and Watson (2001)
and Finn and Chattopadhyay (2000) conclude likewise that discrete emotions,
affect, and mood are reciprocally interrelated, and that choice of which model is
most appropriate depends on the purpose of the analysis and the functional nature
of outcomes.
Interestingly, AET researchers (see Fisher, 2000b; Weiss et al., 1999) have
provided strong conrmation that job satisfaction and affect are different, albeit
related, constructs. They have used ESM (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983),
where respondents were asked to provide data on their instantaneous feelings
over a set period in their workplace environment.
A further outcome of AET is the importance of accumulation of hassles and
uplifts. Thus, rather than the intensity of major events being the source of attitudes
and behavior at work, according to AET, emotions are more determined by the
frequency with which hassles or uplifts occur (see Fisher, 1998, 2000a, b). This
conclusion implies that, in respect of negative emotions, people are more capable of
handling one-off incidents than they are of dealing with ongoing hassles. Afurther
corollary of this is that the accumulation of negative events can be offset by positive
support from colleagues, friends, and family (see Grzywacz & Marks, 2000).
This conclusion leads to the idea of affective episodes, where it is not so
much particular events that result in outcomes, but rather the accumulation of
positive or negative events in an episode that determines how we feel (cf. Fisher,
2000b). In addition, Fredrickson (2000) refers to the peaks and ends of
affective experiences, where the outcomes of affective episodes are determined
respectively by two factors: (1) the most intense experience; and (2) the experience
at the end of the episode. Thus, an employee who experiences a series of setbacks
may ultimately end up seeing the episode in a positive light if the episode has
a positive conclusion.
In summary, it is clear that the AET model holds tremendous potential to further
our understanding of why people behave as they do in organizations. AET is the
rst model in the organizational literature to include transient emotional states
as its core, and it provides explanations previously inaccessible to researchers
of organizational behavior. Early research ndings (e.g. Fisher, 2000b; OShea
et al., 1999, 2000a, b; Weiss et al., 1999) are encouraging, but there remain
several unresolved issues in the way that the model is operationalized, including
the nature of affect and emotion. Still, there is enough already to suggest
that study of within-person variations in emotion will provide further useful
insights in this respect.
Mood
Although not as rapidly varying as emotion, mood nonetheless constitutes a
distinct additional source of within-person variability (see Gray & Watson, 2001;
Oatley & Jenkins, 1992) and an important determinant of decision making and
behavior in social (see Forgas, 1992; Isen, 1999) and organizational (see George &
Brief, 1992, 1996a) settings. As a general rule, however, research into the effects
of mood in workplace settings has treated positive (Isen & Baron, 1991) and
negative (George & Brief, 1996b) mood as distinctly different phenomena. In
this regard, Forgass (1995) affect infusion model (AIM) may provide a means to
understand mood as a more integrated phenomenon. More recently, Forgas and
George (2001) teamed up to show how the AIM might be applied in workplace
settings.
In the AIM, mood affects cognitive judgments through two basic mechanisms
(Forgas, 1995). In the rst of these mechanisms, mood acts directly on decision
making through fast evaluative reactions based on body states (cf. Damasio, 1994).
Put simply, research has shown that judgmental evaluations are usually consistent
with the actors prevailing mood state (e.g. see Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995; Forgas
& George, 2001; Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman
& Evans, 1992; Mayer & Salovey, 1988). The second mechanism in the AIM
works through the effect of mood on selection of cognitive strategies and the
effect of mood states on memory.
The AIM attempts to provide an integration of positive and negative mood
theory, but the bulk of work on mood in workplace settings has treated positive
and negative mood effects differentially. In the following paragraphs, therefore, I
briey review rst positive, then negative mood effects.
Positive Mood
In respect to positive mood, the work of Isen and her colleagues has been at the
forefront of our understanding (see Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman &
Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz &Robinson, 1985). Findings of these studies
have provided evidence that positive affect results in creativity and cognitive
exibility. Consistent with this, the general conclusion from research (e.g. Isen &
Baron, 1991) is that positive mood is associated with positive outcomes, including
better job satisfaction (Connolly & Viswesvaran, 2000), less turnover (Shaw,
1999), more helping behaviors at work (Williams & Shiaw, 1999), better negotia-
tion outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and improved performance (Cropanzano
& Wright, 2001; Wright & Staw, 1999). Kraiger, Billings and Isen (1989) have
also shown that positive affect leads to more positive evaluations of jobs, although
only when the jobs were already seen to be rich and meaningful. The picture that
emerges from these results is that positive mood is universally desired in organi-
zations. The reality, unfortunately, is not so rosy. George and Brief (1996a), for
example, note that positive mood, although facilitative on some tasks, especially
those involving creativity (see Estrada, Isen & Young, 1994), may actually inhibit
performance on other tasks. This is because high performance is so often accom-
panied by striving and effort to meet challenging goals (cf. Locke & Latham,
1990). Positive mood feelings under these conditions are likely to be put on hold.
Negative Mood
As George and Brief (1996b) note, it appears that ndings in respect to negative
mood are less straightforward than those for positive mood. Clark and Isen (1982),
Kaufman and Vosburg (1997), and Rusting and DeHart (2000), for example,
point out that people in a negative mood are often motivated to perform more
positively so that they can change their mood to a positive one. Thus, people in
a negative mood often appear to behave incongruously displaying more helping
behavior and working more productively. Nonetheless, as George and Brief point
out, people in negative moods are still generally less satised with their jobs and
are more likely to want to leave their jobs.
Finally, there is evidence that negative mood promotes more cognitively
efcient information processing (see Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Schwarz
& Bohner, 1996; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Alloy and Abramson, in particular,
have provided evidence that negative moods are often more accurate and realistic
perceptions, while positive moods can lead to feelings of unrealistic optimism.
As noted earlier, it seems that positive moods are not always such a good thing,
although we would all rather be in a good mood than a bad mood.
To summarize the present discussion of within-person emotion and mood, it is
clear that these are important, but neglected dimensions in organizational behavior
research. Recent research into emotions at work, based on AET and the AIM, hold
the potential for improving our understanding of how and why people behave and
think in organizational settings.
EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 2: BETWEEN-PERSONS
As noted earlier, emotions are dynamic and ephemeral. Even so, there are
aspects of emotions and the effects of emotions that can be described at the
between-person level. Recently, for example, Brockner and Higgins (2001) set
out a regulatory focus theory of emotions, where emotions are determined
by personal focus on promotion (self-promotion) or prevention (self-defense).
These foci, in turn, regulate actors emotional states. Theories such as this,
however, fail to take full account of the temporal variability of emotion as I
have described above. Nonetheless, there are certain variables, derived from
within-person processes, that do appear as personal outcomes. These include
job satisfaction, turnover, helping behaviors, and performance. Perhaps the most
researched of these variables is affective commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991),
an emotionally driven liking and attachment to the organization. In addition to
these variables, other aspects of emotions at the individual levels are describable
in terms of traits.
The rst of these is well-being, the maintenance of positive emotional health
in workplace settings (see Cooper & Williams, 1994), often from a mental
health perspective (e.g. Cotton, 1996). Negatively associated with this is the idea
of job burnout (see Cordes & Dougherty, 1993; Maslach, Schaufeli & Leiter,
2000), which includes affect as a central component in the form of emotional
exhaustion. The general conclusion of this literature is that the mental well-being
of employees is determined in part through maintenance of positive affect. (I
return to this topic again in discussion of the organizational level.)
The second consideration is trait affect. Similar to state effect discussed
earlier, and based on the affect circumplex as illustrated in Fig. 3 (see Russell &
Feldman-Barrett, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), trait affectivity represents a
personal disposition to be in a long-term positive or negative affective state. Fox
and Spector (2000) and Staw and Barsade (1993) have examined the effect of trait
affect and found that it plays a small role in determining personal outcomes in
organizational settings. Of course, when negative trait affect becomes chronic, the
result is burnout, with more severe consequences for the individual concerned.
More recently, Judge and Larsen (2001) have proposed a theory of job satisfaction
based on trait affect.
The third and nal dimension of individual difference that I discuss is the
relatively recently introduced concept of emotional intelligence. This variable
relates to individual capacities to deal with emotion in everyday life, rather
than emotions per se. Nonetheless, this ability is clearly salient in the present
discussion of between-person emotion effects. Fisher and Ashkanasy (2000)
note that much has been expected of the emotional intelligence concept, largely
because of its popularity in the popular press (e.g. Goleman, 1995), and especially
in the management practitioner literature (e.g. see Cooper & Sawaf, 1997;
Goleman, 1998a, b). Practitioners (e.g. Goleman, 1998a) are especially interested
in emotional intelligence as a means to improve selection, training, and emotional
competencies among employees. More recently, scholars have sought to dene
emotional intelligence in organizational settings and to determine its relationship
with work attitudes and outcomes (see, for example, Jordan, Ashkanasy & H artel,
2002). On the other hand, scholars working in the intelligence eld (e.g. Davis,
Stankov & Roberts, 1998) have been critical of the construct and some of the
exaggerated claims that have been made for it. They point out that there is still a
dearth of empirical evidence in support of the benecial claims made in respect to
emotional intelligence and ongoing controversy surrounding its denition (see also
Ciarrochi, Chan & Caputi, 2000).
What exactly is emotional intelligence? Goleman (1995) has pointed out that it
is a form of social intelligence (cf. Gardner, 1983; Thorndike, 1966). Most would
agree on this general point, but consensus on the precise nature of the construct
is far from settled. Mayer and Salovey (1993, 1995, 1997), for example, present
emotional intelligence as a set of distinct abilities specically related to emotion,
including perception, identication, understanding, and management of emotion
(see also Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Cooper
and Sawaf (1997) and Goleman (1995), on the other hand, present emotional
intelligence as a quasi-personality construct, including social interaction com-
petencies such as empathy, time management, decision making, and teamwork.
Interestingly, Bechara, Tranel and Damasio (2000) have recently presented
neurophysiological evidence, based on individual differences in emotional paths
in the brain (cf. Fig. 2).
Our conclusion is that it is safest to view emotional intelligence in terms of the
Mayer and Salovey (1997) model. In this instance, Ashkanasy, H artel and Daus
(2002) present a list of some key ndings that appear to provide a clearer picture
of emotional intelligence. These are that emotional intelligence:
appears to be distinct from, but positively related to, other intelligences;
is an individual difference, where some people are more endowed and others are
less so;
develops over a persons life span and can be enhanced through training;
involves, at least in part, a persons abilities to identify and to perceive emotion

(in self and others); and
includes skills to understand and to manage emotions successfully.

Although individual differences play less of a role in emotions than in the
more traditional areas of study in OB, the dispositional variables discussed
here are nonetheless important. Personal dispositional variables, and especially
personal outcome variables, traditionally lie at the heart of the OB discipline (see
House, Shane & Herold, 1996). It is early days yet in the study of emotions in
organizational settings, but the evidence to date suggests that continued research
in this eld is potentially worthwhile. Still, the theme of this article is that it is the
dynamic nature of emotions that makes their study so interesting. In this respect,
it is the next level of analysis interactions that is potentially a more interesting
and rewarding topic.
EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 3:
INTERPERSONAL INTERACTIONS
Level 3 involves perception and communication of emotions in dyads, consistent
with Waldroms (2000) and De Dreu, West, Fischer and MacCurtains (2001)
notion of emotion as principally a relational phenomenon. In this respect, Waldron
points out that the interactional level constitutes the central level of emotions in
organizations. In terms of the present article, therefore, interactions serve as the
links between Levels 1 and 2 (at the micro level) and Levels 4 and 5 (at the group
and organizational levels). As such, this level would seem to conform to House,
Rousseau and Thomas-Hunts (1995) concept of a meso-level construct. The
importance of this level most likely arises because communication of emotions
is so critically important in social animals such as primates. For example, a smile
encourages repetition of the favored behavior, while a frown or snarl discourages
it (Darwin, 1872/1985; Ekman, 1992, 1999). Furthermore, social bonding is
increased whenever groups of animals share emotional responses, as we see in
sports teams and their fans.
The present discussion is divided into two sections. In the rst section,
building on the earlier discussion of the neuropsychology of emotion, I cover the
neurological and physiological processes that underlie display, perception, and
communication of emotion. In the second section, I deal more specically with
the notion of emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983), which has arguably been the
most researched facet of emotions in work settings.
Neurological and Physiological Processes as the Basis
of Emotional Communication
As was the case for the neural processes discussed earlier in this article, the
communicative role of emotions can also be considered within an evolutionary
context. If emotional communication is adaptive, then humans will have evolved
a system for both displaying and recognizing emotions, particularly primary
emotions (Pinker, 1997). Evolutionary pressure would favor a recognition system
that is subtle and can detect sham emotion readily. There will also be advantage
to those members of the group who can successfully fake emotion. I argue in
this article that emotional recognition systems exist, but that the detection of
sham emotion by an astute observer is likely to thwart attempts at emotional
deceit. These processes are especially important in the workplace context,
where organizational members are required to interact with one another as
a matter of routine.
I noted earlier that the neural circuit for fear includes preconscious pathways
for emotional expression whose effects would be difcult, if not impos-
sible, to control consciously. Many visible expressions of emotion for
example, blushing with embarrassment, watery eyes, panting with fear, and
tensing with anger are automatic, similarly preconscious, and difcult to
control.
I also pointed out earlier in this article that emotional responses are accompa-
nied by complex sub-cortical responses. These have direct sensorimotor effects
as well as effects on hormone levels and emotional behavior beyond the control
of consciousness. At the same time, people try to maintain a particular emotional
display appropriate for the situation (Hochschild, 1983). The resulting response is
thus an interaction of situationally and emotionally determined responses (Hess,
Banse & Kappas, 1995), which may be difcult to untangle. Nevertheless, there
is new evidence that felt emotion is detectable by untrained observers, such as
friends, colleagues, customers, and servers.
As would be expected from the foregoing discussion, there are many indicators
of emotional states (see Ekman, 1984, 1999; Ekman, Friesen & Scherer, 1976;
Izard, 1993; Scherer, 1988). These include vocal intonation (Pittam & Scherer,
1993), body movements and gestures (Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Ekman, Friesen
& Scherer, 1976), combinations of vocal and bodily markers (Ekman, OSullivan,
Friesen & Scherer, 1991), and skin conductivity changes (Ney, 1988). The
weight of empirical evidence concerning facial expression (see Camras, Holland
& Patterson, 1993; Ekman, 1984), however, makes this particular aspect of
emotional expression especially relevant.
The most salient example of this process resides in the role of human smile. Over
the past 30 years, researcher Paul Ekman and his colleagues have identied the
smile as a key element of emotional expression on the human face (Ekman, 1984,
1992, 1999). In particular, research has concentrated on differentiation of felt
and false smiles (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ekman, Friesen & OSullivan, 1988;
Frank, Ekman & Friesen, 1993). Further, smiles have been the focus of interest
in the organizational science literature (see Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Rafaeli &
Sutton, 1987, 1989). The role of the smile as a powerful tool of social inuence in
the workplace was dramatically illustrated in Hochschilds (1983) study of airline
ight attendants. Hochschild, however, also highlighted the negative side of smil-
ing, noting that smiling as a work requirement can become an onerous task (see
also Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). Hochschild coined the term emotional labor
to describe this situation and gives examples of frustrated reactions to passengers
who expect always to be attended to by smiling staff. (I discuss this topic in
more detail later.)
The smiling face is not a unitary phenomenon, however. French anatomist
Duchenne de Boulogne, a contemporary of Darwin, investigated the muscles
involved in smiling over a century ago. Duchenne (1862/1990) found, in a series of
electrophysical experiments, that the smile has two distinct components. Further,
the two components appear to have distinctly different driving mechanisms.
Duchenne concluded that:
. . . frank joy is expressed in the face by the combined contraction of the zygomatic majoris
muscle and the obicularis oculi. The rst obeys the will, but the second . . . is only put in play
by the sweet emotions of the soul . . . (and) fake joy . . . cannot provoke the contraction of this
muscle (p. 126).
Fig. 4. The Muscles Involved in Smiling.
The muscle sets that Duchenne referred to are illustrated in Fig. 4. The zygomatic
majoris muscle pulls up the corners of the mouth, while the obicularis oculi
form the creases around the eye that we associate with a smiling face. Duchenne
argues that we can fake the action of the zygomatic majoris but not the obicularis
oculi; that only in the case of genuine feelings of joy can people smile with their
eyes. Ekman (1990) noted that Duchennes observations appear to have been
lost for a hundred years and that, as a consequence, a great deal of confusion
has been generated in reports of recognizability of facial markers of emotion.
Ekmans early research nonetheless has now been replicated in great detail
(Ekman, Davidson & Friesen, 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1974, 1982; Ekman,
Friesen & Ancoli, 1980; Ekman, Friesen & OSullivan, 1988; Ekman, Hager &
Friesen, 1981). Ekman referred to the smile generated by the obicularis oculi as
the smile of enjoyment and named it the Duchenne-smile (or D-smile) in
honor of its discoverer.
Other research, however, has revealed some departures in detail from
Duchennes original observations. In particular, Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980)
found that the obicularis oculi consist of two distinct groups of muscles. The
inner section, which controls tightening of the eyelids, appears to be controllable
to some extent. The outer obicularis oculi, however, which affects the skin around
the lower eye, appear to be much more difcult to control consciously. In fact, it
is this muscle set that accounts for the sparkle in the eye characteristic of smiles
of felt enjoyment (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Ekman and Friesen have since shown
that felt smiles are, in fact, differentiated from feigned smiles on a number of
other parameters, including synchronization between the action of the two muscle
sets, symmetry of action on both sides of the face, smoothness (or naturalness)
of the muscular contractions, and duration of the muscular contractions. Given
that human perception is highly sensitive to small changes in facial features (see
examples in Ekman, 1990), it follows that humans may be reasonably adept at
distinguishing felt from feigned smiles, especially when the actor is not well
trained in presenting feigned emotions.
While Ekman and his colleagues conducted much of their research in laboratory
settings, especially using the proprietary Facial Action Coding System (FACS;
Ekman & Friesen, 1978), more recently the research focus has moved into
eld studies involving non-expert judgment. In this respect, Frank, Ekman and
Friesen (1993) showed that nave observers are surprisingly adept at spotting
the difference between felt and false smiles, endorsing Darwins (1872/1985)
observation that so many shades of expression are instantly recognized without
any conscious process of analysis (p. 359). In the Frank et al. study, recognition
accuracy under ideal conditions peaked at 81%. Even under less than ideal
conditions (when the study participants were not instructed to look specically
to look for real smiles), there was still a clear recognition of enjoyment smiles.
People displaying enjoyment smiles were also seen to be more expressive, natural,
outgoing, sociable, relaxed, and pleasant than those displaying non-enjoyment
(or feigned) smiles.
Ekman(1992) argues further that the complexset of facial expressions, involving
dozens of muscle sets, is a reliable indicator of the whole range of emotions. He also
suggests that, like the Duchenne smile, many facial markers of emotion are driven
by sub-cortical processes and are, therefore, not subject to conscious manipulation.
The question that remains, however, is the accuracy with which onlookers
read emotional markers. Early research by Krauss, Apple, Morency, Wenzel and
Winton (1981) showed that displayed emotional states are communicated largely
by verbal, rather than non-verbal, means. The more recent evidence seems to
indicate that non-verbal modes of communication play a more predominant role
in interpretation of felt emotion. In this respect, Ekman (1990) argues that key
non-verbal cues identify felt emotional states, and that these signs (or markers) are
recognizable by observers. The Frank et al. (1993) studies in relation to smiles of
enjoyment conrm this, as do more recent results obtained by Gosselin, Kirouac
and Dor e (1995). In the Gosselin et al. research, actors were asked to express felt
or feigned emotions of happiness, anger, and sadness. As in the Frank et al. study,
results showed that observers were more accurately able to recognize emotions
when they were derived from true feelings, rather than a feigned expression.
Overall, these studies provide evidence that people can to some extent recognize
emotional states in others, and furthermore that they are able to discern when an
actors emotions are truly felt and when emotions are being feigned, especially
when the actor is not well trained. Combining this nding with the evidence
that emotional reactions are only partially under conscious control, and that they
interact with behavioral and cognitive reactions (Fischer et al., 1990), leads to the
conclusion that emotional states expressed through sub-cortical channels will be
recognizable to some extent, even to untrained observers (see Frank et al., 1993).
In other words, it is difcult to hide our inner feelings and emotional reactions.
If true, this conclusion will challenge some of the more established theories of
organizational behavior based on theories of cognitive and social rationalism (e.g.
Simon, 1976), which are predicated on the notion that emotions can be subsumed
in cognitions and behavior.
In summary, I have argued here that facial expressions, through their sub-
cortical, preconscious mediation, are indicators of true or feigned emotion. From
what we know of the sub-cortical processes of emotion, it is clear that the other
preconscious physical forms of emotional expression will also be indicators of
truly felt versus feigned emotion. Likely perception of these indicators, along with
the cognitive load associated with their attempted control, leads to the conclusion
that a sustained attempt to hide inner feelings and emotional reactions is difcult
at best. This leads us to the issue of emotional labor.
Emotional Labor
In the previous discussion, I introduced the neurological and physiological bases
of the phenomenon that Hochschild (1983) has termed emotional labor the act
of managing emotion in the service of ones job. Like other aspects of emotion in
work settings, emotional labor research is still developing, but there is little doubt
that it has been the most prominent area of study of emotions in work settings in
recent years.
The genesis of emotional labor is that many occupations, especially in service in-
dustries, embody strongly sanctioned norms concerning the appropriate display of
emotion (see, for example, Rafaeli &Sutton, 1987, 1989; Sutton &Rafaeli, 1988).
In many cases, these norms are strongly embedded in the organizational culture,
including the organizations recruitment strategies, job descriptions, and employee
socialization (Fineman, 2001; Ott, 1989; Schein, 1985). Emotional labor also
affects policies relating to rewards (Humphrey, 2000) and job valuation (Kruml &
Geddes, 2000). In essence, job performance in these organizations is dependent
to a large extent on employees skills at emotional expression and management
and, in particular, their ability to successfully project one emotion while simulta-
neously feeling another (Hochschild, 1983). In view of the preceding discussion,
this is not always easily accomplished, so that employees who do possess this
skill are likely to be highly valued and rewarded in their organization. It is not
surprising, therefore, that so much recent research has recently been devoted to
the study of the effects of emotional labor on job performance and customer
service, as well as on employees and organizations well-being and survival (see
Fineman, 2001; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Tews & Glomb, 2000; Wharton &
Erickson, 1993).
A corollary to my earlier discussion of the neurology and physiology of
emotional expression is that emotional labor can have detrimental effects on
well-being. Further, as Hochschild (1983) notes, employees often bottle up
feelings of frustration and resentment, resulting in emotional outbursts. In the case
of an organization that depends on employees displaying emotions, and that fails
to provide a means to express emotions, emotional exhaustion is a likely outcome
(see Grandey, 2000; H artel, Hsu & Boyle, 2002; Kruml & Geddes, 2000). In
one recent study, for example, emotional labor was found to be a precursor
of emotional exhaustion among debt collectors, military recruiters, and nurses
(Morris & Feldman, 1996).
Parker and Wall (1998) have argued specically that emotional labor can
have detrimental health effects by weakening the bodys immune system. In this
respect, Grandey (2000) and Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) found that inhibition
of expression of negative emotion might cause a range of physical illnesses,
including serious illnesses such as hypertension and cancer. Pugliesi (1999)
reported in addition that emotional labor was a cause of psychological distress,
and Brill (2000) argues further that emotional dishonesty leads to antisocial
behaviors, including violence.
Afurther point is that employees who are expected to engage in emotional labor
and who consequently experience emotional dissonance may become increasingly
impaired in their ability to express their true emotional feelings (Ekman, Friesen
& OSullivan, 1988; Fineman, 2001; Mann, 1999). The detection by customers of
inauthentic expressionmay, inturn, leadtoevenpoorer perceptions bythe customer
of service quality, resulting in a downward spiral of poor service and increasing
emotional labor (Grove & Fisk, 1990; Mann, 1999; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987).
In summary, emotional expression and communication lie at the important
junction between individual and organizational outcomes, characterized by House
et al. (1995) as the meso-level. In effect, incidents of emotional labor constitute
affective events in the AET model. As such, emotional labor leads to emotional
reactions, and thus to the personal and organizational outcomes I detailed in the
earlier discussion of AET at Level 1 of the model. In this discussion, I also touched
on the individual-level (Level 2: performance outcomes, rewards, well-being) and
organizational-level (Level 5: climate and culture) variables. Later in this article,
I will return to these intersections and suggest an integrated multi-level model
of emotions in organizations. Before moving on to this stage, however, I discuss
emotions at Level 4: group interactions.
EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 4: GROUPS AND TEAMS
Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn (2001) dene a group as a collection of two
or more people who work with one another regularly to achieve common goals
(p. 174). As such, group members interact on a dyadic and collective basis,
and they naturally encounter all of the perceptions and experiences that I have
outlined earlier in reference to individuals and their interactions. Nonetheless,
groups introduce additional dimensions of cohesiveness, collective values, and
leadership that render an added level of complexity to the discussion of emotions
in workplace settings. In this respect, De Dreu et al. (2001) see group settings as a
sort of emotional incubator, where the emotional states of the group members
combine to produce an overall group-level emotional tenor that, in turn, affects
all group members. Kelly and Barsade (2001) argue more specically that teams
possess an affective composition or a group mood, which begins initially with
the emotional characteristics of team members, and then develops through a
process of emotional contagion, entrainment, modeling, and manipulation of
affect (see also Barsade, 1997). In this section, therefore, I begin by building
on the previous discussion of personal interactions and emotional display, and
then address two additional dimensions of groups: leadership and the idea of the
emotionally intelligent group.
Emotional Exchange in Groups
In the earlier discussion of emotions in interpersonal relationships, the importance
of emotional displays and perception of emotional markers was emphasized.
Moving to the group level, however, and as Ashforth and Humphrey (1995)
and Kelly and Barsade (2001) argue, factors outside of the narrow connes of
interpersonal relationships come into play. Ashforth and Humphrey give examples
of collective socialization in work groups (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989), trust in
group conict situations (Smith & Berg, 1987), emotional contagion (Hateld,
Cacioppo & Rapson, 1992), and attitudes toward play in work (Abramis, 1990).
Zurcher (1982) goes further, arguing that displays of emotion in group situations
constitute an essential ingredient necessary for establishment of group cohesion.
Lawler (1992) posits that emotion is the essential social process in group
formation and maintenance, because positive emotions strengthen feelings of
control. As such, positive emotion is a necessary precursor of group cohesiveness.
On the other hand, negative emotions weaken group cohesion. In the context
of organizational work groups, George (1990) has shown that affect is a key
ingredient for group effectiveness and satisfaction (see also George & Brief,
1992). Finally, and as I discuss in more detail later, Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995)
have argued that leader-member exchange relationships develop into complex
networks of relationships that dene group membership.
The difculty with these models (in common with much of the literature in
this area) is that there is an assumption that group members can accurately read
emotional cues presented by other group members, and by the group leader in
particular. George and Brief (1992), for example, argue that positive feelings are
an essential prerequisite for group effectiveness, satisfaction, and commitment.
Zurchers (1982) argument implies, however, that emotional climate in groups is
developed through emotional displays. In a similar vein, emotional contagion is
open to manipulation though manufactured displays of emotion (Barsade, 1997).
The question that arises in the context of this article is the extent to which these
phenomena depend on felt, rather than displayed, emotions. In particular, what
would be the effect on the group if emotional displays (especially by the group
leader) are seen to be at odds with perceived felt emotion? A leader who attempts
to engender positive mood in a work group, for example, may not be successful if
group members perceive a conicting felt emotion such as hostility or contempt.
In particular, attempts to portray a calm, rational, unemotional facade that is
inconsistent with markers of felt emotion are likely to be detectable by group
members, as I argued earlier in this article. Thus, as for the interpersonal case,
perception of insincerity in group interactions is likely to lead to cynicism and
poor group functioning. In this case, displayed emotions in group situations can
have a positive or negative effect, depending on whether the emotional display
is seen to be genuine or contrived. This issue is taken up in more detail in the
following discussion of emotion in leader-member exchange.
Group Leadership and Emotion
The role of leadership in communicating, expressing, and managing emotions in
groups is axiomatic (see Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). In this respect, Ashforth and
Humphrey (1995) refer to leadership in terms of the symbolic models proposed by
Daft and Weick (1984) and Smirchich and Stubbart (1985). In this view, leadership
is seen as a process of symbolic management (Pfeffer, 1981) and involves creating
and maintaining shared meanings among followers. Ashforth and Humphrey
argue that this process depends intrinsically on evocation of emotion. Based on
Ortners (1973) model, they note that symbols generate interacting cognitive
and emotional responses and, they conclude, symbolic management involves
orchestrating, summarizing, and elaborating symbols to evoke emotion which
can be generalized to organizational ends (p. 111). These symbols can be
subtle and ineffable, and need not relate directly to cognitive aspects of emotion.
Thus, leaders engage in communication of symbols designed to make followers
feel better about themselves, and to strengthen followers commitment to the
organization (see also Fineman, 2001; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989).
It follows, therefore, that leadership entails perception, recognition, and
management of emotional cues by both the leader and the led, which we
described earlier as emotional sensitivity. In this respect, the leader-member
exchange (LMX) model provides a useful frame of reference (see Graen &
Uhl-Bien, 1995, for a review of LMX theory). The basis of LMX is that leaders
and work group members exhibit different-quality relationships, based on social
exchanges with the leader. When exchanges are high quality, members are given
better job assignments, more freedom, and greater opportunities to work with
the leader. When exchanges are of low quality, on the other hand, members are
given fewer opportunities to interact with the leader and perform low-status work
assignments.
I argue that quality in this context is largely an emotional judgment. Factors
that have been shown to contribute to LMX quality include attitude similarity
(Phillips & Bedeian, 1994; Turban, Jones & Rozelle, 1990), satisfaction with
the relationship (McClane, 1991), psychological size and distance (Salzmann &
Grasha, 1991), and the role of mentoring (Scandura & Schreisheim, 1994). More
recently, social discourse (Sias & Jablin, 1995) and perceptual categorization
(Foti, 1995) have been shown to be important in determining exchange quality.
Although fewstudies have focused on the emotional dimensions in leader-member
exchanges per se, the clear implication of the LMX studies is that higher-quality
relationships between leaders and members are associated with positive emotions.
In a recent laboratory study, Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002) showed just this
effect. Respondents who viewed vignettes of leaders giving performance appraisal
feedback were judged more favorably on an LMX measure when they displayed
positive emotion. These data suggest that a leaders displayed emotion is a critical
determinant of the quality of relationships with group members, and consequently
of the leaders ability to communicate emotionally evocative symbols.
The question remains, however, as to how accurately leaders and members can
perceive and interpret the emotional cues in their relationships. For example, a
leader who feels negatively toward a subordinate may consciously display positive
emotion as a means of inuencing the subordinate through symbolic management.
If, as I noted earlier, the subordinate can detect unconscious markers of the
negative (felt) emotion, then it is likely that the leaders inuence attempts will be
ineffective. Given that leadership involves management of emotionally charged
symbolism, followers interpretation of leadership inuence attempts as insincere
is likely to lead to a breakdown in the leadership relationship and to cause distrust
and cynicism (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). This, in turn, is likely to be recognized by
the leader, leading to further low-quality exchanges and continuing deterioration
of the leader-follower relationship. Thus, symbolic leadership may be seen to
be more than the ability to display skin deep emotions in leader-member
relationships. Ashkanasy and Newcombe (2001) also investigated this issue and
found that leaders insincere expressions of emotion led to much lower LMX
ratings of the leaders. This evidence tells us that insincere attempts to manipulate
symbolism lead to a cynical reaction and can be counterproductive.
The foregoing discussion raises the intriguing possibility that the individual
difference of emotional intelligence may play a key role here. In this respect,
the transformational leadership model (see Bass, 1998; Bass & Avolio, 1990) is
at present arguably the dominant paradigm of leadership. Bass and Avolio (1990)
point out in particular that transformational leadership is enacted when a leader can
project a charismatic vision that is believed in by group members, can inspire group
members to perform above normal standards, can provide intellectual stimulation
for group members, and looks after the emotional needs of group members.
Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) argued that these four aspects of transformational
leadership overlap with Mayer and Saloveys (1988) four dimensions of emo-
tional intelligence, described earlier in this article. Bass (1998), for example,
emphasizes the role played by emotional self-awareness, which is close to Mayer
and Saloveys concept of emotional self-understanding. Also, and as I pointed
out earlier, leaders are required to understand the emotional states of group
members, to display empathy, and to project an appropriately emotional persona.
Thus, by inspiring and arousing their followers emotionally, transformational
leaders engender commitment to the organization and to the leaders vision (see
Weierter, 1997). George (2000) similarly sees emotional intelligence as a catalyst
for leaders to energize group members, and to enable them to achieve their goals
and objectives in a trusting group atmosphere.
By the same token, there is a potential for charismatic leadership to be seen
as exploitive. This exploitation may be further compounded when emotional
manipulation is employed to garner follower compliance. Weierter (1997)
has noted in addition that follower characteristics are important in resisting
such exploitation. To differentiate this phenomenon from true transformational
leadership, which is directed toward positive outcomes, Bass (1998) coined the
term pseudo-transformational leadership. Again, the tie-in with emotional
intelligence suggests that the emotionally intelligent leader, through understand-
ing and regulation of his or her and others emotions is positioned to achieve
positive outcomes. As Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) note, such leaders form
positive, empathetic, and constructive relationships with their followers. These
relationships enable them to communicate their vision and enthusiasm, and to
inspire the group to achieve above the usual expectations.
The Emotionally Intelligent Work Group?
In my nal discussion of group-level questions, I take the issue of emotional
intelligence in groups a step further, addressing the issue of whether emotional
intelligence can be generalized to the group itself. In other words, is it possible
for group members who are more emotionally astute to leverage this ability into
higher group performance and effectiveness? That is, is there such a thing as an
emotionally intelligent group? Druskat and Wolff (2001) argue in particular
that emotionally intelligent teams can be created by appropriate training.
Jordan, Ashkanasy, H artel and Hooper (2002) have, in fact, addressed this
question in a study that involved ve- to seven-person semi-autonomous learning
teams in an undergraduate management class. In this study, conducted in the
context of student-centered learning, students were coached over a nine-week
period in interpersonal communication skills, goal setting, and emotional under-
standing (see Engel, 1993). Team members completed measures of emotional
intelligence at the conclusion of the study, and team emotional intelligence
was calculated by aggregating the scores of team members on this measure.
Jordan and his colleagues expected to nd that the high-emotional-intelligence
teams would outperform their low-emotional-intelligence counterparts on two
measures: goal focus and team process effectiveness. Results, however, showed
that the low-emotional-intelligence teams under-performed the high-emotional-
intelligence teams only at the beginning of the nine-week period. At the end
of the coaching period, both the high- and the low-emotional-intelligence
teams were performing at the same high level (see Fig. 5). The results of this
study are based on a laboratory study and are therefore preliminary, but they
suggest that teams can operate more effectively if the group members either
possess a trait of emotional intelligence or if they can be taught the skills
of emotional intelligence.
Fig. 5. Goal Focus and Process Effectiveness of High and Low Emotional Intelligence
Teams (Jordan, Ashanasy, H artel & Hooper, 2002).
Although the Jordan, Ashkanasy, H artel and Hooper (2002) study does not
really answer the question of the emotionally intelligent team, it does support
Druskat and Wolffs (2001) point that emotionally intelligent teams can be
more than just a collection of emotionally intelligent individuals. On the other
hand, and as Kelly and Barsade (2001) point out, groups in organizations are
embedded in the wider organizational context, the nal level that I address in this
article.
EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 5: ORGANIZATIONS
CULTURE AND CLIMATE
Level 5 of the multi-level model presented in this article is qualitatively different
from the other levels. At the lower levels, organizational policies and values
are interpreted in the context of face-to-face interactions, where all the basic
biological and neurophysiological mechanisms I have discussed up to this
point are salient. Thus, at these levels of the model, a manager can recognize
cues of real or felt emotion, and can identify the emotional indicators of
employees who are genuinely motivated toward goal achievement and condent
of achieving their goals. Similarly, in leader-member exchanges or in group
situations, perception and interpretation of emotional feelings are likely to be
instrumental in the development of high-quality leader-member relationships and
high-performing teams.
When dealing with the organization-wide or macro view, on the other hand,
the situation is much less clear. Although some members of a large organization
will have meetings with senior managers, these meetings are likely to be brief
and infrequent (Mintzberg, 1973) and are likely to be constrained by power
differences (see Gibson & Schroeder, 2002). Instead, it is necessary to deal with
the more nebulous concept of emotional climate, dened by De Rivera (1992)
as an objective group phenomenon that can be palpably sensed as when one
enters a party or a city and feels an attitude of gaiety or depression, openness or
fear (p. 197). In the context of work organizations, organizational climate has
been studied for some time now (see Ashkanasy, Wilderom & Peterson, 2000;
Reichers &Schneider, 1990) and constitutes the collective mood of organizational
members toward their jobs, the organization, and management. The concept is
distinct from organizational culture, in that climate is essentially an emotional
phenomenon, while culture is more stable and is rooted in beliefs, values, and
embedded assumptions (Ashkanasy, Wilderom & Peterson, 2000; Ott, 1989;
Schein, 1985). Nonetheless, Schein makes it clear that assumptions underlying
organizational culture are associated with deeply felt feelings. More recently,
Beyer and Ni no (2001) demonstrated how culture and organizational members
emotional views and states are intimately and reciprocally related. As such,
both organizational climate and organizational culture arguably have emotional
underpinnings.
A number of writers in the organizational literature have noted the emotional
basis of organizational culture (e.g. Beyer & Ni no, 2001; Fineman, 2001;
Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989),
but primarily in the context of displayed emotional states rather than felt emotion.
This begs the question as to how to ascertain real emotional climate (or culture) in
organizations. Although H artel, Gough and H artel (in press) measured emotional
climate and reported a correlation with job satisfaction, most advocates of an
ethnographic approach (e.g. Schein, 1985; Trice & Bayer, 1993) argue that only
through active, day-to-day involvement in organizations is it possible to sense
real, as opposed to displayed, emotion. De Rivera (1992) notes, however, that
emotional climate is an objective phenomenon and is therefore amenable to
objective perception and interpretation, provided the observer knows what to look
for. In effect, his point is that observers need to be sensitive to markers of felt,
rather than displayed, emotion. In this case, however, the markers are not so much
in the individual expressions of organizational members, but rather in the social
structures and patterns of behavior that are manifest in the organization. De Rivera
argues further that people are sensitive to such cues, and that they shape their
beliefs and behaviors accordingly. It follows that the arguments developed earlier
in the present paper in respect to interpersonal relationships and small groups
may be extendable to the organization as a whole, especially since organizational
policies ultimately come down to the perceptions, understanding, and behavior of
individuals, interacting dyads, and groups.
The interplay of culture and emotional climate in the workplace was illustrated
in a recent study by Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003). They measured two dimen-
sions of organizational culture in two restaurant chains using the Organizational
Culture Prole (see Ashkanasy, Broadfoot & Falkus, 2000) and a measure of
Climate of Fear developed for their study. Results showed that, while culture
varied between organizations, the climate of fear varied across sites within each
organization. More particularly, Ashkanasy and Nicholson used an ethnographic
follow-up to show that the climate of fear was present in some of the restaurants,
and they concluded that the climate could, indeed, be palpably sensed, as De
Rivera (1992) intimated. Organizational policies in the form of requirements for
emotional labor are similarly manifest on the shop oor and are easily observed.
The organizations studied by Hochschild (1983), for instance, provide illustrative
examples (see also Ashkanasy, Daus & H artel, 2002).
The nal point in respect to the organizational level deals with the idea of
the healthy organization (Cooper & Williams, 1994). According to Cooper
and Williams, the healthy organization is one where priority is given equally to
employee well-being and to maintaining positive organizational outcomes. Such
an organization also minimizes negative emotional events for its employees,
including a restraint on unreasonable demands for emotional labor. H artel, Hsu
and Boyle (2002) and Kelly and Barsade (2001) are among recent authors who
have emphasized the close connections between organizational-level policies and
group and personal emotional outcomes.
AN INTERACTIVE MULTI-LEVEL MODEL
In this article, I have traced emotions in organizations from the most micro level
of emotional experience to the macro view of organizational climate and culture.
A recurring theme throughout the article, however, is the interrelatedness of
emotional variables across all levels of the analysis. Starting with affective events
theory, itself a multi-level model, through the individual, interrelationships, and
group levels of organizations, there are a myriad of interconnections. In Fig. 6,
which has at its core the AET model proposed by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996),
I have tried to capture some of these links.
At the center of Fig. 6 is Level 1. At this level, affective events determine
emotional reactions (state affect) that, in turn, inuence immediate behavior,
including contextual (helping) behavior and work performance, as well as the
Fig. 6. A Multi-Level Model of Emotions in Organizations.
attitudes (affective commitment and job satisfaction) that underlie the personal
outcomes at Level 2. Level 1 incorporates all of the within-person neuropsy-
chological processes that were described earlier in this article, including the
physiological manifestations of emotion. Importantly, and also as detailed earlier,
these affective reactions to events are largely beyond conscious control. Further,
and consistent with AET, emotional reactions mediate the effects of everyday
hassles and uplifts on outcomes. In this respect, it should be noted that it is the
accumulation of frequent events, rather than infrequent intense effects, that are
likely to have the most profound effects in terms of attitudes and behaviors.
Represented at Level 2 are individual differences, including trait affect and
emotional intelligence, and attitudes, including affective commitment and job
satisfaction. Individual differences impact on every level of the model, with
the exception of Level 5. In particular, they affect behaviors directly at Level 1
and indirectly through attitudes at Level 2. Individual differences especially
emotional intelligence also affect expression and perception of emotion at Level
2 that, in turn, constitute affective events at Level 1; they likewise play a role at
Level 4, acting through emotional intelligence in leadership and group processes.
In addition, individual differences can act as moderators of the antecedents and
consequences of emotional reactions. In this respect, Jordan, Ashkanasy and
H artel (2000, 2002) argue that highly emotionally intelligent individuals are
more able than their low emotionally intelligent counterparts to interpret and deal
with affective events, and also to regulate the effects of their emotions. Finn and
Chattopadhyay (2000) argue similarly that trait affectivity inuences the severity
and effect of emotional reactions to events.
Perception of emotion in interpersonal exchanges (Level 3) is posited to lie
at the meso-level of the model and connects to all the other levels, including
organizational climate, culture, and policies at Level 5, and leader-member
exchange at Level 4. In the discussion of Level 3, it was stressed that emotional
communication is governed by physiological constraints. Consequently, expres-
sion of emotion that is different from personally felt emotion, as in the instance
of emotional labor, is difcult, especially when sustained. The signicance of
this level and the issues raised in the processes that underlie emotional display
explain in part why there has been such intense research interest in phenomena at
Level 2, and also why this level has such important implications for practice.
Level 4 of the model encompasses group interactions, including group affective
composition (Kelly & Barsade, 2001) and leader-member exchange. Ashkanasy
and Tse (2000) have emphasized in particular the highly interconnected role of
leadership in governing and reacting to emotions in groups, concluding that a
leaders emotional acumen may be central to group effectiveness as well as a
determinant of the individual performances of team members.
At the highest level of the model are organizational policies, climate, and
culture. These encompass the emotional atmosphere that De Rivera (1992) asserts
can be palpably sensed within organizations. Driven by top management, this
dimension can include positive climate as well as a climate of fear (Ashkanasy
& Nicholson, 2003). Organizational policies and industry practice are also
important determinants of requirements for emotional labor, which I argue can
have far-reaching effects on employees. Like Level 3, Level 5 has connections
to every other level, but this time as an exogenous effect. Thus, organizational
policies can impact: (1) directly on employees in the form of affective events
precipitated by managers (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996); (2) the affective climate
of the organization, which in turn may determine the affective composition of
groups; and (3) leader-member exchanges at Level 4 (see Cogliser &Schriesheim,
2000) that, in turn, can directly affect employee behavior. Organizational policies
can also (4) constitute a major input to perception of emotion, most particularly
in the form of requirements for emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983).
I do not claim that every possible path is represented in Fig. 6. Clearly, there
are likely to be other relationships in the model that I have not dealt with in detail.
Nonetheless, the model provides an indicative representation of the ve-level
structure of emotions in organizational settings and shows how variables at the
different levels interrelate. In particular, the model highlights the centrality of
Level 1 the within-person level and the role of Level 3 (interpersonal relations)
at the meso-level. The importance of these two levels of the model and their
neurophysiological bases have been highlighted in this article.
Implications for Research
The ve-level model described in this article presents multiple challenges for
researchers. The perennial issue of the ephemeral nature of emotion continues to
pose a challenge to researchers of emotion. The ESM method holds the greatest
potential to advance, however, especially when small hand-held computers are
employed (see, for example, Totterdell, 2000), although the effect of the intrusive-
ness of this method and the demands placed on study participants are still largely
unknown. Further, the means to combine emotion data at different levels of analy-
sis, especially at more than two levels, presents a further challenge to researchers
(see Bliese & Jex, 1999, for discussion in the context of job stress research).
Another issue in such a complex multi-level model is the need to combine data
using different methodologies (see Jick, 1979). Further, as Cacioppe and Gardner
(1999) note, emotion is a very short label for a broad category of experimental,
behavioral, socio-developmental, and biological phenomena (p. 194). In this
respect, emotion research in organizations will require qualitative (interpre-
tivist) and quantitative (positivist) methods, with the latter including survey,
observational, experience sampling, and experimental approaches.
Implications for Management
In this article, I have argued that emotion in organizations is intrinsically a
multi-level phenomenon, extending all the way from the top of the organization
to the most fundamental level the day-to-day experiences of organizational
members. The model also highlights the central role that neurophysiological
processes play. In particular, emotional expression at the interpersonal level has
an innate physiological component that, although connected to higher cortical
functions, operates through the amygdala at a sub-cortical level that is beyond
conscious control. Further, more recent research has suggested that people are able
to recognize physiological, or felt emotion, as distinct fromconsciously controlled
displayed emotion. These processes lie at the meso-level and have relationships
to emotions at the organizational and group levels, as well as at the individual
and within-person levels. These propositions suggest that felt emotion can be
separated from displayed emotion, which has consequences for management.
In particular, the ability to read emotional and affective signs in employees is
much discussed in the leadership literature. For example, Bass and Avolio (1990)
suggest that sensitivity to followers motivational states is an important aspect
of transformational leadership. Nevertheless, the mechanisms involved in such
perception constitute an area that has been largely neglected in the literature to
date. If a manager is sensitive to the real attitudes of work group members in
relation to achievement at work, then clearly that manager is in a better position to
begin remedial measures that may improve the members work performance (see
Bass & Avolio, 1990). This suggests that such sensitivity may be an important
management skill, and that training programs to develop sensitivity may have the
potential to improve managers effectiveness.
Similarly, perception of felt emotion cues has implications for impression
management in interpersonal and group situations, both from the perspective of
managers (see Becker & Martin, 1995; Wayne & Liden, 1995) and employees
(Rao, Schmidt & Murray, 1995). Weinberger and Davidson (1994), for example,
found that managers can distinguish repressive coping behavior and impression
management in leader-member exchanges. Again, most of this research has
been based on analysis of verbal cues and self-reports, rather than looking at the
physical processes of recognizing emotion. The research ideas outlined in this
article have implications for improving our understanding of processes relating to
felt emotion, and ultimately for personal development in organizational contexts.
Finally, the ideas set out in this article have implications for overall management
of organizational culture and climate. Failure to read signs of negative organi-
zational climate accurately has consequences for organizational and managerial
effectiveness (Ashkanasy & Nicholson, 2003; Beyer & Ni no, 2001; Reichers &
Schneider, 1990). Although emotional signs in the context of organization-wide
culture and climate are more complex than those involved in small group and inter-
personal situations, the principles are similar, andunderstandingof the mechanisms
of perception of felt emotion clearly has implications for effective management.
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Emotions in Organizations: A Multi-Level Perspective: Neal M. Ashkanasy

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EMOTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS:

appears to be distinct from, but positively related to, other intelligences;

involves, at least in part, a persons abilities to identify and to perceive emotion

includes skills to understand and to manage emotions successfully.

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