GAPACAN V.

OMIPET, 387 SCRA 383

Issues of property rights can be determined in an action to quiet title.
FACTS:
Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels of riceland
and another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation purposes. He had two children Maria and
Antonio. Antonio left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria remained, took care of their
father and eventually took over the cultivation of the land.

Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that the property had
been transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet (Omipet) making him in effect the legal owner of the
property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacans family (Gapacans) had been occupying and cultivating the
property.

Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and cultivate portions of the disputed property. Gapacans
prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to vacate the land and restore possession to plaintiffs.

Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful owner. RTC adjudged that
Gapacans have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA, declared that the land is common property of both
Omipet and Gapacans and ordered its partition.
Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot declare that the land is common property since it deviates
from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipets appeal is mostly factual.

ISSUE: Whether or not property rights can be decided in an action to quiet title?

HELD: Yes.
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the
title to a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v. Exconde, we held that the property owner
whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper determination of the
respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that is, to require the one
who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only of the rightful
owner but also for the benefit of both with the view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It goes
without saying therefore that the appellate court in resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to
adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to
declare the same as common property.

As to Omipets appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the trial court that she did not present sufficient
evidence to overcome Gapacans better right to possession. SC ultimately ruled that CA was correct in its
determination that the land in dispute is common property and should be partitioned.
ROBLES v. CA
FACTS
Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino, their
grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvinos death in 1942, said petitioners inherited the property and
started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-brother of the petitioners, was entrusted
with the payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax
declaration covering the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane mortgaged the property
and, for some reason, the tax declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged
the property to private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said bank acquired by
public bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the mortgage
only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as parties-defendant the Director of Lands and
the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour
of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA
reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer had title to the property.

ISSUES
(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant issue) and (2)
whether title claimed by respondents is valid
(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid
(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid
HELD
(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as owners of the
subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent issued and the tax
declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading to the transfer of the property to
spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the
title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the
real estate. He must have first repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider the
irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show
any transaction between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.

(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is concerned there being co-ownership between
the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank by not exercising
due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such was unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue of the
adverse possession in the concept of owners since.
(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands or Bureau of Lands.

Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but the patent
issued was null.
SAPTO V FABIANA
FACTS:
The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) and located in
Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. The latter predeceased his
brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour
of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of Davao but was never registered.
The property was transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed possession from 1931 until the case was
filed.

Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon the latters death, his
widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to
defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it
was binding valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs. The CFI also ordered the petitioners to
execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid.

HELD:
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that even though it
was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the
court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and possession of the property was
a clear indication of the validity of the sale.

Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In assailing the order,
the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because the defendants cause of action had
already prescribed.

The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited
American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that actions to quiet title to property in
the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.





Heirs Uberas vs. CFI of Negros Occidental G.R. No. L-48268, 86 SCRA 145
(October 30, 1978)

FACTS: Siblings Segundo, Albino, Francisca, Pedro, and Alejandra Uberas inherited a parcel of land from their
parents. Petitioners (children and successors in interest of Segundo Uberas and Albino Uberas) filed a complaint
against respondents (surviving spouse and children of Pedro Uberas and Alejandra Uberas) for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and ownership, partition, and reconveyance with damages of the property in suit.
Defendants sought for dismissal on the ground that the action is barred by prescription. But plaintiffs argued that
the action is imprescriptible because it is to quiet the title to the property in question, for partition, and for
declaring heirship and deed of sale executed by defendants as void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription, holding that the action is essentially for reconveyance based upon an implied trust
resulting from fraud. In this case, plaintiffs aver that Pedro Uberas executed the declaration of heirship with malice
and bad faith to deprive the compulsory heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the case is one for quieting of title and therefore imprescriptible.

RULING: This case is an action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible. The teaching in Faja vs. CA applies, that
is, an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are
material facts to be inquired into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will
determine the legal precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be given full opportunity
to prove his case. RTC should not have summarily dismissed the case on the alleged ground of prescription
notwithstanding contrary factual averments in the complaint which would clearly rule out prescription. The SC set
aside respondent courts order of dismissal and remanded the case to respondent court for trial and determination
on the merits.




f




VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the brother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands
from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo
Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the
area allotted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.

Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500
square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant
Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately
1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting
and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant said that he
merely reconstructed the same.

Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action

RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest
therein.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a
cloud to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition
dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is
whether these lands were properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by
the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be
availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.




















GALLAR v. HUSAIN

If the action is brought by the one who is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible; otherwise, it could
prescribe.

FACTS:
Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro Husain sold the land under dispute for 30 pesos to
Serapio Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to his sister, Graciana
Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the
land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same
occasion to Gallar, who since then has been in possession of the land. A couple of years after, Gallar filed this suit
in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of
Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He
also asked for damages. The Husains countered by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price thus
their father had already reacquired ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of Elias has already
PRESCRIBED.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not ownership was transferred to Gallar?
2) Whether or not the action has already prescribed?

RULING:
1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in
whom the right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been transferred. Graciana
Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's
right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she
exchanged it for a cattle with Gallar.

2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to
remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their
predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's
argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title
would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of
limitation governing such actions.



PINGOL VS CA
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had
made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused
to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title
being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
FACTS:
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-
HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6
years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161.
The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However,
Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for
specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donascos
lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract
to sell, not contract of sale). With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was
deemed cancelled, and the heirs continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the
parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties intended an absolute
deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donascos possession
and construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot
divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded under
Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period stipulated as long as no
demand for rescission has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence,
Donasco has equitable title over the property.

(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was actually an action
to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them
by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to
accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear
his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have an
absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to property in ONEs
POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
TITONG v. CA
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be complied with
meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title.
Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion reivindicatoria or
accion publiciana.

FACTS:
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being disputed in
this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however legal title over the property can only be given to
one of them.

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate
decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the
disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared
for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly
entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part
of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.

Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for
20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what
remained of Titongs property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed
the latter to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion
of Titongs property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.

Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs, saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first
declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on
the north by the B. River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property
owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property
pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a
part of the estate of Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all
these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in the
name of Titongs.

The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was made by Titong, while the second
was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary
to Titongs allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606.
The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold
by Titong to him.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a
case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which were suspended because of instant case.

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of
the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by
the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud settlement, Titongs share bloated to
2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached upon his property and declared it as part of his
inheritance.

The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on
the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong diverted course of the B.
river after he had repurchased the land from Verano because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC
wherein it says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant
must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt,
question or shadow upon owners title to or interest in real property. The ground for filing a complaint for quieting
title must be instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property.
Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were Laurios alleged acts of physical
intrusion into his purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible entry and not quieting
title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong
sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale
to the latter.

Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing
sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.


OCLARIT v. CA
FACTS:
Juan Oclarit purchased an unregistered land in Bohol for P100 from Macalos. This particular land did not have
specified boundaries, as it was only indicated that the borders were a brook, lands of Gales, and another of Baja.
He subsequently purchased 5 more unregistered parcels of land from Gales, one of which was an irrigated rice and
coconut lands, which is now the subject of the action.

Balasabas apparently entered the land about 15 years later and replaces the J.O. labels on top of the trees with
F.G. (Felipa Gales, his mother). The heirs of Oclarit then filed an action for the quieting of the title and damages
against Balasabas, averring that Oclarit exercised dominion and ownership openly, peacefully, adversely and
uninterrupted. The deceased even planted coconut trees and other crops on the land, enjoyed their fruits and
even paid realty tax on the land.

RTC initially found for Balasabas after having a Commissioner survey the lands and discovered the discrepancy
between the boundaries indicated in the Deed of Sales and the one written on the tax declarations. The CA,
however, reversed the decision, and ruled that Oclarit is the rightful owner of the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands claimed by Balasabas are actually foreign and alien to the lands claimed by Oclarit,
making these lands actually his property?
HELD:
While it is true that tax declarations are not strong proof to claim ones property as his, it will stand in court should
these tax declarations be coupled with ones exercise of ownership, such as those proven by Oclarits heirs.

Furthermore, although what defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its descriptions, but the
boundaries laid down, in cases such as this one, where the boundaries are unclear, the actual size of the land gains
importance.






OBLEA VS CA
FACTS:
The lot in issue was originally registered in the names of Manuel Melencio, Pura Melencio, Wilfredo Wico and
Mariabelle Wico. But was subsequently re-registered in the name of Ramon Melencio (son of deceased Manuel
Melencio), Pura Melencio and the Wicos via a deed of sale.

On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who claimed
to have acquired the property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged administratrix of the estate of Manuel and Pura
Melencio.

Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea leased a building located on the subject lot from a certain Marius Esteban,
an alleged son of private respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea eventually bought from Marius the lot on which the
building stood. As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Juan Esteban filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea.

MTC decided for Juan Esteban and ordered Oblea to vacate and pay arrears. On appeal, RTC affirmed MTC.

On 3 June 1993, the registered owners (Ramon Melencio, Pura Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico)
sold the disputed lot to petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together with the registered owners filed before the
RTC an action for quieting of title against Juan Esteban. They contended that the deeds of sale executed by
Mauricio Ramos in favor of Juan Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio Ramos were a nullity.

Meanwhile, the ejectment case was appealed thrice to the CA but all were denied.

In the appeal to the SC, Oblea asserts that the subsequent sale to him by the registered owners is a supervening
event that gave him a better right of possession and ownership. Hence the judgment of eviction can no longer be
enforced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent action to quiet title in the RTC divests the MTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case?
HELD:
No.The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is physical or material possession, i.e., possession de facto and
not possession de jure. The pendency of an action for quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the MTC of
its jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property. The subsequent acquisition of
ownership by petitioners is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in said unlawful
detainer case, the fact remaining that when judgment was rendered by the MTC in the ejectment case, petitioner
Oblea was a mere possessor of the subject lot.
Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating
the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the eviction
case did not deal with the issue of ownership which was precisely the subject matter of the action for quieting of
title before the RTC. With the finality of the decision in the ejectment case, execution in favor of the prevailing
party has become a matter of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot be avoided.

BENITO vs. SAQUITAN-RUIZ
If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, then his right
to seek reconveyance does not prescribe.

FACTS:
Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the land from Francisco Morales and instituted ejectment
proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land. Respondent, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz bought a portion of
the land from petitioner on a promise to contribute Php 6000 for the ejectment proceedings which will serve as
the consideration for the sale. On 17 April 1979, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in favor of respondent,
however, he failed to pay his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner never caused the issuance of the
certificate of title despite demands of the respondent for such issuance. Instead, petitioner subdivided the lot
where respondents land was located into five while the latter continued to possess such land. Petitioners, then
borrowed Php75,000 from a certain Basilia Dela Cruz, who later sued them for collection. For failure to pay the
borrowed money, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC and the disputed petitioners land was sold to Dela
Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter was the highest bidder. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of
Title was issued to Dela Cruz but it was only on 27 May 1999 that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued.
On 1 April 1999, respondent filed the case for specific performance with declaration of nullity of titles and
damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed?

RULING: No.
The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully
registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. A petition for
the quieting of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the ground of
prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
Furthermore, the action was seasonably filed since Dela Cruzs right to its conveyance and possession was subject
to the 12-month redemption period provided under section 33 of rule 39 of the Rules of court. In this case, only a
month had passed.


METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. V ALEJO

A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. Where a title was previously held null and void already, an action to quiet title is not the proper
remedy because the TCT (as basis of the right) is not, on its face or otherwise, valid in the first place.

FACTS:
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the amounts
of 5k and 2k. As security for the payment, Spouses Acampados executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate
Mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. Subsequently a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
the TCT of the spouses was filed by Sy Tan Se in the RTC of Valenzuela.
Despite being the mortgagee of the real property, the bank was not made a party to the said civil case(complaint
for declaration of nullity of TCT.) They werent notified as well.

The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated. The
bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A certificate of sale was issued in their favor.
When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of Deeds, petitioner was informed of the existence of the
decision in the aforementioned civil case (complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT) declaring the Spouses
Acampadoss TCT null and void.

The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the RTC Decision. The CA dismissed their petition and
ruled that the bank should have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy available to the bank
2. Whether or not the judgment of the trial court (declaring the Spouses Acampados TCT null and void) should be
declared null and void

HELD Both Yes
1. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy available to the bank. It precisely alleged that Sy Tan
Se purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a defendant to the civil case even if he was an
indispensable party. This deprived the bank of its duly registered property right without due process of the law.
The allegation of extrinsic fraud may be the basis for annulling a judgment.

Petition for relief (what the CA recommended) was not available to the bank since it was never a party to the civil
case.

An action for quieting of the title was also not available to the bank. An action for quieting of title is filed only
when there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance
of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The subject judgment cannot be
considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT, which does not even
have a semblance of being a title.

It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action to
quiet title because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment of
another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that our court has no power to do so, as
that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting
of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case.

Bank cant also intervene to a case that he has no knowledge of.

2. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared null and void because the bank, which is an
indispensable party, was not impleaded in the civil case.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.