International Journal of Value-Based Management 15: 225236, 2002.

2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

225
On Property and Exploitation
HANS HERMANN HOPPE
1
& WALTER BLOCK
2
1
Economics Department, University of Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas,
NV 89154, U.S.A.;
2
College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans,
Box 15, New Orleans, LA 70118, U.S.A.
Abstract. The authors contend that what can legitimately be owned in a free society is only
rights to physical property, not to the value thereof. You are thus free to undermine the value
of our property by underselling us, by inventing a new substitute for our property, etc. But you
cannot legitimately physically agress against our property, even if its value remains constant
despite your efforts.
Keywords: private property rights, value, price, ethics
1.
Whenever one says I own a house, what one normally means is: I have
the right to determine how that particular resource described in objective,
physical terms is to be employed; I am free to employ it for any purpose
whatsoever, provided that in so doing I do not impair the physical integrity of
resources owned by others; I am likewise entitled to expect that the physical
integrity of my resource, my house, remains unaffected by the actions others
perform with the physical resources at their disposal. Property rights, then,
are commonly conceived of as extending to specic, physical objects. These
objects are economic goods and hence have value, otherwise no one would
claim them. Yet it is not to the value attached to a specic resource that
property rights extend, but rather exclusively to the physical integrity of such
a good. I do not own the value of my house. I own a physically specied
house; and I have the right to expect that others will not physically damage it.
2.
Plausible as this theory of property is,
1
in much of contemporary political
economy and philosophy confusion abounds on the issue of whether prop-
erty rights concern the value of physical things or, instead, it is the physical
thing themselves which are of value.
2
It is thus necessary to clarify why the
226 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
common notion of property rights as extending exclusively to physical things
is indeed correct; and why the notion of property rights in values is awed.
First, it should be noted that these theories are incompatible with each
other. It is easily recognized that every action of a person may alter the value
(or price) of another persons property. If A enters the labor or the marriage
market, this may impair Bs value in these markets. And if A changes his
relative evaluation of beer and bread, or if A decides to become a brewer or
a baker himself, this may change the property values of the other brewers
and bakers. According to the view that value-impairments constitute rights
violations it follows that As actions may represent punishable offenses. Yet if
A is guilty, then B and the brewers or bakers in turn must be entitled to defend
themselves against As actions. Their right to defend themselves can only
consist in their (or their agent) being permitted to physically attack or restrict
A and his property: B must be entitled to physically bar A from entering
the labor or marriage market; and the brewers or bakers must be allowed to
physically hinder A from spending his own money as he pleases, e.g., from
using his own possessions for the operation of a brewery or bakery. Based on
this theory, the physical damaging or restricting of another persons property
use obviously cannot be said to constitute a rights violation. Rather, physical
attacks and physical restrictions on the use of private property then have to
be classied as lawful defenses. On the other hand, suppose that physical
attacks and physical property restrictions constitute rights violations. Then B
and brewers or bakers are not allowed to defend themselves against As ac-
tions. For As actions his entering the labor or marriage market, his changed
evaluation of beer and bread, and his opening of a brewery or bakery neither
affects Bs bodily integrity nor the physical integrity of other brewers or
bakers property. If they engage in physical resistance against As actions
nonetheless, then the right to defense rests with A. In this case, however, it
cannot be considered a rights violation that a persons actions impair the value
of another persons property. No other, third alternative exists.
These two theories of property are not only incompatible, however. The al-
ternative view that a person may own the value (or price) or scarce physical
goods is also praxeologically impossible,
3
i.e., it is a theory that we cannot
put into effect even if we wanted to; as well, it is as argumentatively indefensi-
ble. For while every person can, in principle, have control over whether or not
his actions cause the physical attributes of other persons property to change,
control over whether or not his actions affect the value of other peoples prop-
erty rests with other people and their evaluations. Consequently, it would be
impossible to ever know in advance if ones planned actions were permitted
or not. One would have to interrogate the entire population to make sure that
ones planned actions would not impair the value of anybody elses property;
ON PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION 227
as well, one would have to reach a universal agreement on who was permitted
to do what, with which goods. Mankind would be long dead before this was
ever accomplished. Hence, the theory breaks down as non-operational.
Moreover, the proposition that a person may own the value of a physi-
cal thing involves an internal contradiction. For simply in order to propose
this theory it would have to be presupposed that its proponent is allowed to
act. He must do so prior (and simultaneously) to making his proposition or
seeking agreement for his proposal regarding how to protect property values
from value-intrusive actions. He cannot wait, and suspend acting, until an
agreement is reached; rather, he must be permitted to employ at least his
own physical body (and its standing room) immediately. Otherwise he could
not even make his proposal. Yet if one is permitted to assert a proposition
and no one could deny this without falling into a contradiction then this
is only possible because there exist objective (physical) borders of property.
Every person can recognize these borders as such on his own, without having
to agree rst with anyone else with respect to ones subjective system of
values and evaluations. Prior to even beginning the intellectual endeavor of
proposing property theories, then, as its very own praxeological foundation,
there must be an acting (e.g., speaking) man, dened in terms of physical or
human resources. Value of utility considerations, agreements or contracts
all things that contemporary political philosophers and economists typically
regard as fundamental to their various theories of justice or property al-
ready presuppose the existence of physically independent decision-making
units. Also presupposed is a description of these units in terms of a persons
property relations to denite physical resources otherwise there would be
no one to value or agree on anything, and nothing on which to agree or about
which to make contracts. Anyone proposing anything other than a theory of
property-in-physically-dened-resources would contradict the content of his
proposition merely by making it. He could not even open his mouth if his
theory were correct; and the fact that he does open it disproves his claim.
4
3.
The notion of property-in-values is praxeologically impossible (non-
operational) if formulated as a theory of justice, i.e., as a system of rules that
applies universally to each and every person alike. It becomes operational if
and only if it is employed instead as a theory of exploitation. It is at least
logically coherent as a system of rules that privileges one person or group of
persons at the expense of another, underprivileged person or group. No one
could act, if everyone owned the value attached to what he regarded as his.
228 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
Acting is possible, however, if B owns the value of the resources presently
at this disposal and is entitled to determine what others, A, may or may not do
with resources they control so as to not impair his, Bs, property values. This
would perforce include As compensatory delivery to B of resources presently
possessed by A. On the other hand, A is then entitled to own neither the value
nor the physical integrity of his possessions and has no claim against B except
that B allows him to do anything as long as it is to Bs advantage.
Although praxeologically possible, such a system of rules does not even
qualify as a potential human ethic, because it fails to meet the universal-
izability criterion. By adopting this system, two distinct classes of persons
are created superhumans or exploiters such as B, and subhumans or the
exploited such as A to whom different law applies. Accordingly, it fails
from the outset as a universal, human ethic. It is not not even in princi-
ple universally acceptable and thus cannot quality as law. In order to be
considered lawful, a rule must apply universally, for everyone equally. The
idea of property-in-values, then, is not only praxeologically impossible if
universalized but also inhumane if not universalized.
4.
From this conclusion far-reaching consequences follow: (1) Discrimination,
(2) defamation and libel suits, (3) comparable worth, parity, and afrmative
action policies, and (4) the notorious ex-lover seeks compensation for no
longer being loved suits would then have to be regarded as scandalous if
at times amusing perversions of law and justice. Likewise, institutions such
as (5) licensing laws, (6) zoning regulations, (7) anti-trust laws, (8) insider
trading laws, etc., represent legal outgrowths of the property-in-value theory.
Ultimately, they all involve restricting As control over specied resources
by correspondingly expanding Bs control over them. This holds true even
though A had not physically damaged, and was not in the process of physi-
cally damaging, any of Bs possessions in doing whatever A wants to do with
the means presently at this own disposal. Bs claim against A is based not
on physical losses caused by A, but rests solely on Bs assumption that As
actions, unless restricted, impose a value-loss on him. In this theory B owns
the value of his property, and hence is entitled to reassure his value-integrity
by imposing physical restrictions on As actions. One party seeks material
compensation from another for the crime of non-material value damages
suffered from having ones expectations regarding anothers actions disap-
pointed. Disappointed hopes, of which life offers an unlimited supply, are
used by one person as a justication for trying to physically enrich himself at
the expense of another.
ON PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION 229
Let us now illustrate the exploitative character of each of these legal
practices in some more detail.
4.1. Discrimination
Strictly speaking discrimination is the refusal to deal with, trade with, live
next to, buy from, sell to, engage in any commercial or non commercial
activity whatsoever, with another person. In discriminating against B, A un-
doubtedly reduces Bs economic well-being, compared to what it would have
been had A not so discriminated.
5
The value of Bs physical property, as well
as his human capital
6
falls below the level otherwise attainable. Neverthe-
less, since B can only own his person plus his physical property, he can have
no just claim against A for shunning him.
There exists a categorical distinction between physical invasion and the
refusal to deal with, or discrimination.
7
As actions are that of a boycott, and
do not constitute physical intrusion. But many commentators, unfortunately,
fail to make this vital distinction. All too often it is thought, for example, that
rape and discrimination against women are on a continuum. Or that lynching
blacks is different only in degree to ignoring them. But a moments reection
will show that these activities are night and day compared to each other.
The physical assault of B on A (as retaliation against As prior dis-
criminatory action) always involves losses in value terms. But it also robs
A temporarily or permanently of the very means to recover such losses. In
contrast, while discrimination may likewise be unpleasant, in leaving Bs
physical possessions unimpaired, it strictly limits Bs value losses. For exam-
ple, if no one will hire ugly women to be secretaries, the wages they command
will tend to decline. But at lower compensation levels, these females their
physical integrity and hence their job skills being unimpaired will become
more of a bargain in the labor market. This, presumably, will counter the
negative effect of the initial discrimination. They will not be consigned to
unemployment, the rst result, but will rather nd jobs, albeit at lower wages
than absent discrimination. However, once on the payroll, they will be able
to demonstrate their true productivity (perhaps even in excess of that of
their more beauteous competitors) and can in this way recoup at least in
part their initial salary losses. In sharp contrast, had physical invasion been
directed against them (or, as a retaliatory action, against their more beauti-
ful competitors), none of these ameliorative reactions could have come into
play.
8
230 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
4.2. Defamation and libel
Most commentators have argued that one has a legitimate ownership right to
ones reputation. But this is not so. For the simple reason that ones reputation
consists of the thoughts of other people.
9
That is, As reputation consists
solely of the thoughts of B, C, D, and Bs reputation of those of A, C, D,
. . . etc. But since no one can own the thoughts of other people, one cannot,
paradoxically, own ones own reputation.
While there can be no universal right to ones reputation, and libel and
defamation do not constitute exploitation per se, the right of a person to en-
gage in libelous or defamatory action is not unrestricted. For while everyone
has an unrestricted right concerning his thoughts, the right of free speech is
not absolute. For example, no one has the right to tell another person unless
you hand over to me your wallet, Ill shoot you. This sort of speech would
be strictly forbidden in a private property society. It is a threat to engage
in initiatory violence. As well, no one, including any of my detractors, has
a right to come to my living room to give me a speech or tell me what he
thinks about me and when I tell him to leave object on the ground of his right
to freedom of speech. A trespasser has no free speech rights whatsoever on
my property. Free speech rights, so called, are really but an instance of private
property rights. I can say anything I want on my property and so can anyone
else, including any libelous person, on his own property.
4.3. Comparative worth and parity policies
Most advocates of Equal Pay for Equal Work (EPFEW) or of Equal Pay for
Work of Equal Value (EPFWOEV) legislation maintain that these enactments
are necessary in order to combat employer discrimination between males
and females. Even were this the case, there would be nothing that should
be legally untoward in such a situation, for women own only their labor
power, not the price placed upon it by others. Did they but have a right to
the latter, as we have seen, it would be impossible for anyone at all to engage
in human action, lest they advertently or inadvertently impact on the value of
any womens effort.
But it is not at all the case that women earn less than men due to employer
discrimination. On the contrary, this state of affairs is due to the asymmetrical
effects of marriage: it enhances male wages and reduces that of females. Due
to unequal responsibilities in the average family for child care, shopping,
cleaning, laundering, cooking, and a whole host of other such activities, the
average wife earns only some 40% of her husbands salary. In contrast, there
is no pay gap at all between females and males who have never been touched
by the institution of marriage; the salaries of the never married are virtually
ON PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION 231
identical. The much noted and reviled by feminists income ratio of 60%75%
is actually an amalgam of the experiences of these two very different groups
of people.
10
Contrary to the views of feminists, private property and markets are the
institution, par excellence, which assures not only EPFEW, but EPFWOEV
as well. Suppose, for example, that a man and a woman had equal productiv-
ity of $20/hour and that the man were paid this amount of compensation.
11
Suppose further that the women were paid only $12, 60% of the male wage,
exemplifying the supposedly discriminatory pay gap. This would set up the
same irresistable prot opportunities as in the case of the male paid less than
his productivity level. Any male chauvinist employer who hired the man at
$20, rather than the equally productive woman at $12 would place himself
at a serious competitive disadvantage. He would be a prime candidate for
bankruptcy.
EPFEW and EPFWOEV, then, equate wages between equally productive
males and females. The reason women earn only some 60% of what males do
is because, on average (due, perhaps largely, to marriage asymmetries) they
are only 60% as productive. So EPFEW and EPFWOEV have already been
attained on the market. There is no discriminatory wage gap.
But this is not at all what the advocates of pay equity demand. Their
view, predicated on the notion that people have a right not merely to their
own persons and property but to the value thereof is in effect that males
and females should receive the same compensation, despite differences in
productivity. Imagine that their wish were granted. That is, suppose that the
law requires a male with productivity of $20, and a female with productivity
of $12, both to be paid the former amount. Now, incentives will all be turned
around. Instead of having a nancial interest in hiring the woman, the rm
now will be led as if by an invisible hand to avoid her at all costs. The re-
sult will be greatly enhanced unemployment rates for women, a result which
obtains whenever the legal system articially prices factors of production out
of the market.
4.4. Afrmative love
Most people can see through law suits seeking damage for alienation of affec-
tion. These are properly regarded as a scandal and a disgrace. People cannot
own the love of others. The very notion is contradictory; true affection must
be given voluntarily, while ownership implies the right to take it from another
person, whether or not he is willing to bestow it.
So these suits, too, are an instance of the confusion over physical owner-
ship vs. property in values. An ex-lover seeking nancial compensation from
her no longer amorous suitor is really asserting that she has the right to control
232 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
his feelings. If this were true his ownership right over his person would be null
and void, since he could not even choose the object of his desires.
4.5. Licensing laws
This legislation is an attempt to restrict the actions of others so that the
value of ones own property can be enhanced or stabilized. If entry into the
industry of potential competitors can be precluded, ones wealth increases.
Naturally, this motivation is disguished, hidden behind a plethora of public
interest billingsgate. Accordingly, taxi license holders wax eloquent about
the reduced trafc congestion afforded by this system, and members of the
American Medical Association take pride in the enhanced quality of medical
services thus engendered. But this is empty rhetoric. Taxi cab medallions sell
for many thousands of dollars, attesting to the value of government imposed
monopoly, not to the ease of trafc ows. And the salary levels achieved by
doctors has little to do with the nations health; if anything, the very opposite
is true.
12
For example, consider the Viennese doctors the best in the world at
that time who came to the U.S. to escape the ravages of National-Socialism
in the 1930s. It was no coincidence that the AMA did everyting in its power to
hinder the process whereby they could practice their profession. They insisted
on loyalty oaths, but this had nothing to do with patient care. They compelled
familiarity with the English language as if there were no German speaking
sick people, nor translators. They demanded residence periods, as if these
were anything but a blatant attempt to forestall unwanted competition.
13
But licensing laws do not even go far enough if the values of taxis, med-
ical equipment, skills, are to be maintained and enhanced. Strictly speaking,
there should also be requirements on the demand side as well. That is, the
temporarily unemployed cabbies should be able to commandeer the man on
the street, force him into the taxi, and drive him, if need be right back to
the point of embarcation, so as to maintain revenues. And if ever revenues
decline, doctors ought to be allowed to inict diseases on innocent people
so that they can charge them for cures. After all, according to the property
in values theory, people who do not get sick, and/or refuse to ride around in
taxis, are really stealing from doctors and cabbies, respectively.
4.6. Zoning
Who has not yielded to the temptation at least in thought of wishing
to maintain if not upgrade the value of his real estate holdings? One way
to do this is through entrepreneurial action (including insurance). A person
purchases a home in a large scale condominium development, for instance,
where all owners are precluded from any activity (painting a house with polka
ON PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION 233
dots, ripping it down and putting in a cement factory) which might conceiv-
ably lower property values. Alternatively, a restrictive covenant can be signed
with neighbors to the same end.
But this costs money, time and effort. There are transaction costs in-
volved. Frequently it is much easier to rely on the political process. If a law
is passed requiring a minimum one acre lot size for single family dwellings,
hordes of undesirables can be kept out. For the only chance of the poor suc-
cessfully bidding against wealthy people is in the form of multiple dwelling
units. They can gang up on the rich by more intensive land settlement. But
if this is precluded by zoning laws, that option is not available to them. Bet-
ter yet, inaugurate the no growth philosophy, ostensibly for environmental
ends; this obstructs any new building, for whatever purpose, the better to
maintain property values. Why rely on an imperfect market when legislative
enactments can attain such ends?
14
City planners (who owe employment to the existence of zoning laws)
argue that this system keeps incompatible land uses separated from one
another. But private property rights can achieve the same ends, without the
use of force and compulsion.
15
The reason lling stations do not locate in cul-
de-sacs is that there is too little trafc to support them there. Likewise, cement
factories are prohibited by marketplace considerations from setting up shop in
downtown areas. High real estate prices relegate them to the periphery. When
land use bureaucrats err, they do so on a colossal, city-wide scale. They lose
millions for the citizenry but not a penny of their own personal funds. The
benets of marketplace zoning, as is illustrated most drastically by the failure
of the Soviet economic system, is that private investors, who risk their own
money, tend to be more careful with it. The drawbacks of central planning
apply to cities as well as to countries.
4.7. Anti trust
Anti trust laws serve many purposes. From the point of view of the expert
in law and economics, for instance, they function as a full employment
bill, calling forth millions of hours of highly paid expert testimony. From
the perspective of the neo-classical economist it furnishes an opportunity to
demonstrate manual dexterity with average and marginal cost and revenue
curves, dead weight losses and resource misallocations, the better to daz-
zle naive students. For the political ideologue, the theory of monopoly, upon
which anti trust laws are based, provides the scientic legitimation for the
permanency of so-called market failures; it is a stick which can be used to
beat up on the private property (capitalist) system.
For our purposes, anti trust laws illustrate yet another instance of dening
property in terms of values, not physical criteria. If company A sells a better
234 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
product, or the same one at a lower price, how does it hurt its competitors?
Only in value terms, not physical ones.
As in the case of witch craft, or heresy during the period of the inquisition,
there is no defense against the charge of monopoly. Promotion of consumer
welfare is no defense; indeed, it is part of the indictment. Selling at a price
lower than competitors is prima facie evidence of cutthroat competition;
selling at a higher price indicates monopolistic proteering; selling at the
same price as everyone else is evidence of collusion. Since there is no fourth
alternative, any rm is theoretically guilty as charged, no matter what its
behavior. Similarly with quantity sold. Too much is pre-emptive, too little is
monopolistic withholding, and the same as others is collusive dividing up of
the market. Heads the anti-trust division and the Federal Trade Commission
win; tails, the business concern loses.
16
4.8. Insider trading
The last instance of the property-in-value theory we shall discuss are laws
prohibiting insider trading. The complaint on the part of the advocates of
such laws is that the knowledge possessed by someone, when acted upon in
a commercial matter, is a violation of the rights of others. Previously we had
asserted that no one could act, if everyone owned the value attached to what
he regarded as his. With insider trading we see a paradigm case of this.
17
The legally established contention here is that a knowledgeable state of
mind can convert what would otherwise be a legitimate purchase of stock
into an illegitimate one, provided that the information relied upon is not ho-
mogeneously spread throughout the population. Since it never is, virtually any
commercial activity with regard to stocks and bonds can be deemed unlawful.
The situation is indeed worse than that. A rigorous pursuit of the logic of
insider trading prohibitions could potentially be used to preclude any market
transaction.
Did a woman buy an umbrella because she heard a newscast that if would
rain tomorrow? Unless everyone turned into the same weather program, and
listened as attentively as did she, this would give her an unfair advantage
over other people. And what of the person who attended, horrors!, a course
on the case and feeding of stocks and bonds? Such studies would surely
give the student an inside track vis--vis those who had not attended the
lectures. If the crime of excessive information
18
can be applied to umbrel-
las and stocks and bonds, it can be applied to anything: to real estate, to
amenities, to human capital, to factors of production. Moreover, this doctrine
calls into question the acquisition of any knowledge (unless, of course, it is
evenly spread throughout the entire world community). Those particularly
ON PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION 235
at risk include doctors, lawyers, economists, college professors, Nobel Prize
winners.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Armen alchian, Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
1977, pp. 131132; notes Alchian although private property rights protect private prop-
erty from physical changes chosen by other people, no immunity is implied for the
exchange value of ones property. . . . Private property, as I understand it, does not imply
that a person may use his property in any way he sees t so long as no one else is hurt.
Instead, it seems to mean the right to use goods (or to transfer that right) in any way
the owner wishes to long as the physical attributes or uses of all other peoples private
property is unaffected. And that leaves plenty of room for disturbance and alienation of
affections of other people.
2. The idea of property-in-values underlies, for instance, John Rawls difference principle,
i.e., the rule that all inequalities among people have to be expected to be to everyones
advantage regardless of how they have come about (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 60, pp. 75f, p. 83); and also Robert Nozicks
claimthat a dominant protection agency has the right to outlawcompetitors regardless of
their actual behavior, and his related claim that non-productive exchanges, in which one
party would be better off if the other did not exist, may be outlawed again regardless of
whether or not such an exchange involved any physical invasion (Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp. 55f, pp. 8386).
3. On the concept of praxeology, and the systematic reconstruction of economic theory as
a logic of action, see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1949 (3rd ed. Chicago: Regnery, 1966); idem, Theory and
History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution, New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1957 (reprint: Auburn University, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute,
1985).
4. See also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1989, ch. 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property,
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, part II; idem, Man, Economy, and Liberty,
Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 4, 1990, esp. pp. 260263. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann,
Democracy The God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy,
and Natural Order, Rutgers University, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001.
5. A reduces his own wealth, too, apart from the psychic income gains that accrue to him,
which is the reason he indulges his preferences in this manner.
6. Gary Becker, Human Capital, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964.
7. See Walter Block, The Economics of Discrimination, The Journal of Business Ethics,
Vol. 11, 1992, pp. 241254.
8. One must also distinguish between discrimination on the part of a private property owner
and that engaged in by the State. In the former case, as we have seen, the law of private
property assures that value losses may be recovered by the victim. But this does not
apply when government engages in discriminatory behavior. If the civil service shuns ugly
secretaries, their wages will fall as a result. But this will not make them more attractive
to the bureaucracy, since their access to coercive levies from the citizenry (e.g., taxes)
shield them from any concern for prot. To the extend that the government engages in
236 HANS HERMANN HOPPE AND WALTER BLOCK
discrimination, then, the victims are in a far worse position than when this occurs in the
private sector.
9. See Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy, Menlo Park,
Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970; idem, For a New Liberty, Macmillan: New York,
1973; idem, The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press: Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982; see
also Walter Block, Defending the Undefendable, New York: Fleet Press, 1976.
10. See Thomas Sowell, Race and Economics, New York: Morrow, 1983. See also Wal-
ter Block, Economic Intervention, Discrimination, and Unforeseen Consequences, in:
Walter Block/Michael Walker, eds., Discrimination, Afrmative Action and Equal Op-
portunity, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1982, pp. 101125; idem, Focus on Employment
Equity: A Critique of the Abella Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (with
Michael Walker), Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1985; Michael Levin, Feminism and Free-
dom, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987. Epstein, Richard A., Forbidden
Grounds: The Case against Employment Discrimination Laws, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992.
11. That wages tend to equal productivity levels is one of the best established propositions in
all of economics. This result can be illustrated in our example. If the mans productivity is
$20 and his wage is higher than that, say $25, the rm employing him will lose $5/hour.
If they persist in this behavior, and especially if they apply it to other workers as well,
they will go bankrupt. On the other hand, if the wage is below this level, say at $12, then
a prot opportunity of $8 exists. Any competitor would be glad to woo these workers
away from his present employer for, say, $12.25. But if one company offers that amount,
another will up the ante to $12.50. Where will this bidding process end? As close to the
productivity level of $20 as search and transportation costs will allow.
12. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962, ch. 9; Ronald Hamowy, Canadian Medicine: A Study in Restricted Entry, Vancou-
ver: Fraser Institute, 1984. Henderson, David R., The Joy of Freedom: An Economists
Odyssey, Financial Times, Prentice Hall, 2001, Ch. 15.
13. A similar situation took place with regard to Cuban doctors who ed Castro. The AMA
placed obstacles in their way of attempting to practice medicine in the U.S. as well.
14. See William Tucker, The Excluded Americans: Homelessness and Housing Policy,
Chicago: Regnery-Gateway, 1990.
15. See Bernard Siegan, Land Use without Zoning, New York: Lexington, 1972.
16. See Anderson, William, Walter Block, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Ilana Mercer, Leon Snyman
and Christopher Westley, The Microsoft Corporation in Collision with Antitrust Law,
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp.
287302.
17. See Henry A. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, New York: Free Press,
1966; idem, In Defense of Insider Trading, Harvard Business Review, 113, Nov./Dec.
1966. See also Walter Block and Robert McGee, Information, Privilege, Opportunity and
Insider Trading, Northern Illinois Law Review, December 1989, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 135.
18. Another market failure beloved by interventionists is lack of perfect information. Lets
see if we have this straight. Too little information is no good, because it violates the
requirement of perfect information. Too much information is problematic, because it is
incompatible with the strictures against insider trading. How about the same amount of
information as everyone else? Aha. A lacunae in the theory. So far, to the best of knowl-
edge of the present authors, this state of affairs has not been subjected to legal prohibition.
But who knows? A theoretical breakthrough may be lurking in these intellectual thickets.