The Rediscovery of the

Marketing Concept
Fr e de r i c k E. We b s t e r , Jr.
29
Frederi ck E. Webs t er, Jr. i s t he E. B. Os-
born Professor of Marketing at the Amos
Tuck School of Business Administration,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H. He is
also the executive director of the Market-
ing Science Institute.
The marketing concept hel ped American
busi nesses gain dominant positions in the
world's economy. Yet, the rush to strategic
pJanning forced out the marketing concept
at many companies. Now, as American
firms lose their positions, the marketing
concept is back in vogue.
T
he ma na ge me nt s of ma n y
Ameri can compani es have re-
di scovered the market i ng con-
cept , a bus i ne s s p h i l o s o p h y fi rst
devel oped mor e t han t hree decades
ago. In the process, t hey have f ound
it difficult to devel op t he cust omer fo-
cus that is central to a market -dri ven
enterprise. Among t he barriers to de-
vel opi ng that mar ket ori ent at i on are:
An i ncompl et e under st andi ng of
the market i ng concept itself;
The i nher ent confl i ct b e t we e n
short -t erm and l ong-t erm sales and
profit goals;
An overemphasi s on short-term,
f i nanci al l y- or i ent ed me a s ur e s of
management performance; and
Top management ' s own val ues
and priorities concerni ng t he relative
i mpor t ance of c us t ome r s and t he
firm' s ot her constituencies.
Many of t hese barriers have their
roots in formal strategic-planning sys-
tems, wi t h their emphasi s on finan-
cial criteria for management action,
whi ch had their heyday in the 1970s.
These syst ems are now bei ng sub-
stantially modified in many compa-
nies.
This article will explore the reasons
for the decline and resurgence of man-
agement interest in the market i ng
concept. It will also highlight some of
the basic requi rement s for the devel-
opment and mai nt enance of a cus-
tomer focus. In the process, we will
consider briefly the origins and es-
sential features of the market i ng con-
cept , its evol ut i on i nt o cor por at e
strategic planning, the current swi ng
in emphasi s from strategic planning to
strategic management, and some basic
issues of management values.
THE C H A N G E D B U S I N E S S
E N V I R O N M E N T
I t is not ed that Ameri can
wi del y
i ndust ry has lost compet i t i veness
in worl d market s in the last dec-
ade. At the same time, it has not been
able to def end its domest i c market s
agai nst f or ei gn compet i t or s . The
count ry' s huge t rade deficit (which
reflects a st rong U.S. dollar and, most
Business Horizons / May-June 1988
"This customer orientation
offered carefully tailored products and an
integrated mix of marketing el ements products, prices,
promotion, and distribution. A short-term,
tactical vi ewpoi nt was replaced by a
long-term, strategic orientation."
30
importantly, the t r emendous affec-
tion the American market has for for-
eign suppliers~ is onl y part of the
evidence of Ameri can manufact urers'
fai l ure to r e s pond ef f ect i vel y to
changes in their markets. More re-
cently, the declining dollar has inten-
sified foreign compet i t i on in many
markets, such as aut omobi l es and
comput er chips, while demand in
bot h t he ma nuf a c t ur i ng and con-
sumer-goods sectors shows little or
no real growt h. Changi ng competi-
tion, cont i nui ng technological inno-
vation, and evolving cust omer pre-
f er ences, t he basi c f or ces dr i vi ng
busi ness and pr oduct life cycles, are
not new challenges by any means.
These have been facts of life for busi-
ness managers as l ong as t here have
been markets. What has appar ent l y
happened is that many busi nesses,
and even whol e industries, have suf-
fered a substantial, somet i mes fatal,
i mpai rment of their ability to r espond
to t hese forces. In many compani es,
the most seri ous weaknesses have
been a loss of cust omer and mar ket
orientation and a basic inability to of-
fer competitively-priced products that
are responsi ve to cust omers' current
needs and preferences.
Strategic planning, once t hought to
be part of the way to cope wi t h a
changi ng compet i t i ve envi r onment
and evol vi ng pr oduct life cycles, has
actually led to pr obl ems for many
firms. Formal, centralized strategic
pl anni ng s ys t ems , of t en accom-
pani ed by a heavy emphasi s on pr od-
uct - por t f ol i o f r a me wor ks and . t he
s educt i ve l ogi c of t he exper i ence
curve, are now recogni zed to have
caused many busi nesses to lose sight
of what is requi red to remai n com-
petitive in their i ndust ri es. The basic
probl em is not wi t h strategic plan-
ning per se but wi t h the ways in whi ch
it has been i mpl ement ed and mis-
under st ood in many firms. One resul t
of this mi sunder st andi ng has been
that the basic requi rement s for effec-
tive market i ng are not al ways seen as
key i ngredi ent s in the devel opment
and i mpl ement at i on of sound busi-
ness strategy.
The Rediscovery of the Marketing Concept
I
"Marketing pl anni ng and the
broader area of l ong-range pl anni ng
began to merge and evol ved into the broader concept
of corporate strategic pl anni ng whi ch customer
markets to serve and whi ch products
to offer in t hose markets. "
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MARKETING CONCEPT
U
' ntil the mid-1950s, the busi-
ness world equated "market-
ing" with "selling." Under
this traditional view of marketing, the
key to profitability was greater sales
volume, and marketing' s responsibil-
ity was to sell what the factory could
produce. The focus was on products,
not customers, and products were
taken as gi ven--what the factory was
currently producing was what the
sales force had to sell. The emphasis
within marketing was short-term and
tactical, focusing on the selling pro-
cess itself (personal selling, advertis-
ing, and sales promotion including
short-term price inducements). The
marketing job was to convince pros-
pects that they needed what the firm
was producing.
As the American economy matured
into a consumer society in the 1950s,
and as post-war conditions of scarcity
were replaced by an abundance of
manufact urers and brands scram-
bling for the patronage of an increas-
ingly affl uent consumer, the mar-
keting concept evol ved. Volume,
price, and promotional orientations
were seen to be less profitable than
an orientation that focused on the
needs of particular sets of customers.
This cust omer ori ent at i on offered
carefully tailored products and an in-
tegrated mix of marketing elements---
products, prices, promotion, and dis-
tribution. A short-term, tactical view-
point was replaced by a long-term,
strategic orientation. The key to prof-
itability was not current sales volume
but long-term customer satisfaction
and the then-new strategic concepts
of market segmentation and product
differentiation. 1 The firm that ana-
lyzed its markets carefully, selected
groups of customers whose needs
matched up best with its capabilities,
ai~d tailored its product offering to do
the best job of satisfying those needs
was rewarded. This firm realized not
only better profit margins and repeat
purchases but also the cost efficien-
cies of more focused marketing ef-
forts.
One of the first statements of the
marketing concept as a management
phi l osophy was made by Peter
Drucker, who remains to this day one
of its strongest defenders. Drucker ar-
gued that marketing was a general
management responsibility:
There is only one valid defini-
tion of business purpose: to cre-
ate a satisfied customer. It is the
customer who determines what
the business is. Because it is its
purpose to create a customer,
any busi ness ent erpri se has
t wo--and only these two--basic
functions: marketing and inno-
vation . . . . Actually marketing
is so basic that it is not just
enough to have a strong sales
force and to entrust marketing
to it. Marketing is not only much
broader than selling, it is not a
specialized activity at all. It is the
whole business seen from the
point of view of its final result,
that is, from the customer's point
of view. 2
Within the business community,
forward-thinking executives such as
John B. McKitterick of General Elec-
tric were developing similar thoughts:
So the principal task of the mar-
keting function in a manage-
ment concept is not so much to
be skillful in making the cus-
tomer do what suits the inter-
ests of the business as to be
skillful in conceiving and then
making the business do what
suits the interests of the cus-
tomer. 3
From the academic communi t y,
Theodore Levitt's seminal statement
of the marketing concept argued that
customer needs must be the central
focus of the firm's definition of its
business purpose:
. . the organization must learn
to think of itself not as produc-
ing goods and services but as
buying customers, as doing the
things that will make people
want to do business with it. And
the chief executive himself has
the inescapable responsibility for
creating this environment, this
viewpoint, this attitude, this as-
piration. 4
All of these expressions of the mar-
keting concept emphasize that mar-
keting is first and foremost a general
management responsibility. Execu-
tives must put the interests of the cus-
tomer at the top of the firm's priorities.
Under the marketing concept, as op-
posed to the traditional sales orien-
31
Business Horizons / May-June 1988
|
"One inevitable consequence of
market ni chi ng is that markets are i ndi vi dual l y
smaller than less carefully defi ned segment s woul d be. The
firm could easily become stronger and stronger
in smaller and smaller segment s. "
32
tation, the pr oduct is' not a gi ven but
a variable to be tailored and modi fi ed
in r esponse to. changi ng cust omer
needs. Market i ng represent s t he cus-
t omer to the factory as well as the
factory to the cust omer.
Des pi t e t he mar ket i ng c onc e pt ' s
appar ent wi s dom and i mport ance, it
has al ways had to st ruggl e for contin-
ued accept ance- - even in t hose firms
that embraced it. The reasons for this
are never simple or obvi ous. At its
roots, the market i ng concept calls for
const ant change as mar ket condi t i ons
evolve, and change is usual l y difficult
for or gani zat i ons . Be yond t hat ,
Amer i can i ndus t r y' s we l l - known
preoccupat i on wi t h quart erl y finan-
cial performance (a reflection of the
short -t erm concerns of institutional
investors, among ot her things), and
the parallel gr owt h in the i mport ance
and sophistication of financial man-
agement in the 1960s and 1970s, con-
tribufed to put t i ng market i ng in the
backseat in many firms. It also has
been obser ved by some chief execu-
tives that marketing managers in their
firms have not devel oped t he analyt-
ical tools and ot her skills necessary to
under st and the cust omer and repre-
sent cust omer needs and preferences
persuasi vel y in management discus-
sions. 5
Inst ead of marketing, t he orienta-
tion in many firms (especially i ndus-
trial fi nns and ot hers t hat do not sell
f r equent l y pur c ha s e d pr oduc t s di-
rectly to the consumer) cont i nues to
be the traditional one t owar d sales.
The top marketing executive may e.ven
be called the sales manager, and it is
clear that sales vol ume is the most
i mport ant market i ng objective. With
a sales orientation, mor e is bet t er,
every order is a good order, and ever y
cust omer is a good cust omer, despi t e
the conflicting demands made on the
firm' s limited capabilities. The focus
is on current product s, not the con-
t i nuous devel opment of new ones. If
market i ng exists, it is as a staff func-
tion. The emphasi s wi t hi n market i ng
is short -t erm and tactical, focused on
selling more t oday rat her t han devel -
opi ng new market s and r espondi ng
to changi ng cust omer needs and com-
petition.
There are also several good indi-
cators of a t rue market i ng orientation.
The t op market i ng execut i ve report s
to the chief executive officer and has
line responsibility for bot h t he sales
function and ot her market i ng activi-
ties such as market research, pr oduct
devel opment , distribution, advertis-
ing, and sales promot i on. There is a
market i ng-research or market-infor-
mat i on syst em that fulfills market -
ing' s f undament al responsi bi l i t y of
bei ng an expert on the cust omer. In
market -ori ent ed firms, sales manage-
ment is gui ded by and tied to mar-
keting strategy; it does not operat e as
an aut onomous management func-
tion. The company' s busi ness strate-
gies have a clear and strong marketing
component built ar ound precise def-
initions of market segment s and care-
ful anal ysi s of t ar get s e gme nt s ,
cus t omer s , and t he f i r m' s uni que
compet i t i ve advant ages in t hose seg-
ment s. There is an organi zed and
act i ve p r o d u c t - d e v e l o p me n t f unc-
tion, and R&D is gui ded by good mar-
ket i nf or mat i on and ma r ke t i ng
di r ect i on. Ther e are ke y- a c c ount
strategies for dealing wi t h maj or cus-
t omers and di st ri but ors, who are re-
gar ded as bus i ne s s as s et s and
managed as l ong-t erm relationships.
In a ma r ke t i ng- or i e nt e d c o mp a n y ,
management is seeki ng profitability,
not j ust sales vol ume. It consi st ent l y
articulates the i mport ance of bei ng a
cust omer-focused and market -dri ven
enterprise, put t i ng the i nt erest s of t he
cust omer ahead of all ot her claimants
on t he company' s resources.
FROM MARKETI NG TO
STRATEGIC PLANNI NG
T
he market i ng concept t hat was
devel oped in t he 1950s and
1960s fit nicely into t he evol v-
ing emphasi s on corporat e st rat egy
and long-range strategic pl anni ng in
the 1960s and 1970s. Corporat e strat-
egy and f or mal s t r at egi c- pl anni ng
syst ems wer e compl et el y consi st ent
wi t h t he strategic ori ent at i on of t he
market i ng concept and the emphasi s
on market i ng as a general manage-
me nt r es pons i bi l i t y. The de ve l op-
ment of a cust omer-ori ent ed busi ness
r equi r ed l ong- t er m pl a nni ng and
pr oduct and mar ket devel opment to
make the busi ness grow. Market i ng
planning and the broader area of long-
range pl anni ng began to mer ge and
evol ved into the br oader concept of
cor por at e st r at egi c pl anni ng. St ra-
tegic pl anni ng focuses on the t wo key
st r at egi c choi ces t hat any fi rm
makes---whi ch cust omer market s to
i
serve and whi ch product s to offer in
those markets.
One of t he most i mport ant contri-
butions to t he est abl i shment of cor-
porate strategic planning as a separate
management discipline was t hat of H.
Igor Ansoff, who has been called "The
Father of Strategic Planning. ''~ Build-
ing on t he base established in mar-
keting, Ansoff ar gued that Levitt' s
mandat e to defi ne t he busi ness mis-
sion in t erms of cust omer needs was
too broad. It did not consider the basic
fact that a firm' s technical compe-
tence and its ability to r espond to cus-
t omer needs had to be fact ored into
the definition of st rat egy and t he se-
lection of market s served and prod-
ucts offered. Ansoff pr oposed four
strategic options, called gr owt h vec-
tors, defi ned by t he cells in a two-by-
two matrix of ol d/ new product s/ mar-
kets: market penet rat i on; mar ket de-
vel opment ; pr oduc t de ve l opme nt ;
and diversification (see Figure). Each
defi ned a direction in whi ch t he firm
could elect to grow, dependi ng upon
its basic capabilities and mar ket op-
portunities. The probl em was to al-
locate t he firm' s efforts and resources
among compet i ng gr owt h oppor t un-
ities, fi ndi ng t he best gr owt h vectors.
Ansoff also devel oped t he concept of
"competitive advant age" (somet i mes
called "distinctive compet ence") , t he
idea that every firm has a certain thing
that it does especially well in partic-
ular market segment s and that gives
it an edge over its competition. The
firm must find mar ket niches t hat
value, and provi de f ur t her oppor t un-
ities to devel op, its compet i t i ve ad-
vant age. Fi nal l y, t her e was t he
concept of strategic " s yner gy, " t he
a r gume nt t hat each ne w ve nt ur e
(product or market) shoul d benefi t
from, be consi st ent wi t h, and hel p to
develop some aspect of t he firm' s
competitive st rengt hs and distinctive
compet ence.
Ansoff' s t hree concept s of strat-
e g y - g r o wt h vectors, compet i t i ve ad-
varitage, and s yner gy- - have intuitive
appeal and make a good deal of sense.
Less obviously, this strategic-plan-
ning f r amewor k present s an implicit
ar gument for a soft eni ng of t he cus-
t omer orientation of t he mar ket i ng
concept. The basic premi se is t hat
cust omer needs must be bal anced
against what t he firm can do well and
what is consistent wi t h its strategy
given competitive realities. Cust omer
orientation is certainly not inconsist-
ent wi t h the concept of corporate
strategy. But t he strategic-planning
framework subtly shifts t he focus of
ma n a g e me n t at t ent i on a wa y f r om
cust omers and t oward competitors
and market domi nance.
As st r at egi c pl anni ng gai ned in
popul ar i t y, fi rms de ve l ope d l arge
central staffs to i mpl ement a strategic
pl anni ng system. Annual pl anni ng
cycles wer e established to create and
updat e one-, three-, and five-year
plans for achieving some carefully de-
fined corporate objectives, which very
oft en emphasi zed gr owt h and ret urn-
on- i nve s t me nt cri t eri a. St rat egi c-
planning management positions were
regarded as among the most attrac-
ti~'e for MBAs and ot her "fast-track-
ers. " It was wher e t he action was, t he
control room of the enterprise. As one
CEO put it when reflecting on this era
of management in his firm, "All t he
good market i ng guys want ed to be-
come strategic pl anner s. "
The strategic-planning boom also
fueled gr owt h in management con-
sul t i ng. Amo n g t he mos t popul ar
product s to come out of this i ndust r y
were the product-portfolio and ex-
peri ence-curve model s devel oped by
t he Boston Consul t i ng . Group, t he
The Rediscovery o f t h e Ma r k e t i n g C o n c e p t
I
gr owt h- shar e mat ri x devel oped by
McKinsey & Company in its wor k
with General Electric, t he Ar t hur D.
Little generic-strategies model based
on t he product ' s life-cycle stage and
market position, and t he PIMS (Profit
Impact of Marketing Strategy) studies
of the Strategic Pl anni ng Institute,
originated at General Electric by Sid-
ney Schoeffl er. 7 All of t hes e ap-
pr oaches t e nde d to vi ew ma r ke t
opportunities in t erms of t he market ' s
growt h rate and t he firm' s ability to
domi nat e its chos en mar ket seg-
ments. Market share (defined relative
to the share of t he largest competitor)
became t he key strategic variable, es-
peci al l y wh e n t he PIMS st udi es
showed that market share, among 37
variables exami ned, was most strong-
ly correlated with business profitabil-
ity measur ed by ret urn on invest-
ment . A
THE BIASES OF STRATEGIC
PLANNING
T
he formal st r at egi c- pl anni ng
approaches and portfolio mod-
els brought analytical rigor and
a hi gher order of financial discipline
to the task of devel opi ng corporate
strategy. They also brought a definite
set of priorities and biases to t he task
of managi ng a business. Underl yi ng
the approaches and models was a kind
of optimism about t he economy and
Figure
Ans of f ' s Growth Vectors
Markets
Old
New
Old
Products
New
Market
Penetration
Market
Development
Product
Development
Diversification
33
34
The Rediscovery of the Marketing Concept
i
an assumpt i on of sust ai ned economi c
gr owt h. Ma na ge me nt ' s pr i nci pal
st r at egi c pr obl e m be c a me one of
choosi ng among compet i ng gr owt h
oppor t uni t i es . Pr oduc t / ma r ke t op-
por t uni t i es we r e e va l ua t e d by t he
market ' s gr owt h rate and the firm' s
ability to achieve a domi nant posi t i on
in that market. Market niching, a stra-
tegic concept growi ng out of the gen-
eral not i on of market segment at i on,
was seen as a way of isolating onesel f
from head-t o-head compet i t i on wi t h
we l l - e nt r e nc he d compet i t or s . The
search was for hi gh-growt h market s
and well-protected niches in which the
firm coul d achieve the hi ghest "rates
of gr owt h and ret urns on i nvest ment .
As market share and hi gh-growt h
market s received strategic emphasi s,
and managem6nt -performance eval-
uat i on focused more sharpl y on rel-
atively short -t erm financial measur es
(especially ret urn on i nvest ment and
ret urn on assets), there was a subt l e
r ever s i on to t he t r adi t i onal sal es
or i ent at i on t hat had pr e c e de d t he
market i ng concept. Mergers and ac-
quisitions, as means of bot h achiev-
ing large market share and domi nant
pos i t i on and movi ng i nt o gr owt h
market s more quickly, gai ned greatly
in i mport ance relative to the sl ower
and less certain internal devel opment
of new pr oduct s and market s ar ound
the core of existing busi nesses. Div-
ersi fi cat i on i nt o new, hi gh- gr owt h
pr oduct s and market s was seen as a
very attractive gr owt h vect or for t he
firm wi shi ng to move away from its
traditional, mat ure, l ow- gr owt h busi-
nesses.
Market-niching strategies gai ned in
popul ari t y as firms searched for op-
port uni t i es to mat ch mor e precisely
t hei r di st i nct i ve c ompe t e nc e s wi t h
cust omer needs in the absence of
strongly entrenched competitors. One
i nevi t abl e c ons e que nc e of mar ket
niching is that market s are individ-
ually smaller t han less carefully de-
fined segment s woul d be. The firm
coul d easi l y be c ome s t r onger and
st ronger in smaller and smaller seg-
ment s. By itself, this is not bad. The
firm that has successfully posi t i oned
itself in a number of related market
ni ches ma y be s t r ongl y pr ot e c t e d
agai nst compet i t i ve t hr eat s. "The
problem is that the firm may lose sight
of the forest for the trees by mi sde-
fining and mi sreadi ng its compet i -
tion, especially if management has
defi ned its ser ved mar ket too nar-
r o wl y - wh i c h it coul d be easily de-
cei ved into doi ng to make sure it has
a domi nant posi t i on in the ser ved
market.
Market niching, pr oduct differen-
tiation, and l ow-cost l eadershi p have
been pr esent ed by some aut hor s as
three distinct strategic opt i ons. Either
the firm can strive for high market
share and low-cost leadership through
exploiting the experi ence curve (it is
of t en a s s ume d t hat t hi s firm al so
needs to have t he l owest prices), or
it can defi ne a distinct and well-pro-
tected market niche, or it can at t empt
to bui l d a loyal following of cust omer s
willing to pay more for a hi ghl y dif-
ferentiated pr oduct (high quality and
high price, whi ch are implicitly as-
sumed to go together). Some anal yst s
argued that the firms t hat had the
hi ghest ret urn on i nvest ment wer e
t hose that had ei t her a cost-leader-
shi p (low-price) posi t i on or a hi ghl y
di f f er ent i at ed (hi gh-pri ce) pr oduct ,
while t he l owest ret urns wer e ear ned
by t hose that wer e nei t her fish nor
fowl, stuck in the mi ddl e wi t h nei t her
low cost nor high quality. The em-
pirical evi dence to suppor t t hese ar-
gument s was, at best, anecdotal. 9
What Strategi c Pl a nni ng Left Out
The poi nt s of emphasi s in t hese stra-
tegic pl anni ng f r amewor ks may riot
be as significant as the poi nt s that
were left out. Most i mport ant l y, the
cust omer seemed to be largely out of
the picture. Market s wer e def i ned as
aggregat i ons of compet i t ors, not cus-
t omer s. Pr oduc t pos i t i oni ng and
pr oduc t qual i t y wer e bar el y men-
t i oned when defi ni ng market s and
t hi nki ng a bout oppor t uni t i e s for
bui l di ng market share. The internal
devel opment of new busi nesses, dri-
ven by consi st ent commi t ment s to re-
sear ch and de ve l opme nt , pl a ye d
s econd f i ddl e to gr owt h t hr ough
The Rediscovery of the Marketing Concept
"Strategic planning took
its toll primarily in the marketing,
R&D, and production areas because financial
strategy grew in importance and
often domi nated the others."
35
mergers and acquisitions. The build-
ing and mai nt enance of mar ket i ng
channel s and di st r i but i on ar r ange-
ment s recei ved little strategic atten-
tion, as did the devel opment of a long-
t erm cus t omer franchi se. Expendi -
tures on R&D to achieve process and
productivity i mpr ovement s in estab-
lished busi nesses oft en seemed less
attractive t han t he r edepl oyment of
funds into new vent ures, especially
as t ax-dri ven asset - r eval uat i on op-
portunities pr ovi ded large positive
cash flows. A new breed, "congl om-
erat eurs, " became role model s for
managers in a broad variety of in-
dustries. Large, stable, mat ure, tra-
ditional market s lost their luster, and
some of Ameri ca' s largest manufac-
turing enterprises could see little point
in def endi ng their historical positions
in t hose sl ow-growt h busi nesses.
Meanwhi l e, f or ei gn compet i t or s
saw Ameri can i ndust r y not r espond-
ing to cust omer needs in many evolv-
ing market s, avoi di ng i nvest ment in
its mat ur e busi nesses, and abandon-
ing some of its traditional market
strongholds, and moved in. The U.S.
market, wi t h onl y about 15 percent of
the worl d' s popul at i on, account s for
appr oxi mat el y 40 pe r c e nt of t he
world' s consumpt i on. A pr oducer in
a smaller count r y wi t h gr owt h aspi-
rations and a limited domest i c market
for ' things it has l earned to make ver y
well is likely to look first at t he U.S.
market because of its size, homo-
geneity, affluence, and accessibility.
In a number of cases, Ameri can busi-
nesses wer e clearly not offering prod-
ucts that American consumers want ed
(such as small, economical, and reli-
able automobiles, farm tractors, and
motorcycles), had lost their techno-
logical l eader s hi p ( wat ches, con-
sumer electronics, and tires), or had
simply not i nvest ed in t he cont i nued
product and process i mpr ovement re-
quired to mai nt ai n compet i t i veness
(appliances, steel, and automobiles).
Foreign (especially Asian) compet -
itors ent eri ng t he U.S. market fre-
quent l y gai ned t oehol ds in relatively
unexplored market niches, often at the
low-price end of t he market. They
t hen built cust omer and t rade loyalty
t hrough offering hi gh quality and fa-
vorable prices and margins, and grad-
ually expanded out of those niches
into adjoining market segment s, pick-
ing off additional cust omers and com-
pet i t or s. They c ont i nue d to offer
superi or cust omer value, oft en incor-
porating product feat ures that do-
mestic suppliers offered onl y as extra-
cost options or not at all, and even-
tually dominated the total market, not
just a few carefully defi ned segment s.
In many instances, t hey destroyed the
"ni chers, " who had creat ed their own
vulnerability by defi ni ng their busi-
nesses and their sets of competitors
too narrowl y.
Strategic pl anni ng t ended (unin-
tentionally) to drive out attention to
cust omers and their needs, t he cen-
tral t hrust of t he market i ng concept,
as t he pri mary requi rement for long-
t erm prof1'tability. By shifting atten-
t i on to compet i t or s, gr owt h, a nd
short -t erm ret urn on i nvest ment , and
by regardi ng mat ur e busi nesses as
primarily sources of cash rat her t han
as key contributors to fut ure profita-
bility, t he strategic-planning model s
weakened the ability of some of this
count ry' s most i mport ant compani es
and industries to r espond to evolving
customer needs, new technology, and
changing competition, especially from
overseas competitors. By concentrat-
ing management ' s attention on cor-
porate strategy, t hey weakened t he
functional strategies, especially mar-
keting strategy, necessary to imple-
ment t he hi gher - l evel st r at egi es
successfully.
LEVELS OF STRATEGY
A s strategic pl anni ng
evolved
out of long-range pl anni ng
and the market i ng concept,
there was a blurring of t he distinc-
tions among various levels of strat-
egy. One usef ul cl assi fi cat i on I
describes five types of strategy: en-
terprise, corporate, business, func-
tional, and subfunctional. Enterprise
strategy defines the mission of t he
company in society, oft en as a mis-
sion st at ement that expresses man-
agement values and relates t he firm
to the society it serves. Corporate strat-
egy ans wer s t he quest i on, " Wha t
business are we in?" and integrates
t he var i ous busi nesses wi t hi n t he
product portfolio. Business st rat egy
answers t he question, "How do we
want to compet e in our chosen busi-
nes s es ?" Functional s t r at egi es - - i n
marketing, production, finance, R&D,
purchasing, and human resources/or-
gani zat i onal de ve l opme nt - - i mpl e -
ment t he busi ness st r at egy. Sub-
Business Hori zons / May-June 1988
|
" No t o nl y mu s t t he b u s i n e s s be
de f i ne d by t he c u s t o me r n e e d s it is c o mmi t t e d to
s e r vi ng, but it mu s t al s o de f i ne its di s t i nc t i ve c o mp e t e n c e
i n s at i s f yi ng t ho s e n e e d s , its u n i q u e wa y of
de l i ve r i ng v a l ue to t he c us t o me r . "
36
functional strategies, such as t hose for
market segment at i on and targeting,
product devel opment and manage-
ment , pricing, distribution, personal
sel l i ng, adver t i s i ng and sal es pr o-
motion, and publicity, i mpl ement t he
functional strategies.
Clearly, t he formal strategic-plan-
ni ng approaches and product -port -
folio model s emphasi zed corporat e
and busi ness strategies whi l e down-
playing, if not ignoring, t he func-
tional and subf unct i onal st rat egi es
necessary to i mpl ement t hem. At t en-
tion to strategic pl anni ng drove out
attention to good marketing. On t he
ot her hand, t here certainly is not hi ng
in t he total concept of strategic plan-
ni ng that requires i nat t ent i on to mar-
keting; in fact, a pl anni ng process that
focuses onl y on corporate and busi-
ness level strategies and leaves out
the functional and subfunct i onal lev-
els of strategy is si mpl y i ncompl et e.
Strategic pl anni ng took its toll pri-
marily in the marketing, R&D, and
pr oduct i on areas because fi nanci al
strategy grew in importance and often
domi nat ed t he others, an emphasi s
consistent wi t h t he cash-flow and in-
vest ment orientation of t he product -
portfolio view of corporate strategy.
FROM STRATEGIC PLANNING TO
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
B
y t he early 1980s, management
i practitioners and academi c ad-
vocates of strategic pl anni ng
had r eal i zed s ome t hi ng ha d gone
wrong. Many firms wi t h t he most
el abor at e and expens i ve st r at egi c-
pl anni ng syst ems saw their manage-
ment spendi ng an i nordi nat e amount
of time prepari ng and readi ng plan-
ni ng document s whi l e their operat i ng
business lost competitive effective-
ness. In many cases, means had be-
come ends; t he pl af f ni ng pr oces s
became a domi nat i ng influence, tak-
ing a significant port i on of manage-
ment ~rne away from actually runni ng
t he business. Some ver y large and
wel l -known compani es that had pi-
one e r e d f or mal s t r at egi c- pl anni ng
syst ems, such as General Electric, be-
gan to scale back their corporat e plan-
ning organizations and push planning
responsibility back into t he operat i ng
units. A new focus on i mpl ement a-
tion began to develop. Articles began
to appear, bot h in t he popul ar busi-
ness press and in academi c journals,
argui ng that t here was mor e to stra-
tegic management t han strategic plan-
ning."
Strategic management has been de-
fined as a six-part process, i ncl udi ng
goal f or mul at i on, e nvi r onme nt a l
analysis, st rat egy formulation, eval-
uation of strategic options, st rat egy
i mpl ement at i on, and strategic con-
trol. ~2 Corporate strategic pl anni ng
t ended to end before i mpl ement at i on
and control. Perhaps peopl e assumed
that operat i ng management woul d
worry about strategies at t he func-
tional and sub-functional levels even
if top management di d not. It is fair
to concl ude that most divisional man-
ager s a s s ume d t hat t he pl a nni ng
process was compl et e after top man-
agement had accept ed their busi ness
plans. Business uni t manager s wer e
often forced to spend most of t hei r
energi es fighting for and def endi ng
capital allocations for their busi nesses
rat her t han on t he wor k of operat i ng
the business. Once t he pl anni ng job
had been done, operat i ng manage-
ment had to t ur n quickly to hitting
the targets for sales vol ume, cur r ent
profitability, ret urn on i nvest ment ,
and cash flow called for by t he annual
plan. There was little time for atten-
tion to the details of st rat egy imple-
ment at i on.
Strategic management begins to re-
dress t he balance by bri ngi ng a re-
newed focus on i mpl ement at i on and
t he search for l ong-t erm, sustainable,
competitive advant ages over compet -
itors servi ng t he needs of a carefully
defi ned set of cust omers. It can be
seen in a new concern for quality, in-
novat i on, pr oduct i vi t y, e nt r e pr e -
neurshi p, and internal devel opment
of new busi nesses i nst ead of mer ger s
and acquisitions. In many instances,
it is mani fest ed in a di vest i t ure of re-
lated busi nesses acqui red in t he div-
ersification boom of t he 1960s and
1970s. It is a case of goi ng back to
basics, i ncl udi ng solid market i ng. ,3
M A R K E T I N G R E D I S C O V E R E D
C
ur r ent busi ness publications
are full of exampl es of firms
t hat ar e r edi s cover i ng t he
market i ng concept. Several years ago,
General Electric appoi nt ed its first
corporate vice pr esi dent of mar ket i ng
in over a decade and charged him with
responsibility for bri ngi ng about a
" ma r ke t i ng r e na i s s a nc e . " Appl e
F
Comput er hired a new president from
PepsiCo, hopi ng he woul d bri ng t he
market i ng skills that the firm needed
to devel op so urgent l y.
The 1986 GTE Corporat i on annual
report highlights, on its cover, "Mar-
ket Sensi t i vi t y: Reachi ng Out to
Cust omer s. " We read about "an ag-
gressive new consumer dri ve" at 3M
Corporation, wher e the "key weapon
in its arsenal " is a "separ at e market -
ing group. ''14 Hewl et t - Packar d' s pres-
ident, John Young, is quot ed as saying
"Creat i ng a personal comput er gr oup
was . . . a wa y of communi cat i ng
to e ve r yone t hat mar ket i ng wa s
okay . . . . ,,1s Chai rman Donal d Peter-
son of Ford Mot or Company may not
have realized that he was repeat i ng
company hi st ory and Henr y For d' s
original dr eam when he obser ved, in
1985, "My single great est desi re is to
devel op Ford Mot or Company as a
cust omer-dri ven c o mp a n y . . . If you
do that, everyt hi ng else falls into
place. ''16 Ford' s recent new- car suc-
cesses and r epor t ed gains in market
share and profitability are st rong ev-
idence that Ford is achi evi ng this ob-
jective. In a recent present at i on to the
Marketing Science Institute, t he di-
rect or of cor por at e ma r ke t i ng re-
search at DuPont r epor t ed efforts to
devel op "a market i ng communi t y. "
He out l i ned a series of specific actions
being t aken under t he l eadershi p of
the company' s CEO "t o make sure
that everyone dearl y underst ands that
serving cust omer s and market s is t he
first priority for all funct i ons. ''~7
Management thinking about mar-
keting appears to be comi ng back to
the basic market i ng concept articu-
lated in the mid-1950s. A maj or s t udy
of busi ness pl anni ng by Yankelovich,
Skelly, and Whi t e for Cooper s and
Lybrand concl uded t hat "CEOs have
indicated t hat devel opment and im-
pl ement at i on of more i nnovat i ve and
cost-effective marketing strategies will
i ndeed be their hi ghest operat i onal
pr i or i t y i n t he l at t er hal f of t he
1980's. ''~B We are learning once again
that market i ng is not sales, it is not
corporate strategy, and it is not busi -
ness strategy, and market share and
profitability are not objectives t hat
stand by t hemsel ves. Market i ng strat-
egy is an ext ensi on and i mpl emen-
t at i on of cor por at e and bus i ne s s
strategies. It focuses on the definition
and selecting of market s and cus-
t omers to be served and the continual
i mpr ovement , in per f or mance and
cost, of pr oduct s to be offered in t hose
mar ket s. In a mar ket - dr i ven, cus-
t omer-ori ent ed busi ness, the key ele-
ment of the busi ness pl an will be a
focus on wel l -defi ned market seg-
ment s and the firm' s uni que compet -
itive advant age in t hose segment s.
DEVELOPI NG A CUSTOMER-
ORI ENTED FIRM
H
avi ng i dent i f i ed bot h t he
need for and the difficulty of
devel opi ng a market -dri ven,
cust omer-focused busi ness, we can
outline some of the basic require-
ment s for achieving this goal. These
include:
Cus t omer - or i ent ed val ues and
bel i ef s s u p p o r t e d by t op manage-
ment;
Integration of market and cus-
t omer focus into the strategic-plan-
ning process;
The devel opment of st rong mar-
keting managers and programs;
The cr eat i on of ma r ke t - ba s e d
measures of performance; and
The d e v e l o p me n t of c us t ome r
commi t ment t hr oughout the organi-
zation. Each of t hese is vital to the
devel opment of a cust omer-ori ent ed
firm, and weakness in any area is suf-
ficient to scuttle the whol e effort.
Val ue s and Bel i ef s
At the base of all organizational func-
tioning is the core of val ues and be-
liefs, the culture shared by member s
of the organization. Organizational
culture is onl y barel y under st ood, es-
pecially in the context of marketing,
but interest among managers and re-
searchers is growi ng rapidly. 19
An organizational belief in the pri-
macy of t he cust omer' s interests as
the beacon for all of t he firm' s activi-
ties must be at the heart of a market-
ori ent ed busi ness. The cust omer-fo-
cused definition of the busi ness must
originate wi t h t op management , in-
cluding t he CEO and the heads of
The Rediscovery of the Marketing C o n c e p t
I
strategic operat i ng units. Not onl y
must the busi ness be defi ned by the
cust omer needs it is commi t t ed to
serving, but it must also defi ne its dis-
tinctive competence in satisfying those
needs, its uni que way of delivering
value to the customer. These beliefs
and values must include a commit-
ment to quality and service as t hey
are defined by customers.in the served
markets.
Cust omer-ori ent ed val ues and be-
liefs are uni quel y the responsibility of
top management . Onl y the CEO can
take the responsibility for defining
cust omer and market orientation as
t he dr i vi ng forces, becaus e if he
doesn' t put the cust omer first he has,
by definition, put somet hi ng else, the
interests of some ot her constituency.
or public, first. Organization mem-
bers will know what that is and be-
have accordingly. CEOs must give
clear signals and establish clear val-
ues and beliefs about serving the cus-
tomer.
Market i ng' s Rol e i n Strategic
Pl anni ng
The next st ep is to integrate market-
ing into the strategic-planning proc-
ess. The busi ness plan shoul d stress
market information, market -segment
definition, and market targeting as key
elements. All activities of the busi-
ness shoul d be built ar ound the ob-
jective of creating the desi red position
with a well-defined set of cust omers.
Separate market segment s shoul d be
the subject of separate busi ness plans
that focus on the devel opment of re-
l at i onshi ps wi t h cust omers that em-
phasize the firm' s distinctive com-
petence. Marketing' s first responsi-
bility in this context is to be truly ex-
per t on t he cus t omer ' s pr obl ems ,
needs, want s, preferences, and de-
cision-making processes. Compet i t or
analysis is also an i mport ant part of
understanding the finn' s position and
opport uni t i es in all targeted market
segment s.
This obvi ousl y is the role of mar-
keting called for by the marketing
concept. Marketing does not si mpl y
find market s and create demand for
what the factory currently produces.
Its contribution to strategic pl anni ng
37
Business Horizons / May-June 1988
"Marketi ng is not s ome t hi ng that
can be del egat ed to a smal l group of managers
whi l e the rest of the organi zat i on goes about its busi ness.
Rather, it is the whol e bus i nes s as s een
from the cust omer' s vi ewpoi nt . "
38
and implementation" begi ns wi t h the
analysis of market segment s and t he
assessment of the firm' s ability to sat-
isfy customer needs. This includes the
analysis of demand t rends, compet i -
tion, and, in industrial market s, t he
compet i t i ve condi t i ons faced by firms
in t hose segment s. Market i ng also
pl ays a key role by wor ki ng wi t h t op
management to defi ne busi ness pur-
pose in t erms of cust omer - need sat-
isfaction.
In this market -ori ent ed vi ew of t he
strategic-planning process, financial
goals are seen as results and rewards,
not the f undament al pur pos e of the
busi ness. The pur pose is cust omer
satisfaction, and the r ewar d is profit,
as not ed by Pet er Drucker in the orig-
inal st at ement of the market i ng con-
cept . The r el at i ons hi p b e t we e n
market i ng objectives and financial re-
sults shoul d be made clear in t he for-
mal .strategic-planning document .
Developing Marketing Managers and
Programs
The devel opment of market i ng-man-
a ge me nt c ompe t e nc e r equi r es de-
tailed programs, with the CEO' s active
i nvol vement , for recruiting and de-
vel opi ng pr of es s i onal mar ket i ng
managers. It also requires pr ogr ams
for recognizing and r ewar di ng supe-
rior market i ng performance, not j ust
by market i ng manager s but by all
managers, to bri ng their cont ri bu-
tions to the at t ent i on of ot her man-
agers, devel op st rong role model s,
a n d reinforce t he basic commit~aent
to cust omer-ori ent ed beliefs and val-
ues. All of the organi zat i on' s com-
muni cat i ons and ma n a g e me n t -
devel opment resources are pot ent i al
vehicles for accompl i shi ng this pur-
pose, including i n-company and on-
campus execut i ve- devel opment pro-
grams, management meet i ngs and
seminars, and company publications.
Top- ma na ge me nt i nvol ve me nt in
t hese activities can subst ant i al l y en-
hance the credibility of the market-
i ng- management effort.
With compet i t i ve market i ng man-
agement , the rest of t he firm can ex-
pect s uper i or qual i t y in t he
devel opment and execut i on of mar-
keting programs. The basic pur pose
of all of the firm' s activities shoul d be
the del i very of superi or val ue in prod-
ucts and services. Market i ng shoul d
be given the resources necessary to
devel op a first-class marketing-infor-
mat i on syst em. Market i ng manage-
ment must be hel d responsi bl e for
bei ng expert on the cust omer. The
company must be willing to i nvest in
the cust omer-servi ce syst ems neces-
sary to establish market l eadershi p.
Similarly, t here must be i nvest ment
in the devel opment of a l eadershi p
position in market i ng channels. Fi-
nally, t op management must insist
upon the very best pl anni ng and crea-
tivity in the devel opment of market -
i ng c ommuni c a t i ons and i n t he
training and depl oyment of t he sales
force. These details are crucial to t he
del i ver y of an ef f ect i ve mar ket i ng
strategy, somet hi ng that has been
overl ooked in formal strategic-plan-
ning syst ems and model s.
Market-Based Measures of
Performance
Per haps the key to devel opi ng a mar-
ket-driven, cust omer-ori ent ed busi-
ness lies in the way manager s are
eval uat ed and r ewar ded. The effort
will come to naught if, in the final
anal ysi s, ma na ge r s are e va l ua t e d
solely in t erms of sales vol ume and
short -t erm profitability and rate-of-
ret urn measures. While one of the
hal l mar ks of a ma r ke t i ng- or i e nt e d
firm is a striving for profitability rather
than sales vol ume or mar ket share
alone, it is long-term profitability and
market posi t i on that are the objec-
tives. The question of balancing short-
and l ong-t erm profit obj ect i ves is one
of the most difficult challenges to t op
management in any busi ness.
It is significant that the Coopers and
Lybrand st udy gave top priority to the
devel opment of market -based meas-
ures of managerial performance. It
obser ved that financial management
shoul d be part of the market i ng team.
In addi t i on to such measur es of mar-
keting performance as indices of cus-
t omer satisfaction and service levels,
it was suggest ed by some manager s
i nvol ved in the s t udy that new mar-
ket -based financial measur es such as
rate of ret urn by channel of distri-
but i on, t ype of account, and t ype of
medi a expendi t ur e, be de ve l ope d.
One of the r espondent s not ed that fi-
nancial management will be much
more i nt egrat ed wi t h market i ng t han
in the past as it is dri ven mor e by
market i ng goals t han by cost-control
goals.
|
Measur ement and r ewar d syst ems
are critical in the devel opment of a
mar ket - or i ent ed bus i ne s s . Just as
managers will emphasize those things
on whi ch t op management ' s state-
ment s of val ues and beliefs focus their
at t ent i on, t hey will al so do t hos e
things for whi ch t hey are eval uat ed
and r ewar ded.
Developing Customer Commi t ment
Throughout the Organization
In the final analysis, as Drucker and
Levitt not ed, market i ng is not some-
thing t hat can be del egat ed to a small
group of managers whi l e the rest of
the organization goes about its busi-
ness. Rather, it is the whol e busi ness
as seen from t he cust omer ' s vi ew-
point. Managers at General Electric
have c a pt ur e d t hi s i dea wi t h t he
phrase, "Market i ng is too i mport ant
to be left to t he market i ng peopl e!"
One of the principal responsibilities
marketing management has is to make
the entire business market-driven and
cust omer-focused. This advocacy role
is a key one for the corporat e mar-
keting staff.
The task is to be sure that ever yone
in the firm wor ks t owar d that over-
riding objective of creating satisfied
customers. Each individual, and es-
pecially t hose who have direct cont act
with the cust omer in any form, is re-
sponsi bl e for the level of cust omer
service and satisfaction. The pr oduct
is defi ned by each interaction t he cus-
tomer has wi t h any company repre-
sent at i ve. An i mpor t a nt rol e for
marketing management is to be sure
that i nformat i on about cust omer ser-
vice and satisfaction is gat hered and
sent to all parts of the organization on
a regular basis. For industrial mar-
keters, it may be ext remel y useful to
have management represent at i ves of
cust omer compani es talk wi t h the
marketer' s personnel , from t op man-
agement to product i on and service
workers, on a regular basi s to explain
the challenges and problems t hey face
and how t he market er will be called
upon to hel p find solutions.
M a n y for Ameri-
spokesmen
can t op management ex-
pr es s t he bel i ef t hat t he
redi scovery of market i ng may pro-
vi de an i mport ant boost. to their firm' s
compet i t i veness at home and abroad.
The market i ng concept, emphasi zi ng
the i mport ance of satisfying cust omer
needs as the key to l ong-t erm prof-
itability, is now expressed in such new
phrases as "cl ose to the cust omer , "
but the basic idea is more than 30 years
old. Once again, we see firms com-
mitting resources to marketing, fo-
cusi ng on and nur t ur i ng t hei r
traditional busi nesses, and bui l di ng
l ong- t er m r el at i ons hi ps wi t h t hei r
cus t omer s . Cus t omer - s er vi ce pr o-
grams are receiving i ncreased atten-
tion, and market -based measur es of
performance are becomi ng part s of
management -eval uat i on syst ems. Fo-
cus on the customer is once again seen
as the fundament al requi rement for
company survival and compet i t i ve ef-
fectiveness. With pr oper attention to
such basic i ssues as t op- management
suppor t and corporat e culture, the in-
tegration of market i ng into the plan-
ni ng pr oces s , t he d e v e l o p me n t of
hi ghl y c ompe t e nt mar ket i ng- man-
a ge me nt per s onnel , ma r ke t - ba s e d
management eval uat i on and r ewar d
syst ems, and maki ng sure the total
or gani zat i on u n d e r s t a n d s and ac-
cept s the basic commi t ment to cus-
t omer satisfaction, we can hope that
the market i ng concept will at last be
firmly ent renched in Ameri can busi-
ness. [ ]
1. See, for exampl e, Wendel l R. Smi t h,
"Product Differentiation and Market Segmen-
tation as Alternative Marketing Strategies,"
Journal of Marketing, July 1956, pp. 3-8.
2. Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Manage-
ment (New York: Harper & Row, 1954): p. 37.
3. John B. McKitterick, "What Is the Mar-
keting Management Concept?" The Frontiers of
Marketing Thought and Action (Chicago: Amer-
ican Marketing Association, 1957): pp. 71-82.
4. Theodore Levitt, "Marketing Myopia,"
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1960, pp.
45-56.
5. Frederick E. Webster, Jr., "Top Manage-
ment ' s Concerns About Marketing: Issues for
the 1980s," Jtournal of Marketing, Summer 1981,
pp. 9-16.
The Rediscovery of the Marketing Concept
6. H. Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
7. For a review of these various product-
portfolio models and strategic-planning ap-
proaches, see Derek F. Abell and John S. Ham-
mond, Strategic Market Planning: Problems and
Analytical Approaches (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1979).
8. Robert D. Buzzell, Bradley T. Gale, and
Ralph G. M. Sultan, "Market Share--Key to
Profitability," Harvard Business Review, Janu-
ary-February 1975, pp. 97-106.
9. Michael E. Porter, Conrpetitive Strategy
(New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 34-46.
10. Dan E. Schendel and Charles W. Hofer
(eds.), Strategic Management: A New View of
B,~siness Policy and Plamling (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 11-13.
11. See, for example, Frederick W. Cluck,
Stephen P. Kaufman, and A. Steven Walleck,
"Strategic Management for Competitive Ad-
vantage, " Harvard Business Review, July-August
1980, pp. 154-163.
12. Schendel and Hofer (see note 10).
13. "Do Mergers Really Work?" Business
Week, June 3, 1985, pp. 88-100.
14. " 3M' s Aggr essi ve New Co n s u me r
Drive," Business Week, July 16, 1984, p. 114.
15. Bill Saporito, "Hewlett-Packard Discov-
ers Marketing," Fortune, October 1, 1984, p. 51.
16. "Now That It' s Cruising, Can Ford Keep
Its Foot on the Gas?" Business Week, February
11, 1985, p. 48.
17. H. Paul Root, "Marketing Practices in
the Years Ahead: The Changi ng Envi ronment
for Research on Marketing," presentation to
the Trustees Meeting, Marketing Science In-
stitute, November 7, 1986, p. 2.
18. Coopers & Lybrand/Yankelovich, Skelly,
and White, "Business Pl anni ng in the Eighties:
The New Marketing Shape of American Cor-
porations," 1985, p. 7.
19. See, for example, Mark G. Dunn, David
Norburn, and Sue Birley, "Corporate Culture:
A Positive Correlate with Marketing Effective-
ness," International Journal of Advertising, 1985:
4, pp. 65-73; and A. Parasuraman and Rohit
Deshpande, "The Cultural Context of Market-
ing Management, " in R. W. Belk (ed.), Pro-
ceedings of the 1984 Educators' Conference of
the American Marketing Association, pp. 176-
179.
39