Ship/ Installation Collisions: Risk Assessment Data Directory

Risk Assessment Data Directory
Report No. 434 16

March 2010
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f O i l & G a s P r o d u c e r s
Ship/
installation
collisions
P
ublications
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RADD Ship/installation collisions
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contents

1.0 Scope and Definitions ........................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Definitions ....................................................................................................... 1
1.2.1 Collisions .................................................................................................................... 1
1.2.2 Damage ....................................................................................................................... 2
2.0 Summary of Recommended Data............................................ 3
2.1 Basics of ship collision risk modelling......................................................... 3
2.1.1 Collision Frequency................................................................................................... 3
2.1.2 Collision consequences ............................................................................................ 4
2.2 Overview of historical ship/installation collision information.................... 7
2.3 Passing vessel collisions............................................................................... 9
2.3.1 Shipping traffic patterns and vessel behaviour ...................................................... 9
2.3.2 Best practice collision risk modelling for passing vessels ................................. 11
2.4 Field related vessel collisions ..................................................................... 12
2.4.1 Frequencies of field related vessel collisions....................................................... 12
2.4.2 Consequences of vessel related field collisions................................................... 16
2.4.3 Collisions of mobile units........................................................................................ 17
2.5 Collision risk management .......................................................................... 18
3.0 Guidance on use of data ...................................................... 18
3.1 General validity ............................................................................................. 18
3.2 Uncertainties ................................................................................................. 18
3.3 Example ......................................................................................................... 18
4.0 Review of data sources ....................................................... 19
5.0 Recommended data sources for further information ............ 20
6.0 References .......................................................................... 20
6.1 References for Sections 2.0 to 4.0 .............................................................. 20
6.2 References for other data sources.............................................................. 21

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Abbreviations:

AIS Automatic Identification System
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
BHN Bombay High North
DP Dynamic Positioning
DSV Diving Support Vessel
ERRV Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel
FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit
FPU Floating Production Unit
FSU Floating Storage Unit
H
2
S Hydrogen sulphide
HC Hydrocarbon
HSE Health and Safety Executive
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MSV Multipurpose Support Vessel
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
REWS Radar Early Warning System
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TLP Tension Leg Platform
TR Temporary Refuge
UK United Kingdom
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
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1.0 Scope and Definitions
1.1 Scope
This datasheet provides data on ship/installation collision risks in relation to activities
within the offshore oil & gas Exploration and Production industry, for use in
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The risks related to icebergs are not considered.
Ship traffic may be divided into two groups:
Passing vessels: Ship traffic which is not related to the installation being
considered, including merchant vessels, fishing vessels, naval vessels and also
offshore related traffic going to and from other installations than that being
considered.
Field related: Offshore related traffic which is there to serve the installation being
considered, e.g. supply vessels, oil tankers, work vessels.
For passing vessels, collision risk is highly location dependent due to variation in ship
traffic from one location to another. The ship traffic volume and pattern at the specific
location should hence be considered with considerable care. This dependency on
location also means that use of historical data which are averaged over a large number
of different locations, is not possible. For passing vessels, the datasheet therefore
presents best current practice in modelling collisions of passing vessels with offshore
installations rather than recommended frequencies.
Field related offshore traffic refers to those vessels which are specifically visiting the
installation, and is therefore considered to be less dependent of the location of the
installation. The frequency of infield vessel impacts will depend on the durations that
vessels are alongside, the installation layout, environmental conditions, and
procedures, so care is required to ensure these factors are considered appropriately.
In addition, the datasheet presents an overview of historical data on ship collisions that
have occurred, with an emphasis on the circumstances and consequences of the
collisions.

1.2 Definitions
1.2.1 Collisions
Collisions can be divided into two groups:
Powered collisions (vessel moving under power towards the installation)
Drifting collisions (vessel drifting towards the installation)
Powered collisions include navigational/manoeuvring errors (human/technical failures),
watch keeping failure, and bad visibility/ineffective radar use. A drifting vessel is a
vessel that has lost its propulsion or steerage, or has experienced a progressive failure
of anchor lines or towline and is drifting only under the influence of environmental
forces.
Table 1.1 sets out the different types of vessels that may collide with an offshore
installation.

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Tabl e 1. 1 Categori es of Col l i di ng Vessel s
Type Of
Traffi c
Traffi c
Category
Vessel
Category
Remarks
Merchant Merchant ships:
cargo, ferries
etc.
Commercial traffic passing the area
Surface vessels Both war ships and submarines Naval traffic
Submerged
vessels
Submerged submarines
Fishing
vessels
Fishing vessels Sub-categorised into vessels in
transit and vessels operating in the
area
Pleasure Pleasure vessels Traffic passing the area
Standby boats Vessels going to and from other
fields
Supply vessels Vessels going to and from other
fields
Offshore tankers Vessels going to and from other
fields
Passing
Offshore
traffic
Tow Towing of drilling rigs, flotels, etc.
Standby vessels Dedicated standby vessels
Supply vessels Visiting supply vessels
Working vessels Special services/support such as
diving vessels, flotels, pipe lay
barges, intervention vessels and
crane barges
Offshore
traffic

Offshore tankers Shuttle tankers visiting the field
Field related
Drilling rigs MODUs May collide with fixed installation
either on approach or as a result of
mooring failure

1.2.2 Damage
Sections 2.2 and 2.4.2 present data for the following damage levels as defined in WOAD
[1]:
Total l oss Total loss of the unit including constructive total loss from
an insurance point of view. However, the unit may be
repaired and put into operation again.
Severe damage Severe damage to one or more modules of the unit;
large/medium damage to loadbearing structures; major
damage to essential equipment.
Si gni fi cant damage Significant/serious damage to module and local area of the
unit; minor damage to loadbearing structures; significant
damage to single essential equipment; damage to more
essential equipment.
Mi nor damage Minor damage to single essential equipment; damage to
more none-essential equipment; damage to non-loadbearing
structures.
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I nsi gni fi cant damage Insignificant or no damage; damage to part(s) or
essential equipment; damage to towline, thrusters,
generators and drives.
2.0 Summary of Recommended Data
The data presented in this section are set out as follows:
Basics of ship collision risk modelling (Section 2.1)
Overview of historical ship/installation collision information (Section 2.2)
Passing vessel collisions (Section 2.3)
Field related vessel collisions (Section 2.4)
Collision risk reduction (Section 2.5)

2.1 Basics of ship collision risk modelling
The risk arising from collision of a ship with an offshore installation is considered in two
parts: collision frequency and collision consequences.

2.1.1 Collision Frequency
The collision frequency is calculated as:
Collision frequency = Frequency of ship being on collision course !
Probability that collision is not avoided

For powered collisions, the frequency of a ship being on a collision course can be
estimated from knowledge of shipping traffic in the vicinity of the installation. This is
discussed, for passing vessels, in Section 2.3.2.1.
For drifting collisions, the frequency of a ship being on a collision course depends on
where the ship loses power or steerage, and the direction and strength of the current
and wind.
For a passing vessel, not suffering from propulsion or steerage problems, to collide
with an offshore installation, the following three conditions must occur:
1. The ship needs to be on a collision course with the installation;
2. The navigator/watchkeeper must be unaware of the collision course sufficiently long
for the ship to reach the installation (watchkeeping failure);
3. The installation/standby vessel crews must be either be unaware of the developing
situation or be unable to warn the vessel to normalise the situation.
Watchkeeping failure is discussed further in Section 2.3.2.1. Measures available to the
operator to prevent a collision can be divided into two categories:
Standby vessel (or ERRV) intervention: Detection of the errant vessel by radar / AIS /
visual sighting; intervention in the form of VHF communication, or approaching the
vessel and attracting its attention using light and sound signals, such as
pyrotechnics.
Installation intervention: This is normally limited to VHF communication, assuming
there is a means to detect the errant vessel on the installation, such as radar and/or
AIS.
Standby vessel intervention is normally more effective as the bridge crew consists of
dedicated watch-keepers with maritime training and experience.
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These scenarios can be addressed by using appropriate collision risk models. Care
should be taken that the model used is calibrated against historical data
1
.

2.1.2 Collision consequences
If a collision occurs, consequences can range from superficial damage to complete loss
of the installation. The damage to the installation depends on:
Size of vessel (M, te)
Speed of vessel
(V, m/s)
The Impact Energy, E (kJ), is related to these by E = 0.5
kMV
2

where k is the hydrodynamic added mass constant: k = 1.1
for end-on (powered) impact, k = 1.4 for broadside (drifting)
impact.
Point of impact, e.g. legs, conductors, risers, bracings
Whether angle of impact is head-on, glancing, or sideways-on (broadside)
Partitioning of impact energy between installation and vessel
Fatalities on the installation as a result of a collision will depend first and foremost on
whether the impending collision has been detected, e.g. by radar or AIS, and whether a
precautionary alarm, evacuation or down-manning has then been carried out. If a vessel
under power is observed on a collision course, the time available for precautionary
evacuation/down-manning will be limited (e.g. typically 30 minutes if observed by radar
down to zero if visual observation only in conditions of poor or night visibility). A
decision may have to be made whether to carry out a precautionary evacuation/down-
manning, which would have to be by TEMPSC or escape direct to sea (see datasheet
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue), or for personnel to remain on the installation. Each of
these carries attendant risks. If a drifting vessel is observed on a collision course, the
time available for response is likely to be much longer and it may be possible to initiate
precautionary evacuation/down-manning by helicopter, or to manoeuvre the vessel /
barge clear of the installation by a security or field support vessel.
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 give example flow charts to determine possible outcomes
given potential collisions by powered and drifting vessels respectively. These figures
are more typical of a fixed production installation than a MODU but illustrate issues that
may need to be considered when analysing ship collisions for any type of installation.
The appropriate flow chart for a specific analysis will depend on the means provided to
detect vessels on a collision course, their availability, and the procedures to decide on
mustering and precautionary evacuation/down-manning. Any or all of these may be
dependent on the weather conditions at the time (e.g. visibility may affect observation,
sea state affects the risks in evacuation by TEMPSC).
Note: Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 refer to the TR (Temporary Refuge), defined as [14]: [a] place
provided where personnel can take refuge for a predetermined period whilst investigations,
emergency response and evacuation preparations are undertaken. Depending on the
jurisdiction, impending ship collision is not necessarily considered to require a TR; however, the
muster location in this scenario is conveniently identified with the TR.

1
Lack of such calibration is often a shortfall of simple models.
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Fi gure 2. 1 Exampl e Fl ow Chart for Powered Vessel on Col l i si on Course
wi th I nstal l ati on

Note: No specific time value is given to Early or Late observation of a vessel on a collision
course. Early can be considered to be sufficient to muster personnel, make a decision
whether or not to evacuate, and if to evacuate then for TEMPSCs to be sufficiently far away at the
time of collision. Late can be considered to give some time to muster at least some personnel
in the TR but insufficient for TEMPSC evacuation; on a bridge linked complex, some personnel
are considered in this example to have insufficient time to reach the TR and therefore to attempt
escape to sea.

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Fi gure 2. 2 Exampl e Fl ow Chart for Dri fti ng Vessel on Col l i si on Course wi th
I nstal l ati on

Note: No specific time value is given to Early or Late observation of a vessel on a collision
course. Early can be considered to be sufficient to initiate helicopter evacuation (considering
the time required to mobilise sufficient helicopters) if this is possible (e.g. sufficient visibility), or
else to muster personnel, and make a decision whether or not to evacuate. Late can be
considered to give some time to muster at least some personnel in the TR but insufficient for
TEMPSC evacuation; on a bridge linked complex, some personnel are considered in this
example to have insufficient time to reach the TR and therefore to attempt escape to sea. A
drifting vessel typically moves at 1 to 2 kn so, in this example, it is assumed that the drifting
vessel is observed sufficiently early for at least partial mustering to take place.
The likelihood of receiving an Early or Late warning will be dependent on the procedures in
place at the field and the detection system that is used. Information on the performance of some
detection systems is available in [13].

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2.2 Overview of historical ship/installation collision information
WOAD [1] provides details of 465 collision incidents worldwide during 1970-2002, of
which 326 have occurred since 1980. As the collision frequency is strongly location
specific, it is not useful to use these records to estimate absolute collision frequencies.
However, other useful information can be derived.
57 of the 1980-2002 incidents in WOAD can be identified with passing vessels
unconnected with field activity. 189 of the remaining incidents in WOAD occurred
during drilling, production or workover, including 10 during shuttle tanker operations
(loading of liquids). Many of these involved supply vessels, standby vessels or crew
boats. Table 2.1 presents statistics for different levels of damage resulting from
collisions.

Tabl e 2. 1 Col l i si ons wi th Offshore I nstal l ati ons (Worl dwi de)
Passi ng Vessel s I nfi el d Vessel s Damage*

Number Percent Number Percent
Total Loss 3 5% 1 0.5%
Severe 19 33% 16 8%
Significant 8 14% 55 29%
Minor 10 18% 65 34%
Insign./No 17 30% 52 28%
All 57 100% 189 100%
* See Section 1.2.2 for definitions of damage categories.

These records do not include the most serious ship-installation collision, that at
Bombay High North (BHN) on 27 July 2005, when an MSV (Multipurpose Support Vessel)
approaching the installation lost control, drifted and collided with the installation. This
resulted in serious oil leakage and a major fire, resulting in the loss, within two hours, of
both the BHN platform and a jackup rig working alongside. A total of 22 fatalities
resulted, on the installation, jackup and MSV; 362 personnel were rescued, some after
spending more than 12 hours in the water [15]. The collision occurred despite the MSV
being DP (Dynamic Positioning) equipped.
Other types of incident in the WOAD database include:
Collision during towing or mobilizing/demobilizing of MODUs (involving vessels
associated with the activity such as tugs, supply vessels, and anchor handling
vessels).
Collision during construction/repair (involving vessels involved with the activity
such as crane barges, pipeline barges and tugs).
Moorings broken when MODU was idle/stacked.
In only one incident did fatalities occur, when a jackup punched through the seabed,
resulting in collapse of two legs; subsequently the jackup drifted into an adjacent unit.
In this incident, there were 2 fatalities and 43 personnel were successfully evacuated.
In 7 incidents, of which 3 were during loading, there was a release of oil from the struck
installation, a pipeline or a loading hose. In one incident, the colliding vessel was
damaged and oil leaked from its fuel and lube oil tanks. In a further 2 incidents, gas
including H
2
S was released.
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Worldwide passing vessel collision frequencies for the periods 1980-1989 and 1990-
2002 have been estimated separately as shown in Table 2.2. Both passing vessel and
infield vessel collisions have considerably reduced from the earlier to the later period,
by almost 60% for passing vessels and 50% for infield vessels.

Tabl e 2. 2 Worl dwi de Col l i si on Data duri ng 1980-1989 and 1990-2002
Collisions Exposure
(installation-years)
Collision Frequency
(per installation-year)
Vessel Type
1980-1989 1990-2002 1980-1989 1990-2002 1980-1989 1990-2002
Passing 33 24 5.9 ! 10
-4
2.5 ! 10
-4

Infield 103 86
56243 97627
1.8 ! 10
-3
8.8 ! 10
-4

Note: figures for Infield vessels exclude loading buoy incidents, for which exposure data is not
available.

DNV has prepared research reports [3], [4] and associated incident databases for the UK
HSE covering accident statistics for offshore installations on the UKCS 1980-2005.
These include 432 events described as Collision, although not all of these resulted in
actual impact. Table 2.3 summarises the statistics for all recorded collision related
events, including near misses; Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for those events
that resulted in actual impact, however minor. Clearly visiting vessels dominate the
statistics even more completely than they do worldwide. However, as Table 2.5 shows,
only 5% of collision events are classified as Accidents, as compared with 31% of
passing vessel events; most visiting vessel events involve minor scrapes.
The number of collision related events involving passing powered vessels appears to
have increased significantly from 1980-1989 to 1990-2005, possibly due to better
reporting of near misses; however, the frequency of actual collisions has fallen by 30%
to 40%, for both passing and visiting vessels. This may be attributable to improved
communication systems, electronic charting, and navigational techniques, systems and
procedures. Introduction of ARPA and DP systems may also have played a role.

Tabl e 2. 3 UKCS Col l i si on Event Data duri ng 1980-1989 and 1990-2005
Events Exposure
Event Frequency
Vessel Type
1980-1989 1990-2005 1980-1989 1990-2005 1980-1989 1990-2005
Passing 5 42 3.0 ! 10
-3
9.1 ! 10
-3

Visiting 140 245
1685 4630
8.3 ! 10
-2
5.3 ! 10
-2

Tabl e 2. 4 UKCS Col l i si on Data duri ng 1980-1989 and 1990-2005
Collisions Exposure
Collision Frequency
Vessel Type
1980-1989 1990-2005 1980-1989 1990-2005 1980-1989 1990-2005
Passing 5 10 3.0 ! 10
-3
2.2 ! 10
-3

Visiting 132 213
1685 4630
7.8 ! 10
-2
4.6 ! 10
-2

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Tabl e 2. 5 UKCS Col l i si on Event Categori es 1990-2005
Passi ng Vessel s Vi si ti ng Vessel s Event
Category
1
Number Percent Number Percent
Accident 13 31% 11 4%
Incident 4 10% 54 22%
Near Miss 23 55% 77 31%
Unsignificant
2
2 5% 103 42%
All 42
100%
245
100%
Notes
1. The event categories in this table are not equivalent to those used in Table
2.1.
2. This can be read as Insignificant (Unsignificant is used for consistency
with the original data source: see Table 4.1).
Of the 31 passing vessel collision events listed for fixed installations, 14 (46%) involved
fishing vessels, and of these 3 involved fishing gear becoming entangled with subsea
wellhead equipment rather than vessel impact with the surface installation. 7 (23%) of
these 31 collision events are known to have involved either infield vessels visiting other
installations or shuttle tankers, i.e. 7 of the events are known to have involved field
related vessels.
Visiting vessel collisions are examined in more detail in Section 2.4.

2.3 Passing vessel collisions
2.3.1 Shipping traffic patterns and vessel behaviour
Each of the passing vessel traffic types listed in Table 1.1 behaves in one of several
distinct ways in relation to a installation. This must be considered both when reviewing
traffic data and when estimating collision frequency. Each type is discussed in the
following sub-sections, with an evaluation of relevant traffic patterns and vessel
behaviour in the vicinity of offshore installations.

2.3.1.1 Merchant Vessels
Merchant vessels are frequently found to represent the greatest installation collision
hazard, since:
Merchant vessels are often large and may thus represent considerable impact
energy.
Traffic may be very dense in some areas.
Oil and gas operators have no prevailing influence.
In addition there is a problem with the uncertainties in the risk estimates, which are
higher than for many of the other vessel groups as merchant vessel operating
standards vary.

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2.3.1.2 Naval Traffic
Estimating risk associated with naval vessels is difficult because information about
movements and volume is restricted and hence difficult to obtain. Estimation very often
has to be based on surveys or subjective evaluation. Further, the naval traffic volume is
difficult to assess since possible routes and areas where naval vessels operate/exercise
can vary from year to year. The variation in traffic routes and density can also be
dependent on the political situation.
Naval traffic may be divided into two main categories, surface traffic (submarines
included) and submerged traffic.

2. 3. 1. 2. 1 Surface Traffi c
As for merchant vessels, collisions are either due to drifting of the vessel or may occur
while the vessel is under power (errant vessels).
As regards collisions under power, it may be acceptable to disregard this scenario as
these vessels have a large crew compared to merchant vessels. They will always have
at least two persons on the bridge (large vessels such as frigates, destroyers and
aircraft carriers will have more personnel on the bridge). Normally the operations room
is also manned. Considering the number of personnel on watch it seems very unlikely,
compared to a merchant vessel, that a naval surface vessel should not know of or
detect the installation, and avoid it. In addition, naval vessels are more likely to operate
in groups, which also will reduce the collision probability. Submarines operating on the
surface are not considered to represent any higher threat to the installation than any
other surface vessel.
Overall, it is considered that the contribution to overall collision risk from such vessels
is in general likely to be very low.

2. 3. 1. 2. 2 Submerged Submari ne Traffi c
As for naval surface vessels, due to a reduced probability of drifting combined with a
relatively low number of vessels, the contribution from drifting submarines to the
overall collision risk is negligible.
Submerged submarines are in a special situation because they do not have a look-out.
Navigation is therefore completely dependent on electronic navigational aids and sonar.
In principle submarines are officially restricted from operating in the immediate vicinity
of offshore installation in times of peace. Nevertheless a 1988 incident when a
submarine collided with Norsk Hydros Oseberg B platform shows a deviation from this
principle. In connection with this accident, it was stated that it was often very difficult
for submarines to detect platforms, which do not emit much sound in the water.
Some data on submarine traffic have been collected [2]. At the time of publication
(1995), an appropriate number of submarines active in the entire North Sea, at all times,
seems to have been in the region of 15 to 25. It is not known if this has changed
appreciably since then.

2.3.1.3 Fishing Vessels
Fishing vessels are divided into two groups, depending on the operational pattern:
Fishing vessels in transit from the coast to and from different fishing areas.
Vessels may be fishing in an area. The vessels operation and behaviour during
fishing (primarily trawling) will be complex and varied, but usually at low speed and
with no preferred heading.
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Fishing vessels vary in size from large factory/freezer ships to smaller vessels operating
near the coast. Typically, a large fishing vessel will have a displacement around
1000 tonnes. This implies that the collision energy will be less than 20 MJ. For a typical
North Sea installation neither drifting vessels nor vessels under power will normally be
able to threaten the installations integrity.
However, risers and other relevant equipment have considerably less impact resistance;
being typically much smaller than merchant vessels, it is also more likely that a fishing
vessel may pass between the legs of an installation and reach risers or conductors.
Collisions of both powered and drifting fishing vessels should therefore be considered,
taking this into account.

2.3.1.4 External Offshore Traffic
Passing offshore vessels and tankers as well as supply, standby and work vessels are
in many respects similar to passing merchant vessels, except that such vessel
operations tend to be more aware of the offshore installations and also may benefit from
operator influence (procedure, training competency, communication etc.).
Vessels or installations under tow pose particular problems which are considered
separately (Section 2.4.3).

2.3.2 Best practice collision risk modelling for passing vessels
2.3.2.1 Collision frequency estimation
As set out in Section 2.1.1, there are two parts to this:
1. Estimating the frequency of a ship being on a collision course
2. Estimating the probability that collision is not avoided
The first of these is strongly dependent on the installations location with respect to
shipping traffic, and also on the installations size (although, in a bridge linked complex,
for some approach directions one platform may be shielded by another).
Shipping databases are available to assist in this task such as ShipRoutes. Where
possible, other methods of logging vessel tracks in and around a field can be
implemented such as Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). This can be achieved
using systems such as AISTracker and will provide an enhanced understanding of the
behaviour of shipping around the field. This offers considerable benefit to collision risk
assessment work in relation to passing and infield vessel risk assessment. Details are
provided on ship type, size, speed, navigation status, etc.
Fishing vessel activity can be assessed by processing satellite tracking data on fishing
vessel movements: this has already been done, for example, for part of the North Sea
(Anatec unpublished).
Based on the work undertaken within the HSEs OTO 1999 052 study [9], the following
causes of ineffective watchkeeping were identified:
Watch-keeper present on bridge but:
o Busy/preoccupied with other tasks
o Asleep
o Incapacitated due to sickness, accident or substance abuse
Watch-keeper absent from the bridge
Poor visibility combined with undetected radar fault.

Further discussion on each of these causation factors is provided in the OTO report [9].
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The probability of radar failure can be estimated from reliability data for the system
concerned (considering all parts: radar, processor, power supply, display).
One widely used model which takes account of these factors when assessing passing
ship collision is COLLRISK [12]. Based on analysis of collision data for the region of
interest (e.g., North Sea), as well as traffic data and installation operating experience,
the model has been back-tested to ensure it provides results in line with experience. As
well as the calibration factor, the main influences on the collision risk are traffic
volumes in proximity to the installation, ship characteristics (e.g. type, size and speed),
installation dimensions/orientation, and metocean data, in particular visibility. The
model can also take into account the benefits of various risk reducing measures.

2.3.2.2 Collision consequences
As shown in Table 2.1, collisions of passing vessels can result in damage ranging from
insignificant to total loss. Table 2.1 shows that almost 40% of such collisions resulted
in severe damage or total loss, although none of these resulted in fatalities to
installation personnel.
Initially, the damage breakdown in Table 2.1 could be used directly in a QRA together
with suitable assumptions about warning, mustering and precautionary evacuation
(using a flow chart such as the examples in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Although no
fatalities have occurred to date as a result of a passing vessel collision, the Bombay
High North incident summarised in Section 2.2 demonstrates that a major accident
involving fatalities is credible, especially if escalation to a hydrocarbon fire or explosion
occurs.
If this relatively simple approach indicates high ship collision risks, then more detailed
analysis may be required in order to demonstrate that the simple approach is
conservative. This could involve structural analysis of the effect of a vessel collision
with the installation
2
.

2.4 Field related vessel collisions
2.4.1 Frequencies of field related vessel collisions
Unlike passing vessel collisions, the dependency of field related vessel collisions on
geographical location is largely limited to metocean conditions and allowable weather
criteria; conversely, field related vessel collisions are strongly dependent on the field
activities (drilling or production) and on the associated support requirements (e.g.
provision of supplies, anchor handling, diving support).
Table 2.6 presents worldwide field related vessel collision statistics based on WOAD [1]
and corresponding exposure data
3
[8]. This shows much lower collision frequencies for
fixed platforms compared with FPSOs and FPUs, and wide variation between the
collision frequencies for the different types of FPU. There are also variations between
different types of MODU but these are not so great.

2
Such a project was undertaken in 2008 for a variety of jacket types; it is intended to publish the
outcome of this work.
3
Note that exposure data is here measured by unit-years in service. It should be noted that
collision frequencies for a particular unit will be strongly dependent on the number of visits per
year and on the types of vessel visiting. Such data are not readily available. However, if the unit
being studied can be considered to have a typical number of visits per year, then the
frequencies given in Table 2.6 can be used. If field related collision frequencies prove to be an
issue, then a more detailed analysis should be undertaken, using actual data combined with
collision risk modelling.
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Figure 2.3 shows worldwide collision frequencies for production installations, Figure 2.4
collision frequencies for MODUs; both show error bars corresponding to 90%
confidence limits. From these figures it is concluded:
The collision frequency for fixed production units is significantly different from
those for FPSOs and FPUs.
TLPs appear to be subject to a significantly higher collision frequency than jackups
and semi-submersibles.

Tabl e 2. 6 Fi el d Rel ated Vessel Col l i si on Stati sti cs (Worl dwi de)
Unit Type Collisions Exposure
(unit-years)
Collision
Frequency
(per unit-year)
Product i on Uni t s
Fixed 77 135122 5. 7 ! 10
-4
FPSO 4 445 9. 0 ! 10
-3

TLP 3 88 3. 4 ! 10
-2

Jackup 1 89 1.1 ! 10
-2

Semi-submersible 4 363 1.1 ! 10
-2

All FPU (not FPSOs) 8 540 1.5 ! 10
-2

Jackups + Semi-subs 5 452 1. 1 ! 10
-2

Loading Buoy 6 Not available -
Dri l l i ng Uni t s (MODUs)
Jackup 41 10743 3.8 ! 10
-3

Semi-submersible 45 4837 9.3 ! 10
-3

Drill ship/barge/tender 14 2183 6.4 ! 10
-3

All MODUs 100 17763 5.6 ! 10
-3

Fi gure 2. 3 Producti on Uni t Vessel Col l i si on Frequenci es (Worl dwi de)

Error bars indicate 90% confidence limits.

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Fi gure 2. 4 MODU Vessel Col l i si on Frequenci es (Worl dwi de)

Error bars indicate 90% confidence limits.

Table 2.7 shows the proportions of collisions by vessel type.

Tabl e 2. 7 Col l i si ons by Vessel Type (Worl dwi de)
Vessel Type Producti on
Uni ts
MODUs
Supply Vessel 34% 60%
Standby Vessel 19% 11%
Working Vessel 34% 16%
Rig 7% 6%
Shuttle Tanker 3% 1%
Other 3% 5%
Unknown 0% 1%

Generally, collisions with any sort of offshore-related traffic can be more easily
controlled because many of these vessels are operated by the oil companies
themselves, and they can impose restrictions on vessel operations if it is deemed
necessary.
Figure 2.5 shows infield vessel collision frequencies by geographical region.
Comparing this with Table 2.2, it is clear that infield vessel collision frequencies vary
significantly from region to region, even considering only the regions with large
numbers of offshore installations and MODUs operating. Of these areas, the frequency
is highest by far in the North Sea (see also Table 2.9) and has only reduced by 19% over
the two time periods presented. On the UKCS the frequency is even higher relative to
the worldwide average. It is not clear from the data whether these high frequencies are
due to better reporting, especially of minor collisions, the more severe weather
conditions in the North Sea compared with other regions, or better control of infield
vessel movements in other regions. There has been no collision resulting in significant
or severe damage or total loss in the North Sea since 1994.
Table 2.8 gives a detailed breakdown of collisions between visiting vessels and
installations on the UKCS for 1990-2005. This shows considerably higher frequencies.
Table 2.10 shows the distribution of damage levels for the main regions: it shows a
much higher proportion of collisions in the North Sea resulting in insignificant or no
damage than any other region. Nevertheless, even excluding these, or counting those
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resulting in significant or severe damage or total loss, the North Sea frequency is
significantly higher than any other region.

Tabl e 2. 8 UKCS Fi el d Rel ated Vessel Col l i si on Stati sti cs 1990-2005
Unit Type Collisions Exposure
(unit-years)
Collision
Frequency
(per unit-year)
Product i on Uni t s
Fixed 90 3383 2. 7 ! 10
-2
FPSO & FSU 14 265 5. 3 ! 10
-2

Dri l l i ng Uni t s (MODUs)
All MODUs 109 982 1. 1 ! 10
-1

Fi gure 2. 5 Geographi cal Vari ati on of I nfi el d Vessel Col l i si on Frequenci es

Tabl e 2. 9 Geographi cal Vari ati on of I nfi el d Vessel Col l i si on Frequenci es
Compared to Worl dwi de Average
Regi on Fracti on of 1990-
2002 Worl dwi de
Average
Africa 0.36
Asia 0.17
Central & S. America 0.59
Europe: North Sea 9.55
Middle East 0.11
US: Gulf of Mexico 0.24
UKCS* 49.35
* Fraction is based on UKCS 1990-2005 frequency as given in Table 2.4.

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Tabl e 2. 10 I nfi el d Vessel Col l i si on Damage Level s by Regi on: Al l
I nstal l ati ons
Damage Level (see Secti on 1. 2. 2 for defi ni ti ons) Geographi cal
Area
Total
Loss Severe Si gni fi cant Mi nor I nsi gni f. / No
Africa 0% 0% 14% 86% 0%
Asia 0% 0% 44% 33% 22%
Central & S America 0% 17% 33% 33% 17%
Europe: N Sea 0% 5% 16% 31% 48%
Middle East 0% 20% 10% 60% 10%
US-GoM 2% 13% 48% 33% 4%

2.4.2 Consequences of vessel related field collisions
Worldwide average collision damage levels are tabulated for different vessel types and
overall as follows:
Fixed installations: Table 2.11
FPSOs: Table 2.12
FPUs: Table 2.13
MODUs: Table 2.14

Tabl e 2. 11 Col l i si on Damage Level s by Vessel Type: Fi xed I nstal l ati ons
Damage Level (see Secti on 1. 2. 2 for defi ni ti ons) Vessel Type
Total
Loss Severe Si gni fi cant Mi nor I nsi gni f. / No
Supply 0% 11% 15% 52% 22%
Standby 0% 0% 20% 13% 67%
Barge/Tug 0% 30% 11% 48% 11%
Rig 0% 0% 0% 80% 20%
Shuttle Tanker 0% 0% 33% 33% 33%
Other n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ALL 0% 14% 14% 44% 27%

Tabl e 2. 12 Col l i si on Damage Level s by Vessel Type: FPSOs
Total Loss Severe Si gni fi cant Mi nor I nsi gni f. / No
Supply 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Standby n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Barge/Tug n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Rig n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Shuttle Tanker n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unknown 0% 0% 33% 33% 33%
ALL 0% 0% 25% 25% 50%

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Tabl e 2. 13 Col l i si on Damage Level s by Vessel Type: FPUs
Supply 0% 0% 50% 50% 0%
Standby 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Barge/Tug 0% 33% 0% 33% 33%
Rig 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Shuttle Tanker n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ALL 0% 13% 13% 25% 50%

Tabl e 2. 14 Col l i si on Damage Level s by Vessel Type: MODUs
Supply 0% 5% 43% 33% 18%
Standby 0% 9% 18% 27% 45%
Barge/Tug 0% 0% 56% 25% 19%
Rig 17% 0% 50% 0% 33%
Shuttle Tanker 0% 0% 40% 20% 40%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Unknown 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
ALL 1% 4% 42% 28% 25%

Note however that, for example, the Norwegian and the UK criteria for design against
vessel impacts have been derived from a probabilistic evaluation of supply vessel
impacts [6], [7]. These collisions are therefore to a large degree minimized by platform
design. Hence the distribution of damage levels to be expected from field related vessel
collisions in different geographical areas may vary from those tabulated above
according to the installation design criteria. They may also vary according to
operational procedures: for example, an arriving supply vessel may be required to stop
on arrival at the installation exclusion zone (500 m radius) and then proceed at low
speed to the installation. Hence, where more specific information is available on design
criteria and operational procedures, these should be taken into account if the risk levels
are sufficiently high to occasion concern. The trend towards the use of larger,
multipurpose vessels, which may exceed the size the installation was originally
designed for, should also be considered where appropriate.

2.4.3 Collisions of mobile units
9 separate incidents of collisions between installations have been identified in WOAD
[1]. Of these, 1 occurred during hurricane Juan (27/10/1985) and 3 during hurricane
Andrew (27/08/1992). 3 further weather related incidents occurred. Of the remaining 2
incidents, one appears to have been an operational error; in the other case, the
description refers to a drifting rig but does not indicate the cause.
The HSE report [4] and database identifies 5 collision incidents during towing of mobile
units. One involved a collision during preparation for tow-out from the construction
yard; no details are given for the remaining 4 but, based on WOAD information, it is
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possible these involved the towing tugs contacting the unit rather than the unit itself
contacting another unit.

2.5 Collision risk management
Collision risk management is examined in the UK HSE OTO 1999 052 report [9], to which
reference should in the first place be made, in particular to Chapter 7. This commences
with the HSEs general Safety Management System model as set out in HS(G)65 [10] and
shows how this can be applied specifically to managing ship collision risks. [9] then
presents specific measures for managing in-field and passing vessel collision risks. It
also includes as Appendix B an overview of ship collision detecting and alerting
(hardware) systems. This includes normal setups such as standby vessel with standard
marine radar or ARPA, and more sophisticated systems such as REWS (Radar Early
Warning System using installation-mounted scanners to increase detection range and
provide early warning of vessels on a possible collision course with the installation,
allowing an early decision and response such as precautionary partial or full
evacuation).Although still cited by the HSE [11], this report is already outdated in some
respects in that the general introduction of AIS post-date it. AIS enables tracking and
identification of vessels in the vicinity of an offshore installation with improved range
and accuracy over radar.
Models (e.g. COLLRISK [12]) allow the benefits of such measures to be taken into
account within the risk modelling.

3.0 Guidance on use of data
3.1 General validity
As stressed in Section 2.3.2.1, the frequency of passing vessel collisions with offshore
installations is highly location specific and therefore it is not appropriate to present in
this datasheet any statistical passing vessel collision frequencies. The frequencies
required should be estimated as described in Section 2.3.2.1.
The data selected for presentation in Section 1.2.2 are those which can be considered
valid for use in QRA, at least to determine whether ship collision risks are significant. If
they are, then more detailed analysis of frequencies (for infield vessel collisions) and/or
of consequences may be required.

3.2 Uncertainties
As in all analyses of incident data, the completeness of incident reporting in particular
is open to question, especially as regards potential under-reporting of minor incidents.
However, for a QRA it is those collisions with the potential to result in fatalities,
significant damage or pollution that need to be considered, and reporting of such
incidents is more likely to be complete.
The exposure data (i.e. unit-years) can be considered reliable, although for MODUs they
do not appear to distinguish between units in operation offshore and units laid-up; also,
prior to 1983, geographical data are only available for some regions.

3.3 Example
The frequency of supply vessel collisions causing significant or severe damage or total
loss to a fixed installation in the North Sea is required for a QRA. It is assumed that the
supply vessel visit frequency is typical of such installations.
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Worldwide average infield vessel collision frequency = 9.3 ! 10
-4
per year (Table 2.2, 1990-
2002)
North Sea weighting = 9.55 (Table 2.9)
Fraction of collisions due to supply vessels = 0.34 (Table 2.7, production units)
Fraction of significant damage + severe damage + total loss = 0.26 (Table 2.11, supply
vessels
4
)
Hence the overall frequency of significant supply vessel collisions with the installation
is estimated as:
(9.3 ! 10
-4
) ! 9.55 ! 0.34 ! 0.26 = 7.9 ! 10
-4

Further, installation specific analysis would be required to determine the consequences
(e.g. damage to conductors, escalation) of such a collision. If the overall risk were
considered high, then more detailed analysis taking into account existing collision risk
management (e.g. supply vessel approach procedures) could be carried out.

4.0 Review of data sources
The analysis presented in Section 1.2.2 is derived from two sources:
Worldwide: WOAD incident data [1] for the period 1980-2002 combined with DNVs
analysis of offshore unit exposure [8] for the same period. The WOAD database has
been used for the detailed information available in it as regards damage levels and
geographical region.
UKCS: HSE reports [3][4] and associated accident databases for the period 1980-
2005. The reports include exposure data as well as summaries of accident statistics.
The databases give the year, type of unit involved, operation mode and event
category (see below) as well as an event description.
Incidents involving collision recorded in the WOAD database include incidents that have
occurred during transfer of mobile units, to units that were idle, to units under
construction, or to units under repair in port or in a yard. These were eliminated from
consideration, as have units of other types, i.e. not involved in drilling or production.
However, accommodation units are included. The analysis in Section 1.2.2 is therefore
for fixed units offshore and for mobile units operating (drilling or production) offshore.
The UKCS databases distinguish between collision events involving passing vessels
(event code CL) and collision events involving visiting vessels (event code CN), The
accident descriptions have been reviewed to identify those that resulted in an actual
collision as well as the type of vessel involved (for passing vessel collisions). Event
categories do not specifically indicate damage levels; they are defined in Table 4.1.

4
The last of these could also have been selected from Table 2.10, taking the North Sea value.
Table 2.11 has been used as the data are specific to a fixed installation and to a supply vessel.
The value is also higher than would have been obtained from Table 2.10 (0.21), hence the result
will be more conservative and hence will accentuate any requirement for more detailed analysis
and/or improved collision risk management.
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Tabl e 4. 1 Event Categori es i n UKCS Database [3][4]
Category Descri pti on
A Accident Hazardous situation which have developed into an accidental situation. In
addition, for all situations/events causing fatalities and severe injuries
this code should be used
I Incident Hazardous situation not developed into an accidental situation. Low
degree of damage, but repairs/replacements are required. This code
should also be used for events causing minor injuries to personnel or
health injuries.
N Near-Miss Events that might have or could have developed into an accidental
situation. No damage and no repairs required
U Unsignificant Hazardous situation, but consequences very minor. No damage, no
repairs required. Small spills of crude oil and chemicals are also
included. To be included are also very minor personnel injuries, i.e. "lost
time incidents".

5.0 Recommended data sources for further information
The analysis derived from the WOAD database [1] has used only some of the
information available in the database. Each incident record contains a description (of
varying quality) and (besides the information used in the analysis presented here) also
the following information that could be used for more detailed investigation:
Accident date
Unit name
Human and equipment causes
Geographical area, shelf and field block
Numbers of crew and 3
rd
party fatalities and injuries
Fluid spilt (if any)
Repairs required
Evacuation
The WOAD database also includes collisions that have occurred in situations other than
drilling and production offshore: units that were under transfer, idle, under construction
or under repair in a port or yard. It can therefore be used to obtain information about
collision incidents in these circumstances if required.
The UK HSE has published accident statistics for fixed and floating offshore units on
the UK Continental Shelf 1980-2005 ([3], [4] respectively). These include collisions but
do not give details in the reports; more detailed information is available in the
accompanying databases (available as Excel spreadsheets)
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway publishes annual reports on risk levels in the
petroleum industry and an annual report including a Facts Section that includes some
information on accidents including collisions.
The US Minerals Management Service publishes numbers of incidents including
collisions by year and provides links to more detailed descriptions of each incident,
however it has not proved possible to obtain the corresponding annual exposure data.

6.0 References
6.1 References for Sections 2.0 to 4.0
[1] DNV. WOAD - Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank, v5.0.1.
[2] Dovre Safetec AS, 1995. SAFETOW Reference Manual Risk Assessment of Towing
Operations, Draft Report No. ST-95-CR-015-00.
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[3] DNV, 2007a. Accident statistics for fixed offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf 1980-
2005, HSE Research Report RR566, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr566.htm
[4] DNV, 2007b. Accident statistics for floating offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf
1980-2005, HSE Research Report RR567, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr567.htm
[5] J. P. Kenny, 1988. Protection of Offshore Installations Against Impact, Report No. OTI 88
535, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
[6] NPD, 1984. Regulation of Structured Design of Loadbearing Structures.
[7] Department of Energy, 1990. Offshore Installations, Guidance on Design, Construction
and Certification, 4
th
. ed.
[8] DNV, 2004. Exposure Data for Offshore Installations 1980-2002, Technical Note 22
(unpublished internal document).
[9] HSE, 2000. Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Installations, Offshore
Technology Report OTO 1992 052, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1999/oto99052.pdf
[10] HSE, 1997. Successful health and safety management, ISBN 0717612767, HS(G)65,
Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
[11] HSE, 2008. Collision risk management guidance on enforcement, HSE Semi
Permanent Circular SPC/ENFORCEMENT/24.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spcenf24.htm
[12] Anatec. COLLRISK. www.anatec.com/collrisk.htm
[13] Anatec, 2007. Assessment of the benefits to the offshore industry from new
technology and operating practices used in the shipping industry for managing
collision risk, HSE RR592.
[14] ISO, 2000. Petroleum and natural gas industries Offshore production installations
Requirements and guidelines for emergency response, International Organization for
Standardization, ISO 15544:2000.
[15] ONGC, 2006. Annual Report 2005-06, p33.
http://www.ongcindia.com/download/AnnualReports/annual_reports05-06.htm

6.2 References for other data sources
Norway
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway.
Annual Report 2007 Facts Section http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/PDF/FACTS%202008.pdf
Risk Levels in the Petroleum Industry, Trends 2007
http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/PDF/Summary_rep_2008.pdf
Similar reports available for previous and subsequent years from the above.
USA
Minerals Management Service, OCS Related Incidents, Incident Statistics and
Summaries 1996-2010 http://www.mms.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm
tabulates numbers of incidents including collisions by year and provides links to more
detailed descriptions of each incident.

For further information and publications,
please visit our website at
www.ogp.org.uk
209-215 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NL
United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7633 0272
Fax: +44 (0)20 7633 2350
165 Bd du Souverain
4th Floor
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Telephone: +32 (0)2 566 9150
Fax: +32 (0)2 566 9159
Internet site: www.ogp.org.uk
e-mail: reception@ogp.org.uk

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