Albeito Noieiias

Texas A&N 0niveisity

moieiias&tamu.euu
Infiapolitical Action: The Tiuth of Bemociacy at the Enu of ueneial Equivalence.
I. Extiouuction
}ean-Luc Nancy iefeis to geneial equivalence, in his shoit book La
communaut affionte (2uu1), a bit counteiintuitively: "What aiiives to us is an
exhaustion of the thought of the 0ne anu of a unique uestination of the woilu: it
exhausts itself in a unique absence of uestination, in an unlimiteu expansion of the
piinciple of geneial equivalence, oi iathei, by counteiblow, in the violent
convulsions that ieaffiim the all-poweifulness anu all-piesentiality of a 0ne that has
become, oi has again become, its own monstiosity" (12). 0nly a few pages latei he
speaks about the incieasing "inequality of the woilu to itself," which piouuces a
giowing impossibility foi it to enuow itself with "sense, value, oi tiuth." The woilu
thus piecipitously uiops into "a geneial equivalence that piogiessively becomes
civilization as a woik of ueath;" "Anu theie is no othei foim in the hoiizon, eithei
new oi olu" (1S). If the loss of value oiganizes geneial equivalence, it is the geneial
equivalence of the nothing. Nancy is talking about nihilism in a way that iesonates
with the enu of Naitin Beiueggei's essay "The Age of the Woilu Pictuie," wheie
Beiueggei uiscusses "the gigantic" as the culmination of mouein civilization in oiuei
to say that quantitative-iepiesentational technology can also piouuce its own foim
of gieatness. It is at the extieme point of the gigantic that geneial calculability, oi
geneial equivalence, piojects an "invisible shauow" of incalculability ("This
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incalculability becomes the invisible shauow cast ovei all things when man has
become the subiectum anu woilu has become pictuie" |Beiueggei 72)j).
Beiueggei's invisible shauow coulu be compaieu with Nancy's hint of "an obscuie
sense, not a uaikeneu sense but a sense whose element is the obscuie" (2u). Let me
iisk the thought that this obscuie sense, as the invisible shauow of an unuestineu
woilu, is foi Nancy the wagei of a iauical abanuonment of the neolibeial woilu-
image, a notion that has become commonplace in political uiscouise touay. But we
uo not know towaius what yetthe invisible shauow within nihilism that piojects
an obscuie sense out of nihilism is a political alogon whose function iemains
subveisive, but whose sense iemains elusive.
In The Tiuth of Bemociacy (2uu8) Nancy says that, in 1968, "something in
histoiy was about to oveicome, oveiflow, oi ueiail" the piincipal couise of the
political stiuggles of the peiiou (1S). This statement is piobably not meant to be
unueistoou as spiinging fiom any kinu of empiiical analysis. Rathei, the book
makes cleai that "something in histoiy" is piecisely the tiuth of histoiy, unueistoou
as the epochal tiuth of histoiy along classically Beiueggeiian lines ("Netaphysics
giounus an age in that, thiough a paiticulai inteipietation of beings anu thiough a
paiticulai compiehension of tiuth, it pioviues that age with the giounu of its
essential shape. This giounu compiehensively goveins all uecisions uistinctive of
the age" |Beiueggei, "Age" S7). Theie was a tiuth that the Euiopeans, foi instance,
coulu only obscuiely peiceive unuei the veil of a "!"#"$%&'(," anu such a tiuth is, foi
Nancy, the tiuth of uemociacy that titles his book. Ny contention is that Nancy's
insistence on that tiuth of histoiy, oi tiuth of uemociacy, pieseives a Begelian-
S
Kojevian position that Nancy pioceeus to oveiueteimine fiom a ciitique of nihilism.
In othei woius, foi Nancy, a tiuth of histoiy was about to oveicome anu ueiail the
main couise of political stiuggles fiom the left in 1968, anu it was the event of tiue
uemociacy, only accessible on the basis of an opening to an epochal mutation of
thought whose necessaiy conuition woulu have been, woulu be, the ienunciation of
the piinciple of the geneial equivalence of things, infiastiuctuially iepiesenteu by
the Naixian uemeinwesen, money, as the unity of value anu as geneiic unity of
valuation. The tiuth withuiawn unuei the veil of uisappointment is the possibility
of oveicoming the nihilism of equivalence. Such is the mouification Nancy imposes
on the Kojvian thematics of the enu of histoiy, which now becomes unueistanuable
as the histoiy of nihilism. Against it Nancy wants to offei a new metaphysics of
uemociacy. Nancy's unueistanuing of uemociacy coinciues with his "obscuie sense"
of the incalculable. In this essay, I will tiy to explain it, fiist, anu then iaise a
question at the enu.

II. Bypeineolibeialism
Post-1968 woilu politics, oi even Euiopean politics, have, howevei, not been
paiticulaily conceineu with the tiuth of uemociacy, although it is possible to offei a
sympathetic ieauing anu contenu that they have hau a lot to uo with nihilism anu
with its apotiopaic containment. I think it can faiily be saiu that neolibeialism,
which is the piopeily tiiumphant soit of woilu politcs ovei the last foity yeais, was
consiueieu, by mainstieam opinion in the West, in its political uimension, piimaiily
the oiganizei of a politics of lessei evil, theiefoie essentially an apotiopaic politics, a
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politics of containment anu aveiting, anu at the same time, on its biopolitical siue,
essentially an entiiely positive management of life anu the life-foice, congiuent with
some piojecteu sense of natuie, anu moie oi less inauequately manageu by us
insofai as we chose, piecisely, to manage it, to biiule it, to iestiain it anu contiol it.
Let me take it foi gianteu that the neolibeial pietense of non-inteifeience in maiket
affaiis, foi instance, is a foim of management, anu so is the ongoing coipoiatization
anu subalteinization of miuule-class, white-collai laboithe committeu neolibeials
piefei moie management in that sense, moie management of economic non-
management foi instance, anu an incieaseu coipoiatization anu subalteinization of
laboi, anu otheis, the uisaffecteu, less of it, that is, moie inteivention, eithei
stiaightfoiwaiu manageiial inteivention on the pait of state agencies, oi
inteivention of an apotiopaic natuie (foi instance, against the coipoiatization anu
subalteinization of woiking life).
1
Actually existing state politics have waveieu
between vaiiously piogiammatic implementations of eithei political oi biopolitical
aspects of neolibeialism, anu weie inteiesteu in eithei piomoting its iauicalization,
on the iight, oi, on the left siue of the spectium, thiough the ciitical melioiism that
has constituteu the latteis funuamental limit ovei the last thiity yeais, in fuitheiing
its containment in the apotiopaic sense mentioneu. Whethei on one siue oi
anothei, fiom the iight oi fiom the left, neolibeialism can ietiospectively be
consiueieu the patent political hoiizon of oui time up until veiy iecently. But it is
uncleai it no longei is, peihaps secietly, still oui hoiizon: it is not cleai that
neolibeialism, in moie oi less ieconstituteu foim, no longei ciicumsciibes the
invisible shauow of contempoiaiy politics even foi the left.
2

S
The financial ciisis that staiteu in the summei of 2uu7 has no uoubt fosteieu
thought towaius the uevelopment of alteinative potential options. Bave these new
options gone beyonu thinking that a thoioughly iesolute new piouuctivization anu
biopoliticization of society might just be the supplement oi coiiective that
neolibeialism neeus, its phaimakon oi, to use anothei uieek woiu, its tiue
katechon. A question comes up, anu it is a uouble question: if the tiuth of things is
on the siue of the thoiough piouuctivization anu biopoliticization of what is, one
wonueis whethei some kinu of hypeineolibeialism, which of couise incluues
funuamental stiategies foi the piouuctivization anu biopoliticization of eveiyuay
life, is still thought, no mattei how ueceptively oi self-ueceptively, the tiue iesponse
to the evils of oui time, to be then supplementeu by a uoubly katechontic appioach
foi some (this is the "ieconstitution" of neolibeialism, such as it may be taking place
in Bolivia, oi Aigentina), oi to be given uoubly fiee iein by otheis (in the 0niteu
States, foi instance, aftei the substantial failuies of the 0bama yeais). I am not suie
mainstieam political thought has auvanceu beyonu these two optionsbut peihaps
non-mainstieam political thought has pioveu to be equally incapable of moving past
them. I want to place my question in the geneial context of what Reinei Schimann
woulu have announceu, a few yeais ago, as the enu of piincipial politics in
contempoiaiy times--but I will have to leave a ieauing of Schimanns Bioken
Begemonies foi anothei time. Let me also wain the ieauei that, heie, it is not my
intention to piouuce any kinu of an answei, but only to claiify the question to a
ceitain extent, anu peihaps piopose a fuithei line foi thought.
6
A kinu of answei to the question of hypeineolibeialism, eithei as intensifieu
oi else as ieconstituteu neolibeialism, may have been pioviueu foi us in a iathei
unlikely place, that is, in Lectuie 11, pionounceu the 1S
th
of Febiuaiy of 19SS, as a
pait of }acques Lacan's Seminai on "The Ego in Fieuu's Theoiy anu in the Technique
of Psychoanalysis." The issue comes up in the context of a uispute in his seminai in
iefeience to Sigmunu Fieuu's teim )&!"*+%,(!- customaiily tianslateu as
"iesistance." A seminai paiticipant, N. valabiega, insists that )&!"*+%,(!, foi Fieuu,
is also "censoiship," anu not just "iesistance," anu Lacan stiongly uisagiees anu
launches into an excuisus on censoiship which centeis on the uiscussion of a
paiticulaily piovocative thought: "if the soveieign is an iuiot, then eveiything is
peimitteu." (Tianslating it politically: "if the state is an iuiot, then
hypeineolibeialism is the iight, peihaps the only path to take.") It is a sentence
fiom a poinogiaphic novel by Raymonu Queneau that of couise quotes the bettei-
known passage in Bostoyevski's Biotheis Kaiamazov, wheie at stake was not the
stupiuity of the soveieign, but the existence of uou. We go fiom the existence of uou
to the stupiuity of the King of Englanu, anu about the foimei Lacan says: "we
analysts know full well that if uou uoesn't exist, then nothing at all is peimitteu any
longei. Neuiotics piove that to us eveiy uay" (128). Bow uo things stanu, then,
with the stupiuity of the soveieign.
"Eveiything is peimitteu" is obviously a phiase whose uesiie expiesses
libeiation, even the libeiation of uesiie. What we neeu to investigate is whethei the
libeiation of uesiie might peihaps be that veiy iauical evil apotiopaic politics tenu
to iestiain us fiom oi whethei the libeiation of uesiie, albeit peiveise uesiie, is the
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tiue accomplishment of political aims. Foi the typist in Queneau's novel no uoubt
the lattei is the case. She no longei uenies heiself anything, Lacan says. But that is
not the case foi Lacan's analysanu whose stoiy he then pioceeus to tell us: "I knew
a subject whose wiitei's ciamp was tieu, as his analysis ievealeu, to the fact that in
the Islamic law, within which he hau been iaiseu, a thief has his hanu cut off. Be
nevei coulu stomach that. Why. Because his fathei hau been accuseu of being a
thief. Be spent his chiluhoou in a kinu of ueep suspension in ielation to Koianic law.
The whole of his ielation with his oiiginal milieu, eveiything soliu, the juuiciaiy,
oiuei, the basic cooiuinates of the woilu weie baiieu, because theie was one thing
he iefuseu to unueistanuwhy someone who was a thief shoulu have his hanu cut
off. Fuitheimoie, foi this ieason, anu piecisely because he uiun't unueistanu it, it
was he who hau his hanu cut off" (1Su-S1). Foi Lacan's subject the soveieign was
inueeu an iuiot, anu theie was nothing to be uone in teims of unueistanuing it. But
such a fact was not libeiatoiyhe lost the use of his hanu to it. As a wiitei, he coulu
not wiite. Why. Lacan says: "censoiship;" anu he says "the law all of a suuuen
appeai|sj to you in a laceiating foim" (1Su). Censoiship is the laceiation of the law.
It has nothing to uo with the subject, it has nothing to uo with the inuiviuual:
"Censoiship anu supei-ego aie to be locateu in the same iegistei as that of the law.
It is the conciete uiscouise, not only in so fai as it uominates man anu makes all
kinus of fulguiations appeai, it uoesn't mattei what, eveiything which happens,
eveiything which constitutes uiscouise, but in so fai as it gives man his own woilu,
which we, moie oi less accuiately, call cultuial" (1Su). I think we can use the lattei
teim inteichangeably with "iueology" foi the puipose at hanu.
8
Censoiship is foi Lacan cultuial oi iueological uiscouise. Cultuial oi
iueological uiscouise is censoiship. 0i, moie piecisely, cultuial oi iueological
uiscouise is that which neeus to be maintaineu thiough censoiship, at the iisk of
losing the veiy fabiic of one's univeise. Theie aie implications to this. Lacan says:
"any piimoiuial law, which incluues the specification of the ueath penalty as such,
by the same token incluues, thiough its paitial chaiactei, the funuamental
possibility of being not unueistoou. Nan is always in the position of nevei
completely unueistanuing the law, because no man can mastei the uiscouise of the
law in its entiiey. If it is foibiuuen to say that the King of Englanu is an iuiot, unuei
pain of having one's heau cut off, one will not say it, anu in consequence of this sole
fact, one will be leu into not saying a gieat many othei thingsthat is to say,
eveiything which ieveals the glaiing ieality that the King of Englanu is an iuiot"
(128). Let us agiee that if one loses one's heau one also loses the entiie fabiic of
one's univeise. Theie is a piice to not unueistanuing the law, anu it is a piice we all
pay. It is the laceiation of stupiuity, which is at one with the laceiation of the law.
We call it censoiship.
But Lacan says something else. Foi him censoiship constitutes "the final,
unexplaineu, inexplicable mainspiing upon which the existence of the law hangs.
The tough thing we encountei in the analytic expeiience is that theie is one, theie is
a law. Anu that inueeu is what can nevei be completely biought to completion in
the uiscouise of the lawit is this final teim which explains that theie is one" (129).
A final teim that explains that theie is one. Petitio piincipii, anu theiefoie an
impossible logical figuie; an inteiiuption of the piinciple of sufficient ieason given
9
as an answei anu as giounu foi ieason itself: it puts oui veiy political existence, oi
oui politico-cultuial existence, unuei a cleai inteiuictionwe aie always alieauy
foiceu into something we ieject. 0i, in othei woius, theie must be "univeisal
connivance in the iuiocy of the Kinguom of Englanu" (129), anu this iemains at the
same time inexplicable anu obligatoiy. Soveieignty holus, as iuiotic, thiough
censoiship, as an iiieuucible, final teim of what it is to be human (in anothei
passage Lacan mentions Fieuu's "navel of the uieam" as the utteily
incompiehensible point of eveiy uieam, "belonging to the uomain of the unknown,"
which neveitheless, as "the point wheie the ielation of the subject to the symbolic
suifaces," is the veiy name of being: "what I call being is that last woiu" |1uSj), anu
it is in that veiy sense that soveieignty is apotiopaic anu katechontic: eithei we
upholu soveieignty thiough oui veiy unbelief in it, thiough oui veiy lack of
unueistanuing anu iejection of it, oi we lose oui heau, which is cut off. (We uon't
ieally know what happeneu to the typist in Queneau's stoiy, but we know too much
about what is happening in oui woikplace on an eveiyuay basis, when, foi instance,
to go into a iathei faicical moou, gioups of tenuieu faculty aie askeu to vote on a
uocument instituting sanctions up to teimination of contiact foi those of them who
uo not iesponu to theii institutional emails within a twenty-foui houi peiiou. It is
not only the soveieign who is an iuiot when the soveieign becomes an iuiot.)
S

But, with that, we may have an answei, oi at least Lacan's answei, to the
question about the possibility of a hypeineolibeialism, anu to the question of why
hypeineolibeialism is at the same time always necessaiily placeu unuei a cuiious
inteiuiction. Fiom Lacans peispective, peihaps neolibeialism, in its apotiopaic
1u
foimulation anu even in its apotiopaic implementation, is the only conceivable
politics touay, to the veiy same extent that the soveieign is now an iuiot (anu that
many of us have consequently hau to assume the position of stiuctuial iuiots.)
Bypeineolibeialism emeiges as the Lacanian limit of postsoveieign politics. 0i
coulu a clean bieak with the uiscouise of cultuial oi iueological law be in fact
implementeu. We woulu fiist have to figuie out how it woulu be possible. Nancy's
woik may help.

II. Anti-equivalence
Ny question is peihaps alieauy opening up. It will have something to uo with
the possibility of ieleasing hypeineolibeialism fiom censoiship, fiom its soveieign
inteiuiction, fiom its own political alogon, its veiy navel. It will have something to
uo with ieleasing the incalculability of the invisible shauow, oi the invisible shauow
of incalculability, so that the notion of an obscuie sense may appeai. To that extent
it will have something to uo with what Nancy has calleu the tiuth of uemociacy, to
which we will tuin in a minute.
The notoiious sixth footnote in Chaptei 6 of Alexanuie Kojeves Intiouuction
to the Reauing of Begel says that Kail Naix picks up on the Begelian figuie of the
enu of human time, oi histoiy, in the pioclamation of the kinguom of fieeuom,
which is the moment when humans, "(mutually iecognizing each othei without
ieseivation) no longei fight, anu woik as little as possible" (1S9). But, in the seconu
euition of his book, Kojeve incluueu an amenument to the footnote wheie he says
that the kinguom of fieeuom is not to come, it is alieauy with us, anu what iemains
11
is only the extension in space of the "univeisal ievolutionaiy foice actualizeu in
Fiance by Robespieiie-Napoleon" (16u).
4

At stake is then the affiimation of the enu of histoiy not in any apocalyptic oi
chiliastic sense but in a uialectical sense. uiven the encountei between natuie anu
histoiy the woilu of spiiit becomes embouieu, anu the futuie is foievei fiee of the
stiuggle foi iecognition: what lies aheau is the infinite ueployment of spiiit in
posthistoiy. Something, howevei, iemains an object of contioveisy between
Kojeves fiist anu seconu veisions of the footnote. In the fiist veision Kojeve saiu
that the enu of histoiy implieu the enu of wais anu bloouy ievolutions, anu also the
uisappeaiance of philosophy, but also that "ait, love, play, etc." "coulu be
inuefinitely pieseiveu." In the amenument, howevei, Kojeve wains that, if piopeily
so-calleu man weie to uisappeai, that is, the man of histoiy, then "ait, love, play, etc."
woulu not peiuuie as human activities, anu it woulu only be possible to speak of an
animal conuuct moie oi less "aitistic, eiotic oi playful." Anu that we woulu become
witnesses of the "uefinitive uisappeaiance of human uiscouise," that is, not just of
philosophy, but also of wisuom itself, given that "in these human animals theie
woulu no longei obtain 'a uiscuisive unueistanuing of the woilu oi self" (1S9-6u).
The Kojevian vacillation may mattei moie than any of the two uiffeient positions.
Accoiuing to one of them, man, in the histoiical sense of uialectical man, tenuentially
uisappeais, oi has alieauy essentially uisappeaieu, but the wise peiuuie. Accoiuing
to the othei one, the ueath of philosophy is also the ueath of wisuom thiough the
veiy annihilation of uiscouiseonly the animal iemains. Foi Kojeve this vacillation
woulu open a political sense oi uestiny at the time of the enu of histoiy that woulu
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be at the same time always alieauy othei than political, since what is at stake is the
funuamental uecision on wisuom as uestiny veisus the lattei's uestiuction thiough
satisfieu animality. Both options belong in a iegion that is no longei political in the
Begelian sense.
S

We know that Raymonu Queneau, the authoi of the novel Lacan glosses
above, was a stuuent of Kojeve's anu spent much time woiiying about the enu of
histoiy. A fellow stuuent anu inteilocutoi was of couise ueoiges Bataille, foi whom
it iemaineu uncleai whethei an enu of Begelian philosophy as a philosophy of woik,
of "pioject," woulu leau to anything but the final iuination of the human. In his
seconu majoi commentaiy to Begelian philosophy in The Innei Expeiience Bataille
mentions his teachei Kojeves ieflections on Begelian uialectics anu the enu of
histoiy but in oiuei to point out that such a "uecisive moment in the histoiy of self-
consciousness" opens up to uisastei: "absolute anu ciiculai knowleuge is uefinitive
non-knowleuge" (1u8). Bataille calls foi "an extieme iuptuie" with the philosophy
of woik anu the entiy into an "unwoikeu" existence, hence opposing the veiy
possibility of a piouuctivization of the human.
But Bataille, like Queneau, iemaineu moie peiplexeu by the othei possibility
of a hypeineolibeialism at the enu of Bistoiy, namely, the thoiough biopoliticization
oi zoopolitization of life, the conveision of life into animal expeiimentation. Foi
Kojeve, in his amenument to footnote 6 in the seconu euition of his book, if man
piopeily so-calleu weie to uisappeai, then a ceitain ietuin to animality coulu be
expecteu (Kojeve 1S9-6u). Anu Batailles "sacieu philosophy" oi the "philosophy of
toiment" he inventeu as the continuation of Begelian philosophy at the enu of
1S
histoiy seems unable to solve the question as to whethei its own seaich foi ecstasy,
in its veiy iauicalization of the expeiience of knowleuge into non-knowleuge, is not
also effective anu affective animalization. Be also lives in Kojevian vacillation. 0ne
coulu say that Batailles philosophy of toiment is the only possible philosophy foi
hypeineolibeialism as the apotiopaic iueology of the enu of histoiy.
Nancys The tiuth of uemociacy engages with the Kojevian thought of the
enu of histoiy at the veiy same time it means to leave it behinu by a ieconuuction of
the Begelian-Kojevian pioblematics of iecognition into the Nietzschean-
Beiueggeiian theme of nihilism. Nancy pioposes in his essay a ieinvention of
uemociacy, in the wake of 1968, baseu upon the abanuonment of the piinciple of
geneial equivalence, anu baseu theiefoie in the iejection of a ceitain notion of the
common as infinite exchangeability. Be also states that 1968 maiks oi ieveals itself
as a symptom foi a geneial mutation in the iegime of thought that must be
unueistoou as the ienunciation of piincipial action in politics, on the basis of a
sepaiation between politics as the activity foi the configuiation of space anu the
powei of "ait anu love, fiienuship anu thought, knowleuge oi emotion" (S4). Let
me note at the outset that the iejection of the notion of geneial equivalence in
politics uoes not only affect capitalism in the Naixian conceptualization, oi
libeialism as its iueological supeistiuctuie: it also affects, anu in a iauical way,
Naixism itself, which was unueistoou by Naix in the uiunuiisse, foi instance, as the
uialectical oveicoming of the piinciple of geneial equivalence in its libeial-capitalist
foimulation, but not as the oveicoming of equivalence itself, iathei as its
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iauicalization (which was iestiaineu anu limiteu to meie foim thiough libeial
political piinciples).
In 1968 Euiope, Nancy tells us, woulu have expeiienceu a ceitain uelay in
iespect of itself, a self-uelay, to the extent that the uemociatic ueception
(ueceptionuisappointment) biought about by the post-Wai peiiou coulu not be
conjuieu away. Euiope coulu no longei unueistanu that it was not, anu was not
going to be, what it hau thought it woulu become. These statements uepenu upon a
pievious one. Foi Nancy, anu he is talking about 1968, "something in histoiy was
about to oveicome, oveiflow, oi ueiail" the piincipal couise of the political stiuggles
of the peiiou (Nancy 1S). Euiopean uemociacies at the time weie uemociacies
without uemos, oblivious of theii essence, fallen into the lie of exploitation anu
political meuiociity, without justice anu without uignity.
But Nancy talks about a "something" that is coming, which he means is a
foice about to opeiate an epochal histoiical change. Nancy says that in 1968
Euiopean uemociacies weie ignoiant of the fact that we weie about to exit the "age
of the woilu image," alluuing to the Beiueggeiian essay of 19S8 on the woilu-
pictuie that I have alieauy quoteu. 0p until 1968, caught up in uecolonization
stiuggles oi in the constiuction of the Euiopean welfaie state as an alteinative to
the Easts "ieal communism," the Euiopean left hau been ieluctant to unueistanu
that the task was no longei "to iectify the image of the goou subject of Bistoiy" (2u).
1968 woulu have been the "fiist explosion" of an exigency to go beyonu the
paiameteis of Euiopean uemociacy anu its unthought ieliance on the (goou) subject
of the political.
1S
Whatevei that something is, it will accoiu to the Nietzschean exigency of a
"ueep mutation of thought . . . as the plane of ieflection on civilization, existence, anu
foims of evaluation" (Nancy 21). Foi Nancy, then, in the 196us, oi towaius theii
enu, a "path towaius an exit fiom nihilism" was opening up, anu it continues to be
open (21). The Beiueggeiian unueitones point not only to "The Age of the Woilu
Pictuie," but moie piecisely towaius the 1947 "Lettei on Bumanism." Nancy
inuicates, in the wake of Beiueggei, the possibility of a political thought beyonu the
subject of politics, beyonu the subject of metaphysics, thiough which Euiope coulu
assume its uestiny in the uiiection of an oveicoming of nihilism. But this is a task
that cannot be announceu along meiely political lines. The tiauitional goou subject
of the political is useless heie: the subject coulu have opteu, but the poitentous
mutation of thought is beyonu options, as it will happen at a iegistei that is piioi to
the iegistei of options. In open iefeience to Kojeve anu the Kojevian pioblematic
Nancy talks heie about an abanuonment of "the age of Bistoiy" (22). So, what uoes
it mean foi Nancy to exit the age of histoiy. Aie we still within the Kojevian
paiameteis, between the assumption of wisuom anu the lattei's animal
annihilation.
6

Nihilism is categoiial exhaustion. Fiom it we can no longei uevelop oui
politics thiough cooiuinates that have been anticipateu, foieseen, pieconfoimeu to
a vision whose iegime is now teiminally clouueusay, fiom libeialism to
neolibeialism to hypeineolibeialism. The ciisis of the subject of the political is
paiamount heie, anu Nancy ciitiques mouein uemociacy as having been always
occupieu by a notion of a subject with masteiy in teims of "iepiesentations,
16
volitions, anu uecisions" (2S): "the subject . . . piesupposeu by a self-piouucing anu
autotelic being-foi-itself, subject of its own piesuppositions anu of its own
anticipations . . . whethei inuiviuual oi collective, was now oveiwhelmeu by events"
(24). This change in subjectal iegimeaftei the enu of the olu subject of histoiy,
the Begelian subject that evolves towaius its iuentification with substance in
absolute knowleuge, histoiy's goalis conceivably the toision Nancy imposes on
the Kojevian thematics, following a no longei Begelian path.
0ne of the thinkable ways of exiting histoiy was the messianic one, not so
much as the aiiival (avenement) of a Savioi, iathei as the event (vnement) of a
iuptuie in histoiy, event as iuptuie anu iuptuie as event (27). The event of 1968,
1968 as event, was an enactment of the "something" that was coming: something
came, a iuptuie. 1968 is foi Nancy the intiouuction anu simultaneous celebiation of
"the piesent of an iiiuption oi a uisiuption that coulu not intiouuce any figuie, any
instance, any new authoiity" (28). 1968 emeiges as an affiimation without
iuentification, a meie "uesiie," "an expiession of a tiue possibility anu thus of a new
potency of being" (29). Nancy is suggesting that we shoulu talk about an event of
uesiie, uesiie as the veiy foim of the event, but uesiie as a iuptuie beyonu
calculation, beyonu options, a uesiie which is alieauy in itself insciibeu within the
invisible shauow of incalculability anu that piouuces itself as a uemanu against
iepiesentational calculation. This is wheie Nancy places the veiy uisplacement of
the iegime of thought. Because it uemanus the unwoiking of calculation, an
openness to incalculability, the uemanu of 1968 exceeus politics, oi tuins politics
17
into a iegion whose mission it is to ensuie the possibility of access to whatevei is
beyonu woik, beyonu the figuie, beyonu pioject.
Foi Nancy the uisappointment with uemociacy is a function of a monumental
eiioi of peiception uatable in the immeuiate post-Fiench-ievolutionaiy peiiou.
Politics must not be conceiveu as the putting into woik oi the activation of an
absolute shaiing (which is the Begelian conception, also in its Kojevian
ueteimination). Foi Nancy uemociatic politics, which eiupts as if foi the fiist time
in 1968, is piecisely the sepaiation between itself anu anothei oiuei, "the oiuei of
tiuth oi sense, that sense of the woilu that is outsiue the woilu, . . . that uoes not
concluue oui existences, uoes not subsume them unuei a signification, iathei simply
opens them to themselves, that is, also to each othei" (SS-6). Euiopean uemociacy
woulu have foigotten such oiiginaiy sepaiationoiiginaiy because "the uemos
coulu not be soveieign except unuei one conuition that uistinguishes it fiom the
soveieign assumption of the State anu of any paiticulai political configuiation" (S9).
The uemos lives in the unwoiking of politics, anu the uemotic uimension of the
political is, paiauoxically, its impoliticality oi infiapoliticality. Bemotic politics is
piimaiily sepaiation fiom the common, that is, the expeiience of the impossibility of
the hypostasis of the common into figuie oi signification. This is the heait of
Nancys pioposala pioposal I woulu call an-aichic oi a-piincipial. It is fiom the
notion that the uivision of the common cannot be exhausteu by any politics that
Nancy appeals to the oxymoion of a "Nietzschean uemociacy," that is, of a
uemociacy of uistinction that opens the way to the oveicoming of nihilism (42; 4S).
The thesis is cleai: if nihilism is the metaphysical uiift of histoiy, oi the uiift of
18
metaphysical histoiy, anu if histoiy coinciues with the Begelian hypothesis of the
iecognition of the common essence of the human, the iuptuie of the piinciple of
geneial equivalence is a sine qua non if not sufficient conuition foi the oveicoming
of nihilism. Bemociacy is not the shaiing but the bieaking up anu sepaiation of the
common.
7
This is Nancy's favoieu metaphoiization of politics: if theie is to be a
"communism," it woulu be thiough a iauical uistancing anu subtiaction fiom any
communitaiization, incluuing of couise the communitaiization of piouuction anu
the collectivization of biopolitical life. The subtiaction is funuamental, anu the most
piopei iecouise of infiapolitical ciitique. Against any anu all foims of
hypeineolibeialism, oi inueeu of any apotiopaic politics of iestiaint. At the enu of
the aichitectonics of moueinity, in the post-Begelian affiimation of the enu of
histoiy as the enu of the nihilism of iecognition, Nancy announces an infiapolitical
uemociacy as piopei uemotic politics. It is uemotic uemociacy, that is, without
figuie, without people, without hegemony, without an agent of piouuction, anu
ultimately without a subject: an an-aichic anu posthegemonic uemociacy.
Theie is no geneial equivalence, no uemeinwesen, in a uemociacy that
abanuons the age of histoiy. But geneial equivalence woulu have maikeu the veiy
conceptualization of uemociacy since the enu of the ancien igime. The epochal
iuptuie of 1968 woulu have been piecisely that: the positing of the enu of the
piinciple of geneial equivalence in uemociacy. Aftei 1968 the ieinvention of
uemociacy must take place on the basis of a "mutation in the paiauigm of
equivalence" on which the fate of uemociacy uepenus (4S). In Nancys own woius:
"It is a mattei of finuing, oi conqueiing, a sense of evaluation, of the evaluating
19
affiimation that may give eveiy evaluating gestuie . . . the possibility of not being
measuieu in auvance by a given system, the affiimation of a unique, incompaiable,
unsubstitutable value, oi sense . . . 0nly that exits nihilism: not the ieactivation of
values, but the manifestation of all values against a backgiounu wheie nihil means
that all of them have value inconmensuiably, absolutely, anu infinitely" (47). Foi
Nancy it is not the ielativist "eveiything is valuable" but iathei the "nothing is
equivalent" that counts anu can eventually ensuie the enu of economic uomination,
baseu as it is on geneial equivalence, anu also iauical equality, which is "the iegime
wheie the incommensuiables aie shaieu" (46, 47). The iuptuie of the piinciple of
geneial equivalence is the funuamental iuptuie of the piimoiuial oi piincipial
political assignationit is the conuition of uemociacy, anu of its ieinvention beyonu
its hijacking by libeial capitalism anu its neolibeial anu hypeineolibeial avatais.
Nancy pioposes a uemociacy without a figuie. Theie will no longei be a
uestiny oi a tiuth in common, but what will be common is the piolifeiation of
uestinies that uemociacy shelteis without confusing itself with them. The enu of
histoiy is the ietuin to the oiiginaiy moment when the city foifeits the foimative-
figuiative piinciple in the ienunciation of the common as geneial equivalence.
"Bemociatic kiatein, the powei of the people, is initially the powei of making aikhia
fail anu then of taking upon itself . . . the infinite opening thus uisplayeu" (S7).
8
Foi
Nancy it is a mattei of a civilizational uecision foi which he ieseives the name of
Actiona piaxis beyonu oi below piincipial histoiical action, wheie the lattei is
linkeu to the woik of the Begelian seif, which is what comes to an enu with the
2u
Begelian exhaustion. I will theiefoie, foi my own puiposes, iefei to Nancy's Action
as infiapolitical action.
Theie aie two moie themes in Nancy's conclusion. The fiist one points to a
paiticulai split between uemociacy anu politics. If uemociacy must, on Rousseau's
teims, "ie-engenuei man" anu "opens the uestiny of man anu woilu to new gestuies,"
politics can no longei offei "the measuie oi the place foi such a uestiny" (6u). This
is why a uemociatic politics uefines itself as a politics in ietieat, oi what I am calling
infiapolitics, having unueistoou its incapacity to assume the totality of human
uestiny fiom its oiginaiy sepaiation fiom the common. Bemociacy cannot offei a
subsumptible tiuth, hence it libeiates itself fiom its obsolete chaiacteiistic as a
politics of enusuemociacy is now only the means foi its own infiapolitical
ueployment.
Which means that, in Nancy's teims, uemociacy is now to be unueistoou
moie as a "metaphysics" than as a "politics," oi fiist as a metaphysics anu then a
politics.
9
But this neeus to be unueistoou in a context within which the metaphysics
uoes not founu the politics, but simply offeis itself as the conuition of its piactice.
Bemociacy "withuiaws fiom the oiuei of the State the assumption of the enus of
man, of its common anu singulai existence" (6S). Is Nancy`s uefinition of
uemociacy as metaphysics not consistent with the Kojevian postulate of wisuom.
The wise at the enu of histoiy lives in satisfieu self-consciousness in so fai as she
knows that no heioic subjective effoit will opeiate a new uialectical consummation
in the iealm of enus. A ienunciation of enus is the impolitical affiimation of an a-
piincipial, uemotic, anu posthegemonic politicality, which is what Nancy calls
21
uemociatic metaphysics. But we neeu to unueistanu how such poitentous
announcements coulu biing about the active oveicoming of the nihilism of geneial
equivalence.

III. 0nbuiy the Always-Alieauy.
Is it conceivable that Lacan, oi analytic expeiience in geneial, coulu enuoise
an iuentification of censoiship, that is, cultuie, with the assumption anu
inteinalization of the piinciple of geneial equivalence. Lacan says: "the tough thing
we encountei in the analytic expeiience is that theie is one, theie is a law." Can we
name that law, at the enu of histoiy, as the law of geneial equivalence. Anu, if so,
woulu the stupiuity of the soveieign suivive its uismantling. At stake is no uoubt,
as Nancy pioposes, the possibility of a new, post-nihilist unueistanuing of uemotic
uemociacy. This is the obscuie sense anu invisible shauow of a futuie that comes
fiom the past, of an "always alieauy" that must make itself manifest. If the veiy
possibility of hypeineolibeialism uepenus on the "univeisal connivance" in the
iuiocy of the soveieign, peihaps the no uoubt messianic iuptuie that Nancy invokes
fiom 1968 points to the iemote beginning of a time foi the iemoval of the
inteiuiction of the law. To unuo Lacanian censoiship, to have uiiect access to the
navel of the uieam: it is of couise easiei saiu than uone.
Bataille uevotes to Begel two funuamental comments in The Innei
Expeiience. In the fiist of them Bataille says that his woik attempts to unuo the
Begelian phenomenology to the extent that Begel's is a "philosophy of woik, of the
'pioject.'" Begelian man comes to be completeu anu accomplisheu in the
22
auequation to the pioject. But, Bataille says, something in man is iiieuucible to any
pioject"non-uiscuisive existence, laughtei, ecstasy" woulu link man to the
negation of the pioject he himself is, which means that man "ultimately iuins
himself" thiough a iauical eiasuie of his human, that is, piojective ueteiminations
(8u). The seconu passage, alieauy mentioneu above, comes in a footnote, anu
incluues a iefeience to Kojeve's analysis of the uialectics of mastei anu seif in the
context of a ciitique of Nietzsche's ignoiance in iefeience to Begel. Foi Bataille the
Begelian foimulation is "the uecisive moment in the histoiy of self-consciousness"
(1u9). Anu self-consciousness culminates in the awaieness that "ciiculai anu
absolute knowleuge is uefinitive non-knowleuge" (1u8). Bence Bataille must
inuicate a iuptuie. At the veiy moment when my self-consciousness ieaches its
utmost expiession, says Bataille, "at the piecise moment the question is foimulateu
that peimits human, uivine existence to entei . . . the most piofounu way towaius an
obscuiity without ietuin: why must theie be what I know, why is it a necessity. In
this question is hiuuen . . . an extieme iuptuie, so ueep that only the silence of
ecstasy can iesponu to it" (1u9).
Bataille's iuptuie bieaks away fiom the philosophy of woik anu it means the
entiy into a thought that he vaiiously calls sacieu philosophy oi thinking of the
toiment. It iefeis to an intense meuitationa meuitation measuieu in expeiiential
intensitieson "unwoikeu" existence, that is, on existence beyonu Begelian
substantiality. That kinu of existence is the iegion wheie nihilism can be liveu,
theiefoie also the iegion wheie, foi Bataille, but also foi Nancy, the possibility of its
oveicoming may open up. But the oveicoming woulu not solve the Kojevian
2S
vacillation: uoes wisuom enuuie, oi uoes the animal iemain. Toiment philosophy,
in its seaich foi ecstasy, woulu not know how to iesponu, since Bataillean ecstasy is
at the same time affective animalization anu the iauicalization of the expeiience of
knowleuge.
I think Nancy's pioposal foi a uemociacy of uistinction, against equivalence,
is a wagei foi the iesolution of the vacillation. 1968, as an event of uesiie, as a
maximal politicization of "unwoikeu" uesiie, of a uesiie beyonu pioject anu figuie,
initiates the ecstatic movement of the uemos, which is foi Nancy the seciet of
histoiy anu the tiuth of uemociacy. It maiks the iuptuie with equivalence as a
piinciple of auministiation in favoi of the soveieignty of a uesiie without figuie, of
ecstatic anu unwoikeu uesiie. No uoubt ecstatic anu unwoikeu uesiie tiaveises
the navel of the political uieam anu points towaius the uissolution of the iuiotic
ielation of the subject to the symbolic. It is on this conuition that the invisible
shauow of the incalculable might be accoiueu a ceitain obscuie visibility. Nancy
says: "not a uaikeneu sense, but a sense whose element is the obscuie." Renueiing
the obscuie as such, thematizing the obscuie might be the conuition of the path
foiwaiu anu beyonu the cuiient ieconstitution of neolibeialism. It may not be
much as a(n) (infia)political pioposal, not "gigantic" in the Beiueggeiian sense. But
then it may be eveiything.

Albeito Noieiias
Texas A&N 0niveisity

24
Woiks Citeu
Bataille, ueoiges. The Innei Expeiience. Leslie Anne Bolut tiansl. Albany: S0NY 0P,
1988.
Bosteels, Biuno. The Actuality of Communism. Lonuon: veiso, 2u11.
Beiiiua, }acques. Beiueggei: la question ue l'Etie et ue l'Bistoiie. Couis ue l'ENS-
0lm 1964-6S. Thomas Butoii anu Naigueiite Beiiiua eus. Paiis: ualile,
2u1S.
Esposito, Robeito. Categoiie uell'impolitico. Bologna: Il Nulino, 1999.
Beau, Simon. Ninuless. Why Smaitei Nachines Aie Naking Bumbei Bumans. New
Yoik: Basic Books, 2u14.
Beiueggei, Naitin. "The Age of the Woilu Pictuie." In 0ff the Beaten Tiack. }ulian
Young anu Kenneth Baynes euitois anu tianslatois. Cambiiuge: Cambiiuge
0P, 2uu2. S7-8S.
Kojeve, Alexanuie. Intiouuction to the Reauing of Begel. Allan Bloom eu. }ames B.
Nichols }i. tiansl. Ithaca: Coinell 0P, 1969.
Lacan, }acques. The Ego in Fieuu's Theoiy anu in the Technique of Psychoanalysis.
19S4-19SS. }acques-Alain Nillei eu. Sylvana Tomaselli tiansl. New Yoik:
Noiton, 1991.
Naitinez Naizoa, Felipe. El concepto ue lo civil. Santiago: Netales Pesauos, 2uu8.
Nancy, }ean Luc. La communaut affionte. Paiis: ualile, 2uu1.
---. La communaut usavoue. Paiis: ualile, 2u14.
---. veiit ue la uemociatie. Paiis: ualile, 2uu8.
Schimann, Reinei. Bioken Begemonies. Reginalu Lilly tiansl. Bloomington:
2S
Inuiana 0P, 2uuS.
Webbei, }effeiy R. Fiom Rebellion to Refoim in Bolivia. Class Stiuggle, Inuigenous
Libeiation, anu the Politics of Evo Noiales. Chicago: Baymaiket, 2u11.

1
"Apotiope" is a cuiious uieek woiu, as it can mean, in its veibal foim ("apotiepo"),
tuining away in the sense of tuining someone away fiom something, to uetei, to
uissuaue fiom, but it also means to tuin fiom otheis against one. Let us take it, foi a
stait, in the sense of "aveiting evil" by accepting anu inteinalizing a small pait of it. I
will use it in this papei togethei with anothei uieek woiu, "katechon," alieauy
uocumenteu in its veibal foim in Bomei anu Besiou anu Beiouotus to talk about
holuing something in check, iestiaining, biiuling, but whose most famous use as a
paiticiple is peihaps in the New Testament: the "katechon" is he who holus the
coming of the Antichiist in check, the iestiainei in the iathei ultimate sense of the
iestiainei fiom the ultimate catastiophe, fiom the enu of times. This is the sense
that favoieu Cail Schmitt, foi whom it becomes an impoitant teim of political
theology: the political katechon is the peison oi iegime whose basic value is the
aveiting oi iestiaining of iauical evil, hence the oiganizei of a politics of lessei evil.

2
}effeiy Webbei has concisely explaineu, in Chaptei 6 of his splenuiu Fiom
Rebellion to Refoim in Bolivia, how contempoiaiy Bolivian politics, which coulu
have evolveu in a ievolutionaiy uiiection aftei the events in the eaily pait of the
2uuu's, have now been channeleu into "ieconstituteu neolibeialism," which we aie
welcome to unueistanu as constituting the limits of what is possible oi in some
othei way. See Webbei 179-229 foi a uefinition of neostiuctuialist political
economy, anu the specifics of the Bolivian case.

S
Simon Beau's Ninuless. Bow Smaitei Nachines Aie Naking Bumbei Bumans is
veiy useful to unueistanu the massive attempt by coipoiate capitalism to tuin all
woikeis, incluuing, epochally, white-collai woikeis into iuiots following the
application of the Computei Business Systems mouel to a ieconstituteu foim of
Tayloiist Foiuism.

4
Ny iefeiences to Kojeve anu Kojevianism in what follows aie, on the one hanu, an
echo of Nancy's own engagement with them in his book. But, on the othei hanu,
they iefei to a state of affaiis in contempoiaiy ieflection that iemains, in my opinion,
still funuamental touay. }acques Beiiiua uefineu it in the fiist sessions of his 1964-
6S couise Beiueggei: la question ue l'tie et l'Bistoiie as the neeu to "uestioy" in the
Beiueggeiian sense Begelian philosophy as the culmination of all philosophy in
oiuei to open the way foi an epochal mutation of thought with implications foi the
whole iange of human affaiis. That the epochal mutation of thought has alieauy
happeneu, but neeus to be woikeu out (oi, if we follow Nancy's hint, "unwoikeu
thiough"), was alieauy stateu by Begel, latei by Beiueggei, then by Kojeve in
uiffeient foims. Anu Beiiiua anu Nancy pick the theme up. Foi Beiiiua, explicitly,
26

the uestiuction of Begelian philosophy must stait with the thematization of the
ontico-ontological uiffeience in oiuei to shift into a geneial ciitique of
metaphoiization as such (the ontico-ontological uiffeience being just one of the
metaphois, albeit inauguial fiom a philosophical oi ontological peispective). See
foi example his biief "conclusions" to the 1964-6S couise, S22-26. I will point out
latei how the ciitique of metaphoiization is latent in Nancy's position. But let me
also iefei the ieauei to the moment in the Eighth Session when Beiiiua is
compaiing Beiueggei's uecisive contiibution to an unueistanuing of human
histoiicity in Being anu Time to the Begelian one. Be says that it woulu be tempting
to affiim that Beiueggei's contiibution, "c'est encoie Begel" (282). Kojeve, he says,
has ceitainly inteipieteu things that way. "uoou sense anu the most immeuiate
appeaiances seem to favoi Kojeve, anu in a ceitain way, in this paiticulai case, goou
sense is nevei simply iight oi wiong. But it is iaie that it be as iight as it claims"
(284-8S). Beiiiua pioceeus to uismantle the Kojevian claim in 28S-29S. Be woulu
continue his ciitique of Kojve in Specteis of Naix, also theie to claim that theie is a
neeu foi a concept of histoiy, of histoiicity, libeiateu fiom the Begelian-Naixian,
anu also Kojevian, unueistanuing of tempoiality, which links it to a subjectivization
of the woilu that enus up ueclaiing woiluing as unconuitioneu piouuction. Nancy's
piesuppositions in The tiuth of uemociacy aie similai to Beiiiua's, anu set the
fiamewoik foi theii funuamental questions on politics anu the infiapolitical.

S
Woulu it be "impolitical" in senses moie oi less geimane to Robeito Esposito's
conceptualization of the teim in his gieat Categoiie uell'impolitico. I woulu piefei
to use the teim "infiapolitical," consistently with my own woik. 0n a (ciitical)
inteipietation of the uiffeience see Biuno Bosteels, The Actuality of Communism,
7S-128.

6
I uon't think so, but an auequate explanation of it woulu iequiie an engagement
with othei woiks by Nancy, anu notably with his iecent La communaut usavoue.
In my opinion, which can only stanu as such foi the time being, Nancy is tiying to
push his political oi infiapolitical thinking along the lines inuicateu by Beiiiua's
unueistanuing of the Beiueggeiian ontico-ontological uiffeience. This is a thought
of politics aftei the "uestiuction" of philosophy, anu theiefoie aftei the uestiuction
of political philosophy. Nancy uoes not thematize the ontico-ontological uiffeience
itself, but has alieauy taken it as a paiticulai foim of metaphoiization. Be ieheaises
anothei metaphoiization on oiiginaiity, which has to uo with the uiffeience
between community anu counteicommunity. 0i let me put it this way: one of the
poles of Nancy's metaphoi is no longei being, but the common. But the common
stanus in a metonymic ielationship to being in the Beiueggeiian sense. The
uestiuction of the piinciple of geneial equivalence attempts to ielease the common
fiom its oblivion as buiieu oiigin of the political, not to ieinstate it as giounu, but to
piesent it as always alieauy withuiawing, always alieauy ieceuing, always alieauy
iefusing its chaiactei as giounu.

27

7
The woik of Felipe Naitinez Naizoa, in paiticulai his El concepto ue lo civil,
shoulu be mentioneu in this connection. I will engage with it in moie uetail in a
foithcoming essay.

8
It is useful to pioviue the lines immeuiately pievious to that quotation, as they
incluue an impoitant iefeience to Bataille anu the Bataillean hoiizon: "If the people
aie soveieign, it is incumbent upon them to take into account what Bataille
unueistanus when he wiites that soveieignty is nothing. It uoes not come to any
peison, uoes not figuie in any figuie, uoes not uisplay itself in any stele. It is, quite
simply, supieme. Nothing above. Neithei uou noi mastei. Bemociacy means
anaichy, in this sense. But anaichy engages actions, opeiations, combats, settings-
into-foim that enable the iigoious pieseivation of the absence of positeu, ueposeu,
oi imposeu aichie" (S7).

9
This is of couise a bit suipiising, in the wake of the Beiueggeiian anu Beiiiuean
uestiuction of metaphysics that Nancy geneially enuoises. Why use the teim
"metaphysics" heie. But it woulu be a metaphysics beyonu metaphysics, a
metaphysics posteiioi to the inauguial metaphoiization of being as the
unshaieable common.