CITIZENSHIP

1. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to? Explain.

Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
2. What are the ways of acquiring citizenship? Discuss.
Held: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and () by
natralization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two !inds of citizens: the
natural"born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. # person, who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural"born citizen thereof.
#s de$ned in the % % % &onstitution, natural"born citizens 'are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without ha(ing to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.)
*n the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who ha(e become +ilipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise !nown as the
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former ,aturalization -aw (#ct ,o. ./), and
by Republic Act No. 3!. (Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n
7anc 89apunan:)
. To !e naturalized" what #ust an applicant pro$e? When and what are the conditions !efore
the decision granting Philippine citizenship !eco#es executory?
Held: To be naturalized, an applicant has to pro(e that he possesses all the
!ali"cations and none of the dis!ali"cations pro(ided by law to become a +ilipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes e%ecutory only after two () years from its
promulgation when the court is satis$ed that during the inter(ening period, the applicant has #$%
not left the Philippines; #&% has dedicated hi'self to a lawfl calling or profession; #(%
has not been con)icted of any o*ense or )iolation of go)ern'ent pro'lgated rles; or
#+% co''itted any act pre,dicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
go)ern'ent annonced policies %&ection 1" '.(. )*+. (Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&,
0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
,. What -.(/0102(T034& #ust !e possessed !y an applicant for naturalization?
Held: 'ection (, Act 473 pro(ides the following -.(/0102(T034&:
(a) <e must be not less than &$ years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
(b) <e must ha(e resided in the Philippines for a continos period of not less
than ten years;
(c) <e must be of good 'oral character and belie)es in the principles nderlying
the Philippine Constittion, and must ha(e condcted hi'self in a proper and
irreproachable 'anner dring the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted go(ernment as well as with the
community in which he is li(ing;
(d) <e must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than ")e thosand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must ha(e some -nown lcrati)e trade, profession,
or lawfl occpation;
(e) <e must be able to spea- and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
langages; and
(f) <e must ha(e enrolled his 'inor children of school age. in any of the pblic
schools or pri)ate schools recognized by the /rea of Pri)ate Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history. go)ern'ent and ci)ic are taght or
prescribed as part of the school crricl'. dring the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines re!ired of hi' prior to the hearing of his petition
for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
(Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
). What are the D0&-.(/0102(T034& under &ection ," (ct ,5" in an application for
naturalization?
Held: 'ection 4) Act 473, pro(ides the following D0&-.(/0102(T034&:
%a+ <e must not be opposed to organized go)ern'ent or a0liated with any
association or grop of persons who phold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized go(ernments;
%!+ <e must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of )iolence.
personal assalt. or assassination for the sccess and predo'inance of their
ideas;
%c+ <e must not be a polyga'ist or belie)er in the practice of polygamy;
%d+ <e must not ha)e been con)icted of any cri'e in)ol)ing 'oral trpitde;
%e+ <e must not be s*ering fro' 'ental alienation or incrable contagios
diseases;
%f+ <e must ha(e, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (or not less than
si1 'onths before "ling his application), 'ingled socially with the 2ilipinos.
or who ha)e not e)inced a sincere desire to learn and e'brace the csto's.
traditions and ideals of the +ilipinos;
%g+ <e must not be a citizen or sb,ect of a nation with who' the Philippines is at
war. dring the period of sch war;
%h+ <e must not be a citizen or sb,ect of a foreign contry whose laws do not
grant 2ilipinos the right to beco'e natralized citizens or sb,ects thereof.
(Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
6. 2an a legiti#ate child !orn under the 17) 2onstitution of a 1ilipino #other and an alien
father $alidly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen %1,+ years after he has reached the age of
#a8ority?
Held: =nder Article #*) 'ection +,3- of the +.3 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child, born of a +ilipino mother and an alien father, followed the citizenship of the father
unless, upon reaching the age of ma>ority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. /(
which was enacted pursuant to ?ection 1(@), #rticle AB of the 1.@C &onstitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to ma!e a (alid election of Philippine citizenship.
<owe(er, the 1.@C &onstitution and &.#. ,o. DC did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1.@C &harter only pro(ides that the
election should be made 'pon reaching the age of 'a,ority.) The age of ma>ority then
commenced upon reaching twenty"one (1) years. An the opinions of the ?ecretary of Eustice on
cases in(ol(ing the (alidity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resol(ed by
basing the time period on the decisions of this &ourt prior to the eFecti(ity of the 1.@C
&onstitution. An these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Gepartment of ?tate of the =nited ?tates 0o(ernment to the
eFect that the election should be made within a 'reasonable ti'e) after attaining the age of
ma>ority. The phrase 'reasonable time) has been interpreted to mean that the election shold
be 'ade within three #(% years fro' reaching the age of 'a,ority.
The span of forteen #$+% years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age
of ma>ority until he $nally e%pressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
!eyond the conte#plation of the require#ent of electing 9upon reaching the age of #a8ority.:
Philippine citizenship can ne)er be treated li-e a co''odity that can be clai'ed
when needed and sppressed when con)enient3 4ne who is pri)ileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to sch citizenship3 5s sch. he
shold a)ail of the right with fer)or. enthsias' and pro'ptitde. (Re0
Application 1or Admission to the 2hilippine "ar) *icente 3. Ching, 7ar 5atter ,o. .12, *ct.
1, 1..., 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
5. ;ow #ay Philippine citizenship !e renounced? 0s the application for an alien certi<cate of
registration" and the possession of foreign passport" tanta#ount to acts of renunciation of
Philippine citizenship?
Held: Petitioner also contends that e(en on the assumption that the pri(ate respondent is
a +ilipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited pri(ate respondentHs application for an alien &erti$cate of 1egistration
(#&1) and Ammigrant &erti$cate of 1esidence (A&1), on ?eptember 1., 1.33, and the issuance to
her of an #ustralian passport on 5arch @, 1.33.
I % %
An order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such rennciation 'st be
E6P7ESS. PetitionerHs contention, that the application of pri(ate respondent for an alien
certi$cate of registration, and her #ustralian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest
in the case of Aznar v. C45%L%C (13C ?&1# /4@ 81..4:) and in the more recent case of
5ercado v. 5anzano and C45%L%C (0.1. ,o. 1@C43@, @4/ ?&1# D@4, 5ay D, 1...).
An the case of (znar, the &ourt ruled that the 'ere fact that he is an 5'erican did not
'ean that he is no longer a 2ilipino, and that an application for an alien certi"cate of
registration was not tanta'ont to rennciation of his Philippine citizenship.
#nd, in 5ercado v. 5anzano and C45%L%C" it was held that the fact that respondent
5anzano was registered as an #merican citizen in the 7ureau of Ammigration and Geportation and
was holding an #merican passport on #pril , 1../, only a year before he $led a certi$cate of
2
candidacy for (ice"mayor of 5a!ati, were ,st assertions of his 5'erican nationality before
the termination of his #merican citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that pri(ate respondent 1osalind Jbasco -opez was a holder of an
#ustralian passport and had an alien certi$cate of registration are not acts constituting an
eFecti(e renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of +ilipino citizenship.
2or rennciation to e*ecti)ely reslt in the loss of citizenship. the sa'e 'st be
e1press. #s held by this &ourt in the aforecited case of (znar, an application for an alien
certi$cate of registration does not amount to an e%press renunciation or repudiation of oneHs
citizenship. The application of the herein pri(ate respondent for an alien certi$cate of registration,
and her holding of an #ustralian passport, as in the case of =ercado $. =anzano" were 'ere acts
of assertion of her 5stralian citizenship before she e*ecti)ely renonced the sa'e.
Thus, at the most, pri(ate respondent had dual citizenship K she was an #ustralian and a +ilipino,
as well.
5oreo(er, under Commonwealth Act /3, the fact that a child of 2ilipino parent/s
was born in another contry has not been inclded as a grond for losing one8s
Philippine citizenship. ?ince pri(ate respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitionerHs claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does
not hold water. (*alles v. C45%L%C, @@/ ?&1# C2@, #ug. ., 444, 6n 7anc 8Purisima:)
>. ;ow #ay 1ilipino citizens who lost their citizenship 'E(2-.0'E the sa#e?
5nswer: +ilipino citizens who ha(e lost their citizenship may % % % reacquire the same in
the manner pro(ided by law. Commonwealth Act No. /3 enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: #$% by natralization, #&% by
repatriation, and #(% by direct act of Congress. (6rivaldo v. C45%L%C, C/ ?&1# //,
Eune 3, 1..D, 6n 7anc 8Panganiban:; Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /,
441, 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
7. Distinguish naturalization fro# repatriation.
Held: 4(T.'(/0?(T034 is a 'ode for both ac!isition and reac!isition of Philippine
citizenship. #s a #ode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is go(erned by
Commonwealth Act No. 473" as a#ended. *n the other hand, naturalization as a #ode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is go(erned by Commonwealth Act No. /3 ((n (ct Pro$iding
for the Ways in Which Philippine 2itizenship =ay @e /ost or 'eacquired 81.@D:). =nder this law, a
for'er 2ilipino citizen who wishes to reac!ire Philippine citizenship 'st possess
certain !ali"cations and none of the dis!ali"cations 'entioned in Section + of C353
+9(.
'EP(T'0(T034, on the other hand, may be had under (arious statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: #$% desertion of the armed forces (&ection ," 2.(. 4o. 6); #&% ser)ice in
the ar'ed forces of the allied forces in Lorld Lar AA (&ection 1" 'epu!lic (ct 4o. 76) A17)B);
#(% ser)ice in the 5r'ed 2orces of the :nited States at any other time (&ec. 1" 'epu!lic (ct
4o. 26* A176*B); #+% 'arriage of a 2ilipino wo'an to an alien (&ec. 1" 'epu!lic (ct 4o. >151
A177)B); and #;% political and econo'ic necessity %0!id+.
#s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, 'EP(T'0(T034 simply consists
of the ta-ing of an oath of allegiance to the 7epblic of the Philippines and registering
said oath in the <ocal Ci)il 7egistry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided3
An Angat v. Republic (@12 ?&1# 2@3 81...:), we held:
8P:arenthetically, under these statutes (referring to 1# ,os. .DC and D@4), the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not e(en be required to $le a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to ta-e an oath of allegiance to the
1epublic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the ci)il registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
5oreo(er, repatriation results in the reco)ery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized +ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized +ilipino citizen. *n the other hand, if he was originally a natural"born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural"born +ilipino.
(Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n 7anc 89apunan:)
1*. Who #ay $alidly a$ail of repatriation under '.(. 4o. >151?
Held: R.A. No. 7+7+, which has lapsed into law on *ctober @, 1..C, is an act pro(iding
for the repatriation #a% of 2ilipino wo'en who ha)e lost their Philippine citizenship by
'arriage to aliens and #b% of natral=born 2ilipinos who ha)e lost their Philippine
citizenship on accont of political or econo'ic necessity. (8erardo Angat v.
Republic, 0.1. ,o. 1@22, ?ept. 12, 1... 8Bitug:)
3
11. @efore what agency should application for repatriation under '.( >151 !e <led?
Held: =nder 'ection + of 2.3. No. 7(, dated Eune C, 1./C, amending &.#. ,o. D@, an
application for repatriation could be $led with the Special Co''ittee on Natralization"
chaired by the Solicitor >eneral with the :ndersecretary of 2oreign 5*airs and the ?irector
of the National Intelligence Coordinating 5gency as the other members. #lthough the
agency was deacti(ated by (irtue of President &orazon &. #quinoHs 5emorandum of 5arch /,
1.3/, it was not, howe(er, abrogated. The &ommittee was reacti(ated on Eune 3, 1..C. <ence,
the application shold be "led with said 5gency. not with the 7egional Trial Cort.
(8erardo Angat v. Republic, 0.1. ,o. 1@22, ?ept. 12, 1... 8Bitug:)
12. =ay a naturalC!orn 1ilipino who !eca#e an (#erican citizen still !e considered a naturalC!orn
1ilipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and" therefore" quali<ed to run for
2ongress#an?
Held: 'EP(T'0(T034 results in the reco)ery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized +ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior stats as a
naturalized +ilipino citizen. *n the other hand, if he was originally a natural"born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural"born +ilipino.
An respondent &ruzHs case, he lost his +ilipino citizenship when he rendered ser(ice in the
#rmed +orces of the =nited ?tates. <owe(er, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. (/3!, which pro(ides:
Section $. #ny person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering ser(ice
to, or accepting commission in, the #rmed +orces of the =nited ?tates, or after separation
from the #rmed +orces of the =nited ?tates, acquired =nited ?tates citizenship, 'ay
reac!ire Philippine citizenship by ta-ing an oath of allegiance to the 7epblic
of the Philippines and registering the sa'e with <ocal Ci)il 7egistry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines3 The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a rennciation of any other citizenship3
<a(ing thus ta!en the required oath of allegiance to the 1epublic and ha(ing registered the
same in the &i(il 1egistry of 5angatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited pro(ision,
respondent &ruz is deemed to ha(e reco(ered his original status as a natural"born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a +ilipino father. At bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to reco)er. or retrn to. his original stats before he lost his
Philippine citizenship3
PetitionerHs contention that respondent &ruz is no longer a natural"born citizen since he
had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. 8T:he term 'natural"born citizen) was
$rst de$ned in #rticle AAA, ?ection 2 of the 1./@ &onstitution as follows:
?ection 2. # natural"born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without ha(ing to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: #$% a person must be a
6ilipino citizen 1rom birth and #&% he does not ha)e to perfor' any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
=nder the 1./@ &onstitution de$nition, there were two categories of +ilipino citizens which
were not considered natural"born: (1) those who were naturalized and () those born before
Eanuary 1/, 1./@ %the date of eDecti$ity of the 175 2onstitution+, of +ilipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of ma>ority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those 'naturalized citizens) were not
considered natural"born ob(iously because they were not +ilipinos at birth and had to perform an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of +ilipino mothers before the eFecti(ity of the
1./@ &onstitution were li!ewise not considered natural"born because they also had to perform an
act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present &onstitution, howe(er, now considers those born of +ilipino mothers before the
eFecti(ity of the 1./@ &onstitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
ma>ority age as natural"born. 5fter de"ning who are natral=born citizens. Section & of
5rticle I@ adds a sentence: AThose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph #(%. Section $ hereof shall be dee'ed natral=born citizens3B Conse!ently.
only natralized 2ilipinos are considered not natral=born citizens. At is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present &onstitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are naturalC!orn and () those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
5 citizen who is not a natralized 2ilipino. i3e3. did not ha)e to ndergo the process of
natralization to obtain Philippine citizenship. necessarily is a natral=born 2ilipino.
,oteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefore is clear: as to sch
persons. they wold either be natral=born or natralized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the 'ode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reac!isition thereof. #s respondent &ruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
4
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural"born +ilipino. #s such, he
possessed all the necessary quali$cations to be elected as member of the <ouse of
1epresentati(es. (Antonio "engson ### v. $R%&, 0.1. ,o. 12324, 5ay /, 441, 6n 7anc
89apunan:)
1. Distinguish dual citizenship fro# dual allegiance.
Held: D.(/ 20T0?E4&;0P arises when, as a reslt of the concrrent application of
the di*erent laws of two or 'ore states. a person is si'ltaneosly considered a
national by the said states. +or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of 8us sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of 8us soli. ?uch a person, ipso facto and without any (oluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
D.(/ (//EE0(42E, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
si'ltaneosly owes. by so'e positi)e act. loyalty to two or 'ore states3 Chile dal
citizenship is in)olntary. dal allegiance is the reslt of an indi)idal8s )olition.
(5ercado v. 5anzano, @4/ ?&1# D@4, 5ay D, 1..., 6n 7anc 85endoza:)
1,. What is the #ain concern of &ection )" (rticle 0F" 17>5 2onstitution" on citizenship?
2onsequently" are persons with #ere dual citizenship disquali<ed to run for electi$e local
positions under &ection ,*%d+ of the /ocal Eo$ern#ent 2ode?
Held: An including 'ection in Article #* on citizenship, the concern of the
Constittional Co''ission was not with dal citizens per se bt with natralized
citizens who 'aintain their allegiance to their contries of origin e)en after their
natralization. <ence, the phrase 'dal citizenshipB in 7353 No3 9$DE. Section +E#d%
#<ocal >o)ern'ent Code% 'st be nderstood as referring to Adal allegiance.)
&onsequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disquali$cation. .nliGe
those with dual allegiance" who #ust" x x x" !e su!8ect to strict process with respect to the
ter#ination of their status" for candidates with dual citizenship" it should suHce if" upon the <ling
of their certi<cate of candidacy" they elect Philippine citizenship to ter#inate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the una$oida!le consequence of
conIicting laws of diDerent states.
/y electing Philippine citizenship. sch candidates at the sa'e ti'e forswear
allegiance to the other contry of which they are also citizens and thereby ter'inate
their stats as dal citizens. At may be that, from the point of (iew of the foreign state and of
its laws, such an indi(idual has not eFecti(ely renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment. (5ercado v. 5anzano, 0.1. ,o. 1@C43@, @4/ ?&1# D@4, 5ay D, 1... 85endoza:)
1). 2ite instances when a citizen of the Philippines #ay possess dual citizenship considering the
citizenship clause %(rticle 0F+ of the 2onstitution.
Held:
1) Those born of 2ilipino fathers and/or 'others in foreign contries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
) Those born in the Philippines of 2ilipino 'others and alien fathers if by the
laws of their father8s contry sch children are citizens of that contry;
@) Those who marr9 aliens i1 b9 the laws o1 the latter:s countr9 the 1ormer are
considered citizens) unless b9 their act or omission the9 are deemed to have
renounced 2hilippine citizenship.
(5ercado v. 5anzano, 0.1. ,o. 1@C43@, @4/ ?&1# D@4, 5ay D, 1... 85endoza:)
16. Does res 8udicata apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship?
Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in >udicial or
administrati(e proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res
>udicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of 5o9 ;a Lim ;ao
v. Commissioner o1 #mmigration (21 ?&1# . 81./1:). <e insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e." the principle of res
8udicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. <owe(er, in the
case of "urca v. Republic (C1 ?&1# 23 81./@:), an e1ception to this general rule was
recognized. The &ourt ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res 8udicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a personHs citizenship be raised as a 'aterial isse in a contro)ersy where said
person is a party;
) the Solicitor >eneral or his athorized representati)e too- acti)e part in the
resoltion thereof, and
5
@) the "nding on citizenship is a0r'ed by this Cort.
#lthough the general rule was set forth in the case of =oy Ja /i# Jao" the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. At elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent oMcial $ndings, though not really binding, to ma!e the eFort easier or
simpler. (*alles v. C45%L%C, @@/ ?&1# C2@, #ug. ., 444, 6n 7anc 8Purisima:)
5C5?EFIC 27EE?4F
15. =ay a uni$ersity $alidly re$oGe a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after the
graduation of the latter after <nding that such degree or honor was o!tained through fraud?
Held: An Earcia $. 1aculty (d#ission 2o##ittee" /oyola &chool of Theology %6> &2'( 255
A175)B+" the ?& pointed out that acade'ic freedo' of instittions of higher learning is a
freedo' granted to Ainstittions of higher learningB which is ths gi)en a Awide
sphere of athority certainly e1tending to the choice of stdents3B If sch instittion
of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot stdy in it. it certainly can also
deter'ine on who' it can confer the honor and distinction of being its gradates.
Chere it is shown that the confer'ent of an honor or distinction was obtained
throgh frad. a ni)ersity has the right to re)o-e or withdraw the honor or distinction
it has ths conferred3 This freedo' of a ni)ersity does not ter'inate pon the
AgradationB of a stdent. for it is precisely the AgradationB of sch a stdent that is
in !estion.
(<2 "oard o1 Regents v. $on. Court o1 Appeals and Aro=iaswam9 >illiam 5argaret
Celine, 0.1. ,o. 1@2DC, #ug. @1, 1...,
nd
Gi(. 85endoza:)
1>. What are the essential freedo#s su!su#ed in the ter# 9acade#ic freedo#:?
Held: An Ateneo de 5anila <niversit9 v. Capulong (0.1. ,o. ..@/, / 5ay 1..@), this
&ourt cited with appro(al the formulation made by Eustice +eli% +ran!furter of the essential
freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom) encompassing not only Athe freedo' to
deter'ine 1 1 1 on acade'ic gronds who 'ay teach. what 'ay be taght #and% how it
shall be taght.B bt li-ewise Awho 'ay be ad'itted to stdy3B Ce ha)e ths
sanctioned its in)ocation by a school in re,ecting stdents who are acade'ically
delin!ent (&angonan v. 2ano" 1@/ ?&1# 2C 81.3C:), or a laywo'an see-ing ad'ission to
a se'inary (8arcia v. Lo9ola 'chool o1 &heolog9, D3 ?&1# // 81./C:), or students
violating ?'chool Rules on 3iscipline.) (Ateneo de 5anila <niversit9 v. Capulong" supra.)
(#sabelo) @r. v. 2erpetual $elp College o1 Rizal) #nc., / ?&1# C.C"C./, ,o(. 3, 1..@, 6n
7anc 8Bitug:)
27EE?4F 42 E6P7ESSI4N
1,1. Distinguish 9234TE4TC@(&ED 'E&T'02T034&: on free speech fro# 9234TE4TC4E.T'(/
'E&T'02T034&": and gi$e exa#ple of each.
Held: Content=based restrictions are i'posed becase of the content of the
speech and are. therefore. sb,ect to the clear=and=present danger test. +or e%ample, a
rule such as that in(ol(ed in Sanidad )3 Co'elec (131 ?&1# C. 81..4:), prohibiting
col'nists. co''entators. and annoncers fro' ca'paigning either for or against an
isse in a plebiscite 'st ha)e co'pelling reason to spport it. or it will not pass
'ster nder strict scrtiny3 These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a
hea)y pres'ption of constittional in)alidity3 In addition. they will be tested for
possible o)erbreadth and )ageness.
Content=netral restrictions, on the other hand, li!e Sec3 $$#b% of 7353 No3 DD+D,
which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air ti'e to political candidates
dring the ca'paign period. are not concerned with the content of the speech3 These
reglations need only a sbstantial go)ern'ental interest to spport the'3 5
deferential standard of re)iew will s0ce to test their )alidity3 The clear=and=present
danger rle is inappropriate as a test for deter'ining the constittional )alidity of
laws. li-e Sec3 $$#b% of 7353 No3 DD+D. which are not concerned with the content of
political ads bt only with their incidents. To apply the clear"and"present danger test to such
regulatory measures would be li!e using a sledgehammer to dri(e a nail when a regular hammer
is all that is needed.
The TEST for this diFerence in the le(el of >usti$cation for the restriction of speech is that
content=based restrictions distort pblic debate. ha)e i'proper 'oti)ation. and are
sally i'posed becase of fear of how people will react to a particlar speech3 No
sch reasons nderlie content=netral reglations. li-e reglation of ti'e. place and
'anner of holding pblic asse'blies nder /3P3 /lg3 GGE. the Pblic 5sse'bly 5ct of
$HG;.
6
(4smena v. C45%L%C, 33 ?&1# 22/, 5arch @1, 1..3 85endoza:)
1,2. Does the conduct of exit poll !y (@& 2@4 present a clear and present danger of destroying
the credi!ility and integrity of the electoral process as it has the tendency to sow confusion
considering the rando#ness of selecting inter$iewees" which further #aGes the exit poll highly
unrelia!le" to 8ustify the pro#ulgation of a 2o#elec resolution prohi!iting the sa#e?
Held: ?uch arguments are purely speclati)e and clearly ntenable. 10'&T" by the
)ery natre of a sr)ey. the inter)iewees or participants are selected at 75N?4F . so
that the reslts will as 'ch as possible be representati)e or reIecti)e of the general
senti'ent or )iew of the co''nity or grop polled. &E234D" the sr)ey reslt is not
'eant to replace or be at par with the o0cial Co'elec cont3 It consists 'erely of the
opinion of the polling grop as to who the electorate in general has probably )oted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled indi(iduals. 104(//J" not at sta-e are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections. which are e1ercises that are separate and
independent fro' the e1it polls3 The holding and the reporting of the reslts of e1it
polls cannot nder'ine those of the elections. since the for'er is only part of the
latter3 If at all. the otco'e of one can only be indicati)e of the other.
The C4FE<EC8s concern with the possible nonco''nicati)e e*ect of e1it polls J
disorder and confsion in the )oting centers J does not ,stify a total ban on the'3
:ndobtedly. the assailed Co'elec 7esoltion is too broad. since its application is
withot !ali"cation as to whether the polling is disrpti)e or not3 There is no
showing. howe)er. that e1it polls or the 'eans to inter)iew )oters case chaos in
)oting centers. ,either has any e(idence been presented pro(ing that the presence of e%it poll
reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the (oters.
Foreo)er. the prohibition incidentally pre)ents the collection of e1it poll data
and their se for any prpose3 The )alable infor'ation and ideas that cold be
deri)ed fro' the'. based on the )oters8 answers to the sr)ey !estions will fore)er
re'ain n-nown and ne1plored. =nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social
scientists and the electorate in general would be depri(ed of studies on the impact of current
e(ents and of election"day and other factors on (otersH choices.
The absolte ban i'posed by the Co'elec cannot. therefore. be ,sti"ed3 It
does not lea)e open any alternati)e channel of co''nication to gather the type of
infor'ation obtained throgh e1it polling3 4n the other hand. there are other )alid
and reasonable ways and 'eans to achie)e the Co'elec end of a)oiding or 'ini'izing
disorder and confsion that 'ay be broght abot by e1it sr)eys.
Lith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption
is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media
and the electorate. Nuite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, e%it polls K properly
conducted and publicized K can be (ital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and
credible elections; and for the elimination of election"$%ing, fraud and other electoral ills.
(A"'AC"N "roadcasting Corporation v. C45%L%C, 0.1. ,o. 1@@23D, Ean. 3, 444, 6n 7anc
8Panganiban:)
1,. 'ection .4 of R.A. No. .!!/ %6air %lection Act+ which pro$idesK 9&ur$eys aDecting
national candidates shall not !e pu!lished <fteen %1)+ days !efore an election and sur$eys
aDecting local candidates shall not !e pu!lished se$en %5+ days !efore an election.: The &ocial
Weather &tations" 0nc. %&W&+" a pri$ate nonCstocG" nonCpro<t social research institution conducting
sur$eys in $arious <eldsL and Ma#ahalan Pu!lishing 2orporation" pu!lisher of the =anila &tandard"
a newspaper of general circulation" which features newsworthy ite#s of infor#ation including
election sur$eys" challenged the constitutionality of aforesaid pro$ision as it constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedo# of speech without any clear and present danger to 8ustify
such restraint. &hould the challenge !e sustained?
Held: +or reason hereunder gi(en, we hold that Section ;3+ of R.A. No. .!!/
constitutes an nconstittional abridg'ent of freedo' of speech. e1pression. and the
press.
To be sure, ?ection C.2 lays a prior restraint on freedo' of speech. e1pression. and
the press by prohibiting the pblication of election sr)ey reslts a*ecting candidates
within the prescribed periods of "fteen #$;% days i''ediately preceding a national
election and se)en #9% days before a local election3 /ecase of the preferred stats of
the constittional rights of speech. e1pression. and the press. sch a 'easre is
)itiated by a weighty pres'ption of in)alidity3 Indeed. Aany syste' of prior restraints
of e1pression co'es to this Cort bearing a hea)y pres'ption against its
constittional )alidity 1 1 13 The >o)ern'ent Kths carries a hea)y brden of showing
,sti"cation for the enforce'ent of sch restraint.H) There is thus a re(ersal of the normal
presumption of (alidity that inheres in e(ery legislation.
,or may it be argued that because of Art. #BAC, Sec3 + of the Constitution, which gi(es
the &omelec super(isory power to regulate the en>oyment or utilization of franchise for the
7
operation of media of communication, no presumption of in(alidity attaches to a measure li!e ?ec.
C.2. 2or as we ha)e pointed ot in sstaining the ban on 'edia political
ad)ertise'ents. the grant of power to the Co'elec nder 5rt3 I6=C. Sec3 + is li'ited to
ensring A EL:5< 4PP47T:NITM. TIFE. SP5CE . and the 7I>HT T4 7EP<M B as well as
:NI247F and 7E5S4N5/<E 75TES 42 CH57>ES for the se of sch 'edia facilities for
Apblic infor'ation ca'paigns and for's a'ong candidates.)
I % %
,or can the ban on election sur(eys be >usti$ed on the ground that there are other
countries % % % which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election sur(eys. #t best
this sur(ey is inconclusi(e. At is noteworthy that in the =nited ?tates no restriction on the
publication of election sur(ey results e%ists. At cannot be argued that this is because the =nited
?tates is a mature democracy. ,either are there laws imposing an embargo on sur(ey results,
e(en for a limited period, in other countries. I % %.
Lhat TE&T should then be employed to deter'ine the constittional )alidity of
?ection C.2O The =nited ?tates ?upreme &ourt % % % held in <nited 'tates v. 4: "rienK
8#: go(ernment regulation is suMciently >usti$ed #$% if it is within the constittional
power of the go)ern'ent; #&% if it frthers an i'portant or sbstantial
go)ern'ental interest; #(% if the go)ern'ental interest is nrelated to the
sppression of free e1pression; and #+% if the incidental restriction on alleged
2irst 5'end'ent freedo's (of speech, e%pression and press) is no greater than is
essential to the frtherance of that interest (@.1 =.?. @D/, 4 -. 6d. d D., D34
81.D3: 8brac!eted numbers added:).
This is so far the 'ost inIential test for distingishing content=based fro'
content=netral reglations and is said to ha)e Abeco'e canonical in the re)iew of
sch laws.) At is noteworthy that the 3N @rien test has been applied by this &ourt in at least two
cases (Adiong v. Comelec, 4/ ?&1# /1 81..:; 4smena v. Comelec, supra.).
:nder this test. e)en if a law frthers an i'portant or sbstantial go)ern'ental
interest. it shold be in)alidated if sch go)ern'ental interest is Anot nrelated to the
sppression of free e1pression3B Foreo)er. e)en if the prpose is nrelated to the
sppression of free speech. the law shold ne)ertheless be in)alidated if the
restriction on freedo' of e1pression is greater than is necessary to achie)e the
go)ern'ental prpose in !estion.
*ur inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to ?ec. C.2.
10'&T. Sec3 ;3+ fails to 'eet criterion #(% of the 48 /rien test becase the casal
connection of e1pression to the asserted go)ern'ental interest 'a-es sch interest
Anot nrelated to the sppression of free e1pression.) @y prohi!iting the pu!lication of
election sur$ey results !ecause of the possi!ility that such pu!lication #ight under#ine the
integrity of the election" &ec. )., actually suppresses a whole class of expression" while allowing
the expression of opinion concerning the sa#e su!8ect #atter !y newspaper colu#nists" radio
and TF co##entators" ar#chair theorists" and other opinion #aGers. 0n eDect" &ec. )., shows a
!ias for a particular su!8ect #atter" if not $iewpoint" !y preferring personal opinion to statistical
results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of e%pression means that 'the go)ern'ent
has no power to restrict e1pression becase of its 'essage. its ideas. its sb,ect
'atter. or its contents.) The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the e%pression falls
within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplins=9 v. New $ampshire (@1C
=.?. CD3, C/1"C/, 3D -. 6d. 14@1, 14@C 81.2:), thus:
There are certain well"de$ned and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
pre(ention and punishment of which ha(e ne(er been thought to raise any &onstitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelos, and the
inslting or K"ghting8 words K those which by their )ery tterance inIict in,ry or
tend to incite an i''ediate breach of the peace. 8?:uch utterances are no essential
part of any e%position of ideas, and are of such slight social (alue as a step to truth that
any bene$t that may be deri(ed from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
,or is there >usti$cation for the prior restraint which ?ec. C.2 lays on protected speech. An
Near v. 5innesota (3@ =.?. D./, /1C"/1D, /C l. 6d. 1@C/, 1@D/ 81.@1:), it was held:
NTOhe protection e)en as to pre)ios restraint is not absoltely nli'ited3 /t
the li'itation has been recognized only in e1ceptional cases 1 1 1. ,o one would
question but that a go(ernment might pre(ent actual obstruction to its recruiting ser(ice or
the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. 4n
si'ilar gronds. the pri'ary re!ire'ents of decency 'ay be enforced against
obscene pblications3 The secrity of the co''nity life 'ay be protected
against incite'ents to acts of )iolence and the o)erthrow by force of orderly
go)ern'ent 1 1 1.
8
Ths. 1 1 1 the prohibition i'posed by Sec3 ;3+ cannot be ,sti"ed on the grond
that it is only for a li'ited period and is only incidental3 The prohibition 'ay be for a
li'ited ti'e. bt the crtail'ent of the right of e1pression is direct. absolte. and
sbstantial3 It constittes a total sppression of a category of speech and is not 'ade
less so becase it is only for a period of "fteen #$;% days i''ediately before a national
election and se)en #9% days i''ediately before a local election.
This suMciently distinguishes ?ec. C.2 from 1.#. ,o. DD2D, ?ec. 11(b), which this &ourt
found to be (alid in 4ational Press 2lu! $. 2o#elec %supra.+" and 3s#ena $. 2o#elec %supra.+. +or
the ban imposed by 1.#. ,o. DD2D, ?ec. 11(b) is not only authorized by a speci$c constitutional
pro(ision %(rt. 0OC2" &ec. ,+" but it also pro(ided an alternati(e so that, as this &ourt pointed out in
3s#ena" there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media ad(ertisements by the
&omelec space, and &omelec hour.
&E234D. E)en if the go)ern'ental interest soght to be pro'oted is nrelated
to the sppression of speech and the reslting restriction of free e1pression is only
incidental. Sec3 ;3+ nonetheless fails to 'eet criterion #+% of the 48 /rien test. na'ely.
that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to frther the go)ern'ental
interest3 5s already stated. Sec3 ;3+ ai's at the pre)ention of last='inte pressre on
)oters. the creation of bandwagon e*ect. A,n-ingB of wea- or AlosingB candidates.
and resort to the for' of election cheating called Adagdag=bawas3B Praiseworthy as
these ai's of the reglation 'ight be. they cannot be attained at the sacri"ce of the
fnda'ental right of e1pression. when sch ai' can be 'ore narrowly prsed by
P:NISHIN> :N<5C2:< 5CTS . 75THE7 TH5N SPEECH becase of apprehension that
sch speech creates the danger of sch e)ils. Thus, under the Administrative Code o1
+.77 (7!. B, Tit. A, ?ubtit. &, &h 1, ?ec. @81:), the Co'elec is gi)en the power:
To stop any illegal acti(ity, or con$scate, tear down, and stop any nlawfl.
libelos. 'isleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restricti(e means than the prohibition contained in ?ec. C.2. Pursuant
to this power of the &omelec, it can con$scate bogus sur(ey results calculated to mislead (oters.
&andidates can ha(e their own sur(eys conducted. ,o right of reply can be in(o!ed by others. ,o
principle of equality is in(ol(ed. At is a free mar!et to which each candidate brings his ideas. #s
for the purpose of the law to pre(ent bandwagon eFects, it is doubtful whether the 0o(ernment
can deal with this natural"enough tendency of some (oters. ?ome (oters want to be identi$ed
with the 'winners.) ?ome are susceptible to the herd mentality. &an these be legitimately
prohibited by suppressing the publication of sur(ey results which are a form of e%pressionO At has
been held that '8mere: legislati(e preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public con(enience
may well support regulation directed at other personal acti(ities, but be insuMcient to >ustify such
as diminishes the e%ercise of rights so (ital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.)
To summarize then, we hold that Sec3 ;3+ is in)alid becase #$% it i'poses a prior
restraint on the freedo' of e1pression, #&% it is a direct and total sppression of a
category of e1pression e)en thogh sch sppression is only for a li'ited period, and
#(% the go)ern'ental interest soght to be pro'oted can be achie)ed by 'eans other
than the sppression of freedo' of e1pression.
('ocial >eather 'tations) #nc.) v. C45%L%C, 0.1. ,o. 12/C/1, 5ay C, 441, 6n 7anc
85endoza:)
1,,. Discuss the PD32T'04E 31 1(0' 23==E4TP as a $alid defense in an action for li!el or
slander.
Held: 2air co''entaries on 'atters of pblic interest are pri)ileged and
constitte a )alid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general e(ery discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because e(ery man is presumed innocent until his guilt is >udicially pro(ed, and e(ery false
imputation is deemed malicious, ne(ertheless, when the discreditable i'ptation is directed
against a pblic person in his pblic capacity. it is not necessarily actionable3 In order
that sch discreditable i'ptation to a pblic o0cial 'ay be actionable. it 'st either
be a false allegation of fact or a co''ent based on a false spposition3 If the
co''ent is an e1pression of opinion. based on established facts. then it is i''aterial
that the opinion happens to be 'ista-en. as long as it 'ight reasonably be inferred
fro' the facts.
("orjal v. CA, @41 ?&1# 1, Ean. 12, 1...,
nd
Gi(. 87ellosillo:)
1,). What is the 9raison dNetre: for the 4ew JorG Ti#es $. &ulli$an (@/D =? C2) holding that
honest criticis#s on the conduct of pu!lic oHcials and pu!lic <gures are insulated fro# li!el
8udg#ents?
Held: The garantees of freedo' of speech and press prohibit a pblic o0cial or
pblic "gre fro' reco)ering da'ages for a defa'atory falsehood relating to his
o0cial condct nless he pro)es that the state'ent was 'ade with actal 'alice. i3e3.
with -nowledge that it was false or with rec-less disregard of whether it was false or
not.
9
The raison dHetre for the ,ew Jor! Times doctrine was that to re!ire critics of o0cial
condct to garantee the trth of all their factal assertions on pain of libel ,dg'ents
wold lead to self=censorship. since wold=be critics wold be deterred fro' )oicing
ot their criticis's e)en if sch were belie)ed to be tre. or were in fact tre. becase
of dobt whether it cold be pro)ed or becase of fear of the e1pense of ha)ing to
pro)e it.
("orjal v. CA, @41 ?&1# 1, Ean. 12, 1...,
nd
Gi(. 87ellosillo:)
1,6. Who is a 9pu!lic <gure": and therefore su!8ect to pu!lic co##ent?
Held: 8L:e deem pri(ate respondent a public $gure within the pur(iew of the 4ew JorG
Ti#es ruling. #t any rate, we ha(e also de$ned 'public $gure) in A9ers 2roduction 2t9.) Ltd. v.
Capulong (0.1. ,os. 3@34 and 3@.3, . #pril 1.33, 1D4 ?&1# 3D1) as K
I % % a person who. by his acco'plish'ents. fa'e. 'ode of li)ing. or by
adopting a profession or calling which gi)es the pblic a legiti'ate interest in
his doings. his a*airs and his character. has beco'e a Kpblic personage8. <e is,
in other words, a celebrity. *b(iously, to be included in this category are those who ha(e
achie(ed some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is,
howe(er, broader than this. At includes public oMcers, famous in(entors and e%plorers, war
heroes and e(en ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the 0reat
6%alted 1uler of the lodge. It incldes. in short. anyone who has arri)ed at a
position where the pblic attention is focsed pon hi' as a person.
The 142/T %1irst 4ational 2onference on /and Transportation+ was an undertaGing infused
with pu!lic interest. 0t was pro#oted as a 8oint pro8ect of the go$ern#ent and the pri$ate sector"
and organized !y top go$ern#ent oHcials and pro#inent !usiness#en. 1or this reason" it
attracted #edia #ileage and drew pu!lic attention not only to the conference itself !ut to the
personalities !ehind as well. (s its Executi$e Director and spoGes#an" pri$ate respondent
consequently assu#ed the status of a pu!lic <gure.
/t e)en ass'ing e1=gratia arg'enti that pri)ate respondent. despite the
position he occpied in the 2NC<T. wold not !alify as a pblic "gre. it does not
necessarily follow that he cold not )alidly be the sb,ect of a pblic co''ent e)en if
he was not a pblic o0cial or at least a pblic "gre. for he cold be. as long as he was
in)ol)ed in a pblic isse3 If a 'atter is a sb,ect of pblic or general interest. it
cannot sddenly beco'e less so 'erely becase a pri)ate indi)idal is in)ol)ed or
becase in so'e sense the indi)idal did not )olntarily choose to beco'e in)ol)ed3
The pblic8s pri'ary interest is in the e)entP the pblic focs is on the condct of the
participant and the content. e*ect and signi"cance of the condct. not the
participant8s prior anony'ity or notoriety. ("orjal v. CA, @41 ?&1# 1, Ean. 12,
1...,
nd
Gi(. 87ellosillo:)
1,5. The 3Hce of the =ayor of /as Pinas refused to issue per#it to petitioners to hold rally a
rally in front of the Qustice ;all of /as Pinas on the ground that it was prohi!ited under &upre#e
2ourt En @anc 'esolution dated Quly 5"177> in (.=. 4o. 7>C5C*2C&2" entitled" P'eK Euidelines on
the 2onduct of De#onstrations" PicGets" 'allies and 3ther &i#ilar Eatherings in the Ficinity of the
&upre#e 2ourt and (ll 3ther 2ourts.P Petitioners thus initiated the instant proceedings. They
su!#it that the &upre#e 2ourt gra$ely a!used its discretion andRor acted without or in excess of
8urisdiction in pro#ulgating those guidelines.
Held: Le shall $rst dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the rules
constitute an abridgment of the peoplePs aggregate rights of free speech, free e%pression,
peaceful assembly and petitioning go(ernment for redress of grie(ances citing ?ec. 2, #rticle AAA of
the 1.3/ &onstitution that Qno law shall be passed abridgingQ them.
At is true that the safeguarding of the peoplePs freedom of e%pression to the end that
indi(iduals may spea! as they thin! on matters (ital to them and that falsehoods may be e%posed
through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free go(ernment. /t freedo'
of speech and e1pression despite its indispensability has its li'itations3 It has ne)er
been nderstood as the absolte right to spea- whene)er. howe)er. and where)er one
pleases. for the 'anner. place. and ti'e of pblic discssion can be constittionally
controlled3 NTOhe better policy is not liberty nta'ed bt liberty reglated by law
where e)ery freedo' is e1ercised in accordance with law and with de regard for the
rights of others.
&on(entional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a comple% society preclde an
absoltist interpretation of freedo' of e1pression where it does not in)ol)e pre
speech bt speech pls physical actions li-e pic-eting3 There are other signi"cant
societal )ales that 'st be acco''odated and when they clash. they 'st all be
weighed with the pro'otion of the general welfare of the people as the lti'ate
ob,ecti)e3 In balancing these )ales. this Cort has accorded freedo' of e1pression a
preferred position in light of its 'ore co'parati)e i'portance. <ence, our rulings now
10
musty in years hold that only the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are
speci$cally tailored to ser(e an important go(ernmental interest may >ustify the application of the
balancing of interests test in derogation of the peoplePs right of free speech and e%pression.
Chere said reglations do not ai' particlarly at the e)ils within the allowable areas
of state control bt. on the contrary. sweep within their a'bit other acti)ities as to
operate as an o)erhanging threat to free discssion. or where pon their face they are
so )age. inde"nite. or ine1act as to per'it pnish'ent of the fair se of the right of
free speech. sch reglations are )oid.
Prescinding fro' this pre'ise. the Cort reiterates that ,dicial independence
and the fair and orderly ad'inistration of ,stice constitte para'ont go)ern'ental
interests that can ,stify the reglation of the pblicQs right of free speech and
peacefl asse'bly in the )icinity of corthoses. An the case of #n Re0 %mil 2. @urado, the
&ourt pronounced in no uncertain terms that:
Q% % % freedo' of e1pression needs on occasion to be ad,sted to and
acco''odated with the re!ire'ents of e!ally i'portant pblic interests3 4ne
of these fnda'ental pblic interests is the 'aintenance of the integrity and
orderly fnctioning of the ad'inistration of ,stice3 There is no antino'y
between free e1pression and the integrity of the syste' of ad'inistering
,stice3 2or the protection and 'aintenance of freedo' of e1pression itself can
be secred only within the conte1t of a fnctioning and orderly syste' of
dispensing ,stice. within the conte1t. in other words. of )iable independent
instittions for deli)ery of ,stice which are accepted by the general co''nity.
% % %Q (#n Re0 %mil 2. @urado, 2@ ?&1# .., @@"@2 81..C:)
It is sadly obser)ed that ,dicial independence and the orderly ad'inistration of
,stice ha)e been threatened not only by conte'ptos acts inside. bt also by
irascible de'onstrations otside. the corthoses3 They wittingly or nwittingly. spoil
the ideal of sober. non=partisan proceedings before a cold and netral ,dge. 6(en in
the =nited ?tates, a prohibition against pic!eting and demonstrating in or near courthouses has
been ruled as (alid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting eFect on the e%ercise by the
public of their liberties. I % %
The ad'inistration of ,stice 'st not only be fair bt 'st also 5PPE57 to be
fair and it is the dty of this Cort to eli'inate e)erything that will di'inish if not
destroy this ,dicial desiderat'. To be sure, there will be grie(ances against our >ustice
system for there can be no perfect system of >ustice but these grie(ances must be (entilated
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. Sch a 'ode is in -eeping with the
respect de to the corts as )essels of ,stice and is necessary if ,dges are to dispose
their bsiness in a fair fashion3 It is the traditional con)iction of e)ery ci)ilized society
that corts 'st be inslated fro' e)ery e1traneos inIence in their decisions3 The
facts of a case shold be deter'ined pon e)idence prodced in cort. and shold be
ninIenced by bias. pre,dice or sy'pathies. (#n Re0 2etition to Annul %n "anc
Resolution A.5. .7A7A!(A'C A Ricardo C. *almonte and <nion o1 Law9ers and Advocates
1or &ransparenc9 in 8overnment C<LA&D, 0.1. ,o. 1@2D1, ?ept. ., 1..3)
1,>. Did the &upre#e 2ourt co##it an act of 8udicial legislation in pro#ulgating En @anc
'esolution (.=. 7>C5C*2C&2" entitled" P'eK Euidelines on the 2onduct of De#onstrations" PicGets"
'allies and 3ther &i#ilar Eatherings in the Ficinity of the &upre#e 2ourt and (ll 3ther 2ourts?P
Held: Petitioners also claim that this &ourt committed an act of >udicial legislation in
promulgating the assailed resolution. They charge that this &ourt amended pro(isions of 7atas
Pambansa (7.P.) 7lg. 334, otherwise !nown as Qthe Public #ssembly #ct,Q by con(erting the
sidewal!s and streets within a radius of two hundred (44) meters from e(ery courthouse from a
public forum place into a Qno rallyQ zone. Thus, they accuse this &ourt of % % % (iolating the
principle of separation of powers.
Le re>ect these low watts arguments. Public places historically associated with the free
e%ercise of e%pressi(e acti(ities, such as streets, sidewal!s, and par!s, are considered, without
#ore, to be public fora. In other words. it is not any law that can i'be sch places with
the pblic natre inherent in the'3 /t e)en in sch pblic fora. it is settled
,risprdence that the go)ern'ent 'ay restrict speech pls acti)ities and enforce
reasonable ti'e. place. and 'anner reglations as long as the restrictions are #$%
content=netral. #&% are narrowly tailored to ser)e a signi"cant go)ern'ental interest.
and #(% lea)e open a'ple alternati)e channels of co''nication.
Contrary therefore to petitioners8 i'pression. /3P3 /lg3 GGE did not establish
streets and sidewal-s. a'ong other places. as pblic fora3 5 close loo- at the law will
re)eal that it in fact prescribes reasonable ti'e. place. and 'anner reglations. Thus,
it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places sub>ect, e(en, to
the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting
of the parade or street march, to limit the (olume of loud spea!ers or sound system and to
prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly.
11
The e1istence of /3P3 /lg3 GGE. howe)er. does not preclde this Cort fro'
pro'lgating rles reglating condct of de'onstrations in the )icinity of corts to
assre or people of an i'partial and orderly ad'inistration of ,stice as 'andated by
the Constittion3 To inslate the ,diciary fro' 'ob pressre. friendly or otherwise.
and isolate it fro' pblic hysteria. this Cort 'erely 'o)ed away the sits of 'ass
actions within a &EE='eter radis fro' e)ery corthose3 In "ne. /3P3 /lg3 GGE
i'poses general restrictions to the ti'e. place and 'anner of condcting concerted
actions3 4n the other hand. the resoltion of this Cort reglating de'onstrations
adds speci"c restrictions as they in)ol)e ,dicial independence and the orderly
ad'inistration of ,stice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory
measures. ?imply put, /3P3 /lg3 GGE and the assailed resoltion co'ple'ent each other.
Le so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conRict between a court rule
and a statutory pro(ision should be harmonized and both should be gi(en eFect if possible.
(#n Re0 2etition to Annul %n "anc Resolution A.5. .7A7A!(A'C A Ricardo C.
*almonte and <nion o1 Law9ers and Advocates 1or &ransparenc9 in 8overnment C<LA&D,
0.1. ,o. 1@2D1, ?ept. ., 1..3)
1,7. &hould li$e #edia co$erage of court proceedings !e allowed?
Held: The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record,
or photograph court proceedings in(ol(es weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, on the one hand, and
on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional
power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial
administration of >ustice. &ollaterally, it also raises issues on the nature of the media, particularly
tele(ision and its role in society, and of the impact of new technologies on law.
The records of the &onstitutional &ommission are bereft of discussion regarding the sub>ect
of cameras in the courtroom. ?imilarly, Philippine courts ha(e not had the opportunity to rule on
the question squarely.
Lhile we ta!e notice of the ?eptember 1..4 report of the =nited ?tates Eudicial &onference
#d <oc &ommittee on &ameras in the &ourtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the +ederal
&ourts of the =nited ?tates prohibits the presence of tele(ision cameras in criminal trials. 7le
;( of the 2ederal 7les of Cri'inal Procedre forbids the ta-ing of photographs dring
the progress of ,dicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of sch proceedings fro'
the cortroo'3 5 trial of any -ind or in any cort is a 'atter of serios i'portance to
all concerned and shold not be treated as a 'eans of entertain'ent3 To so treat it
depri)es the cort of the dignity which pertains to it and departs fro' the orderly and
serios !est for trth for which or ,dicial proceedings are for'lated.
&ourts do not discriminate against radio and tele(ision media by forbidding the
broadcasting or tele(ising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom, since a tele(ision or news reporter has the same pri(ilege, as the news reporter is not
permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
An %stes v. &eEas (@31 =.?. C@), the =nited ?tates ?upreme &ourt held that tele)ision
co)erage of ,dicial proceedings in)ol)es an inherent denial of de process rights of a
cri'inal defendant. Boting C"2, the &ourt through 5r. Eustice &lar!, identi$ed for #+% areas of
potential pre,dice which 'ight arise fro' the i'pact of the ca'eras on the ,ry.
witnesses. the trial ,dge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
Q6%perience li!ewise has established the pre>udicial eFect of telecasting on
witnesses. #$% Citnesses 'ight be frightened. play to the ca'era. or beco'e
ner)os3 They are sb,ect to e1traordinary ot=of=cort inIences which 'ight
a*ect their testi'ony. #lso, #&% telecasting not only increases the trial ,dgeQs
responsibility to a)oid actal pre,dice to the defendantP it 'ay as well a*ect his
own perfor'ance3 Rdges are h'an beings also and are sb,ect to the sa'e
psychological reactions as lay'en. #(% 2or the defendant. telecasting is a for'
of 'ental harass'ent and sb,ects hi' to e1cessi)e pblic e1posre and
distracts hi' fro' the e*ecti)e presentation of his defense.
QThe tele)ision ca'era is a powerfl weapon which intentionally or
inad)ertently can destroy an accsed and his case in the eyes of the pblic.Q
1epresentati(es of the press ha(e no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to
compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporterPs
constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Fassi)e
intrsion of representati)es of the news 'edia into the trial itself can so alter or
destroy the constittionally necessary ,dicial at'osphere and decor' that the
re!ire'ents of i'partiality i'posed by de process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or lea(es the courtroom.
Considering the pre,dice it poses to the defendantQs right to de process as
well as to the fair and orderly ad'inistration of ,stice. and considering frther that
12
the freedo' of the press and the right of the people to infor'ation 'ay be ser)ed and
satis"ed by less distracting. degrading and pre,dicial 'eans. li)e radio and tele)ision
co)erage of cort proceedings shall not be allowed. Bideo footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the >udicial oMcers, the
parties and their counsel ta!en prior to the commencement of oMcial proceedings. ,o (ideo shots
or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. ('upreme Court %n
"anc Resolution Re0 Live &* and Radio Coverage o1 the $earing o1 2resident Corazon C.
AFuinoGs Libel Case, dated *ct. , 1..1)
1)*. &hould the 2ourt allow li$e #edia co$erage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
cri#inal cases <led against for#er President Qoseph E. Estrada !efore the &andigan!ayan in order
9to assure the pu!lic of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our
history: as requested !y the Mapisanan ng #ga @rodGaster ng Pilipinas?
Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition in)ol)e the
weighing ot of the constittional garantees of freedo' of the press and the right to
pblic infor'ation. on the one hand. and the fnda'ental rights of the accsed. on the
other hand. along with the constittional power of a cort to control its proceedings in
ensring a fair and i'partial trial3
Chen these rights race against one another. ,risprdence tells s that the right
of the accsed 'st be preferred to win.
Cith the possibility of losing not only the precios liberty bt also the )ery life
of an accsed. it behoo)es all to 'a-e absoltely certain that an accsed recei)es a
)erdict solely on the basis of a ,st and dispassionate ,dg'ent. a )erdict that wold
co'e only after the presentation of credible e)idence testi"ed to by nbiased
witnesses nswayed by any -ind of pressre. whether open or sbtle. in proceedings
that are de)oid of histrionics that 'ight detract fro' its basic ai' to ferret )eritable
facts free fro' i'proper inIence. and decreed by a ,dge with an npre,diced 'ind.
nbridled by rnning e'otions or passions.
Gue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
pro(ed in a trial that is not lifted abo(e its indi(idual settings nor made an ob>ect of publicHs
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or inRuence but
only by e(idence and argument gi(en in open court, where $tting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
Litnesses and >udges may (ery well be men and women of fortitude, able to thri(e in
hardy climate, with e(ery reason to presume $rmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must
also be conceded that 'tele(ision can wor! profound changes in the beha(ior of the people it
focuses on.) E)en while it 'ay be di0clt to !antify the inIence. or pressre that
'edia can bring to bear on the' directly and throgh the shaping of pblic opinion. it
is a fact. nonetheless. that. indeed. it does so in so 'any ways and in )arying degrees3
The conscios or nconscios e*ect that sch co)erage 'ay ha)e on the testi'ony of
witnesses and the decision of ,dges cannot be e)alated bt. it can li-ewise be said.
it is not at all nli-ely for a )ote of gilt or innocence to yield to it3 It 'ight be farcical
to bild arond the' an i'pregnable ar'or against the inIence of the 'ost powerfl
'edia of pblic opinion .
To say that actual pre>udice should $rst be present would lea(e to near nir(ana the subtle
threats to >ustice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate
dispensation of >ustice can create. The eFect of tele(ision may escape the ordinary means of
proof, but it is not far"fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we
!now it now.
5n accsed has a right to a pblic trial bt it is a right that belongs to hi'. 'ore
than anyone else. where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance3 5 pblic
trial ai's to ensre that he is fairly dealt with and wold not be n,stly conde'ned
and that his rights are not co'pro'ised in secret concla)es of long ago3 5 pblic trial
is not synony'os with pblicized trialP it only i'plies that the cort doors 'st be
open to those who wish to co'e. sit in the a)ailable seats. condct the'sel)es with
decor' and obser)e the trial process. An the constitutional sense, a cortroo' shold
ha)e enogh facilities for a reasonable n'ber of the pblic to obser)e the
proceedings. not too s'all as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants fro' their proper fnctions. who shall then be totally free
to report what they ha)e obser)ed dring the proceedings.
The corts recognize the constittionally e'bodied freedo' of the press and the
right to pblic infor'ation3 It also appro)es of 'edia8s e1alted power to pro)ide the
'ost accrate and co'prehensi)e 'eans of con)eying the proceedings to the pblic
and in ac!ainting the pblic with the ,dicial process in actionP ne)ertheless. within
the corthose. the o)erriding consideration is still the para'ont right of the accsed
to de process which 'st ne)er be allowed to s*er di'intion in its constittional
proportions3 Rstice Clar- thsly prononced. Awhile a 'a1i'' freedo' 'st be
allowed the press in carrying ot the i'portant fnction of infor'ing the pblic in a
13
de'ocratic society. its e1ercise 'st necessarily be sb,ect to the 'aintenance of
5/S4<:TE fairness in the ,dicial process.)
I % %
The Antegrated 7ar of the Philippines % % % e%pressed its own concern on the li(e tele(ision
and radio co(erage of the criminal trials of 5r. 6strada; to paraphrase: -i(e tele(ision and radio
co(erage can negate the rule on e%clusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a
fair trial; at sta!e in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the (ery
credibility of the Philippine criminal >ustice system, and li(e tele(ision and radio co(erage of the
trial could allow the 'hooting throng) to arrogate unto themsel(es the tas! of >udging the guilt of
the accused, such that the (erdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and li(e
tele(ision and radio co(erage of the trial will not subser(e the ends of >ustice but will only pander
to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
I % %
=nli!e other go(ernment oMces, courts do not e%press the popular will of the people in any
sense which, instead, are tas!ed to only ad>udicate contro(ersies on the basis of what alone is
submitted before them. # trial is not a free trade of ideas. ,or is a competing mar!et of thoughts
the !nown test of truth in a courtroom. (Re0 ReFuest RadioA&* coverage o1 the &rial
in the 'andiganba9an o1 the 2lunder Cases against the 1ormer 2resident @oseph %.
%strada, #.5. ,o. 41"2"4@"?&, Eune ., 441, 6n 7anc 8Bitug:)
27EE?4F 42 7E<I>I4N
1)1. Discuss why the 8erona ruling (8ustifying the expulsion fro# pu!lic schools of children of
Qeho$ahNs Witnesses who refuse to salute the Iag and sing the national anthe# during Iag
cere#ony as prescri!ed !y the 1lag &alute /aw) should !e a!andoned.
Held: *ur tas! here is e%tremely diMcult, for the @4"year old decision of this court in
Eerona upholding the Rag salute law and appro(ing the e%pulsion of students who refuse to obey
it, is not lightly to be triRed with.
At is somewhat ironic howe(er, that after the Eerona ruling had recei(ed legislati(e cachet
by its incorporation in the #dministrati(e &ode of 1.3/, the present &ourt belie(es that the time
has come to ree%amine it. The idea that one 'ay be co'pelled to salte the Iag. sing the
national anthe'. and recite the patriotic pledge. dring a Iag cere'ony on pain of
being dis'issed fro' one8s ,ob or of being e1pelled fro' school. is alien to the
conscience of the present generation of 2ilipinos who ct their teeth on the /ill of
7ights which garantees their rights to free speech %The Iag salute" singing the national
anthe# and reciting the patriotic pledge are all for#s of utterances.+ and the free e1ercise of
religios profession and worship.
7eligios freedo' is a fnda'ental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the a'plest protection a'ong h'an rights. for it in)ol)es the relationship of 'an
to his Creator (&hief Eustice 6nrique 5. +ernandoHs separate opinion in 8erman v. "arangan,
1@C ?&1# C12, C@4"C@1).
'The right to religios profession and worship has a two=fold aspect. )iz3.
freedo' to belie)e and freedo' to act on one8s belief3 The "rst is absolte as
long as the belief is con"ned within the real' of thoght3 The second is sb,ect
to reglation where the belief is translated into e1ternal acts that a*ect the
pblic welfare) %Q. 2ruz" 2onstitutional /aw" 1771 Ed." pp. 156C155+.
Petitioners stress % % % that while they do not ta!e part in the compulsory Rag ceremony,
they do not engage in 'e%ternal acts) or beha(ior that would oFend their countrymen who belie(e
in e%pressing their lo(e of country through the obser(ance of the Rag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the Rag ceremony to show their respect for the rights of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. ?ince they do not engage in disrupti(e beha(ior,
there is no warrant for their e%pulsion.
'The sole ,sti"cation for a prior restraint or li'itation on the e1ercise of
religios freedo' (according to the late 2hief Qustice 2laudio TeehanGee in his dissenting
opinion in 8erman v. "arangan, 1@C ?&1# C12, C1/) is the e1istence of a gra)e and
present danger of a character both gra)e and i''inent. of a serios e)il to
pblic safety. pblic 'orals. pblic health or any other legiti'ate pblic interest.
that the State has a right #and dty% to pre)ent3B 5bsent sch a threat to pblic
safety. the e1plsion of the petitioners fro' the schools is not ,sti"ed.
The situation that the &ourt directly predicted in Eerona that:
'8T:he Rag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with
(ery few participants, and the time will come when we would ha(e citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with re(erence for the Rag and lo(e of country, admiration
for national heroes, and patriotism K a pathetic, e(en tragic situation, and all because a
14
small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
e%emption.)
has not come to pass. Ce are not persaded that by e1e'pting the Reho)ah8s Citnesses
fro' salting the Iag. singing the national anthe' and reciting the patriotic pledge.
this religios grop which ad'ittedly co'prises a As'all portion of the school
poplationB will sha-e p or part of the globe and sddenly prodce a nation
Antaght and ninclcated in and ni'bed with re)erence for the Iag. patriotis'.
lo)e of contry and ad'iration for national heroes3 5fter all. what the petitioners see-
only is e1e'ption fro' the Iag cere'ony. not e1clsion fro' the pblic schools where
they 'ay stdy the Constittion. the de'ocratic way of life and for' of go)ern'ent.
and learn not only the arts. sciences. Philippine history and cltre bt also recei)e
training for a )ocation or profession and be taght the )irtes of Apatriotis'. respect
for h'an rights. appreciation for national heroes. the rights and dties of citizenship.
and 'oral and spirital )ales %&ec. A2B" (rt. O0F" 17>5 2onstitution.+ as part of the curricula.
6%pelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the (ery situation that
this &ourt had feared in Eerona. +orcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law,
to participate in a ceremony that (iolates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conduci(e to lo(e of
country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
#s 5r. Eustice Eac!son remar!ed in >est *irginia v. "arnette, @1. =.?. D2 (1.2@):
'% % % To belie)e that patriotis' will not Iorish if patriotic cere'onies are
)olntary and spontaneos instead of a co'plsory rotine is to 'a-e an
nIattering state'ent of the appeal of or instittions to free 'inds3 1 1 1
Chen they #di)ersity% are so har'less to others or to the State as those we deal
with here. the price is not too great3 /t freedo' to di*er is not li'ited to
things that do not 'atter 'ch3 That wold be a 'ere shadow of freedo'3 The
test of its sbstance is the right to di*er as to things that toch the heart of the
e1isting order.)
'2rther'ore. let it be noted that coerced nity and loyalty e)en to the
contry. 1 1 1 J ass'ing that sch nity and loyalty can be attained throgh
coercion J is not a goal that is constittionally obtainable at the e1pense of
religios liberty3 5 desirable end cannot be pro'oted by prohibited 'eans.)
(5e9er v. Nebras=a, D =.?. @.4, D/ -. ed. 142, 142D)
5oreo(er, the e%pulsion of members of Eeho(ahHs Litnesses from the schools where they
are enrolled will )iolate their right as Philippine citizens. nder the $HG9 Constittion. to
recei)e free edcation, for it is the duty of the ?tate to 'protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education % % % and to ma!e such education accessible to all) %&ec. 1" (rt. O0F+.
An *ictoriano v. %lizalde Rope >or=ers: <nion, C. ?&1# C2, we upheld the e%emption
of members of the Aglesia ,i &risto, from the co(erage of a closed shop agreement between their
employer and a union because it would (iolate the teaching of their church not to >oin any labor
group:
'% % % It is certain that not e)ery conscience can be acco''odated by all
the laws of the landP bt when general laws conIict with scrples of conscience.
e1e'ptions oght to be granted nless so'e Kco'pelling state interests8
inter)enes. ('herbert v. "erner" @/2 =.?. @.3, 14 -. 6d. d .DC, ./4, 3@ ?. &t. 1/.4).)
Le hold that a similar e%emption may be accorded to the Eeho(ahHs Litnesses with regard
to the obser(ance of the Rag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, howe(er 'bizarre)
those beliefs may seem to others. ,e(ertheless, their right not to participate in the Rag ceremony
does not gi(e them a right to disrupt such patriotic e%ercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by
this &ourt in Non v. 3ames ##, 13C ?&1# C@, while the highest regard 'st be a*orded
their right to the free e1ercise of their religion. Athis shold not be ta-en to 'ean that
school athorities are powerless to discipline the'B if they shold co''it breaches of
the peace by actions that o*end the sensibilities. both religios and patriotic. of other
persons. Af they quietly stand at attention during the Rag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the Rag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose 'a gra(e and present danger of a
serious e(il to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest
that the ?tate has a right (and duty) to pre(ent.: (%bralinag v. &he 3ivision
'uperintendent o1 'chools o1 Cebu, 1. ?&1# CD, D."/@, 5arch 1, 1..@, 6n 7anc 80rino"
#quino:)
1)2. ( preAtaped TF progra# of the 0glesia 4i 2risto %042+ was su!#itted to the =T'2@ for
re$iew. The latter classi<ed it as 9rated O: !ecause it was shown to !e attacGing another religion.
The 042 protested !y clai#ing that its religious freedo# is per se !eyond re$iew !y the =T'2@.
&hould this contention !e upheld?
Held: The right to religios profession and worship has a two=fold aspect. viz.)
freedo' to belie)e and freedo' to act on oneQs belief3 The "rst is absolte as long as
15
the belief is con"ned within the real' of thoght3 The second is sb,ect to reglation
where the belief is translated into e1ternal acts that a*ect the pblic welfare.
The Iglesia Ni CristoQs postlate that its religios freedo' is per se beyond
re)iew by the FT7C/ shold be re,ected3 Its pblic broadcast on T@ of its religios
progra's brings it ot of the boso' of internal belief3 Tele)ision is a 'edi' that
reaches e)en the eyes and ears of children3 The e1ercise of religios freedo' can be
reglated by the State when it will bring abot the clear and present danger of a
sbstanti)e e)il which the State is dty=bond to pre)ent. i.e.) serios detri'ent to the
'ore o)erriding interest of pblic health. pblic 'orals. or pblic welfare3 5 laissez
1aire policy on the e1ercise of religion can be sedcti)e to the liberal 'ind bt history
consels the Cort against its blind adoption as religion is and contines to be a
)olatile area of concern in or society today. Q+or sure, we shall continue to sub>ect any act
pinching the space for the free e%ercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not lea(e
its rational e%ercise to the irrationality of man. +or when religion di(ides and its e%ercise destroys,
the ?tate should not stand still.Q (#glesia Ni Cristo v. CA, C. ?&1# C., Euly D, 1..D 8Puno:)
1). Did the =T'2@ act correctly when it rated 9O: the 0glesia 4i 2ristoSs preCtaped TF progra#
si#ply !ecause it was found to !e PattacGingP another religion?
Held: The FT7C/ 'ay disagree with the criticis's of other religions by the
Iglesia Ni Cristo bt that gi)es it no e1cse to interdict sch criticis's. howe)er
nclean they 'ay be3 :nder or constittional sche'e. it is not the tas- of the State
to fa)or any religion by protecting it against an attac- by another religion. 1eligious
dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preser(e peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the ?tate from leaning towards
any religion. *isAHAvis religios di*erences. the State en,oys no ban!et of options3
Netrality alone is its "1ed and i''o)able stance3 In "ne. the FT7C/ cannot s!elch
the speech of the INC si'ply becase it attac-s another religion. An a ?tate where there
ought to be no diFerence between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the
remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedroc! of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best ser(ed by encouraging the mar!etplace of dueling ideas. Lhen the lu%ury
of time permits, the mar!etplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for
it is the spar! of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.
(#glesia Ni Cristo v. CA, C. ?&1# C., Euly D, 1..D 8Puno:)
1),. 0s solicitation for the construction of a church co$ered !y P.D. 4o. 1)6, and" therefore"
punisha!le if done without the necessary per#it for solicitation fro# the D&WD?
Held: 10'&T. Solicitation of contribtions for the constrction of a chrch is not
solicitation for Scharitable or pblic welfare prposeS bt for a religios prpose. and a
religios prpose is not necessarily a charitable or pblic welfare prpose. # fund
campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not li!e fund dri(es for needy families or
(ictims of calamity or for the construction of a ci(ic center and the li!e. <i-e solicitation of
sbscription to religios 'agazines. it is part of the propagation of religios faith or
e)angelization3 Sch solicitation calls pon the )irte of faith. not of charity. sa)e as
those solicited for 'oney or aid 'ay not belong to the sa'e religion as the solicitor3
Sch solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as 'ch as the religios fer)or of
the person who is solicited for contribtion.
&E234D. The prpose of the ?ecree is to protect the pblic against frad in )iew
of the proliferation of fnd ca'paigns for charity and other ci)ic pro,ects3 4n the
other hand. since religios fnd dri)es are sally condcted a'ong those belonging
to the sa'e religion. the need for pblic protection against fradlent solicitations
does not e1ist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to
solicitations for charity or ci)ic pro,ects as to ,stify state reglation.
T;0'D. To re!ire a go)ern'ent per'it before solicitation for religios prpose
'ay be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free e1ercise of religion3 Sch
restraint. if allowed. 'ay well ,stify re!iring a per'it before a chrch can 'a-e
Snday collections or enforce tithing. 7ut in American "ible 'ociet9 v. Cit9 o1 5anila
(141 Phil. @3D 81.C/:), we precisely held that an ordinance re!iring pay'ent of a license
fee before one 'ay engage in bsiness cold not be applied to the appellantQs sale of
bibles becase that wold i'pose a condition on the e1ercise of a constittional right3
It is for the sa'e reason that religios rallies are e1e'pted fro' the re!ire'ent of
prior per'it for pblic asse'blies and other ses of pblic par-s and streets (7.P. 7lg.
334, ?ec. @8a:). To read the Gecree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for
religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it (iolates the +ree 6%ercise of 1eligion
&lause of the &onstitution % % %. (&oncurring *pinion, 5endoza, B.B., E., in Centeno v. *illalonA
2ornillos, @D ?&1# 1./, ?ept. 1, 1..2)
1)). What is a purely ecclesiastical aDair to which the &tate can not #eddle?
16
Held: #n E22/E&0(&T02(/ (11(0' is 'one that concerns doctrine. creed. or for' of
worship of the chrch. or the adoption and enforce'ent within a religios association
of needfl laws and reglations for the go)ern'ent of the 'e'bership. and the power
of e1clding fro' sch associations those dee'ed not worthy of 'e'bership.) 7ased
on this de$nition, an ecclesiastical aFair in)ol)es the relationship between the chrch and
its 'e'bers and relate to 'atters of faith. religios doctrines. worship and
go)ernance of the congregation. To be concrete, e%amples of this so"called ecclesiastical
aFairs to which the ?tate cannot meddle are proceedings for e%communication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other acti(ities with attached religious
signi$cance.
(2astor 3ionisio *. Austria v. NLRC, 0.1. ,o. 12@3, #ug. 1D, 1..., 1
st
Gi(. 89apunan:)
1)6. Petitioner is a religious #inister of the &e$enth Day (d$entist %&D(+. ;e was dis#issed
!ecause of alleged #isappropriation of deno#inational funds" willful !reach of trust" serious
#isconduct" gross and ha!itual neglect of duties and co##ission of an oDense against the person
of his e#ployerNs duly authorized representati$e. ;e <led an illegal ter#ination case against the
&D( !efore the la!or ar!iter. The &D( <led a #otion to dis#iss in$oGing the doctrine of
separation of 2hurch and &tate. &hould the #otion !e granted?
Held: Chere what is in)ol)ed is the relationship of the chrch as an e'ployer
and the 'inister as an e'ployee and has no relation whatsoe)er with the practice of
faith. worship or doctrines of the chrch, i.e." the minister was not e%communicated or
e%pelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from employment, it is a
prely seclar a*air3 Conse!ently. the sit 'ay not be dis'issed in)o-ing the
doctrine of separation of chrch and the state. (2astor 3ionisio *. Austria v.
NLRC, 0.1. ,o. 12@3, #ug. 1D, 1..., 1
st
Gi(. 89apunan:)
THE 7I>HT 42 THE PE4P<E T4 IN247F5TI4N 4N F5TTE7S 42 P:/<IC C4NCE7N
1)5. Discuss the scope of the right to infor#ation on #atters of pu!lic concern.
Held: An *almonte v. "elmonte) @r." the &ourt emphasized that the infor'ation
soght 'st be A'atters of pblic concern.B access to which 'ay be li'ited by law3
Si'ilarly. the state policy of fll pblic disclosre e1tends only to Atransactions
in)ol)ing pblic interestB and 'ay also be Asb,ect to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.) #s to the meanings of the terms 'pblic interest) and 'pblic concern,)
the &ourt, in Legaspi v. Civil 'ervice Commission" elucidated:
'An determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is
no rigid test which can be applied. SPblic concernH li!e Spblic interestH is a term that
eludes e%act de$nition. /oth ter's e'brace a broad spectr' of sb,ects which
the pblic 'ay want to -now. either becase these directly a*ect their li)es. or
si'ply becase sch 'atters natrally arose the interest of an ordinary citizen3
In the "nal analysis. it is for the corts to deter'ine on a case by case basis
whether the 'atter at isse is of interest or i'portance. as it relates to or
a*ects the pblic.)
&onsidered a public concern in the abo(e"mentioned case was the 'legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that go(ernment positions requiring ci(il ser(ice eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles.) ?o was the need to gi(e the general public adequate noti$cation of
(arious laws that regulate and aFect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tanada.
-i!ewise did the 'public nature of the loanable funds of the 0?A? and the public oMce held by the
alleged borrowers (members of the defunct 7atasang Pambansa)) qualify the information sought
in Fal#onte as matters of public interest and concern. An AFuinoA'armiento v. 5orato (4@
?&1# C1C, C"@, ,o(ember 1@, 1..1), the &ourt also held that o0cial acts of pblic o0cers
done in prsit of their o0cial fnctions are pblic in characterP hence. the records
pertaining to sch o0cial acts and decisions are within the a'bit of the constittional
right of access to public records.
=nder Republic Act No. /7+3, pblic o0cials and e'ployees are 'andated to
Apro)ide infor'ation on their policies and procedres in clear and nderstandable
langage. NandO ensre openness of infor'ation. pblic consltations and hearing
whene)er appropriate 1 1 1.B e1cept when Aotherwise pro)ided by law or when
re!ired by the pblic interest3B In particlar. the law 'andates free pblic access. at
reasonable hors. to the annal perfor'ance reports of o0ces and agencies of
go)ern'ent and go)ern'ent=owned or controlled corporationsP and the state'ents of
assets. liabilities and "nancial disclosres of all pblic o0cials and e'ployees.
In general. writings co'ing into the hands of pblic o0cers in connection with
their o0cial fnctions 'st be accessible to the pblic. consistent with the policy of
transparency of go)ern'ental a*airs3 This principle is ai'ed at a*ording the people
an opportnity to deter'ine whether those to who' they ha)e entrsted the a*airs of
the go)ern'ent are honestly. faithflly and co'petently perfor'ing their fnctions as
pblic ser)ants. =ndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free"Row of thought; but
thoughts and ideas must be well"informed so that the public would gain a better perspecti(e of
17
(ital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the aFairs of
the go(ernment in a responsible, reasonable and eFecti(e manner. &ertainly, it is by ensuring an
unfettered and uninhibited e%change of ideas among a well"informed public that a go(ernment
remains responsi(e to the changes desired by the people. (Chavez v. 2C88, .. ?&1# /22, Gec.
., 1..3, 8Panganiban:)
1)>. What are so#e of the recognized 'E&T'02T034& to the right of the people to infor#ation
on #atters of pu!lic concern?
Held:
1) National secrity 'atters and intelligence infor'ation. This >urisdiction
recognizes the common law holding that there is a go(ernmental pri(ilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters. <i-ewise. infor'ation on inter=go)ern'ent e1changes
prior to the conclsion of treaties and e1ecti)e agree'ents 'ay be sb,ect
to reasonable safegards for the sa-e of national interest;
) Trade or indstrial secrets (pursuant to the #ntellectual 2ropert9 Code 8R.A. No.
7(.3, appro(ed on Eune D, 1../: and other related laws) and ban-ing transactions
(pursuant to the 'ecrec9 o1 "an= 3eposits Act 8R.A. No. +4!, as amended:);
@) Cri'inal 'atters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of criminals, which corts 'ay not in!ire into prior to sch arrest.
detention and prosection;
2) 4ther con"dential infor'ation. The %thical 'tandards Act (R.A. No. /7+3,
enacted on +ebruary 4, 1.3.) further prohibits pblic o0cials and e'ployees
fro' sing or di)lging Acon"dential or classi"ed infor'ation o0cially -nown
to the' by reason of their o0ce and not 'ade a)ailable to the pblic.) (?ec.
/8c:, ibid.) *ther ac!nowledged limitations to information access include diplo'atic
correspondence. closed door Cabinet 'eetings and e1ecti)e sessions of
either hose of Congress. as well as the internal deliberations of the Spre'e
Cort.
(Chavez v. 2C88, .. ?&1# /22, Gec. ., 1..3 8Panganiban:)
1)7. 0s the alleged illCgotten wealth of the =arcoses a #atter of pu!lic concern su!8ect to this
right?
Held: Lith such pronouncements of our go(ernment, whose authority emanates from the
people, there is no doubt that the reco(ery of the 5arcosesP alleged ill"gotten wealth is a matter of
public concern and imbued with public interest. Le may also add that 'ill"gotten wealth) refers to
assets and properties prportedly ac!ired. directly or indirectly. by for'er President
Farcos. his i''ediate fa'ily. relati)es and close associates throgh or as a reslt of
their i'proper or illegal se of go)ern'ent fnds or propertiesP or their ha)ing ta-en
nde ad)antage of their pblic o0ceP or their se of powers. inIences or
relationships. Areslting in their n,st enrich'ent and casing gra)e da'age and
pre,dice to the 2ilipino people and the 7epblic of the Philippines3B Clearly. the
assets and properties referred to spposedly originated fro' the go)ern'ent itself3 To
all intents and prposes. therefore. they belong to the people3 5s sch. pon
recon)eyance they will be retrned to the pblic treasry. sb,ect only to the
satisfaction of positi)e clai's of certain persons as 'ay be ad,dged by co'petent
corts3 5nother declared o)erriding consideration for the e1peditios reco)ery of ill=
gotten wealth is that it 'ay be sed for national econo'ic reco)ery.
Le belie(e the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right
to respondentsP disclosure of any agreement that may be arri(ed at concerning the 5arcosesH
purported ill"gotten wealth. (Chavez v. 2C88, .. ?&1# /22, Gec. ., 1..3 8Panganiban:)
27EE?4F 42 5SS4CI5TI4N
16*. Does the right of ci$il ser$ants to organize include their right to striGe? 2larify.
Held: ?peci$cally, the right of ci(il ser(ants to organize themsel(es was positi(ely
recognized in Association o1 Court o1 Appeals %mplo9ees ,ACA%- v. 6errerACalleja (4@
?&1# C.D, ,o(ember 1C, 1..1). 7ut, as in the e%ercise of the rights of free e%pression and of
assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of
the association" the o(erriding considerations of national security and the preser(ation of
democratic institutions %People $. 1errer" ,> &2'( >2" Dece#!er 25" 1752" per 2astro" Q." where
the 2ourt" while upholding the $alidity of the (ntiC&u!$ersion (ct which outlawed the 2o##unist
Party of the Philippines and other Psu!$ersi$eP organizations" clari<ed" PWhate$er interest in
freedo# of speech and freedo# of association is infringed !y the prohi!ition against Gnowing
#e#!ership in the 2o##unist Party of the Philippines" is so indirect and so insu!stantial as to !e
clearly and hea$ily outweighed !y the o$erriding considerations of national security and the
preser$ation of de#ocratic institutions in this country.P 0t cautioned" though" that Pthe need for
prudence and circu#spection Acannot !e o$ere#phasizedB in Athe lawSsB enforce#ent" operating
as it does in the sensiti$e area of freedo# of expression and !elief.P+
18
5s regards the right to stri-e. the Constittion itself !ali"es its e1ercise with
the pro)iso Sin accordance with law3S This is a clear 'anifestation that the state 'ay.
by law. reglate the se of this right. or e)en deny certain sectors sch right.
%Eecutive 4rder No. +7! %0ssued !y for#er President 2orazon 2. (quino on Qune 1" 17>5+ which
pro(ides guidelines for the e%ercise of the right of go(ernment wor!ers to organize, for instance,
i'plicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circlar which Sen,oins nder pain of ad'inistrati)e
sanctions. all go)ern'ent o0cers and e'ployees fro' staging stri-es.
de'onstrations. 'ass lea)es. wal-ots and other for's of 'ass action which will
reslt in te'porary stoppage or disrption of pblic ser)iceQ (C'C 5emorandum
Circular No. /) s. +.77, dated #pril 1, 1.3/) by stating that the Ci)il Ser)ice law and
rles go)erning concerted acti)ities and stri-es in the go)ern'ent ser)ice shall be
obser)ed.
At is also settled in >urisprudence that, in general. wor-ers in the pblic sector do not
en,oy the right to stri-e. Alliance o1 Concerned 8overnment >or=ers v. 5inister o1
Labor and %mplo9ment (12 ?&1# 1, #ugust @, 1.3@, also per 0utierrez, Er., E.) rationalized the
proscription thus:
QThe general rle in the past and p to the present is that the Qter's and
conditions of e'ploy'ent in the >o)ern'ent. inclding any political sbdi)ision
or instr'entality thereof are go)erned by law3Q 6 1 13 Since the ter's and
conditions of go)ern'ent e'ploy'ent are IEed b9 law . go)ern'ent wor-ers
cannot se the sa'e weapons e'ployed by the wor-ers in the pri)ate sector to
secre concessions fro' their e'ployers3 The principle behind labor nionis' in
pri)ate indstry is that indstrial peace cannot be secred throgh co'plsion
by law3 7elations between pri)ate e'ployers and their e'ployees rest on an
essentially )olntary basis3 Sb,ect to the 'ini'' re!ire'ents of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation. the ter's and conditions of e'ploy'ent
in the nionized pri)ate sector are settled throgh the process of collecti)e
bargaining3 In go)ern'ent e'ploy'ent. howe)er. it is the legislatre and.
where properly gi)en delegated power. the ad'inistrati)e heads of go)ern'ent
which "1 the ter's and conditions of e'ploy'ent3 5nd this is e*ected throgh
stattes or ad'inistrati)e circlars. rles. and reglations. not throgh
collecti)e bargaining agree'ents.Q %0!id." p. 1+
#fter del(ing into the intent of the framers of the &onstitution, the &ourt aMrmed the
abo(e rule in 'ocial 'ecurit9 '9stem %mplo9ees Association ,'''%A- v. Court o1 Appeals
(1/C ?&1# D3D, Euly 3, 1.3.) and e%plained:
Q0o(ernment employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the &ongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which
are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate go(ernment agencies
for the impro(ement of those which are not $%ed by law. Af there be any unresol(ed
grie(ances, the dispute may be referred to the Public ?ector -abor"5anagement &ouncil for
appropriate action. /t e'ployees in the ci)il ser)ice 'ay not resort to stri-es.
wal-ots and other te'porary wor- stoppages. li-e wor-ers in the pri)ate
sector. to pressre the >o)ern'ent to accede to their de'ands. #s now pro(ided
under ?ec. 2, 1ule AAA of the 1ules and 1egulations to 0o(ern the 6%ercise of the 1ight of
0o(ernment 6mployees to ?elf"*rganization, which too! eFect after the instant dispute
arose, PNtOhe ter's and conditions of e'ploy'ent in the go)ern'ent. inclding
any political sbdi)ision or instr'entality thereof and go)ern'ent=owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are go)erned by law and
e'ployees therein shall not stri-e for the prpose of secring changes
NtheretoO3PP %0!id." p. 67>+
(@acinto v. Court o1 Appeals, 31 ?&1# DC/, ,o(. 12, 1../, 6n 7anc 8Panganiban:)
161. Petitioners pu!lic school teachers walGed out of their classes and engaged in #ass actions
during certain dates in &epte#!er 177* protesting the alleged unlawful withholding of their
salaries and other econo#ic !ene<ts. They also raised national issues" such as the re#o$al of .&
!ases and the repudiation of foreign de!ts" in their #ass actions. They refused to return to worG
despite orders to do so and su!sequently were found guilty of conduct pre8udicial to the !est
interests of the ser$ice for ha$ing a!sented the#sel$es without proper authority" fro# their
schools during regular school days" and penalized. They denied that they engaged in 9striGe: !ut
clai#ed that they #erely exercised a constitutionally guaranteed right T the right to peacea!ly
asse#!le and petition the go$ern#ent for redress of grie$ances C and" therefore" should not ha$e
!een penalized. &hould their contention !e upheld?
Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus go(ernment employees, do not
see! to establish that they ha(e a right to stri!e. 1ather, they tenaciously insist that their
absences during certain dates in ?eptember 1..4 were a (alid e%ercise of their constitutional right
to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the go(ernment for a redress of grie(ances. They
claim that their gathering was not a stri!e, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute
any oFense. 52'&A v. Laguio %&upra" per 4ar$asa" Q." now 2Q.+ and AC& v. Carino %0!id.+, in
which this &ourt declared that Qthese Pmass actionsP were to all intents and purposes a stri!e; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, wor! which it was the
19
teachersP duty to perform, underta!en for essentially economic reasons,Q should not principally
resol(e the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
&T'0ME, as de$ned by law, means an9 te'porary stoppage of wor- done by the
concerted action of e'ployees as a reslt of an indstrial or labor dispte . 5 labor
dispte incldes any contro)ersy or 'atter concerning ter's and conditions of
e'ploy'entP or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. "1ing.
'aintaining. changing or arranging the ter's and conditions of e'ploy'ent.
regardless of whether the disptants stand in the pro1i'ate relation of e'ployers and
e'ployees. Lith these premises, we now e(aluate the circumstances of the instant petition.
It cannot be denied that the 'ass action or asse'bly staged by the petitioners
reslted in the non=holding of classes in se)eral pblic schools dring the
corresponding period3 Petitioners do not dispte that the grie)ances for which they
soght redress concerned the alleged failre of pblic athorities = essentially. their
Se'ployersS = to flly and ,stly i'ple'ent certain laws and 'easres intended to
bene"t the' 'aterially 1 1 13 5nd probably to clothe their action with per'issible
character %0n 8ustifying their #ass actions" petitioners liGen their acti$ity to the proC!ases rally
led !y for#er President 2orazon 2. (quino on &epte#!er 1*" 1771" participated in" as well" !y
pu!lic school teachers who consequently a!sented the#sel$es fro# their classes. 4o
ad#inistrati$e charges were allegedly instituted against any of the participants.+, they also raised
national issues such as the remo(al of the =.?. bases and the repudiation of foreign debt. An
"alingasan v. Court o1 Appeals %E.'. 4o. 12,65>" Quly 1" 1775" per 'egalado" Q.+, howe)er.
this Cort said that the fact that the con)entional ter' Sstri-eS was not sed by the
participants to describe their co''on corse of action was insigni"cant. since the
sbstance of the sitation. and not its appearance. was dee'ed controlling.
5oreover) the petitioners here E E E were not penalized 1or the eEercise o1 their
right to assemble peace1ull9 and to petition the government 1or a redress o1
grievances. Rather) the Civil 'ervice Commission 1ound them guilt9 o1 conduct
prejudicial to the best interest o1 the service 1or having absented themselves without
proper authorit9) 1rom their schools during regular school da9s) in order to participate
in the mass protest) their absence ineluctabl9 resulting in the nonAholding o1 classes
and in the deprivation o1 students o1 education) 1or which the9 were responsible. $ad
petitioners availed themselves o1 their 1ree time A recess) a1ter classes) wee=ends or
holida9s A to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds o1 law) no one A not the 3%C') the C'C or even this Court A could
have held them liable 1or the valid eEercise o1 their constitutionall9 guaranteed rights.
As it was) the temporar9 stoppage o1 classes resulting 1rom their activit9 necessaril9
disrupted public services) the ver9 evil sought to be 1orestalled b9 the prohibition
against stri=es b9 government wor=ers. Their act !y their nature was en8oined !y the 2i$il
&er$ice law" rules and regulations" for which they #ust" therefore" !e #ade answera!le.
(@acinto v. CA, 31 ?&1# DC/, ,o(. 12, 1../, 6n 7anc 8Panganiban:)
THE N4N=IFP5I7FENT C<5:SE
162. 0s the constitutional prohi!ition against i#pairing contractual o!ligations a!solute?
Held: 1. ,or is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular
(iolate the contract clause of the 7ill of 1ights.
The e%ecuti(e order creating the P*6# was enacted to further implement the social >ustice
pro(isions of the 1./@ &onstitution, which ha(e been greatly enhanced and e%panded in the 1.3/
&onstitution by placing them under a separate #rticle %(rticle O000+. The #rticle on ?ocial Eustice
was aptly described as the Qheart of the new &harterQ by the President of the 1.3D &onstitutional
&ommission, retired Eustice &ecilia 5unoz Palma. ?ocial >ustice is identi$ed with the broad scope
of the police power of the state and requires the e%tensi(e use of such power. I % %.
The constittional prohibition against i'pairing contractal obligations is not
absolte and is not to be read with literal e1actness3 It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or so'e ob,ect of )ale and which confer rights that 'ay be
asserted in a cort of ,sticeP it has no application to stattes relating to pblic
sb,ects within the do'ain of the general legislati)e powers of the State and in)ol)ing
the pblic rights and pblic welfare of the entire co''nity a*ected by it3 It does not
pre)ent a proper e1ercise by the State of its police power by enacting reglations
reasonably necessary to secre the health. safety. 'orals. co'fort. or general welfare
of the co''nity. e)en thogh contracts 'ay thereby be a*ected. for sch 'atters
cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to reglate and control
the'.
Berily, the freedo' to contract is not absolteP all contracts and all rights are
sb,ect to the police power of the State and not only 'ay reglations which a*ect
the' be established by the State. bt all sch reglations 'st be sb,ect to change
fro' ti'e to ti'e. as the general well=being of the co''nity 'ay re!ire. or as the
circ'stances 'ay change. or as e1perience 'ay de'onstrate the necessity3 5nd
nder the Ci)il Code. contracts of labor are e1plicitly sb,ect to the police power of the
20
State becase they are not ordinary contracts bt are i'pressed with pblic interest.
5rticle $9EE thereof e%pressly pro(ides:
5rt3 $9EE. The relations between capital and labor are not 'erely
contractal3 They are so i'pressed with pblic interest that labor contracts
'st yield to the co''on good3 Therefore. sch contracts are sb,ect to the
special laws on labor nions. collecti)e bargaining. stri-es and loc-ots. closed
shop. wages. wor-ing conditions. hors of labor and si'ilar sb,ects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being (alid implementations of 6.*.
,o. /./ (&reating the P*6#), which was enacted under the police power of the ?tate, they cannot
be struc! down on the ground that they (iolate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter
long"established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract
clause. (&he Con1erence o1 5aritime 5anning Agencies) #nc. v. 24%A, 2@ ?&1#
DDD, #pril 1, 1..C 8Ga(ide, Er.:)
. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because pri(ate respondents
ha(e (oluntarily e%ecuted quitclaims and releases and recei(ed their separation pay. Petitioners
claim that the present suit is a Qgra(e derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations
arising from a (alid contract ha(e the force of law between the parties and must be complied with
in good faith.Q
The Cort disagrees3 Rrisprdence holds that the constittional garantee of
non=i'pair'ent of contract is sb,ect to the police power of the state and to
reasonable legislati)e reglations pro'oting health. 'orals. safety and welfare3 Not
all !itclai's are per se in)alid or against pblic policy. e1cept #$% where there is clear
proof that the wai)er was wangled fro' an nsspecting or gllible person, or #&% where
the ter's of settle'ent are nconscionable on their face3 In these cases. the law will
step in to annl the !estionable transactions . Sch !itclai' and release agree'ents
are regarded as ine*ecti)e to bar the wor-ers fro' clai'ing the fll 'easre of their
legal rights.
An the case at bar, the pri(ate respondents agreed to the quitclaim and release in
consideration of their separation pay. ?ince they were dismissed allegedly for business losses,
they are entitled to separation pay under #rticle 3@ of the -abor &ode. #nd since there was thus
no e%tra consideration for the pri(ate respondents to gi(e up their employment, such
underta!ings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal.
("ogoA5edellin 'ugarcane 2lanters Association) #nc. v. NLRC, .D ?&1# 143, 12,
8Panganiban:)
@. *nly slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of &167# that
the imposition of the B#T on the sales and leases of real estate by (irtue of contracts entered prior
to the eFecti(ity of the law would (iolate the constitutional pro(ision that Q,o law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.Q It is enogh to say that the parties to a contract
cannot. throgh the e1ercise of prophetic discern'ent. fetter the e1ercise of the
ta1ing power of the State3 2or not only are e1isting laws read into contracts in order
to "1 obligations as between parties. bt the reser)ation of essential attribtes of
so)ereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postlate of the legal order3 The
policy of protecting contracts against i'pair'ent prespposes the 'aintenance of a
go)ern'ent which retains ade!ate athority to secre the peace and good order of
society.
In trth. the Contract Clase has ne)er been thoght as a li'itation on the
e1ercise of the StateQs power of ta1ation sa)e only where a ta1 e1e'ption has been
granted for a )alid consideration. I % %. (&olentino v. 'ecretar9 o1 6inance, @C ?&1#
D@4, D3C"D3D, #ug. C, 1..2, 6n 7anc 85endoza:)
2. Since ti'ber licenses are not contracts. the non=i'pair'ent clase 1 1 1
cannot be in)o-ed.
I % %, e)en if it is to be ass'ed that the sa'e are contracts. the instant case
does not in)ol)e a law or e)en an e1ecti)e issance declaring the cancellation or
'odi"cation of e1isting ti'ber licenses3 Hence. the non=i'pair'ent clase cannot as
yet be in)o-ed3 Ne)ertheless. granting frther that a law has actally been passed
'andating cancellations or 'odi"cations. the sa'e cannot still be stig'atized as a
)iolation of the non=i'pair'ent clase3 This is becase by its )ery natre and
prpose. sch a law cold ha)e only been passed in the e1ercise of the police power of
the state for the prpose of ad)ancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthfl ecology. pro'oting their health and enhancing their general welfare. I % %.
An short, the non=i'pair'ent clase 'st yield to the police power of the state.
2inally. it is di0clt to i'agine 1 1 1 how the non=i'pair'ent clase cold apply
with respect to the prayer to en,oin the respondent Secretary fro' recei)ing.
accepting. processing. renewing or appro)ing new ti'ber license for. sa)e in cases of
renewal . no contract wold ha)e as yet e1isted in the other instances3 Foreo)er. with
21
respect to renewal. the holder is not entitled to it as a 'atter of right.
(4posa v. 6actoran, Er., 2 ?&1# /. 81..@:)
C. #nent petitionersP contention that the forcible refund of incenti(e bene$ts is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suMce it to state that QNnOot all
contracts entered into by the go)ern'ent will operate as a wai)er of its non=sabilityP
distinction 'st be 'ade between its so)ereign and proprietary acts3 The acts
in)ol)ed in this case are go)ern'ental3 /esides. the Cort is in agree'ent with the
Solicitor >eneral that the incenti)e pay or bene"t is in the natre of a bons which is
not a de'andable or enforceable obligation. ("laFuera v. Alcala, .C ?&1# @DD,
22D, ?ept. 11, 1..3, 6n 7anc 8Purisima:)
THE 7I>HT T4 /5I<
156. 0n !ail application where the accused is charged with a capital oDense" will it !e proper for
the 8udge to grant !ail without conducting hearing if the prosecutor interposes no o!8ection to
such application? Why?
Held: Eurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling >udges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital oFense. The
absence of ob,ection fro' the prosection is ne)er a basis for the grant of bail in sch
cases. for the ,dge has no right to pres'e that the prosector -nows what he is
doing on accont of fa'iliarity with the case3 SSaid reasoning is tanta'ont to ceding
to the prosector the dty of e1ercising ,dicial discretion to deter'ine whether the
gilt of the accsed is strong3 Rdicial discretion is the do'ain of the ,dge before
who' the petition for pro)isional liberty will be decided3 The 'andated dty to
e1ercise discretion has ne)er been reposed pon the prosector.Q
Amposed in "a9lon v. 'ison (2@ ?&1# 32, #pril D, 1..C) was this 'andatory dty to
condct a hearing despite the prosectionQs refsal to addce e)idence in opposition
to the application to grant and "1 bail. (@oselito *. Narciso v. 6lor 5arie 'ta.
RomanaACruz, 0.1. ,o. 1@2C42, 5arch 1/, 444, @
rd
Gi(. 8Panganiban:)
155. What are the duties of the 8udge in cases of !ail applications where the accused is charged
with capital oDense?
Held: "asco v. Rapatalo (D. ?&1# 4, 5arch C, 1../) enunciated the following duties
of the trial >udge in such petition for bail:
1) Notify the prosector of the hearing of the application for bail or re!ire hi'
to sb'it his reco''endation;
) Condct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosection refses to present e)idence to show that the gilt of the accsed
is strong for the prpose of enabling the cort to e1ercise its sond
discretion;
@) ?ecide whether the e)idence of gilt of the accsed is strong based on the
summary of e(idence of the prosecution;
2) If the gilt of the accsed is not strong. discharge the accsed pon the
appro)al of the bailbond. *therwise, petition should be denied.
The &ourt added: QThe abo)e=en'erated procedre shold now lea)e no roo'
for dobt as to the dties of the trial ,dge in cases of bail applications3 So basic and
fnda'ental is it to condct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the
proper cases that it wold a'ont to ,dicial apostasy for any 'e'ber of the ,diciary
to disclai' -nowledge or awareness thereof.Q
#dditionally, the courtPs grant or refusal of bail 'st contain a s''ary of the
e)idence for the prosection. on the basis of which shold be for'lated the ,dgeQs
own conclsion on whether sch e)idence is strong enogh to indicate the gilt of the
accsed. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedral de process for both
the prosecution and the defense; its absence will in)alidate the grant or the denial of the
application for bail. (@oselito *. Narciso v. 6lor 5arie 'ta. RomanaACruz, 0.1.
,o. 1@2C42, 5arch 1/, 444, @
rd
Gi(. 8Panganiban:)
15>. &hould the accused who re#ained at large after their con$iction !e allowed pro$isional
li!erty? 2an the !ail !ond that the accused pre$iously posted !e used during the entire period of
appeal?
Held: Gespite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the &ourt of
#ppeals, petitioners had remained at large. It is a1io'atic that for one to be entitled to
bail. he shold be in the cstody of the law. or otherwise. depri)ed of liberty3 The
prpose of bail is to secre one8s release and it wold be incongros to grant bail to
one who is free . Petitioners8 Co'pliance and Fotion 1 1 1 ca'e short of an
nconditional sb'ission to respondent cort8s lawfl order and to its ,risdiction.
22
The trial court correctly denied petitionersH motion that they be allowed pro(isional liberty
after their con(iction, under their respecti$e !ail !onds. #part from the fact that they were at
large, Section ;. 7le $$+ of the Rules o1 Court, as amended by ?upreme &ourt #dministrati(e
&ircular 1".2, pro(ides that:
I % %
The Cort. in its discretion. 'ay allow the accsed to contine on pro)isional
liberty nder the sa'e bail bond dring the 2%R#43 &4 A22%AL sb,ect to the consent
of the bonds'an.
The bail bond that the accsed pre)iosly posted can only be sed dring the
$;=day 2%R#43 &4 A22%AL #7le $&&% and N4T dring the entire 2%R#43 46 A22%AL .
This is consistent with Section &#a% of 7le $$+ which pro)ides that the bail Ashall be
e*ecti)e pon appro)al and re'ain in force at all stages of the case. nless sooner
cancelled. <N&#L &$% 2R45<L8A&#4N 46 &$% @<385%N& 46 &$% R%8#4NAL &R#AL
C4<R& ) irrespecti)e of whether the case was originally "led in or appealed to it.) This
amendment, introduced by ?& #dministrati(e &ircular 1".2 is a departure from the old rules
which then pro(ided that bail shall be eFecti(e and remain in force at all stages of the case until
its full determination, and thus e(en during the period of appeal. Foreo)er. nder the present
rle. for the accsed to contine his pro)isional liberty on the sa'e bail bond dring
the period to appeal. consent of the bonds'an is necessary. +rom the record, it appears
that the bondsman % % % $led a motion in the trial court % % % for the cancellation of petitionersH
bail bond for the latterHs failure to renew the same upon its e%piration. *btaining the consent of
the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. (5aguddatu v. Court o1 Appeals, @D ?&1# @D, +eb. @,
444, 1
st
Gi(. 89apunan:)
157. 0s a condition in an application for !ail that accused !e <rst arraigned !efore he could !e
granted !ail $alid?
Held: An requiring that petitioner be $rst arraigned before he could be granted bail, the
trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, pre(ent
his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest
in their cases. <ence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, appro(al of petitionerHs bail
bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. #fter that, e(en if petitioner does not
appear, trial can proceed as long as he is noti$ed of the date of the hearing and his failure to
appear is un>usti$ed, since under #rt. AAA, ?ec. 12() of the &onstitution, trial in a!sencia is
authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its % % % order conditioning the grant
of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.
This theory is 'ista-en. #$% In the "rst place 1 1 1 in cases where it is
athorized. bail shold be granted before arraign'ent. otherwise the accsed 'ay be
preclded fro' "ling a 'otion to !ash3 2or if the infor'ation is !ashed and the case
is dis'issed. there wold then be no need for the arraign'ent of the accsed. #&% In
the second place. the trial cort cold ensre the presence of petitioner at the
arraign'ent precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings. sch as arraign'ent3 :nder 7le $$+. Sec3 &#b% of the 7les on Cri'inal
Procedre. one of the conditions of bail is that Athe accsed shall appear before the
proper cort whene)er so re!ired by the cort or these 7les.B while nder 7le $$D.
Sec3 $#b% the presence of the accsed at the arraign'ent is re!ired.
*n the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose between #$% <ling a #otion to quash and
thus delay his release on !ail !ecause until his #otion to quash can !e resol$ed" his arraign#ent
cannot !e held, and #&% foregoing the <ling of a #otion to quash so that he can !e arraigned at
once and thereafter !e released on !ail. These scenarios certainly nder'ine the
accsed8s constittional right not to be pt on trial e1cept pon )alid co'plaint or
infor'ation s0cient to charge hi' with a cri'e and his right to bail. (Lavides v.
CA, @2 ?&1# @1, +eb. 1, 444,
nd
Gi(. 85endoza:)
THE 7I>HT T4 /E IN247FE? 42 THE N5T:7E 5N? C5:SE 42 5CC:S5TI4N 5>5INST THE
5CC:SE?
1>*. What are the o!8ecti$es of the right to !e infor#ed of the nature and cause of accusations
against the accused?
Held: Anstructi(e in this regard is Section D. 7le $$E of the Rules o1 Court % % %.
The prpose of the abo)e=!oted rle is to infor' the accsed of the natre and
case of the accsation against hi'. a right garanteed by no less than the
fnda'ental law of the land (5rticle III. Section $+N&O, +.77 Constitution). 6laborating on
the defendantHs right to be informed, the &ourt held in 2echo v. 2eople (D ?&1# C13) that the
ob>ecti(es of this right are:
23
1) To frnish the accsed with sch a description of the charge against hi' as
will enable hi' to 'a-e the defense;
) To a)ail hi'self of his con)iction or ac!ittal for protection against a frther
prosection for the sa'e case; and
@) To infor' the cort of the facts alleged. so that it 'ay decide whether they
are s0cient in law to spport a con)iction. if one shold be had.
At is ths i'perati)e that the Infor'ation "led with the trial cort be co'plete J
to the end that the accsed 'ay sitably prepare for his defense3 Corollary to this. an
indict'ent 'st flly state the ele'ents of the speci"c o*ense alleged to ha)e been
co''itted as it is the recital of the essentials of a cri'e which delineates the natre
and case of accsation against the accsed.
I % %
An the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the #inority of the $icti# % % %
although the same was pro(en during the trial % % %. The omission is not merely formal in nature
since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. At
matters not how conclusi(e and con(incing the e(idence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot
be con(icted of any oFense, not charged in the &omplaint or Anformation on which he is tried or
therein necessarily included. <e has a right to be informed of the nature of the oFense with which
he is charged before he is put on trial. To con(ict an accused of an oFense higher than that
charged in the &omplaint or Anformation on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial
of that right. (2eople v. "a99a) 3(7 'CRA 77+, 5arch 14, 444, 6n 7anc 8Purisima:)
THE 7I>HT T4 5 25I7 T7I5<
1>1. What is the purpose of the rule !arring trial or sentence of an insane person? What are the
reasons underlying it?
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. At has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused
disabled by 0od to ma!e a >ust defense for his life or liberty. To pt a legally inco'petent
person on trial or to con)ict and sentence hi' is a )iolation of the constittional rights
to a fair trialP and this has se)eral reasons nderlying it. #$% 2or one . the 5CC:75CM of
the proceedings 'ay not be assred. as an inco'petent defendant who cannot
co'prehend the proceedings 'ay not appreciate what infor'ation is rele)ant to the
proof of his innocence3 Foreo)er. he is not in a position to e1ercise 'any of the rights
a*orded a defendant in a cri'inal case. e.g.) the right to e*ecti)ely conslt with
consel. the right to testify in his own behalf. and the right to confront opposing
witnesses. which rights are safegards for the accracy of the trial reslt. #&% 'econd)
the 25I7NESS of the proceedings 'ay be !estioned. as there are certain basic
decisions in the corse of a cri'inal proceeding which a defendant is e1pected to 'a-e
for hi'self. and one of these is his P<E5. #(% &hird) the ?I>NITM of the proceedings 'ay
be disrpted. for an inco'petent defendant is li-ely to condct hi'self in the
cortroo' in a 'anner which 'ay destroy the ?EC47:F of the cort3 E)en if the
defendant re'ains passi)e. his lac- of co'prehension fnda'entally i'pairs the
fnctioning of the trial process3 5 cri'inal proceeding is essentially an ad)ersarial
proceeding3 If the defendant is not a conscios and intelligent participant. the
ad,dication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an indi)idal and
his co''nity and beco'es and in)ecti)e against an insensible ob,ect. #+% 6ourth . it is
i'portant that the defendant -nows why he is being pnished. a co'prehension which
is greatly dependent pon his nderstanding of what occrs at trial3 5n inco'petent
defendant 'ay not realize the 'oral reprehensibility of his condct3 The societal goal
of instittionalized retribtion 'ay be frstrated when the force of the state is broght
to bear against one who cannot co'prehend its signi"cance.
(2eople v. %strada, @@@ ?&1# D.., /13"/1., Eune 1., 444, 6n 7anc 8Puno:)
THE 7I>HT T4 5N IFP57TI5< T7I5<
1>2. What are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with
the rain of unrestrained pu!licity during the in$estigation and trial of high pro<le cases?
Held: There are two () principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the in(estigation and trial of high pro$le cases. The
"ritish approach the problem with the presumption that pblicity will pre,dice a ,ry.
Thus, 6nglish courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial
suFers a threat. The American approach is diFerent. =? courts assume a s=eptical approach
abot the potential e*ect of per)asi)e pblicity on the right of an accsed to a fair
trial. They ha(e de(eloped diFerent strains of TESTS to resol(e this issue, i.e., sbstantial
probability of irreparable har', strong li-elihood, clear and present danger, etc.
(%strada v. 3esierto, 0.1. ,os. 12D/14"1C, 5arch , 441, 6n 7anc 8Puno:)
24
1>. &hould the 3#!uds#an !e stopped fro# conducting the in$estigation of the cases <led
against petitioner %for#er President+ Estrada due to the !arrage of pre8udicial pu!licity on his
guilt?
Held: Petitioner % % % contends that the respondent *mbudsman should be stopped from
conducting the in(estigation of the cases $led against him due to the barrage of pre>udicial
publicity on his guilt. <e submits that the respondent *mbudsman has de(eloped bias and is all
set to $le the criminal cases in (iolation of his right to due process.
I % %
This is not the <rst ti#e the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this &ourt to stop
the trials or annul con(ictions in high pro$le criminal cases. An 2eople v. &eehan=ee) @r. (2.
?&1# C2 81..C:), later reiterated in the case of Larranaga v. Court o1 Appeals) et al. (3/
?&1# C31 at pp. C.D"C./ 81..3:), we laid down the doctrine that:
'Le cannot sustain appellantHs claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to pre>udicial publicity. At is true that the print and broadcast media ga(e the case at
bar per(asi(e publicity, >ust li!e all high pro$le and high sta!e criminal trials. &hen and
now) we rule that the right o1 an accused to a 1air trial is not incompatible to a
1ree press. To be sre. responsible reporting enhances an accsed8s right to a
fair trial for. as well pointed ot. a responsible press has always been regarded
as the hand'aiden of e*ecti)e ,dicial ad'inistration. especially in the cri'inal
"eld 1 1 13 The press does not si'ply pblish infor'ation abot trials bt
gards against the 'iscarriage of ,stice by sb,ecting the police. prosectors.
and ,dicial processes to e1tensi)e pblic scrtiny and criticis'3
Per)asi)e pblicity is not per se pre,dicial to the right of an accsed to
fair trial3 The 'ere fact that the trial of appellant was gi)en a day=to=day. ga)el=
to=ga)el co)erage does not b9 itsel1 pro)e that the pblicity so per'eated the
'ind of the trial ,dge and i'paired his i'partiality. +or one, it is impossible to seal
the minds of members of the bench from pre"trial and other oF"court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news
as they happen straight to our brea!fast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news
form part of our e(eryday menu of the facts and $ctions of life. +or another, our idea of a
fair and impartial >udge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. Le ha(e
not installed the >ury system whose members are o(erly protected from publicity lest they
lose their impartiality. % % %. 4r ,dges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard o*=cort e)idence and on=ca'era perfor'ances of parties to a
litigation3 Their 'ere e1posre to pblications and pblicity stnts does not per
se fatally infect their i'partiality.
5t best. appellant can only con,re 24''#"#L#&; 46 2R%@<3#C% on the part
of the trial ,dge de to the barrage of pblicity that characterized the
in)estigation and trial of the case3 In 5artelino) et al. v. Alejandro) et al.) we
re,ected this standard of possibility of pre,dice and adopted the test of AC&<AL
2R%@<3#C% as we rled that to warrant a "nding of pre,dicial pblicity. there
'st be allegation and proof that the ,dges ha)e been ndly inIenced. not
si'ply that they 'ight be. by the barrage of pblicity. An the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial >udge de(eloped actual !ias against appellant as a
consequence of the e%tensi(e media co(erage of the pre"trial and trial of his case. The
totalit9 o1 circumstances o1 the case does not pro)e that the trial ,dge ac!ired
a IEed opinion as a reslt of pre,dicial pblicity which is incapable of change e(en
by e(idence presented during the trial. #ppellant has the burden to pro(e this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.)
Le e%pounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of >ebb v. $on. Raul de
Leon) etc. (2/ ?&1# DC 81..C:) and its companion cases, $iz.K
'#gain, petitioners raise the eFect of pre>udicial publicity on their right to due
process while undergoing preliminary in(estigation. Le $nd no procedural impediment to
its early in(ocation considering the substantial ris! to their liberty whole undergoing a
preliminary in(estigation.
I % %
The de'ocratic settings. 'edia co)erage of trials of sensational cases
cannot be a)oided and oftenti'es. its e1cessi)eness has been aggra)ated by
-inetic de)elop'ents in the teleco''nications indstry. +or sure, few cases can
match the high (olume and high (elocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
in(estigation of the case at bar. *ur daily diet of facts and $ction about the case continues
unabated e(en today. &ommentators still bombard the public with (iews not too many of
which are sober and sublime. Andeed, e(en the principal actors in the case K the ,7A, the
respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers K ha(e participated in this media blitz.
The possibility of 'edia abses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding.
cri'inal trials cannot be co'pletely closed to the press and pblic. An the seminal
case of Richmond Newspapers) #nc. v. *irginia, it was wisely held:
25
S% % %
(a) The historical e(idence of the e(olution of the criminal trial in #nglo"
#merican >ustice demonstrates conclusi(ely that at the time this ,ationHs organic
laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in 6ngland had long been
presumpti(ely open, thus gi(ing assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging per>ury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. An addition, the signi$cant community
therapeutic (alue of public trials was recognized: when a shoc!ing crime occurs, a
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of >ustice ser(e an important prophylactic purpose, pro(iding an
outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To wor! eFecti(ely, it is
important that societyHs criminal process Ssatisfy the appearance of >ustice,H *Futt (.
=nited ?tates, @23 =? 11, 12, .. - 6d 11, /C ? &t 11, which can best be pro(ided by
allowing people to obser(e such process. +rom this unbro!en, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as (alid today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the (ery nature of a criminal
trial under this ,ationHs system of >ustice, &f., e.g., -e(ine (. =nited ?tates, @D =?
D14, 2 - 6d d .3., 34 ? &t 14@3.
(b) The freedo's of speech. press. and asse'bly. e1pressly
garanteed by the 2irst 5'end'ent. share a co''on core prpose of
assring freedo' of co''nication on 'atters relating to the fnctioning
of go)ern'ent3 In garanteeing freedo's sch as those of speech and
press. the 2irst 5'end'ent can be read as protecting the right of
e)eryone to attend trials so as gi)e 'eaning to those e1plicit garanteesP
the 2irst 5'end'ent right to recei)e infor'ation and ideas 'eans. in the
conte1t of trials. that the garantees of speech and press. standing alone.
prohibit go)ern'ent fro' s''arily closing cortroo' doors which had
long been open to the pblic at the ti'e the 2irst 5'end'ent was
adopted. 5oreo(er, the right of assembly is also rele(ant, ha(ing been regarded
not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free e%ercise
of the other +irst #mendment rights with which it was deliberately lin!ed by the
draftsmen. # trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally K and
representati(es of the media K ha(e a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what ta!es
place.
(c) E)en thogh the Constittion contains no pro)ision which by
its ter's garantees to the pblic the right to attend cri'inal trials.
)arios fnda'ental rights. not e1pressly garanteed. ha)e been
recognized as indispensable to the en,oy'ent of en'erated rights3 The
right to attend cri'inal trial is i'plicit in the garantees of the 2irst
5'end'ent: withot the freedo' to attend sch trials. which people ha)e
e1ercised for centries. i'portant aspects of freedo' of speech and of
the press cold be e)iscerated.H
7e that as it may, we recognize that per(asi(e and pre>udicial publicity under
certain circumstances can depri(e an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in
5artelino) et al. v. Alejandro) et al.) we held that to warrant a "nding of pre,dicial
pblicity there 'st be allegation and proo1 that the ,dges ha)e been ndly
inIenced. not si'ply that they 'ight be. by the barrage of pblicity. An the case
at bar, we $nd nothing in the records that will pro(e that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the in(estigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the G*E Panel. Petitioners cannot ,st rely on the sbli'inal e*ects
of pblicity on the sense of fairness of the ?4R Panel. for these are basically
nbe-nown and beyond -nowing. To be sure, the G*E Panel is composed of an
#ssistant &hief ?tate Prosecutor and ?enior ?tate Prosecutors. Their long e%perience in
criminal in(estigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be
blinded by the !lieg lights of publicity. Andeed, their D"page 1esolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any e%tra"record
e(idence e%cept e(idence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
in(estigation was conducted despite it summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the disco(ery motions of petitioners spea! well of their fairness. #t no
instance, we note, did petitioners see! the disquali$cation of any member of the G*E Panel
on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of pre>udicial publicity.)
5pplying the abo)e rling. we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this
Court to enjoin the preliminar9 investigation o1 the petitioner b9 the respondent
4mbudsman. Petitioner needs to o*er 'ore than hostile headlines to discharge his
brden of proof . He needs to show 'ore than weighty social science e)idence to
sccessflly pro)e the i'paired capacity of a ,dge to render a bias=free decision. Lell
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary in(estigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the oMce of the respondent *mbudsman. ,o allegation whatsoe(er has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel ha(e already
been infected by bias because of the per(asi(e pre>udicial publicity against him. Andeed, the
26
special panel has yet to come out with its $ndings and the &ourt cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfa(orable to the petitioner. (%strada v. 3esierto, 0.1. ,os.
12D/14"1C, 5arch , 441, 6n 7anc 8Puno:)
THE 7I>HT 5>5INST ?4:/<E RE4P57?M
1>6. Discuss the two Ginds of dou!le 8eopardy.
Held: *ur 7ill of 1ights deals with two #&% -inds of doble ,eopardy. The $rst
sentence of &lause 4, ?ection 1, #rticle AAA of the &onstitution ordains that 'no person shall be
twice pt in ,eopardy of pnish'ent for the sa'e o*ense.) The second sentence of said
clause pro(ides that 'if an act is pnishable by a law and an ordinance. con)iction or
ac!ittal nder either shall constitte a bar to another prosection for the sa'e act.)
Ths. the "rst sentence prohibits doble ,eopardy of pnish'ent for the S5FE
422ENSE whereasP the second conte'plates doble ,eopardy of pnish'ent for the
S5FE 5CT. :nder the "rst sentence. one 'ay be twice pt in ,eopardy of pnish'ent
of the sa'e act. pro)ided that he is charged with di*erent o*enses. or the o*ense
charged in one case is not inclded in. or does not inclde. the cri'e charged in the
other case3 The second sentence applies. e)en if the o*ense charged are not the
sa'e. owing to the fact that one constittes a )iolation of an ordinance and the other
a )iolation of statte3 If the two charges are based on one and the sa'e act.
con)iction or ac!ittal nder either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosection
nder the other3 Incidentally. sch con)iction or ac!ittal is not indispensable to
sstain the plea of doble ,eopardy of pnish'ent or the sa'e o*ense3 So long as
,eopardy has been attached nder one of the infor'ations charging said o*ense. the
defense 'ay be a)ailed of in the other case in)ol)ing the sa'e o*ense. e)en if there
has been neither con)iction nor ac!ittal in either case.
6lsewhere stated, where the oFense charged are penalized either by diFerent sections of
the same statute or by diFerent statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of oFenses
charged. The constitutional protection against double >eopardy is a(ailable only where an identity
is shown to e%ist between the earlier and the subsequent oFenses charged. The question of
identity or lac! of identity of oFenses is addressed by e%amining the essential elements of each of
the two oFenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respecti(e legislati(e de$nitions of
the oFenses in(ol(ed. (2eople v. Juijada, C. ?&1# 1.1, Euly 2, 1..D)
1>5. What #ust !e pro$ed to su!stantiate a clai# of dou!le 8eopardy? When #ay legal
8eopardy attach?
Held: To substantiate a claim of double >eopardy, the following must be pro(en:
#$% 5 "rst ,eopardy 'st ha)e attached prior to the second; #&% the "rst ,eopardy
'st ha)e been )alidly ter'inated; #(% the second ,eopardy 'st be for the sa'e
o*ense. or the second o*ense incldes or is necessarily inclded in the o*ense
charged in the "rst infor'ation. or is an atte'pt to co''it the sa'e or is a frstration
thereof.
<egal ,eopardy attaches only: #$% pon a )alid indict'ent; #b% before a co'petent
cort; #c% after arraign'ent; #d% when a )alid plea has been entered; and #e% the case
was dis'issed or otherwise ter'inated withot the e1press consent of the accsed.
(Cuison v. CA, 3. ?&1# 1C., #pril 1C, 1..3 8Panganiban:)
1>>. 0n its decision in a cri#inal case" the Qudge pro#ulgated only the ci$il aspect of the case"
!ut not the cri#inal. Will the pro#ulgation of the cri#inal aspect later constitute dou!le
8eopardy?
Held: Petitioner contends that Qthe promulgation by Eudge 1amos on #pril 2, 1..C of the
1espondent &ourtPs decision of Eune @4, 1..1 by reading its dispositi(e portion has eDecti$ely
ter#inated the cri#inal cases against the petitioner x x x.P An other words, petitioner claims that
the $rst >eopardy attached at that point.
The &ourt is not persuaded. 5s a rle. a cri'inal prosection incldes a ci)il action
for the reco)ery of inde'nity3 Hence. a decision in sch case disposes of both the
cri'inal as well as the ci)il liabilities of an accsed. <ere, trial court promulgated only the
ci(il aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
8T:he promulgation of the &# Gecision was not complete. In fact and in trth. the
pro'lgation was not 'erely inco'pleteP it was also )oid3 In e1cess of its ,risdiction.
the trial ,dge rendered a sbstantially inco'plete pro'lgation on 5pril +. $HH;. and
he repeated his 'ista-e in his 5pril $&. $HHD 4rder3 Ce e'phasize that gra)e abse of
discretion rendered the afore'entioned act of the trial cort )oid3 Since the cri'inal
cases ha)e not yet been ter'inated. the "rst ,eopardy has not yet attached3 Hence.
doble ,eopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
27
Le must stress that 1espondent &ourtPs questioned Gecision did not modify or amend its
Euly @4, 1..1 Gecision. At merely ordered the promulgation of the >udgment of con(iction and the
full e%ecution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. (Cuison v. CA, 3. ?&1# 1C.,
#pril 1C, 1..3 8Panganiban:)
THE 7I>HT 5>5INST E6 P4ST 25CT4 <5CS 5N? /I<<S 42 5TT5IN?E7
1>7. What is a !ill of attainder? 0s P.D. 1>66 a !ill of attainder?
Held: 8T:he &ourt, in 2eople v. 6errer (0.1. ,os. -"@D1@"12, Gecember /, 1./, 23
?&1# @3), de$ned a bill of attainder as a legislati)e act which inIicts pnish'ent on
indi)idals or 'e'bers of a particlar grop withot a ,dicial trial3 Essential to a bill
of attainder are a speci"cation of certain indi)idals or a grop of indi)idals. the
i'position of a pnish'ent. penal or otherwise. and the lac- of ,dicial trial3 This last
ele'ent. the total lac- of cort inter)ention in the "nding of gilt and the
deter'ination of the actal penalty to be i'posed. is the 'ost essential. P.G. ,o. 13DD
does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. At does not see! to inRict punishment without
a >udicial trial. ,owhere in the measure is there a $nding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. Lhat the decree does is to de$ne the oFense and pro(ide for the
penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggra(ate the
oFense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing
whether the prosecution has pro(ed beyond reasonable doubt that the oFense of illegal
possession of $rearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances attached to it
has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the &onstitution and >udicial precedents
require. (5isolas v. 2anga, 131 ?&1# D23, DC."DD4, Ean. @4, 1..4, 6n 7anc 8&ortes:)
17*. What is an ex post facto law? 0s '.(. 4o. >2,7 an ex post facto law?
Held: %E post 1acto law. generally. prohibits retrospecti)ity of penal laws3 R.A.
7(4. is not a penal law3 It is a sbstanti)e law on ,risdiction which is not penal in
character3 Penal laws are those acts of the <egislatre which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their )iolationsP or those that de"ne cri'es. treat of their
natre. and pro)ide for their pnish'ent3 R.A. 7.7 . which a'ended P3?3 $DED as
regards the Sandiganbayan8s ,risdiction. its 'ode of appeal and other procedral
'atters. has been declared by the Cort as not a penal law. bt clearly a procedral
statte. i.e.) one which prescribes rles of procedre by which corts applying laws of
all -inds can properly ad'inister ,stice3 Not being a penal law. the retroacti)e
application of R.A. 7(4. cannot be challenged as nconstittional.
Petitioner8s and inter)enors8 contention that their right to a two=tiered appeal
which they ac!ired nder 7353 9H9; has been dilted by the enact'ent of 7353 G&+H.
is incorrect3 The sa'e contention has already been re,ected by the cort se)eral ti'es
considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right bt stattory in natre that
can be reglated by law3 The 'ode of procedre pro)ided for in the stattory right of
appeal is not inclded in the prohibition against eE post 1acto laws3 7353 G&+H pertains
only to 'atters of procedre. and being 'erely an a'endatory statte it does not
parta-e the natre of an eE post 1acto law. At does not mete out a penalty and, therefore,
does not come within the prohibition. 5oreo(er, the law did not alter the rules of e(idence or the
mode of trial. At has been ruled that ad>ecti(e statutes may be made applicable to actions
pending and unresol(ed at the time of their passage.
#t any rate, 1.#. 32. has preser(ed the accusedHs right to appeal to the ?upreme &ourt to
re(iew questions of law. *n the remo(al of the intermediate re(iew of facts, the ?upreme &ourt
still has the power of re(iew to determine if the presumption of innocence has been con(incingly
o(ercome. (2anIlo 5. Lacson v. &he %Eecutive 'ecretar9, et. al., 0.1. ,o. 134.D, Ean. 4,
1... 85artinez:)
C4NSTIT:TI4N5< <5C
/I<< 42 7I>HTS
7ight to /ail
Jap $. 2(
E. '. 4o. 1,1)27 %Qune 6" 2**1+
25CTS: Jap was charged and con(icted of estafa in the 1T& of Pasig &ity. *n appeal to the &#,
Jap applied for bail. The &# set the bail at PC.C million and required Jap to notify the court and
pri(ate complainant that he will change his residence. Jap claimed that the bail is e%cessi(e and
(iolati(e of his constitutional right against e%cessi(e bail.
HE<?: The ?upreme &ourt ruled that the bail was too e%cessi(e. The amount set did not ha(e
any factual basis to support itself.
28
7ight to 5bode
Jap $. 2(
E. '. 4o. 1,1)27 %Qune 6" 2**1+
HE<?: The right to abode and tra(el is not absolute. At may be restricted, especially if the
accused tried to Ree when the case against him was still pending. 5oreo(er, the accused here was
not pre(ented from changing abode. <e was merely required to notify the court when he wishes to
change abode.
2eople v. 3el Rosario
E. '. 4o. 11*6 %Qune 2*" 2**1+
25CTS: Gel 1osario was charged with the crime of roberry with homicide. Guring custodial
in(estigation, Gel 1osario, assisted by counsel, signed a confession. The trial court con(icted
him of robbery with homicide. Gel 1osario questions the (alidity of the confession, stating that
his constitutional rights were (iolated when he signed it.
HE<?: The confession was (alid and admissible. There was no (iolation of Gel 1osarioHs
constitutional rights. There was no proof that 1osarioHs counsel was remiss in his duties when
the confession was signed.
2eople v. 'alonga
E. '. 4o. 1111 %Qune 21" 2**1+
25CTS: The Gepartment of Anternal #Fairs of 5etroban! conducted an in(estigation regarding
anomalies made in the issuance of cashier chec!s. ?alonga was inter(iewed and was
appraised of his constitutional rights during the inter(iew. ?alonga admitted that he committed
the anomalies and signed a confession. The trial court and the &# con(icted ?alonga of
quali$ed theft. ?alonga contends that his confession is inadmissible as e(idence as it (iolated
his constitutional right to counsel.
HE<?: The confession was admissible. <is right to counsel only e%isted when he is under
custodial in(estigation. <e was not under custodial in(estigation during his inter(iew. <e was
inter(iewed by a ban! oMcer, not a police oMcer.
Alvarez v. CA
E. '. 4o. 1,1>*1 %Qune 2)" 2**1+
25CTS: #l(arez was con(icted of the crime of homicide. #l(arez contests the ruling of the
court, claiming that the statement of police oMcer 7ugnot testifying that he admitted !illing
(ictim in self"defense is inadmissible for being (iolati(e of his right to counsel.
HE<?: The statement was held to be admissible. ,o proof was shown that the accused was
under custodial in(estigation. The rights of the accused do not apply to spontaneous
statements gi(en in an ordinary manner.
%stelito Remolona v. C'C
E. '. 4o. 15,5 %(ugust 2" 2**1+
25CTS: 6stelito 1emolona is the Postmaster at Post *Mce ?er(ice in Nuezon. <e was dismissed
from ser(ice upon his admission in a preliminary in(estigation of the &?& that he had paid a
certain #tty. ?alupadin to acquire a fa!e eligibility for his wife in the &i(il ?er(ice &ommission. The
&?& found him guilty of possession of fa!e eligibility, falsi$cation and dishonesty. 6stelito now
contends that he was depri(ed of his right to due process because (1) he was not assisted by
counsel during preliminary in(estigation, and () he was remo(ed from his position without cause
which is contrary to ?ection (@), #rticle IA 7 of the &onstitution which pro(ides that 'no oMcer or
employee in the &i(il ?er(ice shall be remo(ed or suspended e%cept for cause.) At is his
contention that although the oFense of dishonesty is punishable under &? laws, such act must
ha(e been committed in the performance of his function and duty as a Postmaster. ?ince the
charge of dishonesty in(ol(es falsi$cation of the certi$cate of rating of his wife, the same has no
bearing on his oMce.
HE<?: The right to counsel guaranteed by the 7ill of 1ights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial in(estigation. At is only at this stage that the right to counsel
attaches. The e%clusionary rule under paragraph , ?ection 1 of the 7ill of 1ights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal in(estigation but not to those made in administrati(e in(estigation.
=nder e%isting laws, a party in an administrati(e inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespecti(e of the nature of the charges and of the respondentHs capacity to represent himself.
#dministrati(e inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measure against erring public oMcers and employees and with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of go(ernment ser(ice. #dmissions by 1emolona during such
in(estigation may be used as e(idence to >ustify his dismissal.
People $. =orial
8. R. No. +(.(. ,August +) (!!+-
29
+acts: Edwin Forial. <eonardo Forial and Nonelito 5binon were con)icted of 7obbery
with Ho'icide3 ?ring the cstodial in)estigation. <eonardo Forial 'ade an
e1tra,dicial confession ad'itting to the cri'e3 Howe)er. later on. he recanted his
confession saying that the police tortred hi' into ad'itting the cri'e3 4n appeal.
Forial 'o)ed to !ash the e1tra,dicial confession clai'ing that sch confession was
'ade withot the assistance of consel as garanteed by the constittion dring a
cstodial in)estigation3 5pparently. the consel gi)en to hi' by the police was not
present dring the whole interrogation3 He left to attend to so'e personal 'atters
while the interrogation of Forial was still going on3 Howe)er. said attorney clai'ed
that he was present when Forial signed the ad'ission3
<eld: The e1tra,dicial confession cannot be sed against the accsed3 5n accsed
nder cstodial interrogation 'st continosly ha)e a consel assisting hi' fro' the
)ery start ntil the ter'ination of sch in)estigation3 5n e*ecti)e and )igilant consel
Anecessarily and logically re!ires that the lawyer be present and able to ad)ise and
assist his client fro' the ti'e the confessant answers the "rst !estion as-ed by the
in)estigating o0cer ntil the signing of the e1tra,dicial confession3B Section &5 of 75
No3 9+(G re!ires that Aany person arrested. detained or nder cstodial in)estigation
shall at all ti'es be assisted by consel3 T In the absence of any lawyer. no cstodial
in)estigation shall be condcted3B 5dditionally. there was an in)alid wai)er of the
right to consel since this right cannot be wai)ed nless the sa'e is 'ade in writing
and in the presence of consel3 No sch written and conseled wai)er of these rights
was o*ered in e)idence3
?oble Reopardy
U &ara!ia" P4P $. People
E. '. 4o. 1,2*2, %Quly 2*" 2**1+
25CTS: ?arabia, a police oMcer, po!ed his gun at two lo(ers. <e forced them to do se%ual acts
and e%torted them for money. # complaint for gra(e coercion was $led against him by the (ictims.
The 5T& con(icted him, and its ruling was aMrmed by the 1T&. The &# denied ?arabiaHs appeal.
?arabia now contends that double >eopardy has attached to his case, as the incident in the
present case was also the sub>ect of a criminal case for robbery with (iolence against or
intimidation of person wherein he was con(icted.
HE<?: The ?upreme &ourt held that double >eopardy did not attach. There was no identity of
oFenses. The crime of gra(e coercion is not the same as the crime of robbery with (iolence
against or intimidation of person. The former is not an attempt or a frustration to commit the
latter. The former does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in the latter.
(rgel $. Qudge Pascua
(. =. 4o. 'TQC7,C111 %(ugust 2*" 2**1+
25CTS: An the case entitled 'People (. 5iguel #rgel,) Eudge Pascua rendered a >udgment of
acquittal in #rgelHs fa(or. <owe(er, a lawyer called the >udgeHs attention to the fact that a witness
was able to positi(ely identify the accused and such feat was recorded in the >udgeHs notes. *n
the basis of such $ndings, the >udge ordered the arrest of the accused #rgel and rendered a new
>udgment $nding #rgel guilty of murder. #rgel $led an administrati(e case against the >udge for
gross ignorance of the law. The question is whether #rgel may be con(icted of the crime of
murder.
HE<?: The ?upreme &ourt ruled that #rgel cannot be con(icted of murder. # >udgment of
acquittal becomes $nal upon promulgation. At cannot be amended, recalled or withdrawn by
another order after attaining $nality. ?ince #rgel was acquitted, Eudge Pascua cannot issue another
order amending the pre(ious >udgment of acquittal, as to do so would place #rgel in double
>eopardy.
Section +3 No law shall be passed abridging the freedo' of speech. of e1pression. or
of the press. or of the right of the people peaceably to asse'ble and petition the
go)ern'ent for redress of grie)ances3
Chat are considered protected speech:
Protected speech includes e(ery form of e%pression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded.
At includes motion pictures as well as what is !nown as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an
armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful pic!eting has also been included within the meaning of
speech.
Prohi!itions under &ection ,
1. Prohibition against P1A*1 16?T1#A,T
. Prohibition against ?=7?6N=6,T P=,A?<56,T
30
Prohi!ition against prior restraint
Prior restraint means oMcial go(ernmental restrictions on the press or other forms of e%pression
in ad(ance of actual publication or dissemination.
1. 6%amplesTforms of prior restraint
a. mo(ie censorship
b. >udicial prior restraint U in>unction against publication
c. license ta%es based on gross receipts for the pri(ilege of engaging in the business of
ad(ertising in any newspaper
d. Rat license fees for the pri(ilege of selling religious boo!s
When prohi!ition does not apply
a. Guring a war. 6%. 0o(ernment can pre(ent publication about the numberTlocations of its
troops (,ear (. 5innesota, @3 =? D./)
b. *bscene publications.
&tandards for allowa!le su!sequent punish#ent
T6?T &1AT61A*,
+. 3angerous &endenc9 &est &here should be a RA&#4NAL C4NN%C&#4N
between the speech and the evil apprehended.
. &lear and Present Ganger Test There should be a clear and present danger that the
words when used under such circumstances are of such
a nature as to create a &-6#1 #,G P16?6,T G#,061
that they will bring about the substanti(e e(ils that the
?tate has a right to pre(ent.
@. 7alancing of Anterests Test The courts should 7#-#,&6 the P=7-A& A,T616?T
ser(ed by legislation on one hand and the +166G*5 *+
?P66&< (or any other constitutional right) on the other.
The courts will then decide where the greater weight
should be placed.
2reedo' of Speech
The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of 'core) speech,
i.e. speech which communicates political, social or religious ideas. These en>oy the same
degree of protection. &ommercial speech, howe(er, does not.
Co''ercial Speech
1. # communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction.
. To en>oy protection:
a. At must not be false or misleading; and
b. At should not propose an illegal transaction.
@. 6(en truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if:
a. 0o(ernment has a substantial interest to protect;
b. The regulation directly ad(ances that interest; and
c. At is not more e%tensi(e than is necessary to protect that interest. (2entral ;udson Eas
and Electric 2orp. $. Pu!lic &er$ice 2o##ission of 4J" 22/ =? CC/)
:nprotected Speech
$3 <I/E<
#. 1(0' 23==E4T %..&. 'ule+. These are statements of *PA,A*,, not of fact, and are not
considered actionable, e(en if the words used are neither mild nor temperate. Lhat is
important is that the opinion is the true and honest opinion of the person. The statements
are not used to attac! personalities but to gi(e oneHs opinion on decisions and actions.
7. 3P04034&. Lith respect to public personalities (politicians, actors, anyone with a
connection to a newsworthy e(ent), opinions can be aired regarding their public
actuations. &omment on their pri(ate li(es, if not germane to their public personae, are
not protected.
&3 4/SCENITM
#. Test for o!scenity (5iller (. &alifornia)
i. Lhether the a(erage person, applying contemporary community standards
would $nd that the wor!, ta!en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
ii. Lhether the wor! depicts or describes, in a patently oFensi(e way, se%ual
conduct, speci$cally de$ned by law.
iii. Lhether the wor!, ta!en as a whole, lac!s serious literary, artistic, political
or scienti$c (alue.
@. Procedure for seizure of allegedly o!scene pu!lications
i. #uthorities must apply for issuance of search warrant.
ii. &ourt must be con(inced that the materials are obscene. #pply clear and
present danger test.
iii. Eudge will determine whether they are in fact 'obscene).
i(. Eudge will issue a search warrant.
(. Proper action should be $led under #rt. 41 of the 1P&.
31
(i. &on(iction is sub>ect to appeal.
7ight of 5sse'bly and Petition
$3 The standards for allowable i'pair'ent of speech and press also apply to the right
of asse'bly and petition3
. 1ules on assembly in public places:
i. #pplicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when the assembly will ta!e place.
ii. The application should be $led ahead of time to enable the public oMcial concerned
to appraise whether there are (alid ob>ections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant, but in another public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the
application of the &lear and Present Ganger Test.
iii. Af the public authority is of the (iew that there is an imminent and gra(e danger of a
substanti(e e(il, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
i(. The decision of the public authority, whether fa(orable or ad(erse, must be
transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so
desire, ha(e recourse to the proper >udicial authority.
@. 1ules on assembly in pri(ate properties:
*nly the consent of the owner of the property or person entitled to possession thereof is
required.
Section ;3 No law shall be 'ade respecting an establish'ent of religion. or prohibiting
the free e1ercise thereof3 The free e1ercise and en,oy'ent of religios profession and
worship. withot discri'ination or preference. shall fore)er be allowed3 No religios
test shall be re!ired for the e1ercise of ci)il or political rights3
Clases nder Section ;
1. ,on"establishment clause
. +ree e%ercise of 1eligion
?istinction between the clases #'chool 3istrict v. 'chempp) (9+ :S &E(%
1. The non=establish'ent clase does not depend upon any showing of direct go(ernmental
compulsion. At is (iolated by the enactment of laws which establish an oMcial religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non"obser(ing indi(iduals or not. The test of compliance
with the non"establishment clause can be stated as follows: Lhat are the purposes and
primary eFect of the enactmentO Af either is the ad(ancement or inhibition of religion, the law
(iolates the non"establishment clause. Thus, in order for a law to comply with the non"
establishment clause, two requisites must be met. +irst, it has a secular legislati(e purpose.
?econd, its primary eFect neither ad(ances nor inhibits religion.
. The free e1ercise of religion clase withdraws from legislati(e power the e%ertion of any
restraint on the free e%ercise of religion. An order to show a (iolation of this clause, the person
aFected must show the coerci(e eFect of the legislation as it operates against him in the
practice of his religion. Lhile the freedom to belie(e (non"establishment) is absolute, the
moment such belief Rows o(er into action, it becomes sub>ect to go(ernment regulation.
7e!isites for go)ern'ent aid to be allowable:
1. At must ha(e a secular legislati(e purpose;
. At must ha(e a primary eFect that neither ad(ances nor inhibits religion;
@. At must not require e%cessi(e entanglement with recipient institutions.
Section D3 The liberty of abode and of changing the sa'e within the li'its prescribed
by law shall not be i'paired e1cept pon lawfl order of the cort3 Neither shall the
right to tra)el be i'paired e1cept in the interest of national secrity. pblic safety or
pblic health. as 'ay be pro)ided by law3
7ights garanteed nder Section D:
$3 2reedo' to choose and change one8s place of abode3
. +reedom to tra(el within the country and outside.
Crtail'ent of rights:
1A0<T 5#,,61 *+ &=1T#A-56,T
1. -iberty of abode -awful order of the court and within the limits prescribed by
law.
. 1ight to tra(el 5ay be curtailed e(en by administrati(e oMcers (e%. passport
oMcers) in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be pro(ided by law.
32
Note: The right to tra(el and the liberty of abode are distinct from the right to return to oneHs
country, as shown by the fact that the Geclaration of <uman 1ights and the &o(enant on <uman
1ights ha(e separate guarantees for these. <ence, the right to return to oneHs country is not
co(ered by the speci$c right to tra(el and liberty of abode. (=arcos $. =anglapus)
Section 93 The right of the people to infor'ation on 'atters of pblic concern shall be
recognized3
7ights garanteed nder Section 9
1. 1ight to information on matters of public concern
. 1ight of access to oMcial records and documents
Persons entitled to the abo(e rights: 4nly 2ilipino citizens3
Discretion of go$ern#ent
The go(ernment has discretion with respect to the authority to determine what matters are of
public concern and the authority to determine the manner of access to them.
7ecognized restrictions on the right of the people to infor'ation:
1. ,ational security matters
. Antelligence information
@. Trade secrets
2. 7an!ing transactions
C. Giplomatic correspondence
D. 6%ecuti(e sessions
/. &losed door cabinet meetings
3. ?upreme &ourt deliberations
Section $E3 No law i'pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed3
Chen does a law i'pair the obligation of contracts:
1) Af it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of
performance
) Af it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those e%pressed
@) Af it authorizes for its satisfaction something diFerent from that pro(ided in its terms.
# mere change in P1*&6G=1#- 1656GA6? which does not change the substance of the contract,
and which still lea(es an eMcacious remedy for enforcement does ,*T impair the obligation of
contracts.
# (alid e%ercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.
?ection 11. +ree access to the courts and quasi">udicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of po(erty.
Section $&3 7ights of person nder in)estigation for the co''ission of an o*ense3
7ights of person nder in)estigation for the Co''ission of an o*ense C4?E: SCISI
1) 1ight to remain silent
) 1ight to ha(e competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
@) 1ight to be pro(ided with the ser(ices of counsel if he cannot aFord the ser(ices of one.
2) 1ight to be informed of these rights.
Chen rights are a)ailable:
1) #+T61 a person has been ta!en into custody or
) Lhen a person is otherwise depri(ed of his freedom of action in any signi$cant way.
@) Lhen the in(estigation is being conducted by the go(ernment (police, G*E, ,7A) with respect
to a criminal oFense.
2) ?igning of arrest reports and boo!ing sheets.
Chen rights are not a)ailable:
1) Guring a police line"up. 6%ception: *nce there is a mo(e among the in(estigators to elicit
admissions or confessions from the suspect.
) Guring administrati(e in(estigations.
@) &onfessions made by an accused at the time he (oluntarily surrendered to the police or
outside the conte%t of a formal in(estigation.
2) ?tatements made to a pri(ate person.
Exclusionary rule
+- #ny confession or admission obtained in (iolation of this section shall be inadmissible in
e(idence against him (the accused).
(- Therefore, any e(idence obtained by (irtue of an illegally obtained confession is also
inadmissible, being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
7e!isites of )alid wai)er:
1) Lai(er should be made in L1ATA,0
33
) Lai(er should be made in the P16?6,&6 *+ &*=,?6-.
Section $(3 7ight to bail
Cho are entitled to bail:
1) #ll persons #&T=#--J G6T#A,6G
) shall, 76+*16 &*,BA&TA*,
@) 7e entitled to bail.
Cho are not entitled to bail:
1) Persons charged with oFenses P=,A?<#7-6 by 16&-=?A*, P61P6T=# or G6#T<, when
e(idence of guilt is strong
) Persons &*,BA&T6G by the trial court. 7ail is only discretionary pending appeal.
@) Persons who are members of the #+P facing a court martial.
4ther rights in relation to bail3
1) The right to bail shall ,*T be impaired e(en when the pri(ilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
) 6%cessi(e bail shall not be required.
2actors considered in setting the a'ont of bail:
1) #bility to post bail
) ,ature of the oFense
@) Penalty imposed by law
2) &haracter and reputation of the accused
C) <ealth of the accused
D) ?trength of the e(idence
/) Probability of appearing at the trial
3) +orfeiture of pre(ious bail bonds
.) Lhether accused was a fugiti(e from >ustice when arrested
14) Af accused is under bond in other cases
I'plicit li'itations on the right to bail:
1. The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the law.
. The constitutional right is a(ailable only in criminal cases, not, e.g. in deportation proceedings.
Note:
1. 1ight to bail is not a(ailable in the military.
. #part from bail, a person may attain pro(isional liberty through recognizance, which is an
obligation of record entered into before a court guaranteeing the appearance of the accused
for trial. At is in the nature of a contract between the surety and the state.
?ection 12. 1ights of an accused
7ights of a person charged with a cri'inal o*ense
1. 1ight to due process of law
. 1ight to be presumed innocent
@. 1ight to be heard by himself and counsel
2. 1ight to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
C. 1ight to ha(e a speedy, impartial and public trial
D. 1ight to meet the witnesses face to face
/. 1ight to ha(e compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
e(idence in his behalf
9D.E P'32E&&:
This means that the accused can only be con(icted by a tribunal which is required to comply with
the stringent requirements of the rules of criminal procedure.
9P'E&.=PT034 31 04432E42E:
The &onstitution does not prohibit the legislature from pro(iding that proof of certain facts leads to
a prima facie presumption of guilt, pro(ided that the facts pro(ed ha(e a reasonable connection to
the ultimate fact presumed.
Presumption of guilt should not be conclusi(e.
9'0E;T T3 @E ;E('D @J ;0=&E/1 (4D 23.4&E/:
The right to be heard incldes the following rights:
1. 1ight to be present at the trial
#. The right to be present co(ers the period from #11#A0,56,T to P1*5=-0#TA*, of
sentence.
7. #fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused, pro(ided
requisites are met. ,ote, that trial in absentia is allowed only if the accused has been
(alidly arraigned.
34
(i) #ccused has been duly noti$ed; and
(ii) <is failure to appear is un>usti$able.
&. The accused may wai(e the right to be present at the trial by not showing up.
<owe(er, the court can still compel the attendance of the accused if necessary for
identi$cation purposes. 6I&6PTA*,: Af the accused, after arraignment, has stipulated
that he is indeed the person charged with the oFense and named in the information,
and that any time a witness refers to a name by which he is !nown, the witness is to be
understood as referring to him.
G. Lhile the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of >udgement, the
absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not aFect its (alidity.
&3 7ight to consel
(a) 1ight to counsel means the right to 6++6&TAB6 16P16?6,T#TA*,.
(b) Af the accused appears at arraignment without counsel, the >udge must:
(i) Anform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment
(ii) #s! the accused if he desires the aid of counsel
(iii) Af the accused desires counsel, but cannot aFord one, a counsel de o<cio must be
appointed
(i() Af the accused desires to obtain his own counsel, the court must gi(e him a
reasonable time to get one.
@. 1ight to an impartial >udge
2. 1ight of confrontation and cross"e%amination
C. 1ight to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
?R#8$& &4 "% #N64R5%3 46 &$% NA&<R% AN3 CA<'% 46 ACC<'A&#4N A8A#N'& $#5K
Prposes of the right:
1) To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma!e
his defenses
) To a(ail himself of his con(iction or acquittal against a further prosecution for the same cause
@) To inform the court of the facts alleged.
Af the information fails to allege the material elements of the oFense, the accused cannot be
con(icted thereof e(en if the prosecution is able to present e(idence during the trial with respect
to such elements.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in the information. At is
not determined based on the caption or preamble thereof nor from the speci$cation of the
pro(ision of law allegedly (iolated.
9'0E;T T3 &PEEDJ" 0=P('T0(/ (4D P.@/02 T'0(/:
2actors sed in deter'ining whether the right to a speedy trial has been )iolated
1) Time e%pired from the $ling of the information
) -ength of delay in(ol(ed
@) 1easons for the delay
2) #ssertion or non"assertion of the right by the accused
C) Pre>udice caused to the defendant.
E*ect of dis'issal based on the grond of )iolation of the accsed8s right to speedy
trial
Af the dismissal is (alid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used as basis to claim double
>eopardy. This would be the eFect e(en if the dismissal was made with the consent of the accused
7e'edy of the accsed if his right to speedy trial has been )iolated
He can 'o)e for the dis'issal of the case3
Af he is detained, he can $le a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
?e"nition of i'partial trial
The accsed is entitled to the Acold netrality of an i'partial ,dgeB3
At is an element of due process.
?e"nition of pblic trial
The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespecti(e of their relationship to the accused.
<owe(er, if the e(idence to be adduced is 'oFensi(e to decency or public morals), the public may
be e%cluded.
The right of the accsed to a pblic trial is not )iolated if the hearings are condcted
on Satrdays. either with the consent of the accsed or if failed to ob,ect thereto3
?R#8$& &4 5%%& >#&N%'' 6AC% &4 6AC%K
Prposes of the right:
1. To aFord the accused an opportunity to cross"e%amine the witness
. To allow the >udge the opportunity to obser(e the deportment of the witness
35
2ailre of the accsed to cross=e1a'ine a witness
Af the failure of the accused to cross"e%amine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due to
the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should be e%cluded.
Chen the right to cross=e1a'ine is de'andable
At is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be a(ailed of during preliminary in(estigations.
Principal exceptions to the right of confrontation
1. The admissibility of 'dying declarations)
. Trial in absentia under ?ection 12()
@. Lith respect to child testimony
Section $D3 5ll persons shall ha)e the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all ,dicial. !asi=,dicial. or ad'inistrati)e bodies3
Distinction !etween &ection 1, and &ection 16
Lhile the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of criminal cases, the right to a speedy
disposition of cases co(ers #-- phases of E=GA&A#-, N=#?A"E=GA&A#- or #G5A,A?T1#TAB6
proceedings.
Section $93 No person shall be co'pelled to be a witness against hi'self3
Chen is a !estion incri'inating:
5 !estion tends to incri'inate when the answer of the accsed or the witness wold
establish a fact which wold be a necessary lin- in a chain of e)idence to pro)e the
co''ission of a cri'e by the accsed or the witness3
?istinction between an accsed and an ordinary witness
$3 5n accsed can refse to ta-e the witness stand by in)o-ing the right against self=
incri'ination3
. #n ordinary witness cannot refuse to ta!e the stand. <e can only refuse to answer speci$c
questions which would incriminate him in the commission of an oFense.
Scope of right
$3 Chat is P74HI/ITE? is the se of physical or 'oral co'plsion to e1tort
co''nication fro' the witness or to otherwise elicit e)idence which wold not
e1ist were it not for the actions co'pelled fro' the witness3
. The right does ,*T P1*<A7AT the e%amination of the body of the accused or the use of
$ndings with respect to his body as physical e(idence. <ence, the $ngerprinting of an
accused would not (iolate the right against self"incrimination. <owe(er, obtaining a sample
of the handwriting of the accused would (iolate this right if he is charged for falsi$cation.
@. The accused cannot be compelled to produce a pri(ate document in his possession which
might tend to incriminate him. <owe(er, a third person in custody of the document may be
compelled to produce it.
Chen the right can be in)o-ed:
1. An criminal cases
. An administrati(e proceedings if the accused is liable to a penalty (6%. +orfeiture of property)
Cho can in)o-e the right:
4nly natral persons3 Rdicial persons are sb,ect to the )isitorial powers of the state
in order to deter'ine co'pliance with the conditions of the charter granted to the'3
?ection 13. 1ight against in(oluntary ser(itude
?e"nition of in)olntary ser)itde
It is e)ery condition of enforced or co'plsory ser)ice of one to another no 'atter
nder what for' sch ser)itde 'ay be disgised3
E1ceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly con(icted
. Personal military or ci(il ser(ice in the interest of national defense
@. An na(al enlistment: a person who enlists in a merchant ship may be compelled to remain in
ser(ice until the end of the (oyage
2. Posse co#itatus for the apprehension of criminals
C. 1eturn to wor! order issued by the G*-6 ?ecretary or the President
D. 5inors under patria potestas are obliged to obey their parents.
?ection 1.. Prohibition against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
Chen is a penalty Acrel. degrading and inh'anBU
$3 5 penalty is crel and inh'an if it in)ol)es tortre or lingering s*ering3 E13
/eing drawn and !artered3
. # penalty is degrading if it e%poses a person to public humiliation. 6%. 7eing tarred and
feathered, then paraded throughout town.
36
Standards sed:
$3 The pnish'ent 'st not be so se)ere as to be degrading to the dignity of h'an
beings3
. At must not be applied arbitrarily.
@. At must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
2. At must not be e%cessi(e, i.e. it must ser(e a penal purpose more eFecti(ely than a less se(ere
punishment would.
E1cessi)e "ne
5 "ne is e1cessi)e. when nder any circ'stance. it is disproportionate to the o*ense3
Note: +r. 7ernas says that the accused cannot be con(icted of the crime to which the punishment
is attached if the court $nds that the punishment is cruel, degrading or inhuman.
7eason: Cithot a )alid penalty. the law is not a penal law3
Section &E3 No person shall be i'prisoned for debt or non=pay'ent of a poll ta13
?e"nition of debt nder Section &E
$% ?ebt refers to a C4NT75CT:5< obligation. whether e1press or i'plied. reslting in
any liability to pay 'oney3 Ths. all other types of obligations are not within the
scope of this prohibition3
) Thus, if an accused fails to pay the $ne imposed upon him, this may result in his subsidiary
imprisonment because his liability is ex delicto and not ex contractu.
@) # +1#=G=-6,T debt may result in the imprisonment of the debtor if:
#. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa and
7. The accused has been duly con(icted.
Section &$3 No person shall be twice pt in ,eopardy of pnish'ent for the sa'e
o*ense3 If an act pnished by a law and an ordinance. con)iction or ac!ittal nder
either shall constitte a bar to another prosection for the sa'e act3
Chat are the TC4 VIN?S 42 RE4P57?MU
1. +irst ?entence: ,o person shall be twice put in >eopardy of punishment for the sa'e
o*ense3
. ?econd ?entence: Lhen an act is pnished by a law and an ordinance,
con(iction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
sa'e act3
:nder the "rst -ind of ,eopardy. con)iction. ac!ittal. or dis'issal of the case withot
the e1press consent of the accsed will bar a sbse!ent prosection3 :nder the
second -ind of ,eopardy. only con)iction or ac!ittal J not dis'issal withot the
e1press consent of the accsed J will bar a sbse!ent prosection3
'equisites for a $alid defense of dou!le 8eopardyK 23DEK (T&
1+ +irst >eopardy must ha(e attached prior to the second.
2+ The $rst >eopardy must ha(e ter#inated.
+ The second >eopardy must be for the sa#e oDense" one that includes or is necessarily
included in the <rst oDense" or is an atte#pt or frustration of the <rst" or is an ele#ent
thereof.

Chen does ,eopardy 5TT5CH: #$
st
re!isite% C4?E: CIC5@
1) # person is charged
) =nder a complaint or information suMcient in form and substance to sustain a con(iction
@) 7efore a court of competent >urisdiction
2) #fter the person is arraigned
C) ?uch person enters a )alid plea.
Chen does ,eopardy N4T attach:
1) Af information does not charge any oFense
) Af, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents e(idence of complete self"defense, and the court
thereafter acquits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused.
@) Af the information for an oFense cognizable by the 1T& is $led with the 5T&.
2) Af a complaint $led for preliminary in(estigation is dismissed.
Chen does "rst ,eopardy TE7FIN5TE: #&
N?
7EL:ISITE%
1) #cquittal
) &on(iction
@) Gismissal LT* the 6IP16?? consent of the accused
2) Gismissal on the merits.
E1a'ples of ter'ination of ,eopardy:
$% ?is'issal based on )iolation of the right to a speedy trial3 This a'onts to an
ac!ittal3
) Gismissal based on a demurrer to e(idence. This is a dismissal on the merits.
@) Gismissal on motion of the prosecution, subsequent to a motion for rein(estigation $led by the
accused.
2) Gischarge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an acquittal.
37
Chen can the P74SEC:TI4N appeal fro' an order of dis'issal:
$% If dis'issal is on 'otion of the accsed3 %Eception0 If 'otion is based on )iolation
of the right to a speedy trial or on a de'rrer to e)idence3
) Af dismissal does ,*T amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits
@) Af the question to be passed upon is purely legal.
2) Af the dismissal (iolates the right of due process of the prosecution.
C) Af the dismissal was made with gra(e abuse of discretion.
Chat are considered to be the AS5FE 422ENSEB: #nder the $
st
sentence of Section
&$%
$% E1act identity between the o*enses charged in the "rst and second cases3
) *ne oFense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other oFense.
@) *ne oFense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.
4oteK where a single act results in the (iolation of diFerent laws or diFerent pro(isions of the
same law, the prosecution for one will not bar the other so long as none of the e%ceptions apply.
?e"nition of doble ,eopardy #&
nd
sentence of Sec3 &$%
?oble ,eopardy will reslt if the act pnishable nder the law and the ordinance are
the sa'e3 2or there to be doble ,eopardy. it is not necessary that the o*ense be the
sa'e3
S:PE7@ENIN> 25CTS
$% :nder the 7les of Cort. a con)iction for an o*ense will not bar a prosection for
an o*ense which necessarily incldes the o*ense charged in the for'er infor'ation
where:
#. The gra(er oFense de(eloped due to a super(ening fact arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge.
7. The facts constituting the gra(er oFense became !nown or were disco(ered only after
the $ling of the former information.
&. The plea of guilty to the lesser oFense was made without the consent of the $scal and
the oFended party.
) =nder (1)(b), if the facts could ha(e been disco(ered by the prosecution but were not
disco(ered because of the prosecutionHs incompetence, it would not be considered a
super(ening e(ent.
E*ect of appeal by the accsed:
If the accsed appeals his con)iction. he C5I@ES his right to plead doble ,eopardy3
The whole case will be open to re)iew by the appellate cort3 Sch cort 'ay e)en
increase the penalties i'posed on the accsed by the trial cort3
Section &&3 No e1 post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted3
?e"nition of e1=post facto law3
$% 4ne which 'a-es an action done before the passing of the law. and which was
innocent when done. cri'inal. and pnishes sch action3
) *ne which aggra(ates the crime or ma!es it greater than when it was committed.
@) *ne which changes the punishment and inRicts a greater punishment than that which the law
anne%ed to the crime when it was committed.
2) *ne which alters the legal rules of e(idence and recei(es less testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the oFense in order to con(ict the accused.
C) *ne which assumes to regulate ci(il rights and remedies only 7=T, in eFect, imposes a penalty
or depri(ation of a right, which, when done, was lawful.
D) *ne which depri(es a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled such as the protection of a former con(iction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty.
4oteK The prohibition on e% post facto laws only applies to retrospecti(e P6,#- laws.
2haracteristics of an Ex Post 1acto /aw
$3 7efers to cri'inal 'atters
&3 7etrospecti)e
(3 Cases pre,dice to the accsed
?e"nition of /I<< 42 5TT5IN?E7
$% 5 bill of attainder is a <E>IS<5TI@E act which inIicts pnish'ent C/4 R:?ICI5< trial3
) The bill of attainder does not need to be directed at a speci$cally named person. At may also
refer to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inRict punishment on
them without >udicial trial.
@) 6lements of the bill of attainder
#. There must be a -#L.
7. The law imposes a P6,#- burden on a ,#56G A,BAGAG=#-T6#?A-J #?&61T#A,#7-6
565761? of a 01*=P.
38
&. The penal burden is imposed GA16&T-J by the -#L LT* E=GA&A#- trial.
39
#1TA&-6 AB K &ATAV6,?<AP
Cho are citizens of the PhilippinesU
$% Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the ti'e of the adoption of the $HG9
Constittion
) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
@) Those born before Eanuary 1/, 1./@ of +ilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of ma>ority.
2) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Fodes of ac!iring citizenship:
1) Eus ?oli K acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth
) Eus ?anguinis K acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship
@) ,aturalization K the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the pri(ilege of a
nati(e"born citizen.
4oteK The Philippines follows () and (@)
Election of citizenship nder the $HG9 Constittion:
Prior to the $H9( Constittion. if a 2ilipina 'arried an alien. she lost her 2ilipino
citizenship3 Hence. her child wold ha)e to elect 2ilipino citizenship pon reaching the
age of 'a,ority3 :nder the $H9( Constittion. howe)er. children born of 2ilipino
'others were already considered 2ilipinos3 Therefore. the pro)ision on election of
citizenship nder the $HG9 Constittion only applies to those persons who were born
nder the $H(; Constittion3 In order for the children to elect 2ilipino citizenship. the
'others 'st ha)e been 2ilipinos at the ti'e of their 'arriage3 So. if yor 'other was
a 2ilipina who 'arried an alien nder the $H(; constittion and yo were born before
Ranary $9. $H9(. yo can elect 2ilipino citizenship pon reaching the age of 'a,ority3
Chen 'st the election be 'ade:
The election 'st be 'ade within a reasonable period after reaching the age of
'a,ority3
E*ects of natralization:
$% The legiti'ate 'inor children of the natralized father beco'e 2ilipinos as well3
) The wife also becomes a +ilipino citizen, pro(ided that she does not ha(e any disquali$cation
which would bar her from being naturalized.
Natral=born citizens:
$% Citizens of the Philippines fro' birth who do not need to perfor' any act to ac!ire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship3
) Those who elect Philippine citizenship under #rt. AB, ?ec. 1(@) of 1.3/ &onstitution.
Farriage of 2ilipino with an alien:
1+ Eeneral 'uleK The +ilipino 16T#A,? Philippine citizenship
2+ ExceptionK Af, by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to ha(e renounced it.
E1a'ples of rennciation of Philippine citizenship:
1) Boluntarily obtaining foreign passport
) Pledging allegiance to another country (e%. by becoming a naturalized citizen of another
country)
7e=ac!isition of citizenship
Natral=born 2ilipinos who are dee'ed to ha)e lost their citizenship 'ay re=ac!ire the
sa'e )ia repatriation proceedings3 This in)ol)es ta-ing an oath of allegiance and "ling
the sa'e with the ci)il registry3
<ow may one lose citizenship:
$3 /y natralization in a foreign contry
&3 /y e1press rennciation of citizenship
(3 /y sbscribing oath or allegiance to a foreign Constittion
+3 /y ser)ing in the ar'ed forces of an ene'y contry
;3 /y being a deserter of the ar'ed forces of one8s contry
<ow may one reacquire citizenship:
$3 /y direct act of Congress
&3 /y natralization
(3 /y repatriation
C4NSTIT:TI4N5< <5C
I3 /ill of 7ights
40
?3 2reedo' of Speech and of the Press
$3 <ibel
@alandoni v. 3rilon
25 &2'( 1*5
25CTS: Pri(ate respondents published a full"page ad(ertisement in $(e ma>or daily newspapers.
These ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a P&00 &ommissioner of ha(ing
committed illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner $led a complaint for the crime of libel.
HE<?: An libel cases against public oMcials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory
statement must relate to oMcial conduct, e(en if the defamatory statement is false, unless the
public oMcial concerned pro(es that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
!nowledge that it was false or not. <ere, petitioner failed to pro(e actual malice on the part of the
pri(ate respondents. The statements embodied in the ad(ertisement are co(ered by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. This carries the right to criticize the action and
conduct of a public oMcial.
&3 2reedo' of e1pression
A"'AC"N "roadcasting Corporation v. Comelec
2 &2'( >11
25CTS: &omelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of e%it polls during elections
for the reason that e%it polls ha(e the tendency to cause confusion.
HE<?: &onducting e%it polls and reporting their results are (alid e%ercises of freedom of speech
and of the press. # limitation on them may be >usti$ed only by a danger of such substanti(e
character that the state has a right to pre(ent. The concern of the &omelec cannot be >usti$ed
since there is no showing that e%it polls cause chaos in (oting centers.
E3 7ight to Infor'ation
8onzales v. Narvasa
E.'. 4o. 1,*>) %(ugust 1," 2***+
25CTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the 6%ecuti(e ?ecretary requesting for information with
respect to the names of e%ecuti(e oMcials holding multiple positions, copies of their
appointments, and a list of recipients of lu%ury (ehicles pre(iously seized by the 7ureau of
&ustoms and turned o(er to the *Mce of the President. Petitioner $led this petition to compel the
6%ecuti(e ?ecretary to answer his letter.
HE<?: At is the duty of the 6%ecuti(e ?ecretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter
deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public oMces and utilization of public
property. The 6%ecuti(e ?ecretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment
papers.
23 E'inent ?o'ain
'antos v. Land "an= o1 the 2hilippines
E.'. 4o. 15,1 %&epte#!er 5" 2***+
HE<?: &ompensation for land e%propriation for agrarian reform is (alid, e(en if made not
completely in cash.
>3 Prohibition 5gainst I'pair'ent of Contracts
$arrison 5otors Corporation v. Navarro
E.'. 4o. 12267 %(pril 25" 2***+
25CTS: <arrison 5otors sold two truc!s to ,a(arro. ?ubsequently, the 7ureau of Anternal
1e(enue (7A1), the -and Transportation *Mce and the 7ureau of &ustomers (7*&) entered in a
5emorandum of #greement which pro(ided that for purposes of registering (ehicles, a &erti$cate
of Payment should $rst be obtained from the 7A1. 0o(ernment agents seized and detained the
two truc!s of ,a(arro after disco(ering that there were still unpaid ta%es.
HE<?: The 5emorandum of #greement does not impose any additional ta%es which would
unduly impair the contract of sale between petitioner and pri(ate respondent. Anstead, these
administrati(e orders were passed to enforce payment of e%isting 7A1 ta%es and customs duties at
the time of importation. Lhat ?ec. 14 #rt. AAA of the &onstitution prohibits is the passage of a law
which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the contracting parties.
H3 7ights ?ring In)estigation
$3 Inapplicability
a3 5d'inistrati)e In)estigation
'ebastian v. 8architorena
E.'. 4o. 11,*2> %3cto!er 1>" 2***+
25CTS: ?ome employees of the post oMce were in(estigated by the chief postal ser(ice oMcer in
connection with missing postage stamps. Guring interrogation, they submitted sworn statements.
The prosecution presented the sworn statements as e(idence. #ccused claimed that their sworn
statements were not admissible in e(idence since they were not assisted by counsel.
41
HE<?: The right to counsel is not imperati(e in administrati(e in(estigation because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public oMcers.
b3 Police <ine=:p
2eople v. 2artiare
E.'. 4o. 12775* %(pril )" 2***+
HE<?: The accused"appellantHs defense that the identi$cation made by the pri(ate complainant
in the police line"up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line"up without the
assistance of counsel is inadmissible. The stage of an in(estigation wherein a person is as!ed to
stand in a police line"up is outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel. (&ee also
People (. ?irad, 0.1. ,o. 1@4C.2, Euly C, 444)
c3 Photograph
2eople v. 8allarde
2) &2'( >)
25CTS: #ccused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court con(icted him
of murder only. The trial court re>ected the photographs ta!en of the accused immediately after
the incident on the ground that the same were ta!en when the accused was already under the
mercy of the police.
HE<?: The ta!ing of pictures of an accused, e(en without the assistance of counsel, being purely
a mechanical act, is not a (iolation of his constitutional rights against self"incrimination.
>3 5pplicability
8utang v. 2eople
E.'. 4o. 1),*6 %Quly 11" 2***+
HE<?: 1eceipt by the accused of prohibited drugs is inadmissible in e(idence.
(3 Cstodial In)estigation
2eople v. "ariFuit
E.'. 4o. 1225 %3cto!er 2" 2***+
HE<?: &onfession gi(en by the accused without the assistance of counsel, while on the way to
the police station, is inadmissible in e(idence.
2eople v. *aldez
E.'. 4o. 127276 %&epte#!er 2)" 2***+
25CTS: The accused was arrested for ban! robbery. #fter four days, the police in(estigator too!
down his e%tra>udicial confession and called a lawyer who conferred with the accused for ten
minutes and e%ecuted his confession.
HE<?: The confession is inadmissible. The moment the accused was arrested and detained, he
was already under custodial in(estigation. The lawyer was called only on the 2
th
day of detention
when the accused was about to put down his confession in writing.
2eople v. Legaspi
E.'. 4o. 115>*2 %(pril 25" 2***+
25CTS: -egaspi and +ranco were charged and con(icted of the special comple% crime of robbery
with homicide. They were identi$ed as perpetrators of the crime by someone from a group of
ele(en residents who were in(ited for questioning by the police. The accused now claims that
their rights during custodial in(estigation were (iolated.
HE<?: ,o rights were transgressed inasmuch as -egaspi and +ranco were not yet singled out as
perpetrators of the crime on ,o(ember ., 1... An(iting certain indi(iduals for questioning and
as!ing them a single question as to their whereabouts on the day of the crime do not amount to
custodial in(estigation. Lhen certain persons are already singled out and pinpointed as authors
of the crime, they are entitled to the rights of persons under custodial in(estigation.
+3 S0ciency of Carning
2eople v. 'amolde
E.'. 4o. 12>))1 %Quly 1" 2***+
25CTS: The accused was arrested for murder. 7efore he was interrogated, he was informed of
his right to remain silent, that any statement he might gi(e could be used as e(idence against
him, and that he had the right to be assisted by counsel of his own choice. Guring trial, the
prosecution oFered his confession in e(idence.
HE<?: The confession is inadmissible. The accused was gi(en only a perfunctory recitation of his
rights. This is inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
2eople v. 5anriFuez
E.'. 4o. 122)1* %=arch 15" 2***)
42
25CTS: #ccused were found guilty of two counts of murder. They e%ecuted an e%tra">udicial
confession wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime. They also
signed a wai(er in the presence of a counsel which contained that they did not want the
assistance of counsel.
HE<?: 1ights to remain silent and to counsel were (iolated. The lawyerHs e%planation on the
eFects of the wai(er is unsatisfactory. #lso, the e%tra">udicial confession is inadmissible e(idence.
At is intrinsically Rawed. At was merely attached as page of the wai(er. At was not prepared at
the time the wai(er was being prepared since another typewriter was used in preparing the e%tra"
>udicial confession.
2eople v. 4brero
E.'. 4o. 1221,2 %=ay 15" 2***+
25CTS: #ppellant was charged with robbery with homicide. <is e%tra">udicial confession was
presented as e(idence.
HE<?: 6%tra">udicial confession is inadmissible in e(idence because counsel for accused was not
independent. #t the time he assisted accused"appellant, he was the station commander of the
LPG and a P& captain. #s part of the police force, he could not be e%pected to ha(e eFecti(ely
assisted the accused during the in(estigation.
;3 Independence of Consel
2eople v. "ase
E.'. 4o. 1*755 %=arch *" 2***+
HE<?: Lhile the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial in(estigation cannot
aFord the ser(ices of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police in(estigators, the accused really
has the $nal choice as he may re>ect the counsel chosen for him and as! for another one. #
lawyer pro(ided by the in(estigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he ne(er raised
any ob>ection against the formerHs appointment during the course of the in(estigation. (&ee also
People (. 0allardo, @@ ?&1# @13)
D3 5d'issibility of E)idence
a3 5d'issible E)idence
2eople v. Lumandong
25 &2'( 6)*
HE<?: The four fundamental requirements on the admissibility of the e%tra>udicial confession
are: 1) the confession must be (oluntary; ) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; @) the confession must be e%press; and 2) the confession
must be in writing. (&ee also People (. Gaeng, 0.1. ,o. 1342C, #ugust 2, 444; People (.
-lanes, 0.1. ,o. 124D3, ?eptember 13, 444; and People (. 5ameng, 0.1. ,o. 1@12/, *ctober
1@, 444)
2eople v. Continente
E.'. 4o. 1***>*1 %(ugust 2)" 2***+
25CTS: The trial court con(icted the accused of murder. #mong the e(idence the trial court
relied upon were the confession of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were
inadmissible in e(idence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right.
HE<?: The written warning contained an e%planation that the in(estigation dealt with the
participation of the accused who chose not to gi(e any statement to the in(estigator and a
warning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them in court.
They contained an ad(ice that the accused might engage the ser(ice of a lawyer of their own
choice and that if they could not aFord the ser(ice of a lawyer, they would be pro(ided with one
for free. Gespite the manifestation of the accused that they intended to gi(e their statements, the
in(estigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the accused. The lawyers conferred with
the accused before their in(estigation. The accused were informed of their constitutional rights in
the presence of their counsel. The confession are admissible in e(idence.
b3 Inad'issible E)idence
2eople v. Naag
22 &2'( 51*
HE<?: &ircumstances show that the e%tra>udicial confession was signed without the assistance of
counsel. #s such, it is inadmissible. The te%t of the confession is dar!er suggesting that a
diFerent typewriter was used from that used to type the name of the accused. (&ee also People (.
Paglinawan, @2 ?&1# ./)
c3 Cai)er
2eople v. $ermoso
E.'. 4o. 1*)7* %3cto!er 1>" 2***+
HE<?: Lhen the confession of the accused was gi(en without the assistance of counsel and the
accused did not ob>ect, he wai(es his right to ob>ect.
H3 7ight to /ail
Lardes v. CA
43
2, &2'( 21
25CTS: Petitioner $led a petition for bail. The trial court granted it but imposed a condition that
the appro(al of the bail bond would only be made after arraignment to ma!e sure that the
accused could not delay his trial by absenting himself.
HE<?: 7ails should be granted before arraignment. *therwise, the accused might be precluded
from $ling a motion to quash.
I3 7ight to Consel
$3 5bsence of @iolation
2eople v. AFuino
E.'. 4o. 1272>> %=arch *" 2***+
25CTS: #ccused were charged with robbery with homicide. #ccused claimed that he was denied
of his constitutional right to counsel.
HE<?: #ccused should ha(e informed the trial court if he had diMculties with his counsel. <e had
the opportunity to present his own (ersion of the e(ents but he >ust !ept quiet. 7esides, accused
was con(icted based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the wea!ness of the defense.
*illanueva v. 2eople
E.'. 4o. 1)*7> %(pril 12" 2***+
25CTS: Petitioner was found guilty of the 7ouncing &hec! -aw. <e appealed to the &ourt of
#ppeals. The &ourt of #ppeals aMrmed the con(iction. Petitioner $led a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied because it was $led out of time. Petitioner claimed that
he had a diMculty in $nding a new lawyer and that when the &# denied his motion for
reconsideration, he was denied of his right to counsel.
HE<?: Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by a
counsel de parte before the &#. There was no (iolation of his right to counsel when his new
lawyer committed a procedural blunder.

&3 Presence of @iolation
2eople v. Nadera
2, &2'( ,7*
25CTS: The accused was charged for raping his two daughters. <e pleaded guilty. The lawyer of
the accused did not cross"e%amine the $rst daughter because he was con(inced that she was
telling the truth. The cross e%amination of the second daughter centered on what she did when
she saw her sister being raped. The lawyer did not present any e(idence, and e%pressed his
conformity for the admission of the e(idence of the prosecution.
HE<?: The case should be remanded because of the neglect of the lawyer of the accused in
representing his cause.
I3 7ight to be Infor'ed
$3 ?i*erent 4*ense
2eople v. 2aglinawan
2, &2'( 75
25CTS: The accused was charged with murder. Guring trial, it was shown that the (ictims also
suFered in>uries.
HE<?: # person cannot be con(icted of a crime for which he has not been charged. #ccused
cannot be held liable for the in>uries.
&3 5bsence of Lalifying Circ'stance
2eople v. *illar
22 &2'( 7*
HE<?: Af no quali$ying circumstances were alleged in the information, accused cannot be
sentenced to death. (&ee also People (. 7ernaldez, @ ?&1# /D).
+3 N'ber of 4*ense
2eople v. 2ambid)
E.'. 4o. 12716, %=arch 1)" 2***+
HE<?: Af a person is charged only with one count of rape, e(en though the (ictim was raped more
than once, the accused can only be con(icted of one count of rape. (&ee also People (. #lnero,
0.1. ,o. 1@2C@D, #pril C, 444)
;3 ?ate of Co''ission of Cri'e
'umbang v. 8eneral Court 5artial 2R4ARegion /
E.'. 4o. 1,*1>> %(ugust " 2***+
25CTS: Petitioner, who is a member of the Philippine &onstabulary, was charged with double
murder before a general court martial. The composition of the court martial was changed four
44
times. The accused argued that his right to a speedy trial has been (iolated since the case has
been going on for years.
HE<?: The prosecution had no fault in the delay since the membership of the general court
martial underwent changes four times and none of the original members who heard the
prosecution witnesses were reappointed in the succeeding court martial. 7esides, the petitioner
failed to assert his right to a speedy trial. At was only after the general court martial resumed
hearing of the case in 1... that petitioner in(o!ed his right to a speedy trial. <is silence should
be interpreted as a wai(er of such right.
Arambulo v. LaFui
E.'. 4o. 1>)76 %3cto!er 12" 2***+
25CTS: # libel case was $led against the petitioner"accused. <e $led a motion to quash on the
ground of prescription which was denied. <e $led motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. Petitioner"accused $led a petition for certiorari in the &ourt of #ppeals which was
dismissed. <is motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner"accused later on claimed
that his right to a speedy trial was (iolated.
HE<?: The right to a speedy trial is (iolated only when there is an unreasonable delay without
the fault of the accused. Petitioner"accused is not without fault in the delay of the prosecution
against her.
F3 7ight to Confrontation
2eople v. Crispin
25 &2'( 165
HE<?: #Mda(it of a witness who was not presented as such is not admissible in e(idence.
N3 7ight to Co'plsory Process
2eople v. ;ambot
E.'. 4o. 12*)* %3ct. 1" 2***+
25CTS: The accused were charged with !idnapping for ransom. Lhen it was their turn to present
e(idence, the subpoena for the $rst witness was not ser(ed because she was un!nown at her
gi(en address, while the subpoena for the other witness was recei(ed only three days before the
hearing. #t the ne%t hearing, the two witnesses did not appear. The subpoena for the $rst
witness remained unser(ed while the subpoena for the second was recei(ed four days before date
of hearing. The trial court denied the request of the counsel of the accused for postponement and
considered the case submitted for decision e(en though it issued a warrant for the arrest of the
second witness.
HE<?: The delay is not entirely attributable to the accused. The trial court should ha(e granted
postponement.
43 7ight to Speedy ?isposition of Cases
3ansal v. 6ernandez
25 &2'( 1,)
25CTS: Petitioners, who were oMcers of the ,ational +ood #uthority, were charged with estafa
thru falsi$cation of a public document in the oMce of the *mbudsman. #n additional charge for
(iolation of the #nti"0raft and &orrupt Practices #ct was $led against the petitioners. 5ore than
one year and four months after the cases were submitted for resolution, the *Mce of the
*mbudsman issued a resolution recommending the $ling of a case for estafa thru falsi$cation and
a case for (iolation of the #nti"0raft and &orrupt Practices #ct against the petitioners. Petitioners
argued that the delay in the termination of the preliminary in(estigation (iolated their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases.
HE<?: The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relati(e and Re%ible concept. At is
consistent with reasonable delay. The protection under the speedy disposition of cases should not
operate as to depri(e the go(ernment of the inherent prerogati(e to prosecute criminal cases or in
seeing to it that all who approach the bar of >ustice be aForded a fair opportunity to present their
side. At cannot be said that petitioners found themsel(es in a situation oppressi(e to their rights
simply by reason of delay.
3omingo v. 'andiganba9an
22 &2'( 6))
25CTS: *n 5ay D, 1.3/, a complaint was $led with the Tanodbayan against petitioner for
(iolation of the #nti"0raft and &orrupt Practices #ct. *n Euly @4, 1.., a case was $led against
petitioner with the ?andiganbayan. Petitioner argued that the inordinate delay in the preliminary
in(estigation (iolated right to speedy disposition of his case.
HE<?: The delay was not undue since it was brought about by peculiar unforeseen
circumstances. The ?& nulli$ed the authority of the *Mce of the ?pecial Prosecutor which
necessitated the issuance of #* W1 by the *mbudsman authorizing the ?pecial Prosecutor to
continue with the preliminary in(estigation. The assigned prosecutor retired in 1.3.. #fter the
reorganization by the *mbudsman of the *Mce of the ?pecial Prosecutor, the case was assigned
to a new prosecutor. The subpoena sent to petitioner was return unser(ed because he was no
45
longer connected with his pre(ious oMce. The prosecutor issued another subpoena to gi(e
petitioner chance to $le counteraMda(its which he $led only on 5arch 1...
Castillo v. 'andiganba9an
E.'. 4o. 1*7251 %=arch 1," 2***+
25CTS: *n #ugust C, 1.3D, a complaint was $led against petitioners with the Tanodbayan. *n
*ct. @4, 1.3/, the Tanodbayan recommended $ling a case for (iolation of the #nti"0raft and
&orrupt Practices #ct. Petitioners $led motion for rein(estigation. The *mbudsman $led an
information against petitioners on ,o(ember C, 1..4 without $rst resol(ing the motion for
rein(estigation. Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed for un>usti$ed delay in the
$ling of the information.
HE<?: There was no (iolation of right to speedy trial. The delay was not capricious nor
oppressi(e but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initial stages
of the case.
Raro v. 'andiganba9an
E.'. 4o. 1*>,1 %Quly 1," 2***+
25CTS: The complaint against petitioner for (iolation of the #nti"0raft and &orrupt Practices #ct
was referred by the Geputy *mbudsman to the ,7A for in(estigation. The ,7A recommended the
prosecution of the petitioners. <owe(er, the petitioners argue that the four"year delay in the
completion of the preliminary in(estigation (iolated right to speedy disposition of cases.
HE<?: At too! the ,7A years to complete its report. The resolution recommending the $ling of
the case against petitioner has to be re(iewed. The length of time it too! before the conclusion of
the preliminary in(estigation may only be attributed to the adherence of the *mbudsman and ,7A
to the rudiments of fair play.
P3 Prohibition 5gainst Crel Pnish'ent
2eople v. Alicante
E.'. 4o. 125*26 %=ay 1" 2***+
HE<?: Geath penalty is not cruel.
L3 ?oble Reopardy
$3 Ter'ination
2eople v. *elasco
E.'. 4o. 125,,, %&epte#!er 1" 2***+
25CTS: Trial court acquitted respondent from a case of murder; two cases of frustrated murder
and a case for illegal possession of $rearms outside of his residence. The prosecution $led a
petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court deliberately and wrongfully interpreted
certain facts and e(idence.
HE<?: *n the ground of double >eopardy, an acquittal is $nal and unappealable. Prosecution
cannot accomplish through a writ of certiorari what it could not do so by appeal.
&3 ?i*erent 4*enses
2eople v. 4ng
22 &2'( >
HE<?: #n illegal recruiter can be charged with estafa and illegal recruitment (&ee also People (.
5eris, 0.1. ,o. 11/12C, 5arch 3, 444)
II3 Citizenship
*alles v. Comelec
E.'. 4o. 15*** %(ugust 7" 2***+
25CTS: 1espondent was born in #ustralia on 5ay 1D, 1.@2 to a +ilipino father and an #ustralian
mother. ?he ran for go(ernor. Petitioner, her opponent, $led a case for disquali$cation on the
ground that she is not a +ilipino citizen since she was issued an alien certi$cate of registration;
there was an application for an immigrant certi$cate of residence and she was a holder of an
#ustralian passport.
HE<?: The respondent is a +ilipino citizen since her father is a +ilipino. <olding of an #ustralian
passport and an alien certi$cate of registration does not constitute an eFecti(e renunciation of
citizenship and does not militate against her claim of +ilipino citizenship. #t most, she has dual
citizenship.
*alles v. Comelec
E.'. 4o. 15*** %(ugust 7" 2***+
25CTS: 1espondent was born in #ustralia to a +ilipino father and an #ustralian mother. #ustralia
follows 8us soli. ?he ran for go(ernor. *pponent $led petition to disqualify her on the ground of
dual citizenship.
46
HE<?: Gual citizenship as a disquali$cation refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that
she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public oMce. +iling
a certi$cate of candidacy suMces to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certi$cate, the
candidate declares himself to be a +ilipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine
&onstitution. ?uch declaration operates as an eFecti(e renunciation of foreign citizenship.
('T02/E 000 T @0// 31 '0E;T&
Section +3 No law shall be passed abridging the freedo' of speech. of e1pression. or
of the press. or of the right of the people peaceably to asse'ble and petition the
go)ern'ent for redress of grie)ances3
Chat are considered protected speech:
Protected speech includes e(ery form of e%pression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded.
At includes motion pictures as well as what is !nown as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an
armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful pic!eting has also been included within the meaning of
speech.
Prohi!itions under &ection ,
@. Prohibition against P1A*1 16?T1#A,T
2. Prohibition against ?=7?6N=6,T P=,A?<56,T
47
Prohi!ition against prior restraint

. Prior restraint means oMcial go(ernmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
e%pression in ad(ance of actual publication or dissemination.
@. 6%amplesTforms of prior restraint
e. mo(ie censorship
f. >udicial prior restraint U in>unction against publication
g. license ta%es based on gross receipts for the pri(ilege of engaging in the business of
ad(ertising in any newspaper
h. Rat license fees for the pri(ilege of selling religious boo!s
When prohi!ition does not apply
c. Guring a war. 6%. 0o(ernment can pre(ent publication about the numberTlocations of its
troops (,ear (. 5innesota, @3 =? D./)
d. *bscene publications.
&tandards for allowa!le su!sequent punish#ent
T6?T &1AT61A*,
+. 3angerous &endenc9 &est &here should be a RA&#4NAL C4NN%C&#4N
between the speech and the evil apprehended.
. &lear and Present Ganger Test There should be a clear and present danger that the
words when used under such circumstances are of such
a nature as to create a &-6#1 #,G P16?6,T G#,061
that they will bring about the substanti(e e(ils that the
?tate has a right to pre(ent.
@. 7alancing of Anterests Test The courts should 7#-#,&6 the P=7-A& A,T616?T
ser(ed by legislation on one hand and the +166G*5 *+
?P66&< (or any other constitutional right) on the other.
The courts will then decide where the greater weight
should be placed.
2reedo' of Speech
The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of 'core) speech,
i.e. speech which communicates political, social or religious ideas. These en>oy the same
degree of protection. &ommercial speech, howe(er, does not.
Co''ercial Speech
2. # communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction.
C. To en>oy protection:
c. At must not be false or misleading; and
d. At should not propose an illegal transaction.
D. 6(en truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if:
d. 0o(ernment has a substantial interest to protect;
e. The regulation directly ad(ances that interest; and
f. At is not more e%tensi(e than is necessary to protect that interest. (2entral ;udson Eas
and Electric 2orp. $. Pu!lic &er$ice 2o##ission of 4J" 22/ =? CC/)
:nprotected Speech
(3 <I/E<
&. 1(0' 23==E4T %..&. 'ule+. These are statements of *PA,A*,, not of fact, and are not
considered actionable, e(en if the words used are neither mild nor temperate. Lhat is
important is that the opinion is the true and honest opinion of the person. The statements
are not used to attac! personalities but to gi(e oneHs opinion on decisions and actions.
G. 3P04034&. Lith respect to public personalities (politicians, actors, anyone with a
connection to a newsworthy e(ent), opinions can be aired regarding their public
actuations. &omment on their pri(ate li(es, if not germane to their public personae, are
not protected.
+3 4/SCENITM
&. Test for o!scenity (5iller (. &alifornia)
i(. Lhether the a(erage person, applying contemporary community standards
would $nd that the wor!, ta!en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
(. Lhether the wor! depicts or describes, in a patently oFensi(e way, se%ual
conduct, speci$cally de$ned by law.
48
(i. Lhether the wor!, ta!en as a whole, lac!s serious literary, artistic, political
or scienti$c (alue.
D. Procedure for seizure of allegedly o!scene pu!lications
(ii. #uthorities must apply for issuance of search warrant.
(iii. &ourt must be con(inced that the materials are obscene. #pply clear and
present danger test.
i%. Eudge will determine whether they are in fact 'obscene).
%. Eudge will issue a search warrant.
%i. Proper action should be $led under #rt. 41 of the 1P&.
%ii. &on(iction is sub>ect to appeal.
7ight of 5sse'bly and Petition
+3 The standards for allowable i'pair'ent of speech and press also apply to the right
of asse'bly and petition3
C. 1ules on assembly in public places:
(. #pplicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when the assembly will ta!e place.
(i. The application should be $led ahead of time to enable the public oMcial concerned
to appraise whether there are (alid ob>ections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant, but in another public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the
application of the &lear and Present Ganger Test.
(ii. Af the public authority is of the (iew that there is an imminent and gra(e danger of a
substanti(e e(il, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
(iii. The decision of the public authority, whether fa(orable or ad(erse, must be
transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so
desire, ha(e recourse to the proper >udicial authority.
D. 1ules on assembly in pri(ate properties:
*nly the consent of the owner of the property or person entitled to possession thereof is
required.
?ection C. ,o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
e%ercise thereof. The free e%ercise and en>oyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall fore(er be allowed. ,o religious test shall be required for the
e%ercise of ci(il or political rights.
Clases nder Section ;
@. ,on"establishment clause
2. +ree e%ercise of 1eligion
?istinction between the clases #'chool 3istrict v. 'chempp) (9+ :S &E(%
@. The non=establish'ent clase does not depend upon any showing of direct go(ernmental
compulsion. At is (iolated by the enactment of laws which establish an oMcial religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non"obser(ing indi(iduals or not. The test of compliance
with the non"establishment clause can be stated as follows: Lhat are the purposes and
primary eFect of the enactmentO Af either is the ad(ancement or inhibition of religion, the law
(iolates the non"establishment clause. Thus, in order for a law to comply with the non"
establishment clause, two requisites must be met. +irst, it has a secular legislati(e purpose.
?econd, its primary eFect neither ad(ances nor inhibits religion.
2. The free e1ercise of religion clase withdraws from legislati(e power the e%ertion of any
restraint on the free e%ercise of religion. An order to show a (iolation of this clause, the person
aFected must show the coerci(e eFect of the legislation as it operates against him in the
practice of his religion. Lhile the freedom to belie(e (non"establishment) is absolute, the
moment such belief Rows o(er into action, it becomes sub>ect to go(ernment regulation.
7e!isites for go)ern'ent aid to be allowable:
2. At must ha(e a secular legislati(e purpose;
C. At must ha(e a primary eFect that neither ad(ances nor inhibits religion;
D. At must not require e%cessi(e entanglement with recipient institutions.
?ection D. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired e%cept upon lawful order of the court. ,either shall the right to tra(el be impaired
e%cept in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be pro(ided by
law.
49
7ights garanteed nder Section D:
(3 2reedo' to choose and change one8s place of abode3
2. +reedom to tra(el within the country and outside.
50
Crtail'ent of rights:
1A0<T 5#,,61 *+ &=1T#A-56,T
1. -iberty of abode -awful order of the court and within the limits prescribed by
law.
. 1ight to tra(el 5ay be curtailed e(en by administrati(e oMcers (e%. passport
oMcers) in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be pro(ided by law.
Note: The right to tra(el and the liberty of abode are distinct from the right to return to oneHs
country, as shown by the fact that the Geclaration of <uman 1ights and the &o(enant on <uman
1ights ha(e separate guarantees for these. <ence, the right to return to oneHs country is not
co(ered by the speci$c right to tra(el and liberty of abode. (=arcos $. =anglapus)
?ection /. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
7ights garanteed nder Section 9
@. 1ight to information on matters of public concern
2. 1ight of access to oMcial records and documents
Persons entitled to the abo(e rights
*nly +ilipino citizens.
Discretion of go$ern#ent
The go(ernment has discretion with respect to the authority to determine what matters are of
public concern and the authority to determine the manner of access to them.
7ecognized restrictions on the right of the people to infor'ation:
.. ,ational security matters
14. Antelligence information
11. Trade secrets
1. 7an!ing transactions
1@. Giplomatic correspondence
12. 6%ecuti(e sessions
1C. &losed door cabinet meetings
1D. ?upreme &ourt deliberations
Section $E3 No law i'pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed3
Chen does a law i'pair the obligation of contracts:
2) Af it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of
performance
C) Af it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those e%pressed
D) Af it authorizes for its satisfaction something diFerent from that pro(ided in its terms.
# mere change in P1*&6G=1#- 1656GA6? which does not change the substance of the contract,
and which still lea(es an eMcacious remedy for enforcement does ,*T impair the obligation of
contracts.
# (alid e%ercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.
51
Section $&3 7ights of person nder in)estigation for the co''ission of an o*ense3
7ights of person nder in)estigation for the Co''ission of an o*ense C4?E: SCISI
C) 1ight to remain silent
D) 1ight to ha(e competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
/) 1ight to pro(ided with the ser(ices of counsel if he cannot aFord the ser(ices of one.
3) 1ight to be informed of these rights.
Chen rights are a)ailable:
C) #+T61 a person has been ta!en into custody or
D) Lhen a person is otherwise depri(ed of his freedom of action in any signi$cant way.
/) Lhen the in(estigation is being conducted by the go(ernment (police, G*E, ,7A) with respect
to a criminal oFense.
3) ?igning of arrest reports and boo!ing sheets.
Chen rights are not a)ailable:
C) Guring a police line"up. 6%ception: *nce there is a mo(e among the in(estigators to elicit
admissions or confessions from the suspect.
D) Guring administrati(e in(estigations.
/) &onfessions made by an accused at the time he (oluntarily surrendered to the police or
outside the conte%t of a formal in(estigation.
3) ?tatements made to a pri(ate person.
Exclusionary rule
3- #ny confession or admission obtained in (iolation of this section shall be inadmissible in
e(idence against him (the accused).
4- Therefore, any e(idence obtained by (irtue of an illegally obtained confession is also
inadmissible, being the fruit of a poisoned tree.
7e!isites of )alid wai)er:
@) Lai(er should be made in L1ATA,0
2) Lai(er should be made in the P16?6,&6 *+ &*=,?6-.
Section $(3 7ight to bail
Cho are entitled to bail:
2) #ll persons #&T=#--J G6T#A,6G
C) shall, 76+*16 &*,BA&TA*,
D) 7e entitled to bail.
Cho are not entitled to bail:
2) Persons charged with oFenses P=,A?<#7-6 by 16&-=?A*, P61P6T=# or G6#T<, when
e(idence of guilt is strong
C) Persons &*,BA&T6G by the trial court. 7ail is only discretionary pending appeal.
D) Persons who are members of the #+P facing a court martial.
52
4ther rights in relation to bail3
@) The right to bail shall ,*T be impaired e(en when the pri(ilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
2) 6%cessi(e bail shall not be required.
2actors considered in setting the a'ont of bail:
11) #bility to post bail
1) ,ature of the oFense
1@) Penalty imposed by law
12) &haracter and reputation of the accused
1C) <ealth of the accused
1D) ?trength of the e(idence
1/) Probability of appearing at the trial
13) +orfeiture of pre(ious bail bonds
1.) Lhether accused was a fugiti(e from >ustice when arrested
4) Af accused is under bond in other cases
I'plicit li'itations on the right to bail:
@. The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the law.
2. The constitutional right is a(ailable only in criminal cases, not, e.g. in deportation proceedings.
Note:
@. 1ight to bail is not a(ailable in the military.
2. #part from bail, a person may attain pro(isional liberty through recognizance.
?ection 12. 1ights of an accused
7ights of a person charged with a cri'inal o*ense
3. 1ight to due process of law
.. 1ight to be presumed innocent
14. 1ight to be heard by himself and counsel
11. 1ight to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
1. 1ight to ha(e a speedy, impartial and public trial
1@. 1ight to meet the witnesses face to face
12. 1ight to ha(e compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
e(idence in his behalf
9D.E P'32E&&:
This means that the accused can only be con(icted by a tribunal which is required to comply with
the stringent requirements of the rules of criminal procedure.
9P'E&.=PT034 31 04432E42E:
The &onstitution does not prohibit the legislature from pro(iding that proof of certain facts leads to
a prima facie presumption of guilt, pro(ided that the facts pro(ed ha(e a reasonable connection to
the ultimate fact presumed.
Presumption of guilt should not be conclusi(e.
53
9'0E;T T3 @E ;E(' @J ;0=&E/1 (4D 23.4&E/:
The right to be heard incldes the following rights:
. 1ight to be present at the trial
6. The right to be present co(ers the period from #11#A0,56,T to P1*5=-0#TA*, of
sentence.
+. #fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused, pro(ided
requisites are met. ,ote, that trial in absentia is allowed only if the accused has been
(alidly arraigned.
(iii) #ccused has been duly noti$ed; and
(i() <is failure to appear is un>usti$able.
0. The accused may wai(e the right to be present at the trial by not showing up.
<owe(er, the court can still compel the attendance of the accused if necessary for
identi$cation purposes. 6I&6PTA*,: Af the accused, after arraignment, has stipulated
that he is indeed the person charged with the oFense and named in the information,
and that any time a witness refers to a name by which he is !nown, the witness is to be
understood as referring to him.
<. Lhile the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of >udgement, the
absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not aFect its (alidity.
&3 7ight to consel
(c) 1ight to counsel means the right to 6++6&TAB6 16P16?6,T#TA*,.
(d) Af the accused appears at arraignment without counsel, the >udge must:
(() Anform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment
((i) #s! the accused if he desires the aid of counsel
((ii) Af the accused desires counsel, but cannot aFord one, a counsel de o$cio must
be appointed
((iii) Af the accused desires to obtain his own counsel, the court must gi(e him a
reasonable time to get one.
@. 1ight to an impartial >udge
2. 1ight of confrontation and cross"e%amination
C. 1ight to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
?R#8$& &4 "% #N64R5%3 46 &$% NA&<R% AN3 CA<'% 46 ACC<'A&#4N A8A#N'& $#5K
Prposes of the right:
2) To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma!e
his defenses
C) To a(ail himself of his con(iction or acquittal against a further prosecution for the same cause
D) To inform the court of the facts alleged.
Af the information fails to allege the material elements of the oFense, the accused cannot be
con(icted thereof e(en if the prosecution is able to present e(idence during the trial with respect
to such elements.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in the information. At is
not determined based on the caption or preamble thereof nor from the speci$cation of the
pro(ision of law allegedly (iolated.
9'0E;T T3 &PEEDJ" 0=P('T0(/ (4D P.@/02 T'0(/:
2actors sed in deter'ining whether the right to a speedy trial has been )iolated
D) Time e%pired from the $ling of the information
/) -ength of delay in(ol(ed
3) 1easons for the delay
.) #ssertion or non"assertion of the right by the accused
14) Pre>udice caused to the defendant.
E*ect of dis'issal based on the grond of )iolation of the accsed8s right to speedy
trial
Af the dismissal is (alid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used as basis to claim double
>eopardy. This would be the eFect e(en if the dismissal was made with the consent of the accused
54
7e'edy of the accsed if his right to speedy trial has been )iolated
He can 'o)e for the dis'issal of the case3
Af he is detained, he can $le a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
?e"nition of i'partial trial
The accsed is entitled to the Acold netrality of an i'partial ,dgeB3
At is an element of due process.
?e"nition of pblic trial
The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespecti(e of their relationship to the accused.
<owe(er, if the e(idence to be adduced is 'oFensi(e to decency or public morals), the public may
be e%cluded.
The right of the accsed to a pblic trial is not )iolated if the hearings are condcted
on Satrdays. either with the consent of the accsed or if failed to ob,ect thereto3
?R#8$& &4 5%%& >#&N%'' 6AC% &4 6AC%K
Prposes of the right:
@. To aFord the accused an opportunity to cross"e%amine the witness
2. To allow the >udge the opportunity to obser(e the deportment of the witness
2ailre of the accsed to cross=e1a'ine a witness
Af the failure of the accused to cross"e%amine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due to
the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should be e%cluded.
Chen the right to cross=e1a'ine is de'andable
At is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be a(ailed of during preliminary in(estigations.
Principal exceptions to the right of confrontation
2. The admissibility of 'dying declarations)
C. Trial in absentia under ?ection 12()
D. Lith respect to child testimony
?ection 1. ,o person shall be twice put in >eopardy of punishment for the same oFense. Af an
act punished by a law and an ordinance, con(iction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
'equisites for a $alid defense of dou!le 8eopardyK 23DEK (T&
,+ +irst >eopardy must ha(e attached prior to the second.
)+ The $rst >eopardy must ha(e ter#inated.
6+ The second >eopardy must be for the sa#e oDense as that in the $rst.
Chen does ,eopardy 5TT5CH: #$
st
re!isite% C4?E: CIC5@
D) # person is charged
/) =nder a complaint or information suMcient in form and substance to sustain a con(iction
3) 7efore a court of competent >urisdiction
.) #fter the person is arraigned
14) ?uch person enters a (alid plea.
Chen does ,eopardy N4T attach:
C) Af information does not charge any oFense
D) Af, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents e(idence of complete self"defense, and the court
thereafter acquits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused.
/) Af the information for an oFense cognizable by the 1T& is $led with the 5T&.
3) Af a complaint $led for preliminary in(estigation is dismissed.
Chen does "rst ,eopardy TE7FIN5TE: #&
N?
7EL:ISITE%
C) #cquittal
D) &on(iction
/) Gismissal LT* the 6IP16?? consent of the accused
3) Gismissal on the merits.
E1a'ples of ter'ination of ,eopardy:
55
;% ?is'issal based on )iolation of the right to a speedy trial3 This a'onts to an
ac!ittal3
D) Gismissal based on a demurrer to e(idence. This is a dismissal on the merits.
/) Gismissal on motion of the prosecution, subsequent to a motion for rein(estigation $led by the
accused.
3) Gischarge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an acquittal.
Chen can the P74SEC:TI4N appeal fro' an order of dis'issal:
D% If dis'issal is on 'otion of the accsed3 E1ception: If 'otion is based on )iolation
of the right to a speedy trial or on a de'rrer to e)idence3
/) Af dismissal does ,*T amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits
3) Af the question to be passed upon is purely legal.
.) Af the dismissal (iolates the right of due process of the prosecution.
14) Af the dismissal was made with gra(e abuse of discretion.
Chat are considered to be the AS5FE 422ENSEB: #nder the $
st
sentence of Section
&$%
+% E1act identity between the o*enses charged in the "rst and second cases3
C) *ne oFense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other oFense.
D) *ne oFense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.
4oteK where a single act results in the (iolation of diFerent laws or diFerent pro(isions of the
same law, the prosecution for one will not bar the other so long as none of the e%ceptions apply.
?e"nition of doble ,eopardy #&
nd
sentence of Sec3 &$%
?oble ,eopardy will reslt if the act pnishable nder the law and the ordinance are
the sa'e3 2or there to be doble ,eopardy. it is not necessary that the o*ense be the
sa'e3
S:PE7@ENIN> 25CTS
(% :nder the 7les of Cort. a con)iction for an o*ense will not bar a prosection for
an o*ense which necessarily incldes the o*ense charged in the for'er infor'ation
where:
G. The gra(er oFense de(eloped due to a super(ening fact arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge.
6. The facts constituting the gra(er oFense became !nown or were disco(ered only after
the $ling of the former information.
+. The plea of guilty to the lesser oFense was made without the consent of the $scal and
the oFended party.
2) =nder (1)(b), if the facts could ha(e been disco(ered by the prosecution but were not
disco(ered because of the prosecutionHs incompetence, it would not be considered a
super(ening e(ent.
E*ect of appeal by the accsed:
If the accsed appeals his con)iction. he C5I@ES his right to plead doble ,eopardy3
The whole case will be open to re)iew by the appellate cort3 Sch cort 'ay e)en
increase the penalties i'posed on the accsed by the trial cort3
?ection . ,o e% post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
?e"nition of e1=post facto law3
9% 4ne which 'a-es an action done before the passing of the law. and which was
innocent when done. cri'inal. and pnishes sch action3
3) *ne which aggra(ates the crime or ma!es it greater than when it was committed.
.) *ne which changes the punishment and inRicts a greater punishment than that which the law
anne%ed to the crime when it was committed.
14) *ne which alters the legal rules of e(idence and recei(es less testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the oFense in order to con(ict the accused.
11) *ne which assumes to regulate ci(il rights and remedies only 7=T, in eFect, imposes a penalty
or depri(ation of a right, which, when done, was lawful.
1) *ne which depri(es a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled such as the protection of a former con(iction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty.
4oteK The prohibition on e% post facto laws only applies to retrospecti(e P6,#- laws.
?e"nition of /I<< 42 5TT5IN?E7
56
+% 5 bill of attainder is a <E>IS<5TI@E act which inIicts pnish'ent C/4 R:?ICI5< trial3
C) The bill of attainder does not need to be directed at a speci$cally named person. At may also
refer to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inRict punishment on
them without >udicial trial.
D) 6lements of the bill of attainder
G. There must be a -#L.
6. The law imposes a P6,#- burden on a ,#56G A,BAGAG=#-T6#?A-J #?&61T#A,#7-6
565761? of a 01*=P.
+. The penal burden is imposed GA16&T-J by the -#L LT* E=GA&A#- trial.
#1TA&-6 AB K &ATAV6,?<AP
Cho are citizens of the PhilippinesU
;% Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the ti'e of the adoption of the $HG9
Constittion
D) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
/) Those born before Eanuary 1/, 1./@ of +ilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of ma>ority.
3) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Fodes of ac!iring citizenship:
2) Eus ?oli K acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth
C) Eus ?anguinis K acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship
D) ,aturalization K the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the pri(ilege of a
nati(e"born citizen.
4oteK The Philippines follows () and (@)
Election of citizenship nder the $HG9 Constittion:
Prior to the $H9( Constittion. if a 2ilipina 'arried an alien. she lost her 2ilipino
citizenship3 Hence. her child wold ha)e to elect 2ilipino citizenship pon reaching the
age of 'a,ority3 :nder the $H9( Constittion. howe)er. children born of 2ilipino
'others were already considered 2ilipinos3 Therefore. the pro)ision on election of
citizenship nder the $HG9 Constittion only applies to those persons who were born
nder the $H(; Constittion3 In order for the children to elect 2ilipino citizenship. the
'others 'st ha)e been 2ilipinos at the ti'e of their 'arriage3 So. if yor 'other was
a 2ilipina who 'arried an alien nder the $H(; constittion and yo were born before
Ranary $9. $H9(. yo can elect 2ilipino citizenship pon reaching the age of 'a,ority3
Chen 'st the election be 'ade:
The election 'st be 'ade within a reasonable period after reaching the age of
'a,ority3
E*ects of natralization:
(% The legiti'ate 'inor children of the natralized father beco'e 2ilipinos as well3
2) The wife also becomes a +ilipino citizen, pro(ided that she does not ha(e any disquali$cation
which would bar her from being naturalized.
Natral=born citizens:
(% Citizens of the Philippines fro' birth who do not need to perfor' any act to ac!ire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship3
2) Those who elect Philippine citizenship under #rt. AB, ?ec. 1(@) of 1.3/ &onstitution.
Farriage of 2ilipino with an alien:
+ Eeneral 'uleK The +ilipino 16T#A,? Philippine citizenship
,+ ExceptionK Af, by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to ha(e renounced it.
E1a'ples of rennciation of Philippine citizenship:
@) Boluntarily obtaining foreign passport
2) Pledging allegiance to another country (e%. by becoming a naturalized citizen of another
country)
7e=ac!isition of citizenship
57
Natral=born 2ilipinos who are dee'ed to ha)e lost their citizenship 'ay re=ac!ire the
sa'e )ia repatriation proceedings3 This in)ol)es ta-ing an oath of allegiance and "ling
the sa'e with the ci)il registry3
<ow may one lose citizenship:
D3 /y natralization in a foreign contry
93 /y e1press rennciation of citizenship
G3 /y sbscribing oath or allegiance to a foreign Constittion
H3 /y ser)ing in the ar'ed forces of an ene'y contry
$E3/y being a deserter of the ar'ed forces of one8s contry
<ow may one reacquire citizenship:
+3 /y direct act of Congress
;3 /y natralization
D3 /y repatriation
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