Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UPDATES
1)
The Comelec en banc cannot now be declared to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner
candidate for Representatative because (1) the Comelec
decision is already final, the petition here having been filed
after five days from notice, and (2) Comelec still has
jurisdiction over the case since petitioner had not yet assumed
office. HRET's jurisdiction sets in when the candidate has
been proclaimed, has taken oath and has assumed office.
(Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June
25, 2013. (En Banc, Perez, J.)
(The proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation. (Limkaichong v. Comelec, G.R. Nos.
178831-32, etc., April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1). HRET rules
count the 15-day period to file protests and quo warranto from
the time of the proclamation, Rule 16 & 17. Dissenting
Opinion of Brion, J.).
Furthermore, Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding petitioner to have lost and abandoned her
domicile of origin when she became a naturalized American
citizen. (Ibid.,Brion, J.)
2)
Renunciation of US citizenship followed by repeated use
of US passport shows lack of abandonment of US citizenship.
(Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013.
(Resolution En Banc, C.J.).
3)
Bigamy is commited where the first marriage still
existed when the second marriage was contracted, even if the
first marriage is later declared void.
(Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013. (3rd Div.,
Peralta, J.)
4)
Decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately
executory.
5)
The rule in redemption of properties is that it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests a desire to
do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes
the exercise of the right to repurchase. (See, Art. 1616, Civil
Code).
Signifying their intention to avail of the incentive
scheme (liberalizing payments and terms) did not amount to an
exercise of redemption precluding the bank from making the
public sale.
(Note by ASA: The liberalized incentive scheme
program was to expire on December 31, 1988. The bank sold
the properties on November 4, 1988. Yet, petitioners' claim
that the sale was premature was rejected by the SC on the
ground that the evidence (a letter) did not show that the bank
had unequalifiedly represented to petitioners that it had
extended the redemption period to December 31, 1988. The
letter to petitioners had said both that the incentive scheme
[open to all owners of foreclosed properties] would expire
December 31, 1988, and that their own redemption was up to
April 21, 1988. For me, the letter of the bank was
misleading.)
(Spouses Hojas v. Philippine Amanah Bank, G.R. No. 193453,
June 5, 2013. (3rd Div., Mendoza, J.)
6)
An unregistered deed of sale has an inferior probative
value to a title certificate.
(Meralco v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, G.R. No. 192893, June 5,
2013, (3rd Div., Mendoza, J.)
7)
A broker has the right to the agreed commission even if
the owner revoked his authority and directly negotiated with
the buyer whom the owner met thru the broker's efforts.
(Infante v. Cunanan, 93 Phil. 691, 695 [1953]).
As for the fact that the properties were eventually sold
for less than the original asking price, that was within the
owner's discretion, decided unilaterally without consulting the
broker. Thus, the owner should be deemed to have waived its
own minimum price requirement.
8)
When is a person engaged in labor-only contracting?
What is its effect?
1)
Removal of chairs in the bottling plant of Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Inc. not violative of labor laws.
1. Law requires chairs only for women workers. In this
case, all operators were men.
9)
Fair market value of land taken for agrarian reform is
reckoned as of the time of the taking.
11)
The rule is that a proper special procedings is required
to declare heirship and the issue cannot be ventilated in a suit
for recovery of property. Exceptions:
(1) For practical reasons, when it appeared that no other
property was involved in the inheritance and the parties in the
civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and already presented their evidence regarding the heirship and
the RTC consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
(2) When a special proceeding had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, and, hence, cannot be
re-opened.
(Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ponteras, G.R. No. 198680, July
8, 2013. (Resolution En banc, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
12)
Relaxation of procedural rules by way of exceptions to
finality and entry of judgments (the doctrine of immutability of
judgments) are allowed by reversing judgments and recalling
their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where
special and compelling reasons exist for such actions. (Apo
Fruits Corp. v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 164195, Oct. 12, 2010,
632 SCRA 727, 760 citing Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac,
G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417).
(Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013. (3rd Div.,
Mendoza, J.)
2)
The doctrine of indefeseability of Torrens title does not
extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad
faith.
In this case: petitioners-buyers acted in bad faith: (1)
seller did not have possession of subject property; (2) during
the sale, seller did not have the owner's duplicate copy of the
title; (3) there were existing permanent improvements on the
land; (4) respondents were in actual possession of the land.
(Sps. Esmeraldo D. Vallido, et al. v. Sps. Elmer Pono, et al.,
G.R. No. 200173, April 15, 2013. (3rd Div., Mendoza, J.)
3)
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without
whom no final determination can be had of the action.
Non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. The court should have directed
petitioner to implead the indispensable party. In case of
refusal, then the court can dismiss the complaint for plaintiff's
failure to comply with the order.
(Heirs of Faustino Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian,
G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013. (3rd Div., Velasco, Jr., J.)
4)
An amicable settlement reached after a barangay
conciliation, per the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
has the force and effect of a final judgment of the court,
Exception
When repudiated or a petition to nullify it is filed before
the proper city of municipal court in 10 days from its date.
Enforcement
5)
6)
LGUs and DENR share the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the forest
reserves within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGUs'
capacity in forest management is to be enhanced and then the
primary tasks of management of devolved functions shall be
performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.
Mayor Ruzol's permit to transport was held invalid for
failure to follow required procedure and for absence of
supporting ordinance.
But he is not guilty of usurpation of official functions
since he acted in good faith and he did not intend his permit to
supplant that of DENR but to complement it.
(Leovegildo R. Ruzol v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
186735-960, April 17, 2013. (3rd Div., Velasco, J.)
Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost for the full
value of his or her negligent conduct even if it results in a
windfall for the innocent plaintiff. (Citations omitted)
As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to
place the responsibility for losses on the party causing them.
(PERILLO, JOSEPH M., THE COLLATERAL SOURCE
RULES IN CONTRACT CASES, San Diego Law Review, 46
San
Diego
L.
Rev.
705,
709-710
(Summer,
2009); www.lexis.com.>. Its application is justified so that
"'the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made
by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other
relations that may exist between the injured party and third
persons. (Wills v. Foster, Jr., supra note 40 at 397). Thus, it
finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances
under which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance
companies, regardless of who was at fault in the incident
generating the losses. (BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (Fifth
ed. 273, 1979). Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault
insurer. Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization
expenses of the dependents of its employees which had already
been paid by separate health insurance providers of said
dependents.
The Voluntary Arbitrator therefore erred in adopting
Atty. Funks view that the covered employees are entitled to
full payment of the hospital expenses incurred by their
dependents, including the amounts already paid by other health
insurance companies based on the theory of collateral source
rule.
6) Interest rates of 3%/month excessive and void!!!
(Sps. Deo Agner & Maricon Agner v. BPI Family Savings
Bank, et al., G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013):
Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a
number of
cases that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per
month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable,
and exorbitant. (Arthur F. Menchavez v. Marlyn M. Bermudez,
G.R. No. 185368, October 11, 2012). While Central Bank
Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983,
effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both
secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in
the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte
blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels
which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. (Macalinao v. Bank of the
SO ORDERED.
(4) The suit is not a nuisance or harrassment suit.
7) Rule on pretermission of holiday if extension is
granted. (Reiner Pacific International Shippng, Inc., et al. v.
Captain Francisco B. Guevarra, G.R. No. 157020, G.R. No.
157020, June 19, 2013):
The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that
"[a]ny extension of time to file the required pleading should x
x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of
the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday."
For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this
happens to be a Saturday, the time for filing it shall not run,
applying Section 1 of Rule 21, on July 10 (Saturday) nor on
July 11 (Sunday) but will resume to run on the next working
day, which is July 12 (Monday). The pleading will then be due
on the latter date. If the period is extended by 10 days, such 10
days will be counted, not from July 12 (Monday) but from the
original due date, July 10 (Saturday) "regardless of the fact that
said due date is a Saturday." Consequently, the new due date
will be 10 days from July 10 or precisely on July 20.
8) What is a derivative suit? (Juanito Ang, for and in
behalf of Sunrise Marketing (Bacolod), Inc. v. Sps. Roberto
and Rachel Ang., G.R. No. 201675, June 19, 2013):
This Court, in Yu v. Yukayguan, (G.R. No. 177549, 18
June 2009, 589 SCRA 588, at 618, citing Bitong v. Court of
Appeals, 354 Phil. 516 (1998) explained:
The Court has recognized that a stockholders right to
institute a derivative suit is not based on any express provision
of the Corporation Code, or even the Securities Regulation
Code, but is impliedly recognized when the said laws make
corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by
the corporation and its stockholders for violation of their
fiduciary duties. Hence, a stockholder may sue for
mismanagement, waste
or dissipation of corporate assets because of a special injury to
him for which he is otherwise without redress. In effect, the
suit is an action for specific performance of an obligation owed
by the corporation to the stockholders to assist its rights of
action when the corporation has been put in default by the
3)
The Paris Convention is recognized and protection is
extended to parties thereto in trademarks.
(Ecole de Cuisine Manille (Cordon Bleu of the Philippines),
Inc. v. Renaud Cointreau & Cie and Le Cordon Bleu Int'l.,
B.V., G.R. No. 185830, June 5, 2013. (2nd Div., PerlasBernabe,J.)
4)
A disqualified candidate whose certificate of candidacy
is cancelled after assumption of office is a de
facto officer. The cancellation/ disqualification thus creates no
vacancy and no succession occurs. The de jure officer just
assumes the office.
(Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 193314, June 25,
2013. (En Banc, Sereno,C.J.,)
1)
A preliminary investigation is either executive (by
a fiscal) to determine probable cause to file a case in court, or
judicial (by a judge) to determine probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest.
The judicial type is called preliminary examination.
It's the duty of the judge to make it upon receiving a
criminal complaint or information, so a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause is superfluous.
In doing this (preliminary examination), a judge may
7)
A. Rule
Where an employee is terminated for a just cause, no
separation
pay is due,
B. Exceptions
Except as an act of social justice or on equitable grounds,
C. Exceptions to the Exceptions
But not where the dismissal (1) was for serious misconduct or
(2)
reflected on the moral character of the employee.
(Unilever Phil., Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, G.R. No.
201701, June 3, 2013. (3rd Div., Mendoza, J.).
Significant
Decisions/Supreme Court
New
NOTES
(25) Ventanilla Enterprises v Tan, G R No 180325, Feb 20,
2013.
(1) Sec. 18, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court.
(2) Fortun v Quinsayas, G R No 194578, Feb 13. 2013.
(3) Tegimenta Chemical v Oco, G R No 175369, Feb 27,
2013.
Salient parts of the ruling defining for the first time the
concept of betrayal of public trust as a ground for removal, the
same ground available in cases of impeachment, are thus very
instructive:
"The Constitutional Commission eventually found it
reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to
refer to '[a]cts which are just short of being criminal but
constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical
abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism,
and gross exercise of discretionary powers.' In other words,
acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant
removal from office may be less than criminal but must be
attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the
other grounds for impeachment.
"A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not
impeachable officers. However, by providing for their
removal from office on the same grounds as removal by
impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to
redefine constitutional standards as culpable violation for the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less
stringently. Hence, wherebetrayal of public trust, for purposes
of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the
grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds
for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their
nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust
could not 'overreach' to cover acts that are not vicious or
malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for
impeachment.
"The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a
confluence of several unfortunate events including system
failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed
then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to
do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to
his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should
petitioners official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp.
Mendozas case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at
the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a
partys requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by
itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public
trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time
to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted to
his appropriate action compared to the length of time that said
draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and
denied P/S Insp. Mendozas motion for reconsideration within
nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft
resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 for the
latters final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on
the case was no longer in his hands.
"Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of
P/S/ Insp. Mendozas motion and an unexplained failure of
petitioners part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt
disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and
malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public
trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner
appears to be an isolated case.
Significant
Decisions/Supreme Court
New
BY ADOLFO S AZCUNA --
COPYRIGHT 2013.
NOTES
)
A preliminary investigation is either executive (by a
fiscal) to determine probable cause to file a case in court, or
judicial (by a judge) to determine probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest.
The judicial type is called preliminary examination.
It's the duty of the judge to make it upon receiving a
criminal complaint or information, so a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause is superfluous.
In doing this (preliminary examination), a judge may
7)
A. Rule
Where an employee is terminated for a just cause, no
separation
pay is due,
B. Exceptions
Except as an act of social justice or on equitable grounds,
C. Exceptions to the Exceptions
But not where the dismissal (1) was for serious misconduct or
(2)
reflected on the moral character of the employee.
(Unilever Phil., Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, G.R. No.
201701, June 3, 2013. (3rd Div., Mendoza, J.).
3)
The Paris Convention is recognized and protection is
extended to parties thereto in trademarks.
(Ecole de Cuisine Manille (Cordon Bleu of the Philippines),
Inc. v. Renaud Cointreau & Cie and Le Cordon Bleu Int'l.,
B.V., G.R. No. 185830, June 5, 2013. (2nd Div., PerlasBernabe,J.)
4)
A disqualified candidate whose certificate of candidacy
is cancelled after assumption of office is a de
facto officer. The cancellation/ disqualification thus creates no
vacancy and no succession occurs. The de jure officer just
assumes the office.
(Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 193314, June 25,
2013. (En Banc, Sereno,C.J.,)