Habermas The Inclusion of The Other Ok

The Inclusion of the Other
Studies in Contemporary G e r m a n Social T h o u g h t (partial listing)

T h o m a s McCarthy, g e n e r a l e d i t o r
James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy
James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's
Cosmopolitan Ideal
Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere
Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics
Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy
Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics
Jiirgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences
Jiirgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory
Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
Jiirgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians'Debate
Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures
Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles
Jiirgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays
Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication
Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society
Jiirgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"
Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory
Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts
Axel H o n n e t h and Hans Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen Habermas's T h e Theory of Communicative Action
Axel H o n n e t h , Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul
tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo
sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished
Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination
Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity
Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Post
modernism
The Inclusion of the Other

Studies in Political Theory
e d i t e d by C i a r a n C r o n i n a n d P a b l o D e Greiff
T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , Massachusetts
This translation 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This work originally appeared in German u n d e r the title Die Einbeziehung desanderen.
Studien zur politischen Theorie, 1996 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main,
Germany.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in New Baskerville by Wellington Graphics and printed and b o u n d
in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Habermas, Jiirgen.
[Einbeziehung des Anderen. English.]
T h e inclusion of the other : studies in political theory / Jiirgen Habermas : edited
by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff.
p. cm.
Translation of: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-262-08267-5 (he) 0-262-58186-8 (pb)

1. Political science. 2. Liberalism. 3, State, The. 4. H u m a n rights. 5. Democracy.
I. Cronin, Ciaran. II. De Greiff, Pablo. III. Title.
JA68.H23 1998
320.51'3dc21
98-21601
CIP
10 9 8 7 6
Contents
Editors' Introduction
Translator's Note
Preface
vii
xxxiii
xxxv
I H o w Rational Is the Authority o f the Ought?

1 A G e n e a l o g i c a l Analysis of t h e Cognitive C o n t e n t of
Morality
II Political Liberalism: A D e b a t e with J o h n Rawls
2 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c Use of R e a s o n
49
3 " R e a s o n a b l e " versus " T r u e , " o r t h e Morality of

Worldviews
75
III Is T h e r e a Future for the Nation-State?

4 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State: O n t h e Past a n d F u t u r e
of Sovereignty a n d C i t i z e n s h i p
105
5 O n t h e R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of
Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
129
6 Does E u r o p e N e e d a Constitution? Response to

Dieter G r i m m
155
Contents
IV H u m a n Rights: Global and Internal

7 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e : At T w o H u n d r e d
Years' Historical R e m o v e
165
8 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l State
203
V What Is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"?

9 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y
239
10 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e R u l e of Law
and Democracy
253
Notes
265
Index
291
T h e w i d e - r a n g i n g essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e p r o v i d e a n overview

of J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k i n political p h i l o s o p h y over t h e p a s t
d e c a d e t o g e t h e r with a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t e l a b o r a t i o n s of its basic
t h e m e s i n c o n n e c t i o n with c u r r e n t political d e b a t e s . O n e of t h e
distinctive f e a t u r e s of this w o r k h a s b e e n its a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m
of political legitimacy t h r o u g h a s u s t a i n e d reflection o n t h e d u a l
l e g i t i m a t i n g a n d r e g u l a t i n g f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n legal systems. Es
c h e w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y u t o p i a n i s m of t r a d i t i o n a l socialism while
r e m a i n i n g t r u e to its e m a n c i p a t o r y a s p i r a t i o n s , H a b e r m a s h a s fo
c u s e d o n t h e claim to legitimacy implicitly r a i s e d by t h e legal a n d
political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d h a s
a s k e d h o w this claim c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e t h e o r y of
d e m o c r a c y . E x t e n d i n g his d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r m a t i v e validity to
t h e legal-political d o m a i n , h e d e f e n d s a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of
deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h t h e b u r d e n of l e g i t i m a t i n g state
p o w e r is b o r n e by i n f o r m a l a n d legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e s s e s of
political d e l i b e r a t i o n . Its g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is t h e r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c
i d e a t h a t t h e legitimacy of political a u t h o r i t y c a n only b e s e c u r e d
t h r o u g h b r o a d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g or, m o r e succinctly, t h a t t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. I n t h e p r e s e n t
v o l u m e H a b e r m a s b r i n g s this discursive a n d p r o c e d u r a l i s t analysis of
political legitimacy to b e a r o n s u c h u r g e n t c o n t e m p o r a r y issues as
t h e e n d u r i n g legacy of t h e welfare state, t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n
state, a n d t h e p r o s p e c t s for a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights.
1
viii
H a b e r m a s ' s political p h i l o s o p h y is m a r k e d by a d u a l focus t h a t

m i r r o r s a duality i n h e r e n t in m o d e r n law itself. M o d e r n legal o r d e r s
are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , by t h e "facticity" of t h e i r e n a c t
m e n t a n d t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t by t h e state (i.e., by t h e i r positive a n d
coercive c h a r a c t e r ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , by t h e i r claim to "validity."
T h u s a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t a t t a c h e s c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e to t h e
legal system m u s t a p p r o a c h t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m two distinct t h o u g h i n t e r r e
l a t e d perspectives. I n t h e first p l a c e , it m u s t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of
legitimacy: W h a t is t h e g r o u n d of t h e validity of t h e principled of
j u s t i c e t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s ? T h i s
is, of c o u r s e , t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of m o d e r n political p h i l o s o p h y in
b o t h t h e liberal a n d civic r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s . H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y
of political l e g i t i m a t i o n is d e e p l y i n d e b t e d to b o t h , b u t h e takes his
i m m e d i a t e o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m a discursive analysis of q u e s t i o n s of
n o r m a t i v e validity. H e first d e v e l o p e d this a p p r o a c h in his d i s c o u r s e
t h e o r y of m o r a l i t y a n d n o w e x t e n d s it to t h e legal d o m a i n in a way
t h a t is sensitive to t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality t h a t set it a p a r t f r o m
morality. T h i s g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h to n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s is b a s e d o n
t h e cognitivist p r e m i s e t h a t c e r t a i n k i n d s of a c t i o n n o r m s a d m i t of
r e a s o n e d justification in p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d t h a t t h e i r validity
c a n as a c o n s e q u e n c e b e e l u c i d a t e d by a n analysis of t h e f o r m s of
a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h they a r e justified.
2
However, this n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h to law a n d politics is in n e e d of

s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n by a n analysis of t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t
positive legal o r d e r s m a k e to t h e stabilization a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n of
m o d e r n societies. M o d e r n legal systems d e v e l o p e d in r e s p o n s e to
t h e p r o b l e m s of social o r d e r c r e a t e d by a c c e l e r a t i n g p r o c e s s e s of
m o d e r n i z a t i o n ; t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality a r e d i c t a t e d by this
regulative f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n law. Moreover, H a b e r m a s claims t h a t
t h e s e two a p p r o a c h e s to law, t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f u n c t i o n a l , a r e
i n s e p a r a b l e . T h e p r o b l e m of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t b e a d d r e s s e d in a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e positive a n d
coercive c h a r a c t e r of t h e legal m e d i u m in w h i c h they a r e to b e
realized; a n d t h e s e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of m o d e r n law a r e c o n d i t i o n e d
by t h e p r o b l e m s of social i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n to w h i c h
m o d e r n legal o r d e r s r e s p o n d . It is crucial for t h e analyses of h u m a n
ix
r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of H a b e r m a s ' s
t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y t h a t t h e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e p r o b l e m t h e y a r e
i n t e n d e d t o solve a r e laid d o w n by history. If, following H a b e r m a s ,
we a p p r o a c h t h e p r o b l e m of legitimacy by asking w h a t r i g h t s free
a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s h a v e to c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r w h e n they delib
e r a t e o n h o w t h e y c a n legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by
m e a n s of law, t h e n t h e m e d i u m o r l a n g u a g e in w h i c h t h e y m u s t
a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g they a r e free to c h o o s e b u t is
i m p o s e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e task they a r e t r y i n g to solve. T h e r e
a r e n o f u n c t i o n a l alternatives to positive law as a basis for i n t e g r a t i n g
societies of t h e m o d e r n type.
It is n o t o u r a i m to offer a n exhaustive analysis of this w i d e - r a n g i n g
t h e o r e t i c a l p r o j e c t h e r e . I n s t e a d , by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n we will
o u t l i n e t h e r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r
mative legitimacy as t h e y b e a r o n his t h e o r y of legal r i g h t s (sec
t i o n 1 ) , b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o his p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of
deliberative d e m o c r a c y (section 2 ) . We will t h e n c o n s i d e r t h e impli
c a t i o n s of this p r o j e c t for t h e p r o b l e m s of t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n
state, of a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights, a n d of c o r r e s p o n d i n g
s u p r a n a t i o n a l political i n s t i t u t i o n s (section 3 ) . T h i s will p r o v i d e t h e
b a c k g r o u n d for s o m e c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s o n H a b e r m a s ' s c o n t r i b u
t i o n s to t h e d e b a t e s c u r r e n t l y r a g i n g o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d t h e
r i g h t s of c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s (section 4 ) .
1
T h e Discourse T h e o r y o f Morality and Law
H a b e r m a s starts f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t in m o d e r n , pluralistic
societies, social n o r m s c a n derive t h e i r validity only f r o m t h e r e a s o n
a n d will of t h o s e w h o s e d e c i s i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e s u p p o s e d to
b e b o u n d by t h e m . H e s h a r e s this s t a r t i n g p o i n t with J o h n Rawls,
w h o h a s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t d i s a g r e e m e n t over c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e
g o o d a n d q u e s t i o n s of u l t i m a t e value is likely to b e a n e n d u r i n g
f e a t u r e of pluralistic societies a n d c o u l d only b e o v e r c o m e t h r o u g h
t h e repressive i m p o s i t i o n of o n e belief system. Yet t h e i r r e s p o n s e s to
t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by p l u r a l i s m differ in i m p o r t a n t ways. Rawls
a r g u e s t h a t citizens c o m m i t t e d to different a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e "com
prehensive doctrines" can nevertheless reach an "overlapping
c o n s e n s u s " o n basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w h i c h t h e y justify separately

w i t h i n t h e i r o w n evaluative worldviews, a s s u m i n g t h a t they c a n d r a w
o n c e r t a i n s h a r e d ideals of t h e p e r s o n , of society, a n d of p u b l i c
r e a s o n r o o t e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c y . H a b e r
m a s , by c o n t r a s t , t h i n k s t h a t t h e r e exists a m o r e universal basis for
a g r e e m e n t o n general normative principles even a m o n g m e m b e r s
of pluralistic societies w h o differ o n q u e s t i o n s of value a n d t h e g o o d
life. T h i s c o n f i d e n c e is g r o u n d e d in t h e c e n t r a l r o l e his social t h e o r y
a c c o r d s c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h a t is, t h a t f o r m of social i n t e r a c
t i o n in w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s act o n , o r t r y t o r e a c h , a s h a r e d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n r e g u l a t i n g a n d r e p r o d u c i n g
f o r m s of social life a n d t h e i d e n t i t i e s of social a c t o r s . A m o n g t h e
t h i n g s o n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s a r e c o m m i t t e d to r e a c h i n g a
s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g to this t h e o r y a r e t h e n o r m a t i v e
a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m t h e i r actions; h e n c e t h e y a r e implicitly
o r i e n t e d to practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity of
n o r m s as a m e a n s of resolving practical d i s a g r e e m e n t s . T h i s l e a d s
H a b e r m a s t o suggest t h a t t h e g r o u n d s of t h e validity of n o r m s c a n
b e e l u c i d a t e d t h r o u g h a n analysis of t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t speak
ers u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n they e n g a g e in g o o d faith in p r a c t i c a l
argumentation. I n d e e d h e argues that these unavoidable pragmatic
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n e n t a i l a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of dis
c o u r s e , ( D ) , w h i c h specifies t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a n y valid social n o r m
m u s t satisfy: ' J u s t t h o s e n o r m s a r e valid to w h i c h all possibly affected
p e r s o n s c o u l d a g r e e as p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e s . "
4
T h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e f o r m s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of a t h e o r y of b o t h
m o r a l a n d legal validity w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to r e b u t n o n c o g n i t i v i s t
skepticism c o n c e r n i n g t h e r a t i o n a l basis of m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s .
T h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t at least a c e r t a i n r a n g e of n o r m a t i v e
q u e s t i o n s have g e n u i n e cognitive c o n J ^ t T T n " " p a r t i c u l a r , it claims
t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n ideally inclusive p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e c o u l d in
p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t o n t h e validity of t h e s e
k i n d s of n o r m s o n t h e basis of r e a s o n s t h a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e to all. T h e
idealizations to w h i c h this discursive a p p r o a c h a p p e a l s l e n d H a b e r mas's theory a d e m a n d i n g , counterfactual character: the principle
of d i s c o u r s e p o i n t s to a n ideal p r o c e d u r e of discursive validation
w h i c h f u n c t i o n s as a n o r m a t i v e s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h existing c o n 7
xi
.
d i t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e c a n b e criticized. A l t h o u g h t h e s e idealizations
a r e u n d o u b t e d l y controversial, t h e suspicion t h a t t h e y a r e simply
arbitrary, o r reflect a n idealistic c o n c e p t i o n of r e a s o n t h a t h a s little
practical r e l e v a n c e , c a n b e allayed by n o t i n g t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e r n a l l y
r e l a t e d to t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a c t o r s f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n
their identities a n d regulate their interactions.
T h i s discursive analysis of n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s allows for a s h a r p
differentiation b e t w e e n m o r a l a n d l e g a l validity. T h e p r i n c i p l e of
d i s c o u r s e e x p r e s s e s a g e n e r a l i d e a of impartiality t h a t finds different,
t h o u g h c o m p l e m e n t a r y , e x p r e s s i o n s in m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s .
H a b e r m a s ' s differentiation b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e
t r a d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t m o r a l i t y r e p r e s e n t s a h i g h e r d o m a i n of
value in w h i c h basic legal a n d political p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e g r o u n d e d .
W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e of m o d e r n societies o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d a state
a n d a positive legal o r d e r , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e basis of political
legitimacy u n d e r w e n t a p r o f o u n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : m o d e r n n a t u r a l
law o r social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b r o k e with t r a d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l law in
a r g u i n g t h a t political a u t h o r i t y flows f r o m t h e will of t h o s e w h o a r e
subject to it r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a divinely o r d a i n e d m o r a l o r d e r . Nev
e r t h e l e s s , t h e a s s u m e d priority of m o r a l i t y over law c o n t i n u e d to play
a c e n t r a l , if n o t always critically e x a m i n e d , r o l e i n b o t h t h e liberal
a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s of m o d e r n political t h o u g h t . W h e r e a s
classical liberalism in t h e L o c k e a n t r a d i t i o n a c c o r d s p r i m a r y i m p o r
t a n c e to prepolitically g r o u n d e d r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l liberty, c o m m u
n i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s a p p e a l t o values r o o t e d in i n h e r i t e d n a t i o n a l ,
religiousj o r e t h n i c i d e n t i t i e s as t h e i n e s c a p a b l e b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t
w h i c h all q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e m u s t b e a n s w e r e d . Against
b o t h t r a d i t i o n s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t law a n d m o r a l i t y s t a n d in a
c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n . T h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s e n s h r i n e d in m o d
e r n legal o r d e r s a r e essentially legal rights, n o t m o r a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e
i m p o s e d as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g
p r a c t i c e of t h e citizens, t h o u g h m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e n t e r i n t o t h e
justification of basic rights.
H a b e r m a s c o n s t r u e s m o r a l i t y in b r o a d l y K a n t i a n t e r m s as a system
of d u t i e s g r o u n d e d in t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l claim to r e s p e c t a n d c o n
s i d e r a t i o n of all p e r s o n s . M o r a l d u t i e s a r e b i n d i n g o n all b e
ings c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n a n d h e n c e h a v e u n r e s t r i c t e d o r
8
xii
universal s c o p e . However, t h e very n a t u r e of m o r a l i t y m e a n s t h a t it

is l i m i t e d as a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e
u n r e s t r i c t e d universality of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e i r h i g h l y abstract,
cognitive claim to validity, a n d t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e
d u t i e s t h e y i m p o s e c r e a t e a rift b e t w e e n m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d r e a s o n
ing, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d motivation, o n the other. Moral n o r m s
p r o v i d e a g e n t s with w e a k cognitive motives g r o u n d e d in t h e knowl
e d g e t h a t they h a v e n o g o o d r e a s o n to act o t h e r w i s e , b u t p r o v i d e
t h e m with n o r a t i o n a l motives t o act accordingly. Moreover, t h e
justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s calls for p r a c t i c a l dis
courses whose highly exacting conditions can at best b e approxi
m a t e d by real discourses. T h u s m o r a l n o r m s a r e u n s u i t a b l e for
r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s w h e r e t h e p r a c t i c a l
costs in t i m e a n d effort of establishing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s
of m u t u a l t r u s t r e q u i r e d for practical discourses a r e t o o h i g h .
As a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s ,
m o d e r n law h a s a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t s t r u c t u r a l a d v a n t a g e s over
morality. M o d e r n legal systems s e c u r e a s p a c e of i n d i v i d u a l liberty in
w h i c h citizens a r e free to p u r s u e t h e i r private p u r p o s e s by c o n f e r r i n g
a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o n all citizens: w h e r e a s in t h e m o r a l
d o m a i n d u t i e s a r e p r i o r to r i g h t s a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , in t h e legal
d o m a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a r e p r i o r to d u t i e s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e
H o b b e s i a n p r i n c i p l e t h a t w h a t e v e r is n o t p r o h i b i t e d is p e r m i t t e d . I n
a d d i t i o n , w h e r e a s m o r a l i t y m u s t rely o n t h e w e a k s a n c t i o n s of a
guilty c o n s c i e n c e , t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of legal n o r m s is e n s u r e d by t h e
p o l i c e a n d p e n a l p o w e r of t h e state. T h o u g h t h e c o n t e n t of basic
legal n o r m s m a y s o m e t i m e s b e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t of univer
sal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e fact t h a t legal n o r m s m u s t b e e n a c t e d a n d
t h a t all legal n o r m s a r e in p r i n c i p l e subject to revision m e a n s t h a t
t h e i r d o m a i n of a p p l i c a t i o n is l i m i t e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e to a
p a r t i c u l a r j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d its citizenry.
If we a r e t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e distinctive m o d e of legitimacy of
positive legal o r d e r s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , we s h o u l d b e g i n by a s k i n g
w h a t basic r i g h t s free a n d e q u a l citizens m u s t c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r
if t h e y a r e to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of positive law.
O n c e t h e g o a l of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e is a p p r o p r i a t e l y
c h a r a c t e r i z e d , t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it m u s t
xiii
b e a c c o m p l i s h e d t h a t is, positive, coercive lawset strict limits o n

t h e possible o u t c o m e s of t h e p r o c e d u r e . I n particular, since legal
r i g h t s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t citizens h a v e t h e status of legal subjects, t h e
citizens m u s t first c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r c e r t a i n basic liberty rights
w h i c h g u a r a n t e e t h e m this artificial status, i n c l u d i n g r i g h t s to t h e
g r e a t e s t possible m e a s u r e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties, r i g h t s of
m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e political c o m m u n i t y , a n d r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e i n g
i n d i v i d u a l legal p r o t e c t i o n . W i t h o u t t h e s e r i g h t s of private auton
omy, w h i c h c r e a t e a s p a c e for citizens to p u r s u e t h e i r private e n d s
free f r o m i n t e r f e r e n c e , m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t s c o u l d n o t r e a s o n
ably b e e x p e c t e d to s u b m i t t h e m s e l v e s voluntarily to a coercive legal
o r d e r . B u t in a d d i t i o n t h e y m u s t g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r basic rights of
political participation o r r i g h t s of public autonomy t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e
laws t h a t give effect to all of t h e basic rights, i n c l u d i n g t h e political
r i g h t s themselves, a r e f o r m u l a t e d a n d e n a c t e d . C o n t r a r y to classical
liberalism, w h i c h treats liberty r i g h t s as p r e p o l i t i c a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d
i n t e r p r e t s t h e m as n e g a t i v e r i g h t s of n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e , H a b e r m a s
a r g u e s t h a t liberty r i g h t s c a n n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t b r o a d
p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e p r o c e s s e s of political o p i n i o n - f o r m a t i o n
of a n inclusive p u b l i c s p h e r e , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e citizens c a n influ
e n c e t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t a r e e m b o d i e d
in t h e l a w . V i e w e d f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , political r i g h t s c a n b e
r e p r e s e n t e d as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e ar
tificial status of legal subject as b e a r e r of rights, b e c a u s e they r e g u
late t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e liberty r i g h t s . However, t h e r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n - p r i v a t e l a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y c a n also b e i n t e r p r e t e d in
light of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy e x p r e s s e d in t h e p r i n c i p l e of
d i s c o u r s e . T h i s p r i n c i p l e stipulates t h a t laws derive t h e i r legitimacy
f r o m t h e p r e s u m e d rationality of t h e d e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d t h r o u g h
a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e g u l a t e d p r o c e d u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n ; t h u s t h e legiti
m a c y of a legal o r d e r u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n
of t h e f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for r a t i o n a l
political will-formation, a n d t h e liberty r i g h t s c a n b e justified as
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e cor
r e s p o n d i n g f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h u s n e i t h e r t h e
liberty r i g h t s n o r t h e political r i g h t s c a n b e a c c o r d e d priority
b u t m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as co-original. T h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e essential
1 0
11
xiv
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y or, alternatively, of

t h e co-originality of t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty, f o r m s
t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative
democracy.
B u t b e f o r e t u r n i n g to this, we s h o u l d n o t e a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t
f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of rights. I n t h e first p l a c e , it avoids
t h e p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d by t h e fiction of t h e state of n a t u r e in social
c o n t r a c t theory, p r o b l e m s t h a t a r g u a b l y still bedevil Rawls's device
of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . H a b e r m a s n e e d n o t a p p e a l to controversial
p r e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d of practical r e a s o n ,
n o r n e e d h e a p p e a l to c o n c e p t i o n s g r o u n d e d i n specific constitu
t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s ; o n his a c c o u n t , t h e d e c i s i o n to f o u n d a political
c o m m u n i t y is n o t itself in n e e d of n o r m a t i v e justification. T h e n a
t u r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g task a n d t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it
is to b e a c c o m p l i s h e d n e e d only b e justified in f u n c t i o n a l t e r m s
t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e regulative f u n c t i o n s of m o d e r n legal sys
t e m s a n d t h e n t h e g e n e r a l s h a p e of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s follows
automatically, in c o n j u n c t i o n with t h e discursive a c c o u n t of n o r m a
tive validity. T h e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e o n t h e basis of w h i c h partici
p a n t s m u s t d e c i d e w h i c h r i g h t s to g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r is n o t g r o u n d e d
in t r a n s c e n d e n t ideals of r e a s o n a n d t h e p e r s o n b u t is i m p l i c i t in t h e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a n d practical d i s c o u r s e .
T h u s r i g h t s a r e n o t t r e a t e d as m o r a l givens w h i c h a r e i m p o s e d as a n
e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e citizens' political d e l i b e r a t i o n s b u t a r e
r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e r e s u l t of a p r o c e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d h e n c e as
a n e x p r e s s i o n of t h e r e a s o n a n d will of t h e citizens themselves.
However, a l t h o u g h h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s for t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state n e e d n o t d r a w o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s of
value a n d t h e h u m a n g o o d , H a b e r m a s d o e s n o t e x c l u d e e t h i c a l
q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e p u r v i e w of politics a l t o g e t h e r . Political q u e s
tions of w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically
realized d o n o t a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e s o l u t i o n in t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d sense
of q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l
t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of
g r o u p s , a n d h e n c e c a n only b e a n s w e r e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n
already constituted political c o m m u n i t y . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t q u e s
t i o n s of t h e collective g o o d c a n n o t b e rationally d e b a t e d a n d re12
XV
solved; b u t in pluralistic societies d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d decisions c o n

c e r n i n g w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically
i m p l e m e n t e d m u s t take p l a c e w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t
g u a r a n t e e s individual liberty a n d t h e r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s to dissent
f r o m t h e values of t h e majority c u l t u r e a n d t o cultivate t h e i r distinc
tive i d e n t i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e a c h political c o m m u n i t y m u s t
realize t h e system of basic r i g h t s w i t h i n a political c u l t u r e t h a t
reflects s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s , t h o u g h this
political c u l t u r e m u s t n o t b e assimilated to t h e majority c u l t u r e .
A f u r t h e r n o t e w o r t h y f e a t u r e of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h , o n e with
f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , is t h a t
t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e d u r e of a m u t u a l c o n f e r r i n g of r i g h t s c a n b e
c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g p e r f o r m e d by g r o u p s of different scopes, r a n g i n g
f r o m t h e local a n d t h e n a t i o n a l to t h e r e g i o n a l a n d t h e g l o b a l .
W h i l e t h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t m u s t b e c o n f e r r e d in o r d e r to
establish a l e g i t i m a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e a r e essentially t h e s a m e
in e a c h case, t h e political i n s t i t u t i o n s r e q u i r e d for t h e i r i m p l e m e n
t a t i o n w o u l d h a v e to reflect t h e different s c o p e of t h e practical
m a t t e r s to b e r e g u l a t e d a n d t h e different c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u
lations subject to t h e laws e n a c t e d . T h u s , as we shall see, H a b e r m a s ' s
g e n e r a l t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s p o i n t s to t h e possibility of a global
political o r d e r in w h i c h sovereignty w o u l d b e divided a n d d i s p e r s e d
a m o n g local, n a t i o n a l , a n d r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s , with a g l o b a l r e g i m e
a s s u m i n g responsibility for t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level.
-
13
Public R e a s o n and Deliberative D e m o c r a c y
H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for

t h e c r e a t i o n of political i n s t i t u t i o n s in w h i c h discursive p r o c e s s e s of
o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation play a c e n t r a l r o l e . T h i s follows f r o m t h e
radically p r o c e d u r a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y w h i c h
places t h e w h o l e w e i g h t of political l e g i t i m a t i o n o n i n f o r m a l a n d
legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation.
O n this a c c o u n t , t h e legitimacy of legal n o r m s is a f u n c t i o n of t h e
f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of p r o c e d u r e s of political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n
making which support the presumption that their outcomes are
xvi
r a t i o n a l . T h e r e s u l t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e e n a c t m e n t of legal
n o r m s b e tied to discursive p r o c e s s e s of r a t i o n a l political will-forma
t i o n a p p l i e s in different ways to basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d
to e n a c t e d legal n o r m s a n d statutes. At t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l level, t h e
p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens m u s t b e
a b l e to affirm t h e basic r i g h t s as o n e s t h e y w o u l d c o n f e r o n o n e
a n o t h e r in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e . B e c a u s e in m o s t cases
t h e citizens a r e b o r n i n t o a n already existing state a n d n e v e r actually
p a r t i c i p a t e in s u c h a p r a c t i c e , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e i r v o l u n t a r y
c o n s e n t m u s t b e given effect t h r o u g h p r o c e d u r e s by w h i c h existing
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e c h a l l e n g e d a n d c h a n g e d if sufficient
political will to d o so c a n b e m o b i l i z e d . I n t h e case of e n a c t e d laws,
t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens s h o u l d
play a n active r o l e in t h e e l a b o r a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e of t h e criteria in
a c c o r d a n c e with w h i c h t h e basic r i g h t s a r e i m p l e m e n t e d , m o s t im
p o r t a n t l y in s h a p i n g t h e definitions of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s
w h i c h b e c o m e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o law. I n n e i t h e r case c a n t h e c o n t e n t
of legal n o r m s b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e p o p u l a r will as
e x p r e s s e d in a critical p u b l i c o p i n i o n . T h u s t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for a p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h all political deci
sion m a k i n g , f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s to t h e d r a f t i n g a n d
e n a c t m e n t of legislation, is b o u n d to discursive p r o c e s s e s of a politi
cal p u b l i c s p h e r e .
H a b e r m a s h a s specified t h e basic s h a p e t h a t political i n s t i t u t i o n s
w o u l d have to take in o r d e r to realize this m o d e l of deliberative
d e m o c r a c y It calls in t h e first p l a c e for a p u b l i c s p h e r e of i n f o r m a l
political c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l basis is p r o v i d e d by t h e
v o l u n t a r y associations of civil society a n d w h i c h d e p e n d s o n i n p u t s
of e x p e r t i n f o r m a t i o n a n d o n o p e n access to t h e p r i n t a n d e l e c t r o n i c
m e d i a . T h e i n f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r of p u b l i c political discussion, a n d t h e
fact t h a t it m u s t b e r e s p o n s i v e to p r o b l e m s as t h e y arise i n t h e
lifeworld of everyday i n t e r a c t i o n , m e a n t h a t t h e associations in
w h i c h it is c o n d u c t e d c a n n o t b e directly r e g u l a t e d by law; however,
t h e basic political r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , s u c h as
f r e e d o m of association, f r e e d o m of s p e e c h , a n d f r e e d o m of c o n
science, a r e specifically d e s i g n e d to s e c u r e t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i -
xvii
14
tions t h a t m a k e possible a flourishing civil s o c i e t y . T h e p u b l i c

s p h e r e h a s as its c o m p l e m e n t t h e legally r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t
s p h e r e c o m p o s e d of t h e legislative, j u d i c i a l , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
b r a n c h e s . T h e specific tasks of e a c h of t h e s e b r a n c h e s call for a
c o m p l e x division of l a b o r in w h i c h e a c h b r a n c h plays b o t h a n e n
a b l i n g a n d a l i m i t i n g r o l e vis-a-vis e a c h of t h e o t h e r s . F o r e x a m p l e ,
t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l j u d i c i a r y m u s t n o t p r e e m p t t h e political f u n c t i o n of
t h e legislature by c r e a t i n g law; conversely, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of j u d i c i a l
review e n a b l e s t h e j u d i c i a r y to r e s t r a i n t h e legislature f r o m p r o g r a m
m i n g specific legal j u d g m e n t s by e n a c t i n g laws to t h a t e f f e c t .
15
W h i l e this m o d e l c o n f o r m s to t h e basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s
of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s , H a b e r m a s p r o v i d e s a n origi
n a l r a t i o n a l e for t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s in t e r m s of t h e l e g i t i m a t i n g
f u n c t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n . T h i s h e c o n s t r u e s in t e r m s of a m o d e l of
t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of p o w e r : o n t h e i n p u t side, i n f l u e n c e g e n e r a t e d in
t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e
d u r e s of e l e c t i o n s a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation
i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e power, w h i c h in t u r n is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h
t h e legal p r o g r a m s a n d policies of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s i n t o a d m i n
istrative p o w e r ; at t h e o u t p u t e n d , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o g r a m s c r e a t e
t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x i s t e n c e of civil society a n d its
v o l u n t a r y associations, a n d h e n c e of a v i b r a n t political p u b l i c
sphere.
1 6
H a b e r m a s claims t h a t this p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative

d e m o c r a c y c a p t u r e s t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of t h e r u l e
of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty b e t t e r t h a n rival t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s
als. T h e rival p o s i t i o n t h a t is p e r h a p s closest to H a b e r m a s ' s is t h e
political liberalism of Rawls, w h i c h is discussed at l e n g t h in t h e two
essays t h a t c o m p r i s e P a r t II of this v o l u m e . I n t h e first, H a b e r m a s
o u t l i n e s t h r e e basic criticisms of political liberalism: first, t h a t t h e
devices of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e d o n o t
a d e q u a t e l y m o d e l t h e i d e a of impartiality t h a t i n f o r m s d e o n t o l o g i c a l
c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e ; s e c o n d , t h a t t h e i d e a of a p u b l i c justification
of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e in t e r m s of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g con
s e n s u s " is n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e e p i s t e m i c o r cognitive validity
claim s u c h a t h e o r y m u s t raise if it is to claim legitimacy; a n d , t h i r d
t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e political i m p l i e s a rigid division
xviii
b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c a n d n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of citizens w h i c h l e a d s
h i m to a c c o r d t h e negative liberty r i g h t s priority over t h e r i g h t s of
political p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n a reply to this essay Rawls a r g u e d force
fully t h a t H a b e r m a s ' s criticisms d i d n o t d o j u s t i c e to t h e c o m p l e x i t y
of his p o s i t i o n , r e v e a l i n g in t h e p r o c e s s t h a t his p o s i t i o n is in s o m e
r e s p e c t s closer to H a b e r m a s ' s t h a n t h e latter m a y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d .
However, i n t h e n e x t essay H a b e r m a s r e i t e r a t e s a n d f u r t h e r clarifies
his basic criticisms.
17
18
P e r h a p s t h e key d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m c o n c e r n s t h e a p p r o
p r i a t e n a t u r e a n d s c o p e of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n t h a t w o u l d b e sufficient to g r o u n d a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . A l t h o u g h b o t h take a b r o a d l y c o n s t r u c tivist a p p r o a c h to practical r e a s o n t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s
tice for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y as t h o s e t h a t citizens w o u l d a g r e e
to as t h e r e s u l t of a n a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e s s of reflection o r d e l i b e r a
t i o n H a b e r m a s believes t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy implicit
in m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s calls for a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e
t h e o r y of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a n Rawls allows. T h u s h e r e i t e r a t e s his
a r g u m e n t t h a t Rawls's i d e a of r e a s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is
n o t sufficient to g r o u n d t h e legitimacy of t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r i n c i p l e s b e c a u s e it d o e s n o t allow for a s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m
w h i c h t h e citizens c o u l d c o n v i n c e themselves of t h e validity of t h e
p r i n c i p l e s for the same reasons.
S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e , h e a r g u e s , is
implicit in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t s p e a k e r s u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n
they e n g a g e in practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n , so t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l m a n
ner. Rawls, by c o n t r a s t , rejects this a p p r o a c h o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t a
political t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t b e f r e e s t a n d i n g , a n d h e n c e c a n h a v e
n o p a r t of t h e o r i e s of r e a s o n g r o u n d e d in c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h i l o
sophical d o c t r i n e s s u c h as H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action.
19
20
T h e significance of t h e i r c o n t r a s t i n g a p p r o a c h e s to p r a c t i c a l rea
son can b e b r o u g h t o u t by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r respective analyses of
t h e legitimating function of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , a n i d e a t h a t is
c e n t r a l to b o t h of t h e i r positions. It h a s e m e r g e d f r o m t h e i r ex
c h a n g e t h a t p u b l i c r e a s o n u n d e r g o e s a p r o b l e m a t i c split in Rawls's
political liberalism. I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e r e is t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d ex-
xix
c h a n g e of i d e a s in t h e " b a c k g r o u n d c u l t u r e of civil society" in w h i c h

all p r a c t i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s a l s a r e o p e n to d e b a t e ; h e r e
p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e free to a p p e a l to w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s they find
c o m p e l l i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e views, i n a n a t t e m p t
t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r fellows. T h i s is t h e f o r u m in w h i c h j u s t i c e as
fairness a n d rival political c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e m u s t p r o v e t h e m
selves. However, a m u c h m o r e r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n
i n f o r m s Rawls's i d e a of t h e "public justification" of a political con
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e by "political society" a n d t h e r e l a t e d n o t i o n of
p u b l i c r e a s o n as a n ideal to w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s in p u b l i c political life
s h o u l d c o n f o r m w h e n d e b a t i n g m a t t e r s of political c o n c e r n . I n p u b
lic justification of a s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n , r e a s o n a b l e citizens,
w h o have a l r e a d y justified t h e political c o n c e p t i o n "privately" by
e m b e d d i n g it i n t h e i r various c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , take a c c o u n t
of the fact t h a t o t h e r s h a v e r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t
likewise e n d o r s e t h e political c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h for different rea
sons. W h a t is g a i n e d by this " m u t u a l a c c o u n t i n g " a r e n o t f u r t h e r
s u p p o r t i n g r e a s o n s for t h e political c o n c e p t i o n s i n c e t h e e x p r e s s
content of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s plays n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c
j u s t i f i c a t i o n b u t a s h a r e d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t different citizens e n
d o r s e t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n for different r e a s o n s t h a t m u s t b e r e
s p e c t e d . T h i s m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i d e a l of
p u b l i c r e a s o n a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g political v i r t u e of civility: w h e n
a d d r e s s i n g political issues, especially o n e s t h a t b e a r o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
essentials, citizens, c a n d i d a t e s for office, officeholders, j u d g e s , a n d
legislators m u s t .limit t h e m s e l v e s t o a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e i r fel
low citizens c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a n d h e n c e m u s t refrain f r o m
appealing to their own comprehensive doctrines.
21
H a b e r m a s is h i g h l y critical of this r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c
r e a s o n . T h e c o n s e n s u s t h a t results f r o m p u b l i c justification as d e
p i c t e d by Rawls is n o t "rationally m o t i v a t e d " in a sense t h a t is c o n s o
n a n t with t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of
justice on which m o d e r n constitutional regimes are founded. T h e
p r o b l e m is t h a t t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is n o t b a s e d o n s h a r e d
r e a s o n s : citizens simply observe t h a t t h e i r fellows a c c e p t t h e political
c o n c e p t i o n for t h e i r o w n r e a s o n s b u t c a n n o t j u d g e w h e t h e r this
a c c e p t a n c e h a s a g e n u i n e r a t i o n a l basis. T h i s a t t e n u a t e d c o n c e p t i o n
XX
of p u b l i c justification m e a n s t h a t Rawls m u s t restrict t h e validity

claim publicly associated with t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s to
t h e w e a k claim t o " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . " B u t this leaves h i m in t h e f o r
H a b e r m a s , h i g h l y p a r a d o x i c a l p o s i t i o n of h o l d i n g t h a t publicly
d e f e n s i b l e r e a s o n s c a n only s u p p o r t a w e a k claim to " r e a s o n a b l e
ness," w h e r e a s t h e private r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e f e n s e of c o m p r e
hensive d o c t r i n e s c a n g r o u n d t h e s t r o n g e r claim to " m o r a l t r u t h . "
H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , h o l d s t h a t t h e values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d
associated with religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews c a n n o t claim
t h e universal validity of basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h t h e y d o
s h a p e t h e c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h basic p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e
i n t e r p r e t e d a n d a p p l i e d . Moreover, h e a r g u e s t h a t a consistently
p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n entails t h a t
i n f o r m a l political discussion in civil society (i.e., in t h e "public
s p h e r e " ) a n d p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n b e a r i n g o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essentials
in legislative a n d j u d i c i a l c o n t e x t s a r e subject to essentially t h e same
r a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . I n b o t h cases t h e rationality of o u t c o m e s ideally
s h o u l d b e solely a f u n c t i o n of t h e r e a s o n s a d d u c e d , t h e only differ
e n c e b e i n g t h a t i n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e t h e rationality of d e b a t e is
a s s u r e d by a v i b r a n t political c u l t u r e t h a t facilitates o p e n participa
tion, w h e r e a s i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t a l s p h e r e
it is a s s u r e d t h r o u g h legally p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s of j u d i c i a l a n d
p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g d e s i g n e d to e n s u r e
sufficient a p p r o x i m a t i o n to ideal c o n d i t i o n s of discursive o p e n n e s s
u n d e r l i m i t a t i o n s of t i m e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n . O n this a c c o u n t , t h e
legitimacy-conferring f u n c t i o n of political d e l i b e r a t i o n d o e s n o t
h a v e to rely o n t h e civility of citizens, legislators, a n d j u r i s t s w h o
voluntarily refrain f r o m a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e y t h i n k w o u l d n o t
b e a c c e p t a b l e to t h e i r fellow citizens; it c a n a n d m u s t b e left t o t h e
p r o c e d u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s of discourses t h e m s e l v e s to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h
r e a s o n s ultimately win o u t .
A l t h o u g h it m u s t b e left to t h e r e a d e r to u n r a v e l t h e t h r e a d s of
this i n t r i c a t e d e b a t e f u r t h e r , we w o u l d like to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to a
d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n Rawls's a n d H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h e s t o issues of
international justice, which has a bearing o n H a b e r m a s ' s b r o a d e r
c o n c e r n s in this v o l u m e . Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e is t a i l o r e d f r o m t h e
b e g i n n i n g to a view of t h e state as a m o r e o r less self-sufficient system
22
xxi
of social c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t is a s s u m e d to exist in p e r p e t u i t y ; h e n c e , it
p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e as e x e r c i s i n g exclu
sive sovereignty over a t e r r i t o r y a n d p e o p l e e n s h r i n e d in m o d e r n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h i s o r i e n t a t i o n is r e i n f o r c e d by Rawls's m o r e
r e c e n t i d e a of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e as o n e t h a t draws o n
i d e a s l a t e n t in t h e political c u l t u r e of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c i e s .
W h e n h e t u r n s to t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w liberal d e m o c r a c i e s s h o u l d
b e h a v e t o w a r d n o n l i b e r a l r e g i m e s w h o s e political c u l t u r e s a r e n o t
s t r u c t u r e d by s u c h liberal ideas, t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o l e r a t i o n itself
dictates t h a t a liberal r e g i m e m u s t n o t insist unilaterally o n liberal
s t a n d a r d s as t h e basis f o r j u d g i n g w h i c h r e g i m e s it s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e
as l e g i t i m a t e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , Rawls is c o m p e l l e d t o apply m u c h
w e a k e r s t a n d a r d s of political legitimacy to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n ,
a n d his t h e o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , at least as c u r r e n t l y f o r m u
l a t e d , s e e m s t o allow for only l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s
of citizens of a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e s .
O n H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h t h e r e is n o s u c h t h e o r e t i c a l b r e a k b e
t w e e n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of liberal p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e to t h e n a t i o n a l
a n d to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n s . R a t h e r t h a n a c c e p t i n g t h e frame
w o r k of t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w h i c h views states as t h e sole
l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r citizens, H a b e r m a s advocates a
m o d e l of cosmopolitan law w h i c h w o u l d s u p e r s e d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,
c o n f e r a c t i o n a b l e legal r i g h t s directly o n individuals, a n d m a n d a t e t h e
c r e a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s to e n
s u r e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s o n a g l o b a l scale. W h i l e
nation-states w o u l d r e t a i n l i m i t e d sovereignty, t h e i r citizens w o u l d b e
a b l e to a p p e a l to t h e coercive legal a u t h o r i t y of r e g i o n a l o r g l o b a l
a g e n c i e s , a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s if necessary. T h i s e x t e n s i o n
of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s a n d p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y in a c o s m o p o l i t a n
d i r e c t i o n raises far-reaching q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e of t h e
n a t i o n - s t a t e , to w h i c h we n o w t u r n .
23
T h e Future o f the Nation-State in an Era o f Globalization
T h e essays c o l l e c t e d in P a r t s III a n d IV of this v o l u m e r e p r e s e n t

s o m e of H a b e r m a s ' s m o s t significant i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e o n g o i n g
d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . I n c o n t r a s t
xxii
to m o s t a r g u m e n t s for c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , however, H a b e r m a s ' s p o i n t

of d e p a r t u r e is n e i t h e r a n attack o n t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e n o r a r e p u d i a
t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m , b u t a n o r m a t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis of t h e i r
successes as well as t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s . Briefly, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t
t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e e m e r g e d in r e s p o n s e to a d u a l crisis of l e g i t i m a t i o n
a n d i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t a r o s e with t h e d e m i s e of t h e o l d E u r o p e a n
f e u d a l o r d e r a n d d e e p e n e d with t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n of p r o c e s s e s of
m o d e r n i z a t i o n . After t h e wars of r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of
c r e d a l p l u r a l i s m , a u t h o r i t y h a d to b e l e g i t i m a t e d in a secular fashion.
M o d e r n i z a t i o n left in its wake isolated individuals a n d d i s l o c a t e d
c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e consists p r e
cisely in a d d r e s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m s of l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n a t
o n c e . By f o r m i n g states a n d i n c o r p o r a t i n g d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r o c e d u r e s , c o m m u n i t i e s g a i n a m e a s u r e of legitimacy for t h e i r
a u t h o r i t a t i v e political institutions. At t h e s a m e t i m e , it is precisely
t h e (in m o s t cases d e l i b e r a t e ) a d o p t i o n of t h e i d e a of n a t i o n h o o d
t h a t c r e a t e s b o n d s of m u t u a l solidarity b e t w e e n f o r m e r s t r a n g e r s a n d
motivates t h e e x t e n s i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, t h e r e b y a d d r e s s
i n g t h e p r o b l e m of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
2 4
25
B u t if t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n was historically i m p o r t a n t in t h e
f o r m a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c a l l y o r d e r e d societies, for H a b e r m a s it
s e e m s to h a v e outlived its usefulness, at least as traditionally c o n
ceived a n d e n s h r i n e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. It is n o t j u s t t h a t t h e
i n c r e a s i n g p l u r a l i s m a n d r e l e n t l e s s p r o c e s s e s of e c o n o m i c globaliza
t i o n a r e r e n d e r i n g o b s o l e t e t h e n o t i o n of i n t e r n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s
a n d e x t e r n a l l y sovereign states; in a d d i t i o n a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n b e
t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m is c o m i n g to a h e a d . W h e r e a s
n a t i o n a l i t y d e p e n d s p r i m a r i l y o n ascriptive criteria s u c h as ethnicity,
a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e , o r a s h a r e d history, r e p u b l i c a n i s m is f o u n d e d
o n t h e ideals of v o l u n t a r y association a n d universal h u m a n r i g h t s .
D e s p i t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e historical c o n v e r g e n c e of n a t i o n a l i t y
a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e since t h e
F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , this was only a c o n t i n g e n t
link: r e p u b l i c a n i s m is n e i t h e r c o n c e p t u a l l y n o r practically d e p e n d
e n t o n nationality, a n d t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y in p a r t i c u l a r h a s p r o
v i d e d g r o t e s q u e e x a m p l e s of t h e d a n g e r s of e m p h a s i z i n g t h e
relationship between ethnos a n d demos.
xxiii
H a b e r m a s ' s m a i n t a r g e t in this discussion is t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t

r e g a r d s a culturally o r ethnically h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n as a n e c
essary c o n d i t i o n of t h e effective o p e r a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c
r a c y . F o r H a b e r m a s , insisting o n this c o n d i t i o n i m p l i e s a failure to
a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of legal i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h e f o r m a t i o n
of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s . H e r e m i n d s u s t h a t m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s is
n o t m e r e l y a r e s u l t of m e m b e r s h i p in p r e p o l i t i c a l a n c e s t r a l c o m m u
nities b a s e d o n k i n s h i p , b u t is a t least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of politics,
of t h e active e n j o y m e n t of t h e status of citizen w i t h i n a political
community.
26
A t t e n t i o n to t h e r o l e of legal s t r u c t u r e s a s o p p o s e d t o i n h e r i t e d
loyaltiesin t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y h e l p s H a b e r m a s to
m e e t o n e of t h e o b j e c t i o n s raised a g a i n s t s u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s s u c h
as t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o s o m e critics, in t h e a b s e n c e of
a g e n u i n e s u p r a n a t i o n a l identity s u c h r e g i m e s suffer f r o m a n i r r e
solvable legitimacy deficit: t h e y will inevitably b e a n t i d e m o c r a t i c
b o t h in o r i g i n a n d in o p e r a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , of c o u r s e , a c k n o w l e d g e s
t h a t a E u r o p e a n i d e n t i t y will n o t c o m e a b o u t m e r e l y t h r o u g h legal
fiat; b u t h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e genesis of s u c h a n identity d e p e n d s o n
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s . J u s t
as t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e F r e n c h , for e x a m p l e , is b a s e d n o t m e r e l y o n a
s h a r e d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y b u t also o n t h e s h a r e d legal-political institu
t i o n s a n d p r a c t i c e s t h a t a r e p a r t of t h e legacy of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h e
i d e n t i t y of E u r o p e a n s will b e at least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of a legal
f r a m e w o r k t h a t allows for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a g e n u i n e l y E u r o p e a n
identity. H a b e r m a s ' s m o d e l h e r e is t h a t of t h e slow historical p r o c e s s
t h r o u g h w h i c h , in t h e c o u r s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i n h e r i t e d
local a n d dynastic loyalties b e c a m e s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e m o r e ab
stract a n d legally m e d i a t e d political i d e n t i t y of citizens of p a r t i c u l a r
nation-states.
I n m o u n t i n g this a r g u m e n t , H a b e r m a s m a k e s u s e of a p a i r of
r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t a r e b e c o m i n g i m p o r t a n t in discussions n o t
j u s t a b o u t n a t i o n a l i s m b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y a b o u t political justifica
t i o n in m u l t i c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s . H e distinguishes, o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
b e t w e e n a civic a n d a n ethnic sense of t h e n a t i o n , a n d o n t h e o t h e r ,
b e t w e e n a political and a majority c u l t u r e . T h e idea, of c o u r s e , is to
restrict t h e object of politics so as to m a k e a g r e e m e n t m o r e feasible.
xxiv
Citizens d o n o t h a v e to a g r e e o n a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e set of c u l t u r a l
p r a c t i c e s b u t m u s t c o m e t o a t o m o r e m o d e s t t h o u g h still d e m a n d
i n g a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . As with
n a t i o n a l identity w i t h i n pluralistic states, H a b e r m a s t h i n k s t h a t a
s u p r a n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y m i g h t evolve a r o u n d a n a g r e e m e n t a b o u t
political p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t c u l t u r e m o r e
generally. T h e a g r e e m e n t in q u e s t i o n a m o u n t s to a n identification
with basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s w h i c h H a b e r m a s
( a m o n g o t h e r s ) calls " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m . " As w i t h i n t h e na
tion-state, i n h e r i t e d r e g i o n a l loyalties c o u l d b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o , b u t
n o t c o m p l e t e l y r e p l a c e d by, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m , so a similar
p r o c e s s m i g h t take s h a p e at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level, p r o v i d e d t h a t
t h e different c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s of t h e m e m b e r states e m b o d
i e d t h e s a m e set of basic r i g h t s .
27
B u t H a b e r m a s ' s i n t e r e s t in c o s m o p o l i t a n s t r u c t u r e s g o e s b e y o n d
t h e a p p r o v i n g o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e different r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s
c o n v e r g e o n t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . After all, t h e classical
system of states, u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , also
i n c l u d e d a set of p r i n c i p l e s t h a t all m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s w e r e s u p p o s e d
to f o l l o w . B u t t h a t system d i d n o t give a n y o n e t h e a u t h o r i t y to
i n t e r v e n e in d e f e n s e of t h e s h a r e d p r i n c i p l e s . I n this r e s p e c t , H a b e r
m a s ' s c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m is m o r e d e m a n d i n g t h a n K a n t ' s i d e a of a
f e d e r a t i o n of sovereign states, w h i c h is in s o m e ways r e f l e c t e d in t h e
classical c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . O n H a b e r m a s ' s view,
t h e r e is a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y in K a n t ' s d u a l a s p i r a t i o n to p r e s e r v e t h e
sovereignty of t h e associated states, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d to m a i n
tain p e a c e in t h e l o n g r u n , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t e n s i o n lies in t h e fact
t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d federative s c h e m e exists only insofar, a n d as l o n g
as, t h e m e m b e r states will to r e m a i n in it. However, if p e a c e is to b e
p r o m o t e d , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , states m u s t b e u n d e r t h e obligation to
act in h a r m o n y with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e f e d e r a t i o n .
Although
K a n t envisaged t h e possibility of a "universal f e d e r a l state" (Volkerstaat) "based u p o n e n f o r c e a b l e p u b l i c laws to w h i c h e a c h state m u s t
s u b m i t , " in fact h e a d v o c a t e d a " f e d e r a t i o n of p e o p l e s " (Volkerbund), a m o r e m o d e s t s t r u c t u r e w h o s e a i m is n o t to c o n s t i t u t e a legal
o r d e r to i n c r e a s e welfare a n d j u s t i c e , b u t r a t h e r only to f u r t h e r t h e
a b o l i t i o n of w a r . T h i s v o l u n t a r y association d o e s n o t give rise to a n y
a c t i o n a b l e rights, a n d h e n c e its p e r m a n e n c e r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d .
28
29
30
31
32
XXV
Moreover, t h e c o n c e r n to leave i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r

states will, predictably, conflict with t h e n e e d to o b l i g a t e u n r u l y
m e m b e r s to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r o w n raison d'etat so t h a t p e a c e m a y b e
p e r p e t u a t e d . T h u s t h e r e is a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n in t h e d u a l a i m of
e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e g i m e of e n f o r c e a b l e h u m a n rights, o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
a n d of m a k i n g c o n s e n t t h e sole s o u r c e of o b l i g a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law, o n t h e o t h e r .
3 3
A n a p p r o p r i a t e r e f o r m u l a t i o n of classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is in
o r d e r , t h e n . T h e t h r u s t of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m
n e e d s to b e p r e s e r v e d at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level if it is to survive at
all. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e suffers t h r e e sorts of weaknesses, w h i c h a r e
unlikely to b e o v e r c o m e by t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e a l o n e . First, i n d i v i d u a l
nation-states d o n o t h a v e t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with risks
o n a g l o b a l scale, i n c l u d i n g ecological p r o b l e m s , e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i
ties, t h e a r m s t r a d e , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e . S e c o n d , states a r e
b e c o m i n g helpless in t h e face of t h e g l o b a l i z a t i o n o r d e n a t i o n a l i z a
t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y . It is n o t only t h e i n c r e a s e d m a g n i t u d e of t h e
e c o n o m i c activity across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s b u t also t h e r a p i d mobility
of capital t h a t leads to t h e loss of a l a r g e m e a s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l states'
c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i e s . T h i s w e a k n e s s is n o t m e r e l y a
p r a g m a t i c m a t t e r b u t t h r e a t e n s to u n d e r m i n e t h e integrative
a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . O n e of t h e d a n g e r s of t h e d e n a
t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s is a r a c e b e t w e e n several c o u n t r i e s to
d i s m a n t l e t h e i r welfare systems in t h e s e a r c h for c o m p e t i t i v e advan
tages. T h i s in t u r n w o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e f o r m a t i o n of u n d e r c l a s s e s
even in d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , with t h r e e fateful c o n s e q u e n c e s : a n
i n c r e a s i n g r e c o u r s e to repressive politics in a vain a t t e m p t to c o n t a i n
t h e a n o m i c effects of a l a r g e u n d e r c l a s s ; t h e decay of t h e infrastruc
t u r e of e x p a n d e d areas; a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e
collapse of t h e b o n d s of social solidarity a n d political legitimacy, two
a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n - s t a t e . Finally, t h e i n h e r e n t
t e n s i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m m a k e s t h e sovereign
state a less t h a n reliable g u a r a n t o r of t h e rights t h a t individuals a r e
s u p p o s e d to h a v e q u a h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d n o t only as citizens of
p a r t i c u l a r states.
34
S u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s , a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , a r e m o r e likely to
s u c c e e d w h e r e sovereign states fail. F o r this r e a s o n , h e s u p p o r t s
s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s with g r e a t e r executive a n d j u d i c i a l p o w e r s ,
xxvi
so l o n g as t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e also m o r e d e m o c r a t i c t h a n p r e s e n t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e a i m of t h e s e r e g i m e s is t o c o n s t i t u t e
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r t h a t at t h e very least w o u l d b i n d indi
vidual g o v e r n m e n t s to r e s p e c t t h e basic r i g h t s of t h e i r citizens, if
n e c e s s a r y t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s a n c t i o n s .
W h i l e i n c r e a s e d j u d i c i a l a n d executive f u n c t i o n s w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y
to m a k e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s effective in t h e p r o t e c t i o n of indi
vidual rights, for this very r e a s o n t h e y w o u l d also h a v e to e m b o d y
g r e a t e r d e m o c r a t i c o p e n n e s s in o r d e r t o p r e v e n t selective a n d u n f a i r
uses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l force.
T h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c , c o s m o p o l i t a n o r i e n t a t i o n c a n b e s e e n in
H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n t h e f u t u r e of E u r o p e . Critics allege t h a t t h e
U n i o n suffers f r o m a serious " d e m o c r a t i c deficit" o n at least t h r e e
g r o u n d s . First, t h e U n i o n rests o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l treaties, a s e e m
ingly shaky basis for i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d legal p r e c e d e n t s t h a t increas
ingly play a federative r o l e . S e c o n d , critics aver t h a t s t r u c t u r a l
i m p e d i m e n t s t o d e m o c r a c y s u c h as t h e i n c r e a s i n g p o w e r of t h e
C o m m i s s i o n , t h e p o o r l y d e v e l o p e d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s of t h e
C o u n c i l , a n d t h e relative s t r u c t u r a l u n i m p o r t a n c e of t h e Parlia
m e n t , m a k e U n i o n d e c i s i o n s a p p e a r as i m p o s i t i o n s o n t h e p a r t of
a b u r e a u c r a t i c b o d y t h a t h a s b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s l y a u t o n o m o u s . Even
if m e m b e r states c o u l d " l e n d " t h e i r legitimacy to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of
t h e U n i o n , over t i m e a d e m o c r a t i c g a p h a s allegedly o p e n e d u p , for
t h e o v e r l o a d e d C o u n c i l h a s d e l e g a t e d d e c i s i o n s to t h e E u r o p e a n
C o m m i s s i o n , w h o s e m e m b e r s a r e n o t a c c o u n t a b l e to t h e p a r t i c u l a r
m e m b e r states b u t to t h e U n i o n itself. Finally, s o m e critics d i s p u t e
t h e d e m o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r of t h e U n i o n , asserting t h a t a s t r o n g e r
U n i o n w o u l d h a v e a n even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of
t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a E u r o p e a n p u b l i c .
3 5
3 6
37
38
3 9
H a b e r m a s ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n p a r
allels his suggestions c o n c e r n i n g t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . H e d e f e n d s
" [ n ] e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s s u c h as a E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t with t h e
usual powers, a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e C o m m i s s i o n , a Sec
o n d C h a m b e r r e p l a c i n g t h e C o u n c i l , a n d a E u r o p e a n C o u r t of
Justice with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s . " I n s h o r t , H a b e r m a s advo
cates "a transition of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y
constituted, federal s t a t e . " F o r h i m , t h e way to m a k e g o o d t h e
4 0
41
xxvii
d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n is precisely to s t r e n g t h e n its political

i n s t i t u t i o n s while giving it t h e c h a r a c t e r of a f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t . To
t h o s e (like G r i m m ) w h o t h i n k t h a t a s t r o n g e r U n i o n w o u l d have a n
even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of
a n E u r o p e a n p u b l i c , H a b e r m a s offers t h e r e m i n d e r t h a t t h e identity
of p e r s o n s as citizens is s h a p e d , at least in p a r t , by t h e legal a n d
political i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h they c o n d u c t t h e i r lives. It is n o t
u n r e a s o n a b l e , t h e n , to e x p e c t t h a t "the political i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t
w o u l d b e c r e a t e d by a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d h a v e a catalytic
e f f e c t " t h a t is, t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to t h e f o r m a t i o n of a n
a u t h e n t i c E u r o p e a n identity, w h i c h w o u l d i n t u r n p r o m o t e t h e
d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of E u r o p e a n institutions.
42
T h e s u g g e s t i o n s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t h a t H a b e r
m a s offers a r e provocative, b u t t h e focus of his w o r k lies o n t h e
n o r m a t i v e d i m e n s i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m . At this level, w h a t m a k e s
his d e f e n s e of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p e l l i n g is t h a t it
follows f r o m a n a r g u m e n t t h a t seeks to r e c o n c i l e p a r t i c u l a r i s m a n d
universalism, Sittlichkeit a n d Moralitat, by giving e a c h its d u e . T h e
g u i d i n g i d e a is t h a t c o s m o p o l i t a n political i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n b e s e e n
as t h e r e s u l t of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e very s a m e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n
s t r u c t in t e r m s of w h i c h h e e l u c i d a t e s t h e legitimacy of legal r i g h t s
w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n state. J u s t as w i t h i n states r i g h t s a r e n e c e s s a r y in
o r d e r to m e d i a t e social i n t e r a c t i o n s by m e a n s of laws, c e r t a i n r i g h t s
b e c o m e n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to achieve t h e s a m e g o a l w h e n t h e inter
a c t i o n s t a k e p l a c e across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s . Since for H a b e r m a s t h e
l e g i t i m a t i o n of law r e q u i r e s sensitivity b o t h to t h e c o n c r e t e c o n t e x t
of a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t o t h e universalistic t h r u s t of i m p a r t i a l r e a s o n , t h e
universality of basic rights, far f r o m t h w a r t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n a n d
d e v e l o p m e n t of c o n c r e t e f o r m s of life, actually p r o m o t e s t h e m , as
will b e c o m e clear in t h e n e x t section.
4
Multiculturalism and the Rights o f Cultural Minorities
H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m serves to illustrate t h e

a d v a n t a g e s of his d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to m o r a l , legal, a n d politi
cal issues a n d to t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e m . B o t h
liberals a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n s c h a r g e o n e a n o t h e r with insensitivity
xxviii
t o w a r d difference a n d h e n c e with difficulties in d e a l i n g with s o m e

of t h e p r e s s i n g issues of c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e n t i t y politics. C o m m u n i
t a r i a n s c h a r g e t h a t t h e liberal e m p h a s i s o n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a m o u n t s
to "an a b s t r a c t leveling of distinctions, a leveling of b o t h c u l t u r a l a n d
social d i f f e r e n c e s . " Liberals, in t u r n , claim t h a t m a n y of t h e c h a r
acteristic f e a t u r e s of c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m l e a d to a n e x c l u s i o n of dif
f e r e n c e . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s ' willingness to g r a n t
p r i m a c y to collective over individual r i g h t s a n d t h e i r c o n s t r u a l of
r i g h t s as a n e x p r e s s i o n of values c o n t a i n e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n s of par
ticular c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e s t r o n g link b e t w e e n t h e n o t i o n of collec
tive i d e n t i t y a n d r i g h t s is particularly p r o b l e m a t i c in pluralistic
societies, w h e r e conflicts inevitably arise c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t s of
m i n o r i t y g r o u p s w h o s e i d e n t i t i e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s differ f r o m t h o s e of
t h e majority g r o u p .
43
T h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r a n d originality of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of politi

cal l e g i t i m a t i o n consists in p a r t in its ability to d e a l with a b r o a d
r a n g e of issues w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a single u n i f i e d t h e o r y of
h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u l a r sovereignty. However, it is n o t i m m e
diately e v i d e n t t h a t his a p p r o a c h is b e t t e r a b l e t o a c c o u n t for politi
cally significant differences b e t w e e n e t h n i c , religious, a n d n a t i o n a l
g r o u p s t h a n e i t h e r c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m o r classical liberalism. F o r
o n e t h i n g , t h e highly a b s t r a c t t h e o r i e s of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u
lar sovereignty o n w h i c h h e p r o p o s e s to g r o u n d d e m o c r a c y at b o t h
t h e n a t i o n a l a n d s u p r a n a t i o n a l levels s e e m to i g n o r e t h e c u l t u r a l
values t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of g r o u p s . We shall c o n c l u d e with a
few brief r e m a r k s o n t h e s e m a t t e r s .
(1) T h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l h o m o g e n e i t y a r e
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of a d e m o c r a t i c
c o m m u n i t y c r e a t e s obvious difficulties for justifying e q u a l t r e a t m e n t
of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s ' s d e f e n s e of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
e t h n o s a n d d e m o s , as we saw a b o v e , is d i r e c t e d precisely against this
a s s u m p t i o n , a n d this e n a b l e s h i m to a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is n o a p r i o r i
r e a s o n why a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y s h o u l d find itself c h a l l e n g e d
by ever-increasing e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m . Critics will p r e d i c t
ably c o m p l a i n t h a t this very a r g u m e n t u n d e r e s t i m a t e s t h e i m p o r
t a n c e of c u l t u r a l identities. T h e y will p o i n t o u t t h a t m o d e r n
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s e m e r g e d for t h e m o s t p a r t f r o m strug
gles for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by g r o u p s w h o saw t h e i r political destiny
xxix
as a m a t t e r of cultivating p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life, c u s t o m s , a n d values

t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e m f r o m o t h e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s , by
c o n t r a s t , s e e m s to t r e a t t h e q u e s t i o n of m e m b e r s h i p m e r e l y as a
m a t t e r of historical c o n t i n g e n c y .
Even critics w h o a c c e p t t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of political m e m b e r s h i p
c o u l d a r g u e , however, t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n o s a n d de
m o s c a n establish at b e s t t h e impermissibility of overt d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,
b u t t h a t t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m d e b a t e reveals precisely t h e t e n s i o n
b e t w e e n t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d t h e a i m of p r o t e c t i n g
c u l t u r a l identity. H a b e r m a s ' s r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a s h a r e d
political c u l t u r e a n d diverse s u b c u l t u r e s , w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s t h a t p o
litical i n t e g r a t i o n is a m a t t e r of a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g basic consti
tutional principles a n d procedures rather than about concrete forms
of life, m i g h t a d d fuel to t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t h e is insufficiently
a t t u n e d to t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c u l t u r e in politics, t h a t m e r e a g r e e
m e n t a b o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , in isolation f r o m t h e sub
s t a n c e of a thick ethical life, is unlikely to l e a d t o t h e legal p r o t e c t i o n
of m i n o r i t y o r f o r m e r l y u n r e c o g n i z e d c o m m u n i t i e s .
W h i l e t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a c e r t a i n plausibility, H a b e r m a s ' s so
cial t h e o r y p r o v i d e s h i m with t h e o r e t i c a l r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with
t h e m . I n t h e first p l a c e , h e c a n d r a w o n a n a c c o u n t of identity-forma
t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a t i o n is a c h i e v e d only t h r o u g h p r o c
esses of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , Briefly, t h e i d e a is t h a t p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y h a s
a n i r r e d u c i b l y intersubjective basis b e c a u s e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n a n d
m a i n t e n a n c e of a sense of self d e p e n d s u p o n t h e s t r u c t u r e s of reci
p r o c i t y a n d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a r e b u i l t i n t o t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . If i d e n t i t i e s a r e always a r t i c u l a t e d in a n d
t h r o u g h p r o c e s s e s of socialization, t h e n p r o t e c t i n g t h e i d e n t i t i e s of
individuals necessarily implies p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n
in w h i c h t h e y d e f i n e w h o they a r e . B e c a u s e r e s p e c t for t h e integrity
of individuals t h u s r e q u i r e s r e s p e c t for t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e y
f o r m a n d sustain t h e i r identities, H a b e r m a s is l e d to d e f e n d policies
t h a t s u p p o r t e r s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m also e n d o r s e , s u c h as m u l t i c u l t u
ral e d u c a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t a l s u p p o r t for t h e c u l t u r a l activities of
m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , a n d t h e like.
A l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s a n d his c o m m u n i t a r i a n o p p o n e n t s m a y s u p
p o r t s o m e of t h e s a m e policies, t h e y differ sharply in t h e justifica
tions they offer for t h e m . T h u s C h a r l e s Taylor ultimately a p p e a l s to
44
XXX
45
a controversial n o t i o n of g r o u p r i g h t s , w h e r e a s H a b e r m a s relies o n
t h e n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y . F o r h i m , m u l t i c u l t u r a l policies n o t
only sustain t h e c o n d i t i o n s for m a i n t a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l a n d g r o u p
identities, b u t also s e c u r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s for e x e r c i s i n g a u t o n o m o u s
c h o i c e . T h e g o a l of s u c h policies is to allow citizens t o e n g a g e in
t h e i r c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t b e i n g p e n a l i z e d , t h a t is, w i t h o u t
b e i n g d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t for t h e i r c h o i c e s . H e n c e , w h a t e v e r
p r o g r a m s a r e i n s t i t u t e d for t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s , t h e y
o u g h t to b e s u c h as to s e c u r e t h e possibility of m e a n i n g f u l c u l t u r a l
c h o i c e s . To this e x t e n t H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is mistrustful of essentialist m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m s t h a t a t t r i b u t e to t h e m e m b e r s of n a t i o n a l o r
c u l t u r a l g r o u p s w h a t A n t h o n y A p p i a h h a s called "tightly s c r i p t e d
i d e n t i t i e s , " Or t h a t e n g a g e in a t t e m p t s to d i c t a t e to individuals t h e
n a t u r e o r i m p o r t a n c e of s u c h g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p s . I n a pluralistic
c o n t e x t , b o t h collective a n d p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t i e s a r e to s o m e d e g r e e
o p e n to c h o i c e . H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , t h e n , e n
d o r s e s difference, b u t it is also sensitive to t h e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s to
p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y e n t a i l e d by d e m a n d s for r e c o g n i z i n g g r o u p i d e n
tities. T h e oppressive p o t e n t i a l of t h e politics of r e c o g n i t i o n derives
b o t h f r o m t h e d e s i r e t o d e f i n e w h a t c o u n t s as a n a u t h e n t i c manifes
t a t i o n of c u l t u r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d f r o m t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t par
ticipants s h o u l d m a k e t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p in n a t i o n a l o r c u l t u r a l
g r o u p s t h e c e n t r a l , d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e of t h e i r identities.
46
4 7
(2) A s e c o n d a s p e c t of H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k t h a t u n d e r g i r d s its sensi

tivity to difference is its h i g h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to t h e n a t u r e
of legal-political discussions. Liberals h a v e traditionally t e n d e d to
t r e a t political d i s c o u r s e as t h o u g h it w e r e all of a p i e c e a n d h e n c e
have b e e n divided over w h e t h e r d e m o c r a t i c discussion o u g h t to b e
c o n s t r u e d e i t h e r as p u r e l y strategic, a c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g elites for
t h e votes of t h e citizens ( S c h u m p e t e r , B o b b i o , Z o l o ) , o r as conversa
tions t h a t s t a n d u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s of m o r a l i t y a n d h e n c e
r e q u i r e special sorts of c o n v e r s a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s ( A c k e r m a n ,
Rawls). H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h is m o r e c o m p l e x . S t a r t i n g f r o m his
distinction b e t w e e n p r a g m a t i c , ethical, a n d m o r a l uses of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n , h e offers a n analysis of political d i s c o u r s e w h i c h u n d e r l i n e s
the i m p o r t a n c e of ethical c o n c e r n s in t h e political d o m a i n . W h i l e
the legitimacy of t h e law d e p e n d s o n p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d t o e n s u r e
48
xxxi
'
h a r m o n y b e t w e e n basic legal n o r m s a n d morality, for H a b e r m a s

legal n o r m s differ f r o m m o r a l n o r m s in t h a t in a d d i t i o n to m o r a l
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as well as p r o c
esses of c o m p r o m i s e f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g , play a c r u c i a l r o l e
in t h e justification of t h e f o r m e r . T h o u g h t h e historical d e v e l o p
m e n t s of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s e x h i b i t a n u n m i s t a k a b l e
c o n v e r g e n c e o n universal h u m a n r i g h t s w h o s e basic c o n t e n t is
m o r a l , n o n e t h e l e s s t h e citizens of e a c h political u n i t , in legislating
for themselves, i n t e r p r e t t h e s e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in light
of t h e i r o w n h i s t o r y a n d t h e i r o w n culturally specific values. I n o t h e r
w o r d s , in a d d i t i o n t o e n s h r i n i n g universal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , a legal
system is o n e of t h e p r i m e m e a n s by w h i c h a p e o p l e defines w h o they
a r e a n d w h o t h e y w a n t to b e a n d t h e r e b y a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r distinctive
c u l t u r a l identity.
(3) H a b e r m a s ' s clarification of t h e essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e
t w e e n legal validity a n d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e p u t s h i m in a s t r o n g
p o s i t i o n i n d e b a t e s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , for t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y m e a n s t h a t t h e legitimacy of
law is a f u n c t i o n n o t m e r e l y of t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l liberties
b u t also of t h e exercise of p a r t i c i p a t o r y r i g h t s . Feminists, in p a r t i c u
lar, h a v e insisted t h a t t h e r i g h t s of w o m e n c a n n o t b e p r o t e c t e d w h e n
w o m e n a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e i r n e e d s , a n d t h a t this is
so e v e n w h e r e i n s t i t u t i o n s have b e e n d e s i g n e d a n d b u d g e t s a l l o t t e d
for t h e p u r p o s e of s u c h p r o t e c t i o n . I n criticizing welfare s c h e m e s
t h a t l e a d t o t h e t r e a t m e n t of clients as passive r e c i p i e n t s of p u b l i c
charity, t h e y have, e m p h a s i z e d t h e fragility of i n d i v i d u a l liberties
w h e n t h e y a r e severed f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h o s e w h o s e n e e d s
s t a n d in n e e d of p r o t e c t i o n . If p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
n e e d s is w a n t i n g , welfare t u r n s i n t o a p e c u l i a r k i n d of charity t h a t is
given c o n d i t i o n a l l y o n t h e r e c i p i e n t s ' a c c e p t a n c e of t h e a d m i n i s t r a
tive s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e i r lives. M o r e broadly, i n t h e d o m a i n of strug
gles for r e c o g n i t i o n of differences, t h e a i m c a n n o t b e t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n f r o m a b o v e of p r o t e c t i o n s a n d benefits for p r e
viously d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , b u t m u s t r a t h e r b e t h e realization of
full d e m o c r a t i c d i a l o g u e in w h i c h e v e r y o n e affected h a s s o m e i n p u t
i n t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e e d s a n d i d e n t i t i e s a n d h o w t h e s e will b e
p r o m o t e d o r h a m p e r e d by state a c t i o n .
49
xxxii
I n t h e e n d , c o n v e r s a t i o n s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a d v a n c e only if
p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t f o r c e d to c h o o s e b e t w e e n a n o r m a t i v e l y w e a k
c o n t e x t u a l i s m , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a context-insensitive universalism, o n t h e o t h e r . H e r e as e l s e w h e r e , r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s d o m a k e
a difference.
Translator's Note
Ciaran Cronin
O f t h e essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e , I a m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e

t r a n s l a t i o n s of c h a p t e r s 1-5 a n d 7, t h o u g h J a m e s B o h m a n kindly
s h o w e d m e a n early draft of his t r a n s l a t i o n of c h a p t e r 7. T h e r e m a i n
i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e by o t h e r h a n d s , t h o u g h I h a v e m a d e s o m e revi
sions to all of t h e m , as I h a v e to previously p u b l i s h e d versions of
c h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2, to take a c c o u n t of final revisions of t h e G e r m a n
texts a n d to e n s u r e a n a p p r o p r i a t e level of consistency b e t w e e n t h e
essays.
A s h o r t e r version of c h a p t e r 1 a p p e a r e d in Proceedings of the Aristo
telian Society 96 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 3 3 5 - 3 5 8 . C h a p t e r 6 was p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e
title " R e m a r k s o n D i e t e r G r i m m ' s ' D o e s E u r o p e N e e d a Constitu
t i o n , ' " t r a n s l a t e d by Iain L. F r a s e r a n d J o h n R M c C o r m i c k , in Euro
pean Law Journal4 ( 3 ) , 1995: 3 0 3 - 3 0 7 . C h a p t e r 8 was t r a n s l a t e d by
S h i e r r y W e b e r N i c h o l s e n a n d a p p e a r e d in C h a r l e s Taylor, Multicul
turalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, e d i t e d by A m y G u t m a n n
( P r i n c e t o n University Press: P r i n c e t o n , NJ, 1 9 9 4 ) , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 4 8 ; it is
r e p r i n t e d h e r e by p e r m i s s i o n of t h e p u b l i s h e r . A n earlier version of
c h a p t e r 9 a p p e a r e d in Constellations 1 ( 1 ) : 1-10. C h a p t e r 10 was trans
l a t e d by William R e h g a n d a p p e a r e d in European Journal of Philosophy
3 ( 1 ) : 12-20.
In preparing my own translations I l e a r n e d something from each
of t h e s e t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d especially f r o m Bill R e h g ' s t r a n s l a t i o n of
H a b e r m a s ' s Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory
of Law and Democracy, t o w h i c h this b o o k is a c o m p a n i o n v o l u m e . I
xxxiv
Translator's Note
a m i n d e b t e d to P a b l o D e Greiff, Vic P e t e r s o n , a n d Bill R e h g for

s u g g e s t i o n s o n various c h a p t e r s , a n d especially to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s
w h o w e n t t h r o u g h a c o m p l e t e draft a n d m a d e m a n y helpful sugges
tions. I n a n u m b e r of p l a c e s h e h a s also revised t h e t e x t so t h a t
t h e m e a n i n g is c l e a r e r t h a n it w o u l d h a v e b e e n in a m o r e literal
translation.
Preface
T h e studies c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e w e r e w r i t t e n since t h e a p p e a r

a n c e of Faktizitdt und Geltungin 1 9 9 2 . T h e y a r e u n i t e d by a n i n t e r e s t
in t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t c o n c l u s i o n s c a n still b e d r a w n f r o m t h e
universalistic c o n t e n t of r e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r for plu
ralistic societies in w h i c h m u l t i c u l t u r a l conflicts a r e b e c o m i n g m o r e
a c u t e , for nation-states t h a t a r e c o a l e s c i n g i n t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l u n i t s ,
a n d for t h e citizens of a w o r l d society w h o h a v e b e e n d r a w n u n b e
k n o w n s t to t h e m s e l v e s i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society.
I n P a r t I, I d e f e n d t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n
e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y a n d o n t h e universal solidarity a n d
responsibility of e a c h for all. P o s t m o d e r n suspicion of a n indiscrimi
n a t e l y assimilating a n d h o m o g e n i z i n g universalism fails to g r a s p t h e
m e a n i n g of this m o r a l i t y a n d i n t h e h e a t of c o n t r o v e r s y o b l i t e r a t e s
t h e r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o t h e r n e s s a n d d i f f e r e n c e t h a t universal
ism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , precisely takes i n t o a c c o u n t . I n The Theory
of Communicative Action I set f o r t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way
t h a t t h e y reveal t h e possibility of c o n d i t i o n s of life t h a t e s c a p e t h e
false o p p o j s i t i i m J ^ e n ^
" Gesellschaft" b e t w e e n
" c o m m u n i t y " a n d "society." T h e c o u n t e r p a r t to this social-theoretical
p r o g r a m in m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is a universalism t h a t is h i g h l y
sensitive to differences. E q u a l r e s p e c t for everyone is n o t l i m i t e d
to t h o s e w h o a r e like us; it e x t e n d s to t h e p e r s o n of t h e o t h e r in
his o r h e r o t h e r n e s s . A n d solidarity with t h e o t h e r as one of us re
fers to t h e
flexibkj^'ôf^^
substontive
1
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Preface
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a n d e x t e n d s its p e r m e a b l e b o u n d a r i e s ever further.

T h i s ( m ^ g r c o m r n u n r r y ^ c o n s t i t u t e s itself solely by way of t h e negative
i d e a of a b o l i s h i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d h a r m a n d of e x t e n d m ^ r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o i n c l u d e m a r g i n a l i z e d m e n a n d
w o m e n . T h e c o m m u n i t y t h u s constructively o u d i n e d is n o t a collec
tive t h a t w o u l d force its h o m o g e n i z e d m e m b e r s t o affirm its distinct
iveness. H e r e i n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t imply l o c k i n g m e m b e r s i n t o a
c o m m u n i t y t h a t closes itself off f r o m o t h e r s . T h e "inclusion of t h e
o t h e r " m e a n s r a t h e r t h a t t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e c o m m u n i t y a r e o p e n
for all, also j u i d jaostjesrjecially for t h o s e w h o a r e s t r a n g e r s to o n e
an^^
P a r t II c o n t a i n s a d e b a t e with J o h n Rawls w h i c h t o o k p l a c e at t h e
invitation of t h e e d i t o r s a n d p u b l i s h e r s of The Journal of Philosophy.
I n m y c o n t r i b u t i o n I a r g u e t h a t d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y is b e t t e r a b l e to
c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m b o t h Rawls's a n d m y
work. My reply also a t t e m p t s to clarify t h e differences b e t w e e n p o
litical liberalism a n d m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of^Kantian r e p u b l i c a n i s m )
P a r t III a t t e m p t s to s h e d l i g h t o n a c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t h a s flared u p
o n c e a g a i n in G e r m a n y since r e u n i f i c a t i o n . H e r e I take a s t e p fur
t h e r a l i n e of a r g u m e n t I originally d e v e l o p e d in t h e essay "Citizen
s h i p a n d N a t i o n a l Identity." T h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d i d e a of t h e
n a t i o n as a n ethnically b a s e d c o m m u n i t y of c u l t u r e a n d historical
destiny t h a t m a y claim to exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state c o n t i n u e s to
p r o v i d e s u p p o r t t o s u c h q u e s t i o n a b l e a t t i t u d e s as t h e a p p e a l t o a n
a l l e g e d r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h o s
tility t o w a r d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s , a n d a
distrust of t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i
zations. T h e d e f e n d e r s of t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n (Volksnation) o v e r l o o k
t h e fact t h a t we c a n take as o u r g u i d e precisely t h e impressive his
torical a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n state a n d its r e p u b l i
c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in d e a l i n g with t h e p r o b l e m s c u r r e n t l y
p o s e d by t h e i n e x o r a b l e shift t o p o s t n a t i o n a l f o r m s of society.
2
P a r t IV deals with t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at b o t h t h e
g l o b a l a n d t h e d o m e s t i c level. T h e b i c e n t e n n i a l of K a n t ' s essay o n
perpetual peace is a suitable o c c a s i o n for revising his c o n c e p t i o n of
c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) in light of o u r s u b s e q u e n t histori
cal e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e o n c e sovereign states h a v e l o n g since forfeited
xxxvii
Preface
t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e c o n f e r r e d o n t h e m by i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law (Volkerrecht) a n d c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l affairs. T h e c h a l l e n g e of m u l t i c u l t u r a l
ism is precisely a n a l o g o u s t o t h e q u e s t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n
i n t e r v e n t i o n . H e r e t o o m i n o r i t i e s seek p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e i r o w n
g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t in t h e case of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
takes p l a c e w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a b r o a d l y l e g i t i m a t e constitu
t i o n a l state a n d takes t h e m o r e s u b t l e f o r m of d o m i n a t i o n by a
majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s m e r g e d with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e .
However, a g a i n s t C h a r l e s Taylor's c o m m u n i t a r i a n p r o p o s a l , I a r g u e
t h a t a "politics of r e c o g n i t i o n , " w h i c h is s u p p o s e d t o e n s u r e t h e
e q u a l r i g h t of different s u b c u l t u r e s a n d f o r m s of life to coexist
w i t h i n a single r e p u b l i c a n polity, m u s t reject collective r i g h t s a n d
survival g u a r a n t e e s .
I n P a r t V, I review s o m e basic a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. I n
particular, this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of deliberative politics allows a n ac
c o u n t of t h e co-originality of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights.
How Rational Is the Authority of the Ought?
1
A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content *
of Morality
i
If m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s o r u t t e r a n c e s c a n b e justified, t h e n t h e y have a
cognitive c o n t e n t . T h u s if we w a n t to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r m o r a l i t y
h a s a cognitive c o n t e n t we m u s t e x a m i n e w h a t it m e a n s to justify
s o m e t h i n g morally. I n so d o i n g we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e
theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s i n d e e d e x p r e s s
k n o w l e d g e a n d , if so, h o w t h e y c a n b e justified, a n d t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n of w h a t cognitive m e a n i n g t h o s e w h o partici
p a t e in m o r a l conflicts t h e m s e l v e s associate with t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s . I
will u s e t h e t e r m " m o r a l justification" in t h e first i n s t a n c e in a
descriptive m a n n e r t o refer t o t h e r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e of justifica
t i o n w h i c h h a s its. p r o p e r p l a c e in t h e everyday i n t e r a c t i o n s of t h e
lifeworld.
I n everyday c o n t e x t s we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s t h r o u g h w h i c h we d e
m a n d c e r t a i n c o n d u c t of o t h e r s (i.e., h o l d t h e m to a n o b l i g a t i o n ) ,
c o m m i t ourselves to a c o u r s e of a c t i o n ( i n c u r a n o b l i g a t i o n ) , re
p r o a c h ourselves o r o t h e r s , a d m i t mistakes, m a k e excuses, offer to
m a k e a m e n d s , a n d so f o r t h . O n this first level, m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s
serve t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e a c t i o n s of different a c t o r s i n a b i n d i n g o r
o b l i g a t o r y fashion. " O b l i g a t i o n " p r e s u p p o s e s t h e intersubjective rec
o g n i t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s o r c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e s t h a t lay d o w n for a
c o m m u n i t y in a convincing mannerwhat âctors a r e o b l i g e d to d o a n d
w h a t t h e y c a n e x p e c t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . "In a c o n v i n c i n g m a n n e r "
4
Chapter 1
m e a n s t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a p p e a l t o t h e s e
n o r m s w h e n e v e r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n b r e a k s d o w n a n d p f e s e n t t h e m as p r i m a facie c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s for claims a n d critical
p o s i t i o n s . M o r a l u t t e r a n c e s a r e m a d e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d of p o t e n
tial reasons o n w h i c h we c a n d r a w i n m o r a l d i s p u t e s .
M o r a l r u l e s o p e r a t e i n a reflexive m a n n e r ; t h e i r p o w e r t o c o o r d i
n a t e a c t i o n is c o n f i r m e d o n two i n t e r c o n n e c t e d levels of i n t e r a c t i o n .
O n t h e first level, t h e y r e g u l a t e social a c t i o n i m m e d ^ e l y j b y ^ i n d
t h e m i l of a c t o r s a n d o r i e n t i n g it in a p a r t i c u l a r way; o n t h e s e c o n d
level, t h e y g o v e r n t h e critical p o s i t i o n s a c t o r s a d o p t when, conflicts
arise. T h e m o r a l i t y of a c o m m u n i t y n o t only lays d o w n h o w its
m e m b e r s s h o u l d act; it also ( p r o v i d e s g r o u n d s : for t h e c o n s e n s u a l
r e s o l u t i o n of r e l e v a n t conflicts. To t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e b e l o n g
d i s a g r e e m e n t s t h a t c a n b e resolved c o n v i n c i n g l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c
tive of p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e basis of p o t e n t i a l justifications t h a t a r e
equally accessible t o all. Sociologically s p e a k i n g , m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s
r e c o m m e n d t h e m s e l v e s by t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e g e n t l e , p e r
suasive force of r e a s o n s as a n a l t e r n a t i v e to strategic, t h a t is, coercive
o r m a n i p u l a t i v e , f o r m s of conflict r e s o l u t i o n . To p u t it a n o t h e r way,
if m o r a l i t y d i d n o t possess a c r e d i b l e cognitive c o n t e n t for m e m b e r s
of t h e corrmaimity, it w o u l d h a v e no^^\^^ge_Q^jô}^v
more
costly f o r m s of a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n ( s u c h as t h e u s e of d i r e c t force,
o r t h e exercise of i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t of s a n c t i o n s o r t h e
p r o m i s e of r e w a r d s ) .
9
W h e n we e x a m i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s , we m u s ^ c l u d ^ f f e c t i y e
, r e a c t i o n s in t h e class of m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s . T h e key c o n c e p t of oblig a t i o n refers n o t only t o t h e c o n t e n t of m o r a l i n j u n c t i o n s b u t in
a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l validity (Sollgeltung)
w h i c h is also r e f l e c t e d i n t h e feeling of b e i n g o b l i g a t e d . T h e critical
a n d self-critical s t a n c e s we a d o p t t o w a r d t r a n s g r e s s i o n s find e x p r e s
sion in affective a t t i t u d e s : f r o m t h e t h i r d p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , i n
a b h o r r e n c e , i n d i g n a t i o n , a n d c o n t e m p t , f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
t h o s e affected, in feelings of violation o r r e s e n t m e n t t o w a r d s e c o n d
p e r s o n s , a n d f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , in s h a m e a n d g u i l t .
To t h e s e c o r r e s p o n d t h e positive e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s of a d m i r a t i o n ,
loyalty, g r a t i t u d e , etc. B e c a u s e t h e y e x p r e s s i m p l i c i t j u d g m e n t s , t h e s e
feelings in w h i c h a c t o r s e x p r e s s t h e i r p r o a n d c o n a t t i t u d e s a r e
1
5
A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
c o r r e l a t e d with evaluations. We j u d g e a c t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s to b e
" g o o d " o r "bad," w h e r e a s o u r t e r m s for virtues refer to p e r s o n a l
qualities of a g e n t s . T h e claim t h a t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a d m i t of
justification also reveals itself in t h e s e m o r a l feelings a n d evaluations,
for t h e y differ f r o m o t h e r feelings a n d evaluations i n . b e i n ^ j i i e d to
o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t f u n c t i o n as r e a s o n s . We d o n o t r e g a r d t h e m as t h e '
e x p r e s s i o n of m e r e s e n t i m e n t s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s .
F r o m t h e fact t h a t m o r a l n o r m s a r e "valid" for t h e m e m b e r s of a
c o m m u n i t y it d o e s n o t follow, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e y h a v e intrinsic
cognitive c o n t e n t . A sociological o b s e r v e r m a y b e a b l e to d e s c r i b e a
m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a social fact, a n d even to e x p l a i n why
m e m b e r s a r e " c o n v i n c e d " of t h e i r m o r a l r u l e s , w i t h o u t h i m s e l f b e i n g
in a p o s i t i o n t o give a p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r r e a s o n s a n d
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . B u t a p h i l o s o p h e r c a n n o t r e m a i n c o n t e n t with this.
H e will p u r s u e t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e r e l e v a n t m o r a l disagree
m e n t s f u r t h e r i n o r d e r to c o m p r e h e n d w h a t m e m b e r s of t h e c o m
m u n i t y d o w h e n t h e y justify s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y . O f c o u r s e ,
" c o m p r e h e n d " h e r e m e a n s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n simply " u n d e r g B t i g " u t t e r a n c e s . Reflective r e c o n s t r u c t i o n oTtKe everyday p r a c
tice of justification i n w h i c h we ourselves p a r t i c i p a t e as l a y p e r s o n s
p e r m i t s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n s t h a t foster critical u n d e r
s t a n d i n g . I n this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r e x t e n d s
from within t h e p a r t i c i p a n t p e r s p e c t i v e b e y o n d t h e circle of immediate
participants.
j.
T h e results of s u c h efforts c a n b e g a u g e d by e x a m i n i n g m o d e r n
p r o g r a m s i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e s e t h e o r i e s differ in t h e i r d e g r e e s
of h e r m e n e u t i c o p e n n e s s . T h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e cognitive
c o n t e n t of o u r everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e m o r e o r less c o m p r e
h e n s i v e to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e sensitive to t h e intuitive m o r a l ,
k n o w l e d g e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
Strong noncognitivism tries to u n m a s k t h e p r e s u m e d cognitive con
t e n t of m o r a l l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l as a n illusion. It a t t e m p t s to show
t h a t b e h i n d t h e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t a p p e a r to p a r t i c i p a n t s as m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s a n d stances t h a t a d m i t of justification, t h e r e l u r k m e r e
feelings, a t t i t u d e s , a n d decisions. Utilitarianism, w h i c h traces t h e
" b i n d i n g " force of (evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ a n d o b l i g a t i o n s b a c k to
p r e f e r e n c e s , arrives at revisionist d e s c r i p t i o n s similar to t h o s e of
2
st
6
Chapter 1
n o n c o g n i t i v i s t views s u c h as emotivism (e.g., t h a t of S t e v e n s o n ) a n d

d e c i s i o n i s m (e.g., t h a t of P o p p e r o r t h e early H a r e ) . B u t in c o n t r a s t
with s t r o n g n o n c o g n i t i v i s m , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m r e p l a c e s t h e unreflective
m o r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r t i c i p a n t s with a utility c a l c u l a t i o n
u n d e r t a k e n f r o m a n o b s e r v e r ' s p o i n t of view a n d t h e r e b y p r o v i d e s a
m o r a l - t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e .
I n this r e s p e c t t h e r e is a n affinity b e t w e e n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d f o r m s
of weak noncognitivism t h a t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of m o r a l l y acting subjects, w h e t h e r by r e f e r e n c e t o m o r a l feelings (as
in t h e t r a d i t i o n of Scottish m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ) o r by r e f e r e n c e to a n
o r i e n t a t i o n to a c c e p t e d n o r m s (as in H o b b e s i a n c o n t r a c t u a l i s m ) .
However, t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ( m o r a l l y judging subjects) suc
c u m b s to revision. O n s u c h a c c o u n t s , t h e s u p p o s e d l y objectively
g r o u n d e d p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s of m o r a l l y j u d g i n g subjects i n
fact m e r e l y e x p r e s s r a t i o n a l motives, b e t h e y feelings o r interests,
justified in a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l m a n n e r .
Weak cognitivism leaves i n t a c t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e every
day p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it ascribes a n
e p i s t e m i c status to " s t r o n g " evaluations. Reflection o n w h a t is " g o o d "
for m e (or for us) all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d o r o n w h a t is " a u t h o r i t a t i v e "
for m y ( o r for o u r ) consciously p u r s u e d life-plan o p e n s u p a f o r m
of r a t i o n a l a s s e s s m e n t of evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s (in t h e spirit of
Aristotle o r K i e r k e g a a r d ) . W h a t in e a c h i n s t a n c e is valuable o r
a u t h e n t i c forces itself u p o n us, so to speak, a n d differs f r o m m e r e
p r e f e r e n c e s in its b i n d i n g character, t h a t is, in t h e fact t h a t it p o i n t s
b e y o n d n e e d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . However, t h e intuitive u n d e r
s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e u n d e r g o e s revision o n this view. F r o m t h e p e r
spective of e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , j u s t i c e , w h i c h
is t a i l o r e d t o i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a p p e a r s as j u s t o n e value
a m o n g o t h e r s (however p r o n o u n c e d ) , n o t as a c o n t e x t - i n d e p e n d e n t
s t a n d a r d of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t .
U
Strong cognitivism seeks in a d d i t i o n to take a c c o u n t of t h e categori
cal validity claim of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s . It a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e
cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e across its full s c o p e .
T h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n , u n l i k e neo-Aristotelianism, is n o t j u s t c o n
c e r n e d with clarifying a p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification t h a t u n f o l d s
within t h e h o r i z o n of r e c e i v e d n o r m s , b u t seeks to justify a m o r a l
7
p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h s u c h n o r m s c a n t h e m s e l v e s b e j u d g e d in
a n i m p a r t i a l fashion. I n this t r a d i t i o n , m o r a l t h e o r y g r o u n d s t h e
possibility of m o r a l justification by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e p o i n t of view
t h a t m e m b e r s of p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l _ s o c i e t i e s t h e m s e l v e s intuitively
a d o p t w h e n t h e y find t h a t t h e y m u s t a p p e a l t o r e a s o n s t o justify
p r o b l e m a t i c m o r a l n o r m s . B u t in c o n t r a s t with e m p i r i c i s t varieties of
c o n t r a c t u a l i s m , this view h o l d s t h a t t h e s e r e a s o n s a r e n o t c o n c e i v e d
as agent-relative motives, t h e r e b y leaving t h e e p i s t e m i c c o r e of m o r a l
validity intact.
I n w h a t follows I first d e s c r i b e t h e historical s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h
m o r a l i t y loses its religious f o u n d a t i o n (II). T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n p r o v i d e s
t h e b a c k g r o u n d for a g e n e a l o g i c a l e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e two variants of
classical e m p i r i c i s m (III), two i n t e r e s t i n g a t t e m p t s to r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e
e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m ( I V - V ) , a n d t h e two t r a d i t i o n s t h a t o r i g i n a t e
with Aristotle (VI) a n d K a n t (VII), respectively. We a r e t h e n in a
p o s i t i o n to e x a m i n e two systematic q u e s t i o n s : W h i c h m o r a l intui
t i o n s a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ? (VIII) a n d c a n t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t itself b e justified? (IX)
T h e various a t t e m p t s t h a t h a v e b e e n m a d e to e x p l i c a t e t h e " m o r a l
p o i n t of view" r e m i n d us that, after t h e b r e a k d o w n of a universally
valid "catholic" worldview a n d with t h e s u b s e q u e n t t r a n s i t i o n to
pluralistic societies, m o r a l c o m m a n d s c a n n o l o n g e r b e publicly
justified f r o m f C t r a n s c e n d e n t G o d ' s eye p o i n t of view) F r o m this latter
v a n t a g e p o i n t b e y o n d t h e w o r l d , t h e w o r l d c o u l d b e objectified as a^
w h o l e . T h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to r e c o n s t r u c t this
p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h i n t h e w o r l d itself, t h a t is, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of'
ôur intersubjectively s h a r e d w o r l d , while p r e s e r v i n g t h e possibility of
d i s t a n c i n g ourselves f r o m t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , a n d h e n c e t h e u n i
versality of t h e w o r l d - e n c o m p a s s i n g viewpoint. T h i s shift in p e r s p e c
tive to a " t r a n s c e n d e n c e f r o m w i t h i n " raises t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r
t h e specific b i n d i n g force of n o r m s a n d values c a n b e g r o u n d e d in
th^__subjective f r e e d o m a n d j J i e p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n of h u m a n b e i n g s
f o r s a k e n by G o d a n d , if so, h o w t h e p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y of t h e m o r a l
o u g h t is t h e r e b y t r a n s f o r m e d . I n t h e secular societies of t h e West,
4
8
Chapter 1
everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e still s h a p e d by t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e
of so to s p e a k d e c a p i t a t e d , legally privatized, jreligious t r a d i t i o n s , in
p a r t i c u l a r by t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e H e b r e w m o r a l i t y of j u s t i c e i n t h e
O l d T e s t a m e n t a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n ethics of love in t h e N e w Testa
m e n t . T h e s e c o n t e n t s a r e t r a n s m i t t e d by p r o c e s s e s of socialization,
t h o u g h often only implicitly a n d u n d e r different titles. T h u s a m o r a l
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t views its task as o n e of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g everyday
m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is faced with t h e c h a l l e n g e of e x a m i n i n g h o w
m u c h of this s u b s t a n c e c a n b e rationally justified.
T h e biblically t r a n s m i t t e d p r o p h e t i c d o c t r i n e s f u r n i s h e d i n t e r p r e
t a t i o n s a n d r e a s o n s t h a t i m b u e d m o r a l n o r m s with t h e p o w e r to
g e n e r a t e p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t ; t h e y e x p l a i n e d why G o d ' s c o m m a n d s
a r e n o t a r b i t r a r y i n j u n c t i o n s b u t c a n claim validity in a cognitive
sense. L e t u s a s s u m e t h e r e is n o f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for m o r a l i t y
u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s either, a n d h e n c e t h a t t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e
g a m e c a n n o t b e r e p l a c e d b y a _ s y s t e m of p u r e l y b e h a v i o r a l c o n t r o l s
w h i c h a r e also s e e n as s u c h . T h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y a t t e s t e d
cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s p o s e s t h e p r o b
l e m of w h e t h e r t h e p o w e r of a c c e p t e d values a n d n o r m s to g e n e r a t e
r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t m a y n o t b e a f o r m of ( t r a n s c e n d e n t a l illusior^, o r
w h e t h e r it c a n still b e justified even u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i
tions. M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t itself have to p r o v i d e t h e r e a s o n s
a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t , in secularized societies, take t h e p l a c e of
t h e (at least publicly) d e v a l u e d religious r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ;
b u t it w o u l d h a v e to identify t h e k i n d s of r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
t h a t c a n l e n d t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e sufficient r a t i o n a l force even
w i t h o u t t h e b a c k i n g of r e l i g i o n . W i t h r e g a r d to this g e n e a l o g i c a l
p r o b l e m a t i c , I w o u l d like, first, to recall t h e m o n o t h e i s t i c f o u n d a t i o n
of t h e validity of o u r m o r a l n o r m s (1) a n d , s e c o n d , to specify
in g r e a t e r detail t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e m o d e r n historical situ
ation (2).
(1) T h e b i b l e g r o u n d s m o r a l c o m m a n d s in t h e r e v e a l e d w o r d of
G o d . T h e s e c o m m a n d s a r e to b e o b e y e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y b e c a u s e
they a r e b a c k e d by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a n o m n i p o t e n t G o d . B u t if t h a t
w e r e t h e only s o u r c e of t h e i r authority, t h e i r validity w o u l d m e r e l y
have t h e c h a r a c t e r of a "must" (Mussen), as a reflection of t h e u n
l i m i t e d p o w e r of a sovereign: G o d c a n c o m p e l o b e d i e n c e . B u t this
9
voluntaristic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s n o t yet e n d o w n o r m a t i v e validity

with any cognitive significance. It first a c q u i r e s a cognitive m e a n i n g
w h e n m o r a l c o m m a n d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d as e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of
a n all-knowing a n d c o m p l e t e l y just and loving G o d . M o r a l c o m m a n d s
d o n o t s p r i n g f r o m t h e free c h o i c e of a n A l m i g h t y b u t a r e t h e
e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of a n all-wise C r e a t o r a n d a n all-just a n d
loving R e d e e m e r . We c a n distinguish two different o r d e r s of r e a s o n s
for t h e r e s p e c t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e divine c o m m a n d s : m e t a p h y s i c a l
(ontotheologisch) r e a s o n s g r o u n d e d in t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n a n d
soteriological r e a s o n s r o o t e d in t h e (divinely o r d a i n e d ) h i s t o r y of
salvation.
Metaphysical justification a p p e a l s to a w o r l d o r d e r t h a t owes its
e x i s t e n c e to t h e wise legislation of t h e Creator. It a c c o r d s h u m a n
b e i n g s a n d t h e h u m a n c o m m u n i t y a privileged status w i t h i n c r e a t i o n
a n d t h e r e b y e n d o w s t h e m with a "calling." C r e a t i o n i s t m e t a p h y s i c s
gives c u r r e n c y to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r a l law u n d e r l y i n g cosmologically g r o u n d e d e t h i c a l systems w h i c h is also familiar f r o m t h e
i m p e r s o n a l worldviews of t h e Asiatic r e l i g i o n s a n d of G r e e k p h i l o s o
phy. O n s u c h e t h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , t h i n g s a r e essentially e n d o w e d with
teleological significance. H u m a n b e i n g s a r e also p a r t of t h e o r d e r of
B e i n g a n d c a n d e d u c e f r o m it w h a t t h e y a r e a n d w h a t t h e y o u g h t to
b e . I n this way t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of m o r a l laws receives o n t o l o g i c a l
c o n f i r m a t i o n f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l o r d e r of B e i n g as a w h o l e .
T h e soteriological justification of m o r a l c o m m a n d s , by c o n t r a s t ,
a p p e a l s to t h e j u s t i c e a n d g o o d n e s s of a R e d e e m e r ; at t h e e n d of
t i m e h e will fulfill his p r o m i s e of salvation w h i c h is c o n t i n g e n t o n
o n e ' s l e a d i n g a m o r a l o r lawful life. H e is J u d g e a n d R e d e e m e r in
o n e p e r s o n . I n l i g h t of his c o m m a n d s , G o d j u d g e s e a c h p e r s o n ' s life
in a c c o r d a n c e with his j u s t d e s e r t s . H i s j u s t i c e e n s u r e s t h a t his j u d g
m e n t will b e c o n s o n a n t with t h e u n i q u e life h i s t o r y of e a c h individ
ual, while at t h e s a m e t i m e his g o o d n e s s allows for h u m a n fallibility
a n d for t h e sinfulness of h u m a n n a t u r e . M o r a l c o m m a n d s a c q u i r e a
r a t i o n a l m e a n i n g b b t h f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y p o i n t t h e way to
p e r s o n a l salvation a n d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y a r e a p p l i e d in a n
impartial manner.
To b e s u r e , s p e a k i n g of " m o r a l c o m m a n d s " is m i s l e a d i n g in t h a t
t h e p a t h to salvation is n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e d by a system of r u l e s b u t
10,
Chapter 1
by a divinely a u t h o r i z e d way of life t h a t we a r e e n j o i n e d to e m u l a t e .

T h i s is w h a t is m e a n t , for e x a m p l e , by a n imitatio Christi, t h a t is, by
following in t h e footsteps of Christ. O t h e r w o r l d religions t o o , a n d
even p h i l o s o p h y with its ideals of t h e wise m a n a n d t h e vita contemplativa, distill t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of t h e i r d o c t r i n e s i n t o e x e m p l a r y
f o r m s of life. T h i s m e a n s t h a t in religious-metaphysical worldviews,
t h e just is still i n t e r w o v e n with specific c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good life.
H o w we s h o u l d t r e a t o t h e r s in i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s is laid d o w n
by a m o d e l of t h e e x e m p l a r y life.
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e f e r e n c e to a p e r s o n a l G o d w h o sits in j u d g
m e n t o n t h e destiny of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l at t h e e n d of t i m e m a k e s
possible a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two aspects of morality.
Every p e r s o n h a s / a j F ^
first
as
,a m e m b e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y of believers with w h o m G o d h a s e n
t e r e d i n t o a c o v e n a n t , a n d s e c o n d as a u n i q u e p e r s o n i n d i v i d u a t e d
by his life h i s t o r y w h o c a n n o t allow h i m s e l f to b e r e p r e s e n t e d (vertreten) by a n y o n e else b e f o r e G o d . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e
s h a p e s o n e ' s m o r a l r e l a t i o n m e d i a t e d by G o d t o o n e ' s n e i g h b o r
u n d e r t h e aspects of solidarity a n d of justice ( h e r e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e
n a r r o w s e n s e ) . As a m e m b e r of t h e universal c o m m u n i t y of believers,
I a m b o u n d by solidarity to t h e o t h e r as m y fellow, a s ^ n e 6 f u s j as
a n u n s u b s t i t u t a b l e (unvertretbar) individual; by c o n t r a s t , I owe t h e
o t h e T ^ e q u a l r e s p e c t as ^ê^^ôn^Sl^
p e r s o n s w h o , as u n i q u e
individuals, e x p e c t to b e t r e a t e d justly. T h e "solidarity" g r o u n d e d in
m e m b e r s h i p recalls t h e social b o n d t h a t u n i t e s all p e r s o n s : o n e
p e r s o n s t a n d s in for t h e o t h e r . T h e u n c o m p r o m i s i n g e g a l i t a r i a n i s m
of "justice," by c o n t r a s t , calls for sensitivity to t h e differences t h a t set
e a c h individual a p a r t f r o m o t h e r s : e a c h p e r s o n d e m a n d s t h a t o t h e r s
r e s p e c t h i m in his o t h e r n e s s . T h e Jhadaeo-Christian t r a d i t i o n rejraMsjsolida^
they p r o v i d e
5
two different perspectives o n t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e .

(2) W i t h t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a p l u r a l i s m of worldviews i n m o d e r n
society, r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e t h o s r o o t e d in it d i s i n t e g r a t e as a public
basis of a morality s h a r e d by all. At a n y r a t e , t h e validity of universally
binding m o r a l r u l e s c a n n o l o n g e r b e a c c o u n t e d for in t e r m s of
reasons a n d interpretations that presuppose the existence a n d the
a g e n c y of a t r a n s c e n d e n t C r e a t o r a n d R e d e e m e r . As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,
t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l validation of objectively r a t i o n a l m o r a l laws loses
11
its force, a n d with it t h e soteriological c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r j u s t

a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t h e objectively d e s i r a b l e g o o d of salvation. M o r e
over, t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s ( a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d
i n g c a t e g o r y of e x p l a n a t i o n s ) is also c o n n e c t e d with a d i s p l a c e m e n t
of e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y f r o m religious d o c t r i n e s t o t h e e m p i r i c a l scii e n c e s . W i t h t h e dissolution of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s of essences, t h e
i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n assertoric s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o r r e s p o n d
i n g expressive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s also dissolves.
^ p i a t is "objectively r a t i o n a l " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e j u s t
a n d t h e g o o d a r e g r o u n d e d i n a n o r m a t i v e l y i m b u e d B e i n g itself;
a n d w h a t is "objectively d e s i r a b l e " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e
teleology of t h e h i s t o r y of salvation g u a r a n t e e s t h e realization of t h e
state of p e r f e c t j u s t i c e t h a t also involves ^ c o n c r e t e g o o d .
I n this n e w situation, m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d e p e n d s o n a j^gosF
r n e t a p j ^ k a U e y e l ofjustification?] T h i s m e a n s i n t h e first p l a c e that,
as r e g a r d s its m e t h o d , it m u s t r e n o u n c e t h e G o d ' s eye viewpoint; as
r e g a r d s its c o n t e n t , it c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l t o t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n
a n d sacred history; a n d , as regards its theoretical a p p r o a c h , it c a n n o t
a p p e a l to {metaphysical c o n c e p t s of essence^tib^Fundercut t h e logi
cal distinctions b e t w e e n different types of i l l o c u t i o n a r y u t t e r a n c e s .
M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t justify t h e cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g
m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t drawing o n t h e s e r e s o u r c e s .
F o u r r e s p o n s e s t o this situation strike m e as t o o i m p l a u s i b l e t o
m e r i t f u r t h e r discussion:
6
M o r a l realism a t t e m p t s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e o n t o l o g i c a l justification
of n o r m s a n d values with p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l m e a n s . I t d e f e n d s t h e
i d e a t h a t we c a n have cognitive access t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d t h a t
h a s t h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r t o o r i e n t o u r desires a n d t o b i n d o u r wills.
Since this n o r m a t i v e s o u r c e c a n n o l o n g e r b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s of
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , t h e p r o b l e m shifts t o t h e
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l level: a m o d e of e x p e r i e n c e a n a l o g o u s t o p e r c e p
t i o n a n intuitive g r a s p o r ideal i n t u i t i o n of y a l u g s m u s t b e postu
l a t e d as t h e basis of value j u d g m e n t s w h i c h a r e assimilated t o factual
statements.
7
W h i l e utilitarianism d o e s offer a p r i n c i p l e i n t e r m s of w h i c h m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s c a n b e justified, its o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d ag
g r e g a t e utility of a c o u r s e of a c t i o n d o e s n o t p e r m i t a n a d e q u a t e
12
Chapter 1
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v i t y in g e n e r a l . I n p a r t i c u
lar, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m fails to g r a s p t h e individualistic m e a n i n g of a m o
rality b a s e d o n e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e .
As we have s e e n , m e t a e t h i c a l skepticism leads to revisionist d e
scriptions of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e t h a t lose t o u c h with t h e
participants' self-understanding. They c a n n o t explain what they are
t r y i n g to e x p l a i n , namely, everyday m o r a l practices, w h i c h w o u l d
b r e a k d o w n if t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r m o r a l d i s p u t e s d i d
n o t h a v e a n y cognitive c o n t e n t .
8
M o r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m is n o t traditionalistic in t h e sense t h a t it re
verts to p r e m o d e r n m o d e s of justification. It invokes t h e a u t h o r i t y
of u p r o o t e d religious t r a d i t i o n s for t h e i r positive effects in stabilizing
m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t a f u n c t i o n a l justification of m o r a l i t y u n d e r
t a k e n f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r p e r s p e c t i v e n o t only c a n n o t r e p l a c e t h e
a u t h o r i t y of t h e r e a s o n s t h a t c o n v i n c e d believers; it u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y
destroys t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of a religiously g r o u n d e d m o r a l i t y by
t r e a t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of belief as a mere social fact.
9
Ill
T h e religious d o c t r i n e s of c r e a t i o n a n d t h e h i s t o r y of salvation p r o
v i d e d e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s for believing t h a t divine c o m m a n d s d o n o t
s p r i n g f r o m b l i n d a u t h o r i t y b u t a r e r a t i o n a l o r " t r u e . " If r e a s o n n o w
withdraws f r o m t h e objective r e a l m of n a t u r e o r s a c r e d h i s t o r y i n t o
t h e m i n d s of a c t i n g a n d j u d g i n g subjects, t h e "objectively r a t i o n a l "
r e a s o n s for m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d a c t i o n m u s t b e r e p l a c e d by "subjec
tively r a t i o n a l " r e a s o n s . O n c e t h e religious f o u n d a t i o n h a s b e e n
u n d e r m i n e d , t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n
h e n c e f o r t h b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d only o n t h e basis of t h e r e a s o n a n d t h e
will of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . H e n c e "will" a n d " r e a s o n " also f o r m t h e basic
c o n c e p t s of m o r a l t h e o r i e s t h a t set t h e m s e l v e s this task. W h e r e a s
e m p i r i c i s m conceives of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n as t h e faculty of d e t e r m i n
i n g o n e ' s c h o i c e (Willkur) by m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e , A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m
a n d K a n t i a n i s m take a c c o u n t n o t only of r a t i o n a l motives b u t also of
a will (Wille) t h a t is free to b i n d itself by insight.
1 0
E m p i r i c i s m identifies practical r e a s o n with i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n .

O n this view it is r a t i o n a l for a n a c t o r to act in o n e way a n d n o t in
13
a n o t h e r if t h e ( a n t i c i p a t e d ) r e s u l t of t h e a c t i o n is in his interest,
satisfies h i m o r gives h i m p l e a s u r e . I n a p a r t i c u l a r situation s u c h
r e a s o n s c a r r y w e i g h t for a p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r w h o h a s specific prefer
e n c e s a n d goals. We call t h e s e r e a s o n s " p r a g m a t i c " o r p r e f e r e n t i a l
b e c a u s e they^n2otiTOteâycjdons a n d , u n l i k e e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s , d o n o t
immediately support j u d g m e n t s or opinions. They provide rational
motives for a c t i o n s b u t n o t for convictions. However, t h e y "affect"
t h e will only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r u l e
of a c t i o n . T h i s is w h a t differentiates i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n f r o m s p o n t a
n e o u s l y m o t i v a t e d a c t i o n in g e n e r a l . A n " i n t e n t i o n " is also a dispo
sition; b u t , in c o n t r a s t with "inclination," it only arises t h r o u g h
f r e e d o m of will, t h a t is, i n v i r t u e of t h e fact t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a
r u l e of a c t i o n . A n a c t o r acts rationally w h e n h e acts o n
reasonsand
k n o w s why h e follows a m a x i m . E m p i r i c i s m only takes a c c o u n t of
p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , in o t h e r w o r d s , of t h e case in w h i c h a n a c t o r lets
his will b e b o u n d (in K a n t ' s t e r m s ) to "rules of skill" o r "counsels of
p r u d e n c e " by i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . I n this way h e obeys t h e p r i n c i p l e
of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality: " W h o e v e r wills t h e e n d , so far as r e a s o n
h a s decisive i n f l u e n c e o n his a c t i o n , wills also t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l y
n e c e s s a r y m e a n s to it t h a t lie in his p o w e r . "
11
T a k i n g this as t h e i r basis, t h e two classical e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m s

a t t e m p t t o r e c o n s t r u c t a r a t i o n a l c o r e of morality. Scottish m o r a l
p h i l o s o p h y takes m o r a l feelings as basic a n d conceives of m o r a l i t y as
w h a t f o u n d s t h e b o n d s of solidarity t h a t u n i t e a c o m m u n i t y ( a ) .
Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b e g i n s i m m e d i a t e l y with i n t e r e s t s a n d c o n
ceives of m o r a l i t y as w h a t e n s u r e s t h a t social i n t e r a c t i o n s r e g u l a t e d
by n o r m s a r e j u s t ( b ) . B o t h t h e o r i e s u l t i m a t e l y r u n u p against t h e
s a m e p r o b l e m : they c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of
m o r a l d u t i e s , w h i c h p o i n t s b e y o n d t h e b i n d i n g force of p r u d e n c e ,
in t e r m s of r a t i o n a l motives a l o n e .
(a) M o r a l a t t i t u d e s e x p r e s s feelings of a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l .
H u m e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s e as t h e typical s e n t i m e n t s of a t h i r d p e r s o n
w h o j u d g e s actors from a benevolent distance. Consequently an
a g r e e m e n t in m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r sig
nifies a c o n v e r g e n c e of feelings. Even if a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l
e x p r e s s s y m p a t h y a n d a n t i p a t h y a n d h e n c e a r e e m o t i o n a l in n a t u r e ,
it is r a t i o n a l for a n o b s e r v e r t o r e a c t in this way. F o r we e s t e e m
14
Chapter 1
s o m e o n e as v i r t u o u s if h e shows h i m s e l f to b e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e
to u s a n d o u r friends. Moreover, this display of s y m p a t h y fills t h e
v i r t u o u s p e r s o n with p r i d e a n d satisfaction, w h e r e a s b l a m e p a i n s t h e
o n e w h o is r e p r o a c h e d a n d o c c a s i o n s h i m d i s p l e a s u r e . T h u s t h e r e
a r e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s even for altruistic a c t i o n : b e n e v o l e n c e t h a t
m e e t s with t h e a p p r o v a l of o t h e r s gives satisfaction t o t h e useful a n d
a g r e e a b l e p e r s o n himself. T h e s e affective dispositions p r o v i d e t h e
basis u p o n w h i c h t h e socially integrative p o w e r of m u t u a l t r u s t c a n
unfold.
However, t h e s e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for m o r a l a t t i t u d e s a n d a c t i o n s
a r e c o n v i n c i n g only as l o n g as we t h i n k of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s in
small c o m m u n i t i e s b a s e d o n solidarity, s u c h as families a n d n e i g h
borhoods. Complex s o t i e j j e ^ s o l e l y
by feelings like s ^ r p a t i h ^ j i i i d ^ t r u s t , w h i c h a r e g e a r e d to t h e local s p h e r e .
A f o m F c o n d u c t t o w a r d s t r a n g e r s calls for "artificial" virtues, a b o v e all
a disposition to j u s t i c e . I n t h e case of a b s t r a c t n e t w o r k s of a c t i o n ,
m e m b e r s of p r i m a r y r e f e r e n c e g r o u p s c a n n o l o n g e r rely o n t h e
familiar r e c i p r o c i t i e s b e t w e e n p e r f o r m a n c e s a n d r e w a r d s a n d
t h e r e b y lose t h e i r p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for b e n e v o l e n c e . Feelings of
o b l i g a t i o n t h a t b r i d g e t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s a r e n o t "ra
t i o n a l for m e " in t h e s a m e sense as a r e feelings of loyalty t o w a r d
m e m b e r s of m y g r o u p o n w h o s e ^ c o o p e r a t i o n I c a n rely. Insofar as
solidarity is t h e reverse side of j u s t i c e , t h e r e is n o t h i n g w r o n g in
p r i n c i p l e with t h e a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h e origin of m o r a l d u t i e s as
t h e r e s u l t of t h e e x t e n s i o n of p r i m a r y g r o u p loyalties to ever larger/
g r o u p s (or in t e r m s of t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of p e r s o n a l t r u s t i n t o
"system t r u s t " ) . B u t t h e validity of a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y is n o t m e a s
u r e d by h o w it deals with q u e s t i o n s of m o r a l psychology b u t r a t h e r
by h o w it a c c o u n t s for t h e n o r m a t i v e priority of d u t i e s . It s h o u l d
e x p l a i n why, in cases of conflict b e t w e e n b e n e v o l e n t feelings a n d a n
abstract r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e m b e r s of a g r o u p
to subordinate t h e i r loyalty t o w a r d t h o s e t h e y k n o w p e r s o n a l l y to a
solidarity with s t r a n g e r s . B u t feelings offer t o o n a r r o w a basis for t h e
solidarity b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of a n i m p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i t y of m o r a l
beings.
1 2
1 3
(b) Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y overlooks t h e d i m e n s i o n of solidarity

f r o m t h e o u t s e t by r e l a t i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n o r m a t i v e justifica\
15
t i o n of a system of j u s t i c e directly t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e individual,

t h e r e b y shifting t h e focus of m o r a l i t y f r o m d u t i e s t o rights. T h e
j u r i d i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of a n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t (subjektive Recht) t o t h e
legally p r o t e c t e d f r e e d o m t o p u r s u e o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n c e r t a i n
d o m a i n s a c c o r d s with a strategy of justification t h a t o p e r a t e s with
p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s a n d is g e a r e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it is
r a t i o n a l for t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o subject h i s will t o a system of r u l e s .
YurthermoreTTRF'^meTalized
n o t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t d e r i v e d f r o m .
private law, w h i c h g r o u n d s s u c h r i g h t s i n a symmeuTraTway, is well
s u i t e d for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a social o r d e r b a s e d o n a g r e e m e n t .
S u c h a n o r d e r is j u s t o r g o o d i n t h e m o r a l s e n s e w h e n it satisfies t h e
i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r s equally. T h e social c o n t r a c t follows f r o m t h e
i d e a t h a t e a c h c a n d i d a t e m u s t have a r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for c o n s e n t i n g
of h i s o w n free will t o b e c o m e a m e m b e r a n d s u b j e c t i n g h i m s e l f t o
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m s a n d p r o c e d u r e s . T h u s t h e cognitive c o n
t e n t of w h a t m a k e s t h e o r d e r a m o r a l o r a j u s t o r d e r rests o n t h e
a g g r e g a t e d c o n s e n t of all of t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s a n d c a n b e
e x p l a i n e d m o r e precisely i n t e r m s of t h e r a t i o n a l w e i g h i n g of g o o d s
t h a t e a c h of t h e m p e r f o r m s i n l i g h t o f h i s o w n p r e f e r e n c e s .
T h i s p r o g r a m is o p e n t o / t w o o b j e c t i o n ^ First, t h e assimilation of
m o r a l q u e s t i o n s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h e political j u s t i c e of a n association
of individuals u n d e r l a w h a s t h e d r a w b a c k t h a t e q u a l r e s p e c t for
everybody, a n d h e n c e a universalistic morality, c a n n o t b e justified o n
this basis. OtalyMh^
in rule-governed
i n t e r a c t i o n with o n e a n o t h e r h a v e a r e a s o n t o a c c e p t r e c i p r o c a l
o b l i g a t i o n s . T h u s .the s p h e r e of t h o s e p o s s e s i m g r i g h t s will e x t e n d
only t o t h o s e f r o m w h o m r e c i p r o c a t i o n c a n b e e x p e c t e d b e c a u s e
t h e y w a n t t o , o r h a v e t o , c o o p e r a t e . S e c o n d , H o b b e s i a n i s m wrestles
i n vain with iJTf^Jarmliar problem of t h e f r e e j d d e r , w h o e n g a g e s i n
a s h a r e d p r a c t i c e o n l y with t h e proviso t h a t h e c a n deviate f r o m t h e
a g r e e d n o r m s w h e n it is t o h i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e free r i d e r p r o b l e m
shows t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s c a n n o t itself
g r o u n d a n y obligations.
T h i s p r o b l e m h a s l e d t o a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e two
e m p i r i c i s t strategies. A m e n t a l r e s e r v a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g formally r e c
o g n i z e d n o r m s is n o l o n g e r possible o n c e t r a n s g r e s s i o n s of n o r m s
a r e p u n i s h e d n o t b y e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d s a n c t i o n s b u t i n s t e a d by t h e
1 4
16
Chapter 1
1 5
(iniemalizedsanctions)manifested
in feelings of guilt o r s h a m e . B u t
t h e p r o p o s e d e x p l a n a t i o n f o u n d e r s o n t h e rjrima facie difficulty of
explainirig self-punishing feelings in a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . O n e c a n n o t
r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for "wishing to h a v e " i n n e r s a n c t i o n s of this
k i n d . A p a r t f r o m a n y t h i n g else, t h e r e a r e c o n c e p t u a l r e a s o n s why
it c a n n o t b e "rational for m e " to a c c e p t t h e p r o m p t i n g s of a b a d
c o n s c i e n c e u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e t h e m t h e
object of p r a c t i c a l reflection, h e n c e n o n e t h e l e s s to q u e s t i o n t h e m .
W h e n we act m o r a l l y we d o so b e c a u s e we take it to b e r i g h t o r g o o d
a n d n o t b e c a u s e we w a n t to avoid i n n e r s a n c t i o n s . We call s a n c t i o n s
" i n t e r n a l i z e d " w h e n we h a v e m a d e t h e m o u r o w n . B u t t h e p r o c e s s
o f j g ^ i n g them o u r ^
e x p l a i n e d in a p u r p o s i v e 1 6
r a t i o n a l m a n n r ^ at a n y r a t e n o t f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e p e r s o n
affected: for h i m t h e rationality of a n a c t i o n is n o t simply its ability
to m a k e a f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e c o m m u
nity as a w h o l e .
1 7
T h e r e is n o m o r e a way b a c k f r o m t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t justification
of a n o r m a t i v e o r d e r to i n t e r n a l i z e d feelings of d i s a p p r o b a t i o n t h a n
t h e r e is a d i r e c t r o u t e f r o m m o r a l feelings of s y m p a t h y a n d r e j e c t i o n
to t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l justification of d u t i e s . M o r a l feelings give e x p r e s
sion t o a t t i t u d e s t h a t imply m o r a l j u d g m e n t s ; a n d in d i s p u t e s over
t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s we d o n o t limit o u r a r g u m e n t s to
p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s o r p r e f e r e n c e s . Classicalêmpiricism j a i l s toâcc o u n t for t h i s j j h e j i o m e M
reasons.
It c a n n o t u l t i m a t e l y e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y force of m o r a l n o r m s i n
t e r m s of p r e f e r e n c e s .
IV
Two m o r e r e c e n t t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s , w h i c h r e m a i n c o m m i t t e d
to e m p i r i c i s t a s s u m p t i o n s while a t t e m p t i n g to d o j u s t i c e to t h e p h e
n o m e n o l o g y of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s , r e s p o n d t o this p r e d i c a m e n t of
classical e m p i r i c i s m . W h e r e a s Allan G i b b a r d r e m a i n s closer to t h e
expressivist a p p r o a c h of e x p l a i n i n g a social life b a s e d o n solidarity,
E r n s t T u g e n d h a t r e m a i n s closer t o t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h of
r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a social life b a s e d o n j u s t i c e . B u t b o t h start f r o m t h e
s a m e i n t u i t i o n : viewed in t e r m s of f u n c t i o n , every m o r a l system
17
p r o v i d e s a s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of
among
b e i n g s w h o a r e d e p e n d e n t o n social i n t e r a c t i o n . M o r a l conscious
ness is t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e ) d e m a n d s t h a t m e m b e r s of a
c o o p e r a t i v e social g r o u p m a k e o n o n e a n o t h e r . M o r a l feelings r e g u
late t h e o b s e r v a n c e of t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m s . S h a m e a n d guilt a l e r t
a p e r s o n t h a t h e , in T u g e n d h a t ' s w o r d s , h a s failed as a "cooperative
m e m b e r " o r as a " g o o d social p a r t n e r . " G i b b a r d r e m a r k s of t h e s e
feelings: " [ t h e y a r e ] tied genetically to p o o r c o o p e r a t i v e willto a
special way a social b e i n g c a n fail to b e a g o o d c a n d i d a t e for inclu
sion in c o o p e r a t i v e s c h e m e s . " B o t h a u t h o r s seek to d e m o n s t r a t e
t h e r a t i o n a l basis of t h e e m e r g e n c e o r t h e c h o i c e of m o r a l i t y in
g e n e r a l , b u t also of a universalistic m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n r e a s o n (Vernunftmoral). W h e r e a s T u g e n d h a t sticks to t h e subjective p e r s p e c t i v e
of p a r t i c i p a n t s , G i b b a r d takes t h e objectifying a p p r o a c h of func
tional explanation.
I n c o n t r a s t with Kant, w h o u n d e r s t a n d s n o r m s exclusively as m a x
ims of a c t i o n , G i b b a r d e x t e n d s t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m to all k i n d s of
s t a n d a r d s t h a t specify why it is r a t i o n a l to h o l d a n o p i n i o n , to e x p r e s s
a feeling, o r to act in a c e r t a i n way. H a v i n g c e r t a i n o p i n i o n s c a n b e
r a t i o n a l for m e in t h e s a m e way as c a n e x p r e s s i n g c e r t a i n feelings o r
a c t i n g o n c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s . T h a t s o m e t h i n g is "rational for m e "
m e a n s thatÎ h a v e j n ^ e ^ c e r ^ n j n p ^ ^
o w n in light of w h i c h it
" m a k e s sense," o r is " a p p r o p r i a t e , " "plausible" o r simply "best," to
believe, feel, o r d o s o m e t h i n g . G i b b a r d t h e n calls t h o s e n o r m s m o r a l
t h a t lay d o w n for a c o m m u n i t y w h i c h classes of a c t i o n s m e r i t s p o n
t a n e o u s d i s a p p r o v a l . T h e y specify in w h i c h cases it is r a t i o n a l for t h e
m e m b e r s to feel a s h a m e d o r guilty o r to r e s e n t t h e c o n d u c t of
o t h e r s . G i b b a r d ' s inclusive u s e of t h e c o n c g s j ^ o f ^ ^
that,
u n l i k e Kant, h e c a n n o t derive t h e Rationality of a c t i o n (in a c c o r d
a n c e with t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d p r i n c i p l e of p u r p o s i v e rationality)
f r o m t h e a c t o r ' s r e a s o n s for b i n d i n g his__mll to this o r t h a t m a x i m .
B u t if all r a t i o n a l motives refer to p r i o r s t a n d a r d s , it m a k e s n o sense
to ask in t u r n why it was r a t i o n a l to i n t e r n a l i z e s u c h s t a n d a r d s in t h e
first p l a c e . T h e fact t h a t s o m e o n e takes s o m e t h i n g to b e r a t i o n a l
simply expresses t h e fact t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d s a u t h o r i z i n g this j u d g m e n t
a r e his s t a n d a r d s . H e n c e G i b b a r d u n d e r s t a n d s rationality j u d g m e n t s ,
w h e t h e r m o r a l o r n o n m o r a l , as expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n n o t
18
19
18
Chapter 1
b e t r u e o r false, b u t only t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l . A n d t h e only war

r a n t for t h e agent-relative b i n d i n g n e s s of m o r a l r u l e s is a truthfully
expressed mental state.
Given this "expressivist" a c c o u n t of normativity, G i b b a r d m a k e s
two moves. First h e offers a n e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n of m o r a l
n o r m s f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e a n d t h e n h e tries to m a k e
sense of t h e biological "value" of m o r a l i t y f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s
perspective, t h a t is, h e tries to t r a n s l a t e it f r o m t h e Jhej)jretical lan
g u a g e of a '^biolqgyof i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e
ofjpracticai d e l i b e r a t i o n .
~
A c c o r d i n g to t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i a n e x p l a n a t i o n , m o r a l
feelings s u c h as s h a m e , guilt, a n d r e s e n t m e n t d e v e l o p e d in t h e
c o u r s e of t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e h u m a n species as r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a
nisms to facilitate t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n . T h e n o r m a t i v i t y of
r u l e s in virtue of w h i c h it a p p e a r s r a t i o n a l to m e m b e r s of co
o p e r a t i n g g r o u p s to have s u c h feelings, a n d h e n c e to d i s a p p r o v e of
c o n d u c t t h a t deviates f r o m n o r m s a n d to offer o r t o e x p e c t c o r r e
s p o n d i n g excuses as r e p a r a t i o n for a failure i n c o o r d i n a t i o n , is n o t
rationally intelligible to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves. B u t t h e a u t h o r
ity w h i c h simply manifests itself in t h e rationality j u d g m e n t s of t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n b e explained f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e in t e r m s
of t h e " r e p r o d u c t i v e v a l u e " of t h e i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s a n d t h e c o r r e
s p o n d i n g affective dispositions. T h a t t h e s e n o r m s a n d dispositions
a r e a d v a n t a g e o u s f r o m a n e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to
find e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i r subjectively c o n v i n c i n g character. O n this
analysis, t h e p r o p e r task for p h i l o s o p h y is t o establish a p l a u s i b l e
connectio^
t h e o b s e r v e r ancTwhat is
20
taEen^to ^J^twmd^[^the
p a r t i c i p a n t . T h i s p r o b l e m takes o n par
ticular u r g e n c y when t h e a c t o r s n o l o n g e r rely o n i n t e r n a l i z e d
n o r m s b u t e n g a g e i n o p e n d i s p u t e s over w h i c h n o r m s they s h o u l d
a c c e p t as valid.
L a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s in any case as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m for
i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n . M o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s t h a t rest
o n i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s find e x p r e s s i o n i n a n e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d
language. But when the normative background consensus breaks
d o w n a n d n e w n o r m s have to b e w o r k e d o u t , a different f o r m of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e q u i r e d . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t t h e n p u t t h e i r
19
t r u s t i n t h e o r i e n t i n g p o w e r of " n o r m a t i v e discourses": "I shall call

this i n f l u e n c e normative governance. It is i n this g o v e r n a n c e of action,
belief, a n d e m o t i o n t h a t w e m i g h t find a p l a c e for p h e n o m e n a t h a t
c o n s t i t u t e a c c e p t a n c e of n o r m s , as o p p o s e d t o m e r e l y i n t e r n a l i z i n g
t h e m . W h e n we w o r k o u t at a d i s t a n c e , in c o m m u n i t y , w h a t to d o o r
t h i n k o r feel in a situation w e a r e discussing, we c o m e t o a c c e p t
n o r m s for t h e s i t u a t i o n . "
B u t it is n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear w h a t c o u l d s u p p o r t t h e " n o r m a t i v e
g o v e r n a n c e " s u c h discourses a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r o v i d e . It c a n n o t b e
g o o d r e a s o n s , b e c a u s e t h e y derive t h e i r rationally m o t i v a t i n g p o w e r
f r o m i n t e r n a l i z e d s t a n d a r d s w h i c h m u s t b e a s s u m e d t o have for
feited t h e i r a u t h o r i t y o t h e r w i s e t h e r e w o u l d b e n o n e e d t o r e a c h
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g in discourse. W h a t t h e participants must m a k e a n
object of discussion c a n n o t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f u n c t i o n as a s t a n d a r d i n
t h e discussion. G i b b a r d c a n n o t r e p r e s e n t discursively a c h i e v e d
a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g m o r a l n o r m s o n t h e m o d e l of t h e coopera-j
tive s e a r c h for t h e t r u t h ; r a t h e r h e m u s t r e p r e s e n t it as a p r o c e s s ini
w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s rhetorically influence o n e a n o t h e r .
|
21
A p r o p o n e n t w h o w a n t s t o win a g r e e m e n t for a n o r m t h a t h e
believes is w o r t h y of r e c o g n i t i o n c a n only truthfully e x p r e s s t h e
subjective state i n w h i c h h e experiences t h e n o r m as b i n d i n g . If h e
m a n a g e s to d o this i n a n a u t h e n t i c way h e c a n win over his inter
l o c u t o r s by i n d u c i n g similar affective states i n t h e m . T h u s i n n o r m a
tive discourses^ r e a c h i n g ja r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t is r e p l a c e d by
s o m e t h i n g like achieving a m u t u a l h a r n i o n i z a t ^ n ^
Inter
estingly, t h e publicTêgalitarian, a n d n o n c o e r c i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
c o n d i t i o n s of a Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e s u p p o s e d to b e m o s t c o n d u c i v e
to t h e exercise of this k i n d of r h e t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e . T h e "conversa
tional d e m a n d s " g o v e r n i n g Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e of a p r a g m a t i c k i n d
(with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n s m u s t b e
c o h e r e n t ) , T h e y a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r e v e n t t h e unjustified e x c l u s i o n
of affected p a r t i e s a n d t h e a r b i t r a r y privileging of s p e a k e r s a n d
t o p i c s i n o t h e r w o r d s , u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ; t h e y a r e also s u p p o s e d
to p r e c l u d e r e p r e s s i o n a n d m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d n o n r h e t o r i c a l f o r m s
of i n f l u e n c e . T h e s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s a r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e
f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for
t r u t h . So it is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e n o r m s t h a t win a g r e e m e n t
2 2
2 3
20
Chapter 1
u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e ultimately i d e n t i c a l to a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l
solidaristic responsibility for everybody. B u t we c a n n o t s p e a k of
'justification" h e r e b e c a u s e t h e discursive p r o c e s s is n o t g e a r e d to
t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s b u t to t h e effectiveness of t h e
m o r e impressive e x p r e s s i o n s of feelings.
As a result, G i b b a r d owes us a n e x p l a n a t i o n of why precisely d i e
n ^ r j u s ^ X h a l ^ r o y e ^ t o b e t h e b e s t f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e of
t h e i r "survival v a l u e " for a p a r t i c u l a r species s h o u l d w m ^ g r e j [ n e n t
u n d e r t h e p r a g m a t i c a l l y privileged c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n :
"In n o r m a t i v e discussion we a r e i n f l u e n c e d by e a c h other, b u t n o t
only by e a c h o t h e r . M u t u a l i n f l u e n c e n u d g e s u s t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s , if
all g o e s well, but not toward any consensus
whatsoever.Êvolutionary
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest this: c o n s e n s u s m a y p r o m o t e biological
fitness, but only the consensus of the right kind. T h e c o n s e n s u s m u s t b e
m u t u a l l y f i t n e s s - e n h a n c i n g , a n d so to m o v e t o w a r d it we m u s t b e
responsive to t h i n g s t h a t p r o m o t e o u r biological f i t n e s s . " G i b b a r d
r e c o g n i z e s t h e p r o b l e m t h a t t h e results r e a c h e d f r o m t h e objective
p e r s p e c t i v e of investigation m u s t b e m a d e c o n s i s t e n t with t h e results
t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in d i s c o u r s e a c c e p t as r a t i o n a l f r o m a n i n s i d e r ' s
perspective. B u t o n e looks in vain for s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n . G i b b a r d
fails to e x p l a i n why t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of
n o r m a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s a r e "selective" in t h e s a m e sense, a n d why
t l ^ ^ Q u j ^ p r o d u c e t h e s a m r e s u l t t h a t is, a n i n c r e a s e in t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y of collective survivalas d o t h e m e c h a n i s m s of n a t u r a l
evolution.
24
25
E r n s t T u g e n d h a t avoids t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d e t o u r t h r o u g h a f u n c t i o n
alist e x p l a n a t i o n of morality. H e first d e s c r i b e s h o w m o r a l r u l e sys
t e m s f u n c t i o n in general a n d w h a t motives we c o u l d h a v e to b e m o r a l
at all ( a ) , a n d t h e n c o n s i d e r s what form of m o r a l i t y it w o u l d b e
r a t i o n a l for u s to c h o o s e u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) .
(a) I n c o n t r a s t with classical c o n t r a c t u a l i s t n , T u g e n d h a t b e g i n s
with a fulljOejiggd^ c o n c e p t of t h e ^ r n o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h i s c o n c e p t
iricludes t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h o s e w h o feel themselves b o u n d
by m o r a l r u l e s a n d h e n c e t h o s e w h o "have a c o n s c i e n c e , " e x p r e s s
21
m o r a l feelings, a r g u e a b o u t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s with r e a s o n s , a n d so
f o r t h . M e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y t h i n k t h a t t h e y "know" w h a t is
" g o o d " a n d "evil" in t h e c a t e g o r i c a l sense. H a v i n g o u t l i n e d this
c o n c e p t i o n , T u g e n d h a t c o n s i d e r s w h e t h e r it is r a t i o n a l for a n y given
c a n d i d a t e to e n t e r i n t o s u c h a m o r a l p r a c t i c e d e s c r i b e d as a whole,
t h a t is, to b e c o m e a c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y as
such: " T h a t we w a n t to b e l o n g to a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y at all . . . is
u l t i m a t e l y a n act of o u r a u t o n o m y for w h i c h t h e r e c a n only b e g o o d
motives, n o t r e a s o n s . " By " a u t o n o m y " T u g e n d h a t u n d e r s t a n d s only
t h e capacity to act in a r u l e - g o v e r n e d m a n n e r f r o m r a t i o n a l motives.
B u t t h e practical r e a s o n s h e g o e s o n to e n u m e r a t e g o b e y o n d t h e
e m p i r i c i s t f r a m e w o r k of value-free c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e . F o r
T u g e n d h a t adduces n o t p r e m o r a l interests b u t value-orientations
w h i c h c o u l d only have d e v e l o p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a m o r a l l y
c o n s t i t u t e d c o m m u n i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e to e n t e r a
m o r a l c o m m u n i t y b e c a u s e I p r e f e r t h e status of subject a n d ad
d r e s s e e of r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s to t h e status of a n object to w h i c h
r e c i p r o c a l i n s t r u m e n t a l i z a t i o n w o u l d r e d u c e m e ; o r b e c a u s e bal
a n c e d f r i e n d s h i p s a r e b e t t e r for m e t h a n t h e s t r u c t u r a l isolation of
a strategically a c t i n g subject; o r b e c a u s e I c a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e satis
faction of b e i n g r e s p e c t e d by p e r s o n s w h o a r e w o r t h y of m o r a l
r e s p e c t only as a m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a n d so f o r t h .
26
T h e preferences that T u g e n d h a t sp^

c o m m u r n t y a r e a l r e a d y infused with t h e values of s u c h a c o m m u n i t y ;
tHey are c o n t i n g e n t o n pribr, in^
tions. At a n y r a t e - t h e s e motives d o n o t e x p l a i n h o w it c o u l d b e
r a t i o n a l for a c t o r s who find themselves in a premoral condition a n d k n o w
n o t h i n g else to m a k e t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a m o r a l c o n d i t i o n . S o m e o n e
w h o arrives at r e a s o n s for his d e c i s i o n to p u r s u e a m o r a l life, r e a s o n s
w h i c h c a n only r e s u l t f r o m reflection o n t h e p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e of t h e
a d v a n t a g e s of m o r a l l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n , h a s left b e h i n d t h e
e g o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d takes his o r i e n t a t i o n
i n s t e a d f r o m c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. H e o r i e n t s his p r a c t i c a l
d e l i b e r a t i o n to t h e ethical q u e s t i o n of w h a t k i n d of life h e s h o u l d
lead, w h o h e is a n d w a n t s t o b e , w h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n is " g o o d " for
h i m all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , etc. R e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t in l i g h t of t h e s e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t i n g force only insofar as t h e y affect t h e
22
Chapter 1
identity a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n a c t o r w h o h a s a l r e a d y b e e n
f o r m e d by a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y .
M a r t i n Seel also u n d e r s t a n d s ( a n d accepts) t h e a r g u m e n t in this
sense. A l t h o u g h t h e h a p p i n e s s of a successful life d o e s n o t necessar
ily consist in a m o r a l life, a subject w h o w a n t s to live a g o o d life h a s
g o o d r e a s o n s for a c c e p t i n g m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s (of w h a t e v e r k i n d ) . It
is a l r e a d y j : l e a r f r o m t h e ethical p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t it is n o t possible to
l e a d a good life o u t s i d j a _ j j ^ ^
O f c o u r s e , t h a t only
m e a n s t h a t " t h e r e a r e n e c e s s a r y a r e a s of o v e r l a p b e t w e e n a g o o d life
a n d a m o r a l l y g o o d life, b u t n o t t h a t a g o o d life is only possible
within the limits of a m o r a l l y g o o d l i f e . " B u t T u g e n d h a t is n o t so
m u c h i n t e r e s t e d in t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e g o o d life a n d m o r a l i t y
as in t h e ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l . A n d this leads to a n
u n a v o i d a b l e p a r a d o x if, like T u g e n d h a t , o n e rightly insists o n t h e
difference b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d for o n e s e l f a n d m o r a l c o n c e r n for
t h e interests of o t h e r s : insofar as a n a c t o r only h a s r a t i o n a l motives
for p r e f e r r i n g m o r a l to p r e m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s , h e u n d e r m i n e s t h e
o b l i g a t o r y n a t u r e of t h e m o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s w h o s e categorical valid
ity h e s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s .
27
Seel r e c o g n i z e s t h a t " m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . t r a n s c e n d s t h o s e
p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s we have for a c c e p t i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of
view at all,"^ b u t h e d o e s n o t d r a w t h e c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n f r o m
t h i s . T h e t h r u s t of a n ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l is n o t
t h a t s o m e o n e is m o t i v a t e d by p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s to " c o n f r o n t
r e a s o n s of a c o m p l e t e l y different sort" b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e m o r a l
l a n g u a g e loses t h e illocutiraarj^fprce of u n c o n d i t i o n a l demaric[s~as
s o o n as p a r t i c i p a t i o n in_ t h e mora^
entjgn^^
a r a t i o n a l chooser. If t h e a c t o r w h o assures
himself of t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of a m o r a l way of life is t h e s a m e as t h e
o n e w h o accepts s u c h c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e basis of this p r e f e r e n c e , his
ethical justification c o n d i t i o n s t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a w h o l e
a n d c h a n g e s t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e m o v e s t h a t a r e possible w i t h i n it.
F o r a c t i n g m o r a l l y "out of r e s p e c t for t h e law" is i n c o m p a t i b l e with
t h e ethical proviso of always e x a m i n i n ^ w h e t h e r t h e p r a c t i c e as a
w h o l e also pays off f r o m t h e p e ^ ^
life p l a n . F o r
c o n c e p t u a l reâsonsTThe^categorical m e a n i n g of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s
c a n b e u p h e l d only as l o n g as a d d r e s s e e s a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m step8
29
23
p i n g o u t s i d e t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y , if only i n a virtual m a n n e r , i n
o r d e r t o w e i g h t h e a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s of m e m b e r s h i p
f r o m t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e . N o r , conversely, is
t h e r e a r o u t e f r o m ethical reflection t o t h e justification of morality.
(b) Even if t h e e m p i r i c i s t d r e a m w e r e t o b e c o m e a reality, a n d
reflection o n o n e ' s o w n interests w o u l d g e n e r a t e a rationally r e c o n s t r u c t a b l e d y n a m i c t h a t w o u l d p r o p e l o n e b e y o n d t h e p u r s u i t of
t h o s e i n t e r e s t s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of u n c o n d i t i o n a l m o r a l c o n c e r n
even t h e n t h e essential p r o b l e m w o u l d n o t b e solved. Ethical r e a s o n s
e x p l a i n a t m o s t why we s h o u l d e n g a g e i n s o m e j m O T ^ J a n ^ a g e ^ a m e
6 r otherTTiut n o t whicfiTone. T u g e n d h a t gives this p r o b l e m a g e n e a
logical c a s t T T a v i n g lost t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i r s h a r e d
morality, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t r e a c h a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
w h i c h specific m o r a l n o r m s they s h o u l d a d o p t . I n this p r o c e s s n o
b o d y c a n claim m o r e a u t h o r i t y t h a n a n y o n e else; all s t a n d p o i n t s
f r o m w h i c h o n e c o u l d claim privileged access t o m o r a l t r u t h have
lost t h e i r validity. T h e social c o n t r a c t c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a satisfactory
r e s p o n s e t o this c h a l l e n g e b e c a u s e a h a g r e e m e n t a m o n g c o n t r a c t i n g
p a r t n e r s m o t i v a t e d by i n t e r e s t s c a n l e a d a t b e s t t o a n e x t e r n a l l y
i m p o s e d social r e g u l a t i o n of c o n d u c t , b u t n o t t o a b i n d i n g , l e t a l o n e
a universalistic, c o n c e p t i o n o f ( t h e T o m m ^ ^
Tugendhat's de
s c r i p t i o n of t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t is similar t o t h e o n e I have p r o p o s e d .
T h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a r e n o t t r y i n g t o replace m o r a l
ity with a social r e g u l a t i o n of b e h a v i o r t h a t is t o everybody's advan
tage. T h e i r g o a l is n o t t o r e p l a c e t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as such,
b u t only its religious f o u n d a t i o n .
T h i s l i n e of t h o u g h t leads t o reflection o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m
m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t w h i c h , after r e l i g i o n a n d metaphysics, r e p r e
s e n t t h e only r e m a i n i n g r e s o u r c e o n w h i c h t h e justification of a
m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y c a n draw: "If t h e g o o d is n o
l o n g e r laid d o w n i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t m a n n e r , t h e only p r i n c i p l e of t h e
g o o d s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a t i o n for m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y ,
w h o s e m e m b e r s h i p i n t u r n c a n n o l o n g e r b e limited, a n d h e n c e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for all o t h e r s w h i c h m e a n s c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e i r
wishes a n d interests. T o p u t it in t h e f o r m of a slogan: intersubjectivity t h u s u n d e r s t o o d takes t h e p l a c e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t p r e g i v e n .
. . . Since t h e r e c i p r o c a l d e m a n d s . . . c o n s t i t u t e t h e f o r m of morality
24
Chapter 1
in g e n e r a l j o n e c a n also say: i n a s m u c h as t h e c o n t e n t t o w h i c h t h e
d e m a n d s refer is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n for w h a t all w a n t ,
the content now fits the form."^
I n this way T u g e n d h a t derives t h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e of universaliz a t i o n f r o m t h e symmetrical c o n d i t i o n s of t h e initial situation i n
w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s , w h o h a v e b e e n s t r i p p e d of all privileges a n d as a
r e s u l t a r e o n a n e q u a l footing, c o m e t o g e t h e r t o a g r e e o n basic
n o r m s t h a t c a n b e rationally a c c e p t e d by all p a r t i c i p a n t s . However,
h e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t "rational acceptability" t h e r e b y t a k e s j o u a
m e a n i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g "rational for m e . " If t h e r e
is n o a u t h o r i t y for r e l a t i o n s of m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n h i g h e r t h a n t h e
g o o d will a n d i r m g h t of t h q s e j v h o c o m e t o a s h a r e d ^ ^ r e e m e n t
concerning the rules t h a ^ a r e j t o ^ o v e r n
livin^JogejJaer, t h e n
0
31
t h e s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g t h e s e r u l e s m u s t b e d e r i v e d exclusively f r o m
t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s seek t o convince o n e a n o t h e r of
t h e i r beliefs a n d p r o p o s a l s . By e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o o p e r a t i v e c o m m u
nicative p r a c t i c e , t h e y a l r e a d y tacitly a c c e p t t h e c o n d i t i o n of symmet
rical o r e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n for e v e r y o n e ' s interests. B e c a u s e this
p r a c t i c e only achieves its g o a l if e v e r y o n e is willing t o c o n v i n c e
o t h e r s a n d t o b e c o n v i n c e d by t h e m , every serious p a r t i c i p a n t m u s t
e x a m i n e w h a t is rationaLforJilm under the conditions of symmetrical
a n d e q u a l c c ^ i d e r ^ i o n _ o f interests. B u t with t h e r e f e r e n c e ~to t h e
possibility bf a n a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d b y ^ ^ S q n ^ d i s c o u r s e ) (which i n
Rawls's case is i m p o s e d by t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ) ,
p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s take o n a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . I n this way we
t r a n s c e n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . A p r i n c i p l e of
universalization t h a t c a n n o t b e justified by a p p e a l t o e a c h individ
ual's interests ( o r t o e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ) serves
as t h e g r o u n d of validity of r a t i o n a l morality. We c a n g a i n i n s i g h t
into this p r i n c i p l e only t h r o u g h reflection o n t h e u n a v o i d a b l e c o n
ditions of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t .
W h i l e G i b b a r d analyzes t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s as p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i
t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e discourses, h e views t h e m solely f r o m t h e func
tionalist p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of
social a c t i o n . T u g e n d h a t , by c o n t r a s t , u p h o l d s t h e view t h a t t h e
a c c e p t a n c e of m o r a l r u l e s m u s t b e justified f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves; b u t h e t o o d e n i e s t h e e p i s t e m i c m e a n -
25
i n g t h a t this a c c e p t a n c e a s s u m e s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of
discourse.
rational
VI
W e a k n o n c o g n i t i v i s m a s s u m e s t h a t a n a c t o r ' s c h o i c e c a n b e affected
by practical r e a s o n in j u s t o n e way, namely, t h r o u g h d e l i b e r a t i o n s
t h a t a c c o r d with t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. If, by con
trast, p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is n o l o n g e r assimilated to i n s t r u m e n t a l rea
son, t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of r e a s o n a n d will c h a n g e s , a n d h e n c e so d o e s
t h e c o n c e p t of subjective f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m is n o l o n g e r e x h a u s t e d
by t h e ability t o c h o o s e in a c c o r d a n c e with m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e b u t
finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself t h r o u g h insight.
T h e significance of t h e t e r m "insight" h e r e is t h a t a d e c i s i o n c a n b e
justified i n t e r m s of " e p i s t e m i c " r e a s o n s . Since e p i s t e m i c reasonsj
g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t t h e t r u t h of assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , t h e u s e of t h e
e x p r e s s i o n " e p i s t e m i c " in p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s is in n e e d of e x p l a n a
t i o n . P r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s d e p e n d o n t h e p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s of
e a c h p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n . O n l y t h e a g e n t himself, w h o k n o w s his o w n
p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s , h a s t h e final e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y to j u d g e
t h e s e "data." Practical reflection c a n l e a d t o ( m ^ g h t ^ o n l y w h e n it_
g o e s b e y o n d t h e subjective w o r l d to w h i c h t h e a c t o r h a s privileged
access a n d p e r t a i n s to t h e c o n t e n t s of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d ^
social world. I n this way reflection o n s h a r e d e x p e r i e n c e s , practices,
a n d f o r m s of life b r i n g s to a w a r e n e s s f | i n ^ ^
to w h i c h
we d o n o t h a v e access simply t h r o u g h t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e
first p e r s o n singular.
B r i n g i n g to c o n s c i o u s n e s s something^lmplicitly k n o w n is n o t t h e
s a m e as a c q u i r i n g e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . Scientific k n o w l e d g e is
TOunTerrnTurti^^
achieved insight^ critically a p
p r o p r i a t e s a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w - h o w b y j T i a n n g it explicit, c o n t e x tualizing i t , j | r ^
Ethical insights r e s u l t f r o m
t h e e x p l i c a t i o n of t h e k n o w - h o w t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y socialized
individuals h a v e a c q u i r e d by g r o w i n g u p in a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e . T h e
m o s t ^ g e n e r a l e l e m e n t s of t h e practical k n o w l e d g e of a c u l t u r e h a v e
b e c o m e s e d i m e n t e d in its evaluative v o c a b u l a r y a n d in its r u l e s
for t h e u s e of n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . Actors d o n o t j u s t d e v e l o p
32
26
Chapter 1
c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s a n d of t h e life t h e y w o u l d like to l e a d in
g e n e r a l in l i g h t of t h e i r evaluatively c h a r g e d l a n g u a g e g a m e s ; they
also discover attractive a n d repulsive f e a t u r e s of p a r t i c u l a r situations
t h a t they c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d w i t h o u t "seeing" h o w they ought to
r e s p o n d to t h e m . B e c a u s e we h a v e intuitive k n o w l e d g e of w h a t is
attractive a n d repulsive, r i g h t o r w r o n g , a n d in g e n e r a l of r e l e v a n c e ,
^ t h e m o m e n t of i n s i g h t h e r e c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c o r r e s p o n d
i n g disposition o r p r e f e r e n c e . It consists of a n intersubjectively
- s h a r e d k n o w - h o w t h a t h a s g a i n e d a c c e p t a n c e in t h e lifeworld a n d
h a s " p r o v e d " itself in p r a c t i c e . As t h e s h a r e d possession of a c u l t u r a l
f o r m of life, it enjoys "objectivity" in v i r t u e of its social diffusion a n d
a c c e p t a n c e . H e n c e t h e p r a c t i c a l reflection w h i c h critically a p p r o p r i ates this irrtuitive k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s a social p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t g o e s
b e y o n d t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e of s o m e b o d y a c t i n g o n
his p r e f e r e n c e s .
3 4
H e r e I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e o u t s e t b e t w e e n value-orientations (Wertorientierungen) a n d o b l i g a t i o n s (Verpflichtungeri). We j u d g e

v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h e evaluative s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s
o r g r o u p s f r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, w h e r e a s we j u d g e d u t i e s ,
n o r m s , a n d categorical i m p e r a t i v e s f r o m t h e moral p o i n t of view.
E t h i c a l g u e s t i o n s arise f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , S e e n f r o m
t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l p o l r T F ^ F ^ S v ^ T h e y refer t o I T s r i a r e d e t h o s :
w h a t is at issue is h o w we u n d e r s t a n d ourselves as m e m b e r s of o u r
c o m m u n i t y , h o w we s h o u l d o r i e n t o u r lives, o r w h a t is b e s t for u s in
the l o n g r u n a n d all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Similar q u e s t i o n s arise f r o m
t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e : w h o I a m a n d w h o I w o u l d like
to b e , o r h o w I s h o u l d l e a d m y life. S u c h existential c o n c e r n s differ
f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e n o t j u s t in view of t h e e x t e n d e d
h o r i z o n s i m p l i e d by t h e f o r m u l a of w h a t "in the long run and all things
considered is b e s t for m e . " I n t h e s e q u e s t i o n s t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c
tive d o e s n o t i m p l y a n e g o c e n t r i c r e s t r i c t i o n to s h e e r p r e f e r e n c e s ;
r a t h e r , it p o i n t s to a n individual life h i s t o r y t h a t is always a l r e a d y
e m b e d d e d in intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of l i f e .
T h e attractiveness of t h e values in light of w h i c h I u n d e r s t a n d myself
a n d m y life c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n t h e limits of t h e w o r l d of
subjective e x p e r i e n c e s to w h i c h I h a v e privileged access. F r o m t h e
ethical p o i n t of view, m y p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals a r e n o l o n g e r simply
35
27
36
given b u t a r e t h e m s e l v e s o p e n t o d i s c u s s i o n ; since t h e y d e p e n d o n
my self-understanding, they can u n d e r g o reasoned change t h r o u g h
reflection o n w h a t h a s intrinsic value for us w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of o u r
s h a r e d social w o r l d .
F r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of v i e w w e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ v ^ ^ a n ^ i ^ ^ ^
successful, o r better, n o t m i s s p e n t life, w h i c h arise i n t h e c o n t e x t of
a particular, collective f o r m of life o r of a n individual life history.
Practical r e f l e c t i o n takes t h e f o r m of a p r o c e s s of<fiermeneutic selfclarificatiorij) It gives e x p r e s s i o n t o s t r o n g evaluations i n light of
w h i c h I o r i e n t m y s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n this c o n t e x t t h e c r i t i q u e of
^ s e l f - d e c e p t i o n ^ a n d of s y m p t o m s of a<ompulsive o r a l i e n a t e c ^ m o d e
of life takes its yardstick f r o m t h e i d e a of a c o n s c i o u s a n d c o h e r e n t
m o d e of life, w h e r e t h e ^ u j t h e n t i c i t y of a life-projec^can b e u n d e r
s t o o d as a higher-level validity claim a n a l o g o u s with t h e claim t o
t r u t h f u l n e s s of expressivejspeech a c t s .
37
H o w we c o n d u c t o u r lives is d e t e r m i n e d m o r e o r less by h o w we
u n d e r s t a n d ourselves. T h u s ethical insights i n f l u e n c e h o w we o r i e n t
o u r lives t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As
insights t h a t b i n d t h e will, t h e y i n f o r m a conscious p l a n of life in
w h i c h t h e free will in t h e e t h i c a l sense manifests itself. A t t h e level
of ethical r e a s o n i n g , t h e f r e e d o m to c h o o s e , in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l
c h o i c e , is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e f r e e d o m t o d e c i d e u p o n a n a u t h e n t i c
38
life.
~~
:
~
However, t h e limits of t h e e t h i c a l p o i n t of view b e c o m e m a n i f e s t
o n c e q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e arise: for f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e j u s t i c e is
r e d u c e d t o j u s t o n e value a m o n g o t h e r s . M o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s a p p e a r
to b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t for o n e p e r s o n t h a n t h e y a r e for a n o t h e r a n d
to h a v e m o r e w e i g h t i n o n e c o n t e x t t h a n i n a n o t h e r . W i t h i n t h e
h o r i z o n of e t h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , it is certainly possible t o a c c o u n t
for t h e s e m a n t i c difference b e t w e e n t h e attractive c h a r a c t e r of values
a n d t h e b i n d i n g n e s s of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s by giving q u e s t i o n s of
j u s t i c e a c e r t a i n priority over q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life: "Ethical life
itself is i m p o r t a n t , b u t it c a n see t h a t t h i n g s o t h e r t h a n itself a r e
i m p o r t a n t . . . . T h e r e is o n e k i n d of ethical c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t di
rectly c o n n e c t s i m p o r t a n c e a n d deliberative priority, a n d this is o b
l i g a t i o n . " B u t as l o n g as d u t i e s a r e viewed solely f r o m t h e ethical
p o i n t of view, a n absolute priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d , w h i c h
39
28
Chapter 1
a l o n e w o u l d b e c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e c a t e g o r i c a l validity of m o r a l
d u t i e s , c a n n o t b e m a i n t a i n e d : " T h e s e k i n d s of o b l i g a t i o n s v e r y often
c o m m a n d t h e h i g h e s t deliberative priority. . . . However, we c a r t also
see h o w they n e e d n o t always c o m m a n d t h e h i g h e s t priority, even in
ethically well-disposed a g e n t s . " As l o n g as justice is t r e a t e d as a n
i n t e g r a l p a r t of a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , t h e r e is n o
groundTSf^^
in cases of conflict, d u t i e s c a n only
40
b e " t r u m p e d " by d u t i e s a n d r i g h t s by r i g h t s (as D w o r k i n p u t s i t ) .

W i t h o u t t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d o n e c a n n o t h a v e
a n ethically n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice. T h i s deficit w o u l d h a v e
u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s for e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in pluralistic socie
ties. F o r t h e e q u a l t r e a t m e n t of different individuals a n d g r o u p s ,
e a c h of w h i c h h a s its o w n individual o r collective identity, c o u l d only
b e a s s u r e d by s t a n d a r d s t h a t a r e p a r t of a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
g o o d equally r e c o g n i z e d by all of t h e m . T h e s a m e c o n d i t i o n w o u l d
h o l d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s for t h e j u s t r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l rela
t i o n s b e t w e e n states, for c o s m o p o l i t a n r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n w o r l d citi
zens, a n d for g l o b a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c u l t u r e s . T h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y of
this r e q u i r e m e n t of a globally s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d shows
why neo-Aristotelian a p p r o a c h e s fall s h o r t of t h e universalistic con-^
t e n t of a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic responsibility for
e v e r y o n e . F o r a n y a t t e m p t t o p r o j e c t a universally b i n d i n g collective
g o o d o n w h i c h t h e solidarity of all h u m a n b e i n g s i n c l u d i n g f u t u r e
g e n e r a t i o n s c o u l d b e f o u n d e d r u n s u p a g a i n s t a d i l e m m a : a sub
stantive c o n c e p t i o n t h a t is still sufficiently i n f o r m a t i v e entails a n
i n t o l e r a b l e f o r m of p a t e r n a l i s m (at least with r e g a r d to t h e h a p p i
ness of f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s ) ; b u t a n e m p t y c o n c e p t i o n t h a t abstracts
f r o m all local c o n t e x t s u n d e r m i n e s ( t h e ) c o n c e p t of t h e g o o d .
4 1
To d o j u s t i c e to t h e presumptive i m p a r t i a l i t y j ) f irmraljiu^lgmejits
a n d to t h e c a t e g o r i c a l validity claim of b i n d i n g n o r m s , we m u s t
u n c o u p l e t h e h o r i z o n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e , in w h i c h i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela
tions a r e r e g u l a t e d , f r o m t h e vertical p e r s p e c t i v e , of m y o r o u r o w n
life-project, a n d t r e a t m o r a l q u e s t i o n s separately. T h e a b s t r a c t q u e s
t i o n of w h a t is equally in t h e i n t e r e s t of all goes beyond t h e c o n t e x t b o u n d e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n of w h a t is b e s t for m e o r us. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t issues of j u s t i c e r e s u l t f r o m a n idealizing e x t e n s i o n
of t h e ethical p r o b l e m a t i c r e t a i n s a valid m e a n i n g .
29
A Genealogical Analysis/of the Cognitive Content of Morality
If we i n t e r p r e t j u s t i c e as w h a t is equally g o o d for all, t h e n t h e

" g o o d " t h a t h a s b e e n e x t e n d e d step by s t e p to t h e "right" f o r m s a
b r i d g e b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d solidarity. F o r universal j u s t i c e also re
q u i r e s t h a t o n e p e r s o n s h o u l d take responsibility for a n o t h e r , a n d
even t h a t e a c h p e r s o n s h o u l d s t a n d i n a n d a n s w e r for a s t r a n g e r w h o
h a s f o r m e d his i d e n t i t y in c o m p l e t e l y different c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h i m s e l f in t e r m s of o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s . T h e r e m n a n t
^ o f t h e g o o d at t h e c o r e of t h e r i g h t r e m i n d s us t h a t m o r a l conscious
ness d e p e n d s o n a p a r t i c u l a r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l p e r s o n s
w h o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e y belong to t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . All individu
als w h o h a v e b e e n socialized i n t o a n y c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m o f l i f e at
all b e l o n g to ( t M s T o m m T m i t ^ B e c a u s e socialized p e r s o n s c a n only
stabilize t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n ,
t h e i r integrity is p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e a n d they a r e c o n s e q u e n t l y in
n e e d of special p r o t e c t i o n . T h e y m u s t b e a b l e t o a p p e a l to a s o u r c e
of a u t h o r i t y b e y o n c ^ ^ G .
H . M e a d speaks in
this c o n n e c t i o n of t h e "ever w i d e r c o m m u n i t y . " Every c o n c r e t e c o m
m u n i t y d e p e n d s o n t h e m o r a l c o n i m u n i t y as its " b e t t e r self," so to
speak. As m e m b e r s of this c o m m u n i t y , individuals e x p e c t to b e
t r e a t e d equally, while it is a s s u m e d at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t e a c h j j e r s o n
r e g a r d s every o t h e r p e r s o n a ^ ' o n e _ o f u s . " F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e ,
^solidarit^ is simply t h e reverse side of j u s t i c e .
H e r e we m u s t avoid t h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t t h e r i g h t is r e l a t e d to
t h e g o o d as f o r m is to c o n t e n t : " T h e f o r m a l c o n c e p t of t h e g o o d
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m a t e r i a l k e r n e l of a universalistic m o r a l i t y i t is t h e
object of m o r a l c o n c e r n . " T h i s c o n c e p t i o n betrays t h e selective
vision of a liberalism t h a t r e d u c e s t h e r o l e of m o r a l i t y a s t h o u g h it
w e r e t h e s u m of n e g a t i v e liberty r i g h t s t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e
individual g o o d a n d t h e r e b y e r e c t s m o r a l i t y o n a n e t h i c a l f o u n d a
t i o n . I n t h a t case t h e w h e r e f o r e of m o r a l i t y t h a t is, k n o w l e d g e of
t h e " g o o d s a n d ills" t h a t a r e equally "at stake" for e v e r y b o d y in m o r a l
conflictswould h a v e to b e p r e s c r i b e d to m o r a l i t y as s o m e t h i n g
given. T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d h a v e to k n o w already, p r i o r to any
m o r a l d e l i b e r a t i o n , w h a t is equally g o o d for all; a t t h e v e r y least t h e y
w o u l d have to b o r r o w a c o n c e p t of t h e f o r m a l g o o d f r o m t h e p h i
l o s o p h e r . B u t n o b o d y c a n d e t e r m i n e directly f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s
p e r s p e c t i v e w h a t a n y p e r s o n s h o u l d r e g a r d as g o o d . T h e r e f e r e n c e
4 2
4 3
30
Chapter 1
to "any" p e r s o n m a s k s a n a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t o v e r b u r d e n s even t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r . To b e s u r e , m o r a l i t y c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p r o t e c t i v e
m e c h a n i s m t h a t c o m p e n s a t e s for t h e i n t r i n s i c vulnerability of p e r
sons. B u t k n o w l e d g e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l vulnerability of a b e i n g
w h o c a n d e v e l o p a n i d e n t i t y only t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l i z i n g h i m s e l f in
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d w h o c a n stabilize it only in r e l a t i o n s of
intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , derives f r o m a n intuitive familiarity with
t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s of o u r j c o m r m ^
of life as s u c h . It
44
is a d e e p l y r o o t e d g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e of w h i c h we b e c o m e aware
only in cases of clinical d e v i a n c e , t h r o u g h t h e a w a r e n e s s of t h o s e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h t h e i d e n t i t y of socialized individuals is t h r e a t
e n e d . A p p e a l i n g to a k n o w l e d g e t h a t is s h a p e d by s u c h n e g a t i v e
e x p e r i e n c e s d o e s n o t c o m m i t u s t o stating i n a positive way w h a t
c o n s t i t u t e s a g o o d life in g e n e r a l . O n l y t h o s e affected c a n themselves
clarify, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of p a r t i c i p a n t s in practical d e l i b e r a t i o n ,
w h a t is equally g o o d for all. T h e g o o d t h a t is r e l e v a n t f r o i r i j j i e m o r a l
p o i n t of view shows itself in e a c h p a r t i c u l a r case f r o m t h e e n l a r g e d
first p e r s o n p l u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e of a c o m m u n i t y t h a t d o e s n o t e x c l u d e
a n y b o d y T h e g o o d t h a t is s u b s u m e d by t h e j u s t is t h e very f o r m of
a n intersubjectively s h a r e d e t h o s in g e n e r a l , a n d h e n c e it is t h e
s t r u c t u r e of m e m b e r s h i p of a c o m m u n i t y , t h o u g h o n e t h a t h a s
t h r o w n off t h e shackles of a n y e x c l u s i o n a r y c o m m u n i t y .
T h i s c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n solidarity a n d j u s t i c e i n s p i r e d K a n t to
e l u c i d a t e t h e p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e c a n b e
j u d g e d impartially in t e r m s of t h e R o u s s e a u i a n m o d e l of self-legisla
t i o n : " C o n s e q u e n t l y every r a t i o n a l b e i n g m u s t act as if by his m a x i m s
h e w e r e at all t i m e s a legislative m e m b e r of t h e universal r e a l m of
e n d s . " K a n t uses t h e t e r m " r e a l m of e n d s " to i n d i c a t e t h a t e a c h of
its m e m b e r s r e g a r d s h i m s e l f a n d all o t h e r m e m b e r s n e v e r m e r e l y as
m e a n s b u t always also as " e n d s in themselves." As a legislator, n o b o d y
is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n alien will; b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e every p e r s o n
is subject a l o n g with e v e r y o n e else to t h e laws t h a t h e gives himself.
By r e p l a c i n g t h e figure of t h e c o n t r a c t d e r i v e d f r o m private law with
t h a t of r e p u b l i c a n legislation d e r i v e d f r o m p u b l i c law, K a n t c a n , in
morality, combine in o n e a n d t h e s a m e p e r s o n t h e two r o l e s t h a t a r e
s e p a r a t e d in law, t h a t of t h e citizen w h o p a r t i c i p a t e s in legislation
a n d t h a t of t h e private legal p e r s o n w h o is subject to t h e law. T h e
4 5
31
m o r a l l y free p e r s o n m u s t b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d himself s i m u l t a n e
ously as t h e a u t h o r of m o r a l c o m m a n d s to w h i c h h e is subject as
a d d r e s s e e . T h i s is possible only if h e d o e s n o t exercise t h e legislative
c o m p e t e n c e , in w h i c h h e "participates," in a n a r b i t r a r y m a n n e r (as
o n a positivistic c o n c e p t i o n of law) b u t r a t h e r i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n of a political c o m m u n i t y w h o s e citizens g o v e r n t h e m
selves. A n d t h e r e only laws c a n h o l d sway t h a t c o u l d h a v e b e e n
a g r e e d u p o n "by e a c h for all a n d by all for e a c h . "
VII
A law is valid i n t h e m o r a l sense w h e n it c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d by
e v e r y b o d y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e a c h individual. B e c a u s e only
" g e n e r a l " laws fulfill t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y r e g u l a t e m a t t e r s in t h e
e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all, p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e g e n e r alizability o r universalizability of t h e i n t e r e s t s e x p r e s s e d in t h e law.
T h u s a p e r s o n takes t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view w h e n h e d e l i b e r a t e s like
a d e m o c r a t i c legislator o n w h e t h e r t h e p r a c t i c e t h a t w o u l d result
f r o m t h e g e n e r a l o b s e r v a n c e of a h y p o t h e t i c a l l y p r o p o s e d n o r m
Ccoukljbe a c c e p t e d by all t h o s e possibly affected viewed as p o t e n t i a l
co-legislators. E a c h p e r s o n p a r t i c i p a t e s in t h e r o l e o j c o ^ i s l a t o r in
a cooperative e n t e r p r i s e a n d t h e r e b y a d o p t s a n intersubjectively ex
t e n d e d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h it c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d w h e t h e r a
c o n t r o v e r s i a l n o r m c a n c o u n t as g e n e r a l i z a b l e f r o m t h e p o i n t of view
of e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t . P r a g m a t i c a n d ethical r e a s o n s , w h i c h r e t a i n
t h e i r i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n to t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , also play a r o l e in t h e s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s ; b u t t h e s e
agent-relative r e a s o n s n o l o n g e r count as r a t i o n a l motives a n d valueo r i e n t a t i o n s of individual p e r s o n s b u t as e p i s t e m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n s to
a d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h n o r m s a r e e x a m i n e d with t h e a i m of r e a c h i n g
a c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t . B e c a u s e a legislative p r a c t i c e c a n only
b e u n d e r t a k e n jointly, a m o n o l o g i c a l , e g o c e n t r i c o p e r a t i o n of t h e
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n test in t h e m a n n e r of t h e G o l d e n R u l e will n o t suffice.
M o r a l r e a s o n s b i n d t h e will i n a different way t h a n d o p r a g m a t i c
a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . O n c e t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will takes t h e
f o r m of self-legislation, r e a s o n a n d t h e will c o m p l e t e l y interpenetrate.
H e n c e K a n t calls only t h e a u t o n o m o u s , rationally d e t e r m i n e d will
32
Chapter 1
"free." O n l y s o m e o n e w h o lets his will b e d e t e r m i n e d by i n s i g h t i n t o

w h a t all c o u l d will acts freely: "Only a r a t i o n a l b e i n g h a s t h e capacity
of a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g to t h e conception of laws (i.e., a c c o r d i n g to p r i n
ciples) . T h i s capacity is t h e will. Since reason is r e q u i r e d for t h e
d e r i v a t i o n of a c t i o n s f r o m laws, will is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n practical
r e a s o n . " To b e s u r e , every act of c h o i c e rests o n g r o u n d s of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n ; b u t as l o n g as c o n t i n g e n t , subjective d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e still
o p e r a t i v e a n d t h e will d o e s n o t act solely o n g r o u n d s of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n , n o t every t r a c e of compulsion h a s b e e n e x p u n g e d , a n d t h e
will is n o t yet truly free.
46
T h e n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t flows f r o m t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself as

such d o e s n o t as yet h a v e a m o r a l m e a n i n g . W h e n a n a g e n t a d o p t s
t e c h n i c a l r u l e s of skill o r p r a g m a t i c c o u n s e l s of p r u d e n c e , h e lets his
c h o i c e b e g u i d e d by p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , b u t t h e o p e r a t i v e r e a s o n s have
d e t e r m i n i n g force only in r e l a t i o n to c o n t i n g e n t p r e f e r e n c e s a n d
goals. T h i s h o l d s e v e n for e t h i c a l r e a s o n s , t h o u g h in a different way.
T h e a u t h e n t i c k y o f v a l u e - c o m m i t m e n t s p o i n t s b e y o n d t h e subjectc e n t e r e d h o r i z o n of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. B u t s t r o n g evaluations
a c q u i r e objective force for t h e will only in c o n n e c t i o n with c o n t i n
g e n t , t h o u g h intersubjectively s h a r e d , e x p e r i e n c e s , practices, a n d
f o r m s of life. I n b o t h cases t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g i m p e r a t i v e s a n d rec
o m m e n d a t i o n s c a n claim only c o n d i t i o n a l validity: t h e y h o l d u n d e r
, t h e c o n d i t i o n of subjectively given i n t e r e s t s o r intersubjectively
shared traditions.
M o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s a c q u i r e a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l o r c a t e g o r i c a l validity
only w h e n they p r o c e e d f r o m laws t h a t e m a n c i p a t e t h e will, assum
i n g it c o m m i t s itself to t h e m , f r o m all c o n t i n g e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s
a n d t h a t in a sense assimilate it to practical r e a s o n itself. F o r t h e
c o n t i n g e n t goals, p r e f e r e n c e s , a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s t h a t o t h e r w i s e
d e t e r m i n e t h e will f r o m w i t h o u t c a n t h e n b e s u b j e c t e d to critical
e v a l u a t i o n in light of n o r m s t h a t a r e justified f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t
of view. T h e h e t e r o n o m o u s will c a n also b e m o t i v a t e d by r e a s o n s to
a d o p t m a x i m s ; b u t its c o m m i t m e n t r e m a i n s b o u n d to p r e e x i s t i n g
interests a n d context-dependent value-orientations t h r o u g h prag
m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . O n l y w h e n t h e f o r m e r a r e e x a m i n e d as
to t h e i r compatibility with t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d values of all o t h e r s f r o m
t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view h a s t h e will freed itself f r o m h e t e r o n o m y
4 7
33
T h e abstract opposition between a u t o n o m y a n d h e t e r o n o m y nar

rows t h e t h e o r e t i c a l focus o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l subject. K a n t ' s t r a n
s c e n d e n t a l b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s l e a d h i m to ascribe t h e free will
to a n intelligible E g o s i t u a t e d in t h e r e a l m of e n d s . T h u s h e o n c e
a g a i n a t t r i b u t e s self-legislation, w h i c h in its o r i g i n a l political m e a n
i n g is a c o o p e r a t i v e u n d e r t a k i n g in w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e r e l y
" p a r t i c i p a t e s , " to t h e sole c o m p e t e n c e of t h e individual. It is n o
a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is a d d r e s s e d to a s e c o n d
o e r s o n s i n g u l a r a n d t h a t it c r e a t e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t e a c h individ
u a l c o u l d u n d e r t a k e t h e r e q u i r e d test of n o r m s for h i m s e l f in foro
interno. B u t in fact t h e reflexive a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e universalization
test calls for a f o r m of d e l i b e r a t i o n in w h i c h e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t is
c o m p e l l e d to a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of all o t h e r s in o r d e r to e x a m i n e
w h e t h e r , a n o r m c o u l d b e willed by all from the perspective of each person.
T h i s is t h e s i t u a t i o n of a rational discourse o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n
d e r s t a n d i n g in w h i c h all t h o s e c o n c e r n e d p a r t i c i p a t e . T h i s i d e a of a
discursively p r o d u c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l s o j m p o s e s , a g r e a t e r b u r d e n
of justification o n t h e i s o l a t e d _ j u d g i n g subj ect t h a n w o u l d a
m o n o l o g i c a n y ^ a p p ^ l e d universalization test.
K a n t m a y have b e e n so readily i n c l i n e d to f o r e s h o r t e n a n intersubjective c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y in a n individualistic d i r e c t i o n b e
c a u s e h e failed to d i s t i n g u i s h ethical q u e s t i o n s sufficiently f r o m
p r a g m a t i c q u e s t i o n s . A n y o n e w h o takes seriously q u e s t i o n s of
ethical self-understanding r u n s u p against the s t u b b o r n cultural
m e a n i n g of a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s o r a g r o u p ' s historically c h a n g i n g inter
p r e t a t i o n s of t h e . w o r l d a n d of themselves. As a child of t h e eight
e e n t h c e n t u r y K a n t still t h i n k s in a n u n h i s t o r i c a l way a n d
c o n s e q u e n t l y o v e r l o o k s this layer of t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h i d e n t i t i e s a r e
f o r m e d . H e tacitly a s s u m e s t h a t in m a k i n g m o r a l j u d g m e n t s e a c h
individual c a n p r o j e c t h i m s e l f sufficiently i n t o t h e situation of every
o n e else through his own imagination. B u t w h e n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n
n o l o n g e r rely o n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g g r o u n d e d in
m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s c o n d i t i o n s of life a n d interests, t h e m o r a l
p o i n t of view c a n only b e r e a l i z e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ^ t h a t (ensure^ t h a t êveryone tests t h e acceptability of a n o r m ,
i m p l e m e n t e d in a g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e , also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of his
o w n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i m s e l f a n d of t h e world. I n this way t h e
48
49
34
Chapter 1
c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e receives a d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
in w h i c h its p l a c e is t a k e n by t h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e ( D ) , a c c o r d i n g
to w h i c h o n l y t h o s e n o r m s c a n claim validity t h a t c o u l d m e e t with
t h e a g r e e m e n t of all t h o s e c o n c e r n e d in t h e i r capacity as partici
p a n t s in a p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e .
I b e g a n with t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of a
m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic responsibility for e v e r y b o d y
c a n still b e justified after t h e collapse of its religious f o u n d a t i o n . I n
c o n c l u s i o n , I w o u l d like t o e x a m i n e w h a t t h e intersubjectivistic in
t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o answer
i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n . H e r e we m u s t t r e a t two p r o b l e m s separately. First,
we m u s t clarify h o w m u c h o f { & e o r i g i n a l mtuitiqn)a d i s c o u r s e ethics
salvages in t h e d i s e n c h a n t e d u n i v e r s e of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l justifica
t i o n a n d in w h a t sense o n e c a n still s p e a k of t h e cognitive validity of
m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s (VIII). S e c o n d , t h e r e is t h e final
q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y t h a t results f r o m t h e
r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l , religious i n t u i t i o n s r e m a i n s
b o u n d , in spite of its p r o c e d u r a l c h a r a c t e r , to its o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t
(IX).
50
VIII
W i t h t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e G o d ' s eye
view, m o r a l c o m m a n d s lose t h e i r religious as well as t h e i r m e t a p h y s i
cal f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t also h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s for d i s c o u r s e
ethics; it c a n n e i t h e r d e f e n d t h e full m o r a l c o n t e n t s of religious
i n t u i t i o n s (1) n o r c a n it r e p r e s e n t t h e validity of m o r a l n o r m s in
realist t e r m s ( 2 ) .
(1) T h e fact t h a t m o r a l p r a c t i c e is n o l o n g e r tied to t h e individ
u a l ' s e x p e c t a t i o n of salvation a n d a n e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t of life
t h r o u g h t h e p e r s o n of a r e d e m p t i v e G o d a n d t h e divine p l a n for
salvation h a s two u n w e l c o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , m o r a l
knowledge becomes detached from moral motivation, a n d o n the
o t h e r , t h e c o n c e p t of m o r a l l y r i g h t a c t i o n b e c o m e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
f r o m t h e c o n c e p t i o n of a g o o d o r godly life.
D i s c o u r s e ethics c o r r e l a t e s ethical a n d m o r a l q u e s t i o n s with
different f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , namely, with discourses of self-
35
clarification a n d discourses of n o r m a t i v e justification ( a n d applica

t i o n ) , respectively. B u t it d o e s n o t t h e r e b y r e d u c e m o r a l i t y to e q u a l
t r e a t m e n t ; r a t h e r , it takes a c c o u n t of b o t h t h e aspects of j u s t i c e a n d
t h a t of solidarity. A discursive a g r e e m e n t d e p e n d s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o n
t h e n o n s u b s t i t u t a b l e "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s of e a c h individual a n d
o n o v e r c o m i n g j i h e e ^ c ^ n t o c ^ ^ r ^ p e c j ^ e , s o m e t h i n g t h a t all par
ticipants a r e c o n s t r a i n e d to d o by a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e d e
s i g n e d t o p r o d u c e a g r e e m e n t of a n e p i s t e m i c k i n d . If t h e p r a g m a t i c
f e a t u r e s of d i s c o u r s e m a k e possible a n insightful p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n a n d will-formation t h a t g u a r a n t e e s b o t h of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e n
t h e rationally m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s c a n take t h e inter
ests of e a c h individual i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g | d i e j ^ o r
social b o n d j t h a t joins all t h o s e w h o a r e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n a transsubjective a t t i t u d e .
However, u n c o u p l i n g m o r a l i t y f r o m q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life
l e a d s t o a m o t i v a t i o n a l deficit. B e c a u s e t h e r e is n o p r o f a n e substitute
for t h e h o p e of p e r s o n a l salvation, we lose t h e s t r o n g e s t m o t i v e for <
o b e y i n g m o r a l c o m m a n d s . D i s c o u r s e ethics intensifies t h e intellectualistic s e p a r a t i o n of m o r a l j u d g m e n t f r o m a c t i o n even f u r t h e r by
l o c a t i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . T h e r e is n o
d i r e c t r o u t e f r o m discursively a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s t o a c t i o n . Cer
tainly, m o r a l j u d g m e n t s tell u s w h a t we s h o u l d d o , a n d g o o d r e a s o n s
affect o u r will; this is s h o w n by t h e b a d c o n s c i e n c e t h a t " p l a g u e s " u s
w h e n we act a g a i n s t o u r b e t t e r j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e p r o b l e m of weak
n e s s of will also shows t h a t m o r a l i n s i g h t is b a s e d o n t h e w e a k force
of e p i s t e m i c reaspns^ a n d , in c o n t r a s t with p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , d o e s
n o t itself c o n s t i t u t e a r a t i o n a l m o t i v e . W h e n we k n o w w h a t it is
m o r a l l y r i g h t for u s to d o , we k n o w t h a t t h e r e a r e n o g o o d
(epistemic) r e a s o n s to act o t h e r w i s e . B u t t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t
o t h e r motives will n o t p r e v a i l .
51
W i t h t h e loss of its f o u n d a t i o n i n t h e religious p r o m i s e of salva

t i o n , t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n also c h a n g e s . T h e differ
e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n strict d u t i e s a n d less b i n d i n g values, b e t w e e n w h a t
is m o r a l l y r i g h t a n d w h a t is ethically w o r t h striving for, a l r e a d y s h a r p
e n s m o r a l validity i n t o a n o r m a t i v i t y to w h i c h i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t
a l o n e is a d e q u a t e . T h e shift i n p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m G o d to h u m a n
b e i n g s h a s a f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e . 'Validity" n o w signifies t h a t m o r a l
36
Chapter 1
n o r m s c o u l d win t h e a g r e e m e n t of all c o n c e r n e d , o n t h e c o n d i t i o n
t h a t t h e y j o i n t l y e x a m i n e in p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e w h e t h e r a c o r r e
s p o n d i n g p r a c t i c e is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. T h i s a g r e e m e n t
e x p r e s s e s two t h i n g s : t h e fallible r e a s o n of deliberating: subjects w h o
c o n v i n c e o n e a n o t h e r t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l l y i n t r o d u c e d n o r m is wor
thy of b e i n g r e c o g n i z e d , a n d t h e f r e e d o m of legislating subjects w h o
u n d e r s t a n d themselves as t h e a u t h o r s of t h e n o r m s to w h i c h they
subject themselves as a d d r e s s e e s . T h e m o d e of validity of m o r a l
n o r m s n o w b e a r s t h e traces b o t h of t h e fallibility of t h e d i s c o v e r i n g
m i n d a n d of t h e creativity of t h e c o n s t r u c t i n g nrind.
(2) T h e p r o b l e m of in w h i c h sense m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d a t t i t u d e s
c a n claim validity reveals a n o t h e r a s p e c t w h e n we reflect o n t h e
essentialist s t a t e m e n t s t h r o u g h w h i c h m o r a l c o m m a n d s w e r e p r e
viously justified in a m e t a p h y s i c a l f a s h i o n as e l e m e n t s of a rationally
o r d e r e d world. As l o n g as t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of m o r a l i t y c o u l d b e
e x p r e s s e d in assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c o u l d b e viewed
as t r u e o r false. B u t if m o r a l r e a l i s m c a n n o l o n g e r b e d e f e n d e d by
a p p e a l i n g to a c r e a t i o n i s t m e t a p h y s i c s a n d to n a t u r a l law ( o r t h e i r
s u r r o g a t e s ) , t h e validity of m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o l o n g e r b e assimi
l a t e d to t h e t r u t h of assertoric s t a t e m e n t s . T h e l a t t e r state h o w t h i n g s
a r e i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e f o r m e r state w h a t we s h o u l d d o .
If o n e a s s u m e s t h a t , in g e n e r a l , s e n t e n c e s c a n b e valid only in t h e
sense of b e i n g " t r u e " o r "false" a n d f u r t h e r t h a t " t r u t h " is to b e
u n d e r s t o o d as c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d facts, t h e n
every validity claim t h a t is r a i s e d for a n o n d e s c r i p t i v e s e n t e n c e n e c
essarily a p p e a r s p r o b l e m a t i c . I n fact, m o d e r n m o r a l scepticism is
b a s e d o n t h e thesis t h a t n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t b e t r u e o r
false, a n d h e n c e c a n n o t b e justified, b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o m o r a l o r d e r ,
n o s u c h t h i n g s as m o r a l objects o r facts. O n this r e c e i v e d a c c o u n t ,
t h e c o n c e p t of the world as t h e totality of facts is c o n n e c t e d with a
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e n o t i o n of truth a n d a s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n of
justification. I will very briefly discuss t h e s e q u e s t i o n a b l e p r e m i s e s in
reverse o r d e r .
5 2
A s e n t e n c e o r p r o p o s i t i o n is justified o n t h e s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n
if it c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m basic s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g to valid r u l e s of
i n f e r e n c e , w h e r e a class of basic s e n t e n c e s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by specific
(logical, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , o r psychological) criteria. B u t t h e f o u n d a -
37
tionalist a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e exists s u c h a class of basic s e n t e n c e s

w h o s e t r u t h is i m m e d i a t e l y accessible to p e r c e p t i o n o r to i n t u i t i o n
h a s n o t w i t h s t o o d linguistic a r g u m e n t s for t h e holistic c h a r a c t e r of
l a n g u a g e a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : every justification m u s c a t least proceed
from a p r e - u n d e r s t o o d c o n t e x t o r b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s
failure of f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m r e c o m m e n d s a p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n of
justification as a p u b l i c p r a c t i c e in w h i c h criticizable validity claims
c a n b e d e f e n d e d with g o o d r e a s o n s . O f c o u r s e , t h e criteria of r a t i o n
ality t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h i c h r e a s o n s c o u n t as g o o d r e a s o n s c a n
t h e m s e l v e s b e m a d e a m a t t e r for discussion. H e n c e p r o c e d u r a l c h a r
acteristics of t h e p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n itself m u s t ultimately b e a r
t h e b u r d e n of e x p l a i n i n g why results a c h i e v e d in a p r o c e d u r a l l y
c o r r e c t m a n n e r enjoy t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of validity. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e I
c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e c a n e n s u r e t h a t all
r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e h e a r d a n d t h a t t h e u n f o r c e d force of t h e
b e t t e r a r g u m e n t a l o n e d e t e r m i n e s t h e "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s of t h e
participants.
5 3
54
T h e p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n of justification o p e n s t h e way for a n

e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t of t r u t h t h a t o v e r c o m e s t h e well-known p r o b l e m s
with t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y . T h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e refers to t h e
l a n g u a g e g a m e of justification, t h a t is, to t h e p u b l i c r e d e m p t i o n of
validity claims. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t r u t h c a n n o t b e idj^ntifi^d with
justifiability o r w a r r a n t e d assertability. T h e " c a u t i o n a r y " u s e of t h e
t r u t h p r e d i c a t e r e g a r d l e s s of h o w well " p " is justified, it still m a y
n o t b e t r u e h i g h l i g h t s t h e difference in m e a n i n g b e t w e e n " t r u t h "
as a n i r r e d u c i b l e - p r o p e r t y of s t a t e m e n t s a n d "rational acceptability"
as a c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t p r o p e r t y of u t t e r a n c e s . T h i s difference c a n
b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of possible justifications in t e r m s
of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "justified in o u r c o n t e x t " a n d "justified in
every c o n t e x t . " T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n b e c a s h e d o u t in t u r n t h r o u g h a
(jyeak idealization) of o u r p r o c e s s e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d as
c a p a b l e of b e i n g e x t e n d e d indefinitely over t i m e . W h e n we assert "p
a n d t h e r e b y claim t r u t h for "p" we a c c e p t t h e ( ^ l i g a t i o n } t o d e f e n d
"p" in a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n full a w a r e n e s s of its fallibilityagainst all
future objections.
5 5
56
I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t I a m less i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d justification t h a n in t h e possibility of c o n c e i v i n g
38
Chapter 1
_ _
t r u t h , p u r i f i e d of all c o n n o t a t i o n s of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , as a special
case of validity, where this general c o n c e p t of validity is i n t r o d u c e d i n
c o n n e c t i o n with t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity c l a i m s . I n
this way w e o p e n u p a c o n c e p t u a l s p a c e i n which t h e c o n c e p t of
n o r m a t i v e , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l , validity c a n b e situated. T h e
Tightness of m o r a l n o r m s ( o r of g e n e r a l n o r m a t i v e statements.) a n d
of particular^jic^rrra^
based o n t h e m can then b e
57
u n d e r s t o o d as a n a l o g o u s t o t h e t r u t h of descriptive s t a t e m e n t s . W h a t
u n i t e s t h e s e two c o n c e p t s of validity is t h e p r o c e d u r e of discursively
r e d e e m i n g t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity claims. W h a t s e p a r a t e s t h e m
is t h e fact t h a t t h e y refer, respectively, t o t h e social a n d t h e objective
worlds.
T h e social w o r l d , as t h e totality of legitimately o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r
s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , is accessible only f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e ;
it is intrinsically historical a n d h e n c e h a s , if y o u will, a n o n t o l o g i c a l
c o n s t i t u t i o n different f r o m t h a t of t h e objective w o r l d w h i c h c a n b e
d e s c r i b e d f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e social w o r l d is in
extricably i n t e r w o v e n with t h e i n t e n t i o n s a n d beliefs, t h e p r a c t i c e s
a n d l a n g u a g e s of its m e m b e r s . T h i s h o l d s i n a similar way for descrip
tions of t h e objective w o r l d b u t n o t for this w o r l d itself. H e n c e t h e
discursive r e d e m p t i o n of t r u t h claims h a s a different m e a n i n g f r o m
t h a t of m o r a l validity claims: i n t h e f o r m e r case, discursive a g r e e
ment signifies t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of a n assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n ,
i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r m s of assertability c o n d i t i o n s , a r e fulfilled; i n t h e
latter case, discursive a g r e e m e n t justifies t h e claim t h a t a n o r m is
w o r t h y of r e c o g n i t i o n a n d t h e r e b y itself c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e fulfi.il| m e n t of its c o n d i t i o n s of validity. W h e r e a s r a t i o n a l acceptability
m e r e l y points to t h e t r u t h of assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s , it m a k e s a con
structive c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e validity of m o r a l n o r m s . T h e m o m e n t s
of c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d discovery a r e i n t e r w o v e n i n m o r a l i n s i g h t dif
ferently t h a n t h e y a r e i n t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e .
58
W h a t is n o t a t o u r disposal h e r e is t h e m o r a l j j o i n t of view t h a t
i m p o s e s itself u p o n u s , n o t a n objective m o r a l o r d e r a s s u m e d t o exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s . It is n o t t h e social w o r l d as s u c h
t h a t is n o t a t o u r disposal b u t t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d p r o c e d u r e of a [
p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t facilitates b o t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d
t h e discovery o i t n e n o r m s of w e l l - o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s .
c
T h e constructivist m e a n i n g of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s , u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e
m o d e l of self-legislation, m u s t n o t b e f o r g o t t e n ; b u t it m u s t n o t
o b l i t e r a t e t h e e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g of m o r a l justifications e i t h e r .
59
IX
Discourse ethics d e f e n d s a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic
responsibility for everybody. B u t it d o e s t h i s j n T T h e l T r s ^
t h r o u g h a r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t s of a m o r a l tradi
t i o n w h o s e religious f o u n d a t i o n s have b e e n u n d e r m i n e d . If t h e
d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e categorical i m p e r a t i v e re
m a i n e d b o u n d to t h e t r a d i t i o n in w h i c h it o r i g i n a t e s , this g e n e a l o g y
w o u l d r e p r e s e n t a n obstacle to t h e g o a l of d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e cogni
tive c o n t e n t of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s as such. T h u s it r e m a i n s to p r o v i d e
a t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view itself.
T h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e p r o v i d e s a n answer to t h e p r e d i c a m e n t in
w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of any m o r a l c o m m u n i t y find themselves w h e n ,
in m a k i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a m o d e r n , pluralistic society, t h e y find
themselves faced w i t h ] t h e d i l e m m a ! t h a t t h o u g h they still a r g u e with
r e a s o n s a b o u t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d beliefs, t h e i r substantive back
g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s o n t h e u n d e r l y i n g m o r a l n o r m s h a s b e e n shat
t e r e d . T h e y find t h e m s e l v e s e m b r o i l e d in g l o b a l a n d d o m e s t i c
practical conflicts in n e e d of r e g u l a t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t i n u e to r e g a r d
as m o r a l , a n d h e n c e as rationally resolvable, conflicts; b u t t h e i r
s h a r e d e t h o s has"^Jsnrtegra^H] T h e following s c e n a r i o d o e s n o t
d e p i c t a n " o r i g i n a l - p o s i t i o n " b u t fSTMeal-typical developmHit]that
c o u l d have t a k e n p l a c e u n d e r r e a l c o n d i t i o n s .
I p r o c e e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o n o t wish to
resolve t h e i r conflicts t h r o u g h v i o l e n c e , o r even c o m p r o m i s e , b u t
^JJ^
t h e i r initial i m p u l s e is to e n g a g e in
d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d w o r k o u t a s h a r e d ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n a
secular basis. B u t given t h e differentiated f o r m s of life characteristic
of pluralistic societies, s u c h a n effort is d o o m e d to failure. T h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s will s o o n realize jhatJhxLXritical a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t h e i r
^ s t r o n g evaluations leads to c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of j J i e g o o d .
Let us assume th^t t f i e ^
r e m a i n resolved to e n g a g e in
d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d n o t to fall b a c k o n a m e r e m o d u s vivendi as a
substitute for t h e t h r e a t e n e d m o r a l way of life.
40
Chapter 1
I n t h e a b s e n c e of a substantive a g r e e m e n t o n p a r t i c u l a r n o r m s ,
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t n o w rely o n j t h e ^ y n e u t r a r fact] t h a t e a c h
of t h e m p a r t i c i p a t e s i n some c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m of life^which
is s t r u c t u r e d by linguistically m e d i a t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Since
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r o c e s s e s a n d f o r m s of life have c e r t a i n ^ r u c t u r a l
f e a t u r e ^ i n c o m m o n , t h e y c o u l d ask t h e m s e l v e s w h e t h e r t h e s e fea
t u r e s h a r b o r n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e a basis for
s h a r e d o r i e n t a t i o n s . T a k i n g this as a clue, t h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n
of H e g e l , H u m b o l d t , a n d G. H . M e a d h a v e s h o w n t h a t c o m m u n i c a tive a c t i o n s involve s h a r e d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e
f o r m s of life a r e i n t e r w o v e n with r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n ,
/r
60
a n d t o this e x t e n t , b o t h h a v e a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t ^ T h e s e analyses
d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t m o r a l i t y derives a g e n u i n e m e a n i n g , i n d e p e n d e n t
of t h e various c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e j g o o d , f r o m t h e f o r m a n d p e r s p e c tival s t r u c t u r e o f ( { r ^ ^
socializatjog)
T o b e s u r e , s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m s of life
a l o n e a r e n o t sufficient t o justify t h e claim t h a t m e m b e r s of a p a r
ticular historical c o m m u n i t y ought to t r a n s c e n d t h e i r particularistic
v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d m a k e t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e fully s y m m e t r i c a l i
a n d inclusive r e l a t i o n s of a n e g a l i t a r i a n universalism. O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , a universalistic c o n c e p t i o n t h a t w a n t s t o avoid^fklse abstract i o n s y m u s t d r a w o n insights from t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
F r o m t h e fact t l ^ j r j e r s o n s c a n only b e i n d i v i d u a t e d t h r o u g h j s o t i a l i z a t i o n it follows t h a t m o r a l c o n c e r n is o w e d equally to p e r s o n s b o t h
l^ttTrrrgplacea
as m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y , a n d
61
62
h e n c e it ( c c ^ ^
treatment means
e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ofnonelquS^ w h o a r e n o n e t h e l e s s aware of t h e i r
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . M o r a l universalism m u s t n o t take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e
a s p e c t of e q u a l i t y t h e fact t h a t p e r s o n s as s u c h a r e e q u a l t o all
o t h e r p e r s o n s a t the expense of t h e a s p e c t of i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h e
fact t h a t as individuals t h e y a r e a t t h e s a m e t i m e absolutely differ
e n t f r o m all o t h e r s . T h e e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e else d e m a n d e d
by a m o r a l universalism sensitive t o difference t h u s takes t h e f o r m
of a nonleveling a n d nonappropriating i n c l u s i o n of t h e ^ o t h e r in his^
sotherness.
6 3
B u t how c a n the t r a n s i t i o n t o a p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l i t y as s u c h b e
justified? T r a d i t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d o b l i g a t i o n s r o o t e d i n c o m m u n i c a -
41
tive a c t i o n d o n o t of themselves r e a c h b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e family,

t h e t r i b e , t h e city, o r t h e n a t i o n . However, t h e reflexive f o r m of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b e h a v e s differently: a r g u m e n t a t i o n of its very
n a t u r e p o i n t s b e y o n d all p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life. F o r i n t h e p r a g
m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e o r d e l i b e r a t i o n t h e n o r
mative c o n t e n t of t h e implicit a s s u m p t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n
is generalized, abstracted, and freed from all limitsthe p r a c t i c e of delib
e r a t i o n is e x t e n d e d t o a n inclusive c o m m u n i t y t h a t d o e s n o t ^ n
p r i n c i p l ^ e ^ c l u d e a n y subject c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n w h o c a n
^ m a k e ^ r e l ^ ^ n t ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s . T h i s i d e a p o i n t s t o a way o u t of t h e
m o d e r n d i l e m m a , since t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s have lost t h e i r m e t a p h y s i c a l
g u a r a n t e e s a n d m u s t so t o s p e a k derive t h e i r { ^ o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s ^
' f r o m themselves a l o n e . As we have s e e n , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n only
d r a w o n t h o s e features ofj^QprrrrrK^^
t h e y a l r e a d y currently
6 4
s h a r e . Given t h e failure t o identifyja^ shaded g o o d , s u c h features

s h r i n k to t h e ^ u n d ^ o f f o r m a l features of t h e p e r f q r m a t i v e l y s h a r e d
situation of d e l i b e r a t i o n . T h e b o t t o m line is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
have all ( k l r e a d ^ e n t e r e d i n t o t h e c o o p e r a t i v e e n t e r p r i s e of r a t i o n a l
discourse.
~
A l t h o u g h it is a r a t h e r m e a g e r basis for justification, t h e n e u t r a l
c o n t e n t of this c o m m o n store m a y p r o v i d e a n o p p o r t u n i t y , given t h e
p r e d i c a m e n t p o s e d by t h e p l u r a l i s m of worldviews. A p r o s p e c t of
' f i n d i n g a n e q u i v a l e n t for t h e t r a d i t i o n ^ , s u t o
a
n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s w o u l d exist if the form of communication in w h i c h
j o i n t practical d e l i b e r a t i o n takes p l a c e w e r e s u c h t h a t it m a k e s pos
sible a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s c o n v i n c i n g t o all p a r t i c i p a n t s
b e c a u s e of its impartiality. T h e missing ( " t r a n s c e n d e n t good") c a n b e
r e p l a c e d i n a n " i m m a n e n t " fashion only by a p p e a l t o t h e intrinsic
constiftitionjqf t h e practice of deliberation. F r o m h e r e , I suggest, |dirje^
stepsj l e a d t o a t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view.
(a) If t h e p r a c t i c e of d e l i b e r a t i o n itself is r e g a r d e d as t h e only
possible r e s o u r c e for a s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l justification of m o r a l
q u e s t i o n s , t h e n t h e a p p e a l to m o r a l c o n t e n t m u s t b e r e p l a c e d by t h e
self-referential a p p e a l t o t h e f o r m of this p r a c t i c e . T h i s is precisely
w h a t is c a p t u r e d by
(D) O n l y t h o s e n o r m s c a n claim validity t h a t c o u l d m e e t with t h e
a c c e p t a n c e of all c o n c e r n e d i n practical discourse.
42
Chapter 1
H e r e t h e " a c c e p t a n c e " (Zustimmung) a c h i e v e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of

r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e signifies a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverstandnis)
motivated
b y _ e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s ; it s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a c o n t r a c t
(Vereinbarung) t h a t is rationally m o t i v a t e d f r o m t h e e g o c e n t r i c p e r
spective of e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p r i n c i p l e of
d i s c o u r s e leaves o p e n t h e type of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d h e n c e t h e
r o u t e , by w h i c h a discursive a g r e e m e n t c a n b e r e a c h e d . (D) d o e s n o t
by itself state t h a t a justification of m o r a l n o r m s is possible w i t h o u t
r e c o u r s e to a substantive b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s .
(b) T h e h y p o t h e t i c a l l y i n t r o d u c e d p r i n c i p l e (D) specifies t h e c o n
d i t i o n t h a t valid n o r m s w o u l d fulfill if t h e y could b e justified. F o r t h e
m o m e n t we a r e only a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of a m o r a l n o r m is
clear. T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s also h a v e a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w
o n e e n g a g e s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h o u g h they a r e a s s u m e d only to b e
familiar with t h e justification of descriptive s e n t e n c e s a n d n o t yet to
k n o w w h e t h e r m o r a l validity claims c a n b e j u d g e d in a similar way,
t h e y c a n f o r m a c o n c e p t i o n ( w i t h o u t p r e j u d g i n g t h e issue) of w h a t
it would m e a n to justify a n o r m . B u t w h a t is still n e e d e d for t h e
o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of (D) is a r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n specifying h o w
m o r a l n o r m s c a n b e justified.
T h e p r i n c i p l e of universalization (U) is i n d e e d i n s p i r e d by ( D ) ,
b u t initially it is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a p r o p o s a l a r r i v e d at abductively.
(U) A n o r m is valid w h e n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d side
effects of its g e n e r a l o b s e r v a n c e for t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d value-orienta
tions of each individual c o u l d b e jointly a c c e p t e d by all c o n c e r n e d
without coercion.
T h r e e aspecj^pjf t l n ^ o r r n u l a t i o n a r e in n e e d of clarification. T h e
p h r a s e ^ i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ / p o i n t s to t h e r o l e p l a y e d by
t h e p r a g m a t i c a n d ethical r e a s o n s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s in
practical d i s c o u r s e . T h e s e i n p u t s a r e d e s i g n e d to p r e v e n t t h e m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n of t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d worldviews of p a r t i c u l a r
individuals o r g r o u p s a n d , in g e n e r a l , to foster a h e r m e n e u t i c sensi
tivity to a sufficiently b r o a d s p e c t r u m of c o n t r i b u t i o n s . S e c o n d , g e n
eralized r e c i p r o c a l perspective-taking ("of e a c h , " "jointly by all")
r e q u i r e s n o t j u s t e m p a t h y for, b u t also i n t e r p r e t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o , ^
t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o m u s t b e willing to revise
43
/
t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s ( a n d t h e l a n g u a g e
in w h i c h t h e y a r e f o r m u l a t e d ) . Finally, ftlie goal7of " u n c o e r c e d
j o i n t a c c e p t a n c e " specifies t h e r e s p e c t in w h i c h t h e r e a s o n s
p r e s e n t e d in dis^course cast off t h e i r agent-relative m e a n i n g a n d
take o n a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of s y m m e t r i c a l
consideration.
^
(c) T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s will p e r h a p s b e satisfied with this
(or a similar) r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n as l o n g as it p r o v e s ( u s e M ) a n d
d o e s n o t l e a d to c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e results. It m u s t t u r n o u t t h a t a
p r a c t i c e of justification c o n d u c t e d in this m a n n e r selects n o r m s t h a t
a r e c a p a b l e of commanding...jiniyersal a g r e e m e n t f o r e x a m p l e ,
nOTmsjexpr^ssing h u m a n rights. B u t f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e
m o r a l t h e o r i s t ) t h e r e still r e m a i n s o n e final justificatory step.
We m a y a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e of d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d justification
we call " a r g u m e n t a t i o n " is to b e f o u n d in all c u l t u r e s a n d societies
(if n o t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m , t h e n at least as a n i n f o r m a l p r a c y
tice) a n d t h a t t h e r e is n o fimctionally e q u i v a l e n t a l t e r n a t i v e t o this
mode of^roblem solying^^
universality a n d n o n s u b s i t i tutibility of t h e p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , it w o u l d b e difficult tq^
dispute the neutrality o f ' t h e , discourse principle (D). But ethno
c e n t r i c a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d h e n c e a specific c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d
t h a t is n o t s h a r e d by o t h e r c u l t u r e s , m a y h a v e i n s i n u a t e d t h e m
selves i n t o ( t h e a b d u c t i o n of (U}). T h e suspicion t h a t t h e u n d e r
s t a n d i n g of m o r a l i t y o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d in (U) reflects e u r o c e n t r i c
p r e j u d i c e s c o u l d b e d i s p e l l e d t h r o u g h a n " i m m a n e n t " d e f e n s e of
this a c c o u n t of the- m o r a l p o i n t of view, t h a t is, by a p p e a l i n g to
k n o w l e d g e of w h a t it m e a n s t o e n g a g e in t h e p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n
t a t i o n as s u c h . T h u s t h e discourse-eJ:hical m o d e l of j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o n
sists in t h e d e r i v a t i o n of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e (U) f r o m t h e implicit
c o n t e n t of universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n in c o n j u n c
tion with t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n o r m a t i v e justification i n g e n e r a l ex
p r e s s e d in ( D ) .
6 5
T h i s is easy t o u n d e r s t a n d in a n intuitive way ( t h o u g h a n y a t t e m p t

to p r o v i d e a ( f o r m ^ ) j u s t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e involved discussions
of t h e m e a n i n g a n d feasibility of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s " ) .
H e r e I will limit myself to t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t we e n g a g e in argu
m e n t a t i o n with t h e i n t e n t i o n of c o n v i n c i n g o n e a n o t h e r of t h e
6 6
44
Chapter 1
validity claims t h a t p r o p o n e n t s raise for t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s a n d a r e

r e a d y to d e f e n d a g a i n s t o p p o n e n t s . T h e p r a c t i c ^ f ^ r g u m e n t a t i o n
sets i n m o t i o n ^ a cooperative c o m p e t i t i o n for t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t ,
w h e r e t h e ^ r i e n t a t i o n to t h e g o a l of a c o m m u n i c a t r v d y T e a c r i e g
agreement unites the participants from the outset^The assumption
t r r a t l h e c o m p e t i t i o n c a n l e a d to "rationally a c c e p t a b l e , " h e n c e "con
v i n c i n g , " results is b a s e d o n t h e r a t i o n a l j f o r c e of a r g u m e n t s . O f
c o u r s e , w h a t c o u n t s as a g o o d o r a b a d a r g u m e n t c a n itself b e c o m e
a t o p i c for discussion. T h u s t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of a s t a t e m e n t
u l t i m a t e l y rests o n r e a s o n s i n c o n j u n c t i o n j w i t h specific f e a t u r e s j r f
t h e p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n itself. T h e ^ f o u r m o s M m r j o r t a n t y fea
t u r e s a r e : (i) t h a t n o b o d y w h o c o u l d m a k e a r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n
m a y b e e x c l u d e d ; (ii) t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e g r a n t e d a n e q u a l
o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; (iii) t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t
> m e a n w h a t t h e y say; a n d (iv) t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n m u s t b e f r e e d
f r o m e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l c o e r c i o n so t h a t t h e "yes" o r " n o " stances
t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s a d o p t o n criticizable validity claims a r e m o t i v a t e d
solely by t h e r a t i o n a l force of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s . If e v e r y o n e w h o
e n g a g e s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n m u s t m a k e at least t h e s e p r a g m a t i c p r e
s u p p o s i t i o n s , t h e n in v i r t u e of (i) t h e p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r of practical
discourses a n d t h e i n c l u s i o n of all c o n c e r n e d a n d (ii) t h e e q u a l
c o m m u n i c a t i v e r i g h t s of all p a r t i c i p a n t s , only r e a s o n s t h a t give e q u a l
w e i g h t to t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s of e v e r y b o d y
c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of p r a c t i c a l discourses; a n d b e c a u s e of
t h e a b s e n c e of (iii) d e c e p t i o n a n d (iv) c o e r c i o n , n o t h i n g b u t rea
s o n s c a n tip t h e b a l a n c e in favor of t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a c o n t r o v e r
sial n o r m . Finally, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s r e c i p r o
cally i m p u t e a n o r i e n t a t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t to o n e
a n o t h e r , this " u n c o e r c e d " a c j c e p t a n c e j c a n _ o n l y o c c u r "jointly" o r
collectively^
A g a i n s t t h e f r e q u e n t l y r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n t h a t this justification is
c i r c u l a r 1 w o u l d n o t e t h a t t h e c o n t e n t of t h e universal p r e s u p p o s i
t i o n ^ o f j a r g u m e n t a t i o n is b y ^ n o ^ m e a n s " n o r m a t i v e " i n t h e m o r a l
sense. F o r inclusivity only signifies t h a t access to d i s c o u r s e is u n r e
stricted; it d o e s n o t i m p l y t h e universality of b i n d i n g n o r m s of ac
t i o n . T h e e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m s a n d t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t of t r u t h f u l n e s s in d i s c o u r s e h a v e t h e status of argumen6 7
45
tative duties a n d rights, n o t of moral d u t i e s a n d rights. So t o o , t h e

a b s e n c e of c o e r c i o n refers
toJiej3rocesj^^
f o l n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s outside of this p r a c t i c e . T h e s e constitutive
r u l e s of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n g o v e r n t h e e x c h a n g e
of a r g u m e n t s a n d of "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s ; t h e y have t h e e p i s t e m i c
forcejpf^nabling
condrdons^for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n ^ o f ^ t ^ m e n t s b u t
d o n o t h a v e a n y immediate practTcaTîfects in m o t i v a t i n g a c t i o n s a n d
i n t e r a c t i o n s o u t s i d e of d i s c o u r s e .
T h e p o i n t of s u c h a justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is t h a t
t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t of t h i s ^ p i ^ t e j n k ^ j a n g u a g e gamejl is transmit
t e d o n l y by a r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t o t h e selection of n o r m s of
action, w h i c h t o g e t h e r with t h e i r m o r a l validity claim p r o v i d e t h e
i n p u t i n t o practical discourses. A m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n c a n n o t follow
f r o m t h e so t o s p e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t of u n a v o i d a b l e pre
s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a l o n e ; r a t h e r it a t t a c h e s to t h e spe
cific objects of practical d i s c o u r s e , namely, t o t h e n o r m s introduced
i n t o d i s c o u r s e t o w h i c h t h e r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e l i b e r a t i o n refer.
I e m p h a s i z e this w h e n I specify t h a t (U) c a n b e r e n d e r e d plausible
in connection with a (weak, h e n c e n o n p r e j u d i c i a l ) concept of normative
justification.
T h i s justification strategy, w h i c h I have h e r e m e r e l y s k e t c h e d , m u s t
b e s u p p l e m e n t e d with g e n e a l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s j d r a w i r u ^ r i ^ ^ ^
of m o d e r n i z a t i r ^ ^
b e r e n d e r e d p l a u s i b l e . With
(U) we(feassure o u r s e l v e ^ irrja reflexive m a n n e r ) o f a r e s i d u a l n o r m a tive s u b s t a n c e w h i c h is p r e s e r v e d in p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l societies by t h e
f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d a c t i o n o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g a
s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s isf^so) s h o w n by t h e p r o c e d u r e of estab
lishing universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n by d e m o n s t r a t
i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e self-contradictions, w h i c h I c a n n o t g o i n t o h e r e .
T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of n o r m s arises as a n a d d i t i o n a l
p r o b l e m . T h e p r i n c i p l e of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ] d e v e l o p e d by Klaus Gunt h e r first b r i n g s t h e j r n o r a l p o i n t j o f view to b e a r o n s i n g u l a r m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s in a complete m a n n e r . T h e o u t c o m e of successful dis
courses of justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n sjigws t h a t practical questions
a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e sharply d e f i n e d m o r a l p o i n t of view; m o r a ]
q u e s t i o n s of w e l l - o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a r e s e p a r a t e d from
p r a g m a t i c q u e s t i o n s of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d frorrj
68
6 9
7 0
46
Chapter 1
e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d o r n o t m i s s p e n t life o n t h e o t h e r . It
h a s b e c o m e clear t o m e in r e t r o s p e c t t h a t (U) only o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d
a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e with r e f e r e n c e to a
p a r t i c u l a r subject m a t t e r , namely, m o r a l i t y .
T h e p r i n c i p l e ^ of
d i s c o u r s e c a n also b e o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d for o t h e r k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s ,
for e x a m p l e , for t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of political legislators o r for legal
discourses.
71
72
II
Political Liberalism: A Debate with John Rawls
Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
J o h n Rawls's A Theory ofJustice m a r k s a pivotal t u r n i n g p o i n t in t h e

m o s t r e c e n t h i s t o r y of p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , for h e r e s t o r e d l o n g
s u p p r e s s e d m o r a l q u e s t i o n s to t h e status of serious objects of p h i l o
s o p h i c a l investigation. I m m a n u e l K a n t p o s e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s
t i o n of m o r a l i t y in s u c h a way t h a t it a d m i t t e d a r a t i o n a l answer: we
o u g h t to d o w h a t is equally g o o d for all p e r s o n s . W i t h o u t e s p o u s i n g
t h e b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s of K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y ,
Rawls r e n e w e d this t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to
t h e issue of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a j u s t society. I n o p p o s i t i o n to utili
t a r i a n i s m a n d value skepticism h e p r o p o s e d a n intersubjectivist ver
sion of K a n t ' s p r i n c i p l e of a u t o n o m y : we act a u t o n o m o u s l y w h e n we
o b e y t h o s e laws t h a t c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d , b y all c o n c e r n e d o n t h e basis
of a p u b l i c u s e of .their r e a s o n . M o r e recently, in Political Liberalism,
in w h i c h Rawls h a s c o n c l u d e d a twenty-year p r o c e s s of e x t e n s i o n a n d
revision of his t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , h e exploits this m o r a l c o n c e p t of
a u t o n o m y as t h e key to e x p l a i n i n g t h e political a u t o n o m y of citizens
of a d e m o c r a t i c society: " O u r exercise of political p o w e r is fully
p r o p e r only w h e n it is e x e r c i s e d in a c c o r d a n c e with a c o n s t i t u t i o n ,
t h e essentials of w h i c h all citizens as free a n d e q u a l m a y b e r e a s o n
ably e x p e c t e d to e n d o r s e in t h e light of p r i n c i p l e s a n d ideals accept
able to t h e i r c o m m o n h u m a n r e a s o n . " J u s t as previously h e t o o k a
s t a n d a g a i n s t utilitarian p o s i t i o n s , h e n o w r e s p o n d s p r i m a r i l y to
c o n t e x t u a l i s t p o s i t i o n s t h a t q u e s t i o n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r e a s o n
c o m m o n t o all h u m a n b e i n g s .
2
50
Chapter 2
B e c a u s e I a d m i r e this project, s h a r e its i n t e n t i o n s , a n d r e g a r d its

essential results as c o r r e c t , t h e d i s s e n t I e x p r e s s h e r e will r e m a i n
w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a family q u a r r e l . My d o u b t s a r e l i m i t e d t o
w h e t h e r Rawls always b r i n g s to b e a r a g a i n s t his critics his i m p o r t a n t
n o r m a t i v e i n t u i t i o n s in t h e i r m o s t c o m p e l l i n g f o r m . B u t first, let m e
briefly o u t l i n e his p r o j e c t in its c u r r e n t state.
Rawls offers a justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h a m o d e r n
society m u s t b e c o n s t i t u t e d if it is to e n s u r e t h e fair c o o p e r a t i o n of
its citizens as free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s . H i s first step is to clarify t h e
s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h fictional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e c o u l d
answer this q u e s t i o n impartially. Rawls e x p l a i n s why t h e p a r t i e s in
t h e so-called o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e o n two p r i n c i p l e s : first,
o n t h e liberal p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y o n e is e n t i t l e d to
a n e q u a l system of basic liberties, a n d , s e c o n d , o n a s u b o r d i n a t e
p r i n c i p l e t h a t establishes e q u a l access t o p u b l i c offices a n d stipulates
t h a t social i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e only w h e n t h e y a r e also to t h e
a d v a n t a g e of t h e least privileged. I n a s e c o n d step, Rawls shows t h a t
this c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c a n e x p e c t t o m e e t with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r
t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society w h i c h it itself p r o m o t e s . Politi
cal liberalism, as a r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t raise a
claim to t r u t h , is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews* I n a t h i r d
a n d final step, Rawls o u t l i n e s t h e basic r i g h t s a n d p r i n c i p l e s of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e two p r i n c i p l e s of
j u s t i c e . T a k i n g t h e s e steps in s e q u e n c e , I will raise o b j e c t i o n s di
r e c t e d n o t so m u c h against t h e p r o j e c t as s u c h b u t against c e r t a i n
aspects of its e x e c u t i o n . I fear t h a t Rawls m a k e s c o n c e s s i o n s to
o p p o s e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s t h a t i m p a i r t h e c o g e n c y of his o w n
project.
My c r i t i q u e is a c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d i m m a n e n t o n e . First, I d o u b t
w h e t h e r every a s p e c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is d e s i g n e d to clarify
a n d s e c u r e t h e s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of d e o n t o l o g i c a l
p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e ( I ) . F u r t h e r , I t h i n k t h a t Rawls s h o u l d m a k e a
s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s
of a c c e p t a n c e ; h e s e e m s to w a n t to p u r c h a s e t h e n e u t r a l i t y of his
c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e at t h e cost of forsaking its cognitive validity
claim (II). T h e s e two t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s r e s u l t in a c o n s t r u c t i o n
of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t a c c o r d s liberal basic r i g h t s p r i m a c y
51
over t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e of l e g i t i m a t i o n . Rawls t h e r e b y fails to

achieve his g o a l of b r i n g i n g t h e liberties of t h e m o d e r n s i n t o h a r
m o n y with t h e liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s (III). I c o n c l u d e m y r e m a r k s
with a thesis o n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political p h i l o s o p h y : u n d e r
c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t , this s h o u l d b e m o d e s t , b u t
n o t in t h e w r o n g way.
T h e adversarial r o l e assigned m e by t h e e d i t o r s of t h e Journal of
Philosophy c o m p e l s m e to h e i g h t e n tentative r e s e r v a t i o n s i n t o objec
tions. T h i s intensification is justified by m y i n t e n t i o n , at o n c e
friendly a n d provocative, of s e t t i n g t h e n o t easily surveyable argu
m e n t s of a h i g h l y c o m p l e x a n d well t h o u g h t - o u t t h e o r y in m o t i o n
in s u c h a way t h a t t h e latter c a n reveal its s t r e n g t h s .
3
T h e D e s i g n o f the Original Position
Rawls conceives of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n as a situation in w h i c h

rationally c h o o s i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e citizens a r e subject to t h e
specific c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of practi
cal q u e s t i o n s . T h e c o n c e p t of full a u t o n o m y is r e s e r v e d for t h e
citizens w h o a l r e a d y live u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d
society. F o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , Rawls splits this
c o n c e p t of political a u t o n o m y i n t o two e l e m e n t s : t h e m o r a l l y n e u t r a l
characteristics of p a r t i e s w h o seek t h e i r r a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e , o n t h e
o n e h a n d , a n d t h e m o r a l l y substantive s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r
w h i c h t h o s e p a r t i e s c h o o s e p r i n c i p l e s for a system of fair c o o p e r a
tion, o n t h e o t h e r , - T h e s e n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t s p e r m i t t h e p a r t i e s
to b e e n d o w e d with a m i n i m u m of p r o p e r t i e s , in particular, " t h e
capacity for a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ( a n d t h u s t o b e r a t i o n a l ) . "
R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r t a i n exclusively p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o r also a d d r e s s e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r
p l a n s of life, t h e y always r e a c h t h e i r d e c i s i o n s in light of t h e i r valueo r i e n t a t i o n s ( t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e g r o u p s of citizens
they r e p r e s e n t ) . T h e y n e e d n o t r e g a r d m a t t e r s f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t
of view, w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e m to take a c c o u n t of w h a t is in t h e
e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all, for this impartiality is e x a c t e d by a situation t h a t
t h r o w s a veil of i g n o r a n c e over t h e m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d t h o u g h
free a n d e q u a l p a r t i e s . B e c a u s e t h e latter d o n o t k n o w w h i c h
4
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Chapter 2
p o s i t i o n s t h e y will o c c u p y in t h e society t h a t it is t h e i r task to o r d e r ,

t h e y find themselves c o n s t r a i n e d a l r e a d y by t h e i r self-interest to
reflect o n w h a t is equally g o o d for all.
T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t frames t h e f r e e d o m
of c h o i c e of r a t i o n a l a c t o r s in a r e a s o n a b l e fashion is e x p l a i n e d by
Rawls's initial i n t e n t i o n of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e as p a r t
of t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y of c h o i c e . Rawls originally p r o c e e d e d o n t h e
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r a n g e of o p t i o n s o p e n to rationally c h o o s i n g
p a r t i e s only n e e d e d to b e l i m i t e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e fashion in o r d e r
to facilitate t h e d e r i v a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e f r o m t h e i r enlight
e n e d self-interest. B u t h e s o o n realized t h a t t h e r e a s o n of a u t o n o
m o u s citizens c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c o n d i t i o n e d by
subjective p r e f e r e n c e s . Yet even after t h e revision of t h e initial g o a l
t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n was d e s i g n e d to achieve, h e h a s h e l d to t h e
view t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view c a n b e o p e r a t i o n
alized in this way. T h i s h a s s o m e u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s , t h r e e of
w h i c h I w o u l d like to a d d r e s s in w h a t follows: (1) C a n t h e p a r t i e s in
t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r
clients solely o n t h e basis of r a t i o n a l egoism? (2) C a n basic r i g h t s b e
assimilated to p r i m a r y g o o d s ? (3) D o e s t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e g u a r
a n t e e t h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t ?
5
(1) Rawls c a n n o t consistently follow t h r o u g h o n his d e c i s i o n t h a t

"fully" a u t o n o m o u s citizens a r e to b e r e p r e s e n t e d by p a r t i e s w h o lack
this a u t o n o m y . Citizens a r e a s s u m e d t o b e m o r a l p e r s o n s w h o possess
a sense of j u s t i c e a n d t h e capacity for t h e i r own c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
g o o d , as well as a n i n t e r e s t in cultivating t h e s e dispositions in a
r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . B u t in t h e case of t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l posi
tion, t h e s e r e a s o n a b l e characteristics of m o r a l p e r s o n s a r e substi
t u t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of a r a t i o n a l d e s i g n . At t h e s a m e t i m e ,
however, t h e p a r t i e s a r e s u p p o s e d to b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take
a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s " of t h e citizens t h a t
follow f r o m t h e s e very characteristics. F o r e x a m p l e , they m u s t take
a c c o u n t of t h e fact t h a t a u t o n o m o u s citizens r e s p e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of
o t h e r s o n t h e basis of j u s t p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o t m e r e l y f r o m self-inter
est, t h a t t h e y c a n b e o b l i g a t e d to loyalty, t h a t they c a n b e c o n v i n c e d
of t h e legitimacy of existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies t h r o u g h t h e
p u b l i c u s e of t h e i r r e a s o n , a n d so f o r t h . T h u s , t h e p a r t i e s a r e sup-
53
p o s e d b o t h to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take seriously t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d
c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n a u t o n o m y t h a t t h e y a r e t h e m s e l v e s d e n i e d . T h i s
m a y still b e p l a u s i b l e for t h e advocacy of self-related i n t e r e s t s a n d
c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d t h a t a r e n o t k n o w n in detail. B u t c a n t h e
m e a n i n g of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of j u s t i c e r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by t h e p e r
spective of r a t i o n a l egoists? At a n y r a t e , t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n c a p a b l e of
achieving, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s set by t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m , t h e r e c i p
r o c a l p e r s p e c t i v e t a k i n g t h a t t h e citizens they r e p r e s e n t m u s t u n d e r
take w h e n t h e y o r i e n t t h e m s e l v e s in a j u s t m a n n e r to w h a t is equally
g o o d for all: "in t h e i r r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h e p a r t i e s . . . r e c o g n i z e
n o s t a n d p o i n t e x t e r n a l to t h e i r o w n p o i n t of view as r a t i o n a l r e p r e
sentatives" (PL 7 5 ) . B u t if, d e s p i t e this, t h e p a r t i e s a r e to u n d e r s t a n d
t h e m e a n i n g of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s t h e y a r e s e e k i n g a n d to
take sufficient a c c o u n t of t h e i r clients' i n t e r e s t s i n j u s t i c e , they m u s t
b e e q u i p p e d with cognitive c o m p e t e n c e s t h a t e x t e n d f u r t h e r t h a n
t h e capacities sufficient for rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s w h o a r e b l i n d
to issues of j u s t i c e .
O f c o u r s e , it is o p e n t o Rawls to modify t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l
p o s i t i o n accordingly. A l r e a d y in A Theory of Justice h e qualified t h e
rationality of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t n e r s in various ways. O n t h e o n e
h a n d , they take n o i n t e r e s t in o n e a n o t h e r , c o n d u c t i n g themselves
like players w h o "strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e score as p o s s i b l e " (TJ
144). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y a r e e q u i p p e d with a "purely f o r m a l "
sense of j u s t i c e , for t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d to k n o w t h a t t h e y will c o n f o r m
to w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e s a r e a g r e e d u p o r r i n t h e i r f u t u r e r o l e as citizens
living in a w e l l - o r d e r e d society (TJ 1 4 5 ) . T h i s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d to
m e a n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a r e at least c o g n i z a n t
of t h e k i n d of b i n d i n g m u t u a l i t y t h a t will c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e life of t h e i r
clients in t h e f u t u r e , a l t h o u g h t h e y t h e m s e l v e s m u s t for t h e p r e s e n t
c o n d u c t t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r different p r e m i s e s . S u c h stipula
tions a r e perfectly admissible. My only q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r , in b e i n g
e x t e n d e d in this d i r e c t i o n , t h e d e s i g n loses its p o i n t by b e c o m i n g
t o o far r e m o v e d f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e l . F o r as s o o n as t h e p a r t i e s
step o u t s i d e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m a n d a s s u m e
even a d i s t a n t likeness to m o r a l p e r s o n s , t h e division of l a b o r b e
t w e e n t h e rationality of c h o i c e of subjects a n d a p p r o p r i a t e objective
c o n s t r a i n t s is d e s t r o y e d , a division t h r o u g h w h i c h self-interested
54
Chapter 2
a g e n t s a r e n o n e t h e l e s s s u p p o s e d to arrive at m o r a l l y s o u n d deci
sions. T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e m a y n o t have a n y g r e a t significance for t h e
rest of t h e project; b u t it draws a t t e n t i o n to t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o n
straints i m p o s e d by t h e o r i g i n a l ( t h o u g h in t h e m e a n t i m e a b a n
d o n e d ) i n t e n t i o n to p r o v i d e a d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n to
T h o m a s H o b b e s ' s p r o b l e m . F o r a n o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e r a t i o n a l
c h o i c e f o r m a t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of basic
g o o d s , a n d this d e t e r m i n a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t for t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p
m e n t of t h e t h e o r y .
(2) F o r rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s b o u n d to t h e first p e r s o n p e r
spective, n o r m a t i v e issues of w h a t e v e r k i n d c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d solely
in t e r m s of i n t e r e s t s o r values t h a t a r e satisfied by g o o d s . G o o d s a r e
w h a t we strive f o r i n d e e d , w h a t is g o o d for us. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,
Rawls i n t r o d u c e s " p r i m a r y g o o d s " as g e n e r a l i z e d m e a n s t h a t p e o p l e
m a y n e e d in o r d e r to realize t h e i r p l a n s of life. A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i e s
k n o w t h a t s o m e of t h e s e p r i m a r y g o o d s a s s u m e t h e f o r m of r i g h t s
for citizens of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h e y
t h e m s e l v e s c a n only d e s c r i b e r i g h t s as o n e c a t e g o r y of " g o o d s "
a m o n g o t h e r s . F o r t h e m , t h e issue of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c a n only
arise in t h e guise of t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i m a r y
g o o d s . Rawls t h e r e b y a d o p t s a c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e t h a t is p r p p e r t o a n
ethics of t h e g o o d , o n e m o r e c o n s i s t e n t with Aristotelian o r utilitar
i a n a p p r o a c h e s t h a n with a t h e o r y of rights, s u c h as his o w n , t h a t
p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y . Precisely b e c a u s e Rawls
a d h e r e s to a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e o n w h i c h t h e a u t o n o m y of citizens
is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h r i g h t s , t h e p a r a d i g m of d i s t r i b u t i o n g e n e r a t e s
difficulties for h i m . Rights c a n b e "enjoyed" only by b e i n g exercised.
T h e y c a n n o t b e assimilated to distributive g o o d s w i t h o u t forfeiting
t h e i r d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g . A n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of r i g h t s results
only if t h o s e w h o enjoy r i g h t s r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as free a n d
e q u a l . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e exist r i g h t s to a fair s h a r e of g o o d s o r o p p o r
tunities, b u t r i g h t s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e r e g u l a t e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n
actors: they c a n n o t b e "possessed" like t h i n g s . If I a m c o r r e c t , t h e
c o n c e p t u a l c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e m o d e l of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e p r e c l u d e
Rawls f r o m c o n s t r u i n g basic liberties f r o m t h e o u t s e t as basic r i g h t s
a n d c o m p e l h i m to i n t e r p r e t t h e m as p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h i s l e a d s h i m
to assimilate t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s to t h e
teleological m e a n i n g of p r e f e r r e d v a l u e s . Rawls t h e r e b y b l u r s cer7
55
tain d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t I shall briefly m e n t i o n in o r d e r to show h o w

this limits his o p t i o n s in t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of his project.
N o r m s i n f o r m d e c i s i o n s as to w h a t o n e o u g h t to d o , values i n f o r m
d e c i s i o n s as t o w h a t c o n d u c t is m o s t d e s i r a b l e . R e c o g n i z e d n o r m s
impose equal a n d exceptionless obligations o n their addressees,
while values e x p r e s s t h e preferability of g o o d s t h a t a r e striven for by
p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s . W h e r e a s n o r m s a r e o b s e r v e d in t h e sense of a
fulfillment of g e n e r a l i z e d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s , values o r g o o d s
c a n b e r e a l i z e d o r a c q u i r e d only by p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
n o r m s raise a b i n a r y validity claim in v i r t u e of w h i c h t h e y a r e said
to b e e i t h e r valid o r invalid: to o u g h t s t a t e m e n t s , as to assertoric
s t a t e m e n t s , we c a n r e s p o n d o n l y with "yes" o r " n o " o r refrain f r o m
j u d g m e n t . Values, by c o n t r a s t , fix r e l a t i o n s of p r e f e r e n c e w h i c h sig
nify t h a t c e r t a i n g o o d s a r e m o r e attractive t h a n o t h e r s : h e n c e , we
c a n a s s e n t t o evaluative s t a t e m e n t s t o a g r e a t e r o r lesser d e g r e e . T h e
o b l i g a t o r y force of n o r m s h a s t h e a b s o l u t e m e a n i n g of a n u n c o n d i
t i o n a l a n d universal duty: w h a t o n e o u g h t t o d o is w h a t is equally
g o o d for all ( t h a t is, for all a d d r e s s e e s ) . T h e attractiveness of values
reflects a n e v a l u a t i o n a n d a transitive o r d e r i n g of g o o d s t h a t h a s
b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d in p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e s o r h a s b e e n a d o p t e d by
p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s : i m p o r t a n t evaluative d e c i s i o n s o r h i g h e r - o r d e r
p r e f e r e n c e s e x p r e s s w h a t is g o o d for u s ( o r for m e ) , all t h i n g s
c o n s i d e r e d . Finally, different n o r m s m u s t n o t c o n t r a d i c t e a c h o t h e r
w h e n t h e y claim validity for t h e s a m e d o m a i n of a d d r e s s e e s ; t h e y
m u s t s t a n d i n c o h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s to o n e a n o t h e r i n o t h e r w o r d s ,
t h e y m u s t c o n s t i t u t e a system. Different values, by c o n t r a s t , c o m p e t e
for priority; insofar as t h e y m e e t with intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n
w i t h i n a c u l t u r e o r g r o u p , they c o n s t i t u t e shifting c o n f i g u r a t i o n s
f r a u g h t with t e n s i o n . T o s u m u p , n o r m s differ f r o m values, first, in
t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o r u l e - g o v e r n e d as o p p o s e d to p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n ; sec
o n d , in a b i n a r y as o p p o s e d t o a g r a d u a l c o d i n g of t h e respective
validity claims; t h i r d , in t h e i r a b s o l u t e as o p p o s e d to relative b i n d i n g n e s s ; a n d last, in t h e criteria t h a t systems of n o r m s as o p p o s e d to
systems of values m u s t satisfy.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Rawls wishes to d o j u s t i c e to t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l intui
t i o n t h a t finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e s e distinctions; h e n c e , h e m u s t c o m
p e n s a t e for t h e leveling of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n w h i c h
h e a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n
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Chapter 2
initially a c c e p t s with t h e c o n c e p t of p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h e a c c o r d s
t h e first p r i n c i p l e priority over t h e s e c o n d . A n a b s o l u t e priority of
e q u a l liberties over t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s r e g u l a t e d by t h e s e c o n d p r i n
ciple is, however, difficult t o justify f r o m t h e first p e r s o n perspective
in w h i c h we o r i e n t ourselves t o o u r o w n interests o r values. H . L. A.
H a r t h a s d e v e l o p e d this p o i n t clearly i n his c r i t i q u e of Rawls. I n t e r
estingly, Rawls c a n m e e t this criticism only by b u i l d i n g a subsequent
qualification i n t o t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s w h i c h s e c u r e s t h e m a r e l a t i o n
to basic liberties as basic rights: h e a c k n o w l e d g e s as p r i m a r y g o o d s
only t h o s e t h a t a r e e x p e d i e n t for t h e life p l a n s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of t h e m o r a l faculties of citizens asjree and equal persons.
Further
m o r e , Rawls differentiates t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t a r e constitutive of
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society i n t h e m o r a l
sense f r o m t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e
guararrteMgôfjhe "fair v a l u e " of liberty i n t o t h e first p r i n c i p l e .
9
10
11
This a d d i t i o n a l determination^ ^
presupposes a
deorrjtolbgka^
contra
dicts t h e p r i m a facie classification of r i g h t s as g o o d s . Since t h e fair
valulFor^quaT liberties r e q u i r e s t h e a c t u a l availability of e q u a l o p
p o r t u n i t i e s t o exercise t h e s e rights, only rights, n o t g o o d s , c a n b e
qualified in this m a n n e r . O n l y i n t h e case of rights c a n w e d i s t i n g u i s h
b e t w e e n legal c o m p e t e n c e a n d t h e a c t u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c h o o s e
a n d t o act. O n l y b e t w e e n rights, o n t h e o n e side, a n d a c t u a l c h a n c e s
to exercise rights, o n t h e other, c a n t h e r e exist a c h a s m t h a t is
p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of j u s t i c e ; s u c h a r u p t u r e c a n n o t
exist b e t w e e n t h e possession a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d s . It w o u l d b e
e i t h e r r e d u n d a n t o r m e a n i n g l e s s t o s p e a k of t h e "fair v a l u e " of
equally d i s t r i b u t e d g o o d s . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n legal a n d factual
equality h a s n o a p p l i c a t i o n t o " g o o d s " for g r a m m a t i c a l r e a s o n s , to
p u t it i n W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n t e r m s . B u t if t h e n o t i o n of p r i m a r y g o o d s
is subject to c o r r e c t i o n in a s e c o n d step, we m a y ask w h e t h e r t h e first
s t e p t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t necessitates this c o n
c e p t i o n i s a wise o n e .
(3) T h e f o r e g o i n g reflections s h o w t h a t , for t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , t h e capacity t o m a k e r a t i o n a l decisions is n o t
sufficient to c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests of t h e i r clients
o r t o u n d e r s t a n d r i g h t s (in R o n a l d D w o r k i n ' s sense) as t r u m p s t h a t
o v e r r i d e collective goals. B u t w h y t h e n a r e t h e p a r t i e s d e p r i v e d of
12
57
practical r e a s o n in t h e first p l a c e a n d s h r o u d e d in a n i m p e n e t r a b l e
veil of i g n o r a n c e ? Rawls's g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is clear: t h e r o l e of t h e
c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is t a k e n over by a n intersubjectively a p p l i e d
p r o c e d u r e w h i c h is e m b o d i e d in p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s s u c h as t h e
equality of p a r t i e s a n d in situational f e a t u r e s s u c h as t h e veil of
i g n o r a n c e . I n m y view, however, t h e p o t e n t i a l gains of this t u r n a r e
dissipated precisely by t h e systematic d e p r i v a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n . My
t h i r d q u e s t i o n reveals t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h I also p o s e t h e two
p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n s . I believe t h a t Rawls c o u l d avoid t h e difficulties
associated with t h e d e s i g n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if h e o p e r a t i o n a l ized t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different way, namely, if h e k e p t t h e
p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n free of substantive c o n n o
t a t i o n s by d e v e l o p i n g it in a strictly p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r .
Kant's categorical imperative already goes b e y o n d the egocentric
c h a r a c t e r of t h e G o l d e n Rule: "Do n o t d o u n t o o t h e r s w h a t y o u
w o u l d n o t h a v e t h e m d o u n t o y o u . " W h e r e a s this r u l e calls for a
universalization test f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t of a given individual, t h e
c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e r e q u i r e s t h a t all t h o s e possibly affected b e
able to will a j u s t m a x i m as a g e n e r a l r u l e . B u t as l o n g as we apply
this m o r e e x a c t i n g test in a m o n o l o g i c a l fashion, e a c h of u s still
c o n s i d e r s privately w h a t all c o u l d will f r o m individually isolated p e r
spectives. T h i s is i n a d e q u a t e . F o r only w h e n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of e a c h individual reflects a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h a t is, a
universally valid view of t h e w o r l d , w o u l d w h a t f r o m m y p o i n t of view
is equally g o o d for all actually b e i n t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of e a c h
individual. B u t this c a n n o l o n g e r b e a s s u m e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of
social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . If we wish to p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n
u n d e r l y i n g t h e K a n t i a n universalization p r i n c i p l e , we c a n r e s p o n d
to this fact of p l u r a l i s m in different ways. Rawls i m p o s e s a c o m m o n
p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h i n f o r m a
t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d t h e r e b y n e u t r a l i z e s t h e multiplicity of p a r t i c u lar i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives f r o m t h e o u t s e t . jGlsa^^
by
c o n t r a s t , views t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view as e m b o d i e d in a n i n t e r s u b jective p r a x i s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h i c h e n j o i n s t h o s e involved to a n
idealizing enlargement of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives.
D i s c o u r s e ethics rests o n t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
p r i n c i p l e of universalization, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , c ^ U s J ^ r ^ a J c ^ t
p r o c e s s of "irlear r o l e t a k i n g . " It i n t e r p r e t s this i d e a of G. H . M e a d
58
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1 3
| in t e r m s of a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . U n d e r t h e p r a g j m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a n inclusive a n d n o n c o e r c i v e r a t i o n a l dis| c o u r s e b e t w e e n free a n d e q u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , e v e r y o n e is r e q u i r e d to

take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e v e r y o n e else a n d t h u s t o p r o j e c t h e r s e l f i n t o
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self a n d w o r l d of all o t h e r s ; f r o m this inter
l o c k i n g of perspectives t h e r e e m e r g e s a n ideally e x t e n d e d "wej j e r s p e c t i v e " f r o m w h i c h all c a n test in c o m m o n w h e t h e r they wish
to m a k e a controversial n o r m t h e basis of t h e i r s h a r e d p r a c t i c e ; a n d
this s h o u l d i n c l u d e m u t u a l criticism of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e
l a n g u a g e s in t e r m s of w h i c h situations a n d n e e d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n
t h e c o u r s e of successively u n d e r t a k e n a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e c o r e of g e n e r alizable i n t e r e s t s c a n t h e n e m e r g e step by s t e p .
1 4
T h i n g s a r e different w h e n t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e c o n s t r a i n s t h e
field of vision of p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n from the beginning to
t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h p r e s u m p t i v e l y free a n d e q u a l citizens
w o u l d a g r e e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r d i v e r g e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self
a n d world. It is i m p o r t a n t to see t h a t with this initial a b s t r a c t i o n
Rawls a c c e p t s a double b u r d e n of proof. T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e m u s t
e x t e n d to all p a r t i c u l a r viewpoints a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t c o u l d i m p a i r a n
i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , it m a y e x t e n d only to s u c h
n o r m a t i v e m a t t e r s as c a n b e disqualified w i t h o u t furtlier a d o as
c a n d i d a t e s for t h e c o m m o n g o o d to b e a c c e p t e d by free a n d e q u a l
citizens. T h i s s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n places a d e m a n d o n t h e t h e o r y t h a t
is difficult to m e e t , as is s h o w n by brief reflection. Following t h e
justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e is
g r a d u a l l y r a i s e d d u r i n g t h e successive steps of f r a m i n g t h e constitu
tion, of legislation, a n d of a p p l y i n g law. Since t h e n e w i n f o r m a t i o n
t h a t t h e r e b y s t r e a m s in m u s t h a r m o n i z e with t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s
a l r e a d y s e l e c t e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t , u n
p l e a s a n t surprises m u s t b e avoided. If we a r e to e n s u r e t h a t n o
d i s c r e p a n c i e s arise, we m u s t c o n s t r u c t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a l r e a d y
with k n o w l e d g e , a n d even foresight, of all of t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s
t h a t c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y n o u r i s h t h e s h a r e d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of free
a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e f u t u r e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n
himself w o u l d have to s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n of a n t i c i p a t i n g at least
p a r t s of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n of w h i c h h e previously relieved t h e p a r t i e s
in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ! T h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t w o u l d only b e
59
g u a r a n t e e d in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s
e m p l o y e d in its c o n s t r u c t i o n t h o s e of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s
citizen, of fair c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e
specific sense Rawls a t t a c h e s to t h e s e t e r m s c o u l d w i t h s t a n d revi
sion in light of m o r a l l y significant f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d l e a r n i n g
processes.
If s u c h a heavy b u r d e n of p r o o f is g e n e r a t e d by t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of
i n f o r m a t i o n i m p o s e d o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n by t h e
veil of i g n o r a n c e , a c o n v e n i e n t r e s p o n s e w o u l d b e to l i g h t e n this
b u r d e n by o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different
way. I h a v e in m i n d t h e m o r e o p e n p r o c e d u r e of a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e
p r a x i s t h a t p r o c e e d s u n d e r t h e d e m a n d i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of t h e
"public u s e of r e a s o n " a n d d o e s n o t b r a c k e t t h e p l u r a l i s m of convic
tions a n d worldviews f r o m t h e outset. T h i s p r o c e d u r e c a n b e expli
c a t e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to t h e substantive c o n c e p t s t h a t Rawls
e m p l o y s in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n .
II
T h e Fact o f Pluralism and the Idea o f an Overlapping Consensus
Since his Dewey L e c t u r e s , "Kantian C o n s t r u c t i v i s m in M o r a l T h e

o r y , " Rawls h a s stressed t h e political c h a r a c t e r of j u s t i c e as fairness.
T h i s shift is m o t i v a t e d by d i s q u i e t c o n c e r n i n g t h e fact of social a n d ,
a b o v e all, i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . I n discussing t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e ,
I h a v e a l r e a d y clarified t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e
takes u p o n itself with its initial t h e o r e t i c a l decisions. T h e decisive
issue in t h e justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e is less
t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e i n t u i t i o n s a n d
basic c o n c e p t s t h a t g u i d e t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n itself.
Rawls i n t r o d u c e s n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s i n t o t h e very p r o c e d u r e of
justification, a b o v e all t h o s e i d e a s h e associates with t h e c o n c e p t of
t h e m o r a l p e r s o n : t h e sense of fairness a n d t h e capacity for o n e ' s
o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h u s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e citizen as a
m o r a l p e r s o n , w h i c h also u n d e r l i e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e fair c o o p e r a
t i o n of politically a u t o n o m o u s citizens, s t a n d s in n e e d of* a prior
justification. F u r t h e r , it n e e d s to b e s h o w n t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is
n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews a n d r e m a i n s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l
after t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e h a s b e e n lifted. T h i s e x p l a i n s Rawls's
15
60
Chapter 2
i n t e r e s t in a "political," as o p p o s e d to a m e t a p h y s i c a l , c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e . I s u s p e c t t h a t this t e r m i n o l o g y i n d i c a t e s a c e r t a i n u n c l a r i t y
a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e c h a r a c t e r of w h a t is in n e e d of justification; f r o m
this, in t u r n , t h e r e results a n indecisiveness as to h o w t h e validity
claim of t h e t h e o r y itself s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . I will e x a m i n e
w h e t h e r t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s , o n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e
d e p e n d s , plays a cognitive o r m e r e l y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e : w h e t h e r
it p r i m a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e f u r t h e r justification of t h e t h e o r y o r
w h e t h e r it serves, in light of t h e p r i o r justification of t h e t h e o r y , to
e x p l i c a t e a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of social stability ( 1 ) . C o n n e c t e d
with this is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e sense in w h i c h Rawls uses t h e p r e d i
cate " r e a s o n a b l e " : as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s
o r for t h e reflective a t t i t u d e of e n l i g h t e n e d t o l e r a n c e ( 2 ) .
(1) I n o r d e r to p i n d o w n t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m a t i v e i d e a s , Rawls
h a s r e c o u r s e to t h e so-called m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . T h e
p h i l o s o p h e r arrives at t h e basic c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n a n d t h e
a d j u n c t c o n c e p t s of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s citizen, of fair c o o p
e r a t i o n , of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society, a n d so f o r t h , via a r a t i o n a l r e
c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o v e n i n t u i t i o n s , t h a t is, i n t u i t i o n s actually found in
t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c society. Reflective e q u i
l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d at t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r h a s at
t a i n e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h o s e involved c a n n o l o n g e r reject with
g o o d r e a s o n s i n t u i t i o n s r e c o n s t r u c t e d a n d clarified in this m a n n e r .
T h e p r o c e d u r e of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a l r e a d y fulfills T h o m a s
S c a n l o n ' s c r i t e r i o n of w h a t it is " n o t r e a s o n a b l e to reject." O f c o u r s e ,
Rawls d o e s n o t wish to limit h i m s e l f solely to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l n o r
mative convictions of a particular political c u l t u r e : even t h e p r e s e n t day Rawls, pace R i c h a r d Rorty, h a s n o t b e c o m e a c o n t e x t u a l i s t . H i s >.
aim, as b e f o r e , is to r e c o n s t r u c t a s u b s t r a t u m of intuitive i d e a s l a t e n t
in t h e political c u l t u r e of his society a n d its d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n s .
B u t if e x p e r i e n c e s associated with a n incipiently successful institu
t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e h a v e a l r e a d y b e c o m e sedim e n t e d in t h e existing political c u l t u r e i n A m e r i c a n political
c u l t u r e , for e x a m p l e s u c h a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n c a n ac
c o m p l i s h m o r e t h a n m e r e l y t h e h e r m e n e u t i c clarification of a c o n
t i n g e n t t r a d i t i o n . T h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e worked out o n this basis m u s t
n o n e t h e l e s s b e e x a m i n e d o n c e a g a i n as to w h e t h e r it c a n e x p e c t to
61
m e e t with a c c e p t a n c e i n a pluralistic society. H o w is this s e c o n d step

r e l a t e d t o t h e first stage of justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s
a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d ? Is it even p r o p e r l y a s e c o n d step of justification ?
A l r e a d y i n t h e final c h a p t e r s of A Theory ofJustice, Rawls a d d r e s s e s
t h e issue of w h e t h e r a society c o n s t i t u t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e
p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c o u l d stabilize itself: for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r it
c o u l d g e n e r a t e t h e functionally n e c e s s a r y m o t i v a t i o n s f r o m its o w n
r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i s i t e political socialization of its citizens
(TJ 4 9 6 f f ) . I n view of t h e fact of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m
w h i c h h e s u b s e q u e n t l y t o o k m o r e seriously, Rawls n o w w a n t s to
e x a m i n e i n a similar way w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e falls u n d e r t h e "art of t h e p o s s i b l e " a n d h e n c e is "practica
b l e . " First of all, t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of t h e p e r s o n o n w h i c h t h e
t h e o r y u l t i m a t e l y rests m u s t b e sufficiently n e u t r a l t o b e a c c e p t a b l e
f r o m t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives of different worldviews. H e n c e it
m u s t b e s h o w n t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness c a n f o r m t h e basis of a n
" o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . " So far, so g o o d . W h a t b o t h e r s m e is Rawls's
w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s u c h a test of acceptability is of t h e s a m e
k i n d as t h e test of consistency h e previously u n d e r t o o k with refer
e n c e t o t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society's p o t e n t i a l for self-stabilization.
T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l is p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e t h e test can
n o t b e u n d e r t a k e n in a n i m m a n e n t m a n n e r i n t h e case of accept
ability; it is n o l o n g e r a m o v e w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y . T h e test of t h e
n e u t r a l i t y of t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s with r e s p e c t to conflicting
worldviews n o w rests o n d i f f e r e n t p r e m i s e s : it is different f r o m a
h y p o t h e t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e capacity of a society, a l r e a d y o r g a n
ized in a c c o r d a n c e with p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t o r e p r o d u c e itself.
Rawls h i m s e l f i n his p r e s e n t w o r k d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n "two stages"
o f t h e o r y - f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r i n c i p l e s justified a t t h e first stage m u s t
b e e x p o s e d t o p u b l i c discussion a t t h e s e c o n d stage. O n l y w h e n t h e
t h e o r e t i c a l d e s i g n is c o m p l e t e d c a n t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m b e b r o u g h t
i n t o play a n d t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n r e v o k e d . T h e
t h e o r y as a w h o l e m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d t o criticism by t h e citizens in
t h e p u b l i c f o r u m of r e a s o n . I n this f o r u m it is n o l o n g e r t h e fictional
citizens of a j u s t society a b o u t w h o m s t a t e m e n t s a r e m a d e within t h e
t h e o r y b u t r e a l citizens of flesh a n d b l o o d . T h e t h e o r y , t h e r e f o r e ,
m u s t leave t h e o u t c o m e of s u c h a test of acceptability u n d e t e r m i n e d .
1 6
62
Chapter 2
F o r Rawls h a s in m i n d r e a l d i s c o u r s e s w h o s e o u t c o m e is o p e n : " W h a t
if it t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e as fairness c a n n o t g a i n
t h e s u p p o r t of r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s , so t h a t t h e case for stability
fails? . . . We s h o u l d h a v e to see w h e t h e r a c c e p t a b l e c h a n g e s in t h e
p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d achieve stability" (PL 6 5 - 6 6 ) . Clearly, t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r c a n a t m o s t a t t e m p t to a n t i c i p a t e in reflection t h e di
r e c t i o n of r e a l discourses as t h e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y u n f o l d u n d e r c o n
d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society. B u t s u c h a m o r e o r less realistic
s i m u l a t i o n of r e a l d i s c o u r s e s c a n n o t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e t h e b r y
in t h e s a m e way as c a n t h e d e r i v a t i o n of possibilities of self-stabiliza
t i o n f r o m t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r e m i s e s of a j u s t society. F o r n o w t h e
citizens t h e m s e l v e s d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s d e v e l o p e d by t h e
p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n .
T h e m i s l e a d i n g parallel w o u l d b e of n o f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e if it
d i d n o t cast t h e " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s " with w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s
of j u s t i c e a r e s u p p o s e d to m e e t in t h e w r o n g light. B e c a u s e Rawls
situates t h e " q u e s t i o n of stability" in t h e f o r e g r o u n d , t h e o v e r l a p p i n g
c o n s e n s u s m e r e l y expresses t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t t h e t h e
o r y of j u s t i c e c a n m a k e to t h e peaceful i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of social
c o o p e r a t i o n ; b u t in this t h e intrinsic value of a justified t h e o r y m u s t
a l r e a d y b e p r e s u p p o s e d . F r o m this functionalist perspective, t h e
q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r y c a n m e e t with p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t
t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of different worldviews in t h e f o r u m of
t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n w o u l d lose a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g essential
to t h e t h e o r y itself. T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e
m e r e l y a n i n d e x of t h e utility, a n d n o l o n g e r a c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e
c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t h e o r y ; it w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e of i n t e r e s t f r o m t h e
p o i n t of view of acceptability, a n d h e n c e of validity, b u t only froni
t h a t of a c c e p t a n c e , t h a t is, of s e c u r i n g social stability. If I u n d e r s t a n d
Rawls correctly, however, h e d o e s n o t wish to d i s t i n g u i s h in this way
b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s of stability. W h e n h e
calls his c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e "political" his i n t e n t i o n a p p e a r s r a t h e r
to b e to collapse t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n its justified acceptability
a n d its a c t u a l a c c e p t a n c e : " [ T ] h e a i m of j u s t i c e as fairness as a
political c o n c e p t i o n is practical, a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l o r e p i s t e m o logical. T h a t is, it p r e s e n t s itself n o t as a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t
is t r u e , b u t o n e t h a t c a n s e r v e as a basis of i n f o r m e d a n d willing
63
political a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n citizens viewed as free a n d e q u a l

persons."
I n m y view, Rawls m u s t m a k e a s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n accept
ability a n d a c c e p t a n c e . A p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e
t h e o r y is a l r e a d y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e citizens m u s t first
b e convinced by t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e b e f o r e s u c h a
c o n s e n s u s c a n c o m e a b o u t . T h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t n o t b e
political in t h e w r o n g sense a n d s h o u l d n o t m e r e l y l e a d to a m o d u s
vivendi. T h e t h e o r y itself m u s t f u r n i s h t h e p r e m i s e s t h a t "we a n d
o t h e r s r e c o g n i z e as t r u e , o r as r e a s o n a b l e for t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h
i n g a w o r k i n g a g r e e m e n t o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s of political j u s t i c e . "
B u t if Rawls r u l e s o u t a functionalist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of j u s t i c e as
fairness, h e m u s t allow s o m e epistemic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e validity
of his t h e o r y a n d t h e p r o s p e c t of its n e u t r a l i t y t o w a r d c o m p e t i n g
worldviews b e i n g c o n f i r m e d i n p u b l i c discourses. T h e stabilizing
effect of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e e x p l a i n e d i n cog
nitive t e r m s , t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness is n e u t r a l t o w a r d " c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . "
I d o n ' t m e a n to say t h a t Rawls a c c e p t s p r e m i s e s t h a t w o u l d p r e v e n t
h i m f r o m d r a w i n g this c o n s e q u e n c e ; I m e a n only t h a t h e hesitates
to assert it b e c a u s e h e associates with t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n "political"
t h e proviso t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e s h o u l d n o t b e b u r d e n e d with
a n e p i s t e m i c claim a n d t h a t its a n t i c i p a t e d practical effect s h o u l d n o t
b e m a d e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of its assertions.
T h u s we h a v e r e a s o n to ask why Rawls d o e s riot t h i n k his t h e o r y
a d m i t s of t r u t h a n d in what sense h e h e r e uses t h e p r e d i c a t e "reason
a b l e " in p l a c e of t h e p r e d i c a t e " t r u e . "
17
18
(2) O n a w e a k i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e claim t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e
c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false h a s m e r e l y t h e u n p r o b l e m a t i c sense t h a t
n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s d o n o t d e s c r i b e a n i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r of
m o r a l facts. O n a s t r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , this thesis h a s t h e value-skep
tical sense t h a t b e h i n d t h e validity claim of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s
t h e r e l u r k s s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y subjective: feelings, desires, o r deci
sions, e x p r e s s e d i n a g r a m m a t i c a l l y m i s l e a d i n g fashion. B u t for Rawls
b o t h value skepticism a n d m o r a l r e a l i s m a r e equally u n a c c e p t a b l e .
H e w a n t s to s e c u r e for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s a n d for ^he t h e o r y of
j u s t i c e as a w h o l e a f o r m of r a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n f o u n d e d o n justified
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intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , b u t w i t h o u t a c c o r d i n g t h e m a n
e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . F o r this r e a s o n h e i n t r o d u c e s t h e p r e d i c a t e
" r e a s o n a b l e " as a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t to " t r u e . " T h e difficulty
h e r e is in specifying in w h a t sense t h e o n e is a " c o m p l e m e n t a r y
c o n c e p t " to t h e o t h e r . Two a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s suggest t h e m
selves. E i t h e r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in t h e sense of practical
r e a s o n as s y n o n y m o u s with "morally t r u e , " t h a t is, as a validity c o n
c e p t a n a l o g o u s to t r u t h a n d o n t h e s a m e p l a n e as p r o p o s i t i o n a l
t r u t h ; this r e a d i n g is s u p p o r t e d by at least o n e line of a r g u m e n t a t i o n
( a ) . O r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in m o r e o r less t h e s a m e sense
as " t h o u g h t f u l n e s s " in d e a l i n g with d e b a t a b l e views w h o s e t r u t h is
for t h e p r e s e n t u n d e c i d e d ; t h e n " r e a s o n a b l e " is e m p l o y e d as a
higher-level p r e d i c a t e c o n c e r n e d m o r e with " r e a s o n a b l e disagree
m e n t s , " a n d h e n c e with t h e fallibilistic o u t l o o k a n d civil d e m e a n o r
of p e r s o n s , t h a n with t h e validity of t h e i r assertions. I n g e n e r a l , Rawls
s e e m s to favor this latter r e a d i n g ( b ) .
(a) Rawls first i n t r o d u c e s t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " as a p r o p e r t y of m o r a l
p e r s o n s . P e o p l e c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e w h o possess a s e n s e of j u s t i c e
a n d t h u s a r e b o t h willing a n d a b l e to t a k e a c c o u n t of fair c o n d i t i o n s
of c o o p e r a t i o n , b u t w h o a r e also aware of t h e fallibility of k n o w l e d g e
and-in r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e s e " b u r d e n s of r e a s o n " a r # willing to
justify t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of political j u s t i c e publicly. By c o n t r a s t , p e r
sons act m e r e l y "rationally" as l o n g as t h e y a r e p r u d e n t l y g u i d e d by
t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . W h a t it m e a n s t o b e " r e a s o n a b l e "
c a n i n d e e d b e e x p l i c a t e d in t e r m s of s u c h qualities of m o r a l p e r s o n s .
B u t t h e c o n c e p t of a p e r s o n itself a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t
of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n .
1 9
U l t i m a t e l y Rawls e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n by ref
e r e n c e to two d i m e n s i o n s : o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l di
m e n s i o n of n o r m a t i v e validity (which I h e r e leave to o n e side as
u n p r o b l e m a t i c ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of a
p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d t h e p r o c e s s of p u b l i c r e a s o n i n g (which is of
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ) . T h e p u b l i c u s e is in a
sense i n s c r i b e d in r e a s o n . "Publicity" is t h e c o m m o n p e r s p e c t i v e
f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens mutually c o n v i n c e o n e a n o t h e r of w h a t is j u s t
a n d u n j u s t by t h e force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t . T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e of
t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , in w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a t e , first l e n d s m o r a l
65
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c U s e of R e a s o n
convictions t h e i r objectivity. Rawls calls valid n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s

"objective" a n d h e e x p l a i n s "objectivity" in a p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r with
r e f e r e n c e to a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n t h a t satisfies c e r t a i n c o u n t e r f a c tual c o n d i t i o n s : "Political convictions (which a r e also, of c o u r s e ,
m o r a l convictions) a r e objectiveactually f o u n d e d o n a n o r d e r of
r e a s o n s i f r e a s o n a b l e a n d r a t i o n a l p e r s o n s , w h o a r e sufficiently
i n t e l l i g e n t a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s in e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r p o w e r s of practical
r e a s o n . . . w o u l d eventually e n d o r s e t h o s e convictions . . . p r o v i d e d
t h a t t h e s e p e r s o n s k n o w t h e r e l e v a n t facts a n d h a v e sufficiently
surveyed the g r o u n d s that bear o n the matter u n d e r conditions
favorable to d u e r e f l e c t i o n " (PL 1 1 9 ) . Rawls d o e s a d d in this passage
t h a t g r o u n d s a r e only specified as g o o d g r o u n d s in t h e light of a
r e c o g n i z e d c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e ; b u t this c o n c e p t m u s t in t u r n m e e t
with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r t h e s a m e ideal c o n d i t i o n s (PL 1 3 7 ) . H e n c e
Rawls m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t , o n his view t o o , t h e p r o c e
d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n ^remains t h e final c o u r t of a p p e a l
for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s .
I n l i g h t of this reflection, it c o u l d b e said t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e
" r e a s o n a b l e " p o i n t s to t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of a validity claim.
By a n a l o g y with a n o n s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t of t r u t h p u r i f i e d of all
c o n n o t a t i o n s of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , o n e c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d "reason
a b l e " as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . Clearly
Rawls d o e s n o t w a n t to d r a w t h i s i n m y view, c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n ;
o t h e r w i s e h e w o u l d h a v e to avoid t h e p e r p l e x i n g u s a g e a c c o r d i n g to
w h i c h worldviews n e e d n o t b e t r u e even w h e n t h e y a r e r e a s o n a b l e ,
a n d vice versa. T h e p r o b l e m is n o t Rawls's r e j e c t i o n of m o r a l realism
o r t h e c o n s e q u e n t r e j e c t i o n of a s e m a n t i c t r u t h p r e d i c a t e for n o r
mative s t a t e m e n t s , b u t t h e fact t h a t h e d o e s a t t a c h s u c h a t r u t h
p r e d i c a t e to worldviews ( c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ) . H e t h e r e b y d e
n i e s h i m s e l f t h e possibility of e x p l o i t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n n o t a t i o n s
of t h e e x p r e s s i o n " r e a s o n a b l e , " c o n n o t a t i o n s t h a t h e m u s t n e v e r t h e
less a t t r i b u t e to his o w n c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e if it is to b e a b l e to
claim s o m e s o r t of n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g force.
(b) O n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e s a n d religious
w o r l d - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a d m i t of t r u t h a n d falsity. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , a
political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o u l d only b e t r u e if it w e r e n o t m e r e l y
c o m p a t i b l e with s u c h d o c t r i n e s b u t also derivable f r o m a t r u e
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d o c t r i n e . Yet f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is

n e u t r a l t o w a r d worldviews we c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n d w h e n
this is t h e case. F r o m this secular viewpoint, t h e t r u t h claims of all
r e a s o n a b l e worldviews h a v e e q u a l weight, w h e r e t h o s e worldviews
c o u n t as " r e a s o n a b l e " t h a t c o m p e t e with o n e a n o t h e r in a reflexive
a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n e ' s o w n t r u t h claim c o u l d
prevail in p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e in t h e l o n g r u n only t h r o u g h t h e force of
b e t t e r r e a s o n s . " R e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s " a r e ultimately
d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e b u r d e n s of proof, w h i c h
e n a b l e s g r o u p s with c o m p e t i n g i d e o l o g i e s to a c c e p t f o r t h e t i m e
b e i n g a " r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t " as t h e basis of t h e i r peaceful
coexistence.
Since d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d religious t r u t h s re
m a i n u n r e s o l v e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of e n d u r i n g p l u r a l i s m , only t h e
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of this k i n d of reflexive c o n s c i o u s n e s s c a n b e trans
f e r r e d as a validity p r e d i c a t e to a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e
c o m p a t i b l e with all r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s . By way of this t r a n s f e r e n c e ,
a r e a s o n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e p r e s e r v e s a n o b l i q u e r e l a t i o n to
a t r u t h claim p r o j e c t e d i n t o t h e f u t u r e . B u t it c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t
o n e of t h e r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s f r o m w h i c h it is derivable is also t h e
t r u e o n e . A political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is r e a s o n a b l e in t h e sense
t h a t it c a n afford a k i n d of t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e worldviews, in t h e sense a d v o c a t e d by Gottfried Lessing. W h a t r e m a i n s is
a n act of faith in r e a s o n , " r e a s o n a b l e faith in t h e r e a l possibility of
a j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e . " T h i s view m a y a p p e a l to s o m e of o u r
b e t t e r i n t u i t i o n s , b u t h o w c a n it b e h a r m o n i z e d with Rawls's r e a s o n s
for a c c e p t i n g t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d in t h e first place?
Q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e o r m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a d m i t of justifiable an
swersjustifiable in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y b e c a u s e they
a r e c o n c e r n e d with w h a t , f r o m a n ideally e x p a n d e d perspective, is
in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. "Ethical" q u e s t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o n o t
a d m i t of s u c h i m p a r t i a l t r e a t m e n t b e c a u s e they refer to w h a t , f r o m
t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , is in t h e l o n g r u n g o o d for m e o r for
u s e v e n if this is n o t equally g o o d for all. Now, m e t a p h y s i c a l o r
religious worldviews a r e at t h e very least p e r m e a t e d with answers to
basic ethical q u e s t i o n s ; they a r t i c u l a t e in a n e x e m p l a r y fashion col
lective i d e n t i t i e s a n d g u i d e individual p l a n s of life. H e n c e , world21
67
views a r e m e a s u r e d m o r e by t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e lifestyles t h e y
s h a p e t h a n by t h e t r u t h of t h e s t a t e m e n t s they a d m i t . B e c a u s e s u c h
d o c t r i n e s a r e " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " in precisely t h e s e n s e t h a t they offer
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of (the w o r l d as a w h ^ ^ t h e y c a n n o t m e r e l y b e u n
d e r s t o o d as a n o r d e r e d set of s t a t e m e n t s of fact; t h e i r c o n t e n t s
c a n n o t b e e x p r e s s e d c o m p l e t e l y in s e n t e n c e s t h a t a d m i t of t r u t h a n d
t h e y d o n o t f o r m a symbolic system t h a t c a n b e t r u e o r false as s u c h .
So, at least, it a p p e a r s u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l
t h i n k i n g in w h i c h j u s t i c e as fairness is to b e justified.
B u t t h e n it is i m p o s s i b l e t o m a k e t h e validity of a c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e t r u t h of a worldview, h o w e v e r " r e a s o n a b l e "
it m a y b e . Rather, u n d e r t h e s e p r e m i s e s it m a k e s sense to analyze t h e
different validity claims t h a t we associate, respectively, with descrip
tive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s (of various kinds) i n d e
p e n d e n t l y of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o m p l e x of validity claims t h a t a r e
o b s c u r e l y fused t o g e t h e r in religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a
t i o n s of r e a l i t y .
W h y d o e s Rawls n e v e r t h e l e s s t h i n k t h a t identity-stabilizing worldviews a d m i t of t r u t h ? A possible m o t i v e m i g h t b e t h e conviction t h a t
a p r o f a n e , f r e e s t a n d i n g m o r a l i t y is u n t e n a b l e , t h a t m o r a l convictions
m u s t b e e m b e d d e d in m e t a p h y s i c a l o r religious d o c t r i n e s . T h a t , at
any r a t e , w o u l d c o h e r e with Rawls's way of p o s i n g t h e p r o b l e m of a n
o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s : h e takes as his m o d e l t h a t political institu
tionalization of f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e
religious civil wars of t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d to a n e n d . B u t c o u l d t h e
religious conflicts h a v e b e e n b r o u g h t to a n e n d if t h e p r i n c i p l e of
t o l e r a n c e a n d f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e h a d n o t b e e n a b l e
to a p p e a l , with g o o d r e a s o n s , to a m o r a l validity independent of relig
i o n a n d metaphysics?
22
Ill
Private and Public A u t o n o m y
T h e o b j e c t i o n s I r a i s e d in t h e first p a r t a g a i n s t t h e d e s i g n of t h e
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d in t h e s e c o n d against t h e assimilation of q u e s
tions of validity to t h o s e of a c c e p t a n c e p o i n t in t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n .
By subjecting rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s to r e a s o n a b l e p r o c e d u r a l
c o n s t r a i n t s , Rawls r e m a i n s d e p e n d e n t o n substantive n o r m a t i v e
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a s s u m p t i o n s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , by t a i l o r i n g a universalistic t h e o r y of
j u s t i c e to q u e s t i o n s of political stability t h r o u g h a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n
sensus, h e c o m p r o m i s e s its e p i s t e m i c status. B o t h strategies a r e p u r
s u e d at t h e cost of a strict p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m . I n c o n t r a s t with
this a p p r o a c h , Rawls c o u l d satisfy m o r e elegantly t h e b u r d e n s of
p r o o f h e i n c u r s with his s t r o n g a n d p r e s u m p t i v e l y n e u t r a l c o n c e p t
of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n if h e d e v e l o p e d his substantive c o n c e p t s a n d
a s s u m p t i o n s o u t of t h e p r o c e d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n .
Injcny^ vigw^_the m o r a l p o i n t of view is a l r e a d y j m p l i c i t in t h e
socio-ontological c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e r j u M i c j g ^ ^
tion, c o m p r i s i n g t h e cojnjjlex r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t k m _ t h a t
p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e "must" a c c e p t (in t h e sense of w e a k
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessity). Rawls believes t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e
d e v e l o p e d in s u c h exclusively p r o c e d u r a l t e r m s c o u l d n o t b e
"sufficiently s t r u c t u r e d . " Since I ^ s u b s c r i b e to a division o f j a b o r
b e t w e e n m o r a l t h e o r y a n d t h e t h e o r y of a c t i o n , I d o n o t r e g a r d this
as a serious r e s e r ^ i B o n r T R ^ c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e c o n t e x t s
of i n t e r a c t i o n to w h i c h q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e refer is n o t
w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of m o r a l t h e o r y . T o g e t h e r with t h e c o n t e n t of
action-conflicts in n e e d of r e s o l u t i o n , a w h o l e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e for
n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is f o r c e d u p o n u s a n e t w o r k of
c o n c e p t s in w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a c t o r s a n d
actions, n o r m - c o n f o r m i n j j _ ^ d ^
behavior, responsibility a n d
a u t o n o m y , a n d even(intersubjectiveiy^ s t r u c t u r e d j n o r a l
feejings)all
find t h e i r p l a c e . E a c h of t h e s e c o n c e p t s d e s e r v e s a p r i o r analysis. If
we t h e n take t h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n in t h e p r o c e d u r a l sense
t h a t Rawls h i m s e l f i n t i m a t e s with his n o t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of
r e a s o n , we c o u l d say t h a t precisely t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e valid t h a t
m e e t with u n c o e r c e d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s
of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . It r e m a i n s as a further, a n d p r i m a r i l y e m p i r i c a l ,
q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n d w h e n s u c h valid p r i n c i p l e s e n s u r e political
stability u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p l u r a l i s m . I n w h a t follows, I a m inter
e s t e d in t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m only with
r e f e r e n c e to a n i m p l i c a t i o n it h a s for t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e consti
t u t i o n a l state.
Liberals h a v e stressed t h e "liberties of t h e m o d e r n s " : liberty of
belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of life, p e r s o n a l liberty, a n d
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p r o p e r t y i n s u m , t h e c o r e of subjective private rights. R e p u b l i c a n

ism, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e f e n d e d t h e "liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s " : t h e
political r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a k e pos
sible t h e citizens' exercise of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . J e a n - J a c q u e s Rous
s e a u a n d K a n t s h a r e d t h e a s p i r a t i o n of d e r i v i n g b o t h e l e m e n t s f r o m
t h e s a m e r o o t , namely, f r o m m o r a l a n d political a u t o n o m y : t h e
liberal r i g h t s m a y n e i t h e r b e m e r e l y foisted o n t h e p r a c t i c e of selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n as extrinsic c o n s t r a i n t s n o r b e m a d e m e r e l y i n s t r u
m e n t a l to its exercise. Rawls, t o o , subscribes to this i n t u i t i o n ;
n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e two-stage c h a r a c t e r of his t h e o r y g e n e r a t e s a p r i o r
ity of liberal r i g h t s t h a t d e m o t e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s t o a n infe
r i o r status.
Rawls certainly p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e i d e a of political a u t o n o m y a n d
m o d e l s it at t h e level of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n : it is r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e
i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s a n d t h e f r a m e w o r k
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t g u a r a n t e e impartiality of j u d g m e n t . B u t this i d e a is
b r o u g h t to b e a r only selectively at t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l level of t h e d e m o
cratic p r o c e d u r e for t h e political will-formation of free a n d e q u a l
citizens f r o m w h i c h it is n o n e t h e l e s s b o r r o w e d . T h e f o r m of political
a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d virtual e x i s t e n c e in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , a n d t h u s
o n t h e first level of t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n , d o e s n o t fully u n f o l d in t h e
h e a r t of t h e justly c o n s t i t u t e d society. F o r t h e h i g h e r t h e veil of
i g n o r a n c e is r a i s e d a n d t h e m o r e Rawls's citizens t h e m s e l v e s take o n
r e a l flesh a n d b l o o d , t h e m o r e d e e p l y they find t h e m s e l v e s subject
to p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o r m s t h a t h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e o r y a n d
have a l r e a d y b e c o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l . I n this
way, t h e t h e o r y d e p r i v e s t h e citizens of t o o m a n y of t h e insights t h a t
t h e y w o u l d h a v e to assimilate a n e w in e a c h g e n e r a t i o n .
F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , t h e act of f o u n d i n g
t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n n o t b e r e p e a t e d u n d e r t h e institu
t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of a n a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d j u s t society, a n d t h e p r o c
ess of realizing t h e system of basic r i g h t s c a n n o t b e a s s u r e d o n a n
o n g o i n g basis. It is n o t possible for t h e citizens to e x p e r i e n c e this
p r o c e s s as o p e n a n d i n c o m p l e t e , as t h e shifting historical cir
cumstances nonetheless d e m a n d . They c a n n o t reignite the radical
d e m o c r a t i c e m b e r s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n in t h e civic life of t h e i r
society, for f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e all of t h e essential d i s c o u r s e s of
70
Chapter 2
legitimation have already taken place within the theory; a n d they

find t h e results of t h e t h e o r y a l r e a d y s e d i m e n t e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n .
B e c a u s e t h e citizens c a n n o t conceive of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n as a project,
t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n d o e s n o t actually h a v e t h e significance of a
p r e s e n t exercise of political a u t o n o m y b u t m e r e l y p r o m o t e s t h e
n o n v i o l e n t preservation of political stability. G r a n t e d , this r e a d i n g d o e s
n o t reflect Rawls's i n t e n t i o n in f o r m u l a t i n g his t h e o r y , b u t if I a m
c o r r e c t it u n c o v e r s o n e of its u n d e s i r e d c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h i s is s h o w n ,
for e x a m p l e , by t h e rigid b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e
n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of t h e citizens. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, this b o u n d
a r y is set by basic liberal r i g h t s w h i c h c o n s t r a i n d e m o c r a t i c self-leg
islation, a n d with it t h e s p h e r e of t h e political, from the beginning, t h a t
is, p r i o r t o all political will-formation.
23
Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in a t h r e e f o l d sense. T h u s far we

h a v e b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with t h e t h e o r e t i c a l m e a n i n g : a c o n c e p t i o n
of j u s t i c e is political a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l w h e n it is n e u t r a l t o w a r d
conflicting worldviews. F u r t h e r , Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in t h e
u s u a l sense to classify m a t t e r s of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , so t h a t political
p h i l o s o p h y limits itself to t h e justification of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e
w o r k a n d t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of society. B o t h m e a n i n g s a r e u l t i m a t e l y
c o m b i n e d in a n i n t e r e s t i n g way in Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of "political
values." "Political" in this t h i r d sense c o n s t i t u t e s a f u n d b o t h for
s h a r e d convictions of citizens a n d for t h e p u r p o s e of d e l i m i t i n g a n
o b j e c t - d o m a i n . Rawls treats t h e political value s p h e r e , w h i c h is dis
t i n g u i s h e d in m o d e r n societies f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l value s p h e r e s , as
s o m e t h i n g given, a l m o s t in t h e m a n n e r of a n e o - K a n t i a n like M a x
Weber. F o r only with r e f e r e n c e to political values, w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y
b e , c a n h e split t h e m o r a l p e r s o n i n t o t h e p u b l i c identity of a citizen
a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t y of a private p e r s o n s h a p e d by his o r h e r
i n d i v i d u a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h e s e two i d e n t i t i e s t h e n consti
t u t e t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s for two d o m a i n s , t h e o n e c o n s t i t u t e d by
r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e o t h e r p r o
t e c t e d by basic liberal rights. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e
private s p h e r e in this way enjoys p r i o r i t y while t h e "role of t h e
political liberties is . . . largely i n s t r u m e n t a l in p r e s e r v i n g t h e o t h e r
l i b e r t i e s . " T h u s with r e f e r e n c e to t h e political value s p h e r e a p r e political d o m a i n of liberties is d e l i m i t e d w h i c h is w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h e
r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation.
24
71
B u t s u c h a n a p r i o r i b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n
o m y n o t o n l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e r e p u b l i c a n i n t u i t i o n t h a t p o p u l a r sov
e r e i g n t y a n d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e s a m e r o o t ; it also
conflicts with historical e x p e r i e n c e , a b o v e all with t h e fact t h a t t h e
historically shifting b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c
s p h e r e s h a s always b e e n p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of
v i e w . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e welfare state shows t h a t
t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens
are* in flux a n d t h a t s u c h differentiations m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d to t h e
political will-formation of t h e citizens if t h e latter a r e to h a v e t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s s a legal claim to t h e "fair v a l u e " of t h e i r liberties.
A t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n take b e t t e r a c c o u n t of this c i r c u m s t a n c e if
it differentiates t h e "political" in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c r i t e r i o n of
"legal r e g u l a t i o n " ( m e n t i o n e d only in p a s s i n g by Rawls). It is ulti
m a t e l y by m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law t h a t t h e life of a
political c o m m u n i t y is legitimately r e g u l a t e d (PL 2 1 5 ) . T h e basic
q u e s t i o n t h e n is: W h i c h r i g h t s m u s t free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s m u t u a l l y
a c c o r d o n e a n o t h e r if they wish to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e by t h e
l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law?
A c c o r d i n g to K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of legality, coercive law e x t e n d s only
to t h e e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d a d d r e s s e s t h e f r e e d o m
of c h o i c e of subjects w h o a r e allowed t o follow t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n
of t h e g o o d . H e n c e m o d e r n law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e
status of legal subjects in t e r m s of a c t i o n a b l e subjective liberties t h a t
m a y b e e x e r c i s e d by e a c h a c c o r d i n g to h e r o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . Since
it m u s t also b e possible to o b e y a legal o r d e r for m o r a l r e a s o n s , t h e
status of private legal subjects is legitimately d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r i g h t
to equal subjective l i b e r t i e s . As positive o r codified law, o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , this m e d i u m calls for a political legislator, w h e r e t h e legiti
m a c y of legislation is a c c o u n t e d for by a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e t h a t
s e c u r e s t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e citizens. Citizens a r e politically a u t o n o
m o u s only if t h e y c a n view t h e m s e l v e s as t h e j o i n t a u t h o r s of t h e laws
to w h i c h t h e y a r e subject as i n d i v i d u a l a d d r e s s e e s .
T h e dialectical r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y b e
c o m e s clear in light of t h e fact t h a t t h e status of s u c h d e m o c r a t i c
citizens e q u i p p e d with l a w m a k i n g c o m p e t e n c e s c a n b e institutional
ized in t u r n only by m e a n s of coercive law. B u t b e c a u s e this law is
d i r e c t e d to p e r s o n s w h o c o u l d n o t even a s s u m e t h e status of legal
25
26
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Chapter 2
subjects w i t h o u t subjective private rights, private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n

o m y of citizens mutually p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . As we h a v e s e e n ,
b o t h e l e m e n t s a r e a l r e a d y i n t e r w o v e n in t h e c o n c e p t of positive a n d
coercive law: t h e r e c a n b e n o law at all w i t h o u t a c t i o n a b l e subjective
liberties t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e private a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l legal
subjects, a n d n o l e g i t i m a t e law w i t h o u t collective d e m o c r a t i c law
m a k i n g by citizens w h o , as free a n d e q u a l , a r e e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e
in this p r o c e s s . O n c e t h e c o n c e p t of law h a s b e e n clarified in this
way it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e of basic liberal
r i g h t s is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d in t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l e m e d i u m for t h e legal
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n of sovereign citizens.
T h e m a i n objects of f u r t h e r analysis a r e t h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e of a discursive p r o c e s s of o p i n
ion- a n d will-formation in w h i c h t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n is m a n i
fested. I c a n n o t discuss this a l t e r n a t i v e in g r e a t e r detail in t h e
present context.
2 7
S u c h a p r o c e d u r a l m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is at t h e s a m e t i m e b o t h
m o r e a n d less m o d e s t t h a n Rawls's t h e o r y . It is m o r e m o d e s t i n t h a t
it focuses exclusively o n t h e p r o c e d u r a l aspects of t h e p u b l i c u s e of
r e a s o n a n d derives t h e system of r i g h t s f r o m t h e i d e a of its legal
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . It c a n leave m o r e q u e s t i o n s o p e n ^because it
e n t r u s t s m o r e t o t h e process of r a t i o n a l o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation.
P h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d e r s different t h e o r e t i c a l b u r d e n s when* as o n
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , it claims to e l a b o r a t e t h e i d e a of a j u s t society,
while t h e citizens t h e n u s e this i d e a as a p l a t f o r m f r o m w h i c h to
j u d g e existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies. By c o n t r a s t , I p r o p o s e t h a t
phi^^
clarification of t h e m o r a J p o i n t of view
a n d j h g ^ r j r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c l ^ i t i m a t i p i y t o t h e analysis of t h e
c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l discourses a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n this m o r e
mocTesFrole^ p h i l o s o p h y n e e d n o t p r o c e e d in a c o n s t r u c t i v e , b u t
only in a reconstructive fashion. It leaves substantial q u e s t i o n s t h a t
m u s t b e a n s w e r e c T h e r e a n d n o w to t h e m o r e o r less e n l i g h t e n e d
e n g a g e m e n t of p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s
m<^
p u b l i c d e b a t e , t h o u g h in t h e r o l e of
B u t Rawls insists o n a m o d e s t y of a different k i n d . H e w a n t s to
e x t e n d t h e " m e t h o d of a v o i d a n c e , " w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to l e a d to a n
73
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c U s e of R e a s o n
o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s o n q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e , to t h e p h i l o
s o p h i c a l e n t e r p r i s e . H e h o p e s to d e v e l o p political p h i l o s o p h y i n t o a
sharply f o c u s e d discipline a n d t h e r e b y avoid m o s t of t h e c o n t r o v e r
sial q u e s t i o n s of a m o r e g e n e r a l n a t u r e . T h i s a v o i d a n c e strategy c a n
l e a d t o a n impressively self-contained theory, as we c a n see f r o m t h e
w o n d e r f u l e x a m p l e b e f o r e us. B u t even Rawls c a n n o t d e v e l o p his
t h e o r y in as " f r e e s t a n d i n g " a fashion as h e w o u l d like. As we have
s e e n , his "political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " draws h i m willy-nilly i n t o a dis
p u t e c o n c e r n i n g c o n c e p t s of rationality a n d t r u t h . H i s c o n c e p t of
t h e ^ p e r s o n as well^QverstepsJte b o u n d a r i e s o f j D q l i t ^
T h e s e a n d o t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s involve h i m in as
m a n y l o n g - r u n n i n g a n d still u n r e s o l v e d d e b a t e s . T h e subject m a t t e r
itself, it s e e m s to m e , m a k e s a p r e s u m p t u o u s e n c r o a c h m e n t o n
n e i g h b o r i n g fields often u n a v o i d a b l e a n d at t i m e s even fruitful.
3
9
"Reasonable" versus "True/ or the Morality of

Worldviews
J o h n Rawls claims t h a t his i d e a of 'justice as fairness" is a "freestand

i n g " c o n c e p t i o n : it is s u p p o s e d to "move entirely w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n
of t h e political" a n d "leave p h i l o s o p h y as it is." T h e g o a l a n d feasi
bility of this strategy of a v o i d a n c e d e p e n d o n h o w we u n d e r s t a n d t h e
t e r m "political." Rawls uses it in t h e first p l a c e to specify t h e object
d o m a i n of a political t h e o r y t h a t deals with t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e
a n d basic s t r u c t u r e of a ( m o d e r n ) society. T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l e l e m e n t
in t h e c h o i c e of basic c o n c e p t s is n e v e r b e y o n d controversy; b u t o n c e
a t h e o r y d e m o n s t r a t e s its utility s u c h discussions lose t h e i r p o i n t .
However, a s e c o n d a n d less trivial u s e of t h e t e r m " p o l i t i c a l " in
c o n t r a s t with "metaphysical"leads to c o n t r o v e r s i e s t h a t c a n n o t b e
so easily r e s o l v e d .
1
Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in c o n t r a s t with "metaphysical" to

c h a r a c t e r i z e t h o s e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e t h a t satisfy a n essential
r e q u i r e m e n t of liberalism: n e u t r a l i t y t o w a r d c o m p e t i n g worldviews
o r " c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . " W i t h t h e t e r m "political" Rawls h e r e
associates a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of neutrality: "it m e a n s t h a t we
m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n h o w a political c o n c e p t i o n is p r e s e n t e d
a n d its b e i n g p a r t of, o r derivable within, a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c
t r i n e . " T h e k i n d of n e u t r a l i t y t h a t defines t h e "political" c h a r a c t e r
of 'justice as fairness" is e x p l a i n e d by its b e i n g able to b e p r e s e n t e d
as "freestanding." A n d this status is e x p l a i n e d in t u r n by o n e of t h e
m o s t striking a s s u m p t i o n s of Rawls's t h e o r y : "I a s s u m e all citizens to
affirm a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e to w h i c h t h e political c o n c e p t i o n
2
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they a c c e p t is in s o m e way r e l a t e d . B u t a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of a
political c o n c e p t i o n is t h a t it is . . . e x p o u n d e d a p a r t from, o r with
o u t r e f e r e n c e to, a n y s u c h w i d e r b a c k g r o u n d . . . . [ T ] h e political
c o n c e p t i o n is a m o d u l e . . . t h a t fits i n t o a n d c a n b e s u p p o r t e d by
various r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t e n d u r e in t h e so
ciety r e g u l a t e d by it" (PL 12).
I n this s e c o n d m e a n i n g , t h e t e r m "political" d o e s n o t refer to a
specific subject m a t t e r b u t to t h e p e c u l i a r e p i s t e m i c status to w h i c h
political c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e s h o u l d aspire: t h e y s h o u l d b e able to
f o r m a c o h e r e n t p a r t of various c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . I n addi
t i o n t h e y c a n b e justified only w i t h i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e ,
a l t h o u g h they c a n b e c o n c e i v e d a n d " e x p o u n d e d " t h a t is, i n t r o
d u c e d in a p l a u s i b l e m a n n e r i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any worldview.
Rawls's "political liberalism" also aspires to t h e status of a freestand
i n g t h e o r y . Since this status itself r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e
t h e o r y , " f r e e s t a n d i n g " in this c o n t e x t h a s a d o u b l e r e f e r e n c e . O n t h e
o n e h a n d , it specifies a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of all c o n c e p t i o n s of
j u s t i c e t h a t qualify as c a n d i d a t e s for i n c l u s i o n in a n " o v e r l a p p i n g
c o n s e n s u s . " At t h e s a m e t i m e t h e p r e d i c a t e " f r e e s t a n d i n g " is sup
p o s e d to apply to t h e v e r y t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s it: 'justice as fairness"
is o n e of t h e m o s t p r o m i s i n g a m o n g t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s . T h i s selfr e f e r e n t i a l u s e of " f r e e s t a n d i n g " c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a political
claim: Rawls a s s u m e s t h a t his o w n t h e o r y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of "gen
eral a n d w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m " p r o v i d e s a basis o n w h i c h t h e
m e m b e r s of c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n (or any o t h e r m o d e r n ) civil
society c o u l d achieve a basic political a g r e e m e n t .
3
Less plausible, however, is Rawls's b u r d e n i n g of t h e self-referential

u s e of " f r e e s t a n d i n g " with a f u r t h e r claim of a different, t h e o r e t i c a l
k i n d . H e s e e m s to t h i n k t h a t a t h e o r y t h a t is f r e e s t a n d i n g in t h e
political d o m a i n will b e f r e e s t a n d i n g in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o m a i n as
well a n d will steer clear of all c o n t r o v e r s i a l m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m s
"leaving p h i l o s o p h y as it is." B u t it is h a r d to see h o w Rawls c a n
e x p l a i n t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g political c o n c e p t i o n ,
w i t h o u t t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s w h i c h , while
n o t falling u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y of t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , n e v e r t h e l e s s
r e a c h well b e y o n d t h e d o m a i n of t h e political.
T h e t e r m "metaphysical" a c q u i r e s its special m e a n i n g w i t h i n t h e
t h e o r y f r o m its o p p o s i t i o n to t h e t e r m "political." I n m o d e r n socie-
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"Reasonable" versus "True"
ties a c o n s e n s u s o n p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e t h a t is n e u t r a l with r e s p e c t
to worldviews, a n d h e n c e inclusive, is r e q u i r e d in view of religious
a n d c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m . A t h e o r y t h a t a i m s even t o foster s u c h a
c o n s e n s u s m u s t certainly b e "political a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l " in this
sense. B u t it d o e s n o t follow t h a t political t h e o r y c a n itself m o v e
entirely w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of t h e political (R 133) a n d s t e e r clear of
s t u b b o r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l controversies. P h i l o s o p h y c a n m o v e b e y o n d
t h e d o m a i n of t h e political in different d i r e c t i o n s . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
e n t e r p r i s e is ihstitutionally f r a m e d in t e r m s of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h
for t h e t r u t h a n d is n o t necessarily i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to m e t a p h y s i c s
(as c o n c e i v e d in Political Liberalism). If t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n c e p t i o n involves u s in n o n p o litical q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g r e a s o n a n d t r u t h , this d o e s n o t n e c e s
sarily m e a n t h a t we m u s t e n g a g e with m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m s a n d
controversies. T h e following investigation seeks to illustrate this
p o i n t in a n i n d i r e c t , so to speak, p e r f o r m a t i v e way. It will a t t e m p t to
clarify explicitly t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e ( w h e r e " f r e e s t a n d i n g " is u n d e r s t o o d in a n u n p r o b l e m a t i c ,
political s e n s e ) .
I w a n t to e x a m i n e h o w Rawls's division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e
political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , w h i c h is r e f l e c t e d in a p e c u l i a r d e
p e n d e n c e of t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " o n t h e " t r u e , " actually works. It is far
f r o m o b v i o u s why publicly d e f e n s i b l e a n d a c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s
s h o u l d only s u p p o r t t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of a political c o n c e p t i o n ,
while n o n p u b l i c a n d actor-relative r e a s o n s s h o u l d b e sufficient to
establish t h e s t r o n g a n d a u t o c h t h o n o u s claim to m o r a l " t r u t h . "
Rawls's g e n e r o u s a n d d e t a i l e d reply to m y tentative r e m a r k s clarifies
a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s t h e "kinds of justification" t h a t a r e s u p p o s e d t o
l e a d to a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . I n t h e light of t h e s e e l u c i d a t i o n s
I will a r g u e t h a t r e a s o n a b l e citizens c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d to d e v e l o p
a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s so l o n g as t h e y a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m j o i n t l y
a d o p t i n g a m o r a l p o i n t of view i n d e p e n d e n t of, a n d p r i o r to, t h e
various p e r s p e c t i v e s they individually a d o p t f r o m w i t h i n e a c h of t h e i r
c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . T h e n o t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s is e i t h e r so
e t i o l a t e d t h a t it is t o o w e a k to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e m o d e of validity of
a n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d c o n c e p t i o n of political j u s t i c e , o r it
is d e f i n e d in sufficiently s t r o n g t e r m s , in w h i c h case w h a t is practi
cally r e a s o n a b l e is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m w h a t is m o r a l l y r i g h t . I will
4
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Chapter 3
try to show why Rawls c a n n o t u l t i m a t e l y avoid giving full w e i g h t t o

r e q u i r e m e n t s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t constrain r a t i o n a l c o m p r e h e n
sive d o c t r i n e s r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y reflect t h e i r felicitous o v e r l a p p i n g .
Before I e n t e r medias in res I will c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e c h a l l e n g e of t h e
m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n to w h i c h t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e c a n n o t avoid r e s p o n d
i n g ( 1 ) . T h e n I will offer a necessarily b r i e f s k e t c h of t h e p h i l o s o p h i
cal m o v e f r o m H o b b e s to K a n t ( 2 ) , for this f o r m s t h e b a c k g r o u n d
for Rawls's a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h ( 3 ) . I n t h e m a i n p a r t of t h e essay I
will analyze t h e division of t h e b u r d e n s of justification b e t w e e n t h e
" r e a s o n a b l e " c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e a n d t h e "morally t r u e " worldviews ( 4 ) , b e f o r e discussing difficulties t h a t this p o s e s for t h e
justification of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s ( 5 ) . Finally, I will offer
a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t of a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e "public
u s e of r e a s o n " w h i c h is closer to K a n t ( 6 ) . If political j u s t i c e is
u n d e r s t o o d i n this way, d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation a s s u m e s t h e posi
t i o n o c c u p i e d by t h e negative liberties in Political Liberalism. W i t h
this t h e a c c e n t shifts in favor of K a n t i a n R e p u b l i c a n i s m ( 7 ) .
5
T h e M o d e r n Condition
Political liberalism p r o v i d e s a r e s p o n s e to t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e
fact of p l u r a l i s m . It is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e possibility of
a c h i e v i n g a c o n s e n s u s o n political essentials w h i c h g r a n t s e q u a l free
d o m s to all citizens w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e , t h e i r
religious convictions, o r t h e i r individual lifestyles. T h e r e q u i r e d c o n
sensus o n issues of political j u s t i c e c a n n o l o n g e r b e b a s e d o n a
settled t r a d i t i o n a l e t h o s t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e w h o l e of society. Yet
m e m b e r s of m o d e r n societies still s h a r e t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e y
c a n live t o g e t h e r u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of fair a n d peaceful c o o p e r a t i o n .
I n spite of t h e lack of a substantive c o n s e n s u s o n values r o o t e d in a
socially a c c e p t e d worldview, they c o n t i n u e to a p p e a l to m o r a l c o n
victions a n d n o r m s t h a t e a c h of t h e m t h i n k s e v e r y o n e else s h o u l d
a c c e p t . P e o p l e c o n t i n u e to d e b a t e m o r a l q u e s t i o n s with r e a s o n s t h e y
t a k e t o b e c o m p e l l i n g , r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r a m e r e m o d u s vivendi
w o u l d b e sufficient for c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e y e n g a g e in m o r a l dis
c o u r s e s in everyday life as well as in politics, m o s t especially in
d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h e s e discourses p e r -
79
sist, e v e n t h o u g h it is n o t clear w h e t h e r m o r a l d i s p u t e s c a n still b e

settled by a r g u m e n t s . Citizens tacitly a t t r i b u t e to e a c h o t h e r a m o r a l
sense o r a sense of j u s t i c e o p e r a t i n g across t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n
different worldviews, while at t h e s a m e t i m e they l e a r n to t o l e r a t e
t h e s e differences in o u t l o o k as s o u r c e s of r e a s o n a b l e ethical
disagreements.
Rawls r e s p o n d s to t h e s e f e a t u r e s of t h e m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n with a
constructivist p r o p o s a l to d e v e l o p a sufficiently n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n
of j u s t i c e a r o u y d w h i c h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s a m o n g citizens
with different religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l o u t l o o k s c a n crystallize. I n
g e n e r a l , m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d political t h e o r i s t s have felt t h a t
t h e i r task is to p r o v i d e a c o n v i n c i n g substitute for t r a d i t i o n a l
justifications of n o r m s a n d p r i n c i p l e s . I n t r a d i t i o n a l societies m o r a l
ity was a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t of o n t o l o g i c a l o r soteriological worldviews t h a t c o u l d c o m m a n d p u b l i c a c c e p t a n c e . M o r a l n o r m s a n d
p r i n c i p l e s w e r e viewed as e l e m e n t s of a r a t i o n a l " o r d e r of t h i n g s "
i m b u e d with value o r as p a r t of a n e x e m p l a r y way of life l e a d i n g to
salvation. O f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h a t t h e s e
"realistic" e x p l a n a t i o n s w e r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e assertoric m o d e of
s t a t e m e n t s e x p r e s s i n g t r u t h claims. However, with t h e p u b l i c devalu
a t i o n of religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d with t h e rise of
t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences, n o r m a t i v e state
m e n t s h a v e b e c o m e m o r e sharply d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m descriptive
s t a t e m e n t s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d f r o m value j u d g m e n t s a n d e x p r e s
sive u t t e r a n c e s o n t h e o t h e r . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g o n e ' s p o s i t i o n o n t h e
issue of "is" a n d " o u g h t , " with t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o m o d e r n i t y t h e "ob
j e c t i v e " r e a s o n e m b o d i e d in n a t u r e o r s a c r e d h i s t o r y was d i s p l a c e d
by t h e "subjective" r e a s o n of t h e h u m a n m i n d . W i t h this t h e r e a r o s e
t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s r e t a i n a n y cognitive
c o n t e n t a n d , if so, h o w t h e y c a n b e justified.
T h i s q u e s t i o n p o s e s a p a r t i c u l a r c h a l l e n g e for t h o s e w h o (like
Rawls a n d myself) reject b o t h m o r a l r e a l i s m a n d m o d e r n valueskepticism. T h e m u t u a l a t t r i b u t i o n of a capacity for m o r a l j u d g m e n t
w h i c h w e o b s e r v e in everyday life calls for a k i n d of e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t
d o e s n o t flady d e n y t h e r e a s o n a b l e c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l a r g u m e n t s .
T h a t m o r a l d i s p u t e s persist says s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e u n d e r l y i n g
s t r u c t u r e of a social life t h a t is s h o t t h r o u g h with trivial validity
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claims. T h e social i n t e g r a t i o n of everyday life d e p e n d s largely o n

communicative practices oriented toward m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
b a s e d o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of fallible claims to validity.
A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d , t h e p r e m i s e with w h i c h H o b b e s s o u g h t
to l e a d practical p h i l o s o p h y o u t of its d e a d e n d d o e s n o t a p p e a r
especially plausible. H e w a n t e d to r e d u c e practical r e a s o n to instru
m e n t a l r e a s o n . I n d e e d , to this very day t h e r e a r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d ap
p r o a c h e s in t h e H o b b e s i a n c o n t r a c t u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n t h a t conceive of
m o r a l r e a s o n s as r a t i o n a l motives a n d r e d u c e m o r a l j u d g m e n t to
r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . T h e social c o n t r a c t is s u p p o s e d to p r o v i d e a p r o c e
d u r e for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t b a s e d solely o n t h e e n l i g h t e n e d selfi n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s n e e d only c o n
sider w h e t h e r it is a d v a n t a g e o u s o r r a t i o n a l for t h e m in l i g h t of t h e i r
desires a n d p r e f e r e n c e s t o a d o p t a r u l e of a c t i o n o r a system of s u c h
r u l e s . B u t it is well k n o w n t h a t this strategy misses t h e specific obliga
tory force of b i n d i n g n o r m s a n d valid m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s , as is s h o w n
by t h e p r o b l e m of t h e free rider. I will simply cite in p a s s i n g T h o m a s
S c a n l o n ' s a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t utilitarianism: " T h e r i g h t - m a k i n g force
of a p e r s o n ' s desires is specified by w h a t m i g h t b e called a c o n c e p
t i o n of m o r a l l y l e g i t i m a t e interests. S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n is a p r o d u c t
of m o r a l a r g u m e n t ; it is n o t given, as t h e n o t i o n of individual wellb e i n g m a y b e , simply by t h e i d e a of w h a t it is r a t i o n a l for a n individ
u a l to d e s i r e . " B u t if t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s
c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality, to w h a t
c o n c e p t i o n of practical r e a s o n m u s t we t h e n a p p e a l ?
6
From H o b b e s to Kant
H e r e we a r e faced with t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e decisive

i m p u l s e for Rawls's t h e o r e t i c a l i n n o v a t i o n : we c a n e i t h e r follow t h e
p a t h l e a d i n g f r o m H o b b e s to K a n t a n d d e v e l o p a n o t i o n of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n t h a t in s o m e way p r e s e r v e s t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of m o r a l
j t a t e m e n t s , o r we c a n fall b a c k o n c e a g a i n o n t h e ( " % r o n g " t r a d i t i o n s 2)
a n d " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " d o c t r i n e s t h a t g r o u n d t h e t r u t h of t h e m o r a l
c o n c e p t i o n s e m b e d d e d in t h e m . W h i c h e v e r r o u t e we take we e n
c o u n t e r obstacles. If we take t h e f o r m e r , we h a v e to d i s t i n g u i s h
practical r e a s o n clearly f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n , b u t in s u c h a way
81
that it does not completely lose its cognitive force; if we take the
latter, we have to cope with the irreducible plurality of worldviews
that are held to be true within each of the corresponding commu
nities of believers, although everyone knows that only one of them
can be true. _
^ I n (the K a n t i a n tracEtio^ practical reason provides the perspective
from which moral norms and principles can be judged in an impar
tial manner. T h i s "moral point of view" has been explained in terms
of various principles or procedures, be it the categorical imperative
or G. H . M e a d ' s ideal role-taking, Scanlon's rule of argumentation
or Rawls's construction of an original position that imposes suitable
constraints on the rational choice of participants. E a c h of these
different designs is intended to yield an agreement or an under
standing that satisfies our intuitions concerning equal respect and
mutual solidarity with everybody. Since the principles and norms
selected in this way claim universal recognition, a procedurally cor
rect agreement must be "rationally motivated" in an epistemic sense.
T h e reasons that bear on the outcome must carry an epistemic
weight and may not simply express what it is rational for a particular
person to do in light of her existing preferences.
O n e way to capture the epistemic character of practical delibera
tions is through a precise description of how, from a moral point of
view, individual interests that provide the i n p u t for deliberation in
the form of rational motives change their role and meaning in the
course of argumentation. I n practical discourses, only those interests
"count" for the outcome that are presented as intersubjectively rec
ognized values and hence are candidates for inclusion in the semantic
content of valid norms. O n l y generalizable value-orientations, which
all participants (and all those affected) can accept with good reasons
as appropriate for regulating the subject matter at hand, and which
can thereby acquire binding normative force, pass this threshold. A n
"interest" can be described as a "value-orientation" when it is shared
by other members of a community in similar situations. T h u s an
interest only deserves consideration from the moral point of view
once it is stripped of its intrinsic relation to a first person perspec
tive. O n c e it is translated into an intersubjectively shared evaluative
vocabulary, it is n o longer tied to contingent desires and preferences
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Chapter 3
a n d c a n achieve, as a c a n d i d a t e for v a l u e - g e n e r a l i z a t i o n in m o r a l
justification, t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a n a r g u m e n t . W h a t e n t e r s dis
c o u r s e as a d e s i r e o r p r e f e r e n c e survives t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n test only
u n d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of a value t h a t a p p e a r s to b e g e n e r a l l y accept
a b l e to all p a r t i c i p a n t s as a basis for r e g u l a t i n g t h e r e l e v a n t m a t t e r .
L e t us a s s u m e t h a t p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n c a n b e analyzed as a f o r m
of a r g u m e n t a t i o n different f r o m b o t h r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d factstating d i s c o u r s e . A p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n w o u l d t h e n
p r o v i d e a suitable basis for d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n distinct f r o m b o t h i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n . We
w o u l d t h e r e b y p r e s e r v e a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g for o u g h t s e n t e n c e s
w i t h o u t assimilating t h e m t o assertoric s e n t e n c e s o r r e d u c i n g t h e i r
validity to i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. However, t h e analogy b e t w e e n
t r u t h a n d n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s t h a t r e m a i n s i n t a c t w o u l d certainly
give rise to f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . We c o u l d n o m o r e avoid b e i n g d r a w n
i n t o t h e familiar d e b a t e s c o n c e r n i n g s e m a n t i c a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n
c e p t i o n s of t r u t h a n d justification t h a n i n t o t h e discussions a b o u t
t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d validity, t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d r o l e of
a r g u m e n t s , t h e logic, p r o c e d u r e , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of
a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . We w o u l d h a v e to d e a l with t h e p r o b
l e m of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e social w o r l d a n d t h e objective a n d
subjective w o r l d s a n d w o u l d u n a v o i d a b l y b e d r a w n i n t o l o n g r u n n i n g d e b a t e s a b o u t rationality. H e n c e Rawls h a s g o o d r e a s o n s to
try to avoid discussions of this k i n d e v e n if o n e d o e s n o t classify
t h e s e c o n t r o v e r s i e s i m m e d i a t e l y as "metaphysical."
Q n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e t h e r t h e a v o i d a n c e strategy of m a k i n g a
c l e a n s e p a r a t i o n of t h e political f r o m t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l c a n m e e t with
success is a different q u e s t i o n . Rawls initially followed t h e straight
f o r w a r d K a n t i a n strategy; in A Theory of Justice he set h i m s e l f t h e task
of e x p l i c a t i n g t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" in t e r m s of t h e o r i g i n a l
p o s i t i o n . However, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of 'justice as fairness" was in
f o r m e d by a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n e m b o d i e d in t h e two
" h i g h e r capacities" of m o r a l p e r s o n s . Rawls d e v e l o p e d this "Kantian
c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " f u r t h e r in t h e Dewey L e c t u r e s a n d this a p p r o a c h
still leaves its traces in t h e t h i r d c h a p t e r of Political Liberalism. B u t
this b o o k r e p r e s e n t s a shift to a n entirely n e w f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n
w h i c h r e a s o n loses its c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n . Practical r e a s o n is r o b b e d of
8
83
its m o r a l c o r e a n d is d e f l a t e d to a r e a s o n a b l e n e s s t h a t b e c o m e s
d e p e n d e n t o n m o r a l t r u t h s justified o t h e r w i s e . T h e m o r a l validity of
c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e is n o w n o l o n g e r g r o u n d e d in a universally
b i n d i n g practical r e a s o n b u t in t h e lucky c o n v e r g e n c e of r e a s o n a b l e
worldviews w h o s e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s o v e r l a p to a sufficient d e g r e e .
However, t h e r e m n a n t s of t h e o r i g i n a l c o n c e p t i o n c a n n o t b e seam
lessly i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e c u r r e n t t h e o r y
Two conflicting justification p r o g r a m s clash in Political Liberalism.
T h e i d e a of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s involves a decisive w e a k e n i n g
of t h e r a t i o n a l claim of t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I n w h a t
follows, I will first o u t l i n e t h e n e w division of t h e b u r d e n s of justifica
t i o n b e t w e e n t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of political j u s t i c e a n d t h e " t r u t h "
of worldviews a n d will t h e n e x a m i n e c e r t a i n i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w h i c h
suggest t h a t Rawls hesitates to s u b o r d i n a t e practical r e a s o n to t h e
m o r a l i t y of worldviews to t h e e x t e n t called for by his favored alter
native to K a n t i a n a p p r o a c h e s .
3
T h e Alternative to Kantian Proceduralism
A n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s o c c u r s " w h e n all t h e r e a s o n a b l e m e m b e r s
of political society c a r r y o u t a justification of t h e s h a r e d political
c o n c e p t i o n by e m b e d d i n g it in t h e i r several r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n
sive views" (R 1 4 3 ) . T h u s Rawls advocates a division of l a b o r b e t w e e n
t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l t h a t l e a d s to a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
what all citizens c a n a g r e e u p o n a n d the reasons for t h e i r individually
a c c e p t i n g it as t r u e . T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s precisely two
perspectives: e a c h citizen c o m b i n e s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a p a r t i c i p a n t <
with t h a t of a n observer. O b s e r v e r s c a n d e s c r i b e w h a t h a p p e n s in
t h e political r e a l m , for e x a m p l e , t h a t a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s h a s
o c c u r r e d . T h e y c a n see t h a t this a g r e e m e n t is t h e r e s u l t of t h e
successful o v e r l a p p i n g of t h e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s of different relig
ious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews a n d t h a t it c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e stabil
ity of t h e c o m m u n i t y . B u t in t h e objectifying a t t i t u d e of o b s e r v e r s ,
citizens c a n n o t p e n e t r a t e e a c h o t h e r s ' worldviews a n d j u d g e t h e i r
t r u t h c o n t e n t f r o m t h e i n t e r n a l p e r s p e c t i v e p e c u l i a r to e a c h . B o u n d
by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of factual d i s c o u r s e , t h e y c a n n o t take a s t a n d o n
w h a t c o m m i t t e d p a r t i c i p a n t s claim to b e t r u e , r i g h t , a n d valuable
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Chapter 3
f r o m t h e i r first p e r s o n perspectives. If citizens w a n t to raise claims

a b o u t w h a t is m o r a l l y t r u e or, m o r e generally, a b o u t " c o n c e p t i o n s of
w h a t is of value in h u m a n life" (PL 175), t h e y h a v e to shift to t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e i n s c r i b e d in t h e i r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c
t r i n e . F o r thick c o m p r e h e n s i v e worldviews a r e t h e only s o u r c e of
r e a s o n s for justifying m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s a n d value j u d g m e n t s . M o r a l
r e a s o n s for a p r e s u m p t i v e l y s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a r e by
definition nonpublic.
A citizen c a n c o n v i n c e h e r s e l f of t h e t r u t h of a c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e suitable for e v e r y b o d y only f r o m w i t h i n h e r o w n i n t e r p r e t i v e
f r a m e w o r k . S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s its suitability to serve
as a s h a r e d p l a t f o r m for a public justification of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essen
tials by t h e fact t h a t it m e e t s with t h e a g r e e m e n t of all p a r t i c i p a n t s
o n t h e basis of nonpublic r e a s o n s . O n l y t h e lucky c o n v e r g e n c e of t h e
differently m o t i v a t e d n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s c a n g e n e r a t e t h e p u b l i c
validity o r " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of t h e c o n t e n t of this " o v e r l a p p i n g con
s e n s u s " t h a t e v e r y o n e accepts. A g r e e m e n t in c o n c l u s i o n s results f r o m
p r e m i s e s r o o t e d in different o u t l o o k s . It is significant for t h e d e s i g n
of t h e t h e o r y as a w h o l e t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n only register this
c o n v e r g e n c e as a social fact: " T h e e x p r e s s c o n t e n t s of t h e s e d o c t r i n e s
h a v e n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c justification" (R 144)^ At this stage
Rawls d o e s n o t allow his citizens a t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e in a d d i t i o n to
t h a t of t h e o b s e r v e r a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s . Before a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n
sus is e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e is n o p u b l i c , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v d y ^ s h a r e d p e r s p e c
tive f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens c o u l d m a k e ^ i n h e r e n t l y ) i m p a r t i a l
j u d g m e n t s . T h e citizens a r e d e n i e d t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" f r o m
w h i c h t h e y c o u l d d e v e l o p a n d justify a political c o n c e p t i o n in joint
public deliberation. W h a t Rawls calls t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " p r e s u p
p o s e s t h e s h a r e d p l a t f o r m of a n a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d political c o n s e n s u s
o n f u n d a m e n t a l s . T h e citizens c a n avail t h e m s e l v e s of this p l a t f o r m
only post festum, t h a t is, as a consequence of t h e e m e r g i n g "overlap" of
t h e i r different b a c k g r o u n d convictions: "Only w h e n t h e r e is a rea
s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s c a n political society's political c o n U
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e be publicly . . . j u s t i f i e d " (R 144, m y e m p h a s i s ) .

T h e m o d e l for t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e political
a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l is p r o v i d e d by a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e m o d e r n
c o n d i t i o n f r o m a "believer's" p o i n t of view, t h a t is, f r o m t h e "meta-
85
physical" side. T h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e

m e t a p h y s i c a l reflects t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n public ag
nosticism a n d privatized r e l i g i o u s faith, b e t w e e n t h e c o l o r b l i n d n e s s
of t h e n e u t r a l state t o w a r d r e l i g i o u s confessions a n d t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g
force of worldviews t h a t c o m p e t e for t h e " T r u t h " in t h e e m p h a t i c
sense. T h e m o r a l t r u t h s t h a t a r e still e m b e d d e d ir^ r e l i g i o u s o r
m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews s h a r e this s t r o n g claim t o t r u t h , w h e r e a s t h e
fact of p l u r a l i s m reveals at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e
d o c t r i n e s n o l o n g e r a d m i t of p u b l i c justification.
T h e i n g e n i o u s division of t h e b u r d e n s of justification relieves
political p h i l o s o p h y of t h e t r o u b l i n g task of p r o v i d i n g a substitute
for t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l justification of m o r a l t r u t h s . T h o u g h s t r u c k
from t h e p u b l i c a g e n d a , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l n e v e r t h e l e s s r e m a i n s t h e
u l t i m a t e g r o u n d of t h e validity of w h a t is m o r a l l y r i g h t a n d ethically
g o o d . Th^rjolitical s p h e r e , by c o n t r a s t , is d e p r i v e d of a n y s o u r c e of
validity of its o w n . T h e innovative i d e a of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s "
p r e s e r v e s a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n betwejejgLr^
m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s i of, worldviews, t h o u g h with t h e proviso t h a t this
r e l a t i o n c a n o n l y b e g r a s p e d by t h e m o r a l i t y of worldviews a n d h e n c e
r e m a i n s publicly inaccessible: "it is u p to e a c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e
to say h o w its i d e a of t h e r e a s o n a b l e c o n n e c t s with its c o n c e p t of
t r u t h " (PL 9 4 ) . T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e c o n v e r g i n g
m o r a l s e g m e n t s of t h e d i v e r g i n g totalities of w h a t e a c h citizen h o l d s
to b e t r u e . F r o m a n o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e n o b o d y c a n k n o w w h i c h
of t h e c o m p e t i n g belief systems, if any, is actually t r u e . Yet t h e t r u t h
of any single o n e of t h e m w o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h a t "all t h e r e a s o n a b l e
d o c t r i n e s yield t h e r i g h t c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y d o
n o t d o so for t h e r i g h t r e a s o n s as specified by t h e o n e t r u e d o c t r i n e "
(PL 1 2 8 ) .
Like H o b b e s , Rawls c o n c e n t r a t e s o n q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e ,
and h e borrows from the Hobbesian tradition the idea that the
sought-for p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d by private, n o n p u b
lic r e a s o n s . B u t in c o n t r a s t with H o b b e s , for Rawls t h e r a t i o n a l
acceptability of p r o p o s a l s t h a t a d m i t of a g r e e m e n t is n o w b a s e d n o t
o n t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y p r e f e r e n c e s of d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s b u t o n t h e
m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of different, t h o u g h c o n v e r g e n t , worldviews. Rawls
shares w i t h t h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n t h e i d e a of a m o r a l f o u n d a t i o n of
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political j u s t i c e . T h e m o r a l l y c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s s u p p o r t a c o n s e n s u s
t h a t g o e s b e y o n d a m e r e m o d u s vivendi. B u t t h e s e r e a s o n s c a n n o t
b e publicly i n s p e c t e d by e v e r y o n e i n c o m m o n , given t h a t t h e p u b l i c
u s e of r e a s o n d e p e n d s o n a p l a t f o r m t h a t c a n only b e c o n s t r u c t e d
o n t h e basis of n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s . Like a c o m p r o m i s e , t h e overlap
p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e e a c h party's different r e a s o n s ; b u t u n l i k e
a c o m p r o m i s e , t h e s e r e a s o n s a r e of a m o r a l k i n d .
4
A Third Perspective for the Reasonable
T h e i d e a of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s calls for a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
t e r m " r e a s o n a b l e . " A l t h o u g h t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is parasitic o n c o m p l e m e n t a r y m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h s ,
this political c o n c e p t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e s s s u p p o s e d t o e x h i b i t a rea
s o n a b l e n e s s t h a t adds t h e a s p e c t of p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n t o t h o s e idi
osyncratic a n d m u t u a l l y n o n t r a n s p a r e n t t r u t h s . F r o m t h e p o i n t of
view of validity, a n u n e a s y a s y m m e t r y prevails b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c
c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t raises a w e a k claim to r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a n d
t h e n o n p u b l i c d o c t r i n e s with t h e i r s t r o n g claims to t r u t h . T h a t a
p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d ultimately derive its m o r a l
a u t h o r i t y f r o m n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s is c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e . A n y t h i n g valid
s h o u l d also b e c a p a b l e of p u b l i c justification. Valid s t a t e m e n t s d e
serve t h e a c c e p t a n c e of e v e r y o n e for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s . T h e e x p r e s
sion " a g r e e m e n t " is a m b i g u o u s in this r e s p e c t . W h e r e a s p a r t i e s w h o
n e g o t i a t e a c o m p r o m i s e m i g h t a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t for different rea
sons, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n m u s t r e a c h a rationally m o t i
v a t e d a g r e e m e n t , if at all, for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s . S u c h p r a c t i c e s of
justification d e p e n d o n a jointly and publicly reached c o n s e n s u s .
Even o u t s i d e of t h e political d o m a i n , a r g u m e n t s call for a p u b l i c
u s e of r e a s o n (in a s e n s e ) . R a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e s m e r e l y m a k e a t o p i c
of w h a t f u n c t i o n s in everyday life as a r e s o u r c e for t h e b i n d i n g force
of s p e e c h acts, namely, validity claims t h a t d e m a n d intersubjective
r e c o g n i t i o n a n d offer t h e p r o s p e c t of p u b l i c justification w h e n t h e y
a r e q u e s t i o n e d . T h e s a m e h o l d s for n o r m a t i v e validity claims. T h e
p r a c t i c e of reason-giving in m o r a l d i s p u t e s w o u l d b r e a k d o w n if
p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d to a s s u m e t h a t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s d e p e n d essentially
o n p e r s o n a l b a c k g r o u n d beliefs a n d c o u l d n o l o n g e r c o u n t o n t h e
87
a c c e p t a n c e of t h o s e w h o d o n o t s h a r e t h e s e beliefs. O f c o u r s e , this
c a n n o t b e a p p l i e d i m m e d i a t e l y to politics, for political d i s p u t e s a r e
of a m i x e d n a t u r e . B u t t h e m o r e t h e y focus o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essen
tials a n d u n d e r l y i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e , t h e m o r e t h e y resemble
m o r a l discourses. Moreover, basic political q u e s t i o n s a r e l i n k e d to
q u e s t i o n s of legal i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A n d coercive r e g u l a t i o n s m a k e a
basic political c o n s e n s u s a m o n g citizens absolutely necessary.
T h e d e m a n d itself is n o t controversial, only how it is to b e fulfilled.
T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r citizens c a n g r a s p s o m e t h i n g as r e a s o n a b l e
if it is n o t o p e n to t h e m to a d o p t a t h i r d s t a n d p o i n t b e s i d e s t h a t of
a n o b s e r v e r o r a p a r t i c i p a n t . C a n t h e plurality of r e a s o n s r o o t e d in
worldviews, w h o s e n o n p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r is m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d , l e a d
to a c o n s e n s u s t h a t c a n serve as t h e basis for a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n
for citizens of a political c o m m u n i t y ? I w o n d e r w h e t h e r Rawls c a n
a c c o u n t for t h e possibility of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w i t h o u t tac
itly a s s u m i n g s u c h a t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h "we," t h e citizens,
c a n publicly e x a m i n e in c o m m o n w h a t is i n t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of
everybody.
T h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a n a d h e r e n t of a c o m m u n i t y of t r u e believers
is different f r o m t h a t of a p a r t i c i p a n t in p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e . T h e exis
tential resolve of a n i n a l i e n a b l e individual reflecting in t h e first
p e r s o n s i n g u l a r o n h o w s h e s h o u l d live h e r life is q u i t e different
f r o m t h e fallibilistic c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a citizen p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p r o c
esses of political o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. But, as we h a v e s e e n ,
Rawls c a n n o t conceive of t h e p r o c e s s of r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o n a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e in s u c h a way t h a t t h e citizens
a d o p t a s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e . B e c a u s e s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e is lacking, t h e
c o n c e p t i o n t h a t e m e r g e s as " r e a s o n a b l e " m u s t fit i n t o t h e c o n t e x t of
t h e different worldviews in e a c h case t a k e n t o b e t r u e by t h e c o r r e
s p o n d i n g p a r t i e s . B u t h o w c a n t h e fact t h a t t h e n o n p u b l i c t r u t h of
religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e s enjoys priority over t h e r e a s o n
a b l e n e s s of a political c o n c e p t i o n fail to affect t h e universalistic
m e a n i n g of "reasonable"?
Rawls i n t r o d u c e s t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " in t h e following m a n
ner. Citizens w h o a r e willing a n d a b l e to live in a "well-ordered"
society a r e r e a s o n a b l e ; as r e a s o n a b l e p e o p l e t h e y also h a v e r e a s o n
able views of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . If t h e e x p e c t e d c o n s e n s u s results
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f r o m r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , its c o n t e n t also c o u n t s as
r e a s o n a b l e . H e n c e " r e a s o n a b l e " refers in t h e first i n s t a n c e to t h e
a t t i t u d e of p e o p l e w h o a r e (a) willing to p r o p o s e , a g r e e u p o n , a n d
a b i d e by fair t e r m s of social c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n free a n d e q u a l
citizens, a n d (b) c a p a b l e of r e c o g n i z i n g t h e b u r d e n s of a r g u m e n t
a n d willing to a c c e p t t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e p r e d i c a t e is t h e n
e x t e n d e d f r o m t h e attitudes to t h e beliefs of r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s / R e a
s o n a b l e worldviews r e i n f o r c e a n a t t i t u d e of t o l e r a n c e a m o n g t h e i r
a d h e r e n t s b e c a u s e t h e y e x h i b i t a c e r t a i n reflexivity a n d a r e subject
to c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s with r e g a r d to t h e i r practical c o n s e q u e n c e s . A
"reflexive" c o n s c i o u s n e s s results f r o m t h e fact t h a t a n e x p e c t a t i o n of
r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t exists b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n e s . A n d
s u c h subjective belief systems c a n only c o m p e t e with o n e a n o t h e r o n
fair t e r m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of a p l u r a l i s m of worldviews if t h e i r
a d h e r e n t s r e n o u n c e t h e u s e of political v i o l e n c e t o e n f o r c e t h e i r
doctrines.
I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t w h a t is of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e is t h a t t h e
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a l o n e of citizens a n d worldviews, t h u s specified, by
n o m e a n s r e q u i r e s t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e c o u l d b e j o i n t l y a n d p u b
licly discussed. T h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is n e i t h e r i m p l i e d by "rea
s o n a b l e " a t t i t u d e s n o r is it m a d e possible by " r e a s o n a b l e " worldviews.
S u c h a perspective is first o p e n e d u p w h e n a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s
o n a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e h a s e m e r g e d . However, Rawls c a n n o t
avoid m a k i n g at least a n unofficial u s e of this t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e even
in t h e "basic case of p u b l i c justification" (R 1 4 4 ) . I h a v e t h e i m p r e s
sion t h a t h e is t o r n b e t w e e n t h e o r i g i n a l strategy p u r s u e d i n A Theory
ofJustice, w h i c h r e l i e d m o r e heavily o n Kant, a n d t h e m o r e r e c e n t l y
d e v e l o p e d a l t e r n a t i v e w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to take seriously t h e fact of
p l u r a l i s m . H e r e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a g a i n a d o p t s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t ; b u t this "professional" s t a n d p o i n t d o e s n o t cor
r e s p o n d t o a m o r a l p o i n t of view t h a t citizens c o u l d s h a r e by t h e i r
o w n lights.
Rawls h a s in t h e m e a n t i m e a d d r e s s e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e justifica
t i o n of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s at g r e a t e r l e n g t h (R 142ff.). If we
e x a m i n e closely t h e t h r e e k i n d s of justification h e lays o u t t h e r e we
r u n u p a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n of h o w " r e a s o n a b l e " world-
89
views c a n even b e i d e n t i f i e d as s u c h if s t a n d a r d s r o o t e d in a practical

r e a s o n i n d e p e n d e n t of worldviews a r e n o t available. W i n n o w i n g o u t
r e a s o n a b l e worldviews calls for " t h i n " n o r m a t i v e decisions w h i c h
m u s t b e justifiable i n d e p e n d e n t l y of "thick" m e t a p h y s i c a l back
ground assumptions.
5
T h e Last Stage o f Justification
A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, t h e justification of a political c o n c e p t i o n of

j u s t i c e m u s t b e s i t u a t e d i n "the p l a c e a m o n g citizens i n civil soci
e t y t h e v i e w p o i n t of y o u a n d m e . " H e r e every citizen starts f r o m
t h e c o n t e x t of h e r own worldview a n d t h e m o r a l n o t i o n of j u s t i c e
e m b e d d e d t h e r e i n , for t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e is at first t h e
only o n e available for n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n i n g . So to b e g i n with t h e r e
is n o r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
a n d t h a t of any o t h e r citizen. W h e t h e r o r n o t s h e is a p h i l o s o p h e r ,
a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n will e m p l o y h e r sense of j u s t i c e to d e v e l o p a
f r e e s t a n d i n g political c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h s h e h o p e s c a n b e a c c e p t e d
by all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s in t h e i r r o l e as free a n d e q u a l citizens. T h e
first c o n s t r u c t i v e s t e p t h e n r e q u i r e s h e r to a b s t r a c t f r o m c o m p r e h e n
sive d o c t r i n e s . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s of this "pro tan to justification" t h e
citizens m a y also c o n s i d e r various duly r e f l e c t e d u p o n a n d e l a b o
r a t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . S u c h t h e o r i e s offer g u i d e l i n e s for t h e
r e q u i r e d k i n d of a b s t r a c t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e "original p o s i t i o n "
offers o n e s c h e m e for s u c h a universalization test: p r i n c i p l e s t h a t
pass t h e test a p p e a r to b e a c c e p t a b l e t o e v e r y o n e .
1 0
B u t n o b o d y will b e a b l e to a b s t r a c t c o m p l e t e l y f r o m h e r o w n
p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in a p p l y i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e . "You a n d I" c a n n o t
p e r f o r m t h e test in a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s m a n n e r ; e a c h of u s m u s t
u n d e r t a k e it f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s h a p e d by h e r o w n b a c k g r o u n d
beliefs. I n particular, b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e politi
cal s p h e r e a n d w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as a m a t t e r of politics e n t e r in
h e r e . H e n c e t h e r e c a n h a r d l y b e a n y s u r p r i s e at t h e n e x t stage w h e n
e a c h citizen e m b e d s in h e r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e t h e c o n c e p t
t h a t s e e m s p r o m i s i n g to her. T h e universalization test d o e s i n d e e d
d e m a n d t h a t all r e a s o n a b l e citizens a b s t r a c t f r o m t h e specifics of
t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ; b u t this o p e r a t i o n of
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universalization m u s t n e v e r t h e l e s s b e c a r r i e d o u t a g a i n s t t h e back
g r o u n d of t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e w o r l d . F o r n o b o d y c a n give
u p h e r p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h o u t losing sight of t h e n o r m a
tive d i m e n s i o n as s u c h in t a k i n g o n t h e objectivating a t t i t u d e of a n
observer.
T h i s is why t h e universalization test f u n c t i o n s at t h e first stage in
a way r o u g h l y similar to t h e G o l d e n R u l e : it filters o u t a n y t h i n g t h a t
d o e s n o t a p p e a r from my viewpoint to qualify for e q u a l a c c e p t a n c e by
all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s . Precisely t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s a n d
t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s pass t h e test w h i c h , a s s u m i n g t h a t
t h e y c a n b e universally established, a r e in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of eve
r y b o d y given my understanding of the political sphere. I n this way t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e test is c o n d i t i o n e d by p r e c o n c e p t i o n s p e c u l i a r to
m y c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e , for o t h e r w i s e t h e t h i r d stage of justifica
t i o n a n a l o g o u s to t h e m o v e f r o m t h e G o l d e n R u l e to t h e categori
cal i m p e r a t i v e w o u l d b e s u p e r f l u o u s . Rawls r e g a r d s this s t e p as
n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e "you a n d I" c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r we s u c c e e d e d
in a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m every c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e w h e n , e a c h p r o
c e e d i n g f r o m her own b e s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political s p h e r e , we
s u b j e c t e d o u r n o r m a t i v e convictions to t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e origi
n a l p o s i t i o n . O n l y at t h e final stage, w h i c h Rawls calls t h e stage of
"wide a n d g e n e r a l reflective e q u i l i b r i u m " (R 1 4 1 , n . 1 6 ) , d o w e t a k e
t h e o t h e r citizens i n t o a c c o u n t : " r e a s o n a b l e citizens t a k e o n e an
o t h e r i n t o a c c o u n t as h a v i n g r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s
t h a t e n d o r s e t h a t political c o n c e p t i o n " (R 1 4 3 ) .
11
T h i s step, w h i c h is s u p p o s e d to l e a d finally to a n o v e r l a p p i n g
c o n s e n s u s , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of a n as yet
i n c o m p l e t e , still e g o c e n t r i c universalization p r o c e d u r e . O n l y a recur
sive a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r e c a n yield t h e a n t i c i p a t e d result: all
citizens, n o t j u s t y o u a n d I, have to d e c i d e , f r o m t h e i r o w n p e r s p e c
tives a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of t h e political w o r l d , w h e t h e r t h e r e is a
p r o p o s a l t h a t c a n m e e t with universal a c c e p t a n c e . Rawls speaks of
" m u t u a l a c c o u n t i n g ; " b u t w h a t is m e a n t is a m u t u a l observation
t h r o u g h w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s establish w h e t h e r a n a g r e e m e n t o c c u r s .
T h e c o n s e n s u s is a n e v e n t t h a t h a p p e n s : "Public justification happens
w h e n all t h e r e a s o n a b l e m e m b e r s of political society c a r r y o u t a
justification of t h e s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n by e m b e d d i n g it in
91
t h e i r several r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e views" ( R 1 4 3 , m y e m p h a s i s ) .
T h e t e r m s " p u b l i c " a n d " s h a r e d " a r e s o m e w h a t m i s l e a d i n g in this
c o n t e x t . T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s results f r o m everybody's decid
i n g simultaneously, b u t e a c h individually a n d for herself, w h e t h e r
t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n fits i n t o h e r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e .
If it is t o work, e v e r y o n e m u s t a c c e p t t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h
e a c h for h e r o w n , n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s , a n d e a c h m u s t at t h e s a m e
t i m e satisfy h e r s e l f t h a t all o t h e r s also a c c e p t it: "the e x p r e s s c o n t e n t s
of t h e s e d o c t r i n e s h a v e n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c justification;
citizens d o n o t l o o k i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of o t h e r s ' d o c t r i n e s . . . . Rather,
they take i n t o a c c o u n t a n d give s o m e w e i g h t to only t h e f a c t t h e
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s i t s e l f (R 1 4 4 ) .
H e n c e t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n w h a t R a i n e r Forst h a s
called a "private u s e of r e a s o n with public-political i n t e n t . " A g a i n ,
this d e s i g n of " t h r e e k i n d s " of justification lacks a p e r s p e c t i v e of
i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t a n d a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n in t h e strict sense,
which would n o t be contingent on the overlapping consensus but
w o u l d b e s h a r e d from the beginning.
Moreover, it is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r " r e a s o n a b l e " citizens in t h e sense
o u t l i n e d w o u l d ever r e a c h a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s if they c o u l d
only c o n v i n c e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r o w n i n d i v i d u a l c o m p r e
h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s of t h e validity of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e
p r o s p e c t of r e a c h i n g a c o n s e n s u s d e p e n d s essentially o n w h a t k i n d s
of revisions a r e p e r m i t t e d at t h e last stage of a d e c e n t e r e d justifica
t i o n . A pro tanto justified c o n c e p t i o n t h a t "you o r I" j u d g e to b e valid
f r o m o u r respective p o i n t s of view m a y b e o v e r r i d d e n by t h e veto of
o t h e r s " o n c e all values a r e tallied u p . " O u r c o n c e p t i o n m u s t b e
revised b e f o r e it c a n b e e n d o r s e d by e v e r y o n e . T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t s
t h a t m o t i v a t e s u c h a d a p t a t i o n s c o n c e r n in t h e first i n s t a n c e differ
e n c e s in t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political t h a t y o u o r I d i d n o t
a n t i c i p a t e at t h e first o r s e c o n d stages. Following Rawls, I distinguish
b e t w e e n t h r e e k i n d s of d i s a g r e e m e n t s : t h o s e c o n c e r n i n g (a) t h e
d e f i n i t i o n of t h e d o m a i n of political m a t t e r s , (b) t h e r a n k i n g a n d
r e a s o n a b l e b a l a n c i n g of political values, a n d finally a n d m o s t i m p o r
tantly (c) t h e priority of political over n o n p o l i t i c a l values.
( a ) - ( b ) Different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e separa
t i o n of c h u r c h a n d state, for e x a m p l e , t o u c h o n t h e e x t e n t a n d s c o p e
12
13
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of t h e political d o m a i n ; for t h e y l e a d to different n o r m a t i v e g u i d e

lines, in this case g u i d e l i n e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e status a n d t h e r o l e of
religious c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . O t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i e s c o n
c e r n t h e r a n k i n g of political values, for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r o n e ac
c o r d s intrinsic o r m e r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l value to political p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n cases w h e r e political r i g h t s m u s t b e b a l a n c e d against negative
liberties. T h e s e d i s p u t e s a r e n o r m a l l y settled by c o u r t s i n t h e final
i n s t a n c e by t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t a n d h e n c e o n t h e
basis of a n a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h i s is also h o w
Rawls deals with s u c h issues. B u t in s o m e cases conflicts c a n b e so
d e e p t h a t t h e differences in o p i n i o n p l a c e in q u e s t i o n t h e u n d e r l y
i n g political c o n s e n s u s . S u c h conflicts u n d e r m i n e t h e o v e r l a p p i n g
c o n s e n s u s itself. B u t we w o u l d like to t h i n k t h a t m o s t of t h e s e dis
a g r e e m e n t s c a n b e resolved in a c o n s e n s u a l m a n n e r , if n e c e s s a r y by
revising t h e c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . Successful
a d a p t a t i o n s of this type w o u l d c o n f i r m t h a t citizens c o u l d l e a r n f r o m
o n e a n o t h e r at t h e t h i r d stage of justification, if only in a n i n d i r e c t
way. T h e v e t o of o t h e r s c a n l e a d e a c h of u s to realize t h a t t h e
c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e we initially p r o p o s e d w e r e n o t yet sufficiently
decentered.
1 4
(c) T h e r e is a k i n d of conflict, however, t h a t h a s a n i m p a c t o n t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of " r e a s o n a b l e " d o c t r i n e s . S u c h conflicts e x p o s e t h e c o n
c e p t of t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " itself to c o n t e s t a t i o n . T h e a b o r t i o n d e b a t e ,
o n a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n , is a case in p o i n t . Catholics, for e x a m p l e ,
w h o insist o n a g e n e r a l legal p r o h i b i t i o n , assert t h a t t h e i r r e l i g i o u s
conviction c o n c e r n i n g t h e inviolability of life is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n
any political value in w h o s e n a m e o t h e r citizens u r g e t h e m to a c c e p t ,
say, a m o d e r a t e l y liberal r e g u l a t i o n . Rawls deals with this issue in
passing, b u t h e shifts t h e conflict f r o m t h e level of t h e priority of
political values to t h a t of a r e a s o n a b l e balancing of political values
(PL 243f.). F o r h e p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e p u b l i c u s e
of r e a s o n r e q u i r e s citizens to translate t h e i r ethical-existential views
i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e of political j u s t i c e . B u t o n Rawls's o w n p r e m i s e s
"public r e a s o n " c a n i m p o s e s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s o n citizens only if a
c o n s e n s u s c o n c e r n i n g political essentials h a s a l r e a d y b e e n r e a c h e d .
W h i l e a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is still b e i n g w o r k e d o u t t h e r e is n o
e q u i v a l e n t for t h e n e u t r a l a u t h o r i t y of a S u p r e m e C o u r t (which i n
93
any case only u n d e r s t a n d s t h e l a n g u a g e of law). N o r is it possible at

this stage to a p p e a l to t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d , for this
a g a i n p r e s u p p o s e s t h e priority of political over n o n p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s .
N o w Rawls r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is possible only
a m o n g citizens w h o a s s u m e in cases of conflict t h a t political values
o u t w e i g h all o t h e r values (PL 1 3 9 ) . B u t this d o e s n o t follow f r o m t h e
" r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of citizens a n d t h e i r convictions. Rawls simply as
serts t h a t political values a r e "very g r e a t " o n e s (PL 139, 1 5 5 ) . Else
w h e r e h e restricts h i m s e l f to t h e " h o p e " t h a t this priority will
u l t i m a t e l y b e r e c o g n i z e d by a d h e r e n t s of r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e
doctrines.
15
16
T h e s e c a u t i o u s f o r m u l a t i o n s suggest t h a t d e e p - s e a t e d conflicts of
t h e t h i r d k i n d c o u l d only b e resolved if t h e t o l e r a n c e of r e a s o n a b l e
citizens a n d t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i v e views imply
t h a t e v e r y o n e s h a r e s t h e s a m e view of t h e political w o r l d a n d t h a t
political values h a v e priority. B u t s u c h a r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t d o e s
n o t simply h i g h l i g h t qualities t h a t r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c
t r i n e s possess in a n y case; t h a t e x p e c t a t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s h a s to
b e imposed o n t h e c o m p e t i n g worldviews. T h e priority of political
values is a r e q u i r e m e n t of practical r e a s o n : t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a
f o r m of impartiality t h a t e l s e w h e r e finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e m o r a l
p o i n t of view. B u t t h e latter is n o t c o n t a i n e d in t h e c o n c e p t of t h e
r e a s o n a b l e i n t r o d u c e d by Rawls. T h e a t t i t u d e of " r e a s o n a b l e " p e o p l e
w h o wish to t r e a t e a c h o t h e r fairly while r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t they d o
n o t a g r e e in t h e i r religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l convictions d o e s n o t
i m p l y a m o r a l p o i n t of view s h a r e d by all, a n y m o r e t h a n d o e s t h e
reflexivity a n d t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of force of " r e a s o n a b l e " worldviews.
Clearly a r e q u i r e m e n t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n to w h i c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e
d o c t r i n e s m u s t submit if a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is to b e possible
c a n only b e justified by a p p e a l to a n e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y t h a t is itself
i n d e p e n d e n t of w o r l d v i e w s .
17
With practical reason liberated from d e p e n d e n c e o n the morality

of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t r u e
a n d t h e r e a s o n a b l e w o u l d also b e c o m e publicly accessible. T h i s c o n
n e c t i o n n e e d r e m a i n o p a q u e only as l o n g as t h e justification of a
political c o n c e p t i o n c a n only b e g r a s p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a
p a r t i c u l a r c o m p r e h e n s i v e view. However, this a p p r o a c h is t u r n e d o n
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its h e a d o n c e t h e priority of political values h a s to b e justified o n t h e

basis of a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t first d e t e r m i n e s w h i c h
c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s c a n c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e .
6
Philosophers and Citizens
T h e r e r e m a i n s a n u n r e s o l v e d t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of
a political c o n c e p t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to all citizens with r e a s o n a b l e c o m
p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s a n d t h e t r u t h t h a t individuals ascribe t o this
c o n c e p t i o n f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e views. O n
t h e o n e h a n d , t h e validity of t h e political c o n c e p t i o n u l t i m a t e l y
d e p e n d s o n t h e validity-generating r e s o u r c e s of t h e d i f f e r e n t c o m
p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s insofar as t h e y a r e r e a s o n a b l e ; o n t h e o t h e r ,
r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s m u s t in t u r n satisfy s t a n d a r d s p r e s c r i b e d to
t h e m by p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . W h a t m a k e s t h e m r e a s o n a b l e c a n n o t b e
d e f i n e d by s t a n d a r d s i n t e r n a l to a n y o n e of t h e m . C a n Rawls g r o u n d
t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s in p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n w i t h o u t falling b a c k o n t h e
K a n t i a n s t a n d p o i n t of A Theory of Justice, o r m u s t h e a b a n d o n t h e
liberal device of t h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e
metaphysical? To b e s u r e , Rawls also takes t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of "public
r e a s o n " " t h e g e n e r a l o n e s of t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n "
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n in Political Liberalism. B u t t h e y only t a k e effect
o n c e "justice as fairness" h a s b e e n a c c e p t e d by t h e citizens; only t h e n
c a n they d e t e r m i n e t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d (PL 210)
a n d t h e f o r m of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n (PL 216ff.).
B u t if t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s finds e x p r e s
sion i n r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t a r e n o t self-imposed, w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as
r e a s o n a b l e m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d by a s t a n d a r d of impartiality t h a t is
a l r e a d y o p e r a t i v e p r i o r to t h e e m e r g e n c e of a basic political a g r e e
m e n t . A Theory of Justice c l a i m e d validity in t h e n a m e of p r a c t i c a l
r e a s o n ; it d i d n o t d e p e n d o n affirmation by r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n
sive d o c t r i n e s . O v e r t i m e Rawls c a m e to realize t h a t t h e basic d e s i g n
of this theory, r a t h e r t h a n its c o n t e n t , failed to give sufficient w e i g h t
to t h e "fact of r e a s o n a b l e p l u r a l i s m " (R 144, n . 2 1 ) . T h i s is why h e
n o w p r e s e n t s t h e essential c o n t e n t of t h e o r i g i n a l t h e o r y as a first
c o n s t r u c t i v e s t e p in n e e d of s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . A f u r t h e r s t e p is s u p
p o s e d t o l e a d f r o m t h e a c a d e m i c a r e n a i n t o t h e political p u b l i c
95
s p h e r e a n d allow t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l investigation to issue in a n actual

a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n all citizens o n basic political q u e s t i o n s . T h e
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e b u r d e n s of justification b e t w e e n t h e two steps is
r e f l e c t e d in t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d t h e t r u e . T h e
citizens, n o t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , a r e to h a v e t h e final w o r d . W h i l e Rawls
d o e s n o t c o m p l e t e l y shift t h e b u r d e n of justification o n t o t h e rea
s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , they a r e t h e ultimate a r b i t e r s . F o r
t h e t h e o r y w o u l d violate its o w n liberal spirit if it p r e j u d g e d t h e
political will-formation of t h e citizens by a n t i c i p a t i n g its results: "stu
d e n t s of p h i l o s o p h y take p a r t in f o r m u l a t i n g t h e s e i d e a s b u t always
as citizens a m o n g o t h e r s " (R 1 7 5 ) .
However, only a t h e o r y t h a t lays d o w n t h e c o m p l e t e d e s i g n of a
w e l l - o r d e r e d society for t h e citizens c r e a t e s t h e d a n g e r of political
p a t e r n a l i s m . Rawls d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t a consistently w o r k e d - o u t
p r o c e d u r a l i s m c o u l d defuse t h e w h o l e issue of w h e t h e r p h i l o s o p h y
u n d e r m i n e s t h e political a u t o n o m y of t h e c i t i z e n s . A t h e o r y t h a t
restricts itself to clarifying t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e legal institutionali
z a t i o n of p r o c e d u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation d o e s n o t p r e j u d g e
t h e results t h a t t h e citizens t h e m s e l v e s m u s t first r e a c h w i t h i n a n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k s h a p e d by t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s . O n c e a postm e t a p h y s i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n d e p e n d e n t of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s is
r e s t o r e d t o a p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t is e m b o d i e d in p r o c e s s e s r a t h e r
t h a n in c o n t e n t s , it c a n n o t itself play a p a t e r n a l i s t i c r o l e . I favor this
a p p r o a c h a n d t h e r e is at least s o m e s u p p o r t for it in Rawls.
18
B u t first let m e b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e results of t h e discussion t h u s

far. R e a s o n a b l e political c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e p r i o r
ity of political values, a n d t h e r e b y also d e f i n e w h i c h religious a n d
m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews c a n c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e , m u s t n o t only b e
w o r k e d o u t b u t m u s t also b e accepted f r o m a n i m p a r t i a l s t a n d p o i n t .
This standpoint transcends the participant's perspective, occupied
by citizens w h o a r e c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e
d o c t r i n e s . H e n c e t h e citizens c a n h a v e t h e last w o r d only w h e n they
a l r e a d y p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e " f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e s e i d e a s " f r o m a m o r e
c o m p r e h e n s i v e , intersubjectively s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e , or, w h a t
a m o u n t s to t h e s a m e t h i n g , f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h e
recursive universalization test t h a t Rawls r e s e r v e s for t h e t h i r d stage
of justification w o u l d i n s t e a d b e c o m e a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t of a
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p r o c e s s of p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n o n p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e
c a p a b l e of c o m m a n d i n g p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t . T h e r a t i o n a l a c c e p t
ability of t h e o u t c o m e b e it 'justice as fairness" o r s o m e o t h e r
c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d n o t b e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e m u t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n of
a n established c o n s e n s u s ; i n s t e a d a u t h o r i z i n g force w o u l d devolve to
c o n d i t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e , f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of discursive p r o c e s s e s ,
w h i c h c o m p e l p a r t i c i p a n t s to a d o p t t h e s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l
judgment.
We find a similar c o n c e p t i o n in Political Liberalism b u t at a different
systematic l e v e l t h a t of t h e professional e l a b o r a t i o n of a freestand
i n g c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r first p r o j e c t s a pro tanto
justification of his c o n c e p t i o n a n d t h e n tests w h e t h e r t h e basic c o n
c e p t s of his t h e o r y s u c h as t h o s e of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n , of t h e citizen
as a m e m b e r of a n association of free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s , a n d of
society as a system of fair c o o p e r a t i o n c o h e r e with t h e n o r m a t i v e
b a c k g r o u n d i n t u i t i o n s t h a t a r e actually widely s h a r e d in t h e political
t r a d i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c society ( c o n c e i v e d as a " c o m p l e t e a n d
closed social system"). B o t h of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , (a) t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d (b) t h e reflexive testing of its c o n c e p
tual f o u n d a t i o n s , h a v e i n t e r e s t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e r e l a t i o n b e
t w e e n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a n d t h e citizens.
(a) A p h i l o s o p h e r w h o , like Rawls, a d h e r e s to t h e p r i n c i p l e s of
"political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to objectivity, t h a t is, h e
a c c e p t s t h e "essentials of t h e objective p o i n t of view" a n d t h e "re
q u i r e m e n t s of objectivity" (PL III, sections 5 - 7 ) . T h e s e a r e p r o c e
d u r a l f e a t u r e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n : "it is by t h e r e a s o n a b l e t h a t we
e n t e r t h e p u b l i c w o r l d of o t h e r s a n d s t a n d r e a d y t o p r o p o s e , o r
a c c e p t , as t h e case m a y b e , r e a s o n a b l e p r i n c i p l e s to specify fair t e r m s
of c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s issue f r o m a p r o c e d u r e of c o n s t r u c
t i o n t h a t e x p r e s s e s t h e p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . . . ." (PL 1 1 4 ) .
T h u s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r o b s e r v e s s t a n d a r d s of rationality t h a t have a
m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l c o n t e n t t h o u g h t h e y a r e i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y c o m
p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e . W h e t h e r t h e s e s t a n d a r d s at t h e s a m e t i m e im
p o s e l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s of r e a s o n a b l e
citizens d e p e n d s o n h o w o n e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s task.
S o m e t i m e s Rawls s e e m s to suggest t h a t his professionally w o r k e d - o u t
p r o p o s a l s h o u l d have a structuring i n f l u e n c e o n t h e citizens' world-
97
views. At a n y r a t e Rawls e x p r e s s e s t h e h o p e t h a t "in fact [ t h e p h i l o

s o p h i c a l offer] will h a v e t h e capacity to shape t h o s e d o c t r i n e s t o w a r d
i t s e l f (R 145, m y e m p h a s i s ) . O n this c o n c e p t i o n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
w o u l d a d m i n i s t e r a n objective p o i n t of view to w h i c h t h e citizens
have to adapt t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . T h i s w o u l d i n d e e d
involve only a p r o c e d u r a l p r e j u d g m e n t , n o t a substantive o n e ; b u t
n o t even this r e a d i n g is fully c o m p a t i b l e with t h e e g a l i t a r i a n status
of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r as o n e citizen a m o n g o t h e r s .
(b) T h e m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m a c c o r d s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
a m o r e m o d e s t r o l e in any case by r e f e r r i n g h i m to t h e intersubjec
tively s h a r e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of a liberal political c u l t u r e . O f
c o u r s e , this k n o w l e d g e c a n only serve as a c o n t r o l o n t h e c h o i c e of
basic t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s if it h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s h a p e d by t h e p e r
spective of a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e .
O t h e r w i s e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r c o u l d l e a r n n o t h i n g f r o m t h e citizens
a n d t h e i r political c o n v i c t i o n s . If t h e m e t h o d of reflective equilib
r i u m is to g e t off t h e g r o u n d , p h i l o s o p h y m u s t "find" its o w n per
spective a l r e a d y o p e r a t i n g in civil society. T h i s is n o t to i m p l y t h a t
p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d rely o n t h e basic c o n s e n s u s w h i c h a c c o r d i n g to
t h e p r e m i s e s a l r e a d y exists in liberal societies a n d t h e r e b y offers a
p l a t f o r m for t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n (as institutionalized^ e.g., in
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t ) . N o t every c u l t u r e t h a t calls itself liberal is
in fact liberal. A h e r m e n e u t i c p h i l o s o p h y t h a t l i m i t e d itself to clari
fying w h a t a l r e a d y exists w o u l d lose all critical f o r c e . P h i l o s o p h y
s h o u l d n o t m e r e l y a c c e p t e s t a b l i s h e d convictions b u t m u s t also b e
able t o judge t h e m by t h e s t a n d a r d s of a r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i c e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it m a y n o t c o n s t r u c t s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n
o u t of w h o l e c l o t h a n d h o l d it u p to a society as a n o r m . It m u s t
avoid equally t h e u n c r i t i c a l affirmation of t h e status q u o a n d t h e
a s s u m p t i o n of a p a t e r n a l i s t i c r o l e . It s h o u l d n e i t h e r simply a c c e p t
e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n s n o r c o n s t r u c t a d e t a i l e d d e s i g n for a wello r d e r e d society.
19
T h e m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m itself, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d ,
shows u s a way o u t of t h e d e a d e n d , b e c a u s e it calls for a critical
a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n s . T h i s s u c c e e d s with t r a d i t i o n s t h a t c a n b e
u n d e r s t o o d as t h e e x p r e s s i o n of l e a r n i n g processes. A p r i o r stand
p o i n t of critical e v a l u a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r to identify l e a r n i n g
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Chapter 3
p r o c e s s e s as s u c h . P h i l o s o p h y finds s u c h a s t a n d p o i n t i n its aspira

t i o n to objectivity a n d impartiality. B u t insofar as it draws o n p r o c e
d u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , it c a n find confirmation in a
p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t it e n c o u n t e r s in society itself: by t h e m o r a l p o i n t of
view f r o m w h i c h m o d e r n societies a r e criticized by t h e i r o w n social
m o v e m e n t s . P h i l o s o p h y a d o p t s a n affirmative s t a n c e only t o w a r d t h e
n e g a t o r y p o t e n t i a l e m b o d i e d in t h e social t e n d e n c i e s to u n s t i n t i n g
self-criticism.
7
T h e Point o f Liberalism
If political j u s t i c e is c o n c e i v e d in this way, t h a t is, in p r o c e d u r a l

t e r m s , t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m o r a l a n d b e t w e e n
t h e m o r a l a n d t h e ethical a p p e a r in a different light. A political
j u s t i c e t h a t s t a n d s o n its o w n m o r a l feet n o l o n g e r n e e d s t h e s u p p o r t
of t h e t r u t h of religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s .
M o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l
t h i n k i n g n o less t h a n descriptive s t a t e m e n t s , t h o u g h in a d i f f e r e n t
way. T h a n k s to t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, w h i c h also finds e x p r e s s i o n
in w h a t Rawls calls "the p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for a p u b l i c u s e of
r e a s o n " a n d " s t a n d a r d s of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , " m o r a l j u d g i n e n t s g a i n
i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n t e x t s . Like t h e t r u t h of d e s c r i p
tive s t a t e m e n t s , t h e Tightness of m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n b e e x p l a i r i e d
in t e r m s of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity claims. (Of c o u r s e ,
even t o g e t h e r descriptive a n d m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t e x h a u s t t h e
m e a n i n g of m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h s . ) Since m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a r e only
c o n c e r n e d with q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e in g e n e r a l , q u e s t i o n s of political
j u s t i c e m u s t b e specified in t e r m s of t h e m e d i u m of law. T h i s n e e d
n o t c o n c e r n us further here.
B u t o n c e m o r a l a n d political r e a s o n i n g d r a w o n a n i n d e p e n d e n t
s o u r c e of validity, c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t a k e o n a different cog
nitive r o l e . T h e y reveal t h e i r essentially ethical c o n t e n t a n d p r o v i d e
t h e c o n t e x t for w h a t Rawls calls t h e "substantive c o n t e n t of c o m p r e
h e n s i v e c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d . " T h e s e "visions of t h e g o o d life"
f o r m t h e c o r e of a n individual o r collective s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Ethi
cal q u e s t i o n s a r e q u e s t i o n s of identity. T h e y h a v e a n existential sig
nificance ^ n d t h e y d o a d m i t of r a t i o n a l criticism w i t h i n c e r t a i n
99
limits. Ethical discourses o b e y s t a n d a r d s of h e r m e n e u t i c a l reflection

o n w h a t "is g o o d " for m e o r for us, all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Ethical
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s claim a k i n d of validity distinct f r o m b o t h t r u t h
a n d m o r a l r i g h t n e s s . T h e y a r e m e a s u r e d by t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of individuals o r collectives t h a t w e r e f o r m e d in
t h e c o n t e x t of life-histories o r intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s .
C o n s e q u e n t l y , e t h i c a l r e a s o n s a r e c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t in a specific
waythey a r e " n o n p u b l i c " in t h e Rawlsian sense. To b e s u r e , we
a c c e p t t h e u s u a l b u r d e n s of p r o o f a n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s
in Rawls's t e r m s , " b u r d e n s of j u d g m e n t " w i t h every s t a t e m e n t . B u t
s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s a r e n o t m e r e l y subject to g e n e r a l r e s e r v a t i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g fallibilism. We c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e t h i c a l d i s p u t e s
over t h e value of c o m p e t i n g lifestyles a n d f o r m s of life t o l e a d to
a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t s . By c o n t r a s t , we
e x p e c t t h a t m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a n d q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e a d m i t
i n p r i n c i p l e of universally valid answers.
K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n s claim n e u t r a l i t y vis-a-vis c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c
trines, t h a t is, a " f r e e s t a n d i n g " status in t h e sense of ethical, t h o u g h
n o t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l , neutrality. O u r discussion of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i cal u n d e r p i n n i n g s of Political Liberalism s h o u l d have m a d e clear t h a t
Rawls c a n n o t avoid p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s i e s either. T h e p r o b l e m
atic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d t h e t r u e calls for a n
e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t raises q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Rawls's strategy of
a v o i d a n c e . T h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n c a n n o t b e d r a i n e d of
m o r a l s u b s t a n c e a n d m o r a l i t y c a n n o t b e r e l e g a t e d to t h e b l a c k b o x
of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . I c a n n o t see a n y p l a u s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to
t h e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d K a n t i a n strategy. T h e r e s e e m s to b e n o way
a r o u n d t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in t e r m s of a
p r o c e d u r e t h a t claims to b e c o n t e x t - i n d e p e n d e n t . S u c h a p r o c e d u r e
is by n o m e a n s free of n o r m a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s , as Rawls correctly
e m p h a s i z e s (R I70ff.), for it is i n t e r t w i n e d with a c o n c e p t of a u t o n
o m y t h a t i n t e g r a t e s " r e a s o n " a n d "free will;" to that extent it c a n n o t
b e n o r m a t i v e l y n e u t r a l . A n a u t o n o m o u s will is o n e t h a t is g u i d e d by
p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . F r e e d o m in g e n e r a l consists in t h e capacity to
c h o o s e in a c c o r d a n c e with m a x i m s ; b u t a u t o n o m y is t h e self-binding
of t h e will by m a x i m s we a d o p t o n t h e basis of insight. B e c a u s e it is
m e d i a t e d by r e a s o n , a u t o n o m y is n o t j u s t o n e value a l o n g s i d e o t h e r s .
20
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Chapter 3
T h i s e x p l a i n s why this n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t d o e s n o t i m p a i r t h e n e u
trality of a p r o c e d u r e . A p r o c e d u r e t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l i z e s t h e m o r a l
p o i n t of view of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t is n e u t r a l with r e s p e c t to arbi
t r a r y c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of values b u t n o t with r e s p e c t t o p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n
itself.
Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s shifts t h e a c c e n t
f r o m t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y to s o m e t h i n g like ethicalexistential s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n : a p e r s o n is free w h e n h e a c c e p t s
a u t h o r s h i p for his o w n life. T h i s a p p r o a c h also h a s s o m e t h i n g to
r e c o m m e n d it. T h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e
m e t a p h y s i c a l draws a t t e n t i o n to t h e e t h i c a l d i m e n s i o n n e g l e c t e d by
Kant. Rawls salvages a v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t of H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e of K a n t ;
m o r a l n o r m s m a y n o t b e i m p o s e d in a n a b s t r a c t m a n n e r o n t h e
life-histories of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , even if t h e s e n o r m s a p p e a l t o a
practical r e a s o n all individuals have in c o m m o n o r to a universal
sense of j u s t i c e . M o r a l c o m m a n d s m u s t b e internally r e l a t e d to t h e
life-plans a n d lifestyles of affected p e r s o n s in a way they c a n g r a s p
for themselves.
21
T h e different weights a c c o r d e d m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d ethicalexistential s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i d e a n o c c a s i o n for a final r e m a r k .

T h e differences in d e s i g n , if n o t in s u b s t a n c e , b e t w e e n t h e o r i e s of
political j u s t i c e reveal differences in t h e u n d e r l y i n g i n t u i t i o n s t h a t
inform them.
Political o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l liberalism starts f r o m t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t
t h e p e r s o n a n d h e r i n d i v i d u a l way of life m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d frorn t h e
i n t r u s i o n of state p o w e r : "political liberalism allows . . . t h a t o u r
political i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n sufficient s p a c e for w o r t h y ways of life,
a n d t h a t in this sense o u r political society is j u s t a n d g o o d " (PL 2*10).
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s
takes o n f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e . It sets t h e s t a n d a r d s for t h e
a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f r e e d o m : t h e legally g u a r a n t e e d free
d o m of c h o i c e of private legal subjects c r e a t e s t h e free space for
p u r s u i n g a p l a n of life i n f o r m e d by o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
g o o d . Rights a r e liberties, p r o t e c t i v e b a r r i e r s for private a u t o n o m y . At
t h e h e a r t of this a p p r o a c h lies a c o n c e r n for t h e e q u a l f r e e d o m of
every p e r s o n to l e a d a s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d , a u t h e n t i c life. F r o m this
p e r s p e c t i v e t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e
101
p r a c t i c e of political self-legislation is s u p p o s e d to m a k e possible t h e

p e r s o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of private p e r s o n s . W h i l e it m a y also
h a v e a n intrinsic value for m a n y p e o p l e , p u b l i c a u t o n o m y a p p e a r s
in t h e first i n s t a n c e as a m e a n s for realizing private a u t o n o m y .
( ^ K a r r t i a r i R e p u b l i c a n i s m as I u n d e r s t a n d it, starts f r o m a different
i n t u i t i o n . N o b o d y c a n b e free at t h e e x p e n s e of a n y b o d y else's
f r e e d o m . B e c a u s e personsâFe i n d i v i d u a t e d only by way of socializa
tion, t h e f r e e d o m of q n e ^ n c l i v i d u a l c a n n o t b e tied to t h e f r e e d o m
of e v e r y o n e else in a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e way, t h r o u g h r e c i p r o c a l restrictions. Rather, c o r r e c t r e s t r i c t i o n s are_the_rejultôf a p r o c e s s of selflegislation c o n d u c t e d jointly. I n a n association of free a n d e q u a l
p e r s o n s , all m e m b e r s m u s t b e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as j o i n t
a u t h o r s of laws to w h i c h t h e y feel t h e m s e l v e s b o u n d individually as
a d d r e s s e e s . H e n c e t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d
in t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s , p r o v i d e s t h e key for g u a r a n t e e i n g e q u a l
freedoms.
Orêjm^
^ u s t bej embprliejian^tJie jpaedium of coerQye_and positive law, t h e f r e e d o m of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n splits i n t o t h e
' \ P ^ ^ ^ H J S 9 J E Y JP * , 9 " S J ^ Q j ^ d the^jprivate a u t o n o m y of ad
d r e s s e e s of t h e lawy i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e y reciprocally p r e s u p p o s e
o n e another. This complementary relationship between the public
a n d t h e private d o e s n o t refer t o a n y t h i n g given o r n a t u r a l b u t is
c o n c e p t u a l l y g e n e r a t e d by t h e very s t r u c t u r e of %he legal m e d i u m .
H e n c e it is left to t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s c o n t i n u a l l y t o d e f i n e a n d
r e d e f i n e t h e p r e c a r i o u s b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d t h e
p u b l i c so as to s e c u r e e q u a l f r e e d o m s for all citizens in t h e f o r m of
b o t h private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y .
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a n
2 2
Ill
Is There a Future for the Nation-State?
The European Nation-State: On the Past and

Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship
As even t h e n a m e of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s reveals, w o r l d society t o d a y

is c o m p o s e d politically of nation-states. T h e historical type of state
that e m e r g e d from the French a n d American revolutions has
a c h i e v e d g l o b a l d o m i n a n c e . T h i s fact is by n o m e a n s trivial.
T h e classical nation-states in N o r t h e r n a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e
evolved w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of existing t e r r i t o r i a l states. T h e y w e r e
p a r t of t h e E u r o p e a n state system w h i c h a l r e a d y t o o k o n a r e c o g n i z
a b l e s h a p e with t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a of 1648. By c o n t r a s t , t h e
" b e l a t e d " n a t i o n s b e g i n n i n g with Italy a n d G e r m a n y f o l l o w e d a
different c o u r s e , o n e w h i c h was also typical for t h e f o r m a t i o n of
nation-states in C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e ; h e r e t h e f o r m a t i o n of
t h e state followed t h e trail b l a z e d by a n a n t i c i p a t o r y n a t i o n a l c o n
sciousness d i s s e m i n a t e d by p r o p a g a n d a . T h e difference b e t w e e n
t h e s e two p a t h s (from state to n a t i o n vs. f r o m n a t i o n to state) is
r e f l e c t e d in t h e b a c k g r o u n d s of t h e a c t o r s w h o f o r m e d t h e v a n g u a r d
of n a t i o n a n d state b u i l d e r s . A l o n g t h e first p a t h , t h e s e w e r e lawyers,
d i p l o m a t s , a n d m i l i t a r y officers w h o b e l o n g e d to t h e k i n g ' s a d m i n
istrative staff a n d t o g e t h e r c o n s t r u c t e d a "rational state b u r e a u c r a c y "
(in M a x W e b e r ' s s e n s e ) ; a l o n g t h e s e c o n d , t h e y w e r e writers a n d
h i s t o r i a n s , a n d scholars a n d intellectuals in g e n e r a l , w h o laid t h e
g r o u n d w o r k for C a v o u r ' s a n d B i s m a r c k ' s s u b s e q u e n t d i p l o m a t i c a n d
m i l i t a r y u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e state by p r o p a g a t i n g t h e m o r e o r less
i m a g i n a r y u n i t y of t h e "cultural n a t i o n . " After t h e S e c o n d W o r l d
War, a t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n of very different nation-states e m e r g e d f r o m
106
Chapter 4
t h e p r o c e s s of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y in Africa a n d Asia. O f t e n
t h e s e states, w h i c h w e r e f o u n d e d w i t h i n t h e frontiers e s t a b l i s h e d by
t h e f o r m e r c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s , a c q u i r e d sovereignty b e f o r e t h e im
p o r t e d f o r m s of state o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d take r o o t in a n a t i o n a l
i d e n t i t y t h a t t r a n s c e n d e d tribal differences. I n t h e s e cases, artificial
states h a d t o b e first "filled" by n a t i o n s t h a t c o a l e s c e d only later.
Finally, with t h e collapse of t h e Soviet E m p i r e , t h e t r e n d t o w a r d t h e
f o r m a t i o n of i n d e p e n d e n t nation-states in E a s t e r n a n d S o u t h e r n
E u r o p e h a s followed t h e p a t h of m o r e o r less v i o l e n t secessions; in
t h e socially a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y p r e c a r i o u s situation in w h i c h t h e s e
c o u n t r i e s f o u n d themselves, t h e o l d e t h n o n a t i o n a l slogans h a d t h e
p o w e r to m o b i l i z e d i s t r a u g h t p o p u l a t i o n s for i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h u s t o d a y t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s definitively s u p e r s e d e d o l d e r p o
litical f o r m a t i o n s . To b e s u r e , t h e classical city-states also h a d suc
cessors in m o d e r n E u r o p e , for a c e r t a i n p e r i o d , in t h e cities of
N o r t h e r n Italy a n d i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e o l d L o t h a r i n g i a (Lor
r a i n e ) i n t h e b e l t of cities o u t of w h i c h Switzerland a n d t h e N e t h
e r l a n d s e m e r g e d . T h e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e o l d e m p i r e s also r e e m e r g e d ,
first in t h e f o r m of t h e H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e a n d l a t e r in t h e multination-states of t h e Russian, O t t o m a n , a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m
pires. B u t in t h e m e a n t i m e t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s d i s p l a c e d t h e s e
r e m n a n t s of p r e m o d e r n states. We a r e at p r e s e n t witnessing t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of C h i n a , t h e last of t h e o l d e m p i r e s .
1
H e g e l t o o k t h e view t h a t every historical f o r m a t i o n is c o n d e m n e d

to d e c l i n e o n c e it h a s r e a c h e d maturity. O n e n e e d n o t a c c e p t H e g e l ' s
p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y to r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e t r i u m p h a l p r o c e s s i o n of
t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e also h a s a n i r o n i c a l , obverse side. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e
at o n e t i m e r e p r e s e n t e d a c o g e n t r e s p o n s e to t h e historical chal
l e n g e to find a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for t h e early m o d e r n f o r m of
social i n t e g r a t i o n w h i c h was in t h e p r o c e s s of d i s i n t e g r a t i n g . T o d a y
we a r e c o n f r o n t i n g a n a n a l o g o u s c h a l l e n g e . T h e globalization of
c o m m e r c e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , of e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n a n d
finance, of t h e s p r e a d of t e c h n o l o g y a n d w e a p o n s , a n d a b o v e &11 of
ecological a n d m i l i t a r y risks, p o s e s p r o b l e m s t h a t c a n n o l o n g e r b e
solved w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of nation-states o r by t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
m e t h o d of a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n sovereign states. If c u r r e n t t r e n d s
c o n t i n u e , t h e progressive u n d e r m i n i n g of n a t i o n a l sovereignty will
107
The European Nation-State
necessitate t h e f o u n d i n g a n d e x p a n s i o n of political institutions o n

t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level, a p r o c e s s w h o s e b e g i n n i n g s c a n already b e
o b s e r v e d . I n E u r o p e , N o r t h A m e r i c a , a n d Asia, n e w f o r m s of o r g a n i
z a t i o n for c o n t i n e n t a l " r e g i m e s " a r e g r a d u a l l y e m e r g i n g above t h e
level of t h e state, r e g i m e s w h i c h c o u l d o n e day p r o v i d e t h e r e q u i s i t e
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for t h e c u r r e n t l y r a t h e r inefficient U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
T h i s u n p r e c e d e n t e d i n c r e a s e in a b s t r a c t i o n is m e r e l y t h e c o n t i n u
a t i o n of a p r o c e s s t h e first m a j o r e x a m p l e of w h i c h is t h e i n t e g r a t i o n
a c h i e v e d by t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . H e n c e I t h i n k t h a t we c a n take o u r
o r i e n t a t i o n o n t h e p r e c a r i o u s p a t h t o w a r d p o s t n a t i o n a l societies
f r o m t h e very historical m o d e l we a r e o n t h e p o i n t of s u p e r s e d i n g .
First I w o u l d like to review t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e
by clarifying t h e c o n c e p t s "state" a n d " n a t i o n " (I) a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e
two p r o b l e m s to w h i c h t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e p r o v i d e d a s o l u t i o n (II).
T h e n I will e x a m i n e t h e p o t e n t i a l for conflict b u i l t i n t o this f o r m of
n a t i o n a l state, n a m e l y t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n r e p u b l i c a n i s m a n d na
t i o n a l i s m (III). Finally, I w o u l d like to d e a l with two c u r r e n t chal
l e n g e s t h a t o v e r b u r d e n t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e ' s capacity for a c t i o n : t h e
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of society a l o n g m u l t i c u l t u r a l lines (IV) a n d t h e p r o c
esses of g l o b a l i z a t i o n t h a t a r e u n d e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e i n t e r n a l (V)
a n d t h e e x t e r n a l (VI) sovereignty of t h e existing nation-states.
I
"State" and "Nation"
T h e "state" o n t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n is a legally d e f i n e d t e r m
w h i c h refers, at t h e level of s u b s t a n c e , to a state p o w e r t h a t possesses
b o t h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l sovereignty, at t h e spatial level over a
clearly d e l i m i t e d t e r r a i n ( t h e state t e r r i t o r y ) a n d at t h e social level
over t h e totality of m e m b e r s ( t h e b o d y of citizens o r t h e p e o p l e ) .
State p o w e r c o n s t i t u t e s itself in t h e f o r m s of positive law, a n d t h e
p e o p l e is t h e b e a r e r of t h e legal o r d e r w h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n is r e s t r i c t e d
to t h e state territory. I n political u s a g e , t h e c o n c e p t s " n a t i o n " a n d
" p e o p l e " have t h e s a m e e x t e n s i o n . B u t in a d d i t i o n to its legal defini
tion, t h e t e r m " n a t i o n " h a s t h e c o n n o t a t i o n of a political c o m m u n i t y
s h a p e d by c o m m o n d e s c e n t , o r at least by a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e ,
c u l t u r e , a n d history. A p e o p l e b e c o m e s a " n a t i o n " in this historical
sense only in t h e c o n c r e t e f o r m of a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of life. T h e two
108
Chapter 4
c o m p o n e n t s , w h i c h a r e y o k e d t o g e t h e r in s u c h c o n c e p t s as "nations t a t e " a n d " n a t i o n of citizens," c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to two far-fromparallel p r o c e s s e s of historical d e v e l o p m e n t t h e f o r m a t i o n of states

o n t h e o n e h a n d ( 1 ) , a n d of n a t i o n s o n t h e o t h e r ( 2 ) .
(1) T h e historical success of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e is d u e in l a r g e p a r t
to t h e a d v a n t a g e s of t h e m o d e r n state a p p a r a t u s as s u c h . Evidently,
t h e t e r r i t o r i a l state, with its m o n o p o l y o n t h e l e g i t i m a t e u s e of
v i o l e n c e a n d its d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a t u s financed by
t a x a t i o n , was b e t t e r a b l e to c o p e with t h e f u n c t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s of
social, c u l t u r a l , a n d , a b o v e all, e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h a n w e r e
o l d e r political f o r m a t i o n s . F o r o u r p u r p o s e s it will suffice to recall
t h e ideal-typical m o d e l w o r k e d o u t by M a r x a n d Weber.
(a) T h e executive b r a n c h of t h e state w h i c h b e c a m e d e t a c h e d
f r o m t h e royal h o u s e h o l d c o n s i s t e d of a functionally specialized
b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h was r u n by legally t r a i n e d officials
a n d w h i c h c o u l d d r a w o n t h e r e s e r v e force of a s t a n d i n g army, t h e
p o l i c e , a n d t h e p e n a l system. T h e i m p o s i t i o n of "civil p e a c e " (Landfriederi) was t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n for m o n o p o l i z i n g t h e s e le
g i t i m a t e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . A state is sovereign only if it c a n b o t h
m a i n t a i n law a n d o r d e r i n t e r n a l l y a n d p r o t e c t its b o r d e r s a g a i n s t
e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s . It m u s t b e c a p a b l e of prevailing over all c o m p e t i n g
p o w e r s w i t h i n its b o r d e r s a n d of a s s e r t i n g itself in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a r e n a as a c o m p e t i t o r with e q u a l s t a n d i n g . T h e status of a subject of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n a c h i e v i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g
n i t i o n as a n " e q u a l " a n d " i n d e p e n d e n t " m e m b e r of t h e system of
states. I n t e r n a l sovereignty p r e s u p p o s e s t h e ability to m a i n t a i n law
a n d o r d e r , e x t e r n a l sovereignty t h e ability to assert o n e s e l f in t h e
"anarchistic" c o m p e t i t i o n for p o w e r a m o n g states.
(b) Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t for t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o c e s s is t h e
s e p a r a t i o n of t h e state f r o m "civil society" (in H e g e l ' s sense of "burgerliche Gesellschaft"); h e n c e t h e f u n c t i o n a l specification of t h e state
a p p a r a t u s . T h e m o d e r n state is b o t h a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d a taxb a s e d state, w h i c h m e a n s t h a t it limits itself to essentially a d m i n i s t r a
tive tasks. It leaves t h e p r o d u c t i v e tasks, w h i c h w e r e f o r m e r l y
a c c o m p l i s h e d within the framework of political power, t o a m a r k e t
e c o n o m y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m t h e state. To this e x t e n t , it s e c u r e s t h e
" g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n " ; h e n c e t h e legal f r a m e w o r k a n d
109
T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t a r e n e c e s s a r y for capitalistic c o m m o d i t y ex
c h a n g e a n d for t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e l a b o r force.
T h e financial n e e d s of t h e state a r e m e t by a privately g e n e r a t e d tax
i n c o m e . T h e p r i c e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system pays for t h e benefits of
this f u n c t i o n a l specialization is its d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e
of a n e c o n o m y r e g u l a t e d by m a r k e t s . A l t h o u g h m a r k e t s c a n b e
e s t a b l i s h e d a n d r e g u l a t e d by political m e a n s , they o b e y a logic of
t h e i r own t h a t e s c a p e s state c o n t r o l .
T h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of t h e state f r o m t h e e c o n o m y is r e f l e c t e d in
t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n p u b l i c a n d private law. Insofar as t h e
m o d e r n state m a k e s u s e of positive law as a m e a n s of o r g a n i z a t i o n
a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , it b i n d s itself to a m e d i u m t h a t instantiates,
t h r o u g h t h e c o n c e p t of law a n d t h e derivative c o n c e p t s of subjective
r i g h t a n d of t h e legal p e r s o n (as t h e b e a r e r of r i g h t s ) , a n e w p r i n c i
p l e m a d e explicit by H o b b e s : w i t h i n a n o r d e r of m o d e r n law t h a t is
set free f r o m i m m e d i a t e m o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s ( t h o u g h only in c e r t a i n
r e s p e c t s ) , t h e citizens a r e p e r m i t t e d t o d o a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t p r o
h i b i t e d . R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r state p o w e r h a s a l r e a d y b e e n d o m e s
ticated by t h e r u l e of law a n d t h e c r o w n h a s b e c o m e "subject t o t h e
law," t h e state c a n n o t m a k e u s e of t h e m e d i u m of law w i t h o u t o r g a n
izing social i n t e r c o u r s e i n t h e s e p a r a t e s p h e r e of civil society in s u c h
a way t h a t private p e r s o n s enjoyat first u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d i n
dividual liberties. W i t h t h e s e p a r a t i o n of private f r o m p u b l i c law, t h e
i n d i v i d u a l citizen, in h e r r o l e as "subject" ("Untertan" i n K a n t ' s ter
m i n o l o g y ) , first a c q u i r e s at least a c o r e of private a u t o n o m y .
(2) T o d a y we all live in n a t i o n a l societies t h a t owe t h e i r u n i t y to
a n o r g a n i z a t i o n of this type. O f c o u r s e , s u c h states existed l o n g
b e f o r e t h e r e w e r e " n a t i o n s " in t h e m o d e r n sense. State a n d n a t i o n
h a v e fused i n t o t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e only since t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of t h e late
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B e f o r e I e x a m i n e t h e specific n a t u r e of this
c o n n e c t i o n I w o u l d like to review, in a brief digression o n c o n c e p t u a l
history, t h e g e n e s i s of t h e m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e citizen b o d y as a n a t i o n in s o m e t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n a m e r e l y legal sense.
I n t h e classical R o m a n u s a g e , " n a t i o " like " g e n s " f u n c t i o n s as a
c o n t r a s t i n g c o n c e p t t o "civitas." N a t i o n s w e r e originally c o m m u n i t i e s
of s h a r e d d e s c e n t w h i c h w e r e i n t e g r a t e d g e o g r a p h i c a l l y t h r o u g h
2
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s e t t l e m e n t s a n d n e i g h b o r h o o d s a n d culturally t h r o u g h t h e i r c o m
m o n l a n g u a g e , c u s t o m s , a n d t r a d i t i o n s ; b u t t h e y w e r e n o t yet inte
g r a t e d politically t h r o u g h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f o r m of a state. T h i s
r o o t m e a n i n g p e r s i s t e d t h r o u g h t h e M i d d l e Ages i n t o early m o d e r n
times w h e n e v e r " n a t i o " a n d "lingua" w e r e t r e a t e d as e q u i v a l e n t .
T h u s , for e x a m p l e , s t u d e n t s at m e d i e v a l universities w e r e divided
i n t o " n a t i o n e s " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c o u n t r y of o r i g i n . I n a n e r a of
i n c r e a s i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l mobility, t h e c o n c e p t s e r v e d p r i m a r i l y as a
m e a n s of i n t e r n a l differentiation of o r d e r s of k n i g h t s , of universities,
m o n a s t e r i e s , ecclesiastical c o u n c i l s , m e r c h a n t s e t t l e m e n t s , etc. T h u s
it h a p p e n e d t h a t a n a t i o n a l o r i g i n ascribed by others was f r o m t h e very
b e g i n n i n g l i n k e d i n a c o n s p i c u o u s way with t h e n e g a t i v e d e m a r c a
t i o n of f o r e i g n e r s f r o m o n e ' s o w n p e o p l e .
3
A r o u n d this t i m e , t h e t e r m " n a t i o n " a c q u i r e d a m e a n i n g o p p o s e d

to t h e n o n p o l i t i c a l u s a g e in a different c o n t e x t . T h e f e u d a l system
of t h e o l d G e r m a n E m p i r e h a d b e e n s u p e r s e d e d by c o r p o r a t i v e
states (Standestaaten) b a s e d o n c o n t r a c t s in w h i c h t h e k i n g o r e m
p e r o r , w h o s e p o w e r d e p e n d e d o n taxes a n d m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t ,
g r a n t e d t h e nobility, t h e C h u r c h , a n d t h e towns c e r t a i n privileges,
a n d t h e r e w i t h l i m i t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e exercise of political power.
T h e s e r u l i n g estates, w h i c h m e t in " p a r l i a m e n t s " o r "diej:s," r e p r e
s e n t e d t h e c o u n t r y o r "the n a t i o n " vis-a-vis t h e c o u r t . As t h e " n a t i o n , "
t h e aristocracy a c q u i r e d a political e x i s t e n c e t h a t was still d e n i e d t h e
" p e o p l e " as t h e m a s s of t h e subjects. T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s l o g a n "the K i n g in P a r l i a m e n t " in E n g l a n d a n d ,
especially, of t h e identification of t h e " T h i r d E s t a t e " with t h e "na
t i o n " in F r a n c e .
T h e d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e Adelsnation, t h e n a t i o n of
t h e nobility, i n t o a Volksnation, t h e n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e , w h i c h h a s
b e e n in p r o g r e s s since t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , p r e s u p p o s e s a
d e e p t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n s p i r e d by intellectuals, a
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n first a c c o m p l i s h e d by t h e u r b a n , a n d a b o v e all for
mally e d u c a t e d , m i d d l e classes b e f o r e it f o u n d a r e s o n a n c e in t h e
w i d e r p o p u l a t i o n a n d g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t a b o u t a political mobiliza
t i o n of t h e masses. P o p u l a r n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s crystallized i n t o
t h e " i m a g i n e d c o m m u n i t i e s " ( B e n e d i c t A n d e r s o n ) p r o p a g a t e d in
n a t i o n a l histories, w h i c h b e c a m e t h e catalysts of a n e w f o r m of
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collective self-identification: " T h u s n a t i o n s a r o s e in t h e final d e c a d e s

of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h cen
t u r y . . .: c o n c e i v e d by a small n u m b e r of scholars, publicists, a n d
poetsVolksnationen i n c o n c e p t b u t far f r o m it in reality." To t h e
e x t e n t t h a t this i d e a t o o k r o o t , however, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that,
with its t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of a n aristocratic n a t i o n
i n t o t h a t of a n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e , t h e political c o n c e p t h a d i n h e r
i t e d t h e p o w e r to g e n e r a t e stereotypes f r o m t h e older, p r e p o l i t i c a l
c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n as a n i n d e x of d e s c e n t a n d o r i g i n . T h e positive
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o n e ' s own n a t i o n n o w b e c a m e a n efficient
m e c h a n i s m for r e p u d i a t i n g e v e r y t h i n g r e g a r d e d as f o r e i g n , for d e
v a l u i n g o t h e r n a t i o n s , a n d for e x c l u d i n g n a t i o n a l , e t h n i c , a n d relig
i o u s m i n o r i t i e s , especially t h e Jews. I n E u r o p e n a t i o n a l i s m b e c a m e
allied with a n t i s e m i t i s m , with disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s .
4
II
T h e N e w F o r m o f Social Integration
i n t e r p r e t e d in l i g h t of t h e i r results, t h e c o m p l e x a n d l o n g - r u n n i n g
p r o c e s s e s of t h e " i n v e n t i o n of t h e n a t i o n " (Schulze) p l a y e d t h e r o l e
of a catalyst in t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e early m o d e r n state i n t o a
d e m o c r a t i c r e p u b l i c . P o p u l a r n a t i o n a l self-consciousness p r o v i d e d
t h e c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t w h i c h "subjects" c o u l d b e c o m e p o
litically active "citizens." B e l o n g i n g to t h e " n a t i o n " m a d e possible for
t h e first t i m e a r e l a t i o n of solidarity b e t w e e n p e r s o n s w h o h a d p r e
viously b e e n s t r a n g e r s t o o n e a n o t h e r . T h u s t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e
n a t i o n - s t a t e c o n s i s t e d in solving two p r o b l e m s at o n c e : it m a d e pos
sible a n e w mode of legitimation b a s e d o n a new, m o r e a b s t r a c t f o r m
of social integration.
Briefly stated, t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n p r o b l e m r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e fact t h a t
t h e p l u r a l i s m of worldviews t h a t followed t h e schism of t h e religious
confessions g r a d u a l l y s t r i p p e d political a u t h o r i t y of its religious
g r o u n d i n g in "divine r i g h t . " T h e secularized state n o w h a d to derive
its l e g i t i m a t i o n f r o m different s o u r c e s . T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m , t h a t of
social i n t e g r a t i o n , was c o n n e c t e d , simplifying o n c e a g a i n , with ur
b a n i z a t i o n a n d e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n , with t h e i n c r e a s i n g s c o p e
a n d a c c e l e r a t i o n of t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of p e o p l e , g o o d s , a n d news.
P o p u l a t i o n s b e c a m e u n m o o r e d f r o m t h e c o r p o r a t i v e social ties of
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early m o d e r n societies, t h e r e b y b e c o m i n g a t t h e s a m e t i m e b o t h
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y m o b i l i z e d a n d isolated. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e r e s p o n d e d
to b o t h of t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s by politically m o b i l i z i n g its citizens. F o r
t h e e m e r g i n g n a t i o n a l identity m a d e it possible to c o m b i n e a m o r e
a b s t r a c t f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n with n e w s t r u c t u r e s of political
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . D e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as it slowly b e c a m e es
t a b l i s h e d , g e n e r a t e d a n e w level of legally m e d i a t e d solidarity via t h e
status of citizenship while p r o v i d i n g t h e state with a secular s o u r c e
of legitimation. O f c o u r s e , t h e r e was n o m o d e r n state t h a t h a d n o t
d e f i n e d its social b o u n d a r i e s in t e r m s of citizenship r i g h t s . B u t b e
l o n g i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r state at first m e a n t n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n b e i n g
subject to a state power. O n l y with t h e t r a n s i t i o n to t h e d e m o c r a t i c
state was this ascriptive, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m e m b e r s h i p t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o a n a c q u i r e d m e m b e r s h i p b a s e d o n (at least implicit) c o n
s e n t o f citizens w h o w e r e e x p e c t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e actively in t h e
exercise of political power. However, we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n
t h e legal-political a n d t h e p r o p e r l y c u l t u r a l aspects of t h e n e w m e a n
i n g t h a t m e m b e r s h i p a c q u i r e d with t h e shift f r o m t h e status of a
subject to t h a t of a citizen.
As we h a v e s e e n , t h e two d e f i n i n g characteristics of t h e m o d e r n
state w e r e t h e sovereignty of state p o w e r e m b o d i e d in t h e p r i n c e a n d
t h e differentiation of t h e state f r o m society t h r o u g h w h i c h a c o r e of
individual liberties was c o n f e r r e d (in a p a t e r n a l i s t i c m a n n e r ) o n t h e
private citizens. W i t h t h e shift f r o m royal to p o p u l a r sovereignty, t h e
r i g h t s of subjects w e r e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o h u m a n r i g h t s a n d civil
rights, t h a t is, i n t o basic liberal a n d political r i g h t s of citizens. Viewed
as i d e a l types, t h e y g u a r a n t e e d political as well as private a u t o n o m y ,
a n d in p r i n c i p l e , even e q u a l political a u t o n o m y for e v e r y o n e . T h e
d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is, ideally s p e a k i n g , a v o l u n t a r y p o
litical o r d e r e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s a n d l e g i t i m a t e d by
t h e i r free will-formation. A c c o r d i n g to R o u s s e a u a n d Kant, t h e ad
d r e s s e e s of t h e law s h o u l d b e a b l e to c o n c e i v e of t h e m s e l v e s at t h e
s a m e t i m e as its a u t h o r s .
B u t s u c h a legal-political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w o u l d h a v e l a c k e d driv
i n g force, a n d formally e s t a b l i s h e d r e p u b l i c s w o u l d h a v e l a c k e d
staying power, if a n a t i o n of m o r e o r less self-conscious citizens h a d
n o t e m e r g e d f r o m a p e o p l e d e f i n e d by its subjection t o state power.
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T h i s political m o b i l i z a t i o n called for a n i d e a t h a t was vivid a n d

p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to s h a p e p e o p l e ' s convictions a n d a p p e a l e d m o r e
strongly to t h e i r h e a r t s a n d m i n d s t h a n t h e d r y ideas of p o p u l a r
sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights. T h i s g a p was filled by t h e m o d e r n
i d e a of t h e n a t i o n , w h i c h first i n s p i r e d in t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of state
t e r r i t o r i e s a n a w a r e n e s s of t h e new, legally a n d politically m e d i a t e d
f o r m of c o m m u n i t y . O n l y a n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , crystallized
a r o u n d t h e n o t i o n of a c o m m o n ancestry, l a n g u a g e , a n d history,
only t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of b e l o n g i n g to "the s a m e " p e o p l e , m a k e s
subjects i n t o citizens of a single political c o m m u n i t y i n t o m e m b e r s
w h o c a n feel r e s p o n s i b l e for one another. T h e n a t i o n o r t h e Volksgeist,
t h e u n i q u e spirit of t h e p e o p l e t h e first truly modern f o r m of col
lective i d e n t i t y p r o v i d e d t h e c u l t u r a l basis for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
state. As d e s c r i b e d by h i s t o r i a n s , this t h o r o u g h l y artificial fusion of
o l d e r loyalties i n t o a n e w n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h was also
s t e e r e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c i m p e r a t i v e s , is a l o n g , d r a w n - o u t p r o c e s s .
T h i s leads to a d o u b l e c o d i n g of citizenship, with t h e r e s u l t t h a t
t h e legal status d e f i n e d in t e r m s of civil r i g h t s also implies m e m b e r
s h i p in a culturally d e f i n e d c o m m u n i t y . W i t h o u t this c u l t u r a l inter
p r e t a t i o n of political m e m b e r s h i p r i g h t s , t h e nation-state i n its
e m e r g e n t p h a s e w o u l d scarcely h a v e h a d sufficient s t r e n g t h to estab
lish a new, m o r e a b s t r a c t level of social i n t e g r a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e legal
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship. T h e c o u n t e r e x a m p l e of
t h e U n i t e d States d o e s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e c a n a s s u m e
a n d m a i n t a i n a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m even w i t h o u t t h e s u p p o r t of s u c h a
culturally h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n . However, in this case a civil
r e l i g i o n r o o t e d in t h e majority c u l t u r e t o o k t h e p l a c e of n a t i o n a l i s m .
T h u s far I h a v e f o c u s e d exclusively o n t h e achievements of t h e
nation-state. But the connection between republicanism a n d nation
alism also e n g e n d e r s d a n g e r o u s ambivalences. W i t h t h e rise of t h e
nation-state, t h e m e a n i n g of state sovereignty also c h a n g e s , as we
have s e e n . T h i s n o t only h a s a n i m p a c t o n t h e shift f r o m royal to
p o p u l a r sovereignty; it also c h a n g e s t h e p e r c e p t i o n of e x t e r n a l sov
ereignty. T h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n is inextricably b o u n d u p with t h e
Machiavellian will to self-assertion by w h i c h t h e c o n d u c t of sovereign
states i n t h e a r e n a of t h e "great p o w e r s " h a d b e e n g u i d e d f r o m t h e
b e g i n n i n g . N o w t h e strategic self-assertion of t h e m o d e r n state
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a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e existential selfa s s e r t i o n of "the n a t i o n . " W i t h this a t h i r d c o n c e p t of " f r e e d o m " is

i n t r o d u c e d . T h e collective c o n c e p t of n a t i o n a l f r e e d o m c o m p e t e s
with t h e two individualistic c o n c e p t s of f r e e d o m , t h a t of t h e private
liberties of m e m b e r s of civil society a n d t h a t of t h e political a u t o n
o m y of citizens. M o r e i m p o r t a n t is t h e q u e s t i o n of how t h e f r e e d o m
of t h e n a t i o n is to b e c o n s t r u e d : w h e t h e r o n a n a n a l o g y with t h e
liberty of private p e r s o n s w h o differentiate t h e m s e l v e s f r o m , a n d
c o m p e t e with, o n e a n o t h e r , o r o n t h e m o d e l of t h e c o o p e r a t i v e
self-legislation of a u t o n o m o u s citizens.
T h e m o d e l of p u b l i c a u t o n o m y takes p r e c e d e n c e if t h e n a t i o n is
p r i m a r i l y c o n c e i v e d as a legally c o n s t i t u t e d entity, t h a t is, as a n a t i o n
of citizens. T h e s e citizens m a y i n d e e d b e p a t r i o t s w h o u n d e r s t a n d
a n d u p h o l d t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n as a n a c h i e v e m e n t in t h e c o n t e x t of
t h e h i s t o r y of t h e i r c o u n t r y . B u t t h e y c o n s t r u e t h e f r e e d o m of t h e
n a t i o n f o l l o w i n g Kant-in c o s m o p o l i t a n t e r m s , namely, as t h e
a u t h o r i z a t i o n a n d o b l i g a t i o n to e n t e r i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e a g r e e m e n t s
o r to establish a b a l a n c e of i n t e r e s t s with o t h e r n a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e
f r a m e w o r k of a peaceful f e d e r a t i o n (Volkerbund). T h e n a t u r a l i s t i c
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n as a p r e p o l i t i c a l entity, by c o n t r a s t , suggests
a different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e f r e e d o m of t h e
n a t i o n consists essentially in its ability to assert its i n d e p e n d e n c e by
m i l i t a r y m e a n s if necessary. Like private p e r s o n s in t h e m a r k e t ,
p e o p l e s p u r s u e t h e i r respective i n t e r e s t s in t h e free-for-all of inter
n a t i o n a l p o w e r politics. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l i m a g e of e x t e r n a l sover
eignty is d r e s s e d u p in n a t i o n a l colors a n d in this guise a w a k e n s n e w
energies.
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T h e Tension b e t w e e n Nationalism and Republicanism
I n c o n t r a s t to t h e r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m s of individuals, t h e i n d e
p e n d e n c e of o n e ' s n a t i o n , w h i c h m u s t if n e c e s s a r y b e d e f e n d e d with
t h e " b l o o d of its sons," d e s i g n a t e s t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e secularized
state p r e s e r v e s a r e s i d u e of n o n s e c u l a r t r a n s c e n d e n c e . I n times of
w a r t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e i m p o s e s o n its citizens t h e d u t y to risk t h e i r lives
for t h e collective. Since t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , g e n e r a l c o n s c r i p t i o n
h a s g o n e h a n d - i n - h a n d with civil rights; t h e willingness to fight a n d
115
die for o n e ' s c o u n t r y is s u p p o s e d to e x p r e s s b o t h n a t i o n a l conscious

ness a n d r e p u b l i c a n v i r t u e . T h u s t h e i n s c r i p t i o n s of F r e n c h n a t i o n a l
h i s t o r y reflect a d o u b l e m e m o r y - t r a c e : political m i l e s t o n e s in t h e
fight for r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m a r e u n i t e d with t h e d e a t h - s y m b o l i s m of
m e m o r i a l s for soldiers killed in a c t i o n .
T h e n a t i o n is Janus-faced. W h e r e a s t h e v o l u n t a r y n a t i o n of citizens
is t h e s o u r c e of d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n , it is t h e i n h e r i t e d o r as
c r i b e d n a t i o n f o u n d e d o n e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p (diegeborene Nation der
Volksgenossen) t h a t s e c u r e s social i n t e g r a t i o n . Staatsbilrger o r citizens
c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a political association of free a n d e q u a l
p e r s o n s by t h e i r o w n initiative; Volksgenossen o r n a t i o n a l s a l r e a d y find
themselves in a c o m m u n i t y s h a p e d by a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e a n d history.
T h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e universalism of a n e g a l i t a r i a n legal c o m
m u n i t y a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s m of a c o m m u n i t y u n i t e d by historical
destiny is b u i l t i n t o t h e very c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n a l state.
T h i s a m b i v a l e n c e r e m a i n s h a r m l e s s as l o n g as a c o s m o p o l i t a n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n of citizens is a c c o r d e d priority over a n
e t h n o c e n t r i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n as in a p e r m a n e n t state of
war. O n l y a n o n n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n c a n b e c o m b i n e d
seamlessly with t h e universalistic s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o
cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. T h e n t h e r e p u b l i c a n i d e a c a n take t h e
l e a d in p e n e t r a t i n g socially i n t e g r a t i n g f o r m s of life a n d s t r u c t u r i n g
t h e m in a c c o r d a n c e with universalistic p a t t e r n s . T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e
owes its historical success to t h e fact t h a t it s u b s t i t u t e d r e l a t i o n s of
solidarity b e t w e e n t h e citizens for t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i n g c o r p o r a t i v e ties
of early m o d e r n society. B u t this r e p u b l i c a n a c h i e v e m e n t is e n d a n
g e r e d w h e n , conversely, t h e integrative force of t h e n a t i o n of citizens
is t r a c e d b a c k to t h e p r e p o l i t i c a l fact of a q u a s i - n a t u r a l p e o p l e , t h a t
is, t o s o m e t h i n g i n d e p e n d e n t of a n d p r i o r to t h e political o p i n i o n a n d will-formation of t h e citizens themselves. O f c o u r s e , m a n y rea
sons c o u l d b e given for t h e l u r c h i n t o n a t i o n a l i s m . I will m e n t i o n
j u s t two, o n e c o n c e p t u a l , t h e o t h e r e m p i r i c a l .
T h e r e is a c o n c e p t u a l g a p in t h e legal c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e consti
t u t i o n a l state, a g a p t h a t is t e m p t i n g to fill with a naturalistic c o n
c e p t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . O n e c a n n o t e x p l a i n in p u r e l y n o r m a t i v e
t e r m s h o w t h e u n i v e r s e of t h o s e w h o c o m e t o g e t h e r to r e g u l a t e t h e i r
c o m m o n life by m e a n s of positive law s h o u l d b e c o m p o s e d . F r o m a
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n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view, t h e social b o u n d a r i e s of a n association of

free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law a r e perfectly c o n t i n g e n t . Since
t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n to e n g a g e in a law-giving p r a x i s is
a fiction of t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , in t h e r e a l w o r l d w h o gains
t h e p o w e r to d e f i n e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of a political c o m m u n i t y is
settled by historical c h a n c e a n d t h e actual c o u r s e of e v e n t s n o r
mally, by t h e a r b i t r a r y o u t c o m e s of wars o r civil wars. It is a t h e o r e t i
cal m i s t a k e with grave p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s , o n e d a t i n g b a c k to
t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , to a s s u m e t h a t this q u e s t i o n c a n also b e
a n s w e r e d in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s with r e f e r e n c e to a "right to n a t i o n a l
self-determination."
5
N a t i o n a l i s m h a s f o u n d its o w n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of b o u n d a
ries. W h i l e n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s itself m a y very well b e a n artifact,
it projects t h e i m a g i n a r y reality of t h e n a t i o n as a n o r g a n i c d e v e l o p
m e n t w h i c h , in c o n t r a s t with t h e artificial o r d e r of e n a c t e d law a n d
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, n e e d s n o justification
b e y o n d its s h e e r e x i s t e n c e . F o r this r e a s o n , r e c o u r s e to t h e " o r g a n i c "
n a t i o n c a n c o n c e a l t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e historically m o r e o r less
a r b i t r a r y b o u n d a r i e s of t h e political c o m m u n i t y a n d c a n l e n d t h e m
a n a u r a of i m i t a t e d s u b s t a n c e a n d " i n h e r i t e d " legitimacy.
T h e o t h e r r e a s o n for t h e l u r c h i n t o n a t i o n a l i s m is m o r e trivial.
Precisely t h e artificiality of n a t i o n a l m y t h s , b o t h in t h e i r l e a r n e d
origins a n d their dissemination t h r o u g h p r o p a g a n d a , makes nation
alism intrinsically susceptible to m i s u s e by political elites. T h a t d o
m e s t i c conflicts c a n b e n e u t r a l i z e d by f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y successes repts
o n a socio-psychological m e c h a n i s m t h a t g o v e r n m e n t s have r e p e a t
edly e x p l o i t e d . B u t h o w t h e class conflicts g e n e r a t e d by a c c e l e r a t e d
capitalist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n c a n b e d i v e r t e d was p r e f i g u r e d for a bel
l i g e r e n t n a t i o n - s t a t e striving for w o r l d p r o m i n e n c e : t h e collective
f r e e d o m of t h e n a t i o n c o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of a n i m p e r i a l
e x p a n s i o n of power. T h e h i s t o r y of E u r o p e a n i m p e r i a l i s m b e t w e e n
1871 a n d 1914, a n d t h e i n t e g r a l n a t i o n a l i s m of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y
( n o t to s p e a k of t h e racist policies of t h e Nazis), illustrate t h e sad
fact t h a t t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n d i d n o t so m u c h r e i n f o r c e t h e loyalty
of t h e p o p u l a t i o n to t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state b u t m o r e often s e r v e d
as a n i n s t r u m e n t to m o b i l i z e t h e masses for political goals t h a t c a n
scarcely b e r e c o n c i l e d with r e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e s .
6
117
T h e lesson to b e l e a r n e d f r o m this sad h i s t o r y is obvious. T h e

nation-state m u s t r e n o u n c e t h e a m b i v a l e n t p o t e n t i a l t h a t o n c e p r o
p e l l e d it. T h o u g h t h e n a t i o n a l state is t o d a y r u n n i n g u p against its
limits, we c a n still l e a r n f r o m its e x a m p l e . I n its heyday, t h e n a t i o n state f o u n d e d a d o m a i n of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a d e it
possible to a b s o r b t h e a d v a n c e s in a b s t r a c t i o n of societal m o d e r n
ization a n d to r e - e m b e d a p o p u l a t i o n u p r o o t e d f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l
f o r m s of life in a n e x t e n d e d a n d r a t i o n a l i z e d lifeworld t h r o u g h t h e
cultivation of n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . It c o u l d play this integrative
r o l e all t h e b e t t e r in t h a t d e m o c r a t i c citizenship was c o n n e c t e d with
c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p in t h e n a t i o n . Today, as t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e finds
itself c h a l l e n g e d f r o m w i t h i n by t h e explosive p o t e n t i a l of multicul
t u r a l i s m a n d f r o m w i t h o u t by t h e p r e s s u r e of globalization, t h e
q u e s t i o n arises of w h e t h e r t h e r e exists a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for
t h e fusion of t h e n a t i o n of citizens with t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n .
TV
T h e Unity o f Political Culture in the Multiplicity o f Subcultures
Originally, t h e suggestive u n i t y of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n o u s n a t i o n

c o u l d e n s u r e t h e c u l t u r a l e m b e d d i n g of a legally d e f i n e d c i t i z e n s h i p
status. I n this c o n t e x t , d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n s h i p c o u l d f o r m t h e focal
p o i n t of social ties of m u t u a l responsibility. B u t t o d a y we live in
pluralistic societies t h a t a r e m o v i n g f u r t h e r a n d f u r t h e r away f r o m
t h e m o d e l of a n a t i o n - s t a t e b a s e d o n a culturally h o m o g e n e o u s
p o p u l a t i o n . T h e diversity of c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life, e t h n i c g r o u p s ,
religions, a n d worldviews is c o n s t a n t l y g r o w i n g . T h e r e is n o a l t e r n a
tive to this d e v e l o p m e n t , e x c e p t a t t h e n o r m a t i v e l y i n t o l e r a b l e cost
of e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . H e n c e r e p u b l i c a n i s m m u s t l e a r n to s t a n d o n its
o w n feet. T h e c e n t r a l i d e a of r e p u b l i c a n i s m is t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c
p r o c e s s c a n s e r v e a t t h e s a m e t i m e as a g u a r a n t o r for t h e social
i n t e g r a t i o n of a n increasingly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d society. I n a society char
a c t e r i z e d by c u l t u r a l a n d religious p l u r a l i s m , this task c a n n o t b e
d i s p l a c e d f r o m t h e level of political will-formation a n d p u b l i c c o m
m u n i c a t i o n o n t o t h e s e e m i n g l y n a t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d l y
h o m o g e n e o u s n a t i o n . T h e latter w o u l d m e r e l y serve as a facade for
a h e g e m o n i c majority c u l t u r e . F o r historical r e a s o n s , in m a n y c o u n
tries t h e majority c u l t u r e is fused with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e
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w h i c h claims to b e r e c o g n i z e d by all citizens r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r

c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d . T h i s fusion m u s t b e dissolved if it is to b e
possible for different cultural, e t h n i c , a n d religious f o r m s of life to
coexist a n d i n t e r a c t o n e q u a l t e r m s w i t h i n the same political c o m m u
nity. T h e level of t h e s h a r e d political c u l t u r e m u s t b e u n c o u p l e d
f r o m t h e level of s u b c u l t u r e s a n d t h e i r p r e p o l i t i c a l identities. O f
c o u r s e , t h e claim to coexist with e q u a l r i g h t s is subject to t h e proviso
t h a t t h e p r o t e c t e d faiths a n d p r a c t i c e s m u s t n o t c o n t r a d i c t t h e r e i g n
i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s (as t h e y a r e i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e political
culture).
T h e political c u l t u r e of a c o u n t r y crystallizes a r o u n d its constitu
t i o n . E a c h n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e d e v e l o p s a distinctive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
t h o s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a r e equally e m b o d i e d in o t h e r
r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s s u c h as p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n
r i g h t s i n light of its o w n n a t i o n a l history. A " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t
i s m " b a s e d o n t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c a n take t h e p l a c e originally
o c c u p i e d by n a t i o n a l i s m . T h i s n o t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m
a p p e a r s to m a n y o b s e r v e r s to r e p r e s e n t t o o weak a b o n d to h o l d
t o g e t h e r c o m p l e x societies. T h e q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o m e s even m o r e
u r g e n t : u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s c a n a liberal political c u l t u r e p r o v i d e
a sufficient c u s h i o n to p r e v e n t a n a t i o n of citizens, w h i c h c a n n o
l o n g e r rely o n e t h n i c associations, f r o m dissolving i n t o fragments?
T o d a y this p r o b l e m h a s a r i s e n even for classical i m m i g r a n t c o u n
tries like t h e U n i t e d States. T h e political c u l t u r e of t h e U n i t e d States
p r o v i d e s m o r e space t h a n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s for t h e peaceful coexis
t e n c e of citizens f r o m widely d i v e r g e n t c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d s ; it e n
ables e v e r y o n e to m a i n t a i n two i d e n t i t i e s simultaneously, to b e b o t h
a m e m b e r a n d a s t r a n g e r in h e r o w n l a n d . B u t t h e rising tide of
f u n d a m e n t a l i s m a n d even t e r r o r i s m (as witnessed by t h e O k l a h o m a
b o m b i n g ) r e p r e s e n t a w a r n i n g signal t h a t even h e r e t h e safety n e t
of a civil religion, w h i c h i n t e r p r e t s a n impressively c o n t i n u o u s c o n
stitutional h i s t o r y of m o r e t h a n two c e n t u r i e s , c o u l d b e t o r n a p a r t .
My sense is t h a t m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies c a n b e h e l d t o g e t h e r by a
political c u l t u r e , h o w e v e r m u c h it h a s p r o v e n itself, only if d e m o
cratic citizenship pays off n o t only in t e r m s of liberal i n d i v i d u a l
r i g h t s a n d r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , b u t also in t h e e n j o y m e n t
of social a n d c u l t u r a l rights. T h e citizens m u s t b e a b l e to e x p e r i e n c e
119
the fair value of their rights also i n t h e f o r m of social security a n d t h e

r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n of different c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life. D e m o c r a t i c
citizenship c a n only realize its integrative p o t e n t i a l t h a t is, it c a n
only f o u n d solidarity b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s i f it p r o v e s itself as a
m e c h a n i s m t h a t actually realizes t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r e
f e r r e d f o r m s of life.
T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e is s u g g e s t e d a t a n y r a t e by t h e type of welfare state
t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n E u r o p e u n d e r t h e f a v o r a b l e t h o u g h , of c o u r s e ,
n o l o n g e r o b t a i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s of t h e p o s t w a r p e r i o d . After t h e
h i a t u s of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, a n o v e r - h e a t e d n a t i o n a l i s m h a d
e x h a u s t e d its r e s e r v e s of energy. U n d e r t h e u m b r e l l a of a n u c l e a r
balance between the superpowers, the E u r o p e a n countriesand n o t
j u s t t h e divided G e r m a n y c o u l d n o t c o n d u c t a f o r e i g n policy of
t h e i r o w n . T e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s c e a s e d t o b e a n issue. I n t e r n a l social
conflicts c o u l d n o t b e d i v e r t e d o u t w a r d b u t h a d t o b e d e a l t with i n
a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i m a c y of d o m e s t i c politics. U n d e r t h e s e c o n
d i t i o n s it b e c a m e possible t o u n c o u p l e t h e universalistic u n d e r
s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t o a l a r g e e x t e n t f r o m
t h e i m p e r a t i v e s of a p o w e r politics g u i d e d by n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a n d
o r i e n t e d to g e o p o l i t i c a l goals. I n spite of a t h e n prevailing m o o d of
g l o b a l civil w a r a n d a n t i c o m m u n i s t p r o p a g a n d a , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l link
age of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state with t h e a m b i t i o n s of n a t i o n a l selfa s s e r t i o n was l o o s e n e d also t h r o u g h o u t t h e b r o a d e r p o p u l a t i o n .
T h e t r e n d t o w a r d w h a t m i g h t b e t e r m e d a " p o s t n a t i o n a l " selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political c o m m u n i t y m a y h a v e b e e n m o r e p r o
n o u n c e d i n t h e f o r m e r F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y t h a n i n o t h e r
E u r o p e a n states, given its p e c u l i a r situation a n d t h e fact t h a t it h a d ,
after all, b e e n d e p r i v e d of f u n d a m e n t a l sovereignty r i g h t s . B u t i n
m o s t of t h e W e s t e r n a n d N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s , t h e welfarestate pacification of class a n t a g o n i s m s h a d given rise to a n e w
situation. O v e r t i m e , social security systems w e r e i n s t i t u t e d a n d ex
p a n d e d , r e f o r m s in a r e a s s u c h as s c h o o l i n g , t h e family, c r i m i n a l law
a n d t h e p e n a l system, d a t a p r o t e c t i o n , etc., w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d , a n d
policies of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y for w o m e n w e r e a t least i n i t i a t e d .
W i t h i n a single g e n e r a t i o n t h e status of citizens, h o w e v e r i m p e r f e c t ,
was m a r k e d l y i m p r o v e d i n its legal a n d m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . W h a t
is i m p o r t a n t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h a t this m a d e t h e citizens
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themselves m o r e k e e n l y a w a r e of t h e priority of t h e issue of t h e

i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of basic r i g h t s o f t h e priority t h a t t h e r e a l n a t i o n
of citizens m u s t m a i n t a i n over t h e i m a g i n e d e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l n a t i o n .
T h e system of r i g h t s was e x t e n d e d u n d e r t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y favor
a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of a comparatively l o n g p e r i o d of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h .
Each individual could c o m e to recognize a n d appreciate citizenship
status as t h a t w h i c h links h e r with t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e political
c o m m u n i t y a n d m a k e s h e r at t h e s a m e t i m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a n d
co-responsible for t h e m . It b e c a m e clear t o all t h a t private a n d
p u b l i c a u t o n o m y p r e s u p p o s e o n e a n o t h e r in t h e circuit of r e p r o d u c
t i o n a n d i m p r o v e m e n t of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p r e f e r r e d ways of life. At
a n y r a t e , t h e citizens intuitively realized t h a t t h e y c o u l d s u c c e e d i n
r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r private a u t o n o m y fairly only by m a k i n g a n a p p r o p r i
a t e u s e of t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y , a n d t h a t a n i n t a c t private s p h e r e is
i n t u r n a n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n of s u c h political p a r t i c i p a t i o n T h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n f i r m e d itself as t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for a
dialectic of legal a n d factual equality t h a t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e i n f o r c e s
t h e private a n d t h e civic a u t o n o m y of t h e c i t i z e n s .
7
B u t this dialectic h a s in t h e i n t e r i m g r o u n d t o a h a l t q u i t e i n d e
p e n d e n t l y of local causes. If we a r e to e x p l a i n this fact, we m u s t t u r n
o u r attention to the trends that are currently receiving attention
u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of "globalization."
V
Limits o f the Nation-State: Restrictions o f Internal Sovereignty
T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e at o n e t i m e g u a r d e d its t e r r i t o r i a l a n d social
b o u n d a r i e s with a zeal b o r d e r i n g o n t h e n e u r o t i c . T o d a y t h e s e d e
fenses h a v e l o n g since b e e n p e n e t r a t e d by i n e x o r a b l e t r a n s n a t i o n a l
d e v e l o p m e n t s . A n t h o n y G i d d e n s d e f i n e s "globalization" as t h e in
tensification of w o r l d w i d e r e l a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g in r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r c o n
n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n local h a p p e n i n g s a n d d i s t a n t e v e n t s . G l o b a l
c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes p l a c e e i t h e r i n ( n a t u r a l languages^ (usually via
e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a ) o r i n / ^ e c i a l code%)(principally, m o n e y a n d law).
Since " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " h a s a d o u b l e m e a n i n g h e r e , t h e s e p r o c e s s e s
give rise t o two o p p o s e d t e n d e n c i e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d t h e y p r o m o t e
t h e e x p a n s i o n of a c t o r s ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o n t h e o t h e r t h e differentia
t i o n , e x t e n s i o n , a n d i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of systems, n e t w o r k s ( s u c h as
m a r k e t s ) , o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . W h e r e a s t h e g r o w t h of systems a n d n e t 8
121
works m u l t i p l i e s possible c o n t a c t s a n d e x c h a n g e s of i n f o r m a t i o n , it
d o e s n o t l e a d p e r se to t h e e x p a n s i o n o f a n intersubjectively s h a r e d
w o r l d a n d t o t h e discursive i n t e r w e a v i n g of c o n c e p t i o n s of rele
v a n c e , t h e m e s , a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m w h i c h political p u b l i c
s p h e r e s arise. T h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of p l a n n i n g , c o m m u n i c a t i n g , a n d
a c t i n g subjects s e e m s to h a v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e x p a n d e d jugd^jragm e n t e d . T h e p u b l i c s p r o d u c e d by t h e i n t e r n e t r e m a i n closed off
f r o m o n e a n o t h e r like g l o b a l villages. F o r t h e p r e s e n t it r e m a i n s
unclear w h e t h e r an e x p a n d i n g public consciousness, t h o u g h cen
t e r e d in t h e lifeworld, n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s t h e ability to s p a n systemically
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e x t s , o r w h e t h e r t h e systemic p r o c e s s e s , h a v i n g
b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t , h a v e l o n g since s e v e r e d t h e i r ties with all
c o n t e x t s p r o d u c e d by political c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e at o n e t i m e p r o v i d e d t h e f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h
t h e r e p u b l i c a n i d e a of a society t h a t consciously s h a p e s itself was
a r t i c u l a t e d a n d even i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t . Typical of
t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , as we h a v e s e e n , was a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n state a n d e c o n o m y o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c
politics a n d p o w e r struggles b e t w e e n states o n t h e o t h e r . O f c o u r s e ,
this s c h e m a only a p p l i e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h n a t i o n a l politics
c o u l d still e x e r t effective i n f l u e n c e o n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g " n a t i o n a l
e c o n o m y " (Volkswirtschafi). T h u s in t h e e r a of Keynesian e c o n o m i c
policies, for e x a m p l e , g r o w t h d e p e n d e d o n factors t h a t w e r e by n o
m e a n s o n l y favorable t o capital i n v e s t m e n t b u t also b e n e f i t e d t h e
p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e f a c t o r s s u c h a s t h e s t i m u l a t i o n of m a s s c o n
sumption ( u n d e r pressure from i n d e p e n d e n t trade unions) a n d
i m p r o v e m e n t s in p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s ( b a s e d o n i n d e p e n d e n t re
s e a r c h ) w h i c h also l e d to t h e s h o r t e n i n g of t h e w o r k i n g day, o r s u c h
as t h e t r a i n i n g of w o r k e r s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a n e x p a n d i n g
e d u c a t i o n system (which i m p r o v e d t h e g e n e r a l level of e d u c a t i o n of
t h e p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e ) , a n d so f o r t h . A t a n y r a t e , n a t i o n a l
e c o n o m i e s p r o v i d e d a r a n g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a t
c o u l d b e e x p l o i t e d , t h r o u g h w a g e policies a n d o n t h e side of t h e
statewelfare a n d social policies, to satisfy t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of a d e
m a n d i n g a n d intelligent population.
9
A l t h o u g h c a p i t a l i s m f r o m its i n c e p t i o n was a g l o b a l d e v e l o p m e n t ,
t h e e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c was f o s t e r e d by t h e m o d e r n state system a n d
in t u r n h a d t h e effect of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . B u t t o d a y t h e s e
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Chapter 4
two d e v e l o p m e n t s n o l o n g e r r e i n f o r c e o n e a n o t h e r . To b e s u r e , "the
t e r r i t o r i a l r e s t r i c t i o n of capital n e v e r c o r r e s p o n d e d to its s t r u c t u r a l
mobility. It was d u e r a t h e r to t h e p e c u l i a r historical c o n d i t i o n s of
E u r o p e a n civil society." B u t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s h a v e u n d e r g o n e a
f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n with t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i c
p r o d u c t i o n . Nowadays all i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s a r e affected by t h e
o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e i n v e s t m e n t strategies of ever m o r e e n t e r p r i s e s to
globally i n t e r c o n n e c t e d financial and labor m a r k e t s .
10
T h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e s over e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s h i g h l i g h t t h e
ever-widening g a p b e t w e e n t h e l i m i t e d r o o m for nation-states to
m a n e u v e r a n d g l o b a l e c o n o m i c i m p e r a t i v e s t h a t a r e less a n d less
susceptible to political i n f l u e n c e . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t variables a r e ,
first, t h e a c c e l e r a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t a n d diffusion of n e w productivitye n h a n c i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d , s e c o n d , t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e in t h e r e
serves of c o m p a r a t i v e l y c h e a p labor. T h e d r a m a t i c e m p l o y m e n t
p r o b l e m s in t h e f o r m e r First W o r l d s t e m n o t f r o m classical i n t e r n a
t i o n a l t r a d e r e l a t i o n s b u t f r o m globally i n t e r c o n n e c t e d r e l a t i o n s of
p r o d u c t i o n . Sovereign states c a n b e n e f i t f r o m t h e i r e c o n o m i c sys
t e m s only as l o n g as " n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s " to w h i c h t h e i r i n t e r v e n
tionist policies a r e t a i l o r e d still exist. B u t with t h e r e c e n t t r e n d
t o w a r d t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , n a t i o n a l .politics is
g r a d u a l l y losing its i n f l u e n c e over t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n u n
d e r w h i c h taxable i n c o m e a n d profits a r e g e n e r a t e d . G o v e r n m e n t s
have less a n d less i n f l u e n c e over e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t o r i e n t t h e i r invest
m e n t d e c i s i o n s w i t h i n a g l o b a l h o r i z o n . T h e y a r e c a u g h t in thed i l e m m a of h a v i n g t o avoid two equally u n r e a s o n a b l e r e a c t i o n s . A
policy of p r o t e c t i o n i s t i c isolationism a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n of defensive
cartels is h o p e l e s s ; b u t b a l a n c i n g t h e b u d g e t t h r o u g h c u t b a c k s in t h e
d o m a i n of social policy is n o less d a n g e r o u s in view of its likely social
consequences.
T h e social c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n a b d i c a t i o n of politics, w h i c h tacitly
a c c e p t s a c h r o n i c a l l y h i g h level of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e d i s m a n
tling of t h e welfare state as t h e p r i c e to b e p a i d for i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , a r e a l r e a d y d i s c e r n i b l e in t h e O E C D c o u n t r i e s . T h e
s o u r c e s of social solidarity a r e d r y i n g u p , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t social
c o n d i t i o n s of t h e f o r m e r T h i r d W o r l d a r e b e c o m i n g c o m m o n p l a c e
in t h e u r b a n c e n t e r s of t h e First W o r l d . T h e s e t r e n d s a r e crystallizing
123
in t h e p h e n o m e n o n of a n e w " u n d e r c l a s s . " U n d e r this m i s l e a d i n g

s i n g u l a r t e r m sociologists u n i t e t h e diffuse varieties of m a r g i n a l i z e d
g r o u p s w h o a r e to a l a r g e e x t e n t s e g m e n t e d off f r o m t h e rest of
society. T h e u n d e r c l a s s c o m p r i s e s t h o s e p a u p e r i z e d g r o u p s w h o a r e
left to f e n d for themselves, a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r in a p o s i t i o n
to i m p r o v e t h e i r social lot t h r o u g h t h e i r own initiative. T h e y n o
l o n g e r possess a n y v e t o power, a n y m o r e t h a n d o t h e i m p o v e r i s h e d
r e g i o n s over t h e d e v e l o p e d r e g i o n s of t h e world. However, this k i n d
of s e g m e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t f r a g m e n t e d societies c o u l d
simply a b a n d o n p a r t of t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n to t h e i r fate without political
consequences. I n t h e l o n g t e r m at least t h r e e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e u n
a v o i d a b l e . A n u n d e r c l a s s p r o d u c e s social t e n s i o n s t h a t d i s c h a r g e i n
aimless, self-destructive revolts a n d c a n only b e c o n t r o l l e d by r e p r e s
sive m e a n s , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r i s o n s a n d t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a l security in g e n e r a l b e c o m e s a g r o w t h i n d u s
try. I n a d d i t i o n , social d e s t i t u t i o n a n d physical i m m i s e r a t i o n c a n n o t
b e locally c o n t a i n e d ; t h e p o i s o n of t h e g h e t t o s infects t h e infrastruc
t u r e of t h e i n n e r cities, even of w h o l e r e g i o n s , a n d p e n e t r a t e s t h e
p o r e s of t h e society as a w h o l e . T h i s l e a d s finally t o a m o r a l e r o s i o n
of t h e society, w h i c h inevitably u n d e r m i n e s t h e universalistic c o r e of
a n y r e p u b l i c a n polity. F o r m a l l y c o r r e c t majority d e c i s i o n s t h a t
m e r e l y reflect t h e status a n x i e t i e s a n d self-assertive reflexes of a
m i d d l e class t h r e a t e n e d by t h e p r o s p e c t of social d e c l i n e u n d e r m i n e
t h e legitimacy of t h e p r o c e d u r e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. I n this way t h e g r e a t a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n state in i n t e g r a t i n g society t h r o u g h t h e political p a r t i c i p a t i o n of its
citizens is s q u a n d e r e d .
W h i l e this s c e n a r i o is by n o m e a n s u n r e a l i s t i c , it illustrates j u s t o n e
a m o n g several possible f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e r e a r e n o laws of
h i s t o r y i n t h e strict sense, a n d h u m a n b e i n g s , even w h o l e societies,
a r e c a p a b l e of l e a r n i n g . A n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e a b d i c a t i o n of politics
w o u l d b e if politics w e r e to follow t h e l e a d of t h e m a r k e t s by
c o n s t r u c t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s . E u r o p e i n t r a n s i t i o n
t o w a r d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n p r o v i d e s a suitable e x a m p l e . U n f o r t u
nately, m o r e t h a n o n e lesson c a n b e d r a w n f r o m it. At p r e s e n t t h e
E u r o p e a n states a r e l i n g e r i n g o n t h e t h r e s h o l d of a m o n e t a r y u n i o n
w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s to r e n o u n c e t h e i r
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Chapter 4
sovereignty in c u r r e n c y m a t t e r s . A d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of m o n e y a n d
m o n e t a r y policy w o u l d necessitate a c o m m o n financial, e c o n o m i c ,
a n d social policy. Since t h e M a a s t r i c h t Treaty, o p p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n
g r o w i n g in t h e m e m b e r states to a vertical e x p a n s i o n of t h e E u r o
p e a n U n i o n t h a t w o u l d c o n f e r essential characteristics of a state o n
t h e U n i o n , t h e r e b y relativizing t h e sovereignty of t h e m e m b e r states.
T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , c o n s c i o u s of its historical a c h i e v e m e n t s , s t u b b o r n l y
asserts its identity at t h e very m o m e n t w h e n it is b e i n g o v e r w h e l m e d ,
a n d its p o w e r e r o d e d , by p r o c e s s e s of globalization. F o r t h e p r e s e n t ,
a politics still o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e
limits itself to a d a p t i n g its o w n society in t h e least costly way t o t h e
systemic i m p e r a t i v e s a n d side-effects of a g l o b a l e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c
t h a t o p e r a t e s largely free f r o m political c o n s t r a i n t s . B u t i n s t e a d it
s h o u l d m a k e t h e h e r o i c effort to o v e r c o m e its o w n l i m i t a t i o n s a n d
c o n s t r u c t political i n s t i t u t i o n s c a p a b l e of a c t i n g at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l
level. Moreover, t h e latter w o u l d have to b e c o n n e c t e d to p r o c e s s e s
of d e m o c r a t i c will-formation if t h e n o r m a t i v e h e r i t a g e of t h e d e m o
cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is to f u n c t i o n as a b r e a k o n t h e at p r e s e n t
u n f e t t e r e d d y n a m i c of g l o b a l i z e d capitalist p r o d u c t i o n .
VI
"Overcoming" the Nation-State: Abolition or Transformation?
Talk of o v e r c o m i n g t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e is a m b i g u o u s . O n o n e r e a d i n g
let u s call it t h e p o s t m o d e r n t h e e n d of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e also m a r k s
t h e e n d of t h e p r o j e c t of civic a u t o n o m y , w h i c h , o n this view, h a s in
any case hopelessly o v e r d r a w n its credit. A c c o r d i n g to t h e other,
n o n d e f e a t i s t r e a d i n g , t h e p r o j e c t of a society t h a t is c a p a b l e of
l e a r n i n g a n d of consciously s h a p i n g itself t h r o u g h its political will is
still viable e v e n after t h e d e m i s e of a w o r l d of nation-states. T h e
d i s p u t e c o n c e r n s t h e n o r m a t i v e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o
cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. C a n we still identify with it in a n e r a of
globalization o r m u s t we r e n o u n c e it as a c h e r i s h e d , t h o u g h o b s o
lete, relic of t h e o l d E u r o p e ?
If n o t only t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s r u n its c o u r s e b u t a l o n g with it all
f o r m s of political i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens a r e a b a n d o n e d
to a w o r l d of a n o n y m o u s l y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e t w o r k s in w h i c h t h e y
m u s t c h o o s e b e t w e e n systemically g e n e r a t e d o p t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c e
125
with t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . I n this postpolitical w o r l d t h e m u l t i n a t i o n a l

c o r p o r a t i o n b e c o m e s t h e m o d e l for all c o n d u c t . T h e i m p o t e n c e of
a n o r m a t i v e l y g u i d e d politics in t h e face of a n increasingly i n d e
p e n d e n t g l o b a l e c o n o m i c system a p p e a r s , f r o m a systems-theoretical
p e r s p e c t i v e at a n y r a t e , only as a special case of a m o r e g e n e r a l
d e v e l o p m e n t . Its v a n i s h i n g p o i n t is a c o m p l e t e l y d e c e n t e r e d w o r l d
society t h a t splinters i n t o a d i s o r d e r e d mass of s e l f - r e p r o d u c i n g a n d
self-steering f u n c t i o n a l systems. Like H o b b e s i a n individuals in t h e
state of n a t u r e , t h e s e systems f o r m e n v i r o n m e n t s for o n e a n o t h e r .
T h e y n o l o n g e r s p e a k a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . L a c k i n g a u n i v e r s e of
intersubjectively s h a r e d m e a n i n g s , t h e y m e r e l y o b s e r v e o n e a n o t h e r
a n d b e h a v e t o w a r d o n e a n o t h e r in a c c o r d a n c e with i m p e r a t i v e s of
self-preservation.
J. M. G u e h e n n o d e p i c t s this a n o n y m o u s w o r l d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c
tive of i n d i v i d u a l citizens w h o have b e c o m e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e o b
solete solidarity of d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d m u s t n o w o r i e n t
themselves in t h e c h a o t i c b u s t l e of m u t u a l l y a d a p t i n g f u n c t i o n a l
systems. T h e s e "new" h u m a n b e i n g s h a v e s l o u g h e d off t h e illusory
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o d e r n i t y . T h e n e o l i b e r a l i n s p i r a t i o n of this
H e l l e n i s t i c vision is all t o o clear. T h e a u t o n o m y of t h e citizen is
u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y s t r i p p e d of t h e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s of d e m o c r a t i c
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d p a r e d b a c k t o private a u t o n o m y : "Like t h e
R o m a n citizen of t h e t i m e of Caracalla, t h e citizen of t h e i m p e r i a l
a g e of t h e n e t w o r k s defines h i m s e l f less a n d less by his p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in t h e exercise of sovereignty a n d m o r e a n d m o r e by t h e possibility
h e h a s to act in a f r a m e w o r k in w h i c h t h e p r o c e d u r e s o b e y clear a n d
p r e d i c t a b l e r u l e s . . . . It m a t t e r s little w h e t h e r a n o r m is i m p o s e d by
a private e n t e r p r i s e o r by a c o m m i t t e e of b u r e a u c r a t s . It is n o l o n g e r
t h e e x p r e s s i o n of sovereignty b u t simply s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e d u c e s
u n c e r t a i n t i e s , a m e a n s of l o w e r i n g t h e cost of t r a n s a c t i o n s , of in
c r e a s i n g t r a n s p a r e n c [ y ] . " T h r o u g h a p e r v e r s e play o n H e g e l ' s p o
l e m i c a g a i n s t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e state {Not- und Verstandesstaat), t h e
d e m o c r a t i c state is r e p l a c e d by a "state of law d e p r i v e d of all p h i l o
s o p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l law, r e d u c e d to a n e n s e m b l e of r u l e s
with n o o t h e r basis t h a n t h e daily a d m i n i s t e r e d p r o o f of its s m o o t h
f u n c t i o n i n g . " N o r m s t h a t a r e b o t h effective and r e s p o n s i v e to ex
p e c t a t i o n s of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e r e p l a c e d
n
12
126
Chapter 4
u n d e r t h e guise of a "logic of n e t w o r k s " b y t h e invisible h a n d of

s u p p o s e d l y s p o n t a n e o u s l y r e g u l a t e d p r o c e s s e s of t h e g l o b a l e c o n
omy. However, t h e s e m e c h a n i s m s w h i c h a r e insensitive to e x t e r n a l
costs d o n o t exactly i n s p i r e c o n f i d e n c e . T h i s is t r u e at a n y r a t e of
t h e two b e s t - k n o w n e x a m p l e s of global self-regulation.
T h e " b a l a n c e of p o w e r s " o n w h i c h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system was
b a s e d for t h r e e h u n d r e d years c o l l a p s e d s o m e t i m e b e t w e e n t h e First
a n d S e c o n d W o r l d Wars, if n o t b e f o r e . W i t h o u t a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o u r t a n d a s u p r a n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n i n g power, i n t e r n a t i o n a l law
c o u l d n o t b e i n v o k e d a n d e n f o r c e d like state law. However, c o n v e n
t i o n a l m o r a l i t y a n d t h e "ethics" of dynastic r e l a t i o n s e n s u r e d a cer
tain level of n o r m a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n of w a r f a r e . I n t h e t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y , total war h a s d e s t r o y e d even this weak n o r m a t i v e frame
work. T h e a d v a n c e d state of w e a p o n s technology, t h e a r m s b u i l d - u p ,
a n d t h e s p r e a d of w e a p o n s of mass d e s t r u c t i o n have m a d e a b u n
d a n t l y clear t h e risks i n h e r e n t in this a n a r c h y of p o w e r s u n r e g u l a t e d
by a n y invisible h a n d . T h e f o u n d i n g of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s was
t h e first a t t e m p t at least to d o m e s t i c a t e t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e d y n a m i c
of p o w e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n a collective security system. W i t h t h e f o u n
d a t i o n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a s e c o n d a t t e m p t was m a d e to set u p
s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s r e s p o n s i b l e for i n s t i t u t i n g p e a c e o n
a g l o b a l scale. W i t h t h e e n d of t h e b i p o l a r b a l a n c e of t e r r o r , t h e
p r o s p e c t of a "global d o m e s t i c politics" (C. F. v o n Weizsacker) s e e m s
to have o p e n e d u p , in spite of all t h e set-backs in t h e field of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n r i g h t s a n d security policy. T h e failure of t h e
a n a r c h i s t i c b a l a n c e of p o w e r h a s at least m a d e e v i d e n t t h e desirabil
ity of political i n t e r v e n t i o n s a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s .
1 3
Similar o b s e r v a t i o n s h o l d t r u e for t h e o t h e r p r i m e e x a m p l e of
s p o n t a n e o u s self-regulation. Obviously even t h e g l o b a l m a r k e t can
n o t b e m a n a g e d exclusively by t h e W o r l d B a n k a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
M o n e t a r y F u n d if t h e a s y m m e t r i c a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e
O E C D c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a v e n o t yet
d e v e l o p e d self-sustaining e c o n o m i e s is ever to b e o v e r c o m e . T h e
c o n c l u s i o n r e a c h e d by t h e r e c e n t U N g l o b a l s u m m i t o n social p r o b
l e m s in C o p e n h a g e n is u n s e t t l i n g . T h e r e is a lack of c o m p e t e n t
a g e n c i e s at t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level with t h e p o w e r to a g r e e o n t h e
n e c e s s a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s , p r o c e d u r e s , a n d political f r a m e w o r k s . N o t
127
only t h e disparities b e t w e e n N o r t h a n d S o u t h call for s u c h c o o p e r a

t i o n b u t also t h e d r o p in s t a n d a r d s of living in t h e wealthy N o r t h
Atlantic c o u n t r i e s , w h e r e social policies r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e nation-state
a r e p o w e r l e s s to d e a l with t h e effects of lower wages o n globalized
a n d rapidly e x p a n d i n g l a b o r m a r k e t s . T h e lack of s u p r a n a t i o n a l
a g e n c i e s is especially a c u t e w h e n it c o m e s to d e a l i n g with t h e eco
logical p r o b l e m s a d d r e s s e d f r o m a g l o b a l p e r s p e c t i v e at t h e E a r t h
S u m m i t in Rio. A m o r e peaceful a n d j u s t political a n d e c o n o m i c
w o r l d o r d e r is u n t h i n k a b l e w i t h o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t a r e
c a p a b l e of t a k i n g initiatives, a n d a b o v e all w i t h o u t a h a r m o n i z a t i o n
between the continental regimes that are today just emerging, a n d
w i t h o u t t h e k i n d of policies t h a t c o u l d only b e c a r r i e d o u t u n d e r
p r e s s u r e f r o m a m o b i l i z e d g l o b a l civil society.
T h i s l e n d s s u p p o r t to t h e c o m p e t i n g r e a d i n g a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h
the nation-state should b e "transformed" rather than abolished. But
c o u l d its n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t also b e p r e s e r v e d ? T h e optimistic vision
of s u p r a n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s w h i c h w o u l d e m p o w e r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
a n d its r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o i n s t i t u t e a n e w political a n d eco
n o m i c w o r l d o r d e r is c l o u d e d by t h e t r o u b l i n g q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r
d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c o u l d ever achieve a b i n d i n g
force t h a t e x t e n d s b e y o n d t h e level of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e .
On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of

Law, and Democracy
For Hans-Ulrich Wehler on his sixty-fifth birthday

As in t h e p e r i o d of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n following t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War,
t h e collapse of t h e Soviet e m p i r e h a s b e e n m a r k e d by a series of
r a p i d dissociative state-formations. T h e D a y t o n a n d Paris p e a c e ac
c o r d s m a r k t h e provisional e n d of successful secessions l e a d i n g to
t h e f o u n d a t i o n of n e w nation-states o r to t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of states
t h a t h a d b e e n d e s t r o y e d , h a d b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t , o r h a d b e e n di
v i d e d u p . T h e s e , it w o u l d s e e m , a r e m e r e l y t h e m o s t m a n i f e s t symp
t o m s of t h e e n d u r i n g vitality of a p h e n o m e n o n t h a t h a s b e e n largely
f o r g o t t e n n o t j u s t by t h e social sciences: "With t h e collapse of i m p e
rial s p h e r e s of i n f l u e n c e , t h e w o r l d of states r e c o n s t i t u t e s itself w i t h i n
t r a d i t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s w h i c h a r e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of n a t i o n a l
history." T o d a y t h e political f u t u r e s e e m s to b e l o n g o n c e a g a i n to
t h e " h e r e d i t a r y p o w e r s " a m o n g w h i c h H e r m a n n Lixbbe n u m b e r s
" r e j i g L o n ^ r ecclesiastical confessions o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d n a t i o n
o n t h e o t h e r . " O t h e r a u t h o r s s p e a k of " e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m " in o r d e r
to u n d e r l i n e t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e past, w h e t h e r in t h e
physical sense of c o m m o n d e s c e n t o r in t h e b r o a d e r sense of a
shared cultural inheritance.
T e r m i n o l o g i e s a r e far f r o m i n n o c e n t ; t h e y imply a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t
of view. T h e n e o l o g i s m " e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m " b l u r s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l dis
tinction between "ethnos" a n d "demos." This expression empha
sizes t h e p r o x i m i t y b e t w e e n a n " e t h n o s , " a p r e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y
1
130
Chapter 5
of s h a r e d d e s c e n t o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d k i n s h i p ties, o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
a n d a n a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d as a state t h a t at least aspires to political
i n d e p e n d e n c e , o n t h e o t h e r . I n this way t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e t h n i c
c o m m u n i t i e s a r e m o r e " n a t u r a l " a n d evolutionarily " m o r e p r i m i t i v e "
t h a n n a t i o n s is implicitly c o n t r a d i c t e d . T h e "we-conscioiisness,"
f o u n d e d o n a n i m a g i n e d b l o o d r e l a t i o n o r o n c u l t u r a l identity, of
p e o p l e w h o s h a r e a belief i n a c o m m o n o r i g i n , identify o n e a n o t h e r
as " m e m b e r s " of t h e s a m e c o m m u n i t y , a n d t h e r e b y set t h e m s e l v e s
a p a r t f r o m t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , is s u p p o s e d to c o n s t i t u t e t h e common
c o r e of e t h n i c and of n a t i o n a l social f o r m a t i o n s . I n view of this
c o m m o n a l i t y , n a t i o n s w o u l d differ f r o m o t h e r e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s
only i n t h e i r d e g r e e of c o m p l e x i t y a n d s c o p e : "It is t h e largest g r o u p
t h a t c a n c o m m a n d a p e r s o n ' s loyalty b e c a u s e of felt k i n s h i p ties; it
is, f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e fully e x t e n d e d family."
3
T h i s e t h n o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n conflicts with t h e c o n c e p t
as it is usually e m p l o y e d by h i s t o r i a n s . It glosses over t h e specific
c o n n e c t i o n s t o t h e legal o r d e r ' j ^ ^ s ^ I ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ state, t o political
h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , a n d to t h e d y n a m i c s of m a s s c o m n m m c a t i o n t o
w h i c h t h e n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t a r o s e in E u r o p e i n t h e n i n e
t e e n t h c e n t u r y owes its reflexive a n d distinctively artificial c h a r a c t e r .
If t h e n a t i o n a l , as previously t h e e t h n i c , c o m m u n i t y a p p e a r s f r o m
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a generalized c o n s t r u c t i v i s m as a "believed" o r
" i m a g i n e d c o m m o n a l i t y " (Max W e b e r ) , t h e " i n v e n t i o n of t h e e t h n i c
n a t i o n (Volksnatiori)" ( H . Schulze) c a n b e given a surprisingly affir
mative twist. As a specific m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a universal f o r m of social
i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e n a t i o n o n c e a g a i n
takes o n a n a l m o s t n a t u r a l a s p e c t e v e n for t h e scientist w h o a s s u m e s
t h a t it is c o n s t r u c t e d . F o r o n c e we r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e n a t i o n is m e r e l y
a v a r i a n t of a social universal, t h e r e s u r g e n c e of t h e n a t i o n a l n o
l o n g e r n e e d s to b e e x p l a i n e d . W h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of n o r m a l i t y
shifts in favor of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m it n o l o n g e r m a k e s any sense t o
d e s c r i b e t h e conflicts t h a t t o d a y o n c e a g a i n c o m m a n d o u r a t t e n t i o n
as s y m p t o m s of r e g r e s s i o n a n d a l i e n a t i o n in n e e d of e x p l a n a t i o n a n d
to c o n c e i v e of t h e m , for e x a m p l e , as c o m p e n s a t i o n s for t h e loss of
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o w e r status o r as a t t e m p t s t o c o m e t o t e r m s with
a c o n d i t i o n of social a n d e c o n o m i c d e p r i v a t i o n .
2
M o d e r n states w h i c h a r e functionally i n t e g r a t e d by m a r k e t a n d
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r still d e l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s f r o m o n e a n o t h e r as
131
The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
" n a t i o n s " as t h e y always h a v e d o n e . B u t this says n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e

specific c h a r a c t e r of n a t i o n a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It r e m a i n s a n e m
pirical q u e s t i o n w h e n a n d to w h a t e x t e n t m o d e r n p o p u l a t i o n s u n
d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n b a s e d o n e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p o r as
a n a t i o n of citizens. T h i s d o u b l e c o d i n g h a s a b e a r i n g o n t h e issue
of e x c l u s i o n a n d i n c l u s i o n . N a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s vacillates in a
p e c u l i a r fashion b e t w e e n m o r e extensive i n c l u s i o n a n d r e n e w e d
exclusion.
As a m o d e r n f o r m of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y is distin
g u i s h e d o n t h e o n e h a n d by its t e n d e n c y to t r a n s c e n d particularistic,
r e g i o n a l ties. I n n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y E u r o p e t h e n a t i o n f o u n d e d n e w
b o n d s of solidarity b e t w e e n p e r s o n s w h o h a d previously b e e n strang
ers to o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s universalistic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h e r e d i t a r y
loyalties to village a n d family, locality a n d dynasty, is a difficult a n d
in a n y case a p r o t r a c t e d p r o c e s s . Even in t h e classical nation-states
of t h e West it d i d n o t e n c o m p a s s t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n b e f o r e t h e
b e g i n n i n g of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is n o
a c c i d e n t t h a t this m o r e a b s t r a c t f o r m of i n t e g r a t i o n f o u n d e x p r e s
sion in t h e r e a d i n e s s to fight a n d in t h e spirit of self-sacrifice of
military draftees w h o w e r e m o b i l i z e d a g a i n s t t h e " e n e m i e s of t h e
f a t h e r l a n d . " I n a n e m e r g e n c y t h e solidarity of t h e citizens was sup
p o s e d to p r o v e itself in t h e solidarity of t h o s e w h o risk t h e i r lives for
p e o p l e a n d f a t h e r l a n d . O n t h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d c o n c e p t of a
p e o p l e w h o assert t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a n d distinctive identity in t h e
s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t o t h e r n a t i o n s , t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l m o m e n t of a n i m a g
i n e d c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d l a n g u a g e a n d a n c e s t r y is fused with t h e
c o n t i n g e n t m o m e n t of a narratively c o n s t r u c t e d c o m m u n i t y of
s h a r e d destiny. B u t this n a t i o n a l identity r o o t e d in fictional pasts also
p r e f i g u r e s t h e f u t u r e realization of r e p u b l i c a n liberty rights.
6
T h e J a n u s face of t h e n a t i o n , w h i c h o p e n s itself i n t e r n a l l y b u t
s h u t s itself off f r o m t h e o u t s i d e , is a l r e a d y implicit in t h e a m b i v a l e n t
m e a n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m . T h e particularistic f r e e d o m of
a n e x t e r n a l l y a s s e r t e d collective n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e s e e m s to b e
m e r e l y t h e p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d for t h e i n t e r n a l l y realized individual
liberties of t h e c i t i z e n s t h e i r private a u t o n o m y as m e m b e r s of civil
society (Gesellschaftsbiirger) n o less t h a n t h e i r political a u t o n o m y as
citizens (Staatsbiirger). T h e c o n c e p t u a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n a c o m
pulsory, ascriptive e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p viewed as a n i n a l i e n a b l e
132
Chapter 5
p r o p e r t y , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a freely c h o s e n m e m b e r s h i p g u a r
a n t e e d by subjective r i g h t s in a v o l u n t a r y political c o m m u n i t y t h a t
g r a n t s its citizens t h e o p t i o n of e m i g r a t i n g , o n t h e o t h e r , is dissolved
in this s y n d r o m e . T h i s d o u b l e c o d i n g still i n s p i r e s c o m p e t i n g i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n s a n d c o n t r a d i c t o r y political d i a g n o s e s .
\
T h e i d e a of t h e e d m i c n a t i o n suggests t h a t t h e j f e w ^ j of citizens
m u s t b e r o o t e d in t h e ethnos of n a t i o n a l s (Volksgenossen) if it is t o
stabilize itself ^ j y ^ ^ i t i c a l
a n d ^ c j i ^ H e g ^ consociates. T h e b i n d i n g f o r c e of c i t i z e n s h i p is s u p p o s e d l y n o t a d e q u a t e
t o this task. T h e loyalty of citizens h a s to b e a n c h o r e d in t h e quasin a t u r a l , historically fateful s e n s e of t o g e t h e r n e s s of t h e p e o p l e . T h e
" a n o d y n e " a c a d e m i c i d e a of " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m " is n o substi
t u t e for a " h e a l t h y n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s " : "This c o n c e p t (of consti
t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m ) h a n g s i n t h e air w i t h o u t s u p p o r t . . . . H e n c e
a p p e a l to t h e n a t i o n . . . [ a n d ] to t h e e m o t i o n a l l y b i n d i n g wec o n s c i o u s n e s s it c o n t a i n s , is u n a v o i d a b l e . " S e e n f r o m a n o t h e r p e r
spective, however, t h e symbiotic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d
r e p u b l i c a n i s m reveals itself as m e r e l y a transitional, historical c o n
stellation. A n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s p r o p a g a t e d by intellectuals a n d
s c h o l a r s t h a t slowly s p r e a d o u t w a r d f r o m t h e u r b a n b o u r g e o i s i e a
c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t crystallized a r o u n d t h e fiction of a c o m m o n an
cestry, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s h a r e d history, a n d a g r a m m a t i c a l l y
s t a n d a r d i z e d w r i t t e n l a n g u a g e d i d i n d e e d t r a n s f o r m subjects for
t h e first t i m e i n t o politically a w a r e citizens w h o identify with t h e
r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d its d e c l a r e d goals. B u t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
7
this catalyzing r o l e , n a t i o n a l i s m is not,.a.._necessary o r p e r m a n e n t

p r e c o n d i t i o n â^d^p^crd^c^process.
T h e progressive e x t e n s i o n of
t h e status of c i t i z e n s h i p to t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n d o e s n o t j u s t p r o
vide t h e state with a n e w s o u r c e of secular l e g i t i m a t i o n ; it also
p r o d u c e s a n e w level of abstract, legally m e d i a t e d social i n t e g r a t i o n .
B o t h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a s s u m e t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e was a r e s p o n s e
to t h e p r o b l e m of t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a p o p u l a c e t h a t h a d b e c o m e
u p r o o t e d f r o m t h e c o r p o r a t i v e social ties of early m o d e r n society.
B u t t h e o n e side situates t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m at t h e c u l t u r a l
level, w h e r e a s t h e o t h e r looks for a s o l u t i o n at t h e level of d e m o
cratic p r o c e d u r e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . Ernst-Wolfgang B o k e n f o r d e e m
phasizes t h e a s p e c t of collective identity: "A relative h o m o g e n i z a t i o n
133
in a s h a r e d c u l t u r e is n e e d e d by way of c o m p e n s a t i o n . . . if t h e
society w h i c h t e n d s t o b e c o m e a t o m i z e d is to b e r e u n i t e d i n t o a u n i t y
c a p a b l e of c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n , in spite of b e i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o a
multiplicity of p a r t s . T h i s task is p e r f o r m e d by t h e n a t i o n a n d its
a t t e n d a n t n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s a l o n g with, a n d in succession to,
religion . . . . T h u s the ultimate goal c a n n o t b e to overtake national
identity a n d r e p l a c e it with s o m e t h i n g else, n o t even with a univer
salism of h u m a n r i g h t s . " T h e o p p o s i n g view is b a s e d o n t h e convic
t i o n t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s itself c a n p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r y
guarantees for the soriaHnte
8
society. I n d e e d , in pluralistic societies this b u r d e n c a n n o t b e shifted

f r o m t h e level of political will-formation a n d p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n
o n t o t h e s e e m i n g l y n a t u r a l c u l t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d l y h o m o
geneous people. From these premises Hans-Ulrich Wehler concludes
t h a t "federal u n i o n s b o u n d t o g e t h e r by a sense of loyalty b a s e d
p r i m a r i l y o n t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d welfare
states r e p r e s e n t a n i n c o m p a r a b l y m o r e attractive Utopian ideal t h a n
t h e r e g r e s s i o n t o t h e s u p p o s e d n o r m a l i t y of t h e G e r m a n . . . n a t i o n state."
10
I a m n o t c o m p e t e n t t o e n g a g e in this d e b a t e at t h e level of
historical a r g u m e n t s . I n s t e a d I a m i n t e r e s t e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
m o d e l s of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e n a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d
d e m o c r a c y in t e r m s of w h i c h t h e conflict is f o u g h t o u t a t t h e n o r
mative level. J u r i s t s a n d political t h e o r i s t s i n t e r v e n e in t h e p u b l i c
p r o c e s s e s of t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of citizens with different, b u t n o
less effective, m e a n s t h a n h i s t o r i a n s ; t h e y c a n e v e n i n f l u e n c e t h e
d e c i s i o n s of t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t . O n t h e classical, late
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n c e p t i o n , " n a t i o n " refers t o t h e p e o p l e w h o
c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a state by giving themselves a d e m o c r a t i c
c o n s t i t u t i o n . O p p o s e d t o this view is t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t a r o s e in t h e
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h p o p u l a r sovereignty p r e s u p
p o s e s a n a t i o n t h a t p r o j e c t s itself i n t o t h e p a s t as a n organically
evolving entity in c o n t r a s t with t h e artificial o r d e r of positive law:
" T h e ' p e o p l e / . . . w h i c h is t h e subject of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y in
d e m o c r a c i e s , d o e s n o t first a c q u i r e its identity f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n
t h a t it gives itself. T h i s i d e n t i t y is r a t h e r a p r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , histori
cal fact: t h o r o u g h l y c o n t i n g e n t , b u t n o t for t h a t r e a s o n a r b i t r a r y . . .
134
Chapter 5
it is u n a v o i d a b l e for t h o s e w h o find t h a t t h e y b e l o n g to a p a r t i c u l a r
people."
Carl S c h m i t t p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e in t h e h i s t o r y of this i d e a .
I will b e g i n by c o n t r a s t i n g S c h m i t t ' s a c c o u n t of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
n a t i o n , r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y with t h e classical conception (I).
T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s have different c o n s e q u e n c e s for a n u m b e r of
c u r r e n t , i n t e r c o n n e c t e d p r o b l e m s : t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l self-determi
n a t i o n (II), e q u a l r i g h t s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies (III), t h e r i g h t of
h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n (IV), a n d t h e transfer of sovereign r i g h t s
to s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (V). T a k i n g t h e s e p r o b l e m s as m y
g u i d e , I will a r g u e t h a t t h e e t h n o n a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of p o p u l a r
sovereignty is m i s g u i d e d .
1 1
Constitutional Constructions o f Popular Sovereignty
(1) I n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e W e i m a r c o n s t i t u t i o n , Carl S c h m i t t

a c c o r d s a constructivist n o t i o n of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
status. T h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c s t o o d in t h e t r a d i t i o n of t h e r u l e of
lawalready e x e m p l i f i e d by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h y w h i c h is s u p
p o s e d to p r o t e c t t h e citizens f r o m t h e a b u s e of state p o w e r ; b u t for
t h e first t i m e in G e r m a n h i s t o r y it c o m b i n e d t h e r u l e of law with t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r m a n d t h e political c o n t e n t of d e m o c r a c y . T h i s
s t a r t i n g p o i n t , w h i c h is p e c u l i a r to G e r m a n legal history, is r e f l e c t e d
in t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c of S c h m i t t ' s " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y . " T h e r e
S c h m i t t m a k e s a strict d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e "legal" a n d t h e "po
litical" c o m p o n e n t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d treats t h e " n a t i o n " as a
h i n g e b e t w e e n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of t h e b o u r g e o i s constitu
t i o n a l state a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e of t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of t h e p e o p l e . H e a r g u e s t h a t n a t i o n a l h o m o g e n e i t y is a n e c e s s a r y
p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e d e m o c r a t i c exercise of political a u t h o r i t y : "A
d e m o c r a t i c state in w h i c h d e m o c r a c y is f o u n d e d o n t h e n a t i o n a l
h o m o g e n e i t y of its citizens c o n f o r m s to t h e so-called n a t i o n a l i t y
p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e a c h n a t i o n f o r m s a state a n d e a c h
state a n a t i o n . "
1 2
W i t h this p r i n c i p l e , S c h m i t t a d o p t s t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of J o h a n n
C a s p a r Bluntschli; h e also consciously aligns h i m s e l f with t h e p r i n c i
p l e s a c c e p t e d by, b o t h W i l s o n a n d L e n i n t h a t i n f o r m e d t h e E u r o -
135
T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
p e a n p o s t w a r political o r d e r laid d o w n in t h e Versailles p e a c e settle

m e n t . B u t t h e specific c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n
historical a g r e e m e n t s . S c h m i t t conceives of t h e citizens' e q u a l politi
cal p a r t i c i p a t i o n in political will-formation as a m a t t e r of a s p o n t a
n e o u s h a r m o n y b e t w e e n t h e e x p r e s s i o n s of will of
m e m b e r s of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e .
1 3
like-minded
Democracy must
take t h e f o r m of a n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y b e c a u s e t h e " s e l f of t h e
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e is c o n c e i v e d as a m a c r o s u b j e c t ca
p a b l e of a c t i o n a n d b e c a u s e t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n s e e m s to b e t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e e n t i t y to fill this c o n c e p t u a l g a p i t is viewed as t h e
q u a s i - n a t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of t h e state o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s collectivistic
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e R o u s s e a u e a n m o d e l of self-legislation
preju
dices all f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
It is t r u e , t h a t d e m o c r a c y c a n only b e e x e r c i s e d as a j o i n t p r a c t i c e .
B u t S c h m i t t d o e s n o t c o n s t r u e this c o m m o n a l i t y in t e r m s of t h e
higher-level intersubjectivity of a discursive a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n citi
z e n s w h o r e c i p r o c a l l y r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as free a n d e q u a l ;
i n s t e a d h e reifies it i n t o t h e homogeneity of m e m b e r s of a single
p e o p l e . H e m a k e s t h e n o r m of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e
fact of a u n i f o r m n a t i o n a l o r i g i n : " D e m o c r a t i c equality is a substan
tive equality. B e c a u s e all citizens s h a r e in this s u b s t a n c e , t h e y c a n b e
t r e a t e d as e q u a l , t h e y h a v e e q u a l e l e c t o r a l a n d v o t i n g r i g h t s , e t c . "
1 4
T h i s substantialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizenry is r e l a t e d t o a n
existentialist c o n c e p t i o n of t h e d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .
S c h m i t t conceives of political will-formation as t h e collective selfa f f i r m a t i o n of a p e o p l e : " W h a t t h e p e o p l e w a n t is g o o d j u s t b e c a u s e
the people want (it)."
1 5
S e v e r i n g d e m o c r a c y f r o m t h e r u l e of law
h e r e reveals a h i d d e n m e a n i n g : given t h a t t h e g u i d i n g pohtic^LMMh a s n o r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t b u t is e x h a u s t e d by t h e expressive c o n t e n t

of a n a t u r a l i z e d Volksgeist, it d o e s n o t n e e d t o b e g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h
a p u b l i c discussion, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w h i c h is g u a r a n t e e d by civic
rights.
Aside f r o m a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of its r a t i o n a l i t y o r irrationality, t h e
aujhenticityôf t h e p e o p l e / s j v i l l is a t t e s t e d exclusiveJjJ>jM^
s c h a r y ^ p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e w i l L o f a n ^ ^
before
the self-determination
of t h e p e o p l e b e c o m e s
Even
solidified
i n t o t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of state o r g a n s , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e
136
Chapter 5
s p o n t a n e o u s "yes" a n d " n o " r e s p o n s e s of t h e p e o p l e t o p r e d e t e r

m i n e d alternatives: "Only t h e actually a s s e m b l e d p e o p l e is t h e p e o
p l e . . . a n d c a n p e r f o r m t h e activity t h a t specifically p e r t a i n s to this
p e o p l e : it c a n a c c l a i m i n o t h e r w o r d s , signal its a c c e p t a n c e o r
r e j e c t i o n by a s i m p l e act of a c c l a m a t i o n . " T h e p r i n c i p l e of majority
rule merely operationalizes the accord between individual expres
sions of will: "all will t h e s a m e t h i n g . " T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e only b r i n g s
to t h e fore t h e substantive a p r i o r i of a s h a r e d n a t i o n a l f o r m of life.
T h e a p r i o r i p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is g r a n t e d by t h e substantive h o m o
g e n e i t y of n a t i o n a l s w h o set t h e m s e l v e s a p a r t as a s e p a r a t e n a t i o n
f r o m all o t h e r s : " T h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t of equality is a political
c o n c e p t t h a t is p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e possibility of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
H e n c e political d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t rest o n t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d n e s s
of all h u m a n b e i n g s b u t only o n m e m b e r s h i p of a p a r t i c u l a r p e o p l e .
. . . T h u s t h e equality t h a t is essential to d e m o c r a c y applies only
internally, n o t e x t e r n a l l y . "
16
17
I n this way, S c h m i t t sets u p a p o l e m i c a l c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e

" r ^ o p k , " ^ n ^ t h e operand, a n d a h u m a n i s t i c a l l y conceivecl " h u m a n 'itcon^
o n t h e o t h e r : " T h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y is t h e p e o p l e , n o t
h u m a n i t y . If d e m o c r a c y is i n d e e d a political f o r m , it c a n only b e a
d e m o c r a c y of t h e p e o p l e , n o t of h u m a n i t y . " Insofar as t h e "idea off
t h e equality of all h u m a n b e i n g s , " in t h e s e n s e of e q u a l c o n s i d e r a
t i o n of t h e interests of everybody, h a s a n y r e l e v a n c e for t h e consti
t u t i o n , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in a r u l e of law t h a t a p p l i e s to private
citizens. T h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n r i g h t s is e x h a u s t e d by t h e private
e n j o y m e ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ f f ^ ^ ^ n i e s , w h e r e a s t h e exercise of political free
d o m s by citizens is s u p p o s e d t o o b e y a c o m p l e t e l y different logic.
T h e m e a n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n e t h n i c h o
m o g e n e i t y is n o t t h e political a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l citizens b u t
r a t h e r n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e self-assertion, self-affirmation,
a n d self-realization of a n a t i o n in its specificity. T h i s n a t i o n m e d i a t e s
b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y : only t h e citizens, w h o have
b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m private p e r s o n s i n t o m e m b e r s of a politically
self-conscious n a t i o n , c a n p a r t i c i p a t e in d e m o c r a t i c r u l e .
18
(2) By u n c o u p l i n g t h e basic r i g h t s r e g u l a t i n g private i n t e r a c t i o n s

w i t h i n civil society f r o m a substantialized "Volksdemokratie" in this
1
137
T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e o f Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
way, S c h m i t t sets h i m s e l f in stark o p p o s i t i o n to a r e p u b l i c a n i s m

g r o u n d e d i n social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . O n this t r a d i t i o n , " p e o p l e "
a n d " n a t i o n " a r e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e c o n c e p t s for a citizenry t h a t is
co-original with t h e political c o m m u n i t y . T h e p e o p l e w h o m a k e u p
t h e state a r e viewed n o t as a p r e p o l i t i c a l d a t u m b u t as t h e p r o d u c t
of t h e social c o n t r a c t . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r m a n association of free
a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law t h r o u g h t h e i r j o i n t d e c i s i o n t o
m a k e u s e of t h e i r o r i g i n a l r i g h t "to live u n d e r p u b l i c laws of free
d o m . " T h e d e c i s i o n to live in political f r e e d o m is s y n o n y m o u s with
t h e u n d e r t a k i n g to e n g a g e in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g praxis. I n
c o n t r a s t with C a r l S c h m i t t ' s a c c o u n t , o n this c o n c e p t i o n p o p u l a r
sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights, d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
state, a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y i n t e r t w i n e d . F o r t h e initial d e c i s i o n t o e n g a g e
in d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation c a n only b e c a r r i e d o u t by realizing t h e
r i g h t s t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t m u t u a l l y g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r if they
w a n t to legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r life in c o m m o n by m e a n s of
positive law. T h i s calls in t u r n for a l e g i t i m a c y - g u a r a n t e e i n g p r o c e
d u r e of l a w m a k i n g t h a t gives p e r m a n e n t f o r m t o t h e f u r t h e r e l a b o
r a t i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s . Following t h e R o u s s e a u e a n f o r m u l a ,
in this p r o c e d u r e all m u s t r e a c h t h e s a m e d e c i s i o n s for all. T h u s t h e
basic r i g h t s spring from t h e v e r y i d e a of t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n
of t h e p r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation.
20
T h e i d e a of a p r o c e d u r a l , f u t u r e - o r i e n t e d p o p u l a r sovereignty
a l o n g t h e s e lines r e n d e r s m e a n i n g l e s s t h e delnlEiH^l^
will-formation to t h e s u b s t a n t i v e . a p r i o r i of a past, prepolitically
e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s e n s u s a m o n g h o m o g e n e o u s m e m b e r s of a n a t i o n :
"Positive law is n o t l e g i t i m a t e b e c a u s e it c o r r e s p o n d s to substantive
p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e b u t b e c a u s e it is e n a c t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with
p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a r e formally j u s t , t h a t is, d e m o c r a t i c . T h a t all d e c i d e
t h e s a m e t h i n g for all in t h e legislative p r o c e s s is a d e m a n d i n g
n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t is n o l o n g e r d e f i n e d in a substantive
m a n n e r b u t is i n t e n d e d to p r e v e n t a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n s a n d m i n i m i z e
d o m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e self-legislation of t h e a d d r e s s e e s of t h e law,
t h r o u g h e q u a l p r o c e d u r a l positions, a n d t h r o u g h t h e universality of
legal r e g u l a t i o n . " A p r i o r b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s b a s e d o n a h o m o
g e n e o u s c u l t u r e is n o t necessary, b e c a u s e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d
o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation m a k e possible r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t even
21
138
Chapter 5
b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . B e c a u s e t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s legiti
m a c y in v i r t u e of its p r o c e d u r a l characteristics, it c a n if n e c e s s a r y
b r i d g e g a p s in social i n t e g r a t i o n . Insofar as it s e c u r e s t h e fair value
of i n d i v i d u a l liberties for all, it e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e t w o r k of civic
solidarity r e m a i n s intact.
Criticism of this classical c o n c e p t i o n is p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d against
its "liberalistic" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S c h m i t t d i s p u t e s t h e capacity of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state f o u n d e d o n d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s to s e c u r e
social i n t e g r a t i o n u n d e r t h e two h e a d i n g s t h a t i n f o r m e d H e g e l ' s
c r i t i q u e of t h e " N o t - u n d Verstandesstaat" [literally, "state of necessity
a n d of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ] of social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y a n d have b e e n
t a k e n u p a g a i n by t h e " c o m m u n i t a r i a n s " in t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s y with
" l i b e r a l s , " T h e p r i n c i p a l targets of this c r i t i q u e a r e t h e atomistic
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a n " u n e n c u m b e r e d s e l f a n d t h e
i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t c o n c e p t of political will-formation as a m a t t e r of
a g g r e g a t i n g social interests. F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of t h e s e critics,
t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e social c o n t r a c t a r e c o n c e i v e d as isolated, e n l i g h t
e n e d r a t i o n a l egoists w h o a r e n o t s h a p e d by c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s a n d
h e n c e d o n o t s h a r e any c u l t u r a l v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d w h o s e ac
t i o n s a r e n o t o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Political willf o r m a t i o n o n this d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t take t h e f o r m of n e g o t i a t i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g a m o d u s vivendi w i t h o u t a n y possibility of r e a c h i n g a
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m ethical o r m o r a l p o i n t s of view. I n d e e d ,
it is difficult to see h o w s u c h p a r t i e s c o u l d p r o d u c e a n i n t e r s u b j e c tively r e c o g n i z e d legal o r d e r t h a t c a n b e e x p e c t e d to forge a n a t i o n
of citizens f r o m s t r a n g e r s i n o t h e r w o r d s , g e n e r a t e civic solidarity
b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . Against s u c h a H o b b e s i a n b a c k d r o p , t h e s h a r e d
e t h n i c o r c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s p e o
p l e r e c o m m e n d s itself as t h e s o u r c e a n d g u a r a n t o r of t h e k i n d of
n o r m a t i v e b o n d s to w h i c h possessive individualism is b l i n d .
22
However, t h e w e l l - f o u n d e d criticism of this e x t r e m e version of

n a t u r a l law d o e s n o t apply to t h e intersubjectivistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
p r o c e d u r a l p o p u l a r sovereignty, w h i c h is in a n y case m o r e c o n g e n i a l
J to t h e r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c e of
I d e l i b e r a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o w a n t to
arrive at rationally m o t i v a t e d decisions takes t h e p l a c e of t h g j j r i v a t e
I law m o d e l of a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n m a r k e t players. Political o p i n i o n -
139
a n d will-formation is n o t l i m i t e d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o m p r o m i s e s
b u t also c o n f o r m s to t h e m o d e l of p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e s o r i e n t e d to t h e
r a t i o n a l acceptability of r e g u l a t i o n s in t h e l i g h t of g e n e r a l i z e d inter
ests, s h a r e d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d justified p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s
n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n of politics is b a s e d o n t h e i d e a of t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g p e r s o n . N o r s h o u l d t h e a u t o n o m y of legal
p e r s o n s b e c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of self-ownership. T h e social c h a r a c
ter of n a t u r a l p e r s o n s is s u c h t h a t t h e y d e v e l o p i n t o individuals in
t h e c o n t e x t of intersubjectively s h a r e d f o r m s of life a n d stabilize
t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n . H e n c e ,
j d s o f r o m a j e g a l p o i n t of view, i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s c a n b e p r o t e c t e d
jgnly by simultaneously p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t i n jvhich.,,their, f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s u n f ( r i d , j ^ t j s , only by a s s u r i n g t h e m s e l v e s access to
s u p p o r t i v e i n t e r p e r s o n a f _ x e l a t i o n s . social n e t w p r k s , a n d c u l t u r a l
f o r m s of life. A discursively i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e s s of legislation a n d
political d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h a t k e e p s this in view m u s t take a c c o u n t
of values a n d n o r m s as well as existing p r e f e r e n c e s . As s u c h , it is well
qualified to fulfill t h e task of p r o v i d i n g a political substitute for
p r o c e s s e s of i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t fail at o t h e r levels.
F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of K a n t a n d of R o u s s e a u ( p r o p e r l y u n d e r
s t o o d ) , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e t h e collectivistic a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e exclusionary m e a n i n g of t h e assertion o f
n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d of t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of a u n i q u e n a t i o n a l
c h a r a c t e r . Rather, it h a s t h e inclusive m e a n i n g of self-legislation
w h i c h involves all citizens equally. It is inclusive in t h a t s u c h a politi
cal o r d e r k e e p s itself o p e n to t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h o s e w h o
suffer d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d to t h e integîcm^ of t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d , b u t
w i t h o u t imprisoning them iri..,the^miformity.of..a..homogenized e t h n i c
c o m m u n i t y . I n this c o n n e c t i o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of v o l u n t a r i n e s s is cru
cial; t h a t citizens b e l o n g to a state is a f u n c t i o n at least of t h e i r
implicit a g r e e m e n t ) W h e r e a s t h e substantive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u
lar sovereignty a s s u m e s a n essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n "free
d o m " a n d t h e external i n d e p e n d e n c e of a p e o p l e , t h e p r o c e d u r a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n n e c t s sovereignty with t h e private a n d p u b l i c
a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d e v e r y b o d y equally within a n association of free
a n d e q u a l legal subjects. Given t h e c h a l l e n g e s t h a t c o n f r o n t us today,
I w a n t to a r g u e , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c c o u n t of r e p u b l i c a n i s m is
23
140
Chapter 5
m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n e i t h e r a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l o r even a c o m m u n i
t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y .
II
O n the Meaning a n d Limits o f National Self-determination
T h e n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e implies a r i g h t o f n a t i o n a l self-determina
tion. A c c o r d i n g t o this p r i n c i p l e , every n a t i o n t h a t wishes t o g o v e r n
itself h a s t h e r i g h t t o exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state. T h e e t h n o n a
t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u l a r sovereignty s e e m s t o p r o v i d e a so
l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m c a n n o t solve: H o w a r e we t o
d e f i n e t h e totality of t h o s e t o w h o m citizens' r i g h t s s h o u l d legiti
mately apply?
K a n t ascribes t o every h u m a n b e i n g as s u c h t h e r i g h t t o h a v e r i g h t s
a n d t o r e g u l a t e his life i n c o m m o n with o t h e r s i n s u c h a way t h a t
e v e r y o n e c a n enjoy e q u a l liberties i n a c c o r d a n c e with p u b l i c , coer
cive laws. B u t this d o e s n o t settle w h o m a y actually m a k e u s e o f this
r i g h t with w h o m a n d w h e n ; n o r d o e s it settle w h o m a y u n i t e i n t o a
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g c o m m o n w e a l t h o n t h e basis of a social c o n t r a c t .
T l e i ^ i e s t i o n of t h e legitimate composition oi t h e citizen b o d y r e m a i n s
o p e n ^\o^^êYaocr?i\ic
s e l f ^ t o m i n a t i o n o n l y a f f e c t s tlê m o d e
of o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e c o m m o n life of legal c o n s o c i a t e s i n g e n e r a l .
O f c o u r s e , t h e self-legislation of a n a t i o n with a d e m o c r a t i c constitu
t i o n c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e d e c i s i o n of a f o u n d i n g g e n e r a t i o n t o
give t h e m s e l v e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n ; b u t with this a c t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
qualify.AemsefaesLonly retroactiveh as a sovereign p e o p l e (Staatsvolk).
It is t h r o u g h t h e s h a r e d will t o f o u n d a state a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e
of this r e s o l u t i o n , t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e itself
t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n o f citizens.
T h i s a p p r o a c h r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c as l o n g as b o r d e r s a r e n o t
in fact d i s p u t e d , as for e x a m p l e i n t h e F r e n c h o r e v e n t h e A m e r i c a n
R e v o l u t i o n w h e n t h e citizens s t r u g g l e d for r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m s
e i t h e r against t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d h e n c e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a
ries o f a n a l r e a d y existing state, o r a g a i n s t a c o l o n i a l p o w e r w h i c h
h a d itself a l r e a d y d e f i n e d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t . B u t
in o t h e r cases t h e circular a n s w e r t h a t t h e citizens c o n s t i t u t e t h e m
selves as a p e o p l e , a n d t h e r e b y d e l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s b o t h socially a n d
territorially f r o m t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , is n o t sufficient: "To say t h a t all
141
people . . . are entitled to the democratic process begs a prior ques

tion. W h e n d o e s a collection of p e r s o n s c o n s t i t u t e a n e n t i t y ' a
p e o p l e ' e n t i t l e d t o g o v e r n itself d e m o c r a t i c a l l y ? " I n t h e r e a l
world, w h o in e a c h i n s t a n c e a c q u i r e s t h e p o w e r t o d e f i n e t h e dis
p u t e d b o r d e r s of a state is settled by historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s , usually
by t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l o u t c o m e of v i o l e n t conflicts, wars, a n d civil wars.
W 5 e r e a s ~ r e p u b l i c a n i s m r e i n f o r c e s o u r a w a r e n e s s of t h e c o n t i n g e n c y
of t h e s e b o r d e r s , this c o n t i n g e n c y c a n b e d i s p e l l e d by a p p e a l to t h e
i d e a of a g r o w n n a t i o n t h a t i m b u e s t h e b o r d e r s with t h e a u r a of
i m i t a t e d substantiality a n d l e g i t i m a t e s t h e m t h r o u g h fictitious links
with t h e past. N a t i o n a l i s m b r i d g e s t h e n o r m a t i v e g a p by a p p e a l i n g
to a so-called r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
24
I n c o n t r a s t with social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y w h i c h g r o u n d s t h e legal

o r d e r in r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens,
Carl S c h m i t t s e e m s t o b e in a p o s i t i o n t o justify s u c h a collective
r i g h t . F o r if d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e
m o d e l of collective self-assertion a n d self-realization, n o single p e r
s o n c a n realize his f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t t o e q u a l citizens' r i g h t s o u t s i d e
t h e c o n t e x t of a n e t h n i c n a t i o n t h a t enjoys t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n d e
p e n d e n c e of a state. O n this view t h e collective r i g h t of every p e o p l e
t o f o r m a n i n d e p e n d e n t state is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for t h e effec
tive g u a r a n t e e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l rights. T h i s justification of t h e
p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l i t y also yields t h e possibility of e n d o w i n g t h e
actual success of a n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t with r e t r o s p e c
tive n o r m a t i v e force. A p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of p e o p l e qualifies for t h e
r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e fact t h a t it defines itself
as a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e and at t h e s a m e t i m e h a s t h e p o w e r to
c o n t r o l t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s t h a t derive f r o m s u c h ascriptive
characteristics.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e
contradicts the principle of voluntariness a n d has certain n o r m a tively u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h S c h m i t t m a k e s n o a t t e m p t t o
c o n c e a l : "A n a t i o n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s state t h e n a p p e a r s n o r m a l ; a
state t h a t lacks this h o m o g e n e i t y is a b n o r m a l , a t h r e a t to p e a c e . "
T h e a s s u m p t i o n of a corrnpj^sq
necessitates r e
2 5
pressive policies, w h e t h e r it b e t h e f o r c e d assimilation of alien ele

m e n t s o r t h e p u r i f i c a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e t h r o u g h a p a r t h e i d a n d
142
Chapter 5
e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , for, as S c h m i t t p u t s it, "a d e m o c r a t i c state (would)

r o b itself of its s u b s t a n c e by consistently r e c o g n i z i n g t h e universal
equality of h u m a n b e i n g s in t h e d o m a i n of p u b l i c life a n d of p u b l i c
l a w . " I n a d d i t i o n to s u g g e s t i n g p r e v e n t i v e m e a s u r e s l i m i t i n g t h e
a d m i s s i o n of aliens, S c h m i t t r e c o m m e n j i ^ t h e ^
p u l s i o n of h e t e r o g e n e o u s e l e m e n t s ^ of t h e p o p u l a t i o n " as well as
t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c a l s e g r e g a t i o n , h e n c e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p r o t e c
t o r a t e s , c o l o n i e s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , h o m e l a n d s , etc.
26
Of course, the republican conception does n o t preclude ethnic

c o m m u n i t i e s ' giving t h e m s e l v e s d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d estab
lishing t h e m s e l v e s as sovereign states so l o n g as this i n d e p e n d e n c e
is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of citizens to live in f r e e d o m
u n d e r l^ws. B u t as a g e n e r a l r u l e nation-states d o n o t d e v e l o p p e a c e
fully f r o m s e p a r a t e p e o p l e s living in isolation; r a t h e r t h e y typically
e n c r o a c h o n n e i g h b o r i n g r e g i o n s , tribes, s u b c u l t u r e s , a n d linguistic
o r religious c o m m u n i t i e s . F o r t h e m o s t p a r t n e w nation-states
e m e r g e at t h e e x p e n s e of assimilated, s u p p r e s s e d , o r m a r g i n a l i z e d
" s u b a l t e r n " p e o p l e s . T h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states u n d e r t h e b a n
n e r of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m h a s a l m o s t always b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by
b l o o d y p u r i f i c a t i o n rituals, a n d it h a s g e n e r a l l y e x p o s e d n e w m j n o r i ties to n e w waves of r e p r e s s i o n . I n late n i n e t e e n t h - and^ twentiethc e n t u r y E u r o p e it left i n its w a k e a h o r r i f i c legacy of e m i g r a t i o n a n d
e x p u l s i o n , of f o r c e d r e s e t t l e m e n t , d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t , a n d physical
e x t e r m i n a t i o n , u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g g e n o c i d e . O f t e n e n o u g h t h e
p e r s e c u t e d t h e m s e l v e s m u t a t e d i n t o p e r s e c u t o r s o n c e they suc
c e e d e d in e m a n c i p a t i n g themselves. I n t h e prevailing p r a c t i c e c o n
c e r n i n g r e c o g n i t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e
n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e c o i n c i d e d with a shift to t h e " p r i n c i p l e of effec
tiveness" a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h every n e w g o v e r n m e n t r e g a r d l e s s of
its legitimacy-can c o u n t o n r e c o g n i t i o n only if it s u c c e e d s in stabi
lizing its sovereignty b o t h e x t e r n a l l y a n d internally.
B u t as in t h e salient cases of c o l o n i a l i s m a n d d o m i n a t i o n by a
f o r e i g n power, t h e injustices a g a i n s t which, l e g i t i m a t e resigtance. is
d i r e c t e d d o n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e violation of a s u p p o s e d collective
r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b u t f r o m t h e violation of t h e
basic r i g h t s of individuals. T h e d e m a n d for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n caiT
only have as its i m m e d i a t e c o n t e n t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of e q u a l civil
143
rights. T h e a b o l i t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against m i n o r i t i e s d o e s n o t
p e r se call i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s of a n u n j u s t
r e g i m e . A d e m a n d to s e c e d e is l e g i t i m a t e only w h e n t h e c e n t r a l state
p o w e r violates t h e r i g h t s of a p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d
in a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y ; in this case t h e d e m a n d for i n c l u s i o n c a n
b e r e a l i z e d via n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e U n i t e d States was a l r e a d y r e c o g n i z e d by S p a i n
a n d F r a n c e in 1778. Since t h e d e f e c t i o n of t h e S p a n i s h c o l o n i e s in
South a n d Central America, a n d contrary to the practice that pre
vailed u n t i l t h a t t i m e , t h e view h a s g a i n e d g e n e r a l a c c e p t a n c e t h a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of a secession f r o m t h e m o t h e r c o u n t r y is
p e r m i s s i b l e e v e n w i t h o u t t h e assent of t h e f o r m e r s o v e r e i g n .
So l o n g as n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s a p p e a l to d e m o
cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in t h e r e p u b l i c a n sense, a secession ( o r t h e
a n n e x a t i o n of a s e c e d e d p o r t i o n of a t e r r i t o r y by a n o t h e r state)
c a n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d w i t h o u t t a k i n g a c c o u n t of t h e legitimacy of t h e
status q u o . F o r so l o n g as all citizens enjoy e q u a l r i g h t s a n d n o b o d y
suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r e is n o c o m p e l l i n g n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n to
s e c e d e f r o m t h e l a r g e r political c o m m u n i t y . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m
stances, issues of r e p r e s s i o n o r of "foreign d o m i n a t i o n " (Fremdherrschaft) w h i c h w o u l d give m i n o r i t i e s t h e r i g h t to s e c e d e c a n n o t arise.
T h i s view fits t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w h i c h , in
a c c o r d a n c e with t h e U N C h a r t e r , g u a r a n t e e s all p e o p l e s a r i g h t of
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t d o e s so w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g t h e c o n c e p t "peo
p l e " in t h e e t h n i c s e n s e . T h e r e s o l u t i o n rejects explicitly t h e r i g h t
t o s e c e d e f r o m "states t h a t c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s in a c c o r d a n c e with
t h e p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d of t h e r i g h t of self-determina
t i o n of p e o p l e s a n d t h e r e f o r e possess a g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h r e p r e
sents t h e w h o l e p e o p l e , w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n t h e basis of r a c e ,
religion or sex."
2 7
28
2 9
30
Ill
A M o d e l o f Inclusion Sensitive to Difference
To b e s u r e , t h e liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c self-determina
t i o n o b s c u r e s t h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s , w h i c h c o m e s i n t o
s h a r p e r focus f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e a n d f r o m t h e
intersubjective p o i n t of view of d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y . T h e p r o b l e m also
31
32
144
Chapter 5
o c c u r s i n d e m o c r a t i c societies w h e n a politically d o m i n a n t , majority

c u l t u r e i m p o s e s its way of life o n m i n o r i t i e s a n d t h e r e b y d e n i e s
effective equality of r i g h t s to citizens f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l back
g r o u n d s . T h i s p r o b l e m c o n c e r n s political issues t h a t b e a r o n t h e
I ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e identity of citizens. I n t h e s e mat
ters m i n o r i t i e s s h o u l d n o t b e simply o u t v o t e d by a majority. H e r e t h e
p r i n c i p l e of majority r u l e r u n s u p a g a i n s t its limits as t h e c o n t i n g e n t
c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry p r e j u d i c e s t h e o u t c o m e s of a s e e m i n g l y
n e u t r a l p r o c e d u r e : " T h e majority p r i n c i p l e itself d e p e n d s o n p r i o r
a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e u n i t : t h a t t h e u n i t w i t h i n w h i c h it is to o p e r a t e
is itself l e g i t i m a t e a n d t h a t t h e m a t t e r s o n w h i c h it is e m p l o y e d
p r o p e r l y fall w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h a t u n i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
w h e t h e r t h e s c o p e a n d d o m a i n of majority r u l e a r e a p p r o p r i a t e in a
p a r t i c u l a r u n i t d e p e n d s o n a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t t h e majority p r i n c i p l e
itself c a n d o n o t h i n g to justify. T h e justification for t h e u n i t lies
b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t h e majority p r i n c i p l e a n d , for t h a t m a t t e r ,
mostly b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y itself."
33
T h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d by t h e fact

t h a t citizens, e v e n w h e n viewed as legal subjects, a r e n o t a b s t r a c t
individuals w h o a r e c u t off f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n s . By i n t e r v e n i n g ^ in
ethical-political issues, t h e law affects t h e integrity of t h e f o r m s of
life in w h i c h e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n d u c t of life is e m b e d d e d . I n a d d i t i o n
to m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n s , a n d n e g o t i a b l e
interests, this a s p e c t of t h e law b r i n g s strong evaluations i n t o play t h a t
d e p e n d o n intersubjectively s h a r e d , b u t culturally specific, tradi
tions. L e g a l o r d e r s as w h o l e s a r e also "ethically i m b u e d " in t h a t t h e y
i n t e r p r e t t h e universalistic c o n t e n t of t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n
ciples in d i f f e r e n t ways, namely, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of t h e e x p e
r i e n c e s t h a t m a k e u p a n a t i o n a l h i s t o r y a n d in l i g h t of a historically
prevailing t r a d i t i o n , c u l t u r e , a n d f o r m of life. O f t e n t h e r e g u l a t i o n
of culturally sensitive m a t t e r s , s u c h as t h e official l a n g u a g e , t h e
p u b l i c s c h o o l c u r r i c u l u m , t h e status of c h u r c h e s a n d religious c o m
m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e n o r m s of c r i m i n a l law (e.g., t h o s e r e g u l a t i n g
a b o r t i o n ) , b u t also of less o b v i o u s m a t t e r s s u c h as t h e status of t h e
family a n d marriage-like p a r t n e r s h i p s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of security
s t a n d a r d s , o r t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e private f r o m t h e p u b l i c r e a l m ,
is m e r e l y a reflection of t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a
145
majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s a c h i e v e d d o m i n a n c e for c o n t i n g e n t , his

torical r e a s o n s . S u c h implicitly o v e r w h e l m i n g r e g u l a t i o n s c a n also
s p a r k a c u l t u r a l s t r u g g l e by d i s r e s p e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s against t h e m a
j o r i t y c u l t u r e e v e n w i t h i n a r e p u b l i c a n polity t h a t g u a r a n t e e s for
mally e q u a l civil rights, as is s h o w n by n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s s u c h as
t h e F r a n c o p h o n e s in C a n a d a , t h e W a l l o o n s in B e l g i u m , a n d t h e
B a s q u e s a n d C a t a l a n s in S p a i n .
A n a t i o n of citizens is c o m p o s e d of p e r s o n s w h o , as a r e s u l t of
socialization processes, also e m b o d y t h e f o r m s of life in w h i c h they
f o r m e d t h e i r identities, even if as a d u l t s t h e y r e n o u n c e t h e t r a d i t i o n s
in w h i c h t h e y w e r e b r o u g h t u p . I n virtue of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e i r
character, p e r s o n s a r e so to s p e a k n o d a l p o i n t s j l n _ a n ^ a ^ r i p t i y e
n e t w o r k of c u l t u r e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s . T h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m p o s i t i o n of
t h e citizen b o d y i n D a h l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e "political unit"-also
implicitly d e t e r m i n e s t h e ( j ^ i l ^ ^ y e ^ o r i z 1 ^ w i t h i n w h i c h c u l t u r a l
conflicts a n d ethical-political d i s c o u r s e s of self-interpretation a r e
p l a y e d o u t . T h i s evaluative h o r i z o n also c h a n g e s with shifts in t h e
social c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry. F o r e x a m p l e , political q u e s t i o n s
t h a t d e p e n d o n a culture-specific b a c k g r o u n d a r e n o t necessarily
t r e a t e d differently after a secession, t h o u g h t h e o u t c o m e s of votes
a r e different; n e w majorities a r e n o t always t h e r e s u l t of n e w
arguments.
.
,
O f c o u r s e , a m i n o r i t y t h a t suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a n achieve e q u a l
r i g h t s t h r o u g h secession only o n t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o n d i t i o n t h a t its
m e m b e r s are geographically concentrated. Otherwise the old prob
lems merely recur u n d e r new banners. In general, discrimination
c a n b e e l i m i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h ..national i n d e p e n d e n c e b u t only
througl^
is ^sufficiently sensitive to t h e
c u l t u r a l....background- of individual a n d group-specific differences.
T h e p r o b l e m of b o r n m i n o r i t i e s , e n d e m i c to all pluralistic societies,
b e c o m e s m o r e a c u t e in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies. B u t w h e n t h e l a t t e r
a r e o r g a n i z e d as d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states, several different
r o u t e s to t h e elusive g o a l of a " d i f f e r e n c e s ^
a r e at
a n y r a t e available: federalist d e l e g a t i o n of p o w e r s , a functionally
specified transfer o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of state c o m p e t e n c e s , a b o v e all
g u a r a n t e e s of c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y , group-specific rights, c o m p e n s a
t o r y policies, a n d o t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s for effectively p r o t e c t i n g
146
Chapter 5
m i n o r i t i e s . I n this way t h e b o d y of citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e

d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s i n a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y o r i n p a r t i c u l a r policy
d o m a i n s c h a n g e s w i t h o u t affecting its p r i n c i p l e s .
To b e s u r e , t h e c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s of different e t h n i c
c o m m u n i t i e s , l a n g u a g e g r o u p s , religious faiths, a n d f o r m s of life
s h o u l d n o t b e p u r c h a s e d at t h e cost of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of society.
T h e painful p r o c e s s of u n c o u p l i n g m u s t n o t r e n d t h e society asund e r jnjtoji^mûlgDlicJtyj3f s u b c u l t u r e s closed off f r o m o n e a n o t h e r .
O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e majority c u l t u r e m u s t d e t a c h itself f r o m its
fusion with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e i n w h i c h all citizens s h a r e
equally; o t h e r w i s e it dictates t h e p a r a m e t e r s of political discourses
f r o m t h e outset. As j u s t o n e p a r t , it m a y n o l o n g e r f o r m t h e facade
of t h e w h o l e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e i n spe
cific q u e s t i o n s of existential r e l e v a n c e for m i n o r i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , t h e b i n d i n g force of t h e c o n i m o n political c u l t u r e , w h i c h
b e c o m e s progressively m o r e abstract as s u b c u l t u r e s r e d u c e it t o a
c o m m o n denominator^ must remain ^ s t i ^
t o .prjsyemQhe
3 4
n a t i o n of c]tizns.^
"Multiculturalism, while e n d o r s
i n g t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of several c u l t u r a l g r o u p s i n a single political
society, also r e q u i r e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o m m o n c u l t u r e . . . . M e m
b e r s of all c u l t u r a l g r o u p s . . . will have t o a c q u i r e a c o m m o n politi
cal l a n g u a g e a n d c o n v e n t i o n s of c o n d u c t t o b e a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e
effectively i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e p r o t e c t i o n of
g r o u p as well as individual i n t e r e s t s i n a s h a r e d political a r e n a . "
3 5
IV Democracy a n d State Sovereignty: T h e Case o f Humanitarian

Intervention
T h e substantive a n d p r o c e d u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of d e m o c r a c y n o t
only entail different c o n c e p t i o n s of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d
m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ; they also have different c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e c o n
c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of state sovereignty. T h e state t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n m o d
e r n E u r o p e d e p e n d e d f r o m j h e b e g i n n i n g o n t h e r e s e r v e force of a
s t a n d i n g army, t h e police^ a n d t h e p e n a l system, a n d j t e x e r c i s e d a
m o n o p o l y over t h e legitimate m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . I n t e r n a l sover
eignty meanT tKe 5nF67^
state, e x t e r n a l
sovereignty t h e ability t o assert oneself i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g
147
t h e m a j o r p o w e r s (as this b e c a m e c o n s o l i d a t e d in t h e E u r o p e a n state

system after t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a ) . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t t h e
p r o c e s s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w h i c h was set in m o t i o n by t h e f o r m a t i o n
of nation-states a p p e a r s as t h e transfer of sovereign p o w e r f r o m t h e
p r i n c e to t h e p e o p l e . B u t this f o r m u l a lacks p r e c i s i o n in c o m p a r i s o n
with t h e alternative t h a t c o n c e r n s u s h e r e .
If d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of
free a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e p r o c e s s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d legis
lation, t h e n d e m o c r a c y in t h e first p l a c e c h a n g e s ^ t h e j i a t u r e a n d
m o d e of e x e r c i s i n g i n t e r n a l sovereignty. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state
revolutionizes t h e basis o n w h i c h political r u l e is l e g i t i m a t e d . If, by
c o n t r a s t , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e collective self-as
s e r t i o n a n d self-realization of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e , t h e issue of
e x t e r n a l sovereignty m o v e s i n t o t h e f o r e g r o u n d . F o r t h e p r e s e r v a
t i o n of state p o w e r in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t h e r e b y a c q u i r e s t h e
a d d i t i o n a l significance t h a t a n a t i o n secures, t o g e t h e r with its exist
e n c e , its u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r over a n d a g a i n s t o t h e r n a t i o n s . T h u s , in
t h e first case, t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y a n d state sover
eignty lays d o w n s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s for t h e legitimacy of t h e inter
n a l o r d e r b u t leaves t h e q u e s t i o n of e x t e r n a l sovereignty o p e n ; in
t h e s e c o n d case it i n t e r p r e t s t h e p l a c e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e in t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , b u t t h e only c r i t e r i o n of legitimacy it r e q u i r e s
for t h e i n t e r n a l exercise of p o w e r is civil p e a c e , t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of
"law a n d o r d e r . "
T h e c o n c e p t i o n of sovereignty in classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law entails
a p r o h i b i t i o n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of a n i n t e r n a
tionally r e c o g n i z e d state. T h i s p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n is i n d e e d
r e a f f i r m e d by t h e U N C h a r t e r ; b u t f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g it s t o o d in
t e n s i o n with t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of
h u m a n rights. T h e e r o s i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n in
r e c e n t d e c a d e s h a s b e e n d u e p r i m a r i l y to t h e politics of h u m a n
r i g h t s . It is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t S c h m i t t categorically r e p u d i
a t e d this d e v e l o p m e n t . H i s r e j e c t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n g r o u n d e d in
a p p e a l s to h u m a n r i g h t s c a n a l r e a d y b e a c c o u n t e d for by his bellig
e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i n d e e d of politics in
g e n e r a l . It was n o t only t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of c r i m e s against h u m a n
ity after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r t h a t elicited his scornful p r o t e s t . T h e
36
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Chapter 5
3 8
c o n d e m n a t i o n of offensive w a r s h a d a l r e a d y s t r u c k h i m as i n c o m
p a t i b l e with t h e status a n d r a n g e of a c t i o n of n a t i o n s t h a t c a n assert
t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a n d u n i q u e identity only in t h e a n t a g o n i s t i c r o l e of
sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.
M i c h a e l Walzer, w h o c o u l d n o t b e f u r t h e r f r o m t h e m i l i t a n t ethn o n a t i o n a l i s m of a Schmitt, d e f e n d s a similar p o s i t i o n . W i t h o u t
wishing to suggest false parallels, I w o u l d like t o e x a m i n e his c o m
munitarian reservations concerning humanitarian intervention,
for t h e y t h r o w l i g h t o n t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n c e p t i o n s
of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e t r e a t m e n t of sovereignty rights. I n his b o o k
o n j u s t w a r s , Walzer p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y c o m
m u n i t y h a s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it possesses its
o w n collective identity a n d , i n s p i r e d by a n a w a r e n e s s of its c u l t u r a l
h e r i t a g e , h a s t h e will a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c a r v e o u t a state exist
e n c e for itself a n d to assert its political i n d e p e n d e n c e . A g r o u p of
p e o p l e enjoys t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it s u c c e e d s
in laying claim to it.
3 9
40
To b e s u r e , Walzer d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a n d i d a t e for political

i n d e p e n d e n c e as a n e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y of d e s c e n t b u t r a t h e r as a
c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y of i n h e r i t a n c e . However, t h e historically evolv
i n g c u l t u r a l n a t i o n , like t h e c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d ancestry, is also
u n d e r s t o o d as a p r e p o l i t i c a l entity t h a t h a s t h e r i g h t to p r e s e r v e its
integrity in t h e f o r m of a sovereign state: " T h e i d e a of c o m m u n a l
integrity derives its m o r a l a n d political force f r o m t h e r i g h t s of
c o n t e m p o r a r y m e n a n d w o m e n to live as m e m b e r s of a historic
c o m m u n i t y a n d to e x p r e s s t h e i r i n h e r i t e d c u l t u r e t h r o u g h political
f o r m s w o r k e d o u t a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . " Walzer also d e d u c e s t h r e e
e x c e p t i o n s to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n f r o m this r i g h t of
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . H e r e g a r d s i n t e r v e n t i o n s as p e r m i s s i b l e (a) to
lend support to ajiational l i t o
t h a t manifests t h e
41
identity of a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n i t y by t h e very act of resistance

a n d (b) to d e f e n d t h e integrity of a pojijjcal c o m m u n i t y u n d e r attack
w h e n it c a n only b e p r o t e c t e d by a n o p p o s i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n . Walzer
also justifies t h e t h i r d e x c e p t i o n , n o t o n t h e basis of violations of
h u m a n rights p e r se, b u t o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t (c) in cases of enslave
ment, j n a ^ a c e ^ o r ^
deprives its o w n
citizens of t h e possibility of giving e x p r e s s i o n to t h e i r f o r m s of life
a n d t h e r e b y of p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r collective identity.
149
T h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty e m p h a
sizes t h e a s p e c t of e x t e r n a l sovereignty in s u c h a way t h a t t h e q u e s
tion of t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r gets p u s h e d i n t o t h e
b a c k g r o u n d . T h e p o i n t of Walzer's reflections is t h a t a h u m a n i t a r i a n
i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t violations of h u m a n r i g h t s by a d i c t a t o r i a l re
g i m e c a n only b e justified w h e n t h e affected citizens t h e m s e l v e s take
u p t h e c u d g e l s against political r e p r e s s i o n a n d , by a r e c o g n i z a b l e act
of r e b e l l i o n , p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e p r o o f t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t is o p p o s e d
to t h e t r u e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e p e o p l e a n d t h r e a t e n s t h e integrity of
t h e c o m m u n i t y . Accordingly, t h e legitimacy of a political o r d e r is
m e a s u r e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e by t h e a c c o r d b e t w e e n t h e political
l e a d e r s h i p a n d t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life t h a t is constitutive of t h e
identity of t h e p e o p l e : "A state is l e g i t i m a t e o r n o t , d e p e n d i n g u p o n
t h e 'fit' of g o v e r n m e n t a n d c o m m u n i t y , t h a t is, t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h
t h e g o v e r n m e n t actually r e p r e s e n t s t h e political life of its p e o p l e .
W h e n it d o e s n ' t d o t h a t , t h e p e o p l e h a v e a r i g h t to r e b e l . B u t if they
a r e free to r e b e l t h e n they a r e also free n o t to r e b e l . . . b e c a u s e they
still believe t h e g o v e r n m e n t to b e t o l e r a b l e , o r they a r e a c c u s t o m e d
to it, o r they a r e p e r s o n a l l y loyal to its l e a d e r s . . . . A n y o n e c a n m a k e
s u c h a r g u m e n t s , b u t only subjects o r citizens c a n act o n t h e m . "
Walzer's critics p r o c e e d f r o m a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o
cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; they reject t h e view t h a t i n t e r n a l sover
eignty is simply a m a t t e r of t h e e f f e c t i v e j g r e j ^ ^
O n this r e a d i n g t h e key to j u d g i n g t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l
o r d e r is n o t c o m m o n c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e b u t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of civil
rights: " T h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e m u l t i t u d e s h a r e s some form of c o m
m o n l i f e c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s , c u s t o m s , interests, history, institu
tions, a n d b o u n d a r i e s i s n o t sufficient to g e n e r a t e a g e n u i n e ,
i n d e p e n d e n t , l e g i t i m a t e political c o m m u n i t y . " T h e critics d i s p u t e
t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d a d v o c a t e , as far as possible, t h e
e x p a n s i o n of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights. H e r e , of
c o u r s e , t h a t a state is illegitimate a c c o r d i n g to the^stajridards of t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is not, a suffidmt condition, for i n t e r v e n i n g in its
i n t e r n a l affairs. O t h e r w i s e t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w o u l d h a v e to
b e c o m p o s e d a l o n g c o m p l e t e l y different lines. Walzer rightly p o i n t s
o u t t h a t f r o m a m o r a l p o i n t of view every d e c i s i o n t o act o n b e h a l f
of citizens of a n o t h e r c o u n t r y is d u b i o u s . P r o p o s a l s for a case-by-case
t r e a t m e n t of i n t e r v e n t i o n also take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e limits a n d t h e
4 2
43
4 4
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Chapter 5
45
e x t r e m e d a n g e r s of a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s . B u t t h e decisions
a n d strategies of t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d especially t h e i n t e r v e n
tions of forces c a r r y i n g o u t U N m a n d a t e s since 1989, i n d i c a t e t h e
d i r e c t i o n a l o n g w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (Volkerrecht) is g r a d u a l l y b e
i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) ,
T h e s e political a n d legal d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e r e a c t i o n s t o a n objec
tively c h a n g e d situation. T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d n a t u r e a n d scale of t h e
g o v e r n m e n t criminality t h a t s p r e a d i n t h e wake of t h e t e c h n o l o g i
cally u n f e t t e r e d a n d ideologically u n r e s t r a i n e d S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
m a k e s a m o c k e r y of t h e classical p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e i n n o c e n c e of
t h e sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A p r e s c i e n t politics of
p e a c e k e e p i n g m u s t take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c o m p l e x social a n d politi
cal causes of war. W h a t is u r g e n t l y n e e d e d a r e strategies d e s i g n e d to
i n f l u e n c e w h e r e possible, i n a n o n v i o l e n t m a n n e r t h e i n t e r n a l
o r d e r of formally sovereign states w h o s e goal is to foster self-sustain
i n g e c o n o m i e s a n d t o l e r a b l e social c o n d i t i o n s , e q u a l d e m o c r a t i c
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d a c u l t u r e of t o l e r a n c e . S u c h inter
v e n t i o n s i n s u p p o r t of i n t e r n a l d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a r e , however, irrec
o n c i l a b l e with a c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t
g r o u n d s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e for t h e sake of t h e collec
tive self-realization of a c u l t u r a l f o r m of life.
46
Only a Europe o f Fatherlands?
I n view of t h e subversive forces a n d i m p e r a t i v e s of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t

a n d of t h e i n c r e a s i n g density of w o r l d w i d e n e t w o r k s of c o m m u n i c a
tion a n d c o m m e r c e , t h e e x t e r n a l sovereignty of states, h o w e v e r it
m a y b e g r o u n d e d , is by n o w i n a n y case a n a n a c h r o n i s m . Also t h e
i n c r e a s i n g global d a n g e r s w h i c h have l o n g since u n i t e d t h e n a t i o n s
of t h e w o r l d unwittingly i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society r e n d e r a
practical necessity t h e c r e a t i o n of politically c o m p e t e n t organiza
tions o n t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level. F o r t h e t i m e b e i n g thefeTsâTackT
of collective actors w h o c o u l d p u r s u e a " d o m e s t i c " politics o n a
global scale a n d w o u l d have t h e p o w e r t o a g r e e o n t h e r e q u i s i t e
p a r a m e t e r s , a r r a n g e m e n t s , a n d p r o c e d u r e s . Yet t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
have in t h e m e a n t i m e c o m p e l l e d nation-states t o u n i t e i n t o l a r g e r
u n i t s . T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o d a n g e r o u s l e g i t i m a t i o n deficiencies,
151
as is s h o w n by t h e e x a m p l e of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . As n e w o r g a n i
zations e m e r g e even f u r t h e r r e m o v e d f r o m t h e political b a s e , s u c h
as t h e Brussels b u r e a u c r a c y , t h e g a p b e t w e e n s e l f - p r o g r a m m i n g ad
m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d systemic n e t w o r k s , o n t h e o n e j i a n d , a n d d e m o cratic processes, o n t h e other, grows constantly. T h e helpless
defensive r e a c t i o n s to t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s a g a i n d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a substantive c o n c e p t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty.
A l t h o u g h t h e verdict of t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t of Ger
m a n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y effectively ratifies t h e p r o
p o s e d e x p a n s i o n of t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , t h e
justification it p r o v i d e s reaffirms t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e
of d e m o c r a c y w o u l d b e u n a c c e p t a b l y " e m p t i e d of c o n t e n t " if t h e
exercise of state f u n c t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e t i e d o n c e m o r e to a "rela
tively h o m o g e n e o u s " citizen body. T h e C o u r t , w h i c h takes its o r i e n
t a t i o n f r o m H e r m a n n H e l l e r ( r a t h e r t h a n Carl S c h m i t t ) , a p p a r e n t l y
wants to reject a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . Never
theless, it takes t h e view t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y l e g i t i m a t e d state
a u t h o r i t y m u s t flow f r o m a political will-formation t h r o u g h w h i c h a
p e o p l e gives sufficient e x p r e s s i o n to its prepolitically given " n a t i o n a l
identity." If a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is to take r o o t at all, it m u s t b e
possible for t h e citizen b o d y to e x p r e s s legally "what u n i t e s t h e m
socially a n d politically in a relatively h o m o g e n e o u s m a n n e r . "
Given this basic a s s u m p t i o n , t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n s why t h e Maas
t r i c h t Treaty will n o t f o u n d a E u r o p e a n f e d e r a l state i n t o w h i c h t h e
F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c w o u l d b e s u b s u m e d , t h e r e b y s t r i p p i n g it of its
s t a n d i n g as a subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (with t h e r i g h t to c o n d u c t
i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a l , d o m e s t i c , a n d f o r e i g n policies, a n d to m a i n
tain its o w n d e f e n s e forces) . I n e s s e n c e t h e a r g u m e n t of t h e C o u r t
a i m s t o p r o v e t h a t t h e treaty d o e s j i o ^ establish t h e s u p r e m e constit u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y (^^^j^^^^^gfeasl, of a n i n d e p e n d e n t s u p r a n a
t i o n a l legal subject ( o n a n a n a l o g y with t h e U n i t e d States, for
e x a m p l e ) . T h e "alliance of s t a t e s " is s u p p o s e d t o owe its existence
only to t h e " a u t h o r i z a t i o n of states w h i c h remain sovereign": " T h e
M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y takes a c c o u n t of t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d sover
eignty of t h e m e m b e r states by o b l i g a t i n g t h e U n i o n to r e s p e c t t h e
n a t i o n a l idejrtityôf its m e m b e r s t a t e s . " F o r m u l a t i o n s s u c h as t h e s e
b e t r a y the^conceptual barriersj) t h a t t h e substantive c o n c e p t of p o p u l a r
4 7
4 8
49
50
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Chapter 5
sovereignty e r e c t s to t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s to s u p r a n a

t i o n a l b o d i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e y l e a d to a s t o n i s h i n g c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t
c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d with earlier verdicts of t h e c o u r t o n t h e pri
m a c y of E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y l a w .
O n e w o u l d n o t b e m i s t a k e n if o n e d i s c e r n e d in t h e t e n o r of t h e
C o u r t ' s justification a c e r t a i n level of a g r e e m e n t with t h e c o n c l u s i o n
t h a t H e r m a n n L u b b e draws f r o m his p h i l i p p i c a g a i n s t t h e " U n i t e d
States of E u r o p e ; " as h e c o n f i d e n t l y asserts i n t h e subtitle, this u n i o n
is " n o t to b e " : " T h e legitimacy of t h e f u t u r e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . . .
rests o n t h e s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s , n o t o n t h e
s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g will of a E u r o p e a n citizenry. A E u r o p e a n p e o p l e h a s
n o political e x i s t e n c e a n d , while t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t a n
e x p e r i e n c e of m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g a m o n g E u r o p e a n s a n a l o g o u s to
t h a t w h i c h u n i t e s a p e o p l e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e , at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e r e
a r e n o f o r e s e e a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a legitimacy-founding
E u r o p e a n will c o u l d take s h a p e . " Against this skepticism o n e c o u l d
p o i n t to t h e decisive historical e x p e r i e n c e s jthat u n d e n i a b l y u n i t e t h e
E u r o p e a n g e o p l e s . F o r t h e c a t a s t r o p h e s of two w o r l d wars h a v e
tough^^
nationalistic, e x c l u s i o n a r y , m e c h a n i s m s feed. W h y s h o u l d a sense of
b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r culturally a n d politically n o t g r o w o u t of t h e s e
e x p e r i e n c e s e s p e c i a l l y against t h e r i c h b a c k g r o u n d of s h a r e d tradi
t i o n s w h i c h have l o n g since a c h i e v e d world-historical significance, as
well as o n t h e basis of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s a n d d e n s e n e t w o r k s
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h have m o r e r e c e n t l y d e v e l o p e d in t h e d e c
a d e s of e c o n o m i c success of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ? Clearly
L u b b e ' s e u r o s k e p t i c i s m is m o t i v a t e d by t h e artificial d e m a n d for a
m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g , " a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of a p e o p l e . " B u t t h e " h o m o
g e n e o u s p e o p l e , " w h i c h is a g a i n p r o v i n g a n i m p e d i m e n t to reflec
tion, is t h e w r o n g analogy.
51
5 2
T h e conflict-ridden h i s t o r y of state f o r m a t i o n in t h e p o s t c o l o n i a l
p e r i o d in Asia a n d especially in Africa d o e s n o t offer a c o n v i n c i n g
c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . W h e n t h e erstwhile c o l o n i e s w e r e " g r a n t e d " i n d e
p e n d e n c e by t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s , t h e p r o b l e m was
t h a t t h e s e artificial t e r r i t o r i e s a c h i e v e d e x t e r n a l sovereignty w i t h o u t
already h a v i n g a n effective state p o w e r at t h e i r disposal. After t h e
w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t s in
153
m a n y i n s t a n c e s c o u l d assert t h e i r sovereignty i n t e r n a l l y only with

g r e a t difficulty. N o r c o u l d this b e a c h i e v e d by m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n :
"The p r o b l e m was e v e r y w h e r e t o 'fill i n ' r e a d y - m a d e states with
n a t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s p o s e s t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n , w h y postcolonial states h a d t o b e n a t i o n s . . . . N a t i o n - b u i l d i n g as d e v e l o p m e n t
m e a n s t h e e x t e n s i o n of a n active sense of m e m b e r s h i p t o t h e e n t i r e
p o p u l a c e , t h e s e c u r e a c c e p t a n c e of state authority, t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of r e s o u r c e s t o f u r t h e r t h e equality of m e m b e r s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n
of effective state o p e r a t i o n t o t h e p e r i p h e r y . " T h e c o n t i n u i n g tribal
conflicts i n formally i n d e p e n d e n t p o s t c o l o n i a l states serve as a r e
m i n d e r t h a t n a t i o n s only arise o n c e t h e y have traversed t h e difficult
road from e t h n i c a l l y j } ^
53
oHlTalic^
solidarity a m o n g citizens w h o a r e
stt angeTrsnto^ne anotherSln t h e West, this p r o c e s s of nation-state
f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h i n t e r c o n n e c t s a n d m i x e s tribes a n d r e g i o n s , t o o k
m o r e t h a n a century.
T h i s p r o c e s s of i n t e g r a t i o n itself d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e t r u e f u n c t i o n a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c will-formation, namely, t h e c o m m u n i
cative circuits of a political p u b l i c s p h e r e t h a t d e v e l o p e d o u t of
b o u r g e o i s associations a n d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of t h e mass press.
This enabled the same t h e m e s to acquire simultaneously t h e same
r e l e v a n c e for a large p u b l i c t h a t r e m a i n e d a n o n y m o u s a n d t o s p u r
citizens s e p a r a t e d by g r e a t d i s t a n c e s t o m a k e s p o n t a n e o u s c o n t r i b u
tions. T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n s t h a t a g g r e g a t e
t h e m e s a n d a t t i t u d e s t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y exercise political
i n f l u e n c e . T h e c o r r e c t a n a l o g y is obvious: t h e initial i m p e t u s t o
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a p o s t n a t i o n a l society is n o t p r o v i d e d
by t h e s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d " E u r o p e a n p e o p l e " b u t by t h e c o m
m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r ^ o f aûropeanrwifjle political p u b l i c s p h e r e e m
b e d d e d i n a s h a r e d political c u l t u r e . T h e latter is f o u n d e d onfa civjT
Tociety\Torn^^
n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organiza
:
tions, a n d d t i z e n initiatives a n d m o y e m e n t s , a n d will b e o c c u p i e d by

a r e n a s i n w h i c h t h e p o l i t i c a l partiej) c a n directly a d d r e s s t h e deci
sions of E u r o p e a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g o b e y o n d m e r e tactical alliance
to f o r m a E u r o p e a n p a r t y s y s t e m .
54
Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to

Dieter Grimm
I basically a g r e e with D i e t e r G r i m m ' s d i a g n o s i s [of t h e c u r r e n t c o n

stitutional status of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ] ^ h o w e v e r , a n analysis of
its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s l e a d s m e to d r a w a different political c o n c l u s i o n .
T h e Diagnosis
F r o m a constitutional perspective, o n e can discern a contradiction
in t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' s p r e s e n t situation. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e
E U is a s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n e s t a b U ^ ^
ties a n d w i t h o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n of its own. I n this r e s p e c t it is n o t a
state (in t h e m o d e r n sense of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c h a r a c t e r i z e d by
a m o n o p o l y o n v i o l e n c e a n d a domestically a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y rec
o g n i z e d sovereignty). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , C o m m u n i t y i n s t i t u t i o n s
create_Eurêjinâw__ that binds the m e m b e r statesthus the EU
exercises a s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y previously c l a i m e d only by individual
states. F r o m this results t h e o f t - b e m o a n e d d e m o c r a t i c deficit. C o m
mission a n d C o u n c i l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , as well as d e c i s i o n s by t h e
E u r o p e a n C o u r t , a r e i n t e r v e n i n g ever m o r e p r o f o u n d l y i n t o t h e
m e m b e r states' i n t e r n a l affairs. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e sover
eignty r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d u p o n t h e U n i o n , t h e E u r o p e a n executive
m a y e n f o r c e its p r o n o u n c e m e n t s over a n d a g a i n s t t h e o p p o s i t i o n of
t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as l o n g as t h e E u r o p e a n
P a r l i a m e n t is only e q u i p p e d with w e a k c o m p e t e n c e s , t h e s e p r o
n o u n c e m e n t s a n d e n a c t m e n t s lack d i r e c t d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n .
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Chapter 6
T h e executive i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e c o m m u n i t y derive t h e i r legitimacy

f r o m t h a t of t h e m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e y a r e n o t i n s t i t u t i o n s of
a state t h a t is itself c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e act of will o n t h e p a r t of t h e
u n i t e d citizens of E u r o p e . T h e E u r o p e a n p a s s p o r t d o e s n o t as yet
c o n f e r r i g h t s constitutive for d e m o c r a t i c citizenship.
Political Conclusion
I n c o n t r a s t with t h e federalists w h o r e c o m m e n d a d e m o c r a t i c pat
t e r n for t h e E U , G r i m m w a r n s a g a i n s t a n y f u r t h e r e r o s i o n of na
t i o n a l c o m p e t e n c e s by E u r o p e a n law. T h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit w o u l d
n o t b e effectively filled by a "statist s h o r t c u t " to t h e p r o b l e m , b u t
r a t h e r d e e p e n e d . N e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s , s u c h as a E u r o p e a n
P a r l i a m e n t with t h e u s u a l p o w e r s , a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e
Commission, a Second C h a m b e r replacing the Council, a n d a Euro
p e a n C o u r t of J u s t i c e with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s , in themselves
offer n o s o l u t i o n s . If they a r e n o t filled with life, t h e y will i n s t e a d
a c c e l e r a t e t h e t e n d e n c i e s t o w a r d a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i z e d
politics a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k s . T h e r e a l
p r e r e q u i s i t e s for a E u r o p e a n - w i d e i n t e g r a t i o n of citizen will-forma
t i o n have b e e n a b s e n t u p to now. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l e u r o s k e p t i c i s m t h u s
a m o u n t s to t h e empirically b a s e d a r g u m e n t t h a t as l o n g as t h e r e is
n o t a E u r o p e a n p e o p l e t h a t is sufficiently " h o m o g e n e o u s " to f o r m a
d e m o c r a t i c will, t h e r e s h o u l d b e n o c o n s t i t u t i o n .
T h e Discussion
My reflections a r e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t (1) t h e i n c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t of
t h e alternatives a n d (2) t h e n o t entirely u n a m b i g u o u s n o r m a t i v e
justification of t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c willformation.
(1) G r i m m p r e s e n t s u s with t h e u n w e l c o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t
w o u l d r e s u l t f r o m t h e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d , f e d e r a l state s h o u l d t h e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s
n o t take r o o t . So l o n g as a E u r o p e a n - n e t w o r k e d civil society, a E u r o
p e a n - w i d e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , a n d a c o m m o n political c u l t u r e
a r e lacking, t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s w o u l d b e c o m e in-
157
Does Europe Need a Constitution?
creasingly independent of the still nationally organized processes of

opinion- and will-formation. This prognosis of the dangers involved
strikes me as plausible. But what is the alternative?
Grimm's preferred option seems to imply that the constitutional
status quo can at least freeze the extant democratic deficit. Completely independently of constitutional innovations, however, this
deficit expands day by.day because the economic and social dynam
ics, even within the^ existing institutional framework., perpetuate the
erosion of national powers A
As Grimm himself
acknowledges, "The democratic principle is valid for the member
states whose own decision capabilities are however diminishing: de
cisional capability is accruing to the European Community where
the democracy principle is developing only weakly." But if the gap is
steadily widening between the European authorities' expanding
scope and the inadequate legitimation of the proliferating European
regulations, then decisively adhering to an exclusively nation-state
oriented mode of legitimation does not necessarily mean opting for
the lesser evil. The federalists at least accept the foreseeableand
perhaps avoidablerisk of the autonomization of supranational or
ganizations as a challenge. The euroskeptics have, from the start,
acquiesced in the supposedly irresistible erosion of democratic sub
stance so that they do not have to leave what appears to be the
reliable shelter of the nation-state.
In fact, the shelter is becoming increasingly less comfortable. The
debates on national economic competitiveness and the international
division of labor in which we are engaged make us aware of quite
another gapa gap^ between the nation state^s_increasingly limited
maneuverability and the imperatives of modes ofjpmdiicliQn interwoven worldwide . ( f e d e T n ^
profit from their respective
economies only as long as there are "national economies" that can
still be influenced by political means. With the denationalization of
the economy, especially of the financial markets and of industrial
production itself, and above all with the globalization and rapid
expansion of labor markets, national governments today are increas
ingly compelled to accept permanently high unemployment and the
marginalization of a growing minority for the sake of international
competitiveness. If the welfare state is to be preserved at least in its
:
158
Chapter 6
essentials a n d if t h e c r e a t i o n of a s e p a r a t e u n d e r c l a s s is to b e
a v o i d e d , t h e n i n s t i t u t i o n s c a p a b l e of a c t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l l y m u s t b e
f o r m e d . O n l y r e g i o n a l l y c o m p r e h e n d r e g i m e s like t h e E u r o p e a n
C o m m u n i t y c a n still affect t h e g l o b a l system a l o n g t h e lines of a
c o o r d i n a t e d w o r l d d o m e s t i c policy.
I n G r i m m ' s a c c o u n t , t h e E U a p p e a r s as a n i n s t i t u t i o n to b e put up
with, a n d with w h o s e a b s t r a c t i o n s we m u s t live. T h e r e a s o n s we
s h o u l d want it politically a r e n o t p r e s e n t e d . I s u b m i t t h a t t h e g r e a t e r
d a n g e r is p o s e d by t h e a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of g l o b a l i z e d n e t w o r k s a n d
m a r k e t s w h i c h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n t r i b u t e to<^he f r a g m e n t a t i o n of
public^ c o n s c i o u s n e s s ^ If t h e s e systemic p r e s s u r e s a r e n o t m e t by
politically c a p a b l e institutions, t h e r e will b e a r e s u r g e n c e of t h e
c r i p p l i n g fatalism of t h e O l d E m p i r e s in t h e m i d s t of h i g h l y m o b i l e
m o d e r n e c o n o m i e s . T h e decisive e l e m e n t s of this f u t u r e s c e n a r i o
w o u l d b e t h e p o s t i n d u s t r i a l m i s e r y of t h e " s u r p l u s " p o p u l a t i o n p r o
d u c e d by t h e s u r p l u s societythe T h i r d W o r l d w i t h i n t h e First
a n d a n a c c o m p a n y i n g m o r a l e r o s i o n of political c o m m u n i t y . This
f u t u r e - p r e s e n t w o u l d in r e t r o s p e c t see itself as t h e f u t u r e of a p a s t
i l l u s i o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c illusion a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h societies
c o u l d still d e t e r m i n e t h e i r o w n destinies t h r o u g h political will a n d
consciousness.
(2) I h a v e n o t yet said a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e ancillary p r o b l e m of
s u p r a n a t i o n a l b o d i e s ' b e c o m i n g increasingly i n d e p e n d e n t , a p r o b
l e m t h a t G r i m m rightly e m p h a s i z e s . N a t u r a l l y any a s s e s s m e n t of t h e
c h a n c e s for a E u r o p e a n - w i d e d e m o c r a c y d e p e n d s in t h e first p l a c e
u p o n empirically g r o u n d e d a r g u m e n t s . B u t we first h a v e _ t o j d e t e r m i n e t h e f u n c t i o n a l requJTjgments; a n d for t h a t , t h e n o r m a t i v e p e r
spective in w h i c h t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e justified is crucial.
G r i m m rejects a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n " b e c a u s e t h e r e is as yet n o
E u r o p e a n p e o p l e . " T h i s w o u l d s e e m at first sight to b e f o u n d e d
u p o n t h e s a m e p r e m i s e t h a t i n f o r m e d t h e t e n o r of t h e G e r m a n
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t ' s M a a s t r i c h t j u d g m e n t n a m e l y , t h e view t h a t
t h e state's d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n r e q u i r e s a c e r t a i n h o m o g e n e i t y
of t h e citizenry. However, G r i m m i m m e d i a t e l y d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f
f r o m Carl S c h m i t t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of volkisch o r e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l h o m o
geneity: " T h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s for d e m o c r a c y a r e d e v e l o p e d h e r e n o t
of t h e p e o p l e , b u t f r o m t h e society t h a t w a n t s to c o n s t i t u t e itself as
159
Does Europe Need a Constitution? x
a political u n i t . B u t this p r e s u m e s a collective identity, if it w a n t s to

settle its conflicts w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e , a c c e p t majority r u l e , a n d p r a c t i c e
solidarity." T h i s c o n c e p t i o n leaves o p e n t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e
called-for collective i d e n t i t y is to b e u n d e r s t o o d . I see t h e n u b of
r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e fact t h a t t h e f o r m s a n ^ ^ c j ^ e j d m ^ s j o f t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, t o g e t h e r with t h e d e m o c r a t i c m o d e of legitima
t i o n , s i m u l t e n e o u i l y T o r g e a n e w level of social i n t e g r a t i o n . D e m o
cratic c i t i z e n s h i p establishes a n abstract, legally m e d i a t e d solidarity
b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . T h i s f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n , w h i c h first
e m e r g e s with t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , is realized in t h e f o r m of a politically
socializing communicative context. I n d e e d it d e p e n d s u p o n t h e satisfac
t i o n of c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t c a n n o t b e
fulfilled simply by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m e a n s . To t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s b e
l o n g c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h a n etfakiaty
of
citizens c a n also d e v e l o p a n d b e r e p r o d u c e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y b u t
n o t a collective i d e n t i t y t h a t is independent of the democratic process itself
a n d , as s u c h , exists p r i o r to t h a t p r o c e s s . W h a t u n i t e s a n a t i o n of
citizens, as o p p o s e d to a Volksnation, is n o t s o m e p r i m o r d i a l s u b s t r a t e
b u t r a t h e r a n intersubjectively s h a r e d c o n t e x t of possible m u t u a l
understanding.
It is t h e r e f o r e crucial in this c o n t e x t w h e t h e r o n e uses t h e t e r m
" p e o p l e " in t h e juristically n e u t r a l sense of "state-constituting p e o
p l e , " o r w h e t h e r o n e associates t h e t e r m with n o t i o n s of i d e n t i t y of
s o m e o t h e r k i n d . I n G r i m m ' s view t h e i d e n t i t y of a n a t i o n of citizens
" n e e d n o t " b e " r o o t e d in e t h n i c o r i g i n , b u t m a y also h a v e o t h e r
bases." I t h i n k o n t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t it must h a v e a n o t h e r basis if t h e
d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is finally to g u a r a n t e e t h e social i n t e g r a t i o n of a
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d t o d a y increasingly differentiatingsociety. T h i s
b u r d e n m u s t n o t b e shifted f r o m t h e levels of political will-formation
to p r e s u m e d p r e p o l i t i c a l substrates, for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state u n
d e r t a k e s t o foster social i n t e g r a t i o n if n e c e s s a r y in t h e legally ab
stract f o r m of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d t o s e c u r e t h e substantive
status of c i t i z e n s h i p in d e m o c r a t i c ways. T h e e x a m p l e s of culturally
a n d ideologically pluralistic societies only serve to e m p h a s i z e this
n o r m a t i v e p o i n t . T h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n s
of citizens f o r m e d in classical c o u n t r i e s of i m m i g r a t i o n like t h e
U S is m o r e instructive in this r e s p e c t t h a n t h a t d e r i v e d f r o m t h e
160
Chapter 6
culturally assimilationist F r e n c h m o d e l . If i n t h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c
political c o m m u n i t y various c u l t u r a l , religious, a n d e t h n i c f o r m s of
life a r e to exist a m o n g a n d with e a c h o t h e r o n e q u a l t e r m s , t h e n t h e
^majority c u l t u r e ) m u s t b e c o m e s u f f ^ i e n d y d e t a d i g j f r o m its tradi
tional, historically explicable fusion with theôlitical
cultur^shared
by all citizens.
^ "
To b e s u r e , a politically c o n s t i t u t e d c o n t e x t of solidarity b e t w e e n
citizens w h o , d e s p i t e r e m a i n i n g s t r a n g e r s to o n e a n o t h e r , a r e sup
p o s e d to s t a n d u p for e a c h o t h e r is a c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n t e x t involv
ing demanding preconditions. O n this p o i n t t h e r e is n o d i s a g r e e m e n t .
T h e c o r e is f o r m e d by a political p u b l i c s p h e r e w h i c h e n a b l e s citiz e n s t o take p o s i t i o n s at t h e ^ a m e t i m e ^ o n t h e ^ a m e topicsSof t h e
<^same relevance^JTrnrp^blic s p h ^ e m u ^ t r i o t b e Reformed t n r o u g h
e i t h e r e x t e r n a l 3r i n t e r n a l c o e r c i o n . It m u s t b e e m b e d d e d in t h e
c o n t e x t of a f r e e d o m - v a l u i n g political c u l t u r e a n d b e s u p p o r t e d by
a liberal associational s t r u c t u r e of a civil society. Socially r e l e v a n t
e x p e r i e n c e f r o m still-intact private s p h e r e s m u s t flow i n t o s u c h a civil
society so t h a t they m a y b e p r o c e s s e d t h e r e for p u b l i c t r e a t m e n t .
Political p a r t i e s t h a t h a v e n o t b e c o m e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e state a p
p a r a t u s m u s t r e m a i n r o o t e d in this c o m p l e x so t h a t t h e y c a n m e d i a t e
b e t w e e n t h e s p h e r e s of i n f o r m a l p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e pne
h a n d , a n d t h e institutionalized d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
processes, o n t h e o t h e r . Accordingly, f r o m a n o r m a t i v e perspective
t h e r e c a n .be_ n o E u r o p e a n f e d e r a l state w o r t h y of t h e title of a
Euror^^
, integrated public
sphgrejdte
c o m m o n ^ p ^ t i c ^ c u l t u r e : a civil
society e n c o m p a s s i n g i n t e r e s t associations, n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l or
g a n i z a t i o n s , citizens' m o v e m e n t s , etc., a n d n a t u r a l l y a p a r t y system
a p p r o p r i a t e t o a E u r o p e a n a r e n a . I n s h o r t , this entails[public c o m I n u n i c a t i o r i ] t h a t t r a n s c e n d s t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e t h u s far l i m i t e d
national public spheres.
Certainly, t h e a m b i t i o u s f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t of d e m o c r a t i c
will-formation c a n scarcely b e sufficiently fulfilled within t h e p r e s e n t
nation-state framework; this is all t h e m o r e t r u e for E u r o p e . Wha,t
c o n c e r n s m e , however, is t h e perspective f r o m w h i c h t h e s e func
t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s a r e n o r m a t i v e l y justified; for this n o r m a t i v e
s t a n d p o i n t i n a c e r t a i n sense p r e j u d i c e s t h e empiricalêyûajdonôf
161
Does Europe Need a Constitution?
t h e p r e s e n t difficulties. T h e s e m u s t , for t h e t i m e b e i n g , s e e m insu

p e r a b l e if a p r e p o l i t i c a l collective i d e n t i t y is r e g a r d e d as necessary,
as i n d e p e n d e n t c u l t u r a l s u b s t r a t e w h i c h is merely articulated in t h e
fulfillment of t h e said f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . B u t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o c r a c y , o n e t h a t G r i m m also s e e m s t o favor,
c a n n o l o n g e r rest u p o n s u c h a c o n c r e t i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of " t h e
p e o p l e . " T h i s n o t i o n falsely p r o j e c t s h o m o g e n e i t y w h e r e in fact
t h e r e is o n l y h e t e r o g e n e i t y .
T h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of citizens i n a d e m o c r a t i c
c o m m u n i t y m u s t n o t b e t a k e n as a historical-cultural a p r i o r i t h a t
m a k e s d e m o c r a t i c will-formation possible, b u t r a t h e r as t h e fluidc o n t e n t of a c i r c u l a t o r y p r o c e s s t h a t is g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h d i e Jheggl
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of citizens' c o m m u n i c a t i o n ^ T h i s is precisely h o w
n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s w e r e f o r m e d i n m o d e r n E u r o p e . T h e r e f o r e it is
to b e ej^cj ej[^^
:
foaLwoj^dj^created
Gy a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d have a catalytic effect. E u r o p e h a s

b e e n i n t e g r a t i n g economically, socially, a n d administratively for
s o m e t i m e a n d i n a d d i t i o n c a n b a s e itself o n a c o m m o n c u l t u r a l
b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e s h a r e d historical e x p e r i e n c e of h a v i n g h a p p i l y
o v e r c o m e n a t i o n a l i s m . Given t h e political will, t h e r e is n o a p r i o r i
r e a s o n it c a n n o t c r e a t e t h e pohtically n e c e s s a r y c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n J e x t o n c e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l basis for s u c h a c o n t e x t h a s b e e n laid
d o w n . Even t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a c o m m o n language-^-English as a
s e c o n d first language-jought n o t b e a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e obstacle
given t h e existing level of f o r m a l s c h o o l i n g . E u r o p e a n i d e n t i t y can^
in a n y case m e a n n o t h i n g o t h e r t
nation^divejîty.
A n d p e r h a p s G e r m a n federalism, as it d e v e l o p e d after Prussia was
s h a t t e r e d a n d t h e confessional division o v e r c o m e , m i g h t n o t b e t h e
worst m o d e l .
IV
Human Rights: Global and Internal
Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred

Years Historical Remove
9
F o r Kant, t h e " p e r p e t u a l p e a c e " i n v o k e d by t h e A b b e St. P i e r r e is a n

ideal t h a t s h o u l d l e n d t h e i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r attractive
ness a n d intuitive force. W i t h this K a n t i n t r o d u c e s a t h i r d d i m e n s i o n
i n t o his legal t h e o r y : c o s m o p o l i t a n law (das Recht der Weltburger), a n
i n n o v a t i o n with far-reaching i m p l i c a t i o n s , takes its p l a c e a l o n g s i d e
state law a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h e r e p u b l i c a n o r d e r of a d e m o
cratic state f o u n d e d o n h u m a n r i g h t s calls for s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n
t h e w e a k r e g u l a t i o n of b e l l i g e r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s by i n t e r n a
t i o n a l law. Rather, t h e legal p r i n c i p l e s i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h i n single
states s h o u l d l e a d u l t i m a t e l y to a g l o b a l legal o r d e r t h a t u n i t e s all
p e o p l e s a n d a b o l i s h e s war: "All f o r m s of t h e state a r e b a s e d o n t h e
i d e a of a c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h is c o m p a t i b l e with t h e n a t u r a l r i g h t s of
m a n , so t h a t t h o s e w h o o b e y t h e law s h o u l d also act as a u n i f i e d b o d y
of legislators. A n d if we a c c o r d i n g l y t h i n k of t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h i n
t e r m s of c o n c e p t s of p u r e r e a s o n , it m a y b e called a P l a t o n i c ideal
(respublica noumenon), w h i c h is n o t a n e m p t y f i g m e n t of t h e i m a g i n a
t i o n , b u t t h e e t e r n a l n o r m of all civil c o n s t i t u t i o n s whatsoever, a n d
a m e a n s of e n d i n g all w a r s . " T h e c o n c l u s i o n " e n d i n g all wars"is
s u r p r i s i n g . It p o i n t s to t h e fact t h a t t h e n o r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law
t h a t r e g u l a t e w a r a n d p e a c e a r e only provisionally valid, t h a t is, they
a r e valid only u n t i l t h e p r o c e s s of legal pacification for w h i c h K a n t
p r e p a r e s t h e g r o u n d with his w o r k " P e r p e t u a l P e a c e " h a s b r o u g h t
a b o u t a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r a n d t h e r e b y a b o l i s h e d war.
1
166
Chapter 7
O f c o u r s e , K a n t d e v e l o p e d this i d e a w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l frame
w o r k of social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y (Vernunftrecht) a n d against t h e back
g r o u n d of t h e specific historical e x p e r i e n c e s of his t i m e . B o t h n o w
s e p a r a t e u s f r o m K a n t . W i t h t h e u n d e s e r v e d h i n d s i g h t of later g e n
e r a t i o n s , we c a n n o w see t h a t his p r o p o s a l s a r e b e s e t with c o n c e p t u a l
difficulties a n d t h a t t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r c o n s o n a n t with o u r historical
e x p e r i e n c e s . H e n c e in t h e following I will first sketch t h e p r e m i s e s
t h a t f o r m K a n t ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h e y affect all t h r e e steps of his
a r g u m e n t : t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e goal, p e r p e t u a l p e a c e ; t h e d e s c r i p
t i o n of t h e a c t u a l project, t h e a p p r o p r i a t e legal f o r m of a f e d e r a t i o n
of n a t i o n s ; a n d , finally, t h e s o l u t i o n in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y to
t h e p r o b l e m p o s e d by this project, t h e g r a d u a l realization of t h e i d e a
of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r ( I ) . Following this, I will e x a m i n e h o w
K a n t ' s i d e a s t a n d s u p in light of t h e historical e x p e r i e n c e of t h e last
two h u n d r e d years (II) a n d h o w it m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d in light of
t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y g l o b a l situation (III). T h e p r e s e n t a l t e r n a t i v e to
r e g r e s s i o n to t h e state of n a t u r e w h i c h h a s b e e n p r o p o s e d by legal
scholars, political scientists, a n d p h i l o s o p h e r s , n a m e l y t h e i d e a of a
cosmopolitan democracy, has provoked strong objections. But these
o b j e c t i o n s to t h e universalism of c o s m o p o l i t a n law a n d a politics .of
h u m a n r i g h t s lose t h e i r force o n c e we a p p r o p r i a t e l y differentiate
b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y in t h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n r i g h t s (IV). T h i s
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n also p r o v i d e s t h e key to a m e t a c r i t i c i s m of Carl
S c h m i t t ' s influential a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t t h e h u m a n i s t i c f o u n d a t i o n
of legal pacifism (V).
2
I
K a n t defines t h e goal of t h e sought-for "lawful c o n d i t i o n " a m o n g
p e o p l e s negatively, as t h e a b o l i t i o n of war: " t h e r e is to b e n o war;"
t h e " h e i n o u s w a g i n g of w a r " m u s t c o m e to a n e n d . K a n t justifies t h e
desirability of s u c h a p e a c e in r e f e r e n c e to t h e evils of t h e k i n d of
w a r f a r e b e i n g w a g e d by t h e p r i n c e s of E u r o p e at t h a t t i m e with t h e
aid of t h e i r m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s . K a n t d o e s n o t a c c o r d p r i m a r y i m p o r
t a n c e a m o n g t h e s e evils to t h e victims of war, b u t i n s t e a d to t h e "hor
r o r s of v i o l e n c e " a n d t h e "devastation," a n d a b o v e all, to t h e p l u n
d e r i n g a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e
3
167
Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace
c o n s i d e r a b l e b u r d e n s of d e b t t h a t arise f r o m war, a n d h e m e n t i o n s
as possible c o n s e q u e n c e s of war s u b j u g a t i o n , t h e loss of liberty, a n d
foreign d o m i n a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e is t h e c o r r u p t i o n of m o r a l s
t h a t o c c u r s w h e n subjects a r e i n s t i g a t e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t to c o m
m i t s u c h c r i m i n a l acts as spying a n d s p r e a d i n g false i n f o r m a t i o n o r
to c o m m i t acts of t r e a c h e r y , for e x a m p l e , as s n i p e r s o r assassins.
H e r e we e n c o u n t e r t h e p a n o r a m a of l i m i t e d war, w h i c h b e c a m e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as a l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s of solving conflicts via inter
n a t i o n a l law in t h e system of t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r s after t h e P e a c e
of W e s t p h a l i a of 1648. T h e o u t c o m e of s u c h wars defines t h e state
of p e a c e . A n d j u s t as a specific p e a c e treaty e n d s t h e evil of a
p a r t i c u l a r war, so t h e p e a c e alliance is n o w s u p p o s e d to " p u t a n e n d
to w a r forever" a n d abolish t h e evils of war as s u c h . T h i s is w h a t is
m e a n t by " p e r p e t u a l p e a c e . " B u t t h e p e a c e in q u e s t i o n is as l i m i t e d
as t h e w a r f r o m w h i c h it arises.
K a n t h a d in m i n d local wars b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l states o r alliances;
h e h a d n o i n k l i n g of w o r l d wars. H e was t h i n k i n g of wars b e t w e e n
r e g i m e s a n d states, n o t yet of a n y t h i n g like e t h n i c a n d civil wars; of
technically l i m i t e d wars t h a t still allowed for a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
c o m b a t a n t s a n d t h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n , n o t yet of a n y t h i n g like
g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e a n d t e r r o r b o m b i n g ; of wars with politically
d e f i n e d aims, n o t yet of ideologically m o t i v a t e d wars of a n n i h i l a t i o n
a n d e x p u l s i o n . Given t h e p r e m i s e of local wars a n d l i m i t e d w a r f a r e ,
t h e n o r m a t i v e s c o p e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e x t e n d s only to r u l e s for
t h e c o n d u c t of w a r a n d for t h e r e g u l a t i o n of p e a c e . T h e r i g h t "to g o
to war," t h e so-called ius ad helium, w h i c h h a s p r i o r i t y over r i g h t "in
w a r " a n d "after war," is, strictly s p e a k i n g , n o r i g h t at all, for it m e r e l y
e x p r e s s e s t h e a r b i t r a r y f r e e d o m t h a t is a c c o r d e d t h e subjects of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law in t h e state of n a t u r e , t h a t is, in t h e lawless c o n d i
t i o n of t h e i r e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e only n o r m s of c r i m i n a l law t h a t
c a n i n t e r v e n e in this lawless c o n d i t i o n r e l a t e to t h e c o n d u c t of war
itself, a n d even t h e n t h e y a r e only e n f o r c e d by t h e c o u r t s of t h e states
w a g i n g war. W a r c r i m e s a r e c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d in war. O n l y since wars
h a v e b e c o m e u n l i m i t e d , a n d t h e c o n c e p t of p e a c e h a s u n d e r g o n e a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x t e n s i o n , d o e s t h e i d e a arise t h a t war itselfin t h e
f o r m of a w a r of a g g r e s s i o n i s a c r i m e t h a t d e s e r v e s to b e o u t l a w e d
a n d p u n i s h e d . B u t K a n t c o u l d n o t yet conceive of s u c h a c r i m e o/war.
4
168
Chapter 7
W h i l e p e r p e t u a l p e a c e is a n i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of a
c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r , it is still only a s y m p t o m of t h e latter. K a n t m u s t
still solve t h e problem of h o w s u c h a c o n d i t i o n s h o u l d b e c o n c e p t u a l
ized f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of law. H e m u s t specify w h a t differenti
ates c o s m o p o l i t a n law f r o m classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawin o t h e r
w o r d s , w h a t is specific to ius cosmopoliticum.
W h e r e a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, like all law in t h e state of n a t u r e , is
only provisionally valid, c o s m o p o l i t a n law w o u l d r e s e m b l e states a n c t i o n e d civil law in definitively b r i n g i n g t h e state of n a t u r e to a n
e n d . T h e r e f o r e , w h e n d e s c r i b i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n to t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n
o r d e r , K a n t r e p e a t e d l y draws o n t h e a n a l o g y with t h e o r i g i n a l social
c o n t r a c t , t h a t is, with t h a t exit f r o m t h e state of n a t u r e w h i c h estab
lishes a p a r t i c u l a r state a n d m a k e s it possible for citizens to live in
legally s e c u r e d f r e e d o m . J u s t as t h e social c o n t r a c t b r o u g h t t h e state
of n a t u r e b e t w e e n self-reliant individuals t o a n e n d , so t o o t h e state
of n a t u r e b e t w e e n b e l l i g e r e n t states s h o u l d c o m e to a n e n d . I n a n
essay p u b l i s h e d two years p r i o r to " P e r p e t u a l P e a c e , " K a n t draws
strict parallels b e t w e e n t h e s e two processes. H e r e , t o o , h e m e n t i o n s
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of welfare a n d t h e loss of f r e e d o m as t h e g r e a t e s t
evils a n d t h e n c o n t i n u e s : "And t h e r e is n o possible way of c o u n t e r
a c t i n g this e x c e p t t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a legal o r d e r a m o n g
p e o p l e s [Volkerrecht], b a s e d u p o n e n f o r c e a b l e p u b l i c laws to w h i c h
e a c h state m u s t s u b m i t (by a n a l o g y with t h e civil o r political legal
o r d e r a m o n g i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s ) . F o r a p e r m a n e n t universal
p e a c e by m e a n s of a so-called E u r o p e a n b a l a n c e of p o w e r is a p u r e
i l l u s i o n . " K a n t speaks h e r e of a "universal state [Volkerstaat] to w h o s e
p o w e r all t h e individual states w o u l d voluntarily s u b m i t . " B u t j u s t two
years later K a n t carefully d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n "a f e d e r a t i o n of
n a t i o n s " (Volkerbund) a n d "a state of all p e o p l e s " (Volkerstaat).
6
T h e o r d e r h e n c e f o r t h d e s c r i b e d as " c o s m o p o l i t a n " is s u p p o s e d to
differ f r o m a n i n t e r n a l legal o r d e r by v i r t u e of t h e fact t h a t states,
u n l i k e i n d i v i d u a l citizens, d o n o t s u b m i t themselves to t h e p u b l i c
coercive laws of a s u p e r o r d i n a t e p o w e r b u t r e t a i n t h e i r i n d e
p e n d e n c e . T h e envisaged f e d e r a t i o n of free states w h i c h r e n o u n c e
war o n c e a n d for all in t h e i r e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s is s u p p o s e d to leave
i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r s . T h e p e r m a n e n t l y associated
states p r e s e r v e t h e i r s u p r e m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y a n d a r e n o t
169
s u b s u m e d i n t o a w o r l d r e p u b l i c t h a t w o u l d b e e n d o w e d with all of
the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of a state. I n p l a c e of t h e "positive i d e a
of a w o r l d r e p u b l i c " is p u t t h e "negative substitute of a . . . f e d e r a t i o n
likely to p r e v e n t war." T h i s f e d e r a t i o n is s u p p o s e d t o p r o c e e d f r o m
sovereign a g r e e m e n t s u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, w h i c h a r e n o w n o
l o n g e r u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l of t h e social c o n t r a c t . F o r t h e s e
treaties d o n o t establish any a c t i o n a b l e legal r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s
against o n e a n o t h e r b u t o n l y u n i t e t h e m i n t o a p e r m a n e n t alliance,
a n " e n d u r i n g a n d v o l u n t a r y association." T h u s this act of association
i n t o a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s g o e s b e y o n d t h e weak b i n d i n g p o w e r of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law only in r e s p e c t of its " p e r m a n e n c e . " K a n t c o m p a r e s
t h e f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s to a " p e r m a n e n t c o n g r e s s of states."
7
T h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a r a c t e r of this c o n s t r u c t i o n is readily a p p a r
ent. F o r in a n o t h e r passage K a n t asserts t h a t "By a congress is h e r e
u n d e r s t o o d only a v o l u n t a r y coalition of different states w h i c h c a n
b e dissolved at a n y t i m e , n o t a u n i o n (like t h a t of t h e A m e r i c a n states)
w h i c h is b a s e d o n a c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . ." J u s t h o w t h e p e r m a n e n c e of
this u n i o n , o n w h i c h a "civilized" r e s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflict
d e p e n d s , c a n b e g u a r a n t e e d w i t h o u t t h e legally b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r of
a n i n s t i t u t i o n a n a l o g o u s to a state c o n s t i t u t i o n K a n t n e v e r e x p l a i n s .
O n t h e o n e h a n d , h e w a n t s to p r e s e r v e t h e sovereignty of its m e m
b e r s by m e a n s of t h e proviso t h a t they m a y dissolve t h e i r c o m p a c t ;
this is w h a t suggests t h e c o m p a r i s o n with c o n g r e s s e s a n d v o l u n t a r y
associations. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e f e d e r a t i o n t h a t f o u n d s a p e r
m a n e n t p e a c e is s u p p o s e d to differ f r o m m e r e l y t r a n s i t o r y alliances
in t h a t its m e m b e r s feel obligated to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r own raison d'etat
to t h e j o i n t l y d e c l a r e d g o a l of " n o t resolving t h e i r d i s p u t e s by war,
b u t by a p r o c e s s a n a l o g o u s to a c o u r t of law." W i t h o u t this e l e m e n t
of o b l i g a t i o n , t h e p e a c e f u l c o n g r e s s of n a t i o n s c a n n o t b e c o m e "per
m a n e n t , " n o r c a n its v o l u n t a r y association b e c o m e " e n d u r i n g ; " in
stead, it r e m a i n s h o s t a g e to a n u n s t a b l e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of interests a n d
will inevitably fall a p a r t , m u c h as t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s w o u l d years
later. K a n t c a n n o t h a v e legal o b l i g a t i o n in m i n d h e r e , since h e d o e s
n o t conceive of t h e f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s as a n o r g a n i z a t i o n with
c o m m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t c o u l d a c q u i r e t h e characteristics of a state
a n d t h e r e b y o b t a i n coercive authority. H e n c e h e m u s t rely exclu
sively o n e a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s o w n moral self-obligation. B u t s u c h t r u s t
9
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is scarcely r e c o n c i l a b l e with K a n t ' s o w n soberly realistic d e s c r i p t i o n s

of t h e politics of his t i m e .
K a n t is very m u c h aware of this p r o b l e m b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s glosses
over it with a m e r e a p p e a l t o r e a s o n : "If (a) state says: T h e r e shall
b e n o w a r b e t w e e n myself a n d o t h e r states, a l t h o u g h I d o n o t r e c o g
nize a n y s u p r e m e legislative p o w e r w h i c h c o u l d s e c u r e m y r i g h t s a n d
w h o s e r i g h t s I s h o u l d in t u r n s e c u r e , ' it is i m p o s s i b l e to u n d e r s t a n d
w h a t justification I c a n h a v e for p l a c i n g a n y c o n f i d e n c e in m y rights,
u n l e s s I c a n rely o n s o m e substitute for t h e u n i o n of civil society i.e.
o n a free f e d e r a t i o n . If t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i g h t is to have
a n y m e a n i n g at all, r e a s o n m u s t necessarily c o u p l e it with a federa
t i o n of this k i n d . " However, this affirmation leaves o p e n t h e deci
sive q u e s t i o n , namely, h o w t h e p e r m a n e n t self-obligation of states
t h a t r e t a i n t h e i r sovereignty c a n b e e n s u r e d . N o t e t h a t this d o e s n o t
yet c o n c e r n t h e e m p i r i c a l issue of h o w t h e i d e a c a n b e a p p r o x i
m a t e d , b u t r a t h e r h o w t h e i d e a itself is to b e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d . If t h e
u n i o n of p e o p l e s is to b e a legal, r a t h e r t h a n a m o r a l , a r r a n g e m e n t ,
t h e n it m a y n o t lack a n y of t h o s e characteristics of a " g o o d political
c o n s t i t u t i o n " t h a t K a n t e n u m e r a t e s a c o u p l e of p a g e s l a t e r q u a l i t i e s
of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a state t h a t d o e s n o t n e e d to rely o n "the g o p d
m o r a l e d u c a t i o n " of its m e m b e r s , b u t ideally h a s t h e s t r e n g t h to
foster s u c h a n e d u c a t i o n in t u r n .
10
Viewed historically, K a n t ' s r e t i c e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o j e c t of a

constitutionally organized c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s was certainly realistic.
T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state w h i c h h a d only r e c e n t l y e m e r g e d f r o m t h e
A m e r i c a n a n d F r e n c h r e v o l u t i o n s was still t h e e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r t h a n
t h e r u l e . T h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r s o p e r a t e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
only sovereign states c o u l d b e subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. U n d e r
t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , e x t e r n a l sovereignty d e s i g n a t e s t h e capacity of a
state to m a i n t a i n its i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d h e n c e t h e integrity of its
b o r d e r s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , if n e c e s s a r y by m i l i t a r y force.
I n t e r n a l sovereignty refers to its capacity, b a s e d o n t h e m o n o p o l y of
t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e , to m a i n t a i n law a n d o r d e r in its o w n t e r r i t o r y
by m e a n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r a n d positive law. R e a s o n of state
is d e f i n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of a p o w e r politics,
w h i c h i n c l u d e e n g a g e m e n t in p r u d e n t , l i m i t e d wars, w h e r e d o m e s t i c
policy is s u b o r d i n a t e d to f o r e i g n policy. T h e clear s e p a r a t i o n b e -
171
t w e e n f o r e i g n a n d d o m e s t i c policy rests o n a n a r r o w a n d politically

sharply d e f i n e d c o n c e p t of p o w e r w h i c h is m e a s u r e d in t h e final
analysis by t h e c o n t r o l over t h e r e s e r v e force of t h e m i l i t a r y a n d t h e
police.
As l o n g as this classical-modern w o r l d of nation-states defines t h e
h o r i z o n of t h o u g h t , a n y c o n c e p t i o n of a c o s m o p o l i t a n c o n s t i t u t i o n
t h a t d o e s n o t r e s p e c t t h e sovereignty of m e m b e r states necessarily
s e e m s u n r e a l i s t i c . T h i s also e x p l a i n s why t h e possibility of a unifica
t i o n of p e o p l e s u n d e r t h e h e g e m o n y of a p o w e r f u l state, w h i c h K a n t
evokes with t h e i m a g e of a "universal m o n a r c h y , " d o e s n o t r e p r e
s e n t a viable alternative: o n t h e f o r e g o i n g p r e m i s e s , s u c h a r u l i n g
p o w e r w o u l d inevitably b r i n g a b o u t "the m o s t fearful d e s p o t i s m . "
B e c a u s e K a n t d o e s n o t t r a n s c e n d t h e h o r i z o n of his t i m e , it is of
c o u r s e equally difficult for h i m to believe in any m o r a l m o t i v a t i o n
for c r e a t i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a f e d e r a t i o n b e t w e e n free states d e d i
c a t e d to p o w e r politics. K a n t s k e t c h e s as a s o l u t i o n to this p r o b l e m
a p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y with a c o s m o p o l i t a n p u r p o s e w h i c h is sup
p o s e d to l e n d plausibility, t h r o u g h a h i d d e n " p u r p o s e of n a t u r e , " to
t h e i m p r o b a b l e " a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n politics a n d morality."
11
12
II
K a n t identifies t h r e e basic q u a s i - n a t u r a l t e n d e n c i e s t h a t c o m p l e m e n t
r e a s o n a n d a r e s u p p o s e d to e x p l a i n why a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s
c o u l d b e in t h e e n l i g h t e n e d self-interest of e a c h state: (1) t h e p e a c e
ful c h a r a c t e r of r e p u b l i c s , (2) t h e p o w e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e to
f o r g e a n association, a n d (3) t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e political p u b l i c
s p h e r e . Reviewing t h e s e a r g u m e n t s in a historical light is instructive
in two r e s p e c t s . O n t h e o n e h a n d t h e i r m a n i f e s t c o n t e n t h a s b e e n
falsified by d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s .
B u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e y d i r e c t o u r a t t e n t i o n to historical devel
o p m e n t s t h a t e x h i b i t a dialectical t e n d e n c y . W h e r e a s t h e s e d e v e l o p
m e n t s reveal t h a t t h e p r e m i s e s o n w h i c h K a n t b a s e d his t h e o r y ,
s h a p e d as t h e y w e r e by c o n d i t i o n s as t h e y a p p e a r e d at t h e close of
t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a r e n o l o n g e r valid, t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s also
s u p p o r t t h e claim t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law a p p r o p r i
ately r e f o r m u l a t e d for c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n d i t i o n s m i g h t well m e e t
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Chapter 7
with a s u p p o r t i v e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of forces, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w we
ourselves i n t e r p r e t t h e c h a n g e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e late t w e n t i e t h
century.
(1) K a n t ' s first a r g u m e n t claims t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s lose
t h e i r b e l l i g e r e n t c h a r a c t e r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e p u b l i c a n f o r m of
g o v e r n m e n t prevails w i t h i n states, b e c a u s e it is in t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e
p o p u l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states to c o m p e l t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s to
p u r s u e peaceful policies: "If . . . t h e c o n s e n t of t h e citizens is re
q u i r e d to d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r n o t war is to b e d e c l a r e d , it is very
n a t u r a l t h a t t h e y will have g r e a t h e s i t a t i o n in e m b a r k i n g o n so
d a n g e r o u s a n e n t e r p r i s e . F o r this w o u l d m e a n calling d o w n o n
t h e m s e l v e s all t h e m i s e r i e s of war. . . , " T h i s optimistic a s s u m p t i o n
h a s b e e n r e f u t e d by t h e m o b i l i z i n g p o w e r of a n i d e a w h o s e ambiva
l e n c e K a n t c o u l d n o t h a v e r e c o g n i z e d i n 1795, t h a t is, t h e i d e a of
t h e n a t i o n . N a t i o n a l i s m was certainly a vehicle for t h e d e s i r e d trans
f o r m a t i o n of s u b o r d i n a t e d subjects i n t o active citizens w h o identify
with t h e i r state. However, it d i d n o t m a k e t h e n a t i o n a l state a n y m o r e
peace-loving t h a n its p r e d e c e s s o r , t h e dynastic absolutist s t a t e .
F o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s t h e classical selfassertion of t h e sovereign state takes o n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l
i n d e p e n d e n c e . As a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e p u b l i c a n convictions of citi
z e n s w e r e s u p p o s e d to p r o v e themselves in t h e i r willingness to fight
a n d d i e for Volk a n d f a t h e r l a n d . K a n t justifiably r e g a r d e d t h e m e r c e
n a r y a r m i e s of his day as i n s t r u m e n t s for "the u s e of h u m a n b e i n g s
as m e r e m a c h i n e s . . . in t h e h a n d s of s o m e o n e else" a n d called for
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e citizen militia; b u t h e c o u l d n o t foresee t h a t
t h e m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n of r e c r u i t s i n f l a m e d by n a t i o n a l i s t passions
w o u l d u s h e r in a n a g e of devastating, ideologically u n l i m i t e d wars of
liberation.
13
14
At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e i d e a t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c o r d e r t e n d s to foster
n o n b e l l i g e r e n t c o n d u c t t o w a r d o t h e r states is n o t c o m p l e t e l y false.
Historical a n d statistical r e s e a r c h shows t h a t , a l t h o u g h states with
d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s d o n o t necessarily c o n d u c t fewer wars t h a n
a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s (of w h a t e v e r k i n d ) , t h e y a r e less likely to
r e s o r t to force in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s finding c a n
b e given a n i n t e r e s t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e u n i versalist v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s of a p o p u l a t i o n a c c u s t o m e d to free insti15
173
t u t i o n s also s h a p e f o r e i g n policy, a r e p u b l i c a n polity d o e s n o t b e h a v e

m o r e p e a c e a b l y all told, b u t t h e wars it c o n d u c t s h a v e a different
c h a r a c t e r . T h e f o r e i g n policy of t h e state c h a n g e s in t a n d e m with t h e
m o t i v a t i o n of its citizenry. T h e d e p l o y m e n t of m i l i t a r y force is n o
l o n g e r exclusively d e t e r m i n e d by a n essentially particularistic raison
d'etat b u t also by t h e d e s i r e to foster t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p r e a d of
n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n states a n d g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t if value p r e f e r e n c e s
t r a n s c e n d t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s to i n c l u d e t h e im
p l e m e n t a t i o n of d e m o c r a c y a n d h u m a n rights, t h e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s
u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r s o p e r a t e s u n d e r g o
a change.
(2) T h e s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r y w h i c h we n o w l o o k b a c k o n h a s d e a l t
in a similarly dialectical way with t h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t . K a n t was
m i s t a k e n a b o u t t h e i m m e d i a t e situation, b u t indirectly h e also t u r n s
o u t to h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t . F o r K a n t d e t e c t e d in t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e
p e n d e n c e of societies g e n e r a t e d by t h e e x c h a n g e of i n f o r m a t i o n ,
p e r s o n s , a n d c o m m o d i t i e s , b u t especially by t h e e x p a n s i o n of t r a d e ,
a t e n d e n c y favorable to t h e p e a c e f u l u n i f i c a t i o n of p e o p l e s . T r a d e
r e l a t i o n s e x p a n d e d in t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d i n t o t h e d e n s e net
w o r k of a w o r l d m a r k e t , w h i c h a c c o r d i n g to K a n t g r o u n d s a n i n t e r e s t
in s e c u r i n g peaceful r e l a t i o n s t h r o u g h " m u t u a l self-interest": "For
t h e spirit of commerce s o o n e r o r l a t e r takes h o l d of every p e o p l e , a n d
it c a n n o t exist side by side with war. A n d of all t h e p o w e r s ( o r m e a n s )
a t t h e disposal of t h e p o w e r of t h e state, financial power c a n p r o b a b l y
b e r e l i e d o n m o s t . T h u s states find t h e m s e l v e s c o m p e l l e d to p r o m o t e
t h e n o b l e c a u s e of p e a c e . " However, K a n t h a d n o t yet l e a r n e d a s
H e g e l s o o n w o u l d f r o m his r e a d i n g of t h e E n g l i s h e c o n o m i s t s
t h a t capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d l e a d to a conflict b e t w e e n social
classes t h a t t h r e a t e n s in two ways t h e p e a c e a n d t h e p r e s u m p t i v e
p e a c e f u l n e s s of politically liberal societies in particular. K a n t d i d n o t
foresee t h a t t h e social t e n s i o n s t h a t initially intensify in t h e c o u r s e
of a c c e l e r a t i n g capitalist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w o u l d b o t h e n c u m b e r d o
m e s t i c politics with class struggles a n d d i r e c t f o r e i g n policy i n t o t h e
c h a n n e l s of v i o l e n t i m p e r i a l i s m . T h r o u g h o u t t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t h e
first half of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s r e p e a t
edly e x p l o i t e d t h e m o b i l i z i n g p o w e r of n a t i o n a l i s m t o deflect social
conflicts o u t w a r d a n d to n e u t r a l i z e t h e m with f o r e i g n policy
1 6
1 7
18
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successes. It was only after t h e c a t a s t r o p h e s of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r

l e d to t h e d e p l e t i o n of t h e e n e r g i e s of i n t e g r a l n a t i o n a l i s m t h a t t h e
class a n t a g o n i s m s w e r e successfully pacified by m e a n s of t h e welfare
state. T h i s so a l t e r e d t h e i n t e r n a l situation of t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d
n a t i o n s t h a t , at least in t h e O E C D s p h e r e , t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s l e d to t h e k i n d of " e c o n o m i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s " t h a t K a n t rightly h o p e d w o u l d h a v e
a pacifying effect. Today, globally d i s p e r s e d m e d i a , n e t w o r k s , a n d
systems in g e n e r a l necessitate increasingly d e n s e symbolic a n d social
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h l e a d to t h e c o n s t a n t r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e of
local a n d far d i s t a n t e v e n t s . T h e s e p r o c e s s e s of g l o b a l i z a t i o n h a v e
r e n d e r e d c o m p l e x societies, with t h e i r d e l i c a t e t e c h n o l o g i c a l infra
s t r u c t u r e s , ever m o r e v u l n e r a b l e . A l t h o u g h m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
b e t w e e n t h e n u c l e a r s u p e r p o w e r s a r e b e c o m i n g increasingly u n
likely b e c a u s e of t h e h u g e risks involved, local conflicts with rela
tively n u m e r o u s a n d h o r r i b l e casualties a r e b e c o m i n g ever m o r e
f r e q u e n t . At t h e s a m e t i m e , globalization raises q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w t h e sov
e r e i g n t y of states a n d t h e s h a r p division b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c a n d for
e i g n policy.
-J
19
20
N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t o r s s u c h as m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y influential private b a n k s u n d e r m i n e t h e f o r m a l sov
e r e i g n t y of nation-states. T o d a y e a c h of t h e thirty largest c o r p o r a
t i o n s o p e r a t i n g o n a g l o b a l scale h a s a n a n n u a l t u r n o v e r g r e a t e r
t h a n t h e gross d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t of n i n e t y c o u n t r i e s r e p r e s e n t e d in
t h e U N . B u t even t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y m o s t power
ful c o u n t r i e s a r e k e e n l y a w a r e of t h e gulf t h a t is o p e n i n g u p b e t w e e n
t h e limits of t h e r a n g e of a c t i o n of n a t i o n states a n d t h e i m p e r a t i v e s ,
n o t of w o r l d t r a d e , b u t of g l o b a l n e t w o r k s of p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s .
Sovereign states c o u l d profit f r o m t h e i r e c o n o m i e s only as l o n g as
t h e y f u n c t i o n e d as " n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s " over w h i c h t h e y c o u l d ex
ercise i n f l u e n c e by political m e a n s . B u t with t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
of t h e e c o n o m y , in p a r t i c u l a r with t h e i n c r e a s i n g g l o b a l i n t e r c o n n e c
t i o n of financial m a r k e t s a n d i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n itself, n a t i o n a l
politics loses its c o n t r o l over t h e g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n
a n d with it any leverage for m a i n t a i n i n g its s t a n d a r d of living.
2 1
At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e r e is a b l u r r i n g of t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n
d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy t h a t a r e constitutive of state sovereignty.
175
K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e
T h e classical i m a g e of p o w e r politics is b e i n g a l t e r e d n o t only by t h e

a d d i t i o n a l n o r m a t i v e s t a n d p o i n t s of t h e politics of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n
a n d of h u m a n rights, b u t also by a p e c u l i a r diffusion of p o w e r itself.
W i t h t h e g r o w i n g p r e s s u r e for c o o p e r a t i o n , m o r e o r less i n d i r e c t
f o r m s of i n f l u e n c e a r e g a i n i n g i n c r e a s i n g i m p o r t a n c e i n f l u e n c e o n
t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of p e r c e i v e d situations, o n t h e f o r g i n g of c o n t a c t s o r
t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n of flows of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d o n t h e d e f i n i t i o n
of a g e n d a s a n d p r o b l e m s . I n f l u e n c e o n t h e p a r a m e t e r s w i t h i n w h i c h
o t h e r a c t o r s m a k e t h e i r d e c i s i o n s is often m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e
d i r e c t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of o n e ' s o w n goals, t h e exercise of executive
power, o r t h e t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e . "Soft p o w e r " displaces " h a r d
p o w e r " a n d r o b s t h e subjects to w h o m K a n t ' s association of free
states was t a i l o r e d of t h e very basis of t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e .
(3) S o m e t h i n g similar h o l d s , in t u r n , for t h e t h i r d a r g u m e n t K a n t
e m p l o y s to dispel t h e suspicion t h a t t h e p r o j e c t e d f e d e r a t i o n of
n a t i o n s is a " m e r e c h i m e r a . " I n a r e p u b l i c a n polity, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r i n c i p l e s b e c o m e t h e s t a n d a r d s by w h i c h policies m u s t a d m i t of
b e i n g publicly assessed. S u c h r e g i m e s c a n n o t afford to "base t h e i r
policies publicly o n o p p o r t u n i s t i c m a c h i n a t i o n s a l o n e , " even if they
a r e only c o m p e l l e d to pay lip service to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . To
this e x t e n t t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e h a s a s u r v e i l l a n c e f u n c t i o n : it
c a n p r e v e n t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of "shady" policies t h a t a r e i n c o n
sistent with publicly d e f e n s i b l e m a x i m s by e x p o s i n g t h e m to p u b l i c
criticism. O n K a n t ' s view, t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e c a n a c q u i r e a n a d d i
t i o n a l p r o g r a m m a t i c f u n c t i o n to t h e e x t e n t t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , in
t h e i r capacity as "public t e a c h e r s of t h e law," c a n "freely a n d publicly
discuss t h e m a x i m s of w a g i n g war a n d i n s t i t u t i n g p e a c e " a n d c a n
c o n v i n c e t h e p u b l i c of citizens of t h e validity of t h e i r basic p r i n c i p l e s .
K a n t surely h a d t h e e x a m p l e of F r e d e r i c k II a n d Voltaire in m i n d
w h e n h e w r o t e this m o v i n g s e n t e n c e : "It is n o t t o b e e x p e c t e d t h a t
k i n g s will p h i l o s o p h i z e o r t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s will b e c o m e kings; n o r
is it to b e d e s i r e d , however, since t h e possession of p o w e r inevitably
c o r r u p t s t h e free j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n . Kings a n d sovereign p e o p l e s
(i.e. t h o s e w h o g o v e r n t h e m s e l v e s by e g a l i t a r i a n laws) s h o u l d n o t ,
however, force t h e class of p h i l o s o p h e r s to d i s a p p e a r o r to r e m a i n
silent, b u t s h o u l d allow t h e m to s p e a k publicly. T h i s is essential to
b o t h i n o r d e r t h a t light m a y b e t h r o w n o n t h e i r affairs a n d . . . is
beyond suspicion."
22
2 3
24
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Chapter 7
As t h e a t h e i s m controversy involving F i c h t e w o u l d reveal j u s t a few

years later, K a n t h a d every r e a s o n to fear c e n s o r s h i p . We m a y also
forgive his t r u s t in t h e persuasive p o w e r of p h i l o s o p h y a n d in t h e
integrity of p h i l o s o p h e r s ; historicist skepticism a b o u t r e a s o n is a
p r o d u c t of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d it was only in o u r c e n t u r y
t h a t intellectuals c o m m i t t e d t h e u l t i m a t e betrayal. W h a t is m o r e
i m p o r t a n t is t h a t K a n t still c o u n t e d o n t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of a surveya b l e p u b l i c s p h e r e s h a p e d by l i t e r a r y m e a n s a n d o p e n to a r g u m e n t s
a n d w h i c h is s u s t a i n e d by a p u b l i c c o m p o s e d of a relatively small
s t r a t u m of e d u c a t e d citizens. H e c o u l d n o t foresee t h e s t r u c t u r a l
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of this b o u r g e o i s p u b l i c s p h e r e i n t o a semantically
d e g e n e r a t e d p u b l i c s p h e r e d o m i n a t e d by t h e e l e c t r o n i c m a s s m e d i a
a n d p e r v a d e d by i m a g e s a n d virtual realities. H e c o u l d scarcely
i m a g i n e t h a t this m i l i e u of " c o n v e r s a t i o n a l " e n l i g h t e n m e n t c o u l d b e
a d a p t e d b o t h to n o n v e r b a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n a n d to d e c e p t i o n by means
of l a n g u a g e .
T h i s veil of i g n o r a n c e p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s his b o l d , far-sighted an
ticipation, w h o s e p r e s c i e n c e is only t o d a y b e c o m i n g a p p a r e n t , of a
global p u b l i c s p h e r e . F o r s u c h a global p u b l i c s p h e r e is only b e g i n
n i n g to e m e r g e as a r e s u l t of g l o b a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n : " T h e p e o p l e s
of t h e e a r t h (!) have t h u s e n t e r e d in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s i n t o a universal
c o m m u n i t y , a n d it h a s d e v e l o p e d to t h e p o i n t w h e r e a violation of
r i g h t s in one part of t h e w o r l d is felt everywhere. T h e i d e a of a c o s m o
p o l i t a n r i g h t is t h e r e f o r e n o t fantastical o r o v e r s t r a i n e d ; it is a n e c
essary c o m p l e m e n t to t h e u n w r i t t e n c o d e of political a n d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l right, t r a n s f o r m i n g it i n t o a universal r i g h t of h u m a n
ity. O n l y u n d e r this c o n d i t i o n [namely, t h a t of a f u n c t i o n i n g g l o b a l
p u b l i c sphere-J. H . ] c a n we flatter ourselves t h a t we a r e c o n t i n u a l l y
advancing toward a perpetual p e a c e . "
2 5
T h e first events t h a t actually c a p t u r e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e w o r l d

p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d p o l a r i z e d o p i n i o n s o n a g l o b a l scale w e r e p r e s u m
ably t h e V i e t n a m W a r a n d t h e Gulf War. It was only v e r y r e c e n t l y t h a t
t h e U N o r g a n i z e d in q u i c k succession a series of c o n f e r e n c e s o n
g l o b a l issues of ecology (in Rio d e J a n e i r o ) , o n p r o b l e m s of p o p u l a
t i o n g r o w t h (in C a i r o ) , o n p o v e r t y (in C o p e n h a g e n ) , a n d o n g l o b a l
w a r m i n g (in B e r l i n ) . T h e s e "global s u m m i t s " c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as
so m a n y a t t e m p t s to b r i n g at least s o m e political p r e s s u r e to b e a r o n
177
g o v e r n m e n t s simply by t h e m a t i z i n g p r o b l e m s i m p o r t a n t for h u m a n
survival f o r t h e g l o b a l p u b l i c , t h a t is, by a n a p p e a l to w o r l d o p i n i o n .
T o b e s u r e o n e s h o u l d n o t o v e r l o o k t h e fact t h a t this t e m p o r a r y ,
issue-specific p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n is still c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e estab
l i s h e d s t r u c t u r e s of n a t i o n a l p u b l i c s p h e r e s . S u p p o r t i n g s t r u c t u r e s
are n e e d e d to institute p e r m a n e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n between geo
graphically d i s t a n t p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e x c h a n g e c o n t r i
b u t i o n s o n t h e s a m e t h e m e s with t h e s a m e r e l e v a n c e . I n this sense,
t h e r e is n o t yet a g l o b a l p u b l i c s p h e r e , n o r even t h e u r g e n t l y n e e d e d
E u r o p e a n p u b l i c s p h e r e . However, t h e c e n t r a l r o l e played by a n e w
type of o r g a n i z a t i o n n a m e l y , n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h
as G r e e n p e a c e o r A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l n o t only in t h e s e confer
e n c e s b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y in t h e c r e a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n of trans
n a t i o n a l p u b l i c s p h e r e s is at least a n i n d i c a t i o n of t h e g r o w i n g
i m p a c t o n t h e p r e s s a n d m e d i a of a c t o r s w h o c o n f r o n t states f r o m
w i t h i n t h e n e t w o r k of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l civil s o c i e t y .
T h e i m p o r t a n t r o l e t h a t K a n t rightly a c c o r d s publicity a n d t h e
p u b l i c s p h e r e directs o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e
legal c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e political c u l t u r e of a p o l i t y . F o r a liberal
political c u l t u r e p r o v i d e s t h e soil in w h i c h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of free
d o m p u t d o w n t h e i r r o o t s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , it is t h e m e d i u m
t h r o u g h w h i c h p r o g r e s s in t h e political e d u c a t i o n of a p o p u l a c e is
r e a l i z e d . To b e s u r e , K a n t speaks of t h e g r o w t h of c u l t u r e t h a t leads
to " g r e a t e r a g r e e m e n t over p r i n c i p l e s " ; h e also takes it t h a t t h e
p u b l i c u s e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m s translates i n t o p r o c e s s e s of
e n l i g h t e n m e n t t h a t affect t h e a t t i t u d e s a n d m o d e s of t h o u g h t of t h e
p o p u l a c e via political socialization. K a n t speaks in this c o n t e x t of
"the s y m p a t h e t i c i n t e r e s t w h i c h t h e e n l i g h t e n e d m a n inevitably feels
for a n y t h i n g g o o d w h i c h h e fully c o m p r e h e n d s . " However, t h e s e
r e m a r k s d o n o t a s s u m e any systematic i m p o r t o n his t h e o r y , for t h e
d i c h o t o m o u s c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y sepa
r a t e s t h e i n t e r n a l f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l , m o r a l i t y f r o m legality. I n par
ticular, K a n t i g n o r e s t h e c o n t i n u u m t h a t a liberal political c u l t u r e
establishes b e t w e e n t h e p r u d e n t p u r s u i t of o n e ' s interests, m o r a l
insight, a n d c u s t o m ; h e i g n o r e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n o n
t h e o n e h a n d a n d c r i t i q u e o n t h e o t h e r . T h e p r a c t i c e s of s u c h a
c u l t u r e m e d i a t e b e t w e e n morality, law, a n d politics a n d p r o v i d e at
26
27
28
29
3 0
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t h e s a m e t i m e a suitable c o n t e x t for a p u b l i c s p h e r e t h a t fosters

political l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s e s . H e n c e K a n t d i d n o t really n e e d to fall
b a c k o n a m e t a p h y s i c a l p u r p o s e of n a t u r e in o r d e r to e x p l a i n h o w
a "pathologically e n f o r c e d social u n i o n c a n b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a
moral whole."
As t h e s e critical reflections i n d i c a t e , K a n t ' s i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n
o r d e r m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d if it is n o t to lose t o u c h with a global
situation t h a t h a s c h a n g e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y . T h e r e q u i s i t e revision of
K a n t ' s basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k is m a d e easier by t h e fact t h a t t h e
c o s m o p o l i t a n i d e a itself h a s n o t r e m a i n e d fixed: ever since P r e s i d e n t
W i l s o n ' s initiative a n d t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , it h a s
b e e n r e p e a t e d l y t a k e n u p a n d i m p l e m e n t e d at political level. Since
t h e e n d of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, t h e i d e a of p e r p e t u a l p e a c e h a s
t a k e n o n a m o r e t a n g i b l e f o r m in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d
policies of t h e U N (as well as t h o s e of o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i
zations) . T h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d c a t a s t r o p h e s of
t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y h a s also given n e w i m p e t u s to K a n t ' s idea.
A g a i n s t this s o m b e r b a c k g r o u n d , t h e W o r l d Spirit, as H e g e l w o u l d
h a v e p u t it, h a s l u r c h e d f o r w a r d .
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T h e First W o r l d W a r c o n f r o n t e d t h e E u r o p e a n societies-with t h e
t e r r o r a n d h o r r o r s of a territorially a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d
war, t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r with t h e mass c r i m e s of a n ideologically
u n l i m i t e d war. B e h i n d t h e veil of t h e total w a r i n s t i g a t e d by Hitler,
t h e b r e a k d o w n of civilization was so c o m p l e t e t h a t it u n l e a s h e d a
w o r l d w i d e u p h e a v a l a n d facilitated t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law t o c o s m o p o l i t a n law. First, t h e o u t l a w i n g of w a r a l r e a d y p r o
c l a i m e d by t h e Briand-Kellogg P a c t of 1928 was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p u n
ishable c r i m i n a l offenses by t h e N u r e m b e r g a n d Tokyo m i l i t a r y
t r i b u n a l s . T h e s e offenses a r e n o l o n g e r l i m i t e d to c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d
d u r i n g war, b u t i n c r i m i n a t e war itself as a c r i m e . H e n c e f o r t h t h e
"crime of war" c a n b e p r o s e c u t e d . S e c o n d , c r i m i n a l law was e x t e n d e d
to i n c l u d e "crimes against h u m a n i t y , " c r i m e s c a r r i e d o u t u n d e r t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n s of state o r g a n s a n d with t h e assistance of c o u n t l e s s
m e m b e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s , f u n c t i o n a r i e s , civil servants, b u s i n e s s m e n ,
a n d private individuals. W i t h t h e s e two i n n o v a t i o n s , t h e states as
subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law for t h e first t i m e lost t h e g e n e r a l p r e
s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e of a n a s s u m e d state of n a t u r e .
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III
A f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t u a l revision of K a n t ' s p r o p o s a l m u s t focus o n
t h r e e aspects: (1) t h e e x t e r n a l sovereignty of states a n d t h e a l t e r e d
c h a r a c t e r of r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e m ; (2) t h e i n t e r n a l sovereignty of
states a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s of classical p o w e r politics; a n d
(3) t h e stratification of w o r l d society a n d t h e g l o b a l i z a t i o n of d a n
gers t h a t necessitate a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of w h a t is m e a n t by
"peace."
(1) K a n t ' s c o n c e p t of a p e r m a n e n t f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s t h a t
n o n e t h e l e s s r e s p e c t s t h e sovereignty of states is, as we h a v e s e e n ,
i n c o n s i s t e n t . C o s m o p o l i t a n law m u s t b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in s u c h a
way t h a t it is b i n d i n g o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e c o m m u
nity of p e o p l e s m u s t b e a b l e to e n s u r e t h a t its m e m b e r s act at least
in c o n f o r m i t y with t h e law t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t of s a n c t i o n s . O n l y in
this way will t h e u n s t a b l e system of states t h a t assert t h e i r sovereignty
t h r o u g h m u t u a l t h r e a t s b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a f e d e r a t i o n with c o m
m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h a s s u m e state f u n c t i o n s , t h a t is, w h i c h legally
r e g u l a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its m e m b e r s a n d m o n i t o r t h e i r c o m
p l i a n c e with t h e s e r u l e s . T h e e x t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states t h a t f o r m e n v i r o n m e n t s for e a c h o t h e r is
thereby transformed into a domestic relationship between the mem
b e r s of a c o m m o n o r g a n i z a t i o n b a s e d o n a legal c o d e o r a constitu
tion. T h i s is t h e significance of t h e U N C h a r t e r w h i c h (with t h e
p r o h i b i t i o n of v i o l e n c e in Article 2.4) outlaws offensive wars a n d (in
C h a p t e r VII) a u t h o r i z e s t h e Security C o u n c i l to u s e a p p r o p r i a t e
m e a n s , a n d if n e c e s s a r y to initiate m i l i t a r y actions, w h e n e v e r "any
t h r e a t to t h e p e a c e , b r e a c h of t h e p e a c e , o r act of a g g r e s s i o n " exists.
At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e U N is expressly f o r b i d d e n to i n t e r f e r e in t h e
i n t e r n a l affairs of a state (Article 2.7). E a c h state r e t a i n s t h e r i g h t of
military self-defense. I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , t h e G e n e r a l Assembly o n c e
a g a i n r e a f f i r m e d this p r i n c i p l e ( R e s o l u t i o n 4 6 / 1 8 2 ) : " T h e sover
eignty, t e r r i t o r i a l integrity, a n d n a t i o n a l u n i t y of a state m u s t b e fully
r e s p e c t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e C h a r t e r of t h e U N . "
W i t h t h e s e a m b i g u o u s r e g u l a t i o n s , w h i c h b o t h restrict a n d g u a r
a n t e e t h e sovereignty of individual states, t h e C h a r t e r shows itself to
b e a r e s p o n s e to a t r a n s i t i o n a l situation. T h e U N d o e s n o t yet have
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its o w n m i l i t a r y forces; it d o e s n o t even have forces it c o u l d d e p l o y

u n d e r its o w n c o m m a n d , let a l o n e h a v e a m o n o p o l y over t h e m e a n s
of v i o l e n c e . F o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of its r e s o l u t i o n s it d e p e n d s o n
t h e v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n of its m e m b e r s w h o h a v e t h e c o m p e t e n c e
to act. T h e lack of a p o w e r b a s e was s u p p o s e d to b e c o m p e n s a t e d
for by t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Security C o u n c i l , w h i c h b i n d s t h e m a j o r
w o r l d p o w e r s to t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n as p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s with
veto rights. As is well k n o w n , this a r r a n g e m e n t h a s l e d to d e c a d e s of
s t a l e m a t e b e t w e e n t h e s u p e r p o w e r s . A n d w h e n t h e Security C o u n c i l
d o e s t a k e t h e initiative, it uses its d i s c r e t i o n in a h i g h l y selective
m a n n e r , c o m p l e t e l y d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t .
T h i s p r o b l e m h a s g a i n e d r e n e w e d c u r r e n c y as a r e s u l t of t h e Gulf
W a r . Even t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t in t h e H a g u e possesses only a
symbolic if n o t c o m p l e t e l y n e g l i g i b l e significance, as it only c o n v e n e s
w h e n a suit is b r o u g h t a n d m o r e o v e r its j u d g m e n t s a r e n o t even
b i n d i n g (as was s h o w n o n c e a g a i n in t h e case of N i c a r a g u a versus
t h e U n i t e d States).
3 4
35
Nowadays i n t e r n a t i o n a l security, at least in t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n

t h e n u c l e a r p o w e r s , is g u a r a n t e e d n o t by t h e n o r m a t i v e f r a m e w o r k
of t h e U N b u t by a r m s r e d u c t i o n a g r e e m e n t s a n d above all by
"security p a r t n e r s h i p s . " T h e s e bilateral treaties establish c o o r d i n a
tion mechanisms a n d inspections between the c o m p e t i n g power
blocks, so t h a t a n o n n o r m a t i v e , p u r e l y purposively g r o u n d e d reli
ability of e x p e c t a t i o n s is e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h t r a n s p a r e n c y in p l a n
n i n g a n d t h e calculability of motives.
(2) B e c a u s e K a n t r e g a r d e d t h e b o u n d s of n a t i o n a l sovereignty as
inviolable, h e c o n c e i v e d of t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n c o m m u n i t y as a federa
t i o n of states, n o t of w o r l d citizens. T h i s was i n c o n s i s t e n t in t h a t K a n t
d e r i v e d every legal o r d e r , a n d n o t j u s t t h a t w i t h i n t h e state, f r o m t h e
o r i g i n a l r i g h t t h a t a t t a c h e s to every p e r s o n " q u a h u m a n b e i n g . "
Every individual h a s a r i g h t to e q u a l liberties u n d e r universal laws
("since e v e r y o n e d e c i d e s for e v e r y o n e a n d e a c h d e c i d e s for h i m
s e l f ' ) . T h i s f o u n d i n g of law i n g e n e r a l o n h u m a n r i g h t s privileges
individuals as t h e b e a r e r s of r i g h t s a n d l e n d s all m o d e r n legal o r d e r s
a n essentially individualistic c h a r a c t e r . B u t if K a n t h o l d s t h a t this
g u a r a n t e e of f r e e d o m " w h a t h u m a n b e i n g s o u g h t to d o by t h e laws
of f r e e d o m " i s t h e essential p u r p o s e of p e r p e t u a l p e a c e a n d is so
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37
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m o r e o v e r "in all t h r e e a r e a s of p u b l i c lawcivil, i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d

c o s m o p o l i t a n law," t h e n h e m u s t n o t allow t h e a u t o n o m y of citizens
to b e p r e e m p t e d even by t h e sovereignty of t h e i r states.
T h e p o i n t of c o s m o p o l i t a n law is, r a t h e r , t h a t it bypasses t h e
collective subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d directly establishes t h e
legal status of t h e i n d i v i d u a l subjects by g r a n t i n g t h e m u n m e d i a t e d
m e m b e r s h i p in t h e association of free a n d e q u a l w o r l d citizens. Carl
S c h m i t t g r a s p e d this p o i n t a n d r e c o g n i z e d t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n im
plies t h a t " e a c h i n d i v i d u a l is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a w o r l d citizen (in t h e
full j u r i d i c a l sense of t h e w o r d ) a n d a citizen of a s t a t e . " Since t h e
s u p r e m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) n o w resides
in t h e "world f e d e r a l state" a n d individuals a c q u i r e i m m e d i a t e legal
s t a n d i n g in this i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , t h e individual state is
t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o "a m e r e a g e n c y (Kompetenz) for individual h u m a n
beings w h o assume double roles in their international a n d national
f u n c t i o n s . " T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n of a f o r m of law t h a t
bypasses t h e sovereignty of states is t h e p e r s o n a l liability of individu
als for c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d in t h e c o u r s e of g o v e r n m e n t a n d m i l i t a r y
service.
C u r r e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s h a v e also o u t s t r i p p e d K a n t in this r e g a r d .
B a s e d o n t h e A u g u s t 1941 N o r t h Atlantic C h a r t e r , t h e U N C h a r t e r
of J u n e 1945 i m p o s e s o n its m e m b e r states a g e n e r a l o b l i g a t i o n to
r e s p e c t a n d p r o m o t e h u m a n rights. T h e G e n e r a l Assembly specified
t h e s e r i g h t s in a n e x e m p l a r y fashion in D e c e m b e r 1948 in its "Gen
eral D e c l a r a t i o n of H u m a n R i g h t s " a n d h a s d e v e l o p e d t h e m f u r t h e r
in t h e i n t e r i m in n u m e r o u s r e s o l u t i o n s . T h e U N d o e s n o t leave t h e
p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s solely u p to t h e nation-states; it h a s its
o w n m e c h a n i s m s for e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s violations have
occurred. T h e H u m a n Rights Commission has m o n i t o r i n g agencies
a n d r e p o r t i n g p r o c e d u r e s for basic social, e c o n o m i c , a n d c u l t u r a l
r i g h t s t h a t a r e subject to t h e "proviso of t h e possible;" in a d d i t i o n ,
for cases of civil a n d political r i g h t s it h a s set u p f o r m a l c o m p l a i n t
p r o c e d u r e s . T h o u g h it is n o t universally r e c o g n i z e d by all s i g n a t o r y
states, t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of a p p e a l , w h i c h gives i n d i v i d u a l citizens
m e a n s of legal r e c o u r s e a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s , is in t h e o r y
of g r e a t e r significance t h a n states' r i g h t of a p p e a l . B u t u n t i l n o w
t h e r e h a s existed n o s u p r a n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l c o u r t t h a t c o u l d b r i n g
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40
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c o n f i r m e d cases of h u m a n r i g h t s violations to trial a n d pass j u d g

m e n t o n t h e m . At t h e r e c e n t V i e n n a c o n f e r e n c e o n h u m a n r i g h t s it
was n o t possible to win a g r e e m e n t even o n t h e p r o p o s a l to a p p o i n t
a U N H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for H u m a n Rights. A d h o c w a r c r i m e
t r i b u n a l s o n t h e m o d e l of t h e N u r e m b e r g a n d Tokyo i n t e r n a t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l s h a v e t h u s far r e m a i n e d t h e e x c e p t i o n . To b e
s u r e , t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i
ples o n w h i c h t h e j u d g m e n t s of t h e s e t r i b u n a l s w e r e b a s e d as "prin
ciples of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." To this e x t e n t it is false to claim t h a t t h e
trials of l e a d i n g Nazi m i l i t a r y figures, d i p l o m a t s , m i n i s t e r s , d o c t o r s ,
b a n k e r s , a n d i n d u s t r i a l l e a d e r s w e r e "once-off' o c c u r r e n c e s w i t h o u t
t h e p o w e r to establish legal p r e c e d e n t s .
42
4 3
T h e w e a k link in t h e g l o b a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s r e m a i n s
t h e a b s e n c e of a n executive p o w e r t h a t c o u l d e n f o r c e t h e G e n e r a l
D e c l a r a t i o n s of H u m a n Rights, if n e c e s s a r y by c u r t a i l i n g t h e sover
e i g n p o w e r of nation-states. Since h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d h a v e t o b e
i m p l e m e n t e d in m a n y cases d e s p i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of n a t i o n a l gov
e r n m e n t s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law's p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n is in n e e d
of revision. W h e r e a f u n c t i o n i n g state p o w e r is n o t entirely a b s e n t ,
as in t h e case of Somalia, t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n u n d e r t a k e s - a n
i n t e r v e n t i o n only with t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e g o v e r n m e n t s c o n
c e r n e d (as in L i b e r i a a n d in B o s n i a / C r o a t i a ) , However, d u r i n g t h e
Gulf W a r t h e U N t o o k t h e first steps in a n e w d i r e c t i o n i f n o t in its
legal justification, t h e n at least d e factowith R e s o l u t i o n 688 of
April 1 9 9 1 . I n t h a t i n s t a n c e it a p p e a l e d to t h e r i g h t of i n t e r v e n t i o n
w h i c h C h a p t e r VII of its C h a r t e r g r a n t s it in cases of "threats to
i n t e r n a t i o n a l security;" in this sense, f r o m a j u r i d i c a l p o i n t of view
t h e y d i d n o t i n t e r v e n e in "the i n t e r n a l affairs" of a sovereign state
even in this case. B u t t h a t this is precisely w h a t t h e y in effect d i d was
n o t lost o n t h e allies, w h e n t h e y i n s t i t u t e d no-fly z o n e s in I r a q i air
space a n d d e p l o y e d g r o u n d t r o o p s i n n o r t h e r n I r a q to s e c u r e "safe
h a v e n s " for K u r d i s h r e f u g e e s (which T u r k e y h a s in t h e i n t e r i m
a b u s e d ) t o p r o t e c t m e m b e r s of a n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y against t h e i r o w n
s t a t e . T h e British F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s p o k e o n this o c c a s i o n of a n
" e x p a n s i o n of t h e limits of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n . "
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46
(3) T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l revisions n e c e s s i t a t e d by c h a n g e s in t h e

n a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e c u r t a i l m e n t of
t h e r o o m for m a n e u v e r of sovereign states have i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e
183
c o n c e p t i o n of a f e d e r a t i o n of p e o p l e s a n d a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r .
T h e s e a r e r e f l e c t e d in p a r t in t h e d e m a n d i n g n o r m s t h a t a l r e a d y
exist; b u t t h e r e is still a l a r g e d i s c r e p a n c y b e t w e e n t h e l e t t e r a n d t h e
o b s e r v a n c e of t h e s e n o r m s . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d situation c a n
b e u n d e r s t o o d at b e s t as a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage b e t w e e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a n d c o s m o p o l i t a n law. B u t m a n y i n d i c a t i o n s s e e m to p o i n t i n s t e a d
t o a r e g r e s s i o n to n a t i o n a l i s m . T h i s j u d g m e n t d e p e n d s in t h e first
p l a c e o n h o w o n e assesses t h e d y n a m i c of " a c c o m m o d a t i n g " t r e n d s .
We h a v e t r a c e d t h e dialectical u n f o l d i n g of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s t h a t
K a n t e x a m i n e d u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s of t h e p e a c e f u l n e s s of r e p u b l i c s ,
t h e unifying p o w e r of global m a r k e t s , a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e p r e s s u r e of
liberal p u b l i c s p h e r e s . T o d a y t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s a r e c o n f r o n t e d with
a n u n f o r e s e e n c o n s t e l l a t i o n of c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
K a n t e n v i s a g e d t h a t t h e association of free states w o u l d e x p a n d in
s u c h a way t h a t m o r e a n d m o r e states w o u l d crystallize a r o u n d a c o r e
of a n a v a n t g a r d e of peaceful r e p u b l i c s : "For if by g o o d f o r t u n e o n e
p o w e r f u l a n d e n l i g h t e n e d n a t i o n c a n f o r m a r e p u b l i c . . . , this will
p r o v i d e a focal p o i n t for a f e d e r a l association a m o n g o t h e r states . . .
a n d t h e w h o l e will g r a d u a l l y s p r e a d f u r t h e r a n d f u r t h e r by a series
of alliances of this k i n d . " But, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e p r e s e n t w o r l d
o r g a n i z a t i o n u n i t e s virtually all states u n d e r its roof, r e g a r d l e s s of
w h e t h e r o r n o t they a l r e a d y h a v e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d re
s p e c t h u m a n rights. W o r l d political u n i t y finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e U N
G e n e r a l Assembly in w h i c h all g o v e r n m e n t s have e q u a l r i g h t s of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n abstracts
n o t only f r o m t h e differences in legitimacy a m o n g its m e m b e r s
w i t h i n t h e c o m m u n i t y of states, b u t also f r o m differences in t h e i r
status w i t h i n a stratified w o r l d society. I s p e a k of a "world society"
b e c a u s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems a n d m a r k e t s h a v e c r e a t e d a g l o b a l
n e t w o r k ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , o n e m u s t s p e a k of a "stratified" w o r l d
society b e c a u s e t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t c o u p l e s increas
i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y with g r o w i n g i m p o v e r i s h m e n t a n d , m o r e generally,
p r o c e s s e s of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t with p r o c e s s e s of u n d e r d e v e l o p
m e n t . G l o b a l i z a t i o n splits t h e w o r l d in two a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e
forces it to act cooperatively as a c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d risks.
4 7
F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of political science, t h e w o r l d since 1917 h a s

d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h r e e w o r l d s . To b e s u r e , t h e symbols of t h e First,
S e c o n d , a n d T h i r d W o r l d s have t a k e n o n a n e w m e a n i n g since
184
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48
1 9 8 9 . T h e Third World t o d a y consists of t e r r i t o r i e s w h e r e t h e state

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d m o n o p o l y of t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e a r e so weakly
d e v e l o p e d (Somalia) o r h a v e d i s i n t e g r a t e d to s u c h a n e x t e n t ( t h e
f o r m e r Yugoslavia), w h e r e t h e social t e n s i o n s a r e so e x t r e m e a n d t h e
t h r e s h o l d of t o l e r a n c e of political c u l t u r e so low, t h a t i n d i r e c t vio
l e n c e of a Mafia-like o r f u n d a m e n t a l i s t variety d i s r u p t s i n t e r n a l or
der. T h e s e societies a r e t h r e a t e n e d by p r o c e s s e s of n a t i o n a l , e t h n i c ,
o r religious d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . I n fact, t h e vast majority of t h e wars t h a t
have r a g e d in r e c e n t d e c a d e s , often u n n o t i c e d by t h e g l o b a l p u b l i c ,
w e r e civil wars. By c o n t r a s t , t h e Second World is s h a p e d by t h e legacy
of p o w e r politics i n h e r i t e d f r o m O l d E u r o p e by t h e nation-states t h a t
e m e r g e d f r o m d e c o l o n i z a t i o n . I n t e r n a l l y t h e s e states often seek to
c o m p e n s a t e for instabilities t h r o u g h a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d
in t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s obstinately insist o n sovereignty a n d n o n
i n t e r v e n t i o n (as, for e x a m p l e , in t h e Gulf r e g i o n ) . T h e y rely o n
m i l i t a r y force a n d a r e g u i d e d exclusively by t h e logic of t h e b a l a n c e
of power. O n l y t h e states of t h e First World c a n afford to h a r m o n i z e
t h e i r n a t i o n a l interests to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t with t h e n o r m s t h a t d e f i n e
t h e h a l f h e a r t e d c o s m o p o l i t a n a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e U N .
R. C o o p e r lists as i n d i c a t o r s t h a t a state b e l o n g s to t h e First W o r l d
t h e i n c r e a s i n g i r r e l e v a n c e of t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s a n d t h e t o l e r a n c e
of i n t e r n a l p l u r a l i s m ; t h e m u t u a l cross-national exercise of i n f l u e n c e
o n m a t t e r s t h a t h a v e traditionally c o u n t e d as d o m e s t i c c o n c e r n s a n d ,
m o r e generally, t h e i n c r e a s i n g fusion of d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy;
t h e sensitivity to t h e i n f l u e n c e of liberal p u b l i c s p h e r e s ; t h e r e n u n
ciation of m i l i t a r y force as a m e a n s of solving conflicts a n d t h e
j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ; a n d , finally, t h e p r e f e r e n c e
for p a r t n e r s h i p s t h a t b a s e security o n t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y a n d reliability
of e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e First W o r l d t h u s defines so t o s p e a k t h e m e r i d
ian of a p r e s e n t by w h i c h t h e political s i m u l t a n e i t y of e c o n o m i c a n d
c u l t u r a l n o n s i m u l t a n e i t y is m e a s u r e d . Kant, w h o as a c h i l d of t h e
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y still t h o u g h t unhistorically, i g n o r e d t h e s e facts
a n d thereby overlooked the real abstraction that must be accom
p l i s h e d by t h e c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s a n d t h a t t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n
m u s t take i n t o a c c o u n t in its policies.
T h e politics of t h e U N c a n take a c c o u n t of this "real a b s t r a c t i o n "
only if it w o r k s to o v e r c o m e existing social t e n s i o n s a n d e c o n o m i c
185
i m b a l a n c e s . I n t u r n , this a i m c a n s u c c e e d only if, in spite of t h e

stratification of w o r l d society, a c o n s e n s u s e m e r g e s in at least t h r e e
areas: a s h a r e d historical c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e n o n s i m u l t a n e i t y of
societies w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d e p e n d e n t o n a
peaceful coexistence; a normative a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g h u m a n
r i g h t s w h o s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at t h e m o m e n t is a m a t t e r of d i s p u t e
b e t w e e n t h e West, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e Asians a n d Africans, o n
t h e o t h e r ; a n d finally a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e d e s i r a b l e state of
p e a c e . A p u r e l y n e g a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of p e a c e was sufficient for
K a n t ' s p u r p o s e s . T o d a y this is unsatisfactory n o t only b e c a u s e of t h e
b r e a k d o w n of t h e limits o n t h e c o n d u c t of war, b u t a b o v e all b e c a u s e
wars have social causes.
A c c o r d i n g to a p r o p o s a l offered by D i e t e r a n d Eva S e n g h a s s , t h e
c o m p l e x i t y of t h e causes of war calls for a c o n c e p t i o n of p e a c e as a
process w h i c h u n f o l d s in a n o n v i o l e n t m a n n e r a n d w h i c h aims n o t
m e r e l y to p r e v e n t v i o l e n c e b u t to satisfy t h e r e a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s for a
p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e of g r o u p s a n d p e o p l e s . T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
r e g u l a t i o n s s h o u l d n e i t h e r h a r m t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d self-respect of t h e
m e m b e r s , n o r so i m p a i r vital i n t e r e s t s a n d j u s t i c e c o n c e r n s t h a t t h e
p a r t i e s to t h e conflict e n d u p r e s o r t i n g t o v i o l e n c e w h e n t h e p r o c e
d u r a l possibilities have b e e n e x h a u s t e d . Policies t h a t take t h e i r ori
e n t a t i o n f r o m s u c h a c o n c e p t of p e a c e will e m p l o y all m e a n s s h o r t
of m i l i t a r y force, i n c l u d i n g h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n , to i n f l u e n c e
t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of formally sovereign states with t h e g o a l of
p r o m o t i n g self-sustaining e c o n o m i e s a n d t o l e r a b l e social c o n d i t i o n s ,
d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d c u l t u r a l t o l e r a n c e .
S u c h strategies of n o n v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n d e s i g n e d to p r o m o t e
p r o c e s s e s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n rely o n t h e fact t h a t g l o b a l inter
c o n n e c t i o n s h a v e r e n d e r e d all states d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i r e n v i r o n
m e n t s a n d h a v e m a d e t h e m sensitive to t h e "soft" p o w e r of indi
r e c t i n f l u e n c e , u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g explicitly i m p o s e d e c o n o m i c
sanctions.
O f c o u r s e , with t h e i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y of goals a n d t h e increas
i n g costliness of strategies, t h e difficulties of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n also
i n c r e a s e , w h i c h t e n d s to d i s s u a d e t h e l e a d i n g p o w e r s f r o m t a k i n g t h e
initiative a n d b e a r i n g t h e costs. I w o u l d like to m e n t i o n j u s t f o u r
variables t h a t a r e i m p o r t a n t in this r e g a r d : t h e c o m p o s i t i o n a n d t h e
4 9
50
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v o t i n g - r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e Security C o u n c i l w h o s e m e m b e r s have to
act in c o n c e r t ; t h e political c u l t u r e of states w h o s e g o v e r n m e n t s c a n
b e i n d u c e d to a d o p t s h o r t - t e r m "selfless" policies only if t h e y a r e
subject to t h e n o r m a t i v e p r e s s u r e s e m a n a t i n g f r o m m o b i l i z e d p u b l i c
s p h e r e s ; t h e f o r m a t i o n of r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s , w h i c h w o u l d for t h e first
t i m e p r o v i d e t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n with a n effective i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ;
a n d , finally, t h e g e n t l e p r e s s u r e t o w a r d globally c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n
e x e r t e d by t h e a w a r e n e s s of global d a n g e r s . T h e d a n g e r s a r e m a n i
fest: ecological i m b a l a n c e s , a s y m m e t r i e s in s t a n d a r d s of living a n d
e c o n o m i c power, large-scale t e c h n o l o g i e s , t h e a r m s t r a d e (in par
ticular, t h e s p r e a d of a t o m i c , biological, a n d c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s ) ,
t e r r o r i s m , d r u g - r e l a t e d criminality, a n d so f o r t h . T h o s e w h o d o n o t
c o m p l e t e l y d e s p a i r of t h e l e a r n i n g capacity of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sys
t e m h a v e t o r e s t t h e i r h o p e s o n t h e fact t h a t t h e globalization of
t h e s e d a n g e r s h a s in fact l o n g since u n i t e d t h e w o r l d i n t o a n invol
u n t a r y c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d risks.
IV
T h e timely r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e K a n t i a n i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n
pacification of t h e state of n a t u r e b e t w e e n states h a s o n t h e o n e
h a n d i n s p i r e d efforts to r e f o r m t h e U N a n d , m o r e generally, to
e x p a n d s u p r a n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s in t h e different r e g i o n s of t h e w o r l d .
S u c h efforts a i m to i m p r o v e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for a politics
of h u m a n rights, w h i c h h a s m a d e h e a d w a y since t h e P r e s i d e n c y of
J i m m y C a r t e r b u t h a s also suffered d e b i l i t a t i n g setbacks ( 1 ) . O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s h a s m e t with s t r o n g o p p o
sition f r o m t h o s e w h o view t h e a t t e m p t to i m p l e m e n t h u m a n r i g h t s
at t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l level as a self-destructive m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics.
However, this criticism is often b a s e d o n a c o n f u s e d c o n c e p t i o n of
h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t d o e s n o t differentiate sufficiently b e t w e e n t h e
d i m e n s i o n s of politics, law, a n d m o r a l i t y ( 2 ) .
(1) T h e " r h e t o r i c of universalism" a g a i n s t w h i c h this criticism is
d i r e c t e d finds its b o l d e s t e x p r e s s i o n in p r o p o s a l s to e x t e n d t h e U N
i n t o a " c o s m o p o l i t a n d e m o c r a c y . " T h e s e r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s focus o n
t h r e e p o i n t s : t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a w o r l d p a r l i a m e n t , t h e c o n s t r u c
t i o n of a g l o b a l j u d i c i a l system, a n d t h e l o n g o v e r d u e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n
of t h e Security C o u n c i l .
52
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T h e U N still e x h i b i t s f e a t u r e s of a " p e r m a n e n t c o n g r e s s of states."

If it is to s h e d t h e c h a r a c t e r of a m e r e assembly of g o v e r n m e n t
d e l e g a t i o n s , t h e G e n e r a l Assembly m u s t b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a k i n d
of u p p e r h o u s e a n d divide its c o m p e t e n c e s with a s e c o n d c h a m b e r .
I n this p a r l i a m e n t , p e o p l e s w o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e totality of
w o r l d citizens n o t by t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s b u t by directly e l e c t e d r e p
resentatives. C o u n t r i e s t h a t refuse to p e r m i t d e p u t i e s to b e e l e c t e d
by d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s (giving special c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h e i r na
t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s ) c o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e i n t e r i m by n o n g o v
e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a p p o i n t e d by t h e W o r l d P a r l i a m e n t itself as
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o p p r e s s e d p o p u l a t i o n s .
T h e W o r l d C o u r t in t h e H a g u e c u r r e n t l y lacks t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n
to initiate p r o s e c u t i o n s ; it c a n n o t m a k e b i n d i n g j u d g m e n t s a n d m u s t
restrict itself to a r b i t r a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . Moreover, its j u r i s d i c t i o n is
r e s t r i c t e d to r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states; it d o e s n o t e x t e n d to conflicts
b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s o r b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens a n d t h e i r
g o v e r n m e n t s . I n all of t h e s e r e s p e c t s , t h e p o w e r s of t h e C o u r t w o u l d
have to b e e x p a n d e d in a c c o r d a n c e with p r o p o s a l s a l r e a d y w o r k e d
o u t by H a n s Kelsen a half c e n t u r y a g o . I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l
c o u r t s , w h i c h u n t i l n o w h a v e only b e e n c o n v e n e d o n a n a d h o c basis
for specific war c r i m e trials, w o u l d h a v e to b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o n a
p e r m a n e n t basis.
T h e Security C o u n c i l was i n t e n d e d to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e egalitar
ian G e n e r a l Assembly; it is s u p p o s e d to reflect t h e d e facto r e l a t i o n s
of p o w e r in t h e w o r l d . B u t s o m e five d e c a d e s later, this r e a s o n a b l e
p r i n c i p l e n e e d s to b e a d a p t e d to t h e a l t e r e d g l o b a l situation, a n d
t h e r e q u i s i t e a d a p t a t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e l i m i t e d to e x t e n d i n g t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to i n c l u d e o t h e r influential nation-states (for e x a m
p l e , m a k i n g G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s ) . I n s t e a d , it
h a s b e e n p r o p o s e d t h a t a l o n g s i d e g l o b a l p o w e r s ( s u c h as t h e U n i t e d
States), r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s ( s u c h as t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ) s h o u l d b e
g r a n t e d privileged v o t i n g r i g h t s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of
u n a n i m i t y b e t w e e n t h e p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s m u s t b e a b o l i s h e d in
favor of a n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m of qualified majority r u l e . I n s u m , t h e
Security C o u n c i l c o u l d b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n executive b r a n c h
c a p a b l e of i m p l e m e n t i n g policies o n t h e m o d e l of t h e C o u n c i l of
Ministers of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . Moreover, states will b e willing to
a d a p t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l f o r e i g n policy to t h e i m p e r a t i v e s of a w o r l d
5 3
5 4
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d o m e s t i c politics only if t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n d e p l o y m i l i t a r y
forces u n d e r its o w n c o m m a n d a n d exercise p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s .
T h e f b r e g o i n g reflections a r e c o n v e n t i o n a l in t a k i n g t h e i r o r i e n
t a t i o n f r o m t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s of n a t i o n a l constitu
tions. T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a p r o p e r l y clarified c o n c e p t i o n of
c o s m o p o l i t a n law evidently calls for s o m e w h a t m o r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
i m a g i n a t i o n . I n a n y event, t h e m o r a l universalism t h a t i n f o r m e d
Kant's proposals remains the authoritative normative intuition. How
ever, a criticism h a s b e e n m a d e of this m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l self-unders t a n d i n g of m o d e r n i t y w h i c h h a s b e e n especially influential in
G e r m a n y , b e g i n n i n g with H e g e l ' s criticisms of K a n t ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o
phy, a n d h a s left d e e p t r a c e s d o w n to t h e p r e s e n t . C a r l S c h m i t t gave
this a r g u m e n t its m o s t incisive f o r m u l a t i o n a n d offered a justifica
t i o n t h a t is in p a r t insightful, in p a r t c o n f u s e d .
5 5
S c h m i t t distills t h e s l o g a n " W h o e v e r speaks of ' h u m a n i t y ' is a liar"

i n t o t h e striking f o r m u l a "Humanity, Bestiality." O n this view, "the
d e c e p t i o n of h u m a n i s m " h a s its r o o t s i n t h e hypocrisy of a legal
pacifism t h a t w a n t s to c o n d u c t 'just wars" u n d e r t h e b a n n e r of p e a c e
a n d c o s m o p o l i t a n law: " W h e n a state fights its political e n e m y in t h e
n a m e of h u m a n i t y , it is n o t a w a r for t h e sake of h u m a n i t y , b u t r a t h e r
a war w h e r e i n a p a r t i c u l a r state seeks to u s u r p a universal coficept
in its s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t its e n e m y , in t h e s a m e way t h a t o n e c a n m i s u s e
p e a c e , j u s t i c e , p r o g r e s s , a n d civilization in o r d e r to claim t h e s e as
o n e ' s o w n a n d t o d e n y t h e s a m e to t h e e n e m y . T h e c o n c e p t of
h u m a n i t y is a n especially useful i d e o l o g i c a l i n s t r u m e n t . . , , "
56
S c h m i t t l a t e r e x t e n d s this a r g u m e n t , w h i c h in 1932 was still di

r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e o t h e r victors of Versailles,
to t h e a c t i o n s of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s a n d t h e U N . T h e politics of
a w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t takes its i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m K a n t ' s i d e a of
p e r p e t u a l p e a c e a n d is d i r e c t e d to t h e c r e a t i o n of a c o s m o p o l i t a n
o r d e r h e a r k e n s t o t h e s a m e logic, a c c o r d i n g to S c h m i t t : its pan-int e r v e n t i o n i s m w o u l d inevitably l e a d to a p a n - c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n , a n d
h e n c e to t h e p e r v e r s i o n of t h e g o a l it is s u p p o s e d to serve.
57
(2) Before I e x a m i n e t h e specific c o n t e x t of t h e s e reflections, I

w o u l d like to d e a l with t h e a r g u m e n t a t a g e n e r a l level a n d u n c o v e r
its p r o b l e m a t i c c o r e . T h e two c r u c i a l s t a t e m e n t s a r e , first, t h a t t h e
politics of h u m a n r i g h t s l e a d s to wars w h i c h u n d e r t h e guise of
189
p o l i c e a c t i o n s take o n a m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ; a n d s e c o n d , t h a t this
m o r a l i z a t i o n b r a n d s o p p o n e n t s as e n e m i e s , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g crimi
n a l i z a t i o n for t h e first t i m e gives i n h u m a n i t y a c o m p l e t e l y free h a n d :
"We a r e familiar with t h e s e c r e t law b e h i n d this v o c a b u l a r y a n d k n o w
t h a t t o d a y t h e m o s t t e r r i b l e wars a r e c o n d u c t e d in t h e n a m e of p e a c e
a n d t h a t t h e worst i n h u m a n i t y is c o m m i t t e d in t h e n a n i e of h u m a n
ity." S c h m i t t justifies b o t h s t a t e m e n t s in t h e light of two f u r t h e r
p r e m i s e s : (a) t h a t t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s i m p l e m e n t s n o r m s
t h a t a r e p a r t of a universalistic morality; a n d (b) t h a t since m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s a r e g o v e r n e d by t h e c o d e of " g o o d " a n d "evil," t h e m o r a l
criticism of a n o p p o n e n t in war (or a political o p p o n e n t ) destroys
t h e legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e s t r i c t i o n s o n m i l i t a r y conflicts ( o r o n
political d i s p u t e s ) . W h e r e a s t h e first p r e m i s e is false, t h e s e c o n d
p r e m i s e suggests a false a s s u m p t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of a politics of
h u m a n rights.
(a) H u m a n r i g h t s in t h e m o d e r n sense c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e
V i r g i n i a Bill of Rights a n d t h e A m e r i c a n D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e
p e n d e n c e of 1776 a n d t o t h e Declaration des droits de Vhomme et du
citoyen of 1789. T h e s e d e c l a r a t i o n s w e r e i n s p i r e d by t h e political
p h i l o s o p h y of m o d e r n n a t u r a l law, especially t h a t of L o c k e a n d
R o u s s e a u . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s first t a k e o n a c o n c r e t e
f o r m in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e first c o n s t i t u t i o n s , specifically as basic
r i g h t s t h a t a r e g u a r a n t e e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e of a n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r .
However, t h e y s e e m to h a v e a d o u b l e c h a r a c t e r : as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
n o r m s t h e y enjoy positive validity, b u t as r i g h t s possessed by e a c h
p e r s o n q u a h u m a n b e i n g they a r e also a c c o r d e d a suprapositive
validity.
I n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion of h u m a n r i g h t s this a m b i g u i t y h a s
provoked m u c h irritation. O n o n e conception, h u m a n rights are
s u p p o s e d t o h a v e a status s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n m o r a l a n d positive
law; o n t h e o t h e r c o n c e p t i o n , t h e y c a n a s s u m e e i t h e r t h e f o r m of
m o r a l o r of j u r i d i c a l rights, t h o u g h t h e i r c o n t e n t r e m a i n s i d e n t i c a l
t h a t is, t h e y c o n s t i t u t e "a law (Recht) valid (gultig) p r i o r to a n y state,
t h o u g h n o t for t h a t r e a s o n a l r e a d y in force (geltend)." H u m a n r i g h t s
a r e " n e i t h e r actually g r a n t e d o r d e n i e d , b u t a r e e i t h e r r e s p e c t e d o r
d i s r e s p e c t e d . " T h e s e f o r m u l a s reflect a c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l e m
b a r r a s s m e n t a n d suggest t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislator m e r e l y
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dresses u p m o r a l n o r m s , h o w e v e r t h e y a r e justified, in t h e f o r m of
positive law. I n m y view, this a p p e a l to t h e classical d i s t i n c t i o n b e
t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d positive law sets t h e w r o n g p a r a m e t e r s for t h e
d e b a t e . T h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n r i g h t s d o e s n o t h a v e its o r i g i n s in
morality, b u t r a t h e r b e a r s t h e i m p r i n t of t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t of
i n d i v i d u a l liberties, h e n c e of a specifically j u r i d i c a l c o n c e p t . H u m a n
r i g h t s a r e j u r i d i c a l by their very nature. W h a t l e n d s t h e m t h e a p p e a r
a n c e of m o r a l r i g h t s is n o t t h e i r c o n t e n t , a n d m o s t especially n o t
t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , b u t r a t h e r t h e i r m o d e of validity, w h i c h p o i n t s b e
y o n d t h e legal o r d e r s of nation-states.
T h e texts of historical c o n s t i t u t i o n s a p p e a l t o " i n n a t e " r i g h t s a n d
often have t h e s o l e m n f o r m of " d e c l a r a t i o n s ; " b o t h f e a t u r e s a r e
s u p p o s e d to d i s s u a d e us f r o m w h a t we w o u l d n o w call a positivist
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d e x p r e s s t h e fact t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e " n o t
at t h e disposal" of t h e l e g i s l a t o r . B u t this r h e t o r i c a l proviso c a n n o t
p r e s e r v e h u m a n r i g h t s f r o m t h e fate of all positive law; they, t o o , c a n
b e c h a n g e d o r b e s u s p e n d e d , for e x a m p l e , following a c h a n g e of
r e g i m e s . O f c o u r s e , as a c o m p o n e n t of a d e m o c r a t i c legal o r d e r like
t h e o t h e r legal n o r m s , t h e y enjoy "validity" in t h e d u a l sense t h a t
t h e y a r e n o t only valid d e facto, a n d h e n c e a r e enforcecl by t h e
s a n c t i o n i n g p o w e r of t h e state, b u t c a n also claim n o r m a t i v e legiti
macy, t h a t is, they s h o u l d b e c a p a b l e of b e i n g rationally justified. B u t
a p a r t f r o m this typical f e a t u r e , basic r i g h t s d o i n d e e d h a v e a r e m a r k
a b l e status r e g a r d i n g t h e i r justification.
61
As c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s , h u m a n r i g h t s enjoy a c e r t a i n privilege,
w h i c h is m a n i f e s t e d in p a r t by t h e fact t h a t t h e y a r e constitutive for
t h e legal o r d e r as a w h o l e a n d to this e x t e n t d e t e r m i n e a f r a m e w o r k
w i t h i n w h i c h n o r m a l legislation m u s t b e c o n d u c t e d . B u t basic r i g h t s
enjoy a privileged status even w i t h i n t h e e n s e m b l e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
n o r m s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , liberal a n d social basic r i g h t s have t h e
f o r m of g e n e r a l n o r m s a d d r e s s e d to citizens in t h e i r capacity as
h u m a n b e i n g s ( n o t m e r e l y as m e m b e r s of a s t a t e ) . T h o u g h h u m a n
r i g h t s a r e for t h e t i m e b e i n g only r e a l i z e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of
a n a t i o n legal o r d e r , w i t h i n this s p h e r e of validity they g r o u n d r i g h t s
for all p e r s o n s a n d n o t m e r e l y for citizens. T h e f u r t h e r n o r m a l
legislation e x h a u s t s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s , t h e m o r e t h e
legal status of r e s i d e n t aliens c o m e s to r e s e m b l e t h a t of c i t i z e n s . It
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is this universal r a n g e of a p p l i c a t i o n , w h i c h refers to h u m a n b e i n g s

as s u c h , t h a t basic r i g h t s s h a r e with m o r a l n o r m s . As is s h o w n by t h e
r e c e n t c o n t r o v e r s y (in G e r m a n y ) over t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s of r e s i d e n t
aliens, this also h o l d s in c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s for political rights. T h i s
p o i n t s to a s e c o n d a n d e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t aspect. Basic r i g h t s a r e
e q u i p p e d with a universal validity claim b e c a u s e they c a n b e justified
exclusively f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. Certainly, o t h e r legal n o r m s
a r e also justified with t h e h e l p of m o r a l a r g u m e n t s , b u t in g e n e r a l
f u r t h e r ethical-political a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s play a r o l e in
t h e i r justification, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a r e i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e con
c r e t e f o r m of life of a historical legal c o m m u n i t y o r f r o m t h e c o n
c r e t e goals of p a r t i c u l a r policies. Basic rights, by c o n t r a s t , r e g u l a t e
m a t t e r s of s u c h g e n e r a l i t y t h a t m o r a l a r g u m e n t s a r e sufficient for their
justification. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s s h o w why t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s u c h
r u l e s is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all p e r s o n s q u a p e r s o n s , a n d t h u s why
they a r e equally g o o d for everybody.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this f o r m of justification by n o m e a n s r o b s t h e
basic r i g h t s of t h e i r j u r i d i c a l c h a r a c t e r i t d o e s n o t t u r n t h e m i n t o
m o r a l n o r m s . L e g a l n o r m s i n t h e m o d e r n sense of positive law
p r e s e r v e t h e i r legal f o r m , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e k i n d s of r e a s o n s o n t h e
basis of w h i c h t h e i r claim to legitimacy c a n b e justified. F o r t h e y owe
this c h a r a c t e r to t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , n o t to t h e i r c o n t e n t . Basic r i g h t s a r e
a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s w h o s e m e a n i n g at least in p a r t is to free
legal p e r s o n s in a carefully c i r c u m s c r i b e d m a n n e r f r o m t h e b i n d i n g
force of m o r a l c o m m a n d s by c r e a t i n g d o m a i n s of legal c o n d u c t i n
w h i c h a c t o r s c a n act i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e i r o w n p r e f e r e n c e s .
W h e r e a s m o r a l r i g h t s only derive f r o m d u t i e s t h a t b i n d t h e free will
of a u t o n o m o u s p e r s o n s , legal e n t i t l e m e n t s to act in a c c o r d a n c e with
o n e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s enjoy priority over legal d u t i e s , w h i c h in t u r n arise
f r o m legal r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t i e s .
63
T h i s c o n c e p t u a l privileging of r i g h t s over d u t i e s follows f r o m t h e

s t r u c t u r e of m o d e r n coercive law first e l a b o r a t e d by H o b b e s . H o b b e s
i n i t i a t e d a shift in p e r s p e c t i v e away f r o m p r e m o d e r n law, w h i c h was
still e l a b o r a t e d f r o m a religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e .
I n c o n t r a s t to d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y w h i c h g r o u n d s d u t i e s , law
serves t o p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m of c h o i c e in a c c o r d a n c e with
t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is p e r m i t t e d w h i c h is n o t explicitly
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f o r b i d d e n by g e n e r a l laws t h a t set limits to f r e e d o m . To b e s u r e , t h e

g e n e r a l i t y of s u c h laws m u s t satisfy t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view if t h e
individual rights derived from t h e m are to b e legitimateliberties
m u s t b e equally d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g citizens. B u t t h e c o n c e p t of sub
jective r i g h t t h a t c i r c u m s c r i b e s a d o m a i n of f r e e d o m of c h o i c e h a s
s t r u c t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s for m o d e r n legal o r d e r s i n g e n e r a l . H e n c e
K a n t conceives of law as "the s u m of t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e
c h o i c e of o n e c a n b e u n i t e d with t h e c h o i c e of a n o t h e r in a c c o r d
a n c e with a universal law of f r e e d o m . " A c c o r d i n g to Kant, all spe
cial h u m a n rights a r e g r o u n d e d in t h e "single o r i g i n a l " r i g h t to
e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties: "Freedom ( i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m b e i n g c o n
s t r a i n e d by a n o t h e r ' s c h o i c e ) , insofar as it c a n coexist with t h e
f r e e d o m of e v e r y o n e else in a c c o r d a n c e with a universal law, is
t h e only o r i g i n a l r i g h t b e l o n g i n g t o every m a n by v i r t u e of his
humanity."
6 5
66
C o n s i s t e n t with this f o u n d a t i o n , h u m a n r i g h t s t a k e t h e i r p l a c e i n
t h e D o c t r i n e of R i g h t a n d only t h e r e . Like o t h e r subjective r i g h t s ,
theyand they preeminentlyhave a moral content. But without
p r e j u d i c e t o this c o n t e n t , h u m a n r i g h t s b e l o n g structurally to a
positive a n d coercive legal o r d e r w h i c h f o u n d s a c t i o n a b l e individual
legal claims. To this e x t e n t , it is p a r t of t h e m e a n i n g of h u m a r i r i g h t s
t h a t t h e y claim t h e status of basic r i g h t s w h i c h a r e i m p l e m e n t e d
w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of some existing legal o r d e r , b e it n a t i o n a l , inter
n a t i o n a l , o r global. T h e e r r o n e o u s c o n f l a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s with
m o r a l r i g h t s is s u g g e s t e d by t h e fact t h a t , in spite of t h e i r claim to
universal validity, h u m a n r i g h t s h a v e t h u s far m a n a g e d to achieve a n
u n a m b i g u o u s positive f o r m only w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r s of
d e m o c r a t i c states. Moreover, t h e y r e m a i n only a w e a k force in i n t e r
n a t i o n a l law a n d still await i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k
of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r t h a t is only n o w b e g i n n i n g to take s h a p e .
(b) B u t if t h e first p r e m i s e t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e in e s s e n c e
m o r a l rightsis false, t h e n t h e first of S c h m i t t ' s two s t a t e m e n t s is
also u n d e r c u t , t h a t is, his s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e g l o b a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
of h u m a n r i g h t s obeys a m o r a l logic a n d h e n c e w o u l d l e a d t o inter
v e n t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e m e r e l y thinly disguised p o l i c e a c t i o n s . At t h e
s a m e t i m e , t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t t h a t a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t politics of
h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d inevitably d e g e n e r a t e i n t o a "struggle a g a i n s t
193
evil"comes u n d e r severe p r e s s u r e . At a n y r a t e , this s t a t e m e n t sug

gests t h e false a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t a i l o r e d
to l i m i t e d wars w o u l d suffice to c h a n n e l m i l i t a r y conflicts in a "civi
lized" d i r e c t i o n . Even if this a s s u m p t i o n w o u l d w i t h s t a n d e m p i r i c a l
o b j e c t i o n s , t h e p o l i c e a c t i o n s of a politically c o m p e t e n t a n d d e m o
cratically l e g i t i m a t e d w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n w o u l d b e t t e r m e r i t t h e title
of a "civil" r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflicts t h a n w o u l d wars,
h o w e v e r l i m i t e d . F o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r
m e a n s t h a t violations of h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n o l o n g e r j u d g e d a n d
c o m b a t e d immediately f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, b u t r a t h e r a r e
p r o s e c u t e d , like c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a stateo r g a n i z e d legal o r d e r , in a c c o r d a n c e with i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d legal p r o
c e d u r e s . Precisely t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of t h e state of n a t u r e a m o n g
states p r e v e n t s a m o r a l de-differentiation of law a n d g u a r a n t e e s t h e
a c c u s e d full legal p r o t e c t i o n , a n d h e n c e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , even in t h e c u r r e n t l y r e l e v a n t cases of war
crimes a n d crimes against h u m a n i t y .
67
V
I w o u l d like to d e v e l o p this a r g u m e n t f u r t h e r t h r o u g h a m e t a c r i t i c a l
e x a m i n a t i o n of C a r l S c h m i t t ' s o b j e c t i o n s . B u t first I m u s t say s o m e
t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , b e c a u s e t h e way S c h m i t t
links t h e different levels of a r g u m e n t is n o t especially t r a n s p a r e n t .
T h e criticism of a f o r m of c o s m o p o l i t a n law t h a t bypasses t h e sover
eignty of i n d i v i d u a l states c o n c e r n e d S c h m i t t p r i m a r i l y in c o n n e c
t i o n with t h e " d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t i o n of w a r " a s a w a r of
aggression. T h i s s e e m s to l e n d his a r g u m e n t a sharply-defined legal
focus. H e consistently attacks t h e p e n a l i z a t i o n of wars of a g g r e s s i o n
i n s c r i b e d in t h e U N C h a r t e r a n d t h e a s c r i p t i o n of legal liability to
i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s for a type of war c r i m e t h a t was u n k n o w n to
t h a t classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t h e l d sway u n t i l t h e First W o r l d
War. B u t S c h m i t t weighs d o w n this legal a p p r o a c h , w h i c h is h a r m
less in itself, with political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l argu
m e n t s . H e n c e we m u s t first u n c o v e r t h e u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r y ( 1 ) , in
o r d e r t o g e t a t t h e c r i t i q u e of m o r a l i t y t h a t f o r m s t h e c o r e of t h e
a r g u m e n t (2).
194
Chapter 7
(1) T a k e n at face value, the juridical argument aims to civilize war

through international law (a); and it is connected with a political
argument whose sole concern seems to be to preserve the estab
lished international order (b).
(a) S c h m i t t does not reject the distinction between offensive and
defensive wars for the pragmatic reason that it is difficult to operationalize. T h e juridical reason is rather that only a morally neutral
concept of war, which also excludes personal responsibility for a
penalized war, is consistent with the sovereignty of states as subjects
of international law; for the ius ad heliumthat is, the right to go to
war for any reason whatsoeveris constitutive of the sovereignty of
states. A t this stage in the argument, S c h m i t t is not as yet concerned
with the supposedly disastrous consequences of moral universalism
(as is made clear by the relevant text ), but rather with restrictions
on how wars are conducted. O n l y the practice of noncondemnation
of war can succeed in limiting military actions in war and provide
protection against the evils of a total war, which S c h m i t t had already
analyzed with admirable clarity before the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r .
I n this way S c h m i t t presents his call for a return to the status quo
ante of limited wars merely as a more realistic alternative to a cosmopolitan pacification of the state of nature between states; in
comparison with the effort to "civilize" war in terms of classical
international law, abolishing war altogether is a much more farreaching and, so it seems, Utopian goal. B u t there are good empirical
reasons for doubting the "realism" of Schmitt's proposal as well. T h e
bare appeal to international law, which developed out of the wars of
religion as one of the great achievements of W e s t e r n rationalism,
does not of itself show how the classical-modern world of the balance
of powers can be reestablished as a practical matter. F o r interna
tional law in its classical form has manifestly failed in the face of total
wars. B e h i n d the territorial, technical, and ideological expansion of
war there lurk momentous forces. T h e s e forces are still more likely
to be tamed through the sanctions and interventions of an organ
ized community of nations than through the legally ineffectual ap
peal to sovereign governments to conduct themselves in a
reasonable manner; a return to the classical system of international
law would effectively restore complete freedom of action to the
68
69
195
collective a c t o r s w h o w o u l d h a v e to r e f o r m t h e i r uncivilized c o n d u c t .
T h i s w e a k n e s s in t h e a r g u m e n t is a first i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e j u r i d i c a l
l i n e of a r g u m e n t is m e r e l y a facade b e h i n d w h i c h S c h m i t t c o n c e a l s
c o n c e r n s of a different sort.
After t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, S c h m i t t c o u l d save t h e consistency
of his legal a r g u m e n t only by c o n s i g n i n g t h e mass c r i m e s of t h e Nazi
p e r i o d to a sui g e n e r i s c a t e g o r y in o r d e r t h e r e b y to p r e s e r v e at least
t h e a p p e a r a n c e of m o r a l n e u t r a l i t y for w a r itself. I n 1945 in a brief
p r e p a r e d for t h e N u r e m b e r g d e f e n d a n t F r i e d r i c h Flick, S c h m i t t
consistently d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n w a r c r i m e s a n d "atrocities" t h a t
t r a n s c e n d h u m a n c o m p r e h e n s i o n "as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s of a
peculiarly i n h u m a n mentality": " T h e c o m m a n d of a s u p e r i o r c a n n o t
justify o r e x c u s e s u c h o u t r a g e s . " T h a t S c h m i t t m a d e this d i s t i n c t i o n
for p u r e l y tactical r e a s o n s in his r o l e as a lawyer e m e r g e s with b r u t a l
clarity in t h e texts of his d i a r y of a few years later. It is clear f r o m
this " G l o s s a r i u m " t h a t S c h m i t t n o t only w a n t e d t o see offensive w a r
d e c r i m i n a l i z e d b u t also t h e b a r b a r o u s e x t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e Jews. H e
asks, "Was it a ' c r i m e a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y ' ? Is t h e r e s u c h a t h i n g as a
c r i m e a g a i n s t love?" a n d h e d o u b t s w h e t h e r s u c h " c r i m e s " c a n b e
c o n s i d e r e d j u r i d i c a l m a t t e r s at all, b e c a u s e t h e "objects of p r o t e c t i o n
a n d attack" of s u c h a c r i m e c a n n o t b e c i r c u m s c r i b e d with sufficient
p r e c i s i o n : " G e n o c i d e , t h e m u r d e r of p e o p l e s a t o u c h i n g c o n c e p t ;
I h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d a n e x a m p l e of it myself: t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e G e r m a n - P r u s s i a n civil service in 1 9 4 5 . " T h i s r a t h e r prickly u n
d e r s t a n d i n g of g e n o c i d e l e d S c h m i t t to t h e m o r e far-reaching c o n
clusion: " ' C r i m e s a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y ' is only t h e m o s t g e n e r a l of all
g e n e r a l clauses for d e s t r o y i n g a n e n e m y . " I n a n o t h e r passage,
S c h m i t t asserts: " T h e r e a r e c r i m e s against h u m a n i t y a n d c r i m e s for
h u m a n i t y . C r i m e s against h u m a n i t y a r e c o m m i t t e d by t h e G e r m a n s .
C r i m e s for h u m a n i t y a r e p e r p e t r a t e d o n t h e G e r m a n s . "
H e r e a n o t h e r a r g u m e n t clearly e m e r g e s . T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
c o s m o p o l i t a n law, with t h e c o n s e q u e n t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t i o n of
war, is n o t only c o n s i d e r e d as a false r e a c t i o n to t h e e v o l u t i o n t o w a r d
total war, b u t r a t h e r as its c a u s e . Total w a r is s e e n as t h e c o n t e m p o
r a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h e "just w a r " t h a t necessarily issues f r o m a n
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t politics of h u m a n rights: " W h a t is decisive is t h a t t h e
total c h a r a c t e r of war g o e s h a n d - i n - h a n d with its, claim to b e j u s t . "
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Chapter 7
M o r a l universalism n o w a s s u m e s t h e r o l e of t h e e x p l a n a n d u m a n d
t h e a r g u m e n t shifts f r o m t h e j u r i d i c a l t o t h e m o r a l level. S c h m i t t
s e e m e d to have r e c o m m e n d e d t h e r e t u r n to classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law in t h e first i n s t a n c e as a m e a n s of a v o i d i n g total war. B u t it is n o t
even clear w h e t h e r h e r e g a r d e d t h e total e x t e n s i o n of war, h e n c e t h e
i n h u m a n c o n d u c t of war, as t h e r e a l evil, o r w h e t h e r his m a i n fear
was t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of war as s u c h . I n a n y case, in a c o r o l l a r y to The
Concept of the Politicalwritten
in 1938, S c h m i t t d e s c r i b e s t h e totalizing
e x t e n s i o n of t h e c o n d u c t of w a r to n o n m i l i t a r y a r e a s in s u c h a way
t h a t total w a r takes o n t h e m e r i t of e n h a n c i n g " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h " :
" T h e step b e y o n d t h e p u r e l y m i l i t a r y r e p r e s e n t s n o t only a q u a n
titative e x p a n s i o n b u t a qualitative l e a p . F o r this r e a s o n it (i.e., total
war) d o e s n o t b e t o k e n a n alleviation, b u t r a t h e r a n intensifica
t i o n of hostility. T h e m e r e possibility of s u c h a n i n c r e a s e in i n t e n
sity m e a n s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s of f r i e n d a n d foe b e c o m e political
o n c e a g a i n a n d a r e f r e e d f r o m t h e s p h e r e of private a n d psychologi
cal r h e t o r i c , even w h e r e t h e i r political c h a r a c t e r was c o m p l e t e l y
attenuated."
73
(b) Since t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t h a t a n i n v e t e r a t e foe of pacifism

s h o u l d b e overly c o n c e r n e d with t h e t a m i n g of totalized war,
S c h m i t t ' s r e a l c o n c e r n m a y lie e l s e w h e r e , namely, in t h e p r e s e r v a
t i o n of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r in w h i c h wars c a n still b e w a g e d a n d
conflicts resolved in this way. T h e p r a c t i c e of refusing to c o n d e m n
w a r m a i n t a i n s t h e r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a n i s m of u n c o n s t r a i n e d n a t i o n a l
self-assertion. F r o m this p o i n t of view, t h e evil to b e a v o i d e d is n o t
total w a r b u t t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a s p h e r e of t h e political t h a t rests
o n t h e classical division b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy.
S c h m i t t rationalizes this in t e r m s of his o w n p e c u l i a r t h e o r y of t h e
political. A c c o r d i n g t o this t h e o r y , a legally pacified d o m e s t i c policy
m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d by a b e l l i g e r e n t f o r e i g n policy l i c e n s e d by
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law b e c a u s e t h e state, w h i c h enjoys a m o n o p o l y over
t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e , c a n only u p h o l d law a n d o r d e r i n t h e face of
t h e v i r u l e n t force of subversive d o m e s t i c e n e m i e s so l o n g as it p r e
serves a n d r e g e n e r a t e s its political s u b s t a n c e in t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t
e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s . T h i s s u b s t a n c e s u p p o s e d l y c a n only b e r e n e w e d in
t h e willingness of a n a t i o n to kill a n d b e killed, since "the political"
itself is essentially r e l a t e d to "the r e a l possibility of physical k i l l i n g . "
74
197
T h e political is m a n i f e s t e d in t h e ability a n d t h e will of a p e o p l e to

r e c o g n i z e t h e e n e m y a n d to assert itself in t h e face of "the n e g a t i o n
of its o w n e x i s t e n c e " by "the o t h e r n e s s of t h e f o r e i g n . "
T h e s e s c u r r i l o u s reflections o n "the e s s e n c e of t h e political" n e e d
i n t e r e s t u s h e r e o n l y for t h e r o l e t h e y play in S c h m i t t ' s a r g u m e n t . A
political existentialism t h a t i m b u e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e political with
vitalistic c o n n o t a t i o n s f o r m s t h e b a c k g r o u n d for t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
t h e creativity of political p o w e r will b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a destructive
force o n c e it is b a r r e d f r o m t h e p r e d a t o r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a of
" c o n q u e r i n g v i o l e n c e . " T h e g l o b a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s
a n d d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h is d e s i g n e d to foster w o r l d p e a c e , w o u l d h a v e
t h e u n i n t e n d e d effect of allowing w a r to g o b e y o n d t h e "formally
j u s t " b o u n d s w i t h i n w h i c h it was h e l d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. W i t h o u t
t h e safety valve of a d o m a i n in w h i c h it is given free r e i n , w a r will
b e c o m e a u t o n o m o u s a n d o v e r w h e l m all s p h e r e s of civil life in
m o d e r n society, a n d t h e r e b y d e s t r o y t h e c o m p l e x i t y of functionally
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d societies. T h i s w a r n i n g a g a i n s t t h e c a t a s t r o p h i c c o n s e
q u e n c e s of a n a b o l i t i o n of w a r t h r o u g h legal pacification c a n only
b e e x p l a i n e d by a m e t a p h y s i c s t h a t a p p e a l e d to t h e t h e n f a s h i o n a b l e
b u t by n o w r a t h e r h a c k n e y e d a e s t h e t i c of "the s t o r m of steel."
(2) O n e c a n certainly distill o n e specific a r g u m e n t o u t of this
b e l l i g e r e n t Lebensphilosophie. A c c o r d i n g to S c h m i t t , b e h i n d t h e i d e o
logically g r o u n d e d "war a g a i n s t war," w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s t h e l i m i t e d
military struggle between "organized national units" into an unlim
i t e d p a r a m i l i t a r y civil war, lies t h e . universalism of t h a t h u m a n i s t
m o r a l i t y d e v e l o p e d by Kant.
It is clear t h a t S c h m i t t ' s r e a c t i o n t o U N p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d p e a c e
m a k i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n s w o u l d have b e e n n o different t h a n H a n s Mag
n u s E n z e n s b e r g e r ' s : " T h e r h e t o r i c of universalism is specific to t h e
West. Its p o s t u l a t e s a r e s u p p o s e d to h o l d in t h e s a m e way for all
p e o p l e w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . Universalism k n o w s n o d i s t i n c t i o n of n e a r
a n d far; it is u n c o n d i t i o n a l a n d abstract. . . . B u t since all of o u r
possibilities of a c t i o n a r e finite, t h e g a p b e t w e e n claim a n d reality
yawns ever wider. S o o n t h e t h r e s h o l d of objective hypocrisy is over
s t e p p e d ; universalism t h e n reveals itself as a m o r a l t r a p . " T h u s it is
allegedly t h e false a b s t r a c t i o n s of m o r a l h u m a n i s m t h a t p l u n g e u s
i n t o self-delusion a n d m i s l e a d u s i n t o o v e r b u r d e n i n g ourselves in a
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Chapter 7
hypocritical m a n n e r . T h e p r e s u m e d a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l limits over

w h i c h s u c h a m o r a l i t y elevates itself a r e d e t e r m i n e d by E n z e n s b e r ger, following A r n o l d G e h l e n , in t e r m s of spatial p r o x i m i t y a n d
social d i s t a n c e : a b e i n g w h i c h is h e w n f r o m s u c h c r o o k e d t i m b e r c a n
f u n c t i o n m o r a l l y only in its i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t .
W h e n S c h m i t t s p e a k s of hypocrisy h e h a s i n s t e a d H e g e l ' s criticism
of K a n t in m i n d . H e f u r n i s h e s his c o n t e m p t u o u s f o r m u l a " H u m a n
ity, Bestiality" with a n a m b i g u o u s c o m m e n t a r y , w h i c h at first g l a n c e
m i g h t j u s t as well h a v e c o m e f r o m H o r k h e i m e r : "We say: t h e m a i n
city c e m e t e r y a n d tactfully k e e p q u i e t a b o u t t h e s l a u g h t e r h o u s e . B u t
s l a u g h t e r i n g is t a k e n for g r a n t e d ; a n d it w o u l d b e i n h u m a n e , even
bestial, to u t t e r t h e w o r d ' s l a u g h t e r ' a l o u d . " T h i s a p h o r i s m is a m
b i g u o u s : it s e e m s at first sight to b e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e false, b e
c a u s e mystifying, a b s t r a c t i o n of P l a t o n i c g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s by w h i c h
we all t o o often s u p p r e s s t h e reverse side of a civilization of victors,
namely, t h e suffering of its m a r g i n a l i z e d victims. B u t this r e a d i n g ,
after t h e f a s h i o n of a c r i t i q u e of ideology, w o u l d r e q u i r e precisely
t h e k i n d of e g a l i t a r i a n r e s p e c t a n d universal c o m p a s s i o n i n v o k e d by
t h e m o r a l universalism S c h m i t t so v e h e m e n t l y o p p o s e s . W h a t his
a n t i h u m a n i s m seeks to affirm ( a l o n g with Mussolini's a n d L e n i n ' s
H e g e l ) is n o t t h e sacrificial l a m b , b u t r a t h e r s l a u g h t e r H e g e l ' s
s l a u g h t e r - b a n k of p e o p l e s , t h e " h o n o r of war"for h e g o e s o n :
" H u m a n i t y as s u c h c a n n o t wage war . . . . T h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n i t y
e x c l u d e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e e n e m y . " T h i s is S c h m i t t ' s a r g u m e n t :
m o r a l h u m a n i s m d a n g e r o u s l y abstracts f r o m t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r of t h e
political, t h e s u p p o s e d l y u n a v o i d a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f r i e n d a n d
foe. B e c a u s e it s u b s u m e s "political" r e l a t i o n s u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r i e s of
" g o o d " a n d "evil," it t u r n s t h e e n e m y i n t o "an i n h u m a n m o n s t e r t h a t
m u s t n o t only b e r e p u l s e d b u t m u s t b e totally a n n i h i l a t e d . " A n d
b e c a u s e t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t of war c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to t h e
universalism of h u m a n rights, it is u l t i m a t e l y t h e i n f e c t i o n of inter
n a t i o n a l law by m o r a l i t y t h a t e x p l a i n s t h e i n h u m a n i t y of m o d e r n
wars a n d civil wars p e r p e t r a t e d "in t h e n a m e of h u m a n i t y . "
7 6
7 7
7 8
79
80
T h e r e c e p t i o n of this c r i t i q u e of m o r a l i t y h a s h a d baleful effects,

q u i t e a p a r t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h S c h m i t t e m p l o y s it. F o r it fuses
a c o r r e c t i n s i g h t with a fatal m i s t a k e w h i c h draws s u s t e n a n c e f r o m
t h e friend-foe c o n c e p t i o n of t h e political. T h e k e r n e l of t r u t h is t h a t
199
a n unmediated m o r a l i z a t i o n of law a n d politics d o e s in fact b r e a k

t h r o u g h t h o s e p r o t e c t i v e z o n e s t h a t we w a n t to have s e c u r e d for legal
p e r s o n s for g o o d , i n d e e d m o r a l , r e a s o n s . B u t it is a m i s t a k e to
a s s u m e t h a t this m o r a l i z a t i o n c a n only b e p r e v e n t e d by k e e p i n g
i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics free f r o m law a n d t h e law free f r o m o r p u r g e d
of morality. B o t h a s s u m p t i o n s a r e false given t h e p r e m i s e s of t h e r u l e
of law a n d d e m o c r a c y : t h e i d e a of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state d e m a n d s
t h a t t h e coercive force of t h e state b e c h a n n e l e d b o t h e x t e r n a l l y a n d
i n t e r n a l l y t h r o u g h l e g i t i m a t e law; a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n
of law is i n t e n d e d to g u a r a n t e e t h a t law r e m a i n s in h a r m o n y with
r e c o g n i z e d m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . C o s m o p o l i t a n law is a logical c o n s e
q u e n c e of t h e i d e a of t h e constitutive r u l e of law. It establishes for
t h e first t i m e a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of social a n d
political r e l a t i o n s b o t h w i t h i n a n d b e y o n d t h e state's b o r d e r s .
S c h m i t t ' s m o s t r e v e a l i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c y is his insistence u p o n a n
a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n a pacified legal o r d e r in t h e d o m e s t i c s p h e r e
a n d a b e l l i g e r e n t p o s t u r e in f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . Since h e also c o n
ceives of i n t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d civil p e a c e m e r e l y as a l a t e n t conflict
b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y a n d its r e p r e s s e d e n e m i e s , h e
g r a n t s t h e wielders of state p o w e r t h e r i g h t to d e c l a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of t h e o p p o s i t i o n to b e i n t e r n a l e n e m i e s a p r a c t i c e w h i c h h a s left
its m a r k o n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c . I n c o n t r a s t with t h e constitu
t i o n a l state, w h e r e i n d e p e n d e n t c o u r t s a n d t h e w h o l e b o d y of citi
z e n s (in e x t r e m e cases, activated t h r o u g h civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) d e c i d e
sensitive q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m e a s u r e s , S c h m i t t
leaves it to t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t r u l e r s to criminalize political
o p p o n e n t s as o p p o n e n t s in a civil war. B e c a u s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n
trols a r e l o o s e n e d in t h e s e m a r g i n a l a r e a s of i n t e r n a l affairs, p r e
cisely t h a t state of affairs results w h i c h S c h m i t t fears will follow f r o m
t h e pacification of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states: t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of m o r a l
c a t e g o r i e s i n t o a legally p r o t e c t e d z o n e of political a c t i o n a n d t h e
t a r n i s h i n g of o p p o n e n t s as a g e n t s of evil. B u t t h e n it is i n c o n s i s t e n t
to d e m a n d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s s h o u l d r e m a i n i m m u n e f r o m
r e g u l a t i o n s a n a l o g o u s to t h o s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state.
81
As a m a t t e r of fact, a n unmediated m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics w o u l d

b e j u s t as h a r m f u l in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a as in t h e conflict
between governments and their internal enemiessomething that
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ironically S c h m i t t p e r m i t s , b e c a u s e h e locates t h e h a r m in t h e w r o n g
p l a c e . B u t in b o t h cases t h e h a r m results solely f r o m t h e fact t h a t a
legally p r o t e c t e d d o m a i n of political o r state a c t i o n is falsely c o d e d
in two ways: first it is m o r a l i z e d , t h a t is, j u d g e d a c c o r d i n g to criteria
of " g o o d " a n d "evil," a n d t h e n it is c r i m i n a l i z e d , h e n c e c o n d e m n e d
in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria of "legal" a n d "illegal," w i t h o u t a n d this
is t h e decisive p o i n t t h a t S c h m i t t suppresses-the legal p r e c o n d i
t i o n s of a n i m p a r t i a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y a n d a n e u t r a l system of crimi
n a l p u n i s h m e n t in p l a c e . T h e h u m a n r i g h t s politics of a w o r l d
organization b e c o m e s inverted into a h u m a n rights fundamentalism
only w h e n it p r o v i d e s a m o r a l l e g i t i m a t i o n u n d e r t h e cover of a s h a m
legal l e g i t i m a t i o n for a n i n t e r v e n t i o n w h i c h is in reality n o t h i n g
m o r e t h a n a s t r u g g l e of o n e p a r t y against t h e o t h e r . I n s u c h cases,
t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n ( o r a n alliance a c t i n g in its n a m e ) e n g a g e s
in d e c e p t i o n , b e c a u s e it passes off a m i l i t a r y conflict b e t w e e n two
w a r r i n g p a r t i e s as a n e u t r a l p o l i c e m e a s u r e justified by e n f o r c e a b l e
law a n d by t h e j u d g m e n t s of a c r i m i n a l c o u r t . "Morally justified
a p p e a l s a r e in d a n g e r of t a k i n g o n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t f e a t u r e s w h e n
t h e i r g o a l is n o t to i m p l e m e n t legal p r o c e d u r e s for [ e n a c t i n g as well
as] a p p l y i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g h u m a n rights, b u t i n s t e a d a r e a p
p l i e d directly to t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e by m e a n s of w h i c h a c c o u n t
ability for violations of h u m a n r i g h t s is d e t e r m i n e d , a n d w h e n t h e y
a r e t h e sole basis for t h e d e m a n d e d s a n c t i o n s " (my i n t e r p o l a t i o n ) .
82
S c h m i t t d e f e n d s t h e f u r t h e r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of
p o w e r politics b e y o n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of a state, a n d h e n c e t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s in a n a r e n a p r e
viously d o m i n a t e d by m i l i t a r y force, always and necessarily leads to
s u c h h u m a n r i g h t s f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . T h i s assertion is ill f o u n d e d in
t h a t it is b a s e d o n t h e false p r e m i s e t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e m o r a l in
n a t u r e a n d h e n c e t h a t t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w o u l d imply a k i n d of
m o r a l i z a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m a t i c a s p e c t of t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of inter
n a t i o n a l affairs a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d d o e s n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e fact t h a t
a c t i o n s previously u n d e r s t o o d as political a r e h e n c e f o r t h s u b s u m e d
u n d e r legal c a t e g o r i e s . For, in c o n t r a s t with morality, t h e legal c o d e
d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a c t i o n s b e s u b j e c t e d to a n i m m e d i a t e m o r a l
e v a l u a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria of " g o o d " a n d "evil." Klaus
G i m t h e r clarifies t h e key p o i n t : " T h a t a political i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (in
201
Carl S c h m i t t ' s sense) of violations of h u m a n r i g h t s is i n a d m i s s i b l e

d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t a n u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n take its
p l a c e . " H u m a n r i g h t s s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with m o r a l rights.
B u t n e i t h e r d o e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y w h i c h
G i m t h e r u p h o l d s imply t h a t positive law h a s n o m o r a l c o n t e n t .
T h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e of political legislation, m o r a l
a r g u m e n t s ( a m o n g o t h e r sorts) also flow i n t o t h e justification of
e n a c t e d n o r m s a n d t h e r e b y i n t o law itself. As K a n t r e c o g n i z e d , law
differs f r o m m o r a l i t y in t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s of legality. C e r t a i n
aspects of c o n d u c t o p e n to m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t (for e x a m p l e , convic
tions a n d motives) a r e p e r se e x e m p t e d f r o m legal r e g u l a t i o n . But,
a b o v e all, t h e legal c o d e b i n d s t h e j u d g m e n t s a n d s a n c t i o n s of t h e
p r o s e c u t i n g a g e n c i e s t o n a r r o w l y i n t e r p r e t e d , intersubjectively test
a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s , w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d to
p r o t e c t t h o s e a c c u s e d . W h e r e a s t h e m o r a l p e r s o n s t a n d s so to s p e a k
n a k e d b e f o r e t h e i n n e r c o u r t of his o r h e r c o n s c i e n c e , t h e legal
p e r s o n r e m a i n s w r a p p e d in t h e p r o t e c t i v e m a n t l e ofmorally wellg r o u n d e d i n d i v i d u a l liberties. T h e r e f o r e t h e c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e to
t h e d a n g e r of a n u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l i z a t i o n of p o w e r politics is " n o t
t h e d e m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics, b u t r a t h e r t h e d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a
t i o n of m o r a l i t y i n t o a system of positive laws with legal p r o c e d u r e s
for t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . " H u m a n r i g h t s f u n d a
m e n t a l i s m is a v o i d e d n o t by r e n o u n c i n g t h e politics of h u m a n rights,
b u t only t h r o u g h a c o s m o p o l i t a n t r a n s f o r r n a t i o r i ^ c f t h e state of
n a t u r e a m o n g states i n t o a legal o r d e r .
83
85
8 _
Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic

Constitutional State
M o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s owe t h e i r e x i s t e n c e to a c o n c e p t i o n f o u n d in
m o d e r n n a t u r a l law a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h citizens c o m e t o g e t h e r vol
u n t a r i l y to f o r m a legal c o m m u n i t y of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s .
T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p u t s i n t o effect precisely t h o s e r i g h t s t h a t individu
als m u s t g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r if t h e y w a n t to o r d e r t h e i r life t o g e t h e r
legitimately by m e a n s of positive law. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s
t h e n o t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s (subjektive Rechte) a n d i n d i v i d u a l legal
p e r s o n s as t h e b e a r e r s of r i g h t s . A l t h o u g h m o d e r n law establishes a
basis for s t a t e - s a n c t i o n e d r e l a t i o n s of intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e
r i g h t s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s e r e l a t i o n s p r o t e c t t h e v u l n e r a b l e integrity
of legal subjects w h o a r e in every case individuals. I n t h e final analy
sis it is a q u e s t i o n of p r o t e c t i n g t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l legal p e r s o n s , even
if t h e integrity of t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n law n o less t h a n in m o r a l i t y
d e p e n d s o n r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n r e m a i n i n g intact. C a n a
t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h a t is so individualistically c o n s t r u c t e d d e a l a d e
q u a t e l y with struggles for r e c o g n i t i o n , in w h i c h w h a t s e e m s to b e at
stake is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d assertion of collective identities?
A c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n b e t h o u g h t of as a historical p r o j e c t t h a t e a c h
g e n e r a t i o n of citizens c o n t i n u e s to p u r s u e . I n t h e d e m o c r a t i c consti
t u t i o n a l state t h e exercise of political p o w e r is c o d e d in a d u a l
m a n n e r : t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d h a n d l i n g of p r o b l e m s a n d t h e p r o c e
durally r e g u l a t e d m e d i a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s m u s t b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as actualizing a system of r i g h t s . B u t in t h e politi
cal a r e n a t h o s e w h o e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r a r e collective a c t o r s
1
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Chapter 8
c o n t e n d i n g a b o u t collective goals a n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of collective

g o o d s . O n l y in t h e c o u r t r o o m a n d in legal d i s c o u r s e a r e r i g h t s
a s s e r t e d a n d d e f e n d e d as a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l rights, for w h i c h o n e
c a n b r i n g suit. Existing law also h a s to b e i n t e r p r e t e d in n e w ways in
different c o n t e x t s in view of c h a n g i n g n e e d s a n d interests. T h i s
s t r u g g l e over t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d satisfaction of historically u n r e
d e e m e d claims is a s t r u g g l e for l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s in w h i c h o n c e a g a i n
collective a c t o r s a r e involved, c o m b a t i n g a lack of r e s p e c t for t h e i r
dignity. I n this "struggle for r e c o g n i t i o n " p a r t i c i p a n t s voice collective
e x p e r i e n c e s of violated integrity, as Axel H o n n e t h h a s s h o w n . C a n
t h e s e p h e n o m e n a b e r e c o n c i l e d with a t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h a t is individualistically d e s i g n e d ?
2
T h e political a c h i e v e m e n t s of liberalism a n d social d e m o c r a c y t h a t

a r e t h e p r o d u c t of t h e b o u r g e o i s e m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e
E u r o p e a n l a b o r m o v e m e n t suggest a n affirmative a n s w e r to this
q u e s t i o n . B o t h a t t e m p t e d to o v e r c o m e t h e d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t of
u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s a n d with it t h e division of society i n t o social
classes; b u t w h e r e liberal social r e f o r m c a m e i n t o play, t h e s t r u g g l e
a g a i n s t t h e o p p r e s s i o n of collectivities w h o w e r e d e p r i v e d of e q u a l
social o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o o k t h e f o r m of a s t r u g g l e for t h e social-welfarist universalization of civil r i g h t s . Since t h e b a n k r u p t c y of state
socialism, this p e r s p e c t i v e h a s i n d e e d b e e n t h e only o n e r e m a i n i n g :
t h e status of a d e p e n d e n t wage e a r n e r is to b e s u p p l e m e n t e d with
r i g h t s to social a n d political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d t h e m a s s of t h e p o p u
l a t i o n is t h e r e b y to b e given t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to live in realistic
e x p e c t a t i o n of security, social j u s t i c e , a n d affluence. A m o r e equita
b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of collective g o o d s is to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e u n e q u a l
c o n d i t i o n s of life in capitalist societies. T h i s a i m is t h o r o u g h l y c o m
p a t i b l e with t h e t h e o r y of rights, b e c a u s e t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s (in
Rawls's sense) a r e e i t h e r d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g individuals (like m o n e y ,
free t i m e , a n d services) o r u s e d by individuals (like t h e infrastruc
t u r e s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , h e a l t h c a r e , a n d e d u c a t i o n ) a n d c a n t h u s
take t h e f o r m of i n d i v i d u a l claims to benefits.
At first g l a n c e , however, claims to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of collective
i d e n t i t i e s a n d to e q u a l r i g h t s for c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a r e a different
m a t t e r . Feminists, m i n o r i t i e s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies, p e o p l e s strug
g l i n g for n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d f o r m e r l y c o l o n i z e d r e g i o n s
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Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State
s u i n g for t h e equality of t h e i r c u l t u r e s o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage a r e

all c u r r e n t l y fighting for s u c h claims. D o e s n o t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of
c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d t r a d i t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n m a r g i n a l i z e d ,
w h e t h e r in t h e c o n t e x t of a majority c u l t u r e o r in a E u r o c e n t r i c
g l o b a l society, r e q u i r e g u a r a n t e e s of status a n d survivalin o t h e r
w o r d s , s o m e k i n d of collective r i g h t s t h a t s h a t t e r t h e o u t m o d e d
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, w h i c h is
t a i l o r e d to i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a n d in t h a t sense is "liberal"?
C h a r l e s Taylor p r o v i d e s a c o m p l e x a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n , a n
a n s w e r t h a t a d v a n c e s t h e discussion significantly. As t h e c o m m e n
taries o n his essay p u b l i s h e d in t h e s a m e v o l u m e i n d i c a t e , his origi
n a l i d e a s also i n s p i r e criticism. Taylor r e m a i n s a m b i g u o u s o n t h e
decisive p o i n t . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s two r e a d i n g s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n
stitutional state, for w h i c h M i c h a e l Walzer p r o v i d e s t h e t e r m s Liber
alism 1 a n d Liberalism 2. T h e s e d e s i g n a t i o n s suggest t h a t t h e s e c o n d
r e a d i n g , w h i c h Taylor favors, m e r e l y c o r r e c t s a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e u n
d e r s t a n d i n g of liberal p r i n c i p l e s . O n closer e x a m i n a t i o n , however,
Taylor's r e a d i n g attacks t h e p r i n c i p l e s themselves a n d calls i n t o ques
t i o n t h e individualistic c o r e of t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n of f r e e d o m .
3
Taylor's "Politics o f Recognition"
Amy G u t m a n n makes the incontrovertible point that

full public recognition as equal citizens may require two forms of respect:
(1) respect for the unique identities of each individual, regardless of gender,
race, or ethnicity, and (2) respect for those activities, practices, and ways of
viewing the world that are particularly valued by, or associated with, mem
bers of disadvantaged groups, including women, Asian-Americans, AfricanAmericans, Native Americans, and a multitude of other groups in the
United States.
4
T h e s a m e t h i n g h o l d s , of c o u r s e , for Gastarbeiter [foreign w o r k e r s ]

a n d o t h e r f o r e i g n e r s in G e r m a n y , for C r o a t s in Serbia, Russians in
t h e U k r a i n e , a n d K u r d s in Turkey; for t h e disabled, h o m o s e x u a l s ,
a n d so o n . T h e d e m a n d for r e s p e c t is a i m e d n o t so m u c h at e q u a l
izing living c o n d i t i o n s as it is at p r o t e c t i n g t h e integrity of t h e
t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of life in w h i c h m e m b e r s of g r o u p s t h a t h a v e
b e e n d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t c a n r e c o g n i z e themselves. Normally, of
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c o u r s e , t h e failure of c u l t u r a l r e c o g n i t i o n is c o n n e c t e d with gross

social d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a n d t h e two r e i n f o r c e e a c h o t h e r . T h e ques
t i o n t h a t c o n c e r n s us h e r e is w h e t h e r t h e d e m a n d for r e s p e c t for
o n e ' s c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s follows f r o m t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r e s p e c t
for e a c h individual, o r w h e t h e r , at least in s o m e cases, t h e s e two
d e m a n d s will necessarily c o m e i n t o conflict with o n e a n o t h e r .
Taylor p r o c e e d s o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r o t e c t i o n of collec
tive i d e n t i t i e s c o m e s i n t o c o m p e t i t i o n with t h e r i g h t to e q u a l indi
vidual liberties (subjektive Freiheiten)Kant's
o n e original h u m a n
r i g h t s o t h a t in t h e case of conflict a d e c i s i o n m u s t b e m a d e a b o u t
w h i c h takes p r e c e d e n c e . T h e a r g u m e n t r u n s as follows: B e c a u s e t h e
s e c o n d claim d i s t i n g u i s h e d by G u t m a n n r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
precisely t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s f r o m w h i c h t h e first claim s e e m s to
abstract, t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r i g h t s h a s to b e p u t i n t o effect in two
k i n d s of politics t h a t r u n c o u n t e r to o n e a n o t h e r a politics of
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c u l t u r a l differences o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d a politics
of universalization of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o n t h e o t h e r . T h e o n e is
s u p p o s e d to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e p r i c e t h e o t h e r exacts with its e q u a l
izing universalism. Taylor spells o u t this o p p o s i t i o n a n o p p o s i t i o n
t h a t is falsely c o n s t r u e d , as I will try to s h o w u s i n g t h e c o n c e p t s of
t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t , d r a w n f r o m m o r a l t h e o r y . Liberals like Rawls
a n d D w o r k i n call for a n ethically n e u t r a l legal o r d e r t h a t is s u p p o s e d
to assure e v e r y o n e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r s u e his o r h e r o w n
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . I n c o n t r a s t , c o m m u n i t a r i a n s like Taylor a n d
Walzer d i s p u t e t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law a n d t h u s c a n e x p e c t
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, if n e e d b e , actively to a d v a n c e specific c o n
c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d life.
Taylor gives t h e e x a m p l e of t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y t h a t
f o r m s t h e majority in t h e C a n a d i a n p r o v i n c e of Q u e b e c . T h e fran
c o p h o n e g r o u p claims t h e r i g h t for Q u e b e c to f o r m a "distinct
society" w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e . It w a n t s to s a f e g u a r d t h e
integrity of its f o r m of life against t h e A n g l o - S a x o n majority c u l t u r e ,
a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s by m e a n s of r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t f o r b i d i m m i g r a n t s
a n d t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n to s e n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n to E n g
lish-language schools, t h a t establish F r e n c h as t h e l a n g u a g e in w h i c h
firms with m o r e t h a n fifty e m p l o y e e s will o p e r a t e , a n d t h a t in g e n
eral p r e s c r i b e F r e n c h as t h e l a n g u a g e of b u s i n e s s . A c c o r d i n g to
207
S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State
Taylor, a t h e o r y of r i g h t s of t h e first type w o u l d necessarily b e closed

to collective goals of this k i n d :
A society w i t h collective goals like Q u e b e c ' s violates this m o d e l . . . . O n this
m o d e l , t h e r e is a d a n g e r o u s o v e r l o o k i n g of a n e s s e n t i a l b o u n d a r y in speak
i n g of f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s t o t h i n g s like c o m m e r c i a l s i g n a g e i n t h e l a n g u a g e
of o n e ' s c h o i c e . O n e h a s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l liberties, t h o s e t h a t
s h o u l d n e v e r b e i n f r i n g e d a n d t h e r e f o r e o u g h t t o b e unassailably e n
t r e n c h e d , o n o n e h a n d , f r o m privileges a n d i m m u n i t i e s t h a t a r e i m p o r t a n t ,
b u t t h a t c a n b e r e v o k e d o r r e s t r i c t e d for r e a s o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y a l t h o u g h
o n e would n e e d a strong reason to d o thison the other.
5
Taylor p r o p o s e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l t h a t u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s
w o u l d p e r m i t basic r i g h t s to b e r e s t r i c t e d by g u a r a n t e e s of status
a i m e d at p r o m o t i n g t h e survival of e n d a n g e r e d c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life
a n d t h u s w o u l d p e r m i t policies t h a t "actively seek to create m e m b e r s
of t h e c o m m u n i t y , for i n s t a n c e , in t h e i r a s s u r i n g t h a t f u t u r e g e n e r a
tions c o n t i n u e to identify as F r e n c h - s p e a k e r s . T h e r e is n o way t h a t
t h e s e policies c o u l d b e s e e n as j u s t p r o v i d i n g a facility to a l r e a d y
existing p e o p l e . "
6
Taylor m a k e s t h e case for his thesis of i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y by first

p r e s e n t i n g t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h r o u g h a selective r e a d i n g of Liber
alism 1. H e d o e s n o t clearly d e f i n e e i t h e r t h e C a n a d i a n e x a m p l e o r
t h e legal r e f e r e n c e of his p r o b l e m a t i c . Before I take u p t h e s e two
p r o b l e m s , I w o u l d like to show t h a t w h e n p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e
t h e o r y of r i g h t s is by n o m e a n s b l i n d to c u l t u r a l differences.
Taylor u n d e r s t a n d s L i b e r a l i s m 1 as a t h e o r y a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h
all legal c o n s o c i a t e s a r e g u a r a n t e e d e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m s of
c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n in t h e f o r m of basic r i g h t s . I n cases of conflict t h e
c o u r t s d e c i d e w h o h a s w h i c h rights; t h u s t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l
r e s p e c t for e a c h p e r s o n h o l d s only i n t h e f o r m of a legally p r o t e c t e d
a u t o n o m y t h a t every p e r s o n c a n u s e to realize his o r h e r p e r s o n a l
life project. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s is p a t e r n a l i s t i c
in t h a t it i g n o r e s half of t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y . It d o e s n o t take
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t t h o s e to w h o m t h e law is a d d r e s s e d c a n
a c q u i r e a u t o n o m y (in t h e K a n t i a n sense) only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they
c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as t h e a u t h o r s of t h e laws to w h i c h they
a r e subject as private legal p e r s o n s . L i b e r a l i s m 1 fails to r e c o g n i z e
t h a t private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y a r e co-original. It is n o t t h a t p u b l i c
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Chapter 8
a u t o n o m y s u p p l e m e n t s a n d r e m a i n s e x t e r n a l to private a u t o n o m y
b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l , t h a t is, c o n c e p t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two. F o r in t h e final analysis, private legal
p e r s o n s c a n n o t even a t t a i n t h e e n j o y m e n t of e q u a l individual liber
ties u n l e s s t h e y themselves, by j o i n t l y e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r a u t o n o m y as
citizens, arrive at a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t i n t e r e s t s a n d
c r i t e r i a a r e justified a n d in w h a t r e s p e c t s e q u a l t h i n g s will b e t r e a t e d
equally a n d u n e q u a l t h i n g s u n e q u a l l y i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r case.
B u t o n c e we take this internal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y a n d
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state seriously, it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e system of
r i g h t s is b l i n d n e i t h e r t o u n e q u a l social c o n d i t i o n s n o r to c u l t u r a l
differences. T h e c o l o r b l i n d n e s s of t h e selective r e a d i n g vanishes
o n c e we r e c o g n i z e t h a t we ascribe to t h e b e a r e r s of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s
a n identity t h a t is c o n c e i v e d intersubjectively. P e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g
legal p e r s o n s , b e c o m e individualized only t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s of so
cialization. A c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e o r y of r i g h t s r e q u i r e s a poli
tics of r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e integrity of t h e i n d i v i d u a l in t h e
life c o n t e x t s in w h i c h his o r h e r i d e n t i t y is f o r m e d . T h i s d o e s n o t
r e q u i r e a n a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l t h a t c o r r e c t s t h e individualistic d e s i g n
of t h e system of r i g h t s t h r o u g h o t h e r n o r m a t i v e perspectives. All t h a t
is r e q u i r e d is t h e c o n s i s t e n t actualization of t h e system of r i g h t s .
T h e r e w o u l d b e little l i k e l i h o o d of this, of c o u r s e , w i t h o u t social
m o v e m e n t s a n d political struggles.
7
I w o u l d like to show this with r e f e r e n c e to t h e h i s t o r y of f e m i n i s m ,

w h i c h h a s h a d to m a k e r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s t o realize its legal a n d
political goals in t h e face of s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e . Like t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of law in W e s t e r n societies in g e n e r a l , t h e feminist politics of equality
d u r i n g t h e p a s t h u n d r e d years follows a p a t t e r n t h a t c a n b e d e
s c r i b e d as a dialectic of de jure a n d de facto equality. Equality u n d e r
t h e law g r a n t s f r e e d o m s of c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n t h a t c a n b e r e a l i z e d
differently a n d t h u s d o n o t p r o m o t e a c t u a l equality in life c i r c u m
stances o r p o s i t i o n s of power. T h e factual p r e r e q u i s i t e s for t h e e q u a l
o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e u s e of equally d i s t r i b u t e d legal c o m p e t e n c e
m u s t certainly b e fulfilled if t h e n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g of legal equality
is n o t to t u r n i n t o its o p p o s i t e . B u t t h e i n t e n d e d e q u a l i z a t i o n of
a c t u a l life c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r s h o u l d n o t l e a d to
normalizing i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t p e r c e p t i b l y restrict t h e capacities of
209
t h e p r e s u m e d beneficiaries to s h a p e t h e i r lives a u t o n o m o u s l y . As
l o n g as policies a r e f o c u s e d o n s a f e g u a r d i n g private a u t o n o m y , while
t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e individual r i g h t s of private
p e r s o n s a n d t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of t h e citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in
m a k i n g t h e laws is o b s c u r e d f r o m view, t h e politics of r i g h t s will
oscillate helplessly b e t w e e n t h e p o l e s of a liberal p a r a d i g m in t h e
L o c k e a n sense a n d a n equally s h o r t s i g h t e d social-welfare p a r a d i g m .
T h i s is t r u e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t for m e n a n d w o m e n as w e l l .
8
Initially, t h e g o a l of t h e liberal policies was to d e t a c h t h e acquisition

of status f r o m g e n d e r a n d to g u a r a n t e e w o m e n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to
c o m p e t e for j o b s , social s t a n d i n g , e d u c a t i o n , political power, a n d so
o n , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e o u t c o m e s . B u t t h e f o r m a l equality t h a t was
partially a c h i e v e d t h e r e b y only m a d e t h e de facto u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t
of w o m e n all t h e m o r e obvious. Social-welfare policies, especially in t h e
a r e a s of social, labor, a n d family law, r e s p o n d e d t o this with special
r e g u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g p r e g n a n c y , m o t h e r h o o d , a n d t h e social b u r
d e n s of divorce. Since t h e n , of c o u r s e , n o t only unfulfilled liberal
d e m a n d s b u t also t h e a m b i v a l e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s of successfully im
p l e m e n t e d social-welfare p r o g r a m s h a v e b e c o m e t h e object of femi
nist criticism-for e x a m p l e , t h e i n c r e a s e d e m p l o y m e n t risks t h a t
w o m e n suffer as a r e s u l t of t h e s e c o m p e n s a t i o n s , t h e over-repre
s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in t h e lower w a g e b r a c k e t s , t h e p r o b l e m a t i c
n o t i o n of "child welfare," t h e i n c r e a s i n g " f e m i n i z a t i o n " of poverty in
g e n e r a l , a n d so o n . F r o m t h e legal p o i n t of view t h e r e is a s t r u c t u r a l
basis for this reflexively p r o d u c e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , namely, t h e overg e n e r a l i z e d classifications of d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s situations a n d disad
v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . T h e s e "false" classifications l e a d to " n o r m a l i z i n g "
i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t o t h e way p e o p l e l e a d t h e i r lives, with t h e r e s u l t t h a t
t h e i n t e n d e d c o m p e n s a t i o n s t u r n i n t o n e w f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
a n d i n s t e a d of b e i n g g u a r a n t e e d liberties p e o p l e a r e d e p r i v e d of
f r e e d o m . I n t h e d o m a i n s of law t h a t f e m i n i s m is particularly c o n
c e r n e d with, social-welfare p a t e r n a l i s m is precisely t h a t , b e c a u s e leg
islation a n d a d j u d i c a t i o n a r e o r i e n t e d to t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h u s serve only to s t r e n g t h e n existing g e n d e r
stereotypes.
T h e classification of sex r o l e s a n d g e n d e r - d e p e n d e n t differences
t o u c h e s f u n d a m e n t a l levels of a society's c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
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Chapter 8
Radical f e m i n i s m is only n o w m a k i n g us aware of t h e fallible n a t u r e

of this s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h is f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e b a t a b l e a n d in
n e e d of revision. Radical f e m i n i s m rightly insists t h a t s u c h classifica
tions, w h i c h i m b u e with political significance t h e differences in ex
p e r i e n c e s a n d life c i r c u m s t a n c e s of specific g r o u p s of m e n a n d
w o m e n with r e s p e c t to t h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to exercise i n d i v i d u a l
liberties, m u s t b e clarified in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , specifically
in p u b l i c d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n e e d s .
H e n c e this s t r u g g l e for equality for w o m e n is a p a r t i c u l a r l y g o o d
illustration of t h e n e e d for a c h a n g e i n t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c u n d e r
s t a n d i n g of rights. T h e d e b a t e a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e a u t o n o m y of legal
p e r s o n s is b e t t e r e n s u r e d t h r o u g h t h e i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m of private
p e r s o n s to c o m p e t e o r t h r o u g h objectively g u a r a n t e e d claims to
benefits for clients of welfare-state b u r e a u c r a c i e s is b e i n g r e p l a c e d
by a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of r i g h t s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e
d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s h a s to s a f e g u a r d b o t h private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n
o m y at t h e s a m e t i m e . T h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e s u p p o s e d t o
g u a r a n t e e w o m e n t h e a u t o n o m y t o s h a p e t h e i r private lives c a n n o t
even b e a p p r o p r i a t e l y f o r m u l a t e d u n l e s s t h o s e affected a r t i c u l a t e
a n d justify in p u b l i c discussion w h a t is r e l e v a n t t o e q u a l o r u n e q u a l
t r e a t m e n t i n typical cases. S a f e g u a r d i n g t h e private a u t o n o m y of
citizens with e q u a l r i g h t s m u s t g o h a n d in h a n d with activating t h e i r
a u t o n o m y as citizens of t h e n a t i o n .
9
A "liberal" v e r s i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s t h a t fails to take this

c o n n e c t i o n i n t o a c c o u n t will necessarily m i s c o n s t r u e t h e universal
ism of basic r i g h t s as a n a b s t r a c t leveling of distinctions, a leveling
of b o t h c u l t u r a l a n d social differences. T h e s e differences m u s t b e
i n t e r p r e t e d in increasingly context-sensitive ways if t h e system of
r i g h t s is to b e a c t u a l i z e d democratically. T h e p r o c e s s of universaliz
i n g civil r i g h t s c o n t i n u e s to fuel t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of t h e legal
system, w h i c h c a n n o t e n s u r e t h e integrity of legal subjects w i t h o u t
strict e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , d i r e c t e d by t h e citizens themselves, of t h e life
c o n t e x t s t h a t s a f e g u a r d t h e i r identities. If t h e selective r e a d i n g of t h e
t h e o r y of r i g h t s is c o r r e c t e d to i n c l u d e a d e m o c r a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of t h e actualization of basic rights, t h e r e is n o n e e d to c o n t r a s t a
t r u n c a t e d L i b e r a l i s m 1 with a m o d e l t h a t i n t r o d u c e s a n o t i o n of
collective r i g h t s t h a t is alien to t h e system.
211
II Struggles for Recognition: T h e P h e n o m e n a and Levels o f

Analysis
F e m i n i s m , m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , n a t i o n a l i s m , a n d t h e s t r u g g l e against
t h e E u r o c e n t r i c h e r i t a g e of c o l o n i a l i s m a r e r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a t h a t
s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with o n e a n o t h e r . T h e y a r e r e l a t e d i n t h a t
w o m e n , ethnic a n d cultural minorities, a n d nations a n d cultures
d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t o p p r e s s i o n , m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n , a n d disre
s p e c t a n d t h e r e b y s t r u g g l e for t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of collective i d e n t i
ties, w h e t h e r in t h e c o n t e x t of a majority c u l t u r e o r w i t h i n t h e
c o m m u n i t y of p e o p l e s . We a r e c o n c e r n e d h e r e with e m a n c i p a t i o n
m o v e m e n t s w h o s e collective political goals a r e d e f i n e d p r i m a r i l y in
c u l t u r a l t e r m s , even t h o u g h social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s as well
as political d e p e n d e n c i e s a r e always also involved.
(a) F e m i n i s m is n o t , of c o u r s e , a m i n o r i t y c a u s e , b u t it is d i r e c t e d
against a d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e t h a t i n t e r p r e t s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e
sexes in a n a s y m m e t r i c a l m a n n e r t h a t e x c l u d e s e q u a l r i g h t s . G e n d e r specific differences in life c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s d o n o t
receive a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , e i t h e r legally o r informally.
W o m e n ' s c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m s e l v e s d o e s n o t receive d u e
r e c o g n i t i o n , a n y m o r e t h a n d o e s t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e c o m m o n
c u l t u r e ; given t h e p r e v a i l i n g definitions, w o m e n ' s n e e d s c a n n o t even
b e a d e q u a t e l y a r t i c u l a t e d . T h u s t h e i r political s t r u g g l e for r e c o g n i
t i o n b e g i n s as a s t r u g g l e over t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of gender-specific
a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d interests. Insofar as it is successful, it c h a n g e s t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e sexes a l o n g with t h e collective identity of
w o m e n , t h e r e b y directly affecting m e n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m
selves as well. T h e scale of values of t h e society as a w h o l e is u p for
discussion; t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n e x t e n d i n t o
c o r e private a r e a s a n d affect t h e e s t a b l i s h e d b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e
private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s as w e l l .
10
(b) T h e s t r u g g l e of o p p r e s s e d e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s for
r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r collective i d e n t i t i e s is a different m a t t e r . Since
t h e s e e m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s also a i m at o v e r c o m i n g a n illegiti
m a t e division of society, t h e majority c u l t u r e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of itself
c a n n o t r e m a i n u n t o u c h e d by t h e m . B u t f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of
m e m b e r s of t h e majority c u l t u r e , t h e revised i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
212
Chapter 8
a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s d o e s n o t necessarily alter t h e i r
o w n r o l e in t h e s a m e way t h a t t h e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s
b e t w e e n t h e sexes alters t h e r o l e of m e n .
E m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies a r e n o t a u n i
f o r m p h e n o m e n o n . T h e y p r e s e n t different c h a l l e n g e s d e p e n d i n g o n
w h e t h e r t h e situation is o n e of e n d o g e n o u s m i n o r i t i e s b e c o m i n g
a w a r e of t h e i r identity o r n e w m i n o r i t i e s arising t h r o u g h i m m i g r a
t i o n , a n d o n w h e t h e r t h e n a t i o n faced with t h e c h a l l e n g e h a s always
u n d e r s t o o d itself to b e o p e n to i m m i g r a t i o n o n t h e basis of its
h i s t o r y a n d political c u l t u r e o r w h e t h e r t h e n a t i o n a l self-under
s t a n d i n g first n e e d s to b e adjusted to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e i n t e g r a t i o n
of alien c u l t u r e s . T h e c h a l l e n g e b e c o m e s all t h e g r e a t e r t h e m o r e
p r o f o u n d a r e t h e religious, racial, o r e t h n i c differences, o r t h e his
torical-cultural d i s j u n c t i o n s to b e b r i d g e d . T h e c h a l l e n g e b e c o m e s
all t h e m o r e painful t h e m o r e t h e t e n d e n c i e s to self-assertion take
o n a f u n d a m e n t a l i s t a n d separatist c h a r a c t e r , w h e t h e r b e c a u s e e x p e
r i e n c e s of i m p o t e n c e l e a d t h e m i n o r i t y s t r u g g l i n g for r e c o g n i t i o n to
take a regressive p o s i t i o n o r b e c a u s e t h e m i n o r i t y in q u e s t i o n h a s to
u s e mass m o b i l i z a t i o n to a w a k e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s in o r d e r to a r t i c u l a t e
a newly c o n s t r u c t e d identity.
(c) T h e p o s i t i o n of e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s differs f r o m t h a t
of p e o p l e s w h o see t h e m s e l v e s nationalistically, as ethnically a n d
linguistically h o m o g e n e o u s g r o u p s against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a c o m
m o n historical fate a n d w h o w a n t to p r o t e c t t h e i r identity n o t only
as a n e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y b u t as a p e o p l e f o r m i n g a n a t i o n with t h e
capacity for political a c t i o n . N a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s h a v e a l m o s t al
ways m o d e l e d t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n n a t i o n - s t a t e t h a t
e m e r g e d f r o m t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . C o m p a r e d with t h e first g e n
e r a t i o n of nation-states, Italy a n d G e r m a n y w e r e " b e l a t e d n a t i o n s . "
T h e p e r i o d of d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r r e p r e
sents yet a n o t h e r c o n t e x t . A n d t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n s t h a t f o r m e d at t h e
collapse of e m p i r e s like t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n
E m p i r e , o r t h e Soviet U n i o n w e r e different still. T h e situation of
n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s like t h e Basques, t h e K u r d s , o r t h e N o r t h e r n
Irish, w h i c h e m e r g e d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states,
is a g a i n different. A special case is t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e state of Israel,
w h i c h e m e r g e d f r o m b o t h a n a t i o n a l - r e l i g i o u s m o v e m e n t a n d as a
213
r e s p o n s e t o t h e h o r r o r s of Auschwitz, in t h e British M a n d a t e of
P a l e s t i n e c l a i m e d by A r a b s .
(d) E u r o c e n t r i s m a n d t h e h e g e m o n y of W e s t e r n c u l t u r e a r e in t h e
last analysis c a t c h w o r d s for a s t r u g g l e for r e c o g n i t i o n o n t h e inter
n a t i o n a l level. T h e Gulf W a r m a d e u s aware of this. U n d e r t h e
s h a d o w of a c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y t h a t is still vivid in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s , t h e
allied i n t e r v e n t i o n was r e g a r d e d by religiously m o t i v a t e d masses a n d
secularized intellectuals alike as a failure t o r e s p e c t t h e i d e n t i t y a n d
a u t o n o m y of t h e Arabic-Islamic w o r l d . T h e historical r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n t h e O c c i d e n t a n d t h e O r i e n t , a n d especially t h e r e l a t i o n
s h i p of t h e First to t h e f o r m e r T h i r d W o r l d , c o n t i n u e s t o b e a r t h e
m a r k s of a d e n i a l of r e c o g n i t i o n .
T h i s c u r s o r y classification of t h e p h e n o m e n a n e v e r t h e l e s s allows
u s to p l a c e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e C a n a d i a n g o v e r n
m e n t a n d Q u e b e c o n t h e b o r d e r l i n e b e t w e e n (b) a n d (c). Below t h e
t h r e s h o l d of a separatist m o v e m e n t to f o u n d t h e i r o w n state, t h e
s t r u g g l e of t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y is clearly o n e for r i g h t s t h a t
w o u l d b e a c c o r d e d t h e m as a m a t t e r of c o u r s e if they w e r e to d e c l a r e
t h e m s e l v e s a n i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n a s Croatia, Slovenia, a n d
Slovakia, t h e Baltic States, a n d G e o r g i a h a v e r e c e n t l y d o n e . B u t they
a r e a s p i r i n g to b e c o m e a "state w i t h i n a state," s o m e t h i n g for w h i c h
a b r o a d s p e c t r u m of f o r m s of federalist c o n s t r u c t i o n s is available,
r a n g i n g f r o m a f e d e r a l state to a loose c o n f e d e r a t i o n . I n C a n a d a t h e
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of sovereign state p o w e r s is b o u n d u p with t h e
q u e s t i o n of c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y for a m i n o r i t y t h a t w o u l d like to
b e c o m e a relative majority w i t h i n its o w n h o u s e . N e w m i n o r i t i e s
w o u l d arise in t u r n , of c o u r s e , with a c h a n g e in t h e c o m p l e x i o n of
t h e majority c u l t u r e .
I n a d d i t i o n to d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e p h e n o m e n a c a t e g o r i z e d above,
we n e e d to d i s t i n g u i s h different levels of t h e i r analysis. Taylor's
r e m a r k s t o u c h o n at least t h r e e d i s c o u r s e s to w h i c h t h e s e p h e n o m
e n a h a v e given rise.
(e) I n t h e d e b a t e a b o u t political c o r r e c t n e s s t h e s e p h e n o m e n a
s e r v e d as a n o c c a s i o n for A m e r i c a n intellectuals to e n g a g e in a
p r o c e s s of self-reflection a b o u t t h e status of m o d e r n i t y . N e i t h e r of
t h e two p a r t i e s to t h e d e b a t e w a n t s to p u r s u e t h e p r o j e c t of m o d e r
nity o n its o w n t e r m s , as a p r o j e c t t h a t s h o u l d n o t b e a b a n d o n e d .
11
1 2
214
Chapter 8
W h a t t h e "radicals" see as a n e n c o u r a g i n g s t e p i n t o p o s t m o d e r n i t y
a n d t o w a r d o v e r c o m i n g totalizing figures of t h o u g h t is, for t h e "tra
ditionalists," t h e sign of a crisis t h a t c a n b e d e a l t with only t h r o u g h
a r e t u r n to t h e classical t r a d i t i o n s of t h e West. We c a n leave this
d e b a t e aside, since it c o n t r i b u t e s little to a n analysis of s t r u g g l e s for
r e c o g n i t i o n in t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d virtually n o t h
i n g t o t h e i r political r e s o l u t i o n .
13
(f) T h e m o r e strictly philosophical discourses w h i c h take t h e s e p h e

n o m e n a as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for d e s c r i b i n g g e n e r a l p r o b l e m s a r e
o n a different level. T h e p h e n o m e n a a r e well s u i t e d to illustrate t h e
difficulties of i n t e r c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y i l l u m i n a t e t h e rela
t i o n s h i p of m o r a l i t y t o ethical life (Sittlichkeit) a n d t h e i n t e r n a l c o n
n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d validity, a n d t h e y p r o v i d e n e w fuel for
t h e o l d q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it is even possible to t r a n s c e n d t h e
c o n t e x t of o u r o w n l a n g u a g e a n d c u l t u r e o r w h e t h e r all s t a n d a r d s
of rationality r e m a i n b o u n d u p with specific worldviews a n d tradi
tions. T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g e v i d e n c e of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of m u l t i c u l
t u r a l societies a n d t h e B a b y l o n i a n c o n f u s i o n of t o n g u e s in a n overly
c o m p l e x g l o b a l society s e e m s to i m p e l us t o w a r d holistic c o n c e p t i o n s
of l a n g u a g e a n d c o n t e x t u a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of worldviews t h a t m a k e
u s skeptical a b o u t universalist claims, w h e t h e r cognitive o r n o r m a
tive. T h e c o m p l e x a n d still u n s e t t l e d d e b a t e a b o u t rationality also
h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s , of c o u r s e , for t h e c o n c e p t s of t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t
with w h i c h we o p e r a t e w h e n we e x a m i n e t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a "politics
of r e c o g n i t i o n . " B u t Taylor's p r o p o s a l itself h a s a different r e f e r e n c e ,
w h i c h lies at t h e level of law a n d politics.
(g) T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e rights of o f f e n d e d a n d d i s r e s p e c t e d mi
n o r i t i e s takes o n a legal sense w h e n it is p o s e d i n t h e s e t e r m s .
Political decisions m u s t m a k e u s e of t h e r e g u l a t o r y f o r m of positive
law if t h e y a r e to b e at all effective in c o m p l e x societies. I n t h e
m e d i u m of law, however, we a r e d e a l i n g with a n artificial s t r u c t u r e
with c e r t a i n n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . M o d e r n law is formal in t h a t
it rests o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t explicitly f o r b i d d e n
is p e r m i t t e d . It is individualistic in t h a t it m a k e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n
t h e b e a r e r of r i g h t s . It is coercive in t h a t it is s a n c t i o n e d by t h e state
a n d a p p l i e s only t o legal o r r u l e - c o n f o r m i n g b e h a v i o r i t p e r m i t s
t h e p r a c t i c e of r e l i g i o n b u t it c a n n o t p r e s c r i b e religious views. It is
215
positive law in t h a t it derives f r o m t h e (modifiable) decisions of a

political legislature; a n d finally, it is procedurally enacted law in t h a t it
is l e g i t i m a t e d by a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . Positive law r e q u i r e s p u r e l y
legal behavior, b u t t h e law m u s t b e l e g i t i m a t e ; a l t h o u g h it d o e s n o t
p r e s c r i b e t h e motives for o b e y i n g t h e law, it m u s t b e s u c h t h a t its
a d d r e s s e e s c a n always o b e y it o u t of r e s p e c t for t h e law. A legal o r d e r
is l e g i t i m a t e w h e n it safeguards t h e a u t o n o m y of all citizens t o a n
e q u a l d e g r e e . T h e citizens a r e a u t o n o m o u s only if t h e a d d r e s s e e s of
t h e law c a n also see t h e m s e l v e s as its a u t h o r s . A n d its a u t h o r s a r e
free only as p a r t i c i p a n t s in legislative p r o c e s s e s t h a t a r e r e g u l a t e d in
s u c h a way a n d take p l a c e in f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s u c h t h a t
e v e r y o n e c a n p r e s u m e t h a t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s e n a c t e d in t h a t way d e
serve g e n e r a l a n d rationally m o t i v a t e d assent. I n n o r m a t i v e t e r m s ,
t h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state w i t h o u t d e m o c r a c y .
Since, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s itself h a s to b e
legally institutionalized, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty re
quires those fundamental rights without which there can b e n o
l e g i t i m a t e law at all: first a n d f o r e m o s t , t h e r i g h t to e q u a l individual
f r e e d o m of c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n , w h i c h in t u r n p r e s u p p o s e s c o m p r e
h e n s i v e legal p r o t e c t i o n of individuals.
As s o o n as we t r e a t a p r o b l e m as a legal p r o b l e m , we b r i n g i n t o
play a c o n c e p t i o n of m o d e r n law t h a t forces u s o n c o n c e p t u a l
g r o u n d s a l o n e t o o p e r a t e with t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c s of t h e constitu
t i o n a l state a n d its w e a l t h of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . T h i s h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s
for t h e way we d e a l with t h e p r o b l e m of s e c u r i n g e q u a l legal r i g h t s
a n d e q u a l r e c o g n i t i o n for g r o u p s t h a t a r e culturally d e f i n e d , t h a t is,
collectivities t h a t a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r collectivities o n t h e
basis of t r a d i t i o n , f o r m s of life, e t h n i c origins, a n d so o n a n d w h o s e
m e m b e r s w a n t to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m all o t h e r collectivities in
o r d e r to m a i n t a i n a n d d e v e l o p t h e i r identity.
Ill
T h e P e r m e a t i o n o f the Constitutional State by Ethics
F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of legal t h e o r y , t h e p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n t h a t
m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m raises is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of law
a n d politics. By "ethical" I m e a n all q u e s t i o n s t h a t r e l a t e to c o n c e p
tions of t h e g o o d life, o r a life t h a t is n o t m i s s p e n t . Ethical q u e s t i o n s
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c a n n o t b e e v a l u a t e d f r o m t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" of w h e t h e r
s o m e t h i n g is "equally g o o d for e v e r y o n e ; " r a t h e r , i m p a r t i a l j u d g
m e n t of s u c h q u e s t i o n s is b a s e d o n s t r o n g evaluations a n d d e t e r
m i n e d by t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d perspectival life-projects of
p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s , t h a t is, by w h a t is f r o m t h e i r p o i n t of view " g o o d
for u s , " all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . T h e first-person r e f e r e n c e , a n d h e n c e
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e identity of a g r o u p (or a n i n d i v i d u a l ) , is
g r a m m a t i c a l l y i n s c r i b e d in e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s . I will u s e t h e e x a m p l e
of t h e C a n a d i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e to l o o k at t h e liberal d e m a n d
for ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law in r e l a t i o n to t h e ethical-political
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n a t i o n of citizens.
T h e n e u t r a l i t y of t h e l a w a n d of t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s of e n
a c t i n g lawsis s o m e t i m e s u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t political q u e s
tions of a n ethical n a t u r e m u s t b e k e p t off t h e a g e n d a a n d o u t of
t h e discussion by "gag r u l e s " b e c a u s e they a r e n o t susceptible to
i m p a r t i a l legal r e g u l a t i o n . O n this view, in t h e sense of L i b e r a l i s m 1,
t h e state is n o t to b e p e r m i t t e d t o p u r s u e a n y collective goals b e y o n d
g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m a n d t h e welfare a n d security of
its citizens. T h e a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l (in t h e sense of L i b e r a l i s m 2 ) , in
c o n t r a s t , e x p e c t s t h e state to g u a r a n t e e t h e s e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s in
g e n e r a l b u t also b e y o n d t h a t to i n t e r v e n e o n b e h a l f of t h e survival
a n d a d v a n c e m e n t of a "particular n a t i o n , c u l t u r e , r e l i g i o n , o r of a
(limited) set of n a t i o n s , c u l t u r e s a n d r e l i g i o n s , " in M i c h a e l Walzer's
f o r m u l a t i o n . Walzer r e g a r d s this m o d e l t o o as f u n d a m e n t a l ; it leaves
r o o m , however, for citizens to c h o o s e to give priority t o i n d i v i d u a l
r i g h t s u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Walzer s h a r e s Taylor's p r e m i s e
t h a t conflicts b e t w e e n t h e s e two f u n d a m e n t a l n o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s
a r e q u i t e possible a n d t h a t in s u c h cases only L i b e r a l i s m 2 p e r m i t s
collective goals a n d i d e n t i t i e s t o b e given p r e c e d e n c e . Now, t h e
t h e o r y of r i g h t s d o e s assert t h e a b s o l u t e p r e c e d e n c e of r i g h t s over
collective g o o d s , so t h a t a r g u m e n t s a b o u t goals, as D w o r k i n shows,
c a n only " t r u m p " claims b a s e d o n individual r i g h t s if t h e s e goals c a n
in t u r n b e justified in t h e light of o t h e r r i g h t s t h a t take p r e c e d e n c e .
B u t t h a t a l o n e is n o t sufficient t o s u p p o r t t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n view,
w h i c h Taylor a n d Walzer s h a r e , t h a t t h e system of r i g h t s is b l i n d to
claims to t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d collective i d e n
tities a n d is t h u s "leveling" a n d in n e e d of revision.
1 4
217
E a r l i e r I u s e d t h e e x a m p l e of t h e feminist politics of equality to

m a k e a g e n e r a l p o i n t , namely, t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c e l a b o r a t i o n of a
system of r i g h t s i n c o r p o r a t e s n o t only g e n e r a l political goals b u t also
t h e collective goals t h a t a r e a r t i c u l a t e d in struggles for r e c o g n i t i o n .
F o r in d i s t i n c t i o n to m o r a l n o r m s w h i c h r e g u l a t e possible i n t e r a c
tions b e t w e e n s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects in g e n e r a l , legal n o r m s
refer to t h e n e t w o r k of i n t e r a c t i o n s in a specific society. L e g a l n o r m s
a r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n s of a local l a w m a k i n g b o d y a n d apply
w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a of t h e state to a socially delim
i t e d collectivity of m e m b e r s of t h a t state. W i t h i n this well-defined
s p h e r e of validity, legal n o r m s p u t t h e political decisions with w h i c h
a society o r g a n i z e d as a state acts u p o n itself i n t o t h e f o r m of collec
tively b i n d i n g p r o g r a m s . T o b e s u r e , c o n s i d e r a t i o n of collective goals
is n o t p e r m i t t e d to dissolve t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e law. It m a y n o t
d e s t r o y t h e f o r m of t h e law as s u c h a n d t h e r e b y n e g a t e t h e differ
e n c e b e t w e e n law a n d politics. B u t it is i n h e r e n t in t h e c o n c r e t e
n a t u r e of t h e m a t t e r s to b e r e g u l a t e d t h a t in t h e m e d i u m of lawas
o p p o s e d to morality-the p r o c e s s of setting n o r m a t i v e r u l e s for
m o d e s of b e h a v i o r is o p e n to i n f l u e n c e by t h e society's political
goals. F o r this r e a s o n every legal system is also t h e e x p r e s s i o n of a
p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of life a n d n o t m e r e l y a reflection of t h e universal
c o n t e n t of basic rights. O f c o u r s e , legislative decisions m u s t b e u n
d e r s t o o d as actualizing t h e system of r i g h t s , a n d policies m u s t b e
u n d e r s t o o d as a n e l a b o r a t i o n of t h a t system; b u t t h e m o r e c o n c r e t e
t h e m a t t e r at h a n d , t h e m o r e t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a collectivity
a n d its f o r m of life (as well as t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g g r o u p
interests a n d an informed choice between alternative ends a n d
m e a n s ) a r e e x p r e s s e d in t h e acceptability of t h e way t h e m a t t e r is
legally r e g u l a t e d . We see this in t h e b r o a d s p e c t r u m of r e a s o n s t h a t
e n t e r i n t o t h e r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h e legislature's o p i n i o n a n d
will a r e f o r m e d : n o t only m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c c o n s i d e r a
tions, a n d t h e results of fair n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t e t h i c a l r e a s o n s as well
e n t e r i n t o d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d justifications of legislative decisions.
To t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e s h a p i n g of citizens' political o p i n i o n
a n d will is o r i e n t e d to t h e i d e a of actualizing rights, it certainly
c a n n o t , as t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s suggest, b e e q u a t e d with a p r o c e s s by
w h i c h citizens r e a c h a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e i r ethical-political self-
218
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1 5
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t t h e p r o c e s s of actualizing r i g h t s is i n d e e d e m
b e d d e d in c o n t e x t s t h a t r e q u i r e s u c h discourses as a n i m p o r t a n t
c o m p o n e n t of politicsdiscussions a b o u t a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of
t h e g o o d a n d a d e s i r e d f o r m of life t h a t is a c k n o w l e d g e d t o b e
a u t h e n t i c . I n s u c h discussions t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s clarify t h e way they
w a n t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as citizens of a specific r e p u b l i c , as
i n h a b i t a n t s of a specific r e g i o n , as h e i r s to a specific c u l t u r e , w h i c h
t r a d i t i o n s they w a n t to p e r p e t u a t e a n d w h i c h t h e y w a n t to discon
t i n u e , h o w t h e y w a n t t o d e a l with t h e i r history, with o n e a n o t h e r ,
with n a t u r e , a n d so o n . A n d of c o u r s e t h e c h o i c e of a n official
l a n g u a g e o r a d e c i s i o n a b o u t t h e c u r r i c u l u m of p u b l i c schools affects
t h e n a t i o n ' s ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B e c a u s e ethical-political d e
cisions a r e a n u n a v o i d a b l e p a r t of politics, a n d b e c a u s e t h e i r legal
r e g u l a t i o n e x p r e s s e s t h e collective i d e n t i t y of a n a t i o n of citizens,
t h e y c a n s p a r k c u l t u r a l battles in w h i c h d i s r e s p e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s
s t r u g g l e against a n insensitive majority c u l t u r e . W h a t sets off t h e
battles is n o t t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e legal o r d e r b u t r a t h e r t h e
fact t h a t every legal c o m m u n i t y a n d every d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s for
actualizing basic r i g h t s is inevitably p e r m e a t e d by ethics. We see
e v i d e n c e of this, for i n s t a n c e , in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s enjoyed
by C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s in c o u n t r i e s like G e r m a n y d e s p i t e f r e e d o m
of r e l i g i o n o r in t h e r e c e n t l y c h a l l e n g e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e
of status a c c o r d e d t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l family b u t n o t to o t h e r m a r r i a g e
like a r r a n g e m e n t s .
I n this c o n t e x t , it is of i n t e r e s t t h a t b o t h empirically a n d n o r m a tively s u c h ethical-political decisions d e p e n d o n t h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m
p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . T h e social m a k e u p of
t h e p o p u l a t i o n of a state is t h e r e s u l t of historical c i r c u m s t a n c e s
extrinsic to t h e system of r i g h t s a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e constitu
t i o n a l state. It d e t e r m i n e s t h e totality of p e r s o n s w h o live t o g e t h e r
in a t e r r i t o r y a n d a r e b o u n d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t is, by t h e
d e c i s i o n of t h e f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s to o r d e r t h e i r life t o g e t h e r legiti
m a t e l y by m e a n s of positive law; as d e s c e n d a n t s , citizens h a v e implic
itly (or as n a t u r a l i z e d citizens even explicitly) a g r e e d to c o n t i n u e to
p u r s u e a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project. T h r o u g h t h e i r socializa
t i o n processes, however, t h e p e r s o n s of w h i c h a state is c o m p o s e d at
any given t i m e also e m b o d y t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life in w h i c h t h e y
219
h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y e v e n if they h a v e in t h e m e a n t i m e
b e c o m e d i s e n g a g e d f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n s of t h e i r origins. P e r s o n s o r
better, t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s f o r m t h e n o d a l p o i n t s , as it
w e r e , in a n ascriptive n e t w o r k of c u l t u r e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s , of i n t e r s u b
jectively s h a r e d c o n t e x t s of life a n d e x p e r i e n c e . A n d this n e t w o r k
also f o r m s t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h t h e citizens of t h e n a t i o n ,
willingly o r n o t , c o n d u c t t h e ethical-political discourses i n w h i c h they
a t t e m p t to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n t h e i r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . If t h e p o p u
l a t i o n of citizens as a w h o l e shifts, this h o r i z o n will c h a n g e as well;
n e w d i s c o u r s e s will b e h e l d a b o u t t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s , a n d n e w
d e c i s i o n s will b e r e a c h e d . N a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s a r e at least intuitively
aware of this, a n d it is a n i m p o r t a n t m o t i v e for d e m a n d i n g t h e i r o w n
state, or, as in t h e unsuccessful M e e c h L a k e draft c o n s t i t u t i o n , for
d e m a n d i n g to b e r e c o g n i z e d as a "distinct society." If t h e franco
p h o n e m i n o r i t y in C a n a d a w e r e t o c o n s t i t u t e itself as a legal c o m
munity, it w o u l d f o r m o t h e r majorities o n i m p o r t a n t ethical-political
q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s a n d w o u l d arrive
at r e g u l a t o r y d e c i s i o n s different f r o m t h e o n e s C a n a d i a n s as a w h o l e
have hitherto reached.
16
As t h e h i s t o r y of t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states s h o w s , t h e crea
t i o n of n e w n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s gives rise t o n e w n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s .
T h e p r o b l e m d o e s n o t disappear, e x c e p t at t h e p r i c e of " e t h n i c
c l e a n s i n g " a p r i c e t h a t c a n n o t b e politically o r m o r a l l y justified.
T h e d o u b l e - e d g e d n a t u r e of t h e "right" to n a t i o n a l self-determina
t i o n is d e m o n s t r a t e d clearly in t h e c a s e of t h e K u r d s , w h o a r e s p r e a d
across t h r e e different c o u n t r i e s , o r B o s n i a - H e r z o g o v i n a , w h e r e e t h
n i c g r o u p s a r e b a t t l i n g o n e a n o t h e r mercilessly. O n t h e o n e h a n d , a
collectivity t h a t t h i n k s of itself as a c o m m u n i t y with its o w n identity
attains a n e w level of r e c o g n i t i o n by t a k i n g t h e s t e p of b e c o m i n g a
n a t i o n in its o w n r i g h t . It c a n n o t r e a c h this level as a p r e p o l i t i c a l
linguistic a n d e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y , o r e v e n as a n i n c o r p o r a t e d o r
f r a g m e n t e d "cultural n a t i o n . " T h e n e e d to b e r e c o g n i z e d as a na
tion-state is intensified in t i m e s of crisis, w h e n t h e p o p u l a c e clings
to t h e ascriptive signs of a regressively revitalized collective identity,
as for i n s t a n c e after t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Soviet e m p i r e . T h i s k i n d
of s u p p o r t offers d u b i o u s c o m p e n s a t i o n for w e l l - f o u n d e d fears
a b o u t t h e f u t u r e a n d lack of social stability. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
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n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e is often to b e h a d only at t h e p r i c e of civil

wars, n e w k i n d s of r e p r e s s i o n , o r e n s u i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t p e r p e t u a t e
t h e initial conflicts with t h e signs reversed.
T h e situation is d i f f e r e n t in C a n a d a , w h e r e r e a s o n a b l e efforts a r e
b e i n g m a d e to find a federalist s o l u t i o n t h a t will leave t h e n a t i o n as
a w h o l e i n t a c t b u t will t r y to s a f e g u a r d t h e c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y of a
p a r t of it by d e c e n t r a l i z i n g state p o w e r s . If t h e s e efforts s u c c e e d ,
t h e p o r t i o n of t h e citizenry t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e s in t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c
ess in specific a r e a s of policy will c h a n g e , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h a t
p r o c e s s will n o t . F o r t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s in n o way forbids t h e
citizens of a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t o assert a c o n c e p t i o n of
t h e g o o d in t h e i r g e n e r a l legal o r d e r , a c o n c e p t i o n t h e y e i t h e r
a l r e a d y s h a r e o r h a v e c o m e to a g r e e o n t h r o u g h political discussion.
It d o e s , however, f o r b i d t h e m to privilege o n e f o r m of life at t h e
e x p e n s e of o t h e r s w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n . I n f e d e r a l versions of t h e na
tion-state this is t r u e at b o t h t h e f e d e r a l a n d t h e state levels. If I a m
n o t m i s t a k e n , in C a n a d a t h e d e b a t e is n o t a b o u t this p r i n c i p l e of
e q u a l r i g h t s b u t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d e x t e n t of t h e state p o w e r s t h a t
a r e to b e t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e P r o v i n c e of Q u e b e c .
1 7
IV
Equal Rights to Coexistence vs. the Preservation o f S p e c i e s
F e d e r a l i z a t i o n is a possible s o l u t i o n only w h e n m e m b e r s of d i f f e r e n t
e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d c u l t u r a l lifeworlds live in m o r e o r less s e p a r a t e
g e o g r a p h i c a l areas. I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies like t h e U n i t e d States
this is n o t t h e case. N o r will it b e t h e case in c o u n t r i e s like G e r m a n y ,
w h e r e t h e e t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is c h a n g i n g u n d e r
t h e p r e s s u r e of g l o b a l waves of m i g r a t i o n . Even if Q u e b e c w e r e to
b e c o m e culturally a u t o n o m o u s , it w o u l d find itself in t h e s a m e situ
a t i o n , h a v i n g m e r e l y t r a d e d a n E n g l i s h majority c u l t u r e for a F r e n c h
o n e . L e t us a s s u m e for t h e sake of a r g u m e n t t h a t a well-functioning
p u b l i c s p h e r e with o p e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s t h a t p e r m i t a n d
p r o m o t e discussions o r i e n t e d to s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g exists in s u c h
m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a liberal c u l t u r e
a n d o n t h e basis of v o l u n t a r y associations. T h e n t h e d e m o c r a t i c
p r o c e s s of actualizing e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s c a n also e x t e n d to
g u a r a n t e e i n g different e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d t h e i r c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life
221
e q u a l r i g h t s to c o e x i s t e n c e . T h i s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e special justifica
t i o n o r a n a l t e r n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e . F o r f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view,
t h e integrity of t h e individual legal p e r s o n c a n n o t b e g u a r a n t e e d
w i t h o u t p r o t e c t i n g t h e intersubjectively s h a r e d e x p e r i e n c e s a n d life
c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e p e r s o n h a s b e e n socialized a n d h a s f o r m e d his
o r h e r identity. T h e i d e n t i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l is i n t e r w o v e n with
collective i d e n t i t i e s a n d c a n b e stabilized only in a c u l t u r a l n e t w o r k
t h a t c a n n o t b e a p p r o p r i a t e d as private p r o p e r t y a n y m o r e t h a n t h e
m o t h e r t o n g u e itself c a n b e . H e n c e t h e individual r e m a i n s t h e
b e a r e r of "rights to c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p , " in Will Kymlicka's
p h r a s e . B u t as t h e dialectic of legal a n d factual equality plays itself
o u t , it gives rise to extensive g u a r a n t e e s of status, r i g h t s t o selfa d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l benefits, subsidies, a n d so o n . I n ar
g u i n g for s u c h g u a r a n t e e s , e n d a n g e r e d i n d i g e n o u s c u l t u r e s c a n
a d v a n c e special m o r a l r e a s o n s arising f r o m t h e h i s t o r y of a c o u n t r y
t h a t h a s b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e d by t h e majority c u l t u r e . Similar argu
m e n t s in favor of "reverse d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " c a n b e a d v a n c e d for t h e
l o n g - s u p p r e s s e d a n d disavowed c u l t u r e s of f o r m e r slaves.
1 8
T h e s e a n d similar o b l i g a t i o n s arise f r o m legal claims a n d n o t f r o m

a g e n e r a l a s s e s s m e n t of t h e value of t h e c u l t u r e in q u e s t i o n . Taylor's
politics of r e c o g n i t i o n w o u l d b e s t a n d i n g o n shaky g r o u n d if it
d e p e n d e d o n t h e " p r e s u m p t i o n of e q u a l v a l u e " of c u l t u r e s a n d
t h e i r specific c o n t r i b u t i o n s to w o r l d civilization. T h e r i g h t to e q u a l
r e s p e c t , w h i c h e v e r y o n e c a n d e m a n d in t h e life c o n t e x t s in w h i c h
his o r h e r i d e n t i t y is f o r m e d as well as e l s e w h e r e , h a s n o t h i n g to d o
with t h e p r e s u m e d e x c e l l e n c e of his o r h e r c u l t u r e of o r i g i n , t h a t is,
with g e n e r a l l y v a l u e d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . S u s a n Wolf also e m p h a s i z e s
this:
A t least o n e of t h e s e r i o u s h a r m s t h a t a failure of r e c o g n i t i o n p e r p e t u a t e s
h a s little t o d o w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e p e r s o n o r t h e c u l t u r e w h o
g o e s u n r e c o g n i z e d h a s a n y t h i n g i m p o r t a n t to say t o all h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e
n e e d to correct those harms, therefore, does n o t d e p e n d o n the presump
tion o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e is
distinctively v a l u a b l e to p e o p l e o u t s i d e t h e c u l t u r e .
1 9
T h u s c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s for different e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d

t h e i r c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life n e e d n o t b e s a f e g u a r d e d t h r o u g h t h e s o r t
of collective r i g h t s t h a t w o u l d o v e r t a x a t h e o r y of r i g h t s t a i l o r e d to
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Chapter 8
i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s . Even if s u c h g r o u p r i g h t s c o u l d b e g r a n t e d in a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y , t h e y w o u l d b e n o t only u n n e c e s s a r y b u t
q u e s t i o n a b l e f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view. F o r in t h e last analysis,
t h e p r o t e c t i o n of f o r m s of life a n d t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h i d e n t i t i e s a r e
f o r m e d is s u p p o s e d to foster t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r m e m b e r s ; it
d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t a k i n d of p r e s e r v a t i o n of species by a d m i n i s t r a
tive m e a n s . T h e ecological p e r s p e c t i v e o n species c o n s e r v a t i o n can
n o t b e t r a n s f e r r e d to c u l t u r e s . C u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e s a n d t h e f o r m s of
life a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h i n t h e m n o r m a l l y r e p r o d u c e themselves by c o n
v i n c i n g t h o s e w h o s e p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s t h e y s h a p e , t h a t is, by
m o t i v a t i n g t h e m to a p p r o p r i a t e a n d c o n t i n u e t h e t r a d i t i o n s p r o d u c
tively. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c a n m a k e this h e r m e n e u t i c achieve
m e n t of t h e c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n of w o r l d s possible, b u t it c a n n o t
g u a r a n t e e it. F o r t o guarantee survival w o u l d necessarily r o b t h e
m e m b e r s of t h e f r e e d o m to say yes o r n o , w h i c h n o w a d a y s is crucial
if t h e y a r e to r e m a i n a b l e t o a p p r o p r i a t e a n d p r e s e r v e t h e i r c u l t u r a l
h e r i t a g e . W h e n a c u l t u r e h a s b e c o m e reflexive, t h e only t r a d i t i o n s
a n d f o r m s of life t h a t c a n sustain t h e m s e l v e s a r e t h o s e t h a t bind t h e i r
m e m b e r s , while at t h e s a m e t i m e allowing m e m b e r s to subject t h e
t r a d i t i o n s to critical e x a m i n a t i o n a n d leaving l a t e r g e n e r a t i o n s t h e
option of l e a r n i n g f r o m o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s o r c o n v e r t i n g a n d setting o u t
for o t h e r s h o r e s . T h i s is t r u e even of relatively closed sects like t h e
Pennsylvania A m i s h . Even if we c o n s i d e r e d it a m e a n i n g f u l g o a l to
p r o t e c t c u l t u r e s as t h o u g h they w e r e e n d a n g e r e d species, t h e h e r
m e n e u t i c c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y for t h e m to r e p r o d u c e themselves
successfully w o u l d b e i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e goal of " m a i n t a i n [ing]
a n d c h e r i s h [ing] distinctness, n o t j u s t n o w b u t forever" (Taylor).
2 0
O n this p o i n t it h e l p s to recall t h e m a n y s u b c u l t u r e s a n d lifeworlds

t h a t flourished in early m o d e r n E u r o p e with its o c c u p a t i o n a l stratifi
c a t i o n , o r t h e f o r m s of life of r u r a l l a b o r e r s a n d t h e d e r a c i n a t e d ,
p r o l e t a r i a n i z e d u r b a n masses of t h e first p h a s e of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
t h a t s u c c e e d e d t h e m . T h o s e f o r m s of life w e r e c a u g h t u p a n d
c r u s h e d in t h e p r o c e s s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , b u t by n o m e a n s d i d all of
t h e m find t h e i r "Meister A n t o n " a n d have c o m m i t t e d m e m b e r s to
d e f e n d t h e m a g a i n s t t h e alternatives p r e s e n t e d by t h e n e w era.
F o r m s of life t h a t w e r e culturally v i b r a n t a n d attractive e n o u g h to
s t i m u l a t e t h e will to self-assertion, like t h e u r b a n c u l t u r e of t h e
223
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , w e r e able to p r e s e r v e s o m e of t h e i r features only

t h r o u g h self-transformation. Even a majority c u l t u r e t h a t d o e s n o t
c o n s i d e r itself t h r e a t e n e d p r e s e r v e s its vitality only t h r o u g h a n u n r e
s t r a i n e d revisionism, by s k e t c h i n g o u t alternatives to t h e status q u o
o r by i n t e g r a t i n g alien i m p u l s e s e v e n to t h e p o i n t of b r e a k i n g with
its o w n t r a d i t i o n s . T h i s is especially t r u e of i m m i g r a n t c u l t u r e s ,
w h i c h initially d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s s t u b b o r n l y in e t h n i c t e r m s a n d
revive t r a d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s u n d e r t h e assimilationist p r e s s u r e of t h e
n e w e n v i r o n m e n t b u t t h e n quickly d e v e l o p a m o d e of life equally
d i s t a n t f r o m b o t h assimilation a n d t r a d i t i o n .
21
I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies, t h e c o e x i s t e n c e of f o r m s of life with

e q u a l r i g h t s m e a n s e n s u r i n g every citizen t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to g r o w
u p w i t h i n t h e w o r l d of a c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e a n d to have his o r h e r
c h i l d r e n g r o w u p in it w i t h o u t suffering d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . It m e a n s t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n f r o n t this ( a n d every o t h e r ) c u l t u r e a n d to p e r
p e t u a t e it in its c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r m o r to t r a n s f o r m it, as well as t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y to t u r n away f r o m its c o m m a n d s with i n d i f f e r e n c e o r
b r e a k with it self-critically a n d t h e n live s p u r r e d o n by h a v i n g m a d e
a c o n s c i o u s b r e a k with t r a d i t i o n , o r even with a d i v i d e d identity. T h e
a c c e l e r a t e d p a c e of c h a n g e in m o d e r n societies e x p l o d e s all station
a r y f o r m s of life. C u l t u r e s survive only if they d r a w t h e s t r e n g t h to
t r a n s f o r m t h e m s e l v e s f r o m criticism a n d secession. Legal g u a r a n t e e s
c a n b e b a s e d only o n t h e fact t h a t w i t h i n his o r h e r o w n c u l t u r a l
m i l i e u , e a c h p e r s o n r e t a i n s t h e possibility of r e g e n e r a t i n g this
s t r e n g t h . A n d this i n t u r n d e v e l o p s n o t only by setting o n e s e l f a p a r t
b u t at least as m u c h t h r o u g h e x c h a n g e s with s t r a n g e r s a n d t h i n g s
alien.
I n t h e m o d e r n e r a rigid f o r m s of life s u c c u m b to e n t r o p y . F u n d a
m e n t a l i s t m o v e m e n t s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n i r o n i c a t t e m p t to give
o n e ' s o w n lifeworld ultrastability by restorative m e a n s . T h e i r o n y lies
in t h e way t r a d i t i o n a l i s m m i s u n d e r s t a n d s itself. I n fact, it e m e r g e s
f r o m t h e v o r t e x of social m o d e r n i z a t i o n even as it a p e s a s u b s t a n c e
t h a t h a s a l r e a d y d i s i n t e g r a t e d . As a r e a c t i o n to t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g
p u s h for m o d e r n i z a t i o n , f u n d a m e n t a l i s m is itself a t h o r o u g h l y m o d
e r n m o v e m e n t of r e n e w a l . N a t i o n a l i s m t o o c a n t u r n i n t o f u n d a m e n
talism, b u t it s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with it. T h e n a t i o n a l i s m of t h e
F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n allied itself with t h e universalistic p r i n c i p l e s of
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Chapter 8
t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state; at t h a t t i m e n a t i o n a l i s m a n d
r e p u b l i c a n i s m w e r e k i n d r e d spirits. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , f u n d a m e n
talism afflicts n o t only societies t h a t a r e c o l l a p s i n g b u t even t h e
e s t a b l i s h e d d e m o c r a c i e s of t h e West. All w o r l d r e l i g i o n s h a v e p r o
d u c e d t h e i r o w n f o r m s of f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , a l t h o u g h by n o m e a n s
d o all s e c t a r i a n m o v e m e n t s display t h o s e traits.
As t h e R u s h d i e case r e m i n d e d us, a f u n d a m e n t a l i s m t h a t l e a d s to
a p r a c t i c e of i n t o l e r a n c e is i n c o m p a t i b l e with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c
racy. S u c h a p r a c t i c e is b a s e d o n religious o r h i s t o r i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e w o r l d t h a t claim exclusiveness for a privileged
way of life. S u c h c o n c e p t i o n s lack a n a w a r e n e s s of t h e fallibility of
t h e i r claims, as well as a r e s p e c t for t h e " b u r d e n s of r e a s o n " (Rawls).
O f c o u r s e , religious convictions a n d g l o b a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e
w o r l d a r e n o t o b l i g e d to s u b s c r i b e to t h e k i n d of fallibilism t h a t
c u r r e n t l y a c c o m p a n i e s h y p o t h e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e in t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l
sciences. B u t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews a r e d o g m a t i c in a d i f f e r e n t
sense: t h e y leave n o r o o m for reflection o n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with
t h e o t h e r worldviews with w h i c h they s h a r e t h e s a m e u n i v e r s e of
d i s c o u r s e a n d a g a i n s t w h o s e c o m p e t i n g validity claims t h e y c a n ad
v a n c e t h e i r p o s i t i o n s only o n t h e basis of r e a s o n s . T h e y leave n o
r o o m for " r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t . "
22
I n c o n t r a s t with f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews, t h e subjectivized

"gods a n d d e m o n s " of t h e m o d e r n w o r l d a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a
reflexive a t t i t u d e t h a t d o e s m o r e t h a n allow for a m o d u s v i v e n d i
s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n b e legally e n f o r c e d given r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m . I n
a spirit of t o l e r a n c e a la Lessing, t h e n o n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews
t h a t Rawls c h a r a c t e r i z e s as " n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c
t r i n e s " allow for a civilized d e b a t e b e t w e e n convictions, i n w h i c h
o n e p a r t y c a n r e c o g n i z e t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s as c o - c o m b a t a n t s in t h e
s e a r c h for a u t h e n t i c t r u t h s w i t h o u t sacrificing its o w n claims to
validity. I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies t h e n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n toler
ate only f o r m s of life a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h i n t h e m e d i u m of s u c h n o n f u n
d a m e n t a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s , b e c a u s e c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s for
t h e s e f o r m s of life r e q u i r e s t h e m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e different
c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p s : all p e r s o n s m u s t also b e r e c o g n i z e d as m e m
b e r s of e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s i n t e g r a t e d a r o u n d d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s
23
225
S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n in t h e D e m o c r a t i c State
of t h e g o o d . H e n c e t h e ethical i n t e g r a t i o n of g r o u p s a n d s u b c u l t u r e s
with t h e i r o w n collective i d e n t i t i e s m u s t b e u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e
a b s t r a c t political i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e s all citizens equally.
T h e political i n t e g r a t i o n of citizens e n s u r e s loyalty to t h e c o m m o n
political c u l t u r e . T h e latter is r o o t e d in a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of consti
t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e n a t i o n ' s historical
e x p e r i e n c e . To this e x t e n t t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n n o t b e ethically
n e u t r a l . P e r h a p s o n e w o u l d d o b e t t e r to s p e a k of a c o m m o n horizon
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h i n w h i c h c u r r e n t issues give rise to p u b l i c
d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e citizens' political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e "histori
a n s ' d e b a t e " i n 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 in G e r m a n y is a g o o d e x a m p l e of t h i s .
B u t t h e d e b a t e s a r e always a b o u t t h e b e s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s a m e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s a n d p r i n c i p l e s . T h e s e f o r m t h e fixed p o i n t of
r e f e r e n c e for a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m t h a t situates t h e system of
r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e historical c o n t e x t of a legal c o m m u n i t y . T h e y m u s t
b e e n d u r i n g l y l i n k e d with t h e m o t i v a t i o n s a n d convictions of t h e
citizens, for w i t h o u t s u c h a m o t i v a t i o n a l a n c h o r i n g t h e y c o u l d n o t
b e c o m e t h e driving force b e h i n d t h e dynamically c o n c e i v e d p r o j e c t
of p r o d u c i n g a n association of free a n d e q u a l individuals. H e n c e t h e
s h a r e d political c u l t u r e in w h i c h citizens r e c o g n i z e t h e m s e l v e s as
m e m b e r s of t h e i r polity is also p e r m e a t e d by ethics.
24
At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e ethical s u b s t a n c e of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t
ism c a n n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e legal system's n e u t r a l i t y vis-a-vis c o m m u
nities t h a t a r e ethically i n t e g r a t e d a t a subpolitical level. R a t h e r , it
h a s to s h a r p e n sensitivity to t h e diversity a n d integrity of t h e differ
e n t f o r m s of life c o e x i s t i n g w i t h i n a m u l t i c u l t u r a l society. It is crucial
to m a i n t a i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n . If
they a r e c o l l a p s e d i n t o o n e level, t h e majority c u l t u r e will u s u r p state
p r e r o g a t i v e s at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e e q u a l r i g h t s of o t h e r c u l t u r a l
f o r m s of life a n d violate t h e i r claim to m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e
n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law vis-a-vis i n t e r n a l ethical d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s stems
f r o m t h e fact t h a t in c o m p l e x societies t h e citizenry as a w h o l e c a n
n o l o n g e r b e h e l d t o g e t h e r by a substantive c o n s e n s u s o n values b u t
only by a c o n s e n s u s o n t h e p r o c e d u r e s for t h e l e g i t i m a t e e n a c t m e n t
of laws a n d t h e l e g i t i m a t e exercise of power. Citizens w h o a r e politi
cally i n t e g r a t e d in this way s h a r e t h e rationally b a s e d conviction t h a t
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u n r e s t r a i n e d f r e e d o m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e political p u b l i c
s p h e r e , a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s for settling conflicts, a n d t h e constitu
t i o n a l c h a n n e l i n g of political p o w e r t o g e t h e r p r o v i d e a basis for
c h e c k i n g illegitimate p o w e r a n d e n s u r i n g t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r
is u s e d in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. T h e universalism of legal p r i n c i
ples manifests itself in a p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h m u s t b e e m
b e d d e d t h r o u g h a k i n d of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m in t h e c o n t e x t of
a historically specific political c u l t u r e .
V
Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity
Legal e x p e r t s have t h e a d v a n t a g e of discussing n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s

in c o n n e c t i o n with cases to b e d e c i d e d . T h e i r t h i n k i n g is o r i e n t e d
to a p p l i c a t i o n . P h i l o s o p h e r s avoid this decisionist p r e s s u r e ; as con^
t e m p o r a r i e s of classical i d e a s t h a t e x t e n d over m o r e t h a n two t h o u
s a n d years, they a r e n o t e m b a r r a s s e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s
p a r t i c i p a n t s in a c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t will g o o n forever. H e n c e it is all
t h e m o r e fascinating w h e n s o m e o n e like C h a r l e s Taylor a t t e m p t s to
g r a s p his o w n t i m e s in i d e a s a n d to show t h e r e l e v a n c e of p h i l o s o p h i
cal insights to t h e p r e s s i n g political q u e s t i o n s of t h e day. H i s essay is
a n e x a m p l e of this, as u n u s u a l as it is b r i l l i a n t a l t h o u g h , o r r a t h e r
b e c a u s e , h e d o e s n o t follow t h e f a s h i o n a b l e p a t h of a n " a p p l i e d
ethics."
After t h e u p h e a v a l s in C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e t h e r e h a s b e e n
a n o t h e r t h e m e o n t h e a g e n d a of t h e day in G e r m a n y a n d in t h e
E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e : i m m i g r a t i o n . After a c o m p r e h e n
sive p r e s e n t a t i o n of this p r o b l e m , a D u t c h c o l l e a g u e arrives at t h e
following u n a d o r n e d p r o g n o s i s :
W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s . . . will d o t h e i r u t m o s t t o p r e v e n t i m m i g r a
t i o n f r o m T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s . T o this e n d t h e y will g r a n t w o r k p e r m i t s
to p e r s o n s w h o h a v e skills of i m m e d i a t e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e society i n fairly
e x c e p t i o n a l cases o n l y ( s o c c e r players, software specialists f r o m t h e U S ,
s c h o l a r s f r o m I n d i a , e t c . ) . T h e y will c o m b i n e a v e r y restrictive e n t r y policy
w i t h policies a i m e d a t d e a l i n g m o r e quickly a n d effectively with r e q u e s t s for
asylum, a n d w i t h a p r a c t i c e of d e p o r t i n g w i t h o u t d e l a y t h o s e w h o s e r e q u e s t
h a s b e e n d e n i e d . . . . T h e c o n c l u s i o n is, t h a t t h e y will individually a n d j o i n t l y
u s e all means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l to s t e m t h e t i d e .
2 5
227
T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n fits precisely t h e c o m p r o m i s e o n political asylum

t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e o p p o s i t i o n in G e r m a n y m a d e t h e basis
for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e in 1 9 9 3 . T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t t h e g r e a t
majority of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w e l c o m e s this p o l i c y X e n o p h o b i a is wide
s p r e a d t h e s e days in t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y as well. It is m o r e
m a r k e d in s o m e c o u n t r i e s t h a n in o t h e r s , b u t t h e a t t i t u d e s of t h e
G e r m a n s d o n o t differ substantially f r o m t h o s e of t h e F r e n c h a n d
t h e E n g l i s h . Taylor's e x a m p l e e n c o u r a g e s u s to see h o w a p h i l o
s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view c a n h e l p a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r this
policy of sealing ourselves off f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n is justified. I will
b e g i n by discussing t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h e a b s t r a c t a n d t h e n reviewing
t h e G e r m a n d e b a t e o n political asylum of 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 a n d its histori
cal b a c k g r o u n d . I will t h e n o u t l i n e t h e alternatives t h a t w o u l d have
to b e discussed in a p u b l i c d e b a t e o n e t h a t h a s n o t yet b e e n o p e n l y
c o n d u c t e d a b o u t t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e e n
l a r g e d F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y .
26
A l t h o u g h m o d e r n law differs f r o m p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l i t y by its

specific f o r m a l characteristics, t h e system of r i g h t s a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e s
of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a r e in h a r m o n y with this m o r a l i t y by v i r t u e
of t h e i r universalistic c o n t e n t . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as we h a v e s e e n ,
legal systems a r e "ethically p e r m e a t e d " in t h a t they reflect t h e politi
cal will a n d t h e f o r m of life of a specific legal c o m m u n i t y . T h e
U n i t e d States, w h o s e political c u l t u r e is s t a m p e d by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
t r a d i t i o n t h a t is two h u n d r e d years old, is a clear e x a m p l e of this.
B u t t h e j u r i d i f i e d e t h o s of a n a t i o n - s t a t e c a n n o t c o m e i n t o conflict
with civil r i g h t s so l o n g as t h e political legislature is o r i e n t e d to
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d t h u s to t h e i d e a of actualizing basic
rights. T h e e t h i c a l s u b s t a n c e of a political i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t u n i t e s all
t h e citizens of t h e n a t i o n m u s t r e m a i n " n e u t r a l " with r e s p e c t to t h e
differences b e t w e e n t h e ethical-cultural c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h i n t h e na
t i o n , e a c h of w h i c h is i n t e g r a t e d a r o u n d its o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
g o o d . T h e u n c o u p l i n g of t h e s e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n notwith
s t a n d i n g , a n a t i o n of citizens c a n sustain t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of f r e e d o m
only by d e v e l o p i n g a c e r t a i n m e a s u r e of loyalty to t h e i r o w n state, a
loyalty t h a t c a n n o t b e legally e n f o r c e d .
j.
It is this ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h e p a r t of t h e
n a t i o n t h a t is affected by i m m i g r a t i o n ; for t h e influx of i m m i g r a n t s
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Chapter 8
alters t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n in ethical-cultural r e s p e c t s
as well. T h u s t h e q u e s t i o n arises w h e t h e r t h e d e s i r e for i m m i g r a t i o n
r u n s u p a g a i n s t limits in t h e r i g h t of a political c o m m u n i t y to m a i n
tain its political-cultural f o r m of life intact. A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e
a u t o n o m o u s l y d e v e l o p e d state o r d e r is i n d e e d s h a p e d by ethics, d o e s
t h e r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n n o t i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t of a n a t i o n to
affirm its identity vis-a-vis i m m i g r a n t s w h o c o u l d give a different cast
to this historically d e v e l o p e d political-cultural f o r m of life?
F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e r e c i p i e n t society, t h e p r o b l e m of
i m m i g r a t i o n raises t h e q u e s t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s of entry.
I g n o r i n g t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e stages, we c a n focus o n t h e act of n a t u
ralization, with w h i c h a state c o n t r o l s t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e political
c o m m u n i t y d e f i n e d by t h e r i g h t s of citizenship. U n d e r w h a t c o n d i
t i o n s c a n t h e state d e n y citizenship to t h o s e w h o a d v a n c e a claim to
n a t u r a l i z a t i o n ? Aside f r o m t h e u s u a l provisos (as a g a i n s t c r i m i n a l s ) ,
t h e m o s t r e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n i n o u r c o n t e x t is in w h a t r e s p e c t c a n a
d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state d e m a n d t h a t i m m i g r a n t s assimilate
in o r d e r to m a i n t a i n t h e integrity of its citizens' way of life. P h i l o
sophically, we c a n distinguish two levels of assimilation:
1. assent to t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d e t e r m i n e d at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e by t h e ethical-political
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizens a n d t h e political c u l t u r e of t h e
c o u n t r y ; in o t h e r w o r d s , assimilation to t h e way in w h i c h t h e a u t o n
o m y of t h e citizens is i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in t h e r e c i p i e n t society a n d
t h e way t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " is p r a c t i c e d t h e r e ; a n d
2. t h e f u r t h e r level of a willingness to b e c o m e a c c u l t u r a t e d , t h a t is,
n o t only to c o n f o r m e x t e r n a l l y b u t to b e c o m e h a b i t u a t e d to t h e way
of life, t h e p r a c t i c e s , a n d c u s t o m s of t h e local c u l t u r e across t h e i r
full r a n g e . T h i s m e a n s a n assimilation t h a t p e n e t r a t e s to t h e level of
ethical-cultural i n t e g r a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y h a s a d e e p e r i m p a c t o n t h e
collective i d e n t i t y of t h e i m m i g r a n t s ' c u l t u r e of o r i g i n t h a n t h e
political socialization r e q u i r e d u n d e r (1) a b o v e .
T h e results of t h e i m m i g r a t i o n policy p r a c t i c e d in t h e U n i t e d
States s u p p o r t a liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t exemplifies ( 1 ) , t h e
w e a k e r e x p e c t a t i o n of assimilation l i m i t e d to political s o c i a l i z a t i o n .
27
229
A n e x a m p l e of (2) is p r o v i d e d by t h e P r u s s i a n policy o n i m m i g r a t i o n
f r o m P o l a n d u n d e r Bismarck, w h i c h d e s p i t e variations was o r i e n t e d
p r i m a r i l y to G e r m a n i z a t i o n .
A d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t is s e r i o u s a b o u t u n c o u p l i n g
t h e s e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n c a n r e q u i r e of i m m i g r a n t s only t h e
political socialization d e s c r i b e d in (1) a b o v e ( a n d practically speak
i n g c a n e x p e c t to see it only in t h e s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n ) . T h i s e n a b l e s
it to p r e s e r v e t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h n o t h i n g ,
i n c l u d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n , is p e r m i t t e d to e n c r o a c h u p o n , since t h a t
i d e n t i t y is f o u n d e d o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n c h o r e d in t h e
political c u l t u r e a n d n o t o n t h e basic ethical o r i e n t a t i o n s of t h e
c u l t u r a l f o r m of life p r e d o m i n a n t in t h a t c o u n t r y Accordingly, all
t h a t n e e d s to b e e x p e c t e d of i m m i g r a n t s is t h e willingness to e n t e r
i n t o t h e political c u l t u r e of t h e i r n e w h o m e l a n d , w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o
give u p t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life of t h e i r o r i g i n s by d o i n g so. T h e
r i g h t to d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d o e s i n d e e d i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t
of citizens to insist o n t h e inclusive c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r o w n political
c u l t u r e ; it safeguards t h e society f r o m t h e d a n g e r of s e g m e n t a t i o n
f r o m t h e e x c l u s i o n of alien s u b c u l t u r e s a n d f r o m a separatist disin
t e g r a t i o n i n t o u n r e l a t e d s u b c u l t u r e s . As I i n d i c a t e d above, political
i n t e g r a t i o n d o e s n o t e x t e n d to f u n d a m e n t a l i s t i m m i g r a n t c u l t u r e s .
B u t n e i t h e r d o e s it justify c o m p u l s o r y assimilation for t h e sake of
t h e self-affirmation of t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life d o m i n a n t in t h e
country.
28
29
T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e h a s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e legiti
m a t e l y a s s e r t e d i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y will by n o m e a n s
b e p r e s e r v e d f r o m a l t e r a t i o n s indefinitely in t h e w a k e of waves of
i m m i g r a t i o n . B e c a u s e i m m i g r a n t s c a n n o t b e c o m p e l l e d to s u r r e n d e r
t h e i r o w n t r a d i t i o n s , as o t h e r f o r m s of life b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d t h e
h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h citizens h e n c e f o r t h i n t e r p r e t t h e i r c o m m o n
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s m a y also e x p a n d . T h e n t h e m e c h a n i s m
c o m e s i n t o play w h e r e b y a c h a n g e in t h e c u l t u r a l c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e
active citizenry c h a n g e s t h e c o n t e x t to w h i c h t h e ethical-political
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e refers: " P e o p l e live in
c o m m u n i t i e s with b o n d s a n d b o u n d s , b u t t h e s e m a y b e of different
k i n d s . I n a liberal society, t h e b o n d s a n d b o u n d s s h o u l d b e c o m p a t
ible with liberal p r i n c i p l e s . O p e n i m m i g r a t i o n w o u l d c h a n g e t h e
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Chapter 8
c h a r a c t e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y , b u t it w o u l d n o t leave t h e c o m m u n i t y
without any character."
L e t m e n o w t u r n f r o m t h e q u e s t i o n of w h i c h c o n d i t i o n s a d e m o
cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state m a y i m p o s e o n t h e r e c e p t i o n of i m m i
g r a n t s to a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n : W h o h a s t h e r i g h t t o i m m i g r a t e ?
T h e r e a r e sufficient m o r a l g r o u n d s for a n i n d i v i d u a l legal claim
to political asylum (in t h e sense of Article 16 of t h e G e r m a n Basic
Law, w h i c h m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d with r e f e r e n c e to t h e p r o t e c t i o n of
h u m a n dignity g u a r a n t e e d in Article 1 a n d in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e
g u a r a n t e e of legal r e c o u r s e e s t a b l i s h e d in Article 1 9 ) . I d o n o t n e e d
to g o i n t o t h e m h e r e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a
r e f u g e e . I n a c c o r d a n c e with Article 13 of t h e G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n o n
t h e Status of Refugees, s o m e o n e is c o n s i d e r e d to b e e n t i t l e d to
asylum if h e is fleeing f r o m a c o u n t r y "where his life o r f r e e d o m
w o u l d b e t h r e a t e n e d o n a c c o u n t of his r a c e , r e l i g i o n , nationality,
m e m b e r s h i p of a p a r t i c u l a r social g r o u p o r political o p i n i o n . " I n
light of r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e , this d e f i n i t i o n n e e d s to b e e x t e n d e d to
i n c l u d e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of w o m e n f r o m m a s s r a p e s . T h e r i g h t to
t e m p o r a r y asylum for r e f u g e e s f r o m civil war r e g i o n s is also u n p r o b
l e m a t i c . B u t since t h e discovery of A m e r i c a , a n d especially since t h e
explosive i n c r e a s e in w o r l d w i d e i m m i g r a t i o n in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n
tury, t h e g r e a t b u l k of t h o s e w a n t i n g to i m m i g r a t e h a s c o n s i s t e d of
individuals i m m i g r a t i n g in o r d e r to w o r k as well as refugees f r o m
p o v e r t y w h o w a n t to e s c a p e a m i s e r a b l e e x i s t e n c e in t h e i r h o m e l a n d .
A n d so it is today. It is a g a i n s t this i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e i m p o v e r
i s h e d r e g i o n s of t h e East a n d S o u t h t h a t a E u r o p e a n c h a u v i n i s m of
affluence is n o w a r m i n g itself.
30
F r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view we c a n n o t r e g a r d this p r o b l e m solely

f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of affluent a n d p e a c e f u l
societies; we m u s t also take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h o s e w h o c o m e to
f o r e i g n c o n t i n e n t s s e e k i n g t h e i r well-being, t h a t is, a n e x i s t e n c e
w o r t h y of h u m a n b e i n g s , r a t h e r t h a n p r o t e c t i o n f r o m political p e r
s e c u t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a legal claim t o i m m i g r a t i o n exists
over a n d a b o v e a moral claim is particularly r e l e v a n t in t h e c u r r e n t
situation, w h e r e t h e n u m b e r of p e o p l e w a n t i n g to i m m i g r a t e m a n i
festly e x c e e d s t h e willingness to receive t h e m .
231
O n e c a n cite g o o d g r o u n d s for a m o r a l claim. P e o p l e d o n o t

n o r m a l l y leave t h e i r h o m e l a n d s e x c e p t u n d e r d i r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; as
a r u l e t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e y h a v e fled is sufficient e v i d e n c e of t h e i r
n e e d for h e l p . A m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e assistance arises i n
p a r t i c u l a r f r o m t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s of a g l o b a l society
t h a t h a s b e c o m e so e n m e s h e d t h r o u g h t h e capitalist w o r l d m a r k e t
a n d electronic mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that the U N has assumed
s o m e t h i n g like a n overall political responsibility for s a f e g u a r d i n g life
o n t h e p l a n e t , as t h e r e c e n t e x a m p l e of S o m a l i a i n d i c a t e s . F u r t h e r ,
special d u t i e s a r e devolved u p o n t h e First W o r l d as a r e s u l t of t h e
h i s t o r y of c o l o n i z a t i o n a n d t h e u p r o o t i n g of r e g i o n a l c u l t u r e s by t h e
i n c u r s i o n of capitalist m o d e r n i z a t i o n . We s h o u l d also n o t e t h a t in
t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1800 a n d 1960 E u r o p e a n s w e r e d i s p r o p o r t i o n
ately r e p r e s e n t e d in i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i g r a t o r y m o v e m e n t s , m a k i n g
u p 80 p e r c e n t of t h o s e involved, a n d t h e y p r o f i t e d f r o m t h i s t h a t
is, t h e y i m p r o v e d t h e i r living c o n d i t i o n s in c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r
m i g r a n t s a n d with t h o s e of t h e i r c o m p a t r i o t s w h o d i d n o t e m i g r a t e .
At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e e x o d u s of t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r i e s i m p r o v e d t h e e c o n o m i c situations in t h e c o u n t r i e s f r o m
w h i c h t h e y fled, j u s t as decisively as did, conversely, t h e i m m i g r a t i o n
to E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d following t h e S e c o n d
W o r l d W a r . E i t h e r way, E u r o p e was t h e b e n e f i c i a r y of t h e s e s t r e a m s
of m i g r a t i o n .
T h e s e a n d o t h e r r e l a t e d r e a s o n s t h a t c o u l d b e given d o n o t , to
b e s u r e , justify g u a r a n t e e i n g a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l legal r i g h t s to im
m i g r a t i o n b u t they d o justify a m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o h a v e a liberal
i m m i g r a t i o n policy t h a t o p e n s o n e ' s o w n society t o i m m i g r a n t s a n d
r e g u l a t e s t h e flow of i m m i g r a t i o n in r e l a t i o n to existing capacities.
I n t h e defensive s l o g a n "the b o a t is full" o n e h e a r s a lack of willing
ness t o take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e " b o a t p e o p l e "
in t h e i r rickety crafts, for e x a m p l e , t r y i n g to e s c a p e t h e t e r r o r in
I n d o c h i n a . E u r o p e a n societies, s h r i n k i n g d e m o g r a p h i c a l l y a n d d e
p e n d e n t o n i m m i g r a t i o n if only for e c o n o m i c r e a s o n s , h a v e certainly
n o t r e a c h e d t h e limits of t h e i r capacity t o a b s o r b i m m i g r a n t s . T h e
m o r a l basis for a liberal i m m i g r a t i o n policy also gives rise to a n
o b l i g a t i o n n o t t o limit i m m i g r a t i o n q u o t a s to t h e r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r y ' s
e c o n o m i c n e e d s , t h a t is, n o t to "welcome (only) t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , "
31
232
Chapter 8
b u t i n s t e a d to establish q u o t a s in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria t h a t are

a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of all p a r t i e s involved.
VI
T h e Politics o f Asylum in a U n i t e d Germany
If o n e takes t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , t h e c o m p r o m i s e
o n political asylum n e g o t i a t e d b e t w e e n t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t
a n d t h e o p p o s i t i o n Social D e m o c r a t s , w h i c h was p u t i n t o effect in
early 1993, c a n n o t b e justified in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s . W i t h o u t g o i n g
i n t o detail, I will list t h e f o u r c e n t r a l flaws of t h e a g r e e m e n t a n d
criticize t h e p r e m i s e s o n w h i c h they a r e b a s e d .
(a) T h e r e g u l a t i o n s p r o v i d e d for by t h e a g r e e m e n t a r e l i m i t e d to
political asylum, t h a t is, to m e a s u r e s d i r e c t e d against "abuses" of t h e
r i g h t to asylum. T h e y i g n o r e t h e fact t h a t G e r m a n y n e e d s a n i m m i
g r a t i o n policy t h a t p r o v i d e s i m m i g r a n t s with o t h e r legal o p t i o n s as
well. T h e p r o b l e m of i m m i g r a t i o n is falsely d e f i n e d i n a way t h a t h a s
n u m e r o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s . A n y o n e w h o dissolves t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e
t w e e n t h e q u e s t i o n of political asylum a n d t h e q u e s t i o n of i m m i g r a
t i o n to e s c a p e p o v e r t y is implicitly d e c l a r i n g t h a t h e o r s h e w a n t s t o
e v a d e E u r o p e ' s m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n to r e f u g e e s f r o m t h e i m p o v e r i s h e d
r e g i o n s of t h e w o r l d a n d i n s t e a d tacitly t o l e r a t e s a flow of illegal
i m m i g r a t i o n t h a t c a n always b e e x p l o i t e d as "abuse of asylum" for
d o m e s t i c political p u r p o s e s .
(b) P a r l i a m e n t ' s a d d i t i o n of Article 16a to t h e Basic Law, as a
r e s u l t of t h e i n t e r p a r t y a g r e e m e n t of J a n u a r y 15, 1 9 9 3 , w e a k e n s t h e
s u b s t a n c e of t h e individual legal r i g h t to political asylum b e c a u s e it
allows refugees c o m i n g i n t o t h e c o u n t r y f r o m a so-called "safe T h i r d
C o u n t r y " to b e d e p o r t e d w i t h o u t legal r e c o u r s e . T h i s shifts t h e
b u r d e n of i m m i g r a t i o n to E a s t e r n E u r o p e , to o u r n e i g h b o r s P o l a n d ,
t h e C z e c h R e p u b l i c , Slovakia, H u n g a r y , a n d A u s t r i a i n o t h e r w o r d s ,
to c o u n t r i e s t h a t a r e c u r r e n t l y ill p r e p a r e d to h a n d l e this p r o b l e m
in a legally u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e way. I n a d d i t i o n , c u r t a i l i n g t h e g u a r a n
t e e of legal p r o t e c t i o n for refugees f r o m c o u n t r i e s d e f i n e d as "free
of p e r s e c u t i o n " f r o m G e r m a n y ' s p o i n t of view is p r o b l e m a t i c .
3 2
(c) R a t h e r t h a n m a k i n g it easier for f o r e i g n e r s a l r e a d y r e s i d i n g in

G e r m a n y , especially t h e Gastarbeiter [literally, g u e s t w o r k e r s ] w h o m
we r e c r u i t e d , t o a c q u i r e citizenship, t h e asylum c o m p r o m i s e left t h e
233
n a t u r a l i z a t i o n laws u n c h a n g e d . T h e d u a l citizenship t h a t t h o s e
f o r e i g n e r s u n d e r s t a n d a b l y p r e f e r is d e n i e d t h e m ; even c h i l d r e n
b o r n to t h e m i n G e r m a n y d o n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y receive t h e rights
of citizenship. F o r e i g n e r s w h o a r e willing to r e n o u n c e t h e i r p r e v i o u s
citizenship c a n b e n a t u r a l i z e d only after they h a v e b e e n living in
G e r m a n y for at least fifteen years. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e so-called Volksdeutschen o r e t h n i c G e r m a n s p r i m a r i l y Poles a n d Russians w h o c a n
p r o v e G e r m a n a n c e s t r y h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to naturaliza
tion. I n 1992, in a d d i t i o n to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 500,000 asylum seekers
(of w h i c h 130,000 w e r e f r o m t h e civil war r e g i o n s of t h e f o r m e r
Yugoslavia), 220,000 e t h n i c - G e r m a n i m m i g r a n t s w e r e a c c e p t e d i n t o
G e r m a n y o n this basis.
(d) T h e G e r m a n policy o n political asylum rests o n t h e r e p e a t e d l y
r e a f f i r m e d p r e m i s e t h a t G e r m a n y is n o t a l a n d of i m m i g r a t i o n . T h i s
c o n t r a d i c t s n o t only w h a t we all see in t h e streets a n d subways of o u r
m e t r o p o l i s e s t o d a y twenty-six p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Frank
furt consists of f o r e i g n e r s b u t also t h e historical facts. To b e s u r e ,
since t h e early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a l m o s t e i g h t m i l l i o n G e r m a n s
h a v e e m i g r a t e d to t h e U n i t e d States a l o n e . B u t at t h e s a m e t i m e ,
m a j o r waves of i m m i g r a t i o n have o c c u r r e d over t h e last h u n d r e d
years. By t h e First W o r l d War, 1.2 m i l l i o n i m m i g r a n t w o r k e r s h a d
e n t e r e d t h e c o u n t r y , a n d 12 m i l l i o n "displaced p e r s o n s " w e r e left
b e h i n d at t h e e n d of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r p r i m a r i l y f o r c e d l a b o r
d e p o r t e d f r o m P o l a n d a n d t h e Soviet U n i o n . I n 1955, following t h e
p a t h laid o u t by t h e Nazi policy of f o r c e d f o r e i g n labor, a n d d e s p i t e
relatively h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t in G e r m a n y , c a m e t h e o r g a n i z e d re
c r u i t m e n t of a c h e a p , u n m a r r i e d m a l e w o r k f o r c e f r o m s o u t h e r n a n d
s o u t h e a s t e r n E u r o p e . T h i s c o n t i n u e d u n t i l r e c r u i t m e n t c e a s e d in
1973. T o d a y t h e families a n d offspring of t h o s e Gastarbeiter w h o d i d
n o t r e t u r n to t h e i r o w n c o u n t r i e s live in t h e p a r a d o x i c a l situation of
i m m i g r a n t s with n o clear p r o s p e c t s for i m m i g r a t i o n G e r m a n s with
f o r e i g n p a s s p o r t s . T h e y f o r m t h e b u l k of t h e 8.2 p e r c e n t of t h e
1990 G e r m a n p o p u l a t i o n c o m p o s e d of f o r e i g n e r s living in G e r m a n y .
W i t h o u t t h e m , t h e e c o n o m i c b o o m n o w c o m p a r a b l e only t o t h a t of
J a p a n w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n possible, a n d it is even h a r d e r to u n d e r
s t a n d t h e resistance to t h e full i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s e f o r e i g n e r s w h e n
o n e c o n s i d e r s t h a t by 1990 West G e r m a n y h a d i n t e g r a t e d 15 m i l l i o n
33
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Chapter 8
refugees, i m m i g r a n t s , a n d f o r e i g n e r s w h o w e r e e i t h e r G e r m a n o r of
G e r m a n d e s c e n t t h u s also Neuburger, n e w citizens: "If a foreign
p o p u l a t i o n of a b o u t 4.8 m i l l i o n is a d d e d , n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d of t h e
West G e r m a n p o p u l a t i o n h a s r e s u l t e d f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s
since W o r l d W a r I I . "
If t h e n o t i o n t h a t "we a r e n o t a l a n d of i m m i g r a t i o n " c o n t i n u e s to
b e p u t f o r t h in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e in t h e face of this evi
d e n c e , this i n d i c a t e s t h a t it is a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a d e e p - s e a t e d m e n
talityand t h a t a painful c h a n g e is n e c e s s a r y in t h e way we conceive
of ourselves as a n a t i o n . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t o u r n a t u r a l i z a t i o n
d e c i s i o n s a r e b a s e d o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of a n c e s t r y a n d n o t , as in o t h e r
W e s t e r n n a t i o n s , o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of territoriality. T h e s h o r t c o m i n g s
d e s c r i b e d a b o v e in t h e way G e r m a n y is d e a l i n g with t h e p r o b l e m of
i m m i g r a t i o n m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a g a i n s t t h e historical b a c k g r o u n d
of t h e G e r m a n s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n of
Volksgenossen o r e t h n i c c o m r a d e s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d l a n g u a g e a n d cul
t u r e . A n y o n e w h o is b o r n in F r a n c e is c o n s i d e r e d to b e F r e n c h a n d
h o l d s t h e r i g h t s of a F r e n c h citizen. I n G e r m a n y , u n t i l t h e e n d of
t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r fine distinctions w e r e still b e i n g m a d e b e
t w e e n Deutschen, o r citizens of G e r m a n d e s c e n t , Reichsdeutschen, o r
G e r m a n citizens of n o n - G e r m a n d e s c e n t , a n d Volksdeutschen, o r indi
viduals of G e r m a n d e s c e n t living i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s .
3 4
In France national consciousness could develop within the frame

w o r k of a t e r r i t o r i a l state, while i n G e r m a n y it was originally l i n k e d
with t h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d e d u c a t e d middle-class n o t i o n of a
Kulturnation,
a n a t i o n d e f i n e d by its c u l t u r e . T h i s i d e a r e p r e s e n t e d
a n i m a g i n a r y u n i t y t h a t h a d to seek s u p p o r t in a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e ,
t r a d i t i o n , a n d a n c e s t r y in o r d e r to t r a n s c e n d t h e reality of t h e exist
i n g small states in G e r m a n y . Still m o r e i m p o r t a n t was t h e fact t h a t
t h e F r e n c h n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o u l d d e v e l o p in s t e p with t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d e m o c r a t i c civil liberties a n d in t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t
t h e sovereignty of t h e F r e n c h king, w h e r e a s G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m
a r o s e o u t of t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t N a p o l e o n , t h u s a g a i n s t a n e x t e r n a l
e n e m y , i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e b a t t l e for d e m o c r a t i c civil liberties a n d
l o n g b e f o r e t h e kleindeutsche n a t i o n - s t a t e was i m p o s e d f r o m a b o v e .
H a v i n g e m e r g e d f r o m a "war of l i b e r a t i o n " of this k i n d , n a t i o n a l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s in G e r m a n y c o u l d b e l i n k e d with t h e p a t h o s of t h e
235
u n i q u e n e s s of its c u l t u r e a n d a n c e s t r y a p a r t i c u l a r i s m t h a t h a s
indelibly s t a m p e d t h e G e r m a n s ' s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y t u r n e d away f r o m this Sonderbewufitsein o r sense of e x c e p t i o n a l n e s s after 1945, after t h e s h o c k of
t h e collapse of civilization in t h e Nazi mass e x t e r m i n a t i o n s , a s h o c k
it only g r a d u a l l y c a m e to t e r m s with. Loss of sovereignty a n d a
m a r g i n a l p o s i t i o n in a p o l a r i z e d w o r l d r e i n f o r c e d this. R e u n i f i c a t i o n
a n d t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Soviet U n i o n h a v e c h a n g e d this constel
lation in a f u n d a m e n t a l way. H e n c e t h e r e a c t i o n s to t h e right-wing
radicalism t h a t h a s flared u p a g a i n a n d in thi c o n t e x t t h e d e c e p
tive d e b a t e o n asylum as wellraise t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e
e n l a r g e d F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c will c o n t i n u e o n its p a t h t o w a r d a m o r e
civilized politics o r w h e t h e r t h e o l d Sonderbewujitsein is b e i n g r e g e n
e r a t e d i n a different f o r m . T h i s q u e s t i o n is c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e fact
t h a t t h e p r o c e s s of n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n was p u s h e d t h r o u g h a n d
administratively m a n i p u l a t e d f r o m a b o v e a n d h a s set a false c o u r s e
for t h e c o u n t r y i n this r e s p e c t as well. Discussion a n d clarification of
t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizens of two G e r m a n
states with widely d i v e r g e n t historical fates is u r g e n t l y n e e d e d b u t
h a s n o t yet t a k e n p l a c e . T h e "accession" of n e w L a n d e r , o r f e d e r a l
statesa c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d u b i o u s legal o p t i o n p r e v e n t e d a consti
t u t i o n a l d e b a t e , a n d p o s i t i o n s in t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e seat of t h e
G e r m a n capital a r e skewed. I n t h e m e a n t i m e t h e citizens of t h e
f o r m e r East G e r m a n y , h u m i l i a t e d in m a n y ways a n d d e p r i v e d of t h e i r
s p o k e s p e r s o n s a n d a political p u b l i c s p h e r e of t h e i r own, have o t h e r
p r o b l e m s to c o n t e n d with; in p l a c e of clearly a r t i c u l a t e d c o n t r i b u
tions to t h e d e b a t e t h e r e arise s m o l d e r i n g r e s e n t m e n t s .
All r e p r e s s i o n p r o d u c e s s y m p t o m s . O n e c h a l l e n g e after a n o t h e r
f r o m t h e Gulf War, Maastricht, t h e civil war in Yugoslavia, t h e asylum
issue a n d right-wing radicalism, to t h e d e p l o y m e n t of G e r m a n mili
t a r y forces o u t s i d e t h e N A T O a r e a a r o u s e s a sense of helplessness
in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in a n i m m o b i l i z e d g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e c h a n g e d c o n s t e l l a t i o n of p o w e r a n d a c h a n g e d d o m e s t i c situ
a t i o n certainly d e m a n d n e w r e s p o n s e s . T h e q u e s t i o n is, with w h a t
k i n d of c o n s c i o u s n e s s will G e r m a n y m a k e t h e a d a p t a t i o n s r e q u i r e d
if it c o n t i n u e s its p a t t e r n of r e a c t i n g with a d h o c decisions a n d
s u b l i m i n a l m o o d shifts?
236
Chapter 8
H i s t o r i a n s w h o d a s h off b o o k s with titles like "Back to History"

a n d "Fear of P o w e r " offer u s a b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g "farewell to t h e old
F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c " t h a t p u r p o r t s to e x p o s e t h e r e c e n t l y c e l e b r a t e d
success story of p o s t w a r G e r m a n d e m o c r a c y as a Sonderweg o r special
p a t h of its own. T h e f o r m e r West G e r m a n y is said to h a v e e m b o d i e d
t h e f o r c e d a b n o r m a l i t y of a d e f e a t e d a n d d i v i d e d n a t i o n , a n d now,
h a v i n g r e c o v e r e d its n a t i o n a l g r e a t n e s s a n d sovereignty, it m u s t b e
l e d o u t of its u t o p i a n i s m , with its obliviousness to power, a n d b a c k
to t h e p a t h of self-conscious p r e e m i n e n c e in C e n t r a l E u r o p e , t h e
p a t h of p o w e r politics m a r k e d o u t by Bismarck. T h i s c e l e b r a t i o n of
t h e c a e s u r a of 1989 h i d e s t h e r e p e a t e d l y f r u s t r a t e d d e s i r e for n o r
m a l i z a t i o n of t h o s e w h o d i d n o t w a n t to a c c e p t t h e c a e s u r a of 1 9 4 5 .
T h e y reject a n a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t d o e s n o t necessarily l e a d to different
o p t i o n s at every t u r n in t h e s h o r t r u n b u t i n s t e a d o p e n s u p a n o t h e r
p e r s p e c t i v e . I n this a l t e r n a t i v e view, t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e o l d Fed
e r a l R e p u b l i c t o t h e West r e p r e s e n t s n o t a s h r e w d b u t a t r a n s i t o r y
f o r e i g n policy decision, a n d a b o v e all n o t solely a political d e c i s i o n ,
b u t r a t h e r a p r o f o u n d intellectual b r e a k with t h o s e specifically Ger
m a n traditions that stamped the Wilhelminian Empire a n d contrib
u t e d to t h e downfall of t h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c . T h a t b r e a k set t h e
stage for a shift in m e n t a l i t y t h a t affected b r o a d s e g m e n t s of t h e
p u b l i c after t h e y o u t h revolt of 1968 u n d e r t h e favorable c o n d i t i o n s
of a n affluent society, a shift t h a t m a d e it possible for d e m o c r a c y a n d
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state to take political a n d c u l t u r a l r o o t in G e r m a n
soil for t h e first t i m e . T o d a y w h a t is at stake is a d a p t i n g G e r m a n y ' s
political r o l e to n e w realities, w i t h o u t l e t t i n g t h e p r o c e s s of civilizing
politics t h a t was u n d e r w a y u n t i l 1989 b e b r o k e n off u n d e r t h e
p r e s s u r e of t h e e c o n o m i c a n d social p r o b l e m s of u n i f i c a t i o n , a n d
w i t h o u t sacrificing t h e n o r m a t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s of a n a t i o n a l selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is n o l o n g e r b a s e d o n ethnicity b u t f o u n d e d o n
citizenship.
3 5
What is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"?
9
Three Normative Models of Democracy
I n w h a t follows I refer t o t h e i d e a l i z e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e "lib

e r a l " a n d t h e " r e p u b l i c a n " u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o l i t i c s t e r m s w h i c h
m a r k t h e fronts in t h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e in t h e U n i t e d States i n i t i a t e d
by t h e so-called c o m m u n i t a r i a n s . D r a w i n g o n t h e w o r k of F r a n k
M i c h e l m a n , I will b e g i n by d e s c r i b i n g t h e two polemically c o n t r a s t e d
m o d e l s of d e m o c r a c y with specific r e f e r e n c e to t h e c o n c e p t of t h e
citizen, t h e c o n c e p t of law, a n d t h e n a t u r e of p r o c e s s e s of political
will-formation. I n t h e s e c o n d p a r t , b e g i n n i n g with a c r i t i q u e of t h e
"ethical o v e r l o a d " of t h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l , I i n t r o d u c e a t h i r d ,
p r o c e d u r a l m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y for w h i c h I p r o p o s e t o r e s e r v e t h e
t e r m "deliberative politics."
I
T h e crucial difference b e t w e e n liberalism a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m c o n
sists in h o w t h e r o l e of t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is u n d e r s t o o d . A c c o r d
i n g t o t h e "liberal" view, this p r o c e s s a c c o m p l i s h e s t h e task of
p r o g r a m m i n g t h e state in t h e i n t e r e s t of society, w h e r e t h e state is
c o n c e i v e d as a n a p p a r a t u s of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d society is
c o n c e i v e d as a system of m a r k e t - s t r u c t u r e d i n t e r a c t i o n s of private
p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r labor. H e r e politics (in t h e sense of t h e citizens'
political will-formation) h a s t h e f u n c t i o n of b u n d l i n g t o g e t h e r a n d
b r i n g i n g t o b e a r private social i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t a state a p p a r a t u s t h a t
specializes in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t of political p o w e r for
collective goals.
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Chapter 9
O n t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, politics is n o t e x h a u s t e d by this m e d i a t i n g

f u n c t i o n b u t is constitutive for t h e socialization p r o c e s s as a w h o l e .
Politics is c o n c e i v e d as t h e reflexive f o r m of substantial e t h i c a l life.
It c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of q u a s i - n a t u r a l
s o l i d a r y c o m m u n i t i e s b e c o m e aware of t h e i r d e p e n d e n c e o n o n e
a n o t h e r a n d , a c t i n g with full d e l i b e r a t i o n as citizens, f u r t h e r s h a p e
a n d d e v e l o p existing r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n i n t o a n
association of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law. W i t h this, t h e
liberal a r c h i t e c t o n i c of g o v e r n m e n t a n d society u n d e r g o e s a n i m p o r
t a n t c h a n g e . I n a d d i t i o n to t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l r e g u l a t o r y a p p a r a t u s of
sovereign state a u t h o r i t y a n d t h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a
n i s m of t h e m a r k e t t h a t is, b e s i d e s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r a n d selfinterestsolidarity a p p e a r s as a t h i r d s o u r c e of social i n t e g r a t i o n .
T h i s h o r i z o n t a l political will-formation a i m e d at m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s is e v e n s u p p o s e d
to enjoy priority, b o t h i n a g e n e t i c a n d a n o r m a t i v e sense. A n a u t o n o
m o u s basis in civil society i n d e p e n d e n t of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d
m a r k e t - m e d i a t e d private c o m m e r c e is a s s u m e d as a p r e c o n d i t i o n for
t h e p r a c t i c e of civic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h i s basis p r e v e n t s political
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m b e i n g swallowed u p by t h e g o v e r n m e n t a p p a
r a t u s o r assimilated to m a r k e t s t r u c t u r e s . T h u s , o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n
c o n c e p t i o n , t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d its b a s e , civil society,
a c q u i r e a strategic significance. T o g e t h e r they a r e s u p p o s e d t o se
c u r e t h e integrative p o w e r a n d a u t o n o m y of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
p r a c t i c e of t h e citizens. T h e u n c o u p l i n g of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n
f r o m t h e e c o n o m y h a s as its c o u n t e r p a r t a c o u p l i n g of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
p o w e r with t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r g e n e r a t e d by political o p i n i o n a n d will-formation.
1
T h e s e two c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of politics h a v e different c o n

sequences.
(a) I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e i r c o n c e p t s of t h e citizen differ. A c c o r d i n g
to t h e liberal view, t h e citizen's status is d e t e r m i n e d p r i m a r i l y by t h e
individual r i g h t s h e o r s h e h a s vis-a-vis t h e state a n d o t h e r citizens.
As b e a r e r s of individual r i g h t s citizens enjoy t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e
g o v e r n m e n t as l o n g as t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e
b o u n d a r i e s d r a w n by legal s t a t u t e s a n d this i n c l u d e s p r o t e c t i o n
against state i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t violate t h e legal p r o h i b i t i o n o n gov-
241
T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y
e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a r e negative rights t h a t guar

a n t e e a d o m a i n of f r e e d o m of c h o i c e w i t h i n w h i c h legal p e r s o n s a r e
freed f r o m e x t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n . Political r i g h t s h a v e t h e s a m e struc
t u r e : t h e y afford citizens t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to assert t h e i r private in
terests in s u c h a way t h a t , by m e a n s of e l e c t i o n s , t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of
p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n of a g o v e r n m e n t , t h e s e
interests a r e finally a g g r e g a t e d i n t o a political will t h a t c a n affect t h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n this way t h e citizens in t h e i r political r o l e c a n
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y is e x e r c i s e d in t h e inter
est of t h e citizens as m e m b e r s of society.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e status of citizens is n o t
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e m o d e l of negative liberties to w h i c h t h e s e citizens
c a n lay claim as private p e r s o n s . Rather, political r i g h t s p r e e m i
n e n t l y r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e
positive liberties. T h e y d o n o t g u a r a n t e e f r e e d o m f r o m e x t e r n a l
c o m p u l s i o n , b u t g u a r a n t e e i n s t e a d t h e possibility of p a r t i c i p a t i n g in
a c o m m o n p r a c t i c e , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e citizens c a n first m a k e t h e m
selves i n t o w h a t t h e y w a n t to bepolitically r e s p o n s i b l e subjects of
a c o m m u n i t y of free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s . To this e x t e n t , t h e political
p r o c e s s d o e s n o t serve j u s t to k e e p g o v e r n m e n t activity u n d e r t h e
s u r v e i l l a n c e of citizens w h o h a v e a l r e a d y a c q u i r e d a p r i o r social
a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h t h e exercise of t h e i r private r i g h t s a n d p r e p o l i t i cal liberties. N o r d o e s it act only as a h i n g e b e t w e e n state a n d society,
for d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y is by n o m e a n s a n o r i g i n a l
authority. Rather, this a u t h o r i t y p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
p o w e r g e n e r a t e d by t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of self-legislation, a n d it is
l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e fact t h a t it p r o t e c t s this p r a c t i c e by institutional
izing p u b l i c f r e e d o m . T h e state's raison d'etre d o e s n o t lie p r i m a r i l y
in t h e p r o t e c t i o n of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s b u t in t h e g u a r a n t e e of
a n inclusive p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation in w h i c h free a n d
e q u a l citizens r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n w h i c h goals a n d n o r m s lie
in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. I n this way t h e r e p u b l i c a n citizen is
c r e d i t e d with m o r e t h a n a n exclusive c o n c e r n with his o r h e r private
interests.
(b) T h e p o l e m i c against t h e classical c o n c e p t of t h e legal p e r s o n
as b e a r e r of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s reveals a c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t t h e c o n c e p t
of law itself. W h e r e a s o n t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n t h e p o i n t of a legal
2
242
Chapter 9
o r d e r is to m a k e it possible to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h individuals in e a c h
case a r e e n t i t l e d t o w h i c h rights, o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t i o n t h e s e
"subjective" r i g h t s owe t h e i r e x i s t e n c e to a n "objective" legal o r d e r
t h a t b o t h e n a b l e s a n d g u a r a n t e e s t h e integrity of a n a u t o n o m o u s life
in c o m m o n b a s e d o n equality a n d m u t u a l r e s p e c t . O n t h e o n e view,
t h e legal o r d e r is c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of i n d i v i d u a l rights; o n t h e
other, t h e i r objective legal c o n t e n t is given priority.
To b e s u r e , this c o n c e p t u a l d i c h o t o m y d o e s n o t t o u c h o n t h e
intersubjective c o n t e n t of r i g h t s t h a t d e m a n d r e c i p r o c a l r e s p e c t for
r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s in s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n s of r e c o g n i t i o n . B u t t h e
r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t at least p o i n t s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a c o n c e p t of
law t h a t a c c o r d s e q u a l w e i g h t t o b o t h t h e integrity of t h e individual
a n d t h e integrity of t h e c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h p e r s o n s as b o t h indi
viduals a n d m e m b e r s c a n first a c c o r d o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g
n i t i o n . It ties t h e legitimacy of t h e laws to t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e
by w h i c h t h e y a r e g e n e r a t e d a n d t h e r e b y p r e s e r v e s a n i n t e r n a l c o n
n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of self-legislation a n d t h e
i m p e r s o n a l sway of t h e law:
For republicans, rights ultimately are nothing but determinations of prevail
ing political will, while for liberals, some rights are always grounded in a
"higher law" of transpolitical reason or revelation. . . . In a republican view,
a community's objective, common good substantially consists in the success
of its political endeavor to define, establish, effectuate, and sustain the set
of rights (less tendentiously, laws) best suited to the conditions and mores of
that community. Whereas in a contrasting liberal view, the higher-law rights
provide the transactional structures and the curbs on power required so that
pluralistic pursuit of diverse and conflicting interests may proceed as satis
factorily as possible.
5
T h e r i g h t t o vote, i n t e r p r e t e d as a positive right, b e c o m e s t h e

p a r a d i g m of r i g h t s as s u c h , n o t only b e c a u s e it is constitutive for
political s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t b e c a u s e it shows h o w i n c l u s i o n in a
c o m m u n i t y of e q u a l s is c o n n e c t e d with t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t to m a k e
a u t o n o m o u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d take p e r s o n a l p o s i t i o n s o n issues:
[T]he claim is that we all take an interest in each others' enfranchisement
because (i) our choice lies between hanging together and hanging sepa
rately; (ii) hanging together depends on reciprocal assurances to all of
having one's vital interests heeded by others; and (iii) in the deeply plural-
243
T h r e e Normative Models of D e m o c r a c y
ized c o n d i t i o n s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n society, s u c h a s s u r a n c e s a r e n o t
a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h v i r t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t o n l y by m a i n t a i n i n g a t least
t h e s e m b l a n c e of a politics i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e is c o n c e d e d a v o i c e .
6
T h i s s t r u c t u r e , r e a d off f r o m t h e political r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d
c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is e x t e n d e d t o all r i g h t s via t h e legislative p r o c e s s
c o n s t i t u t e d by political r i g h t s . Even t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n g u a r a n t e e d by
private law to p u r s u e private, freely c h o s e n goals s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
i m p o s e s a n o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p e c t t h e limits of strategic a c t i o n w h i c h
a r e a g r e e d to b e in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all.
(c) T h e d i f f e r e n t ways of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e r o l e of citizen a n d
t h e law e x p r e s s a d e e p e r d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of t h e
political p r o c e s s . O n t h e liberal view, politics is essentially a s t r u g g l e
for p o s i t i o n s t h a t g r a n t access t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power. T h e political
p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in
p a r l i a m e n t is s h a p e d by t h e c o m p e t i t i o n of strategically a c t i n g col
lectives t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n o r a c q u i r e p o s i t i o n s of power. Success is
m e a s u r e d by t h e citizens' a p p r o v a l of p e r s o n s a n d p r o g r a m s , as
q u a n t i f i e d by votes. I n t h e i r c h o i c e s at t h e polls, voters e x p r e s s t h e i r
p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e i r votes h a v e t h e s a m e s t r u c t u r e as t h e c h o i c e s of
p a r t i c i p a n t s in a m a r k e t , in t h a t t h e i r decisions license access to
p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r t h a t political p a r t i e s fight over with a successo r i e n t e d a t t i t u d e similar to t h a t of players in t h e m a r k e t . T h e i n p u t
of votes a n d t h e o u t p u t of p o w e r c o n f o r m to t h e s a m e p a t t e r n of
strategic a c t i o n .
A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e political o p i n i o n - a n d will
f o r m a t i o n in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in p a r l i a m e n t d o e s n o t o b e y t h e
s t r u c t u r e s of m a r k e t p r o c e s s e s b u t r a t h e r t h e o b s t i n a t e s t r u c t u r e s of
a p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r i e n t e d to m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . F o r
politics as t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e p a r a d i g m
is n o t t h e m a r k e t b u t d i a l o g u e . F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is a
s t r u c t u r a l difference b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e power, w h i c h p r o c e e d s
f r o m political c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e f o r m of discursively g e n e r a t e d
majority decisions, a n d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r possessed by t h e
g o v e r n m e n t a l a p p a r a t u s . Even t h e p a r t i e s t h a t s t r u g g l e over access
to p o s i t i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r m u s t b e n d t h e m s e l v e s to t h e
deliberative style a n d t h e s t u b b o r n c h a r a c t e r of political discourse:
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Chapter 9
D e l i b e r a t i o n . . . refers t o a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d social c o o p e r a t i o n ,
n a m e l y , t h a t of o p e n n e s s to p e r s u a s i o n by r e a s o n s r e f e r r i n g to t h e claims of
o t h e r s as well as o n e ' s o w n . T h e d e l i b e r a t i v e m e d i u m is a g o o d faith ex
c h a n g e of v i e w s i n c l u d i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s ' r e p o r t s of t h e i r o w n u n d e r
s t a n d i n g of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e vital i n t e r e s t s . . . i n w h i c h a v o t e , if a n y v o t e
is t a k e n , r e p r e s e n t s a p o o l i n g of j u d g m e n t s .
7
H e n c e t h e conflict of o p i n i o n s c o n d u c t e d in t h e political a r e n a h a s
l e g i t i m a t i n g force n o t j u s t in t h e sense of a n a u t h o r i z a t i o n to o c c u p y
p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e o n g o i n g political d i s c o u r s e
also h a s b i n d i n g force for t h e way in w h i c h political a u t h o r i t y is
e x e r c i s e d . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r c a n o n l y b e e x e r c i s e d o n t h e basis
of policies a n d w i t h i n t h e limits laid d o w n by laws g e n e r a t e d by t h e
democratic process.
II
So m u c h for t h e c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t h e two m o d e l s of d e m o c r a c y
t h a t c u r r e n t l y d o m i n a t e t h e discussion b e t w e e n t h e so-called c o m
m u n i t a r i a n s a n d liberals, a b o v e all in t h e U S . T h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l
h a s a d v a n t a g e s a n d disadvantages. I n m y view it h a s t h e a d v a n t a g e
t h a t it p r e s e r v e s t h e r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e a n i n g of a society t h a t
o r g a n i z e s itself t h r o u g h t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y u n i t e d citizens a n d
d o e s n o t t r a c e collective goals b a c k to "deals" m a d e b e t w e e n c o m
p e t i n g private i n t e r e s t s . Its d i s a d v a n t a g e , as I see it, is t h a t it is t o o
idealistic in t h a t it m a k e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
virtues of citizens d e v o t e d to t h e p u b l i c weal. F o r politics is n o t
c o n c e r n e d in t h e first p l a c e with q u e s t i o n s of ethical self-under
s t a n d i n g . T h e m i s t a k e of t h e r e p u b l i c a n view consists in a n e t h i c a l
f o r e s h o r t e n i n g of political d i s c o u r s e .
To b e s u r e , e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e s a i m e d a t a c h i e v i n g a collective selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g d i s c o u r s e s in w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t e m p t to clarify
h o w t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as m e m b e r s of a p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n ,
as m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y o r a state, as i n h a b i t a n t s of a r e g i o n ,
etc., w h i c h t r a d i t i o n s t h e y wish to cultivate, h o w t h e y s h o u l d t r e a t
e a c h other, m i n o r i t i e s , a n d m a r g i n a l g r o u p s , in w h a t s o r t of society
t h e y w a n t to liveconstitute a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of politics. B u t u n d e r
c o n d i t i o n s of c u l t u r a l a n d social p l u r a l i s m , b e h i n d politically rele-
245
v a n t goals t h e r e often lie i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s t h a t a r e by

n o m e a n s constitutive of t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y as
a w h o l e , t h a t is, for t h e totality of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d f o r m
of life. T h e s e i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s , w h i c h conflict with
o n e a n o t h e r w i t h i n t h e s a m e polity w i t h o u t a n y p r o s p e c t of c o n s e n
sual r e s o l u t i o n , n e e d to b e c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d in a way t h a t c a n n o t b e
effected by e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , even t h o u g h t h e results of this n o n d i s cursive c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r e subject to t h e proviso t h a t t h e y m u s t
n o t violate t h e basic values of a c u l t u r e . T h e b a l a n c i n g of i n t e r e s t s
takes t h e f o r m of r e a c h i n g a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n p a r t i e s w h o rely
o n t h e i r p o w e r a n d ability to s a n c t i o n . N e g o t i a t i o n s of this s o r t
certainly p r e s u p p o s e a r e a d i n e s s to c o o p e r a t e , t h a t is, a willingness
to a b i d e by t h e r u l e s a n d to arrive at results t h a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e to
all p a r t i e s , t h o u g h for different r e a s o n s . B u t c o m p r o m i s e - f o r m a t i o n
is n o t c o n d u c t e d in t h e f o r m of a r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e t h a t n e u t r a l i z e s
p o w e r a n d e x c l u d e s strategic a c t i o n . However, t h e fairness of c o m
p r o m i s e s is m e a s u r e d by p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h for
t h e i r p a r t a r e i n n e e d of r a t i o n a l , i n d e e d n o r m a t i v e , justification
f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of j u s t i c e . I n c o n t r a s t with e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s ,
q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e a r e n o t by t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e tied to a p a r t i c u l a r
collectivity. Politically e n a c t e d law, if it is to b e l e g i t i m a t e , m u s t b e at
least in h a r m o n y with m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t claim a g e n e r a l validity
t h a t e x t e n d s b e y o n d t h e limits of a n y c o n c r e t e legal c o m m u n i t y .
T h e c o n c e p t of deliberative politics a c q u i r e s e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e
only w h e n we take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e multiplicity of f o r m s of c o m m u
n i c a t i o n in w h i c h a c o m m o n will is p r o d u c e d , t h a t is, n o t j u s t ethical
self-clarification b u t also t h e b a l a n c i n g of i n t e r e s t s a n d c o m p r o m i s e ,
t h e p u r p o s i v e c h o i c e of m e a n s , m o r a l justification, a n d legal consis
tency-testing. I n this p r o c e s s t h e two types of politics w h i c h Michelm a n d i s t i n g u i s h e s in a n ideal-typical f a s h i o n c a n i n t e r w e a v e a n d
c o m p l e m e n t o n e a n o t h e r i n a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . "Dialogical" a n d
" i n s t r u m e n t a l " politics c a n interpenetrate in t h e m e d i u m of d e l i b e r a
t i o n if t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e sufficiently
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . E v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d s o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m
munication a n d the p r o c e d u r e s that l e n d the institutionalized
o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h e i r l e g i t i m a t i n g force. T h e t h i r d
m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h I w o u l d like to p r o p o s e , relies precisely
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Chapter 9
o n t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n d e r w h i c h t h e political
p r o c e s s c a n b e p r e s u m e d to p r o d u c e r a t i o n a l results b e c a u s e it
o p e r a t e s deliberatively at all levels.
M a k i n g t h e p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative politics t h e
c o r n e r s t o n e of t h e t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y results in differences b o t h
f r o m t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e state as a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y
a n d f r o m t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n of t h e state as t h e g u a r d i a n of a
m a r k e t society. I n c o m p a r i n g t h e t h r e e m o d e l s , I take m y o r i e n t a t i o n
f r o m t h a t d i m e n s i o n of politics w h i c h h a s b e e n o u r p r i m a r y con
c e r n , namely, t h e d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h a t issue
in p o p u l a r e l e c t i o n s a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e c r e e s .
A c c o r d i n g to t h e liberal view, t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s takes p l a c e
exclusively in t h e f o r m of c o m p r o m i s e s b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g inter
ests. F a i r n e s s is s u p p o s e d to b e g u a r a n t e e d by r u l e s of c o m p r o m i s e f o r m a t i o n t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e g e n e r a l a n d e q u a l r i g h t to vote, t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o m p o s i t i o n of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , t h e i r o r d e r of
business, a n d so o n . S u c h r u l e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y justified in t e r m s of
liberal basic r i g h t s . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, by c o n t r a s t ,
d e m o c r a t i c will-formation is s u p p o s e d to take t h e f o r m of a n ethical
d i s c o u r s e of s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h e r e d e l i b e r a t i o n c a n rely for i t s
c o n t e n t o n a culturally e s t a b l i s h e d b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s of t h e
citizens, w h i c h is r e j u v e n a t e d t h r o u g h t h e ritualistic r e e n a c t m e n t o f
a r e p u b l i c a n f o u n d i n g act. D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y takes e l e m e n t s f r o m
b o t h sides a n d i n t e g r a t e s t h e m i n t o t h e c o n c e p t of a n i d e a l p r o c e
d u r e for d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Weaving t o g e t h e r n e g o
tiations a n d d i s c o u r s e s of s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d of j u s t i c e , this
democratic procedure grounds the presumption that u n d e r such
c o n d i t i o n s r e a s o n a b l e o r fair results a r e o b t a i n e d . A c c o r d i n g to this
p r o c e d u r a l i s t view, practical r e a s o n w i t h d r a w s f r o m universal h u m a n
r i g h t s o r f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e ethical life of a specific c o m m u n i t y i n t o
t h e r u l e s of d i s c o u r s e a n d f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t derive t h e i r
n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t f r o m t h e validity-basis of a c t i o n o r i e n t e d to r e a c h
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d u l t i m a t e l y f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e of linguistic
communication.
8
T h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e s t r u c t u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s set t h e
stage for different n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of state a n d society.
T h e sole p r e s u p p o s i t i o n is a p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e k i n d t h a t
247
e m e r g e d i n t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d t o g e t h e r with t h e E u r o p e a n
state system a n d in f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n with a capitalist eco
n o m i c system. A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e citizens' politi
cal o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation f o r m s t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h
society c o n s t i t u t e s itself as a political w h o l e . Society is c e n t e r e d in
t h e state; for i n t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of political s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t h e polity b e c o m e s c o n s c i o u s of itself as a totality a n d acts o n itself
via t h e collective will of t h e citizens. D e m o c r a c y is s y n o n y m o u s with
t h e political self-organization of society. T h i s leads to a p o l e m i c a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e state a p p a r a t u s . I n
H a n n a h A r e n d t ' s political writings o n e c a n see t h e t h r u s t of r e p u b
lican a r g u m e n t s : in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e civic privatism of a depoliticized p o p u l a t i o n a n d in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e acquisition of l e g i t i m a t i o n
t h r o u g h e n t r e n c h e d p a r t i e s , t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e s h o u l d b e
revitalized t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e a r e g e n e r a t e d citizenry c a n , i n t h e
f o r m s of a d e c e n t r a l i z e d self-governance, ( o n c e a g a i n ) a p p r o p r i a t e
t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t h a s b e e n u s u r p e d by a self-regulat
ing bureaucracy.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e liberal view, this s e p a r a t i o n of t h e state a p p a r a t u s
f r o m society c a n n o t b e e l i m i n a t e d b u t only b r i d g e d by t h e d e m o
cratic p r o c e s s . However, t h e w e a k n o r m a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s of a
r e g u l a t e d b a l a n c i n g of p o w e r a n d i n t e r e s t s s t a n d s in n e e d of consti
t u t i o n a l c h a n n e l i n g . T h e d e m o c r a t i c will-formation of self-interested
citizens, c o n s t r u e d i n m i n i m a l i s t t e r m s , c o n s t i t u t e s j u s t o n e e l e m e n t
w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t disciplines g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y
t h r o u g h n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t s (suchuas basic rights, s e p a r a t i o n of
p o w e r s , a n d legal r e g u l a t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) a n d forces it,
t h r o u g h c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n political p a r t i e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d o p p o s i t i o n , o n t h e o t h e r , to t a k e a d e q u a t e
a c c o u n t of c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s a n d value o r i e n t a t i o n s . T h i s statec e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics d o e s n o t h a v e to rely o n t h e
u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n of a citizenry c a p a b l e of a c t i n g collectively. Its
focus is n o t so m u c h t h e i n p u t of a r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l will-formation
b u t t h e o u t p u t of successful a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . T h e
t h r u s t of liberal a r g u m e n t s is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e disruptive p o t e n
tial of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t i n t e r f e r e s with t h e i n d e p e n d e n t
social i n t e r a c t i o n s of private p e r s o n s . T h e liberal m o d e l h i n g e s n o t
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Chapter 9
o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d e l i b e r a t i n g citizens b u t o n
t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a n e c o n o m i c society t h a t is s u p p o s e d
to g u a r a n t e e a n essentially n o n p o l i t i c a l c o m m o n g o o d t h r o u g h t h e
satisfaction of t h e private a s p i r a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i v e citizens.
D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y invests t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s with n o r m a t i v e
c o n n o t a t i o n s s t r o n g e r t h a n t h o s e of t h e liberal m o d e l b u t w e a k e r
t h a n t h o s e of t h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l . O n c e a g a i n , it takes e l e m e n t s
f r o m b o t h sides a n d fits t h e m t o g e t h e r in a n e w way. I n a g r e e m e n t
with r e p u b l i c a n i s m , it gives c e n t e r stage to t h e p r o c e s s of political
o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation, b u t w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e consti
t u t i o n as s o m e t h i n g s e c o n d a r y ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , it conceives t h e
basic p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state as a c o n s i s t e n t a n s w e r to
t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e d e m a n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s
of a d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c a n b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .
D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y d o e s n o t m a k e t h e success of deliberative politics
d e p e n d o n a collectively a c t i n g citizenry b u t o n t h e institutionaliza
t i o n of c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r o c e d u r e s . It n o l o n g e r o p e r a t e s with t h e
c o n c e p t of a social w h o l e c e n t e r e d i n t h e state a n d c o n c e i v e d as a
g o a l - o r i e n t e d subject writ l a r g e . B u t n e i t h e r d o e s it localize t h e
w h o l e in a system of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s m e c h a n i c a l l y r e g u l a t i n g
t h e i n t e r p l a y of p o w e r s a n d i n t e r e s t s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e m a r k e t
m o d e l . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y a l t o g e t h e r j e t t i s o n s t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e
p h i l o s o p h y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h invite us e i t h e r to ascribe t h e
citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n to o n e e n c o m p a s s i n g m a c r o subject o r t o apply t h e a n o n y m o u s r u l e of law to c o m p e t i n g individu
als. T h e f o r m e r a p p r o a c h r e p r e s e n t s t h e citizenry as a collective
a c t o r w h i c h reflects t h e w h o l e a n d acts for its sake; o n t h e latter,
individual a c t o r s f u n c t i o n as d e p e n d e n t variables in systemic p r o c
esses t h a t u n f o l d blindly b e c a u s e n o consciously e x e c u t e d collective
d e c i s i o n s a r e possible over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l acts of c h o i c e (ex
c e p t in a p u r e l y m e t a p h o r i c a l s e n s e ) .
D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y works i n s t e a d with t h e higher-level intersubjectivity
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e s s e s t h a t u n f o l d in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d d e
l i b e r a t i o n s in p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d in t h e
i n f o r m a l n e t w o r k s of t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e , o n t h e o t h e r . B o t h w i t h i n
a n d o u t s i d e p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s g e a r e d to d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , t h e s e
subjeetless m o d e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f o r m a r e n a s in w h i c h a m o r e
249
o r less r a t i o n a l o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c o n c e r n i n g issues a n d

p r o b l e m s affecting society as a w h o l e c a n t a k e p l a c e . I n f o r m a l o p i n
i o n - f o r m a t i o n r e s u l t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d e l e c t i o n d e c i s i o n s a n d legis
lative d e c r e e s t h r o u g h w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y g e n e r a t e d p o w e r is
t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o administratively utilizable power. As o n t h e liberal
m o d e l , t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n state a n d society is r e s p e c t e d ; b u t h e r e
civil society, w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h e social u n d e r p i n n i n g of a u t o n o m o u s
publics, is as distinct f r o m t h e e c o n o m i c system as it is f r o m t h e
p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o c r a c y l e a d s to t h e
n o r m a t i v e d e m a n d for a n e w b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e r e s o u r c e s
of m o n e y , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power, a n d solidarity f r o m w h i c h m o d e r n
societies m e e t t h e i r n e e d for i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n . T h e n o r
mative i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e obvious: t h e integrative force of solidarity,
w h i c h c a n n o l o n g e r b e d r a w n solely f r o m s o u r c e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
a c t i o n , s h o u l d d e v e l o p t h r o u g h widely e x p a n d e d a u t o n o m o u s p u b
lic s p h e r e s as well as t h r o u g h legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e s of
d e m o c r a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d g a i n sufficient
s t r e n g t h t o h o l d its o w n against t h e o t h e r two social f o r c e s m o n e y
a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power.
Ill
T h i s view h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s for h o w o n e s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d legitima
t i o n a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. O n t h e liberal view, d e m o c r a t i c willf o r m a t i o n h a s t h e exclusive f u n c t i o n of legitimating t h e exercise of
political power. T h e o u t c o m e s of e l e c t i o n s license t h e a s s u m p t i o n of
g o v e r n m e n t a l power, t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t justify t h e u s e of
p o w e r to t h e p u b l i c a n d p a r l i a m e n t . O n t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, d e m o
cratic will-formation h a s t h e significantly s t r o n g e r f u n c t i o n of consti
tuting society as a political c o m m u n i t y a n d k e e p i n g t h e m e m o r y of
this f o u n d i n g act alive with e a c h n e w e l e c t i o n . T h e g o v e r n m e n t is
n o t only e m p o w e r e d by t h e e l e c t o r a t e ' s c h o i c e b e t w e e n t e a m s of
l e a d e r s to exercise a largely o p e n m a n d a t e , b u t is also b o u n d in a
p r o g r a m m a t i c fashion to c a r r y o u t c e r t a i n policies. M o r e a c o m m i t
t e e t h a n a n o r g a n of t h e state, it is p a r t of a self-governing political
c o m m u n i t y r a t h e r t h a n t h e h e a d of a s e p a r a t e g o v e r n m e n t a l a p p a
r a t u s . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y , by c o n t r a s t , b r i n g s a t h i r d i d e a i n t o play: t h e
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p r o c e d u r e s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of d e m o c r a t i c o p i n
ion- a n d will-formation f u n c t i o n as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t sluices for
t h e discursive r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e d e c i s i o n s of a g o v e r n m e n t a n d
a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b o u n d by law a n d s t a t u t e . O n this view, rationali
zation signifies m o r e t h a n m e r e l e g i t i m a t i o n b u t less t h a n t h e consti
t u t i o n of political power. T h e p o w e r available to t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
c h a n g e s its g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o n c e it is b o u n d to a p r o c e s s of d e m o
cratic o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h a t d o e s n o t m e r e l y r e t r o s p e c
tively m o n i t o r t h e exercise of political p o w e r b u t also p r o g r a m s it in
a c e r t a i n way. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this discursive r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , only
t h e political system itself c a n "act." It is a subsystem specialized for
collectively b i n d i n g decisions, w h e r e a s t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s
of t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e c o m p r i s e a far-flung n e t w o r k of s e n s o r s t h a t
r e s p o n d to t h e p r e s s u r e of society-wide p r o b l e m s a n d s t i m u l a t e
influential o p i n i o n s . T h e p u b l i c o p i n i o n w h i c h is w o r k e d u p via
d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r c a n n o t itself
" r u l e " b u t c a n only c h a n n e l t h e u s e of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r in
specific d i r e c t i o n s .
T h e c o n c e p t of popular sovereignty stems f r o m t h e r e p u b l i c a n a p
p r o p r i a t i o n a n d r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e early m o d e r n n o t i o n of sover
eignty originally associated with absolutist r e g i m e s . T h e state, w h i c h
m o n o p o l i z e s t h e m e a n s of l e g i t i m a t e v i o l e n c e , is viewed as a c o n c e n
t r a t i o n of p o w e r w h i c h c a n o v e r w h e l m all o t h e r t e m p o r a l p o w e r s .
R o u s s e a u t r a n s p o s e d this i d e a , w h i c h g o e s b a c k to B o d i n , to t h e will
of t h e u n i t e d p e o p l e , fused it with t h e classical i d e a of t h e self-rule
of free a n d e q u a l citizens, a n d s u b l i m a t e d it i n t o t h e m o d e r n c o n
c e p t of a u t o n o m y . D e s p i t e this n o r m a t i v e s u b l i m a t i o n , t h e c o n c e p t
of sovereignty r e m a i n e d b o u n d to t h e n o t i o n of a n e m b o d i m e n t in
t h e (at first actually physically a s s e m b l e d ) p e o p l e . A c c o r d i n g to t h e
r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e at least p o t e n t i a l l y a s s e m b l e d p e o p l e a r e t h e
b e a r e r s of a sovereignty t h a t c a n n o t in p r i n c i p l e b e d e l e g a t e d : in
t h e i r capacity as sovereign, t h e p e o p l e c a n n o t let t h e m s e l v e s b e
r e p r e s e n t e d by o t h e r s . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r is f o u n d e d o n t h e citi
z e n s ' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o t o n t h a t of t h e i r r e p r e
sentatives. Against this, liberalism offers t h e m o r e realistic view t h a t ,
in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, t h e a u t h o r i t y e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e p e o p l e
is e x e r c i s e d only "by m e a n s of e l e c t i o n s a n d v o t i n g a n d by specific
legislative, executive, a n d j u d i c i a l o r g a n s . "
9
251
T h e s e two views e x h a u s t t h e alternatives only o n t h e d u b i o u s

a s s u m p t i o n t h a t state a n d society m u s t b e c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of a
w h o l e a n d its p a r t s , w h e r e t h e w h o l e is c o n s t i t u t e d e i t h e r by a
sovereign citizenry o r by a c o n s t i t u t i o n . By c o n t r a s t to t h e d i s c o u r s e
t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y c o r r e s p o n d s t h e i m a g e of a decentered society,
t h o u g h with t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e it sets a p a r t a n a r e n a for t h e
d e t e c t i o n , identification, a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o b l e m s affecting
society as a w h o l e . If we a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e
p h i l o s o p h y of t h e subject, sovereignty n e e d n e i t h e r b e c o n c e n t r a t e d
in t h e p e o p l e in a concretistic m a n n e r n o r b a n i s h e d i n t o t h e a n o n y
m o u s a g e n c i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e " s e l f of t h e
self-organizing legal c o m m u n i t y d i s a p p e a r s in t h e subjectless f o r m s
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e flow of discursive o p i n i o n - a n d
will-formation w h o s e fallible results enjoy t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of r a t i o n
ality. T h i s is n o t t o r e p u d i a t e t h e i n t u i t i o n associated with t h e i d e a
of p o p u l a r sovereignty b u t r a t h e r to i n t e r p r e t it in intersubjective
t e r m s . P o p u l a r sovereignty, even t h o u g h it h a s b e c o m e a n o n y m o u s ,
r e t r e a t s i n t o d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s a n d t h e legal i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
of t h e i r d e m a n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s only to b e a b l e
to m a k e itself felt as c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y g e n e r a t e d power. Strictly
s p e a k i n g , this c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r s p r i n g s f r o m t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s
b e t w e e n legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d will-formation a n d culturally m o b i
lized p u b l i c s . T h e latter for t h e i r p a r t find a basis in t h e associations
of a civil society distinct f r o m t h e state a n d t h e e c o n o m y alike.
T h e n o r m a t i v e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of deliberative politics d o e s in
d e e d call for a discursive m o d e of socialization for t h e legal commu
nity; b u t this m o d e d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o t h e w h o l e of t h e society in
w h i c h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d political system is embedded.
Even o n its o w n p r o c e d u r a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , deliberative poli
tics r e m a i n s a c o m p o n e n t of a c o m p l e x society, w h i c h as a w h o l e
resists t h e n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h of legal t h e o r y . I n this r e g a r d , t h e
d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c r e a d i n g of d e m o c r a c y c o n n e c t s with a n objecti
fying sociological a p p r o a c h t h a t r e g a r d s t h e political system n e i t h e r
as t h e p e a k n o r t h e center, n o r even as t h e s t r u c t u r i n g m o d e l of
society, b u t as j u s t one a c t i o n system a m o n g o t h e r s . B e c a u s e it p r o
vides a k i n d of surety for t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e social p r o b l e m s t h a t
t h r e a t e n i n t e g r a t i o n , politics m u s t i n d e e d b e able to c o m m u n i c a t e ,
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Chapter 9
via t h e m e d i u m of law, with all of t h e o t h e r legitimately o r d e r e d

s p h e r e s of a c t i o n , h o w e v e r t h e s e m a y b e s t r u c t u r e d a n d s t e e r e d . B u t
t h e political system r e m a i n s d e p e n d e n t o n o t h e r f u n c t i o n a l m e c h a
n i s m s , s u c h as t h e r e v e n u e - p r o d u c t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c system, in
m o r e t h a n j u s t a trivial sense; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , deliberative politics,
w h e t h e r realized in t h e f o r m a l p r o c e d u r e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o p i n
ion- a n d will-formation o r only in t h e i n f o r m a l n e t w o r k s of t h e
political p u b l i c s p h e r e , s t a n d s in a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e c o n t e x t s
of a r a t i o n a l i z e d lifeworld t h a t m e e t s it halfway. Deliberatively
filtered political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a r e especially d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
r e s o u r c e s of t h e l i f e w o r l d o n a free a n d o p e n political c u l t u r e a n d
a n e n l i g h t e n e d political socialization, a n d a b o v e all o n t h e initiatives
of o p i n i o n - s h a p i n g associations. T h e s e r e s o u r c e s e m e r g e a n d r e g e n
e r a t e themselves s p o n t a n e o u s l y for t h e m o s t p a r t a t a n y r a t e , t h e y
c a n only with difficulty b e s u b j e c t e d to political c o n t r o l .
10
On the Internal Relation between the Rule of
Law and Democracy
I n a c a d e m i a w e often m e n t i o n law a n d politics i n t h e s a m e b r e a t h ,

yet a t t h e s a m e t i m e w e a r e a c c u s t o m e d t o c o n s i d e r law, t h e r u l e of
law, a n d d e m o c r a c y as subjects of different disciplines: j u r i s p r u
d e n c e deals with law, political s c i e n c e with d e m o c r a c y , ancTeach
deals with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state i n its o w n w a y j u r i s p r u d e n c e in
n o r m a t i v e t e r m s , political science f r o m a n e m p i r i c a l s t a n d p o i n t T h e
scholarly division of laBor c o n t i n u e s t o o p e r a t e even w h e n legal
scholars a t t e n d t o law a n d t h e r u l e of law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
will-formation i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, o n t h e o t h e r ; o r w h e n
social scientists, i n t h e r o l e of sociologists of law, e x a m i n e law a n d
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d , i n t h e r o l e of political scientists, e x a m
i n e t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d d e m o c r a c y
a p p e a r t o u s as e n
s e p a r a t e objects. T h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s for
this. B e c a u s e political r u l e is always e x e r c i s e d i n t h e f o r m of law, legal
systems exist w h e r e political force h a s n o t yet b e e n d o m e s t i c a t e d by
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. A n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states exist w h e r e t h e
power to govern has n o t yet b e e n democratized. In short, there are
legally o r d e r e d g o v e r n m e n t s w i t h o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
a n d t h e r e a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states w i t h o u t d e m o c r a t i c constitutions. O f c o u r s e , t h e s e e m p i r i c a l g r o u n d s for a division of l a b o r i n
t h e a c a d e m i c t r e a t m e n t of t h e two subjects by n o m e a n s imply that,
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c o u l d exist
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Chapter 10
I n this p a p e r I w a n t t o t r e a t several aspects of this i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n

b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y . T h i s r e l a t i o n results f r o m
t h e c o n c e p t of m o d e r n law itself (section 1) as well as f r o m t h e fact
t h a t positive law c a n n o l o n g e r d r a w its legitimacy f r o m a h i g h e r law
(section 2 ) . M o d e r n law is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e a u t o n o m y g u a r a n t e e d
equally t o e a c h citizen, a n d in s u c h a way t h a t private a n d p u b l i c
a u t o n o m y reciprocally p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r (section 3 ) . T h i s c o n
c e p t u a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n also m a k e s itself felt in t h e dialectic of legal a n d
factual equality. It was this dialectic t h a t first elicited t h e socialwelfare p a r a d i g m of law as a r e s p o n s e t o t h e liberal u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of law, a n d t o d a y this s a m e dialectic necessitates a p r o c e d u r a l i s t
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y (section 4 ) . I n clos
i n g I will e l u c i d a t e this p r o c e d u r a l i s t legal p a r a d i g m with t h e e x a m
p l e of t h e feminist politics of equality (section 5 ) .
1
Formal Properties o f M o d e r n Law
Since L o c k e , R o u s s e a u , a n d Kant, a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t of law h a s g r a d u

ally p r e v a i l e d n o t only in p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t b u t in t h e constitu
t i o n a l reality of W e s t e r n societies. T h i s c o n c e p t is s u p p o s e d to
a c c o u n t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for b o t h t h e positivity a n d t h e f r e e d o m - g u a r
a n t e e i n g c h a r a c t e r of c o e r c i b l e law. T h e positivity of l a w t h e fact
t h a t n o r m s b a c k e d by t h e t h r e a t of state s a n c t i o n s t e m f r o m t h e
c h a n g e a b l e decisions of a political lawgiver-is b o u n d u p with t h e
d e m a n d for l e g i t i m a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o this d e m a n d , positively e n
a c t e d law s h o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h e a u t o n o m y of all legal p e r s o n s
equally; a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e of legislation s h o u l d in t u r n
satisfy this d e m a n d . I n this way, a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d
b e t w e e n t h e coercibility a n d c h a n g e a b i l i t y of positive law o n t h e o n e
h a n d , a n d a m o d e of l a w m a k i n g t h a t e n g e n d e r s legitimacy o n t h e
o t h e r . H e n c e f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is a c o n c e p t u a l o r
i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n a n d n o t simply a historically, a c c i d e n t a l relationb e t w e e n law a n d d e m o c r a c y , b e t w e e n legal t h e o r y a n d d e m o c r a t i c
theory.
At first g l a n c e , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of this i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n h a s t h e
l o o k of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l trick. Yet, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e r e l a t i o n is
d e e p l y r o o t e d in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of o u r everyday p r a c t i c e of law.
255
O n the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy
F o r in t h e m o d e of validity t h a t a t t a c h e s to law, t h e facticity of t h e

state's legal e n f o r c e m e n t is i n t e r m e s h e d with t h e l e g i t i m a t i n g force
of a legislative p r o c e d u r e t h a t claims to b e r a t i o n a l i n t h a t it g u a r a n
tees f r e e d o m . T h i s is s h o w n in t h e p e c u l i a r a m b i v a l e n c e with w h i c h
t h e law p r e s e n t s itself to its a d d r e s s e e s a n d e x p e c t s t h e i r o b e d i e n c e :
t h a t is, it leaves its a d d r e s s e e s free t o a p p r o a c h t h e law in e i t h e r of
two ways. T h e y c a n e i t h e r c o n s i d e r n o r m s m e r e l y as factual con
straints o n t h e i r f r e e d o m a n d take a strategic a p p r o a c h t o t h e calcu
lable c o n s e q u e n c e s of possible rule-violations, o r t h e y c a n c o m p l y
with legal statutes i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e , i n d e e d c o m p l y o u t of
r e s p e c t for results of a c o m m o n will-formation t h a t claim legitimacy.
K a n t a l r e a d y e x p r e s s e d this p o i n t with his c o n c e p t of "legality,"
w h i c h h i g h l i g h t e d t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e two m o m e n t s with
o u t w h i c h legal o b e d i e n c e c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d : legal
n o r m s m u s t b e f a s h i o n e d so t h a t they c a n b e viewed s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
in two ways^ as coerciveItnd as laws of f r e e d o m . T h e s e two aspects
b e l o n g t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o d e r n law: we* c o n s i d e r t h e validity
of a legal n o r m as e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t t h e state c a n
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y g u a r a n t e e factual e n f o r c e m e n t a n d legitimate enact
m e n t t h u s it c a n g u a r a n t e e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e legality of behav
i o r i n t h e sense of average c o m p l i a n c e , w h i c h c a n if n e c e s s a r y b e
c o m p e l l e d by s a n c t i o n s ; a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e legitimacy of
t h e r u l e itself, w h i c h m u s t always m a k e it possible to c o m p l y with t h e
n o r m o u t of r e s p e c t for t h e law.
O f c o u r s e , this i m m e d i a t e l y raises t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e legiti
m a c y of r u l e s s h o u l d b e g r o u n d e d w h e n t h e r u l e s i n q u e s t i o n c a n
b e c h a n g e d a t a n y t i m e by t h e political legislator. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
n o r m s t o o a r e c h a n g e a b l e ; a n d even t h e basic n o r m s t h a t t h e c o n
stitution itself h a s d e c l a r e d n o n a m e n d a b l e s h a r e with all positive law
t h e fate t h a t t h e y carl b e a b r o g a t e d , say, after a c h a n g e of r e g i m e . As
l o n g as o n e was able t o fall b a c k o n a religiously o r metaphysically
g r o u n d e d n a t u r a l law, t h e w h i r l p o o l of t e m p o r a l i t y e n v e l o p i n g posi
tive law c o u l d b e h e l d i n c h e c k by morality. S i t u a t e d i n a h i e r a r c h y
of law, t e m p o r a l i z e d positive law was s u p p o s e d t o r e m a i n subordinate
to a n e t e r n a l l y valid m o r a l law, f r o m w h i c h it was to receive its lasting
o r i e n t a t i o n s . B u t even aside f r o m t h e fact t h a t i n pluralistic societies
s u c h i n t e g r a t i n g worldviews a n d collectively b i n d i n g c o m p r e h e n s i v e
256
Chapter 10
doctrines have in any case disintegrated, modern law, simply by

virtue of its formal properties, resists the direct control of a posttraditional morality of conscience, which is, so to speak, all we have left.
2 T h e C o m p l e m e n t a r y Relation b e t w e e n Positive Law and
A u t o n o m o u s Morality
M o d e r n legal systems are constructed on the basis of individual

rights. S u c h rights have the character of releasing legal persons from
moral obligations in a carefully circumscribed manner. By introduc
ing rights that concede to agents the latitude to act according to
personal preferences, modern law as a whole implements the prin
ciple that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted. W h e r e a s
in morality an inherent symmetry exists between rights and duties,
legal dutiesâre^ a M s e g u e r u ^ ^ ^
jordj^ro
on individu^nbeTties. T h i s basic
conceptual privileging^
is explained by the mod
ern concepts of the "legal person" and of the "legal community." T h e
moral universe, which is unlimited in social space and historical time,
includes all natural persons with their complex life histories; morality
itself extends to the protection of the integrity of fully individuated
persons (Einzelner). By contrast, the legal community, which is always
localized in space and time, protects the integrity of its members
precisely insofar as they acquire the artificial status of rights bearers.
F o r this reason, the relation between law a n d morality is more one
of complementarity than of subordination.
T h e same is true if one compares their relative scope. T h e matters
tha^^
are at once both narrowerand^broader
in scopejthan morally relevant concerns: narrower inasmuch as legal
regulation has access only to external, that is, coercible, behavior,
and broader inasmuch as law, as an organizational form of politics,
pertains not only to the regulation of interpersonal conflicts but also
to t h e pursuit of political goals and the implementation of policies.
H e n c e legal regulations touch not only on moral questions in the
narrow sense, but also on pragmatic and ethical questions, and on
forming compromises among conflicting interests. Moreover, unlike
the clearly delimited normative validity claimed by moral norms, the
257
O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n Law a n d D e m o c r a c y
legitimacy c l a i m e d by legal n o r m s is b a s e d o n various sorts of r e a s o n s .

T h e legislative p r a c t i c e of justification d e p e n d s o n a c o m p l e x n e t
w o r k of d i s c o u r s e s a n d b a r g a i n i n g , a n d n o t j u s t o n m o r a l d i s c o u r s e .
T h e i d e a f r o m n a t u r a l law of a h i e r a r c h y of laws at different levels
of dignity is m i s l e a d i n g . Law is b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as a f u n c t i o n a l
c o m p l e m e n t to morality. As positively valid, legitimately e n a c t e d , a n d
a c t i o n a b l e , law c a n relieve t h e m o r a l l y j u d g i n g a n d a c t i n g p e r s o n of
t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e cognitive, m o t i v a t i o n a l , a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l de
m a n d s of a m o r a l i t y b a s e d entirely o n i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e . Law c a n
c o m p e n s a t e for t h e w e a k n e s s e s of a h i g h l y d e m a n d i n g m o r a l i t y
t h a t i f we j u d g e f r o m its e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s p r o v i d e s only cognitively i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d motivationally u n r e l i a b l e results. Naturally,
this d o e s n o t absolve legislators a n d j u d g e s f r o m t h e c o n c e r n t h a t
t h e law b e in h a r m o n y with morality. B u t legal r e g u l a t i o n s a r e t o o
c o n c r e t e to b e Jegitîmated solely t h r o u g h t h e i r compatibility with
m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . F r o m w h a t , t h e n , c a n positive law b o r r o w its legiti
macy, if n o t f r o m a s u p e r i o r m o r a l law?
Like morality, law t o o is s u p p o s e d to p r o t e c t t h e a u t o n o m y of all
p e r s o n s equally. Law t o o m u s t p r o v e its legitimacy u n d e r this a s p e c t
of s e c u r i n g f r e e d o m . I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h , t h o u g h , t h e positive
c h a r a c t e r of law forces a u t o n o m y to split u p in a p e c u l i a r way, w h i c h
h a s n o p a r a l l e l in m o r a l i t y M o r a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in K a n t ' s sense
is a u n i f i e d c o n c e p t insofar as it d e m a n d s of e a c h p e r s o n , in propria
persona, t h a t s h e o b e y j u s t t h o s e n o r m s t h a t s h e h e r s e l f posits a c c o r d
i n g to h e r o w n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t , o r a c c o r d i n g to a j u d g m e n t
r e a c h e d in c o m m o n with all o t h e r p e r s o n s . However, t h e b i n d i n g
quality of legal n o r m s d o e s n o t s t e m solely f r o m p r o c e s s e s of o p i n
ion- a n d will-formation, b u t arises also f r o m t h e collectively b i n d i n g
d e c i s i o n s o ^ a u A o r i t i e ^ ) w h o m a k e a n d apply law. T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e
m a k e s it c o n c e p t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e r o l e of a u t h o r s
w h o m a k e ( a n d adjudicate) law f r o m t h a t of a d d r e s s e e s w h o a r e
subject to e s t a b l i s h e d law. T h e a u t o n o m y t h a t in t h e m o r a l d o m a i n
* all of a p i e c e , so to speak, a p p e a r s in t h e legal d o m a i n only in t h e
d u a l f o r m of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y .
s
However, t h e s e two m o m e n t s m u s t t h e n b e m e d i a t e d i n s u c h a way

t h a t t h e o n e f o r m of a u t o n o m y d o e s n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e o t h e r .
E a c h f o r m of a u t o n o m y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l liberties of t h e subject of
258
Chapter 10
private law a n d t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of t h e citizen, m a k e s t h e o t h e r

f o r m possible. T h i s r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n is e x p r e s s e d by t h e i d e a t h a t
legal p e r s o n s c a n b e a u t o n o m o u s only insofar as t h e y c a n u n d e r
s t a n d themselves, in t h e exercise of t h e i r civic rights, as a u t h o r s of
j u s t t h o s e rights w h i c h t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d t o o b e y as a d d r e s s e e s .
3
T h e Mediation o f Popular Sovereignty and H u m a n Rights
It is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t m o d e r n n a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s h a v e
a n s w e r e d t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n q u e s t i o n by r e f e r r i n g , o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
to t h e p r i n c i p l e of popular sovereignty a n d , o n t h e other, t o t h e rule of
law as g u a r a n t e e d by h u m a n rights. T h e ^ r i n e i p l e of p o p u l a r sover
eignties e x p r e s s e d in r i g h t s o f , c o m m p i c a t i o n a n d ^ g a r t i d p a t i o n ^
t h a t s e c u r e t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens; the^rule of l a \ ^ i s ~ e x ^
p r e s s e d in t h o s e classical basic r i g h t s ^ A ^ ^ g u ^ ^ t e ^ L J j h e , private
autonornjj^
t h e law is l e g i t i m a t e d as a n
i n s t r u m e n t for t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y .
T o b e sure, political p h i l o s o p h y h a s n e v e r really b e e n a b l e t o strike
a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights, o r b e
t w e e n t h e " f r e e d o m of t h e a n c i e n t s " a n d t h e " f r e e d o m of t h e m o d
e r n s . " T h e political a u t o n o m y of citizens is s u p p o s e d t o b e e m b o d i e d
in t h e self-organization of a c o m m u n i t y t h a t gives itself its laws
t h r o u g h t h e sovereign will of t h e p e o p l e . T h e private a u t o n o m y of
citizens, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is s u p p o s e d t o take t h e f o r m of basic
r i g h t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e a n o n y m o u s r u l e of law. O n c e t h e issue is
set u p in this way, e i t h e r i d e a c a n b e u p h e l d only a t t h e e x p e n s e of
t h e o t h e r . T h e intuitively p l a u s i b l e co-originality of b o t h i d e a s falls
by t h e wayside.
Republicanism, w h i c h g o e s b a c k to Aristotle a n d t h e political hu
m a n i s m of t h e R e n a i s s a n c e , h a s always given t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of
citizens priority over t h e p r e p o l i t i c a l liberties of private p e r s o n s .
Liberalism, w h i c h g o e s b a c k to J o h n L o c k e , h a s i n v o k e d t h e d a n g e r
of tyrannical majorities a n d p o s t u l a t e d t h e priority of h u m a n rights.
A c c o r d i n g t o r e p u b l i c a n i s m , h u m a n r i g h t s o w e d t h e i r legitimacy t o
t h e ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sovereign s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n
a c h i e v e d by a political c o m m u n i t y ; i n liberalism, s u c h r i g h t s w e r e
s u p p o s e d t o p r o v i d e , f r o m t h e very start, l e g i t i m a t e b a r r i e r s t h a t
259
p r e v e n t e d t h e sovereign will of t h e p e o p l e f r o m e n c r o a c h i n g o n
inviolable s p h e r e s of i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . I n t h e i r c o n c e p t s of t h e
legal p e r s o n ' s a u t o n o m y , R o u s s e a u a n d K a n t certainly a i m e d to con
ceive of sovereign will a n d practical r e a s o n as u n i f i e d in s u c h a way
t h a t p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d reciprocally inter
p r e t o n e a n o t h e r . B u t even t h e y failed to d o j u s t i c e t o t h e co-origi
nality of t h e two ideas; R o u s s e a u suggests m o r e of a r e p u b l i c a n
r e a d i n g , K a n t m o r e of a liberal o n e . T h e y m i s s e d t h e i n t u i t i o n they
w a n t e d to a r t i c u l a t e : t h a t t h e i d e a of h u m a n rights, w h i c h is ex
p r e s s e d in t h e r i g h t to e q u a l individual liberties, m u s t n e i t h e r b e
m e r e l y i m p o s e d o n t h e sovereign legislator as a n e x t e r n a l b a r r i e r ,
n o r b e i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d as a f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i s i t e for legislative goals.
To e x p r e s s this i n t u i t i o n p r o p e r l y it h e l p s to view t h e d e m o c r a t i c
p r o c e d u r e w h i c h a l o n e p r o v i d e s l e g i t i m a t i n g force to t h e law
m a k i n g p r o c e s s in t h e c o n t e x t of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m
from a discourse-theoretical standpoint. H e r e I assume a principle
t h a t I c a n n o t discuss in detail, namely, t h a t
^J^Sî^^LS^L^SMB
legitimacy only if all t h o s e possibly affected by it c o u l d c o n s e n t to it
after p ^ t i c ^ ^ t i n ^ ^ Q ^ I i o n a l discourses. Now, if d i s c o u r s e s a n d
b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s e s as well, w h o s e fairness is b a s e d o n discursively
g r o u n d e d proceduresrepresent the place where a reasonable po
litical will c a n d e v e l o p , t h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of reasonability, w h i c h
t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e is s u p p o s e d to g r o u n d ^ u l t i
on
an elaborate communicative a r r a n g e m e n t : the p r e s u m p t i o n de
p e n d s o n The c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o n e c a n legally institutionalize
t h e f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for l e g i t i m a t e l a w m a k i n g . I n
t h a t case, t h e d e s i r e d i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h u m a n r i g h t s a n d
p o p u l a r sovereignty consists in this: h u m a n r i g h t s themselves a r e
w h a t satisfy t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a civic p r a c t i c e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m b e Tegairy I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . H u m a n rights,
wfucTTmake t h e exercise of ""popular sovereignty legally possible,
c a n n o t b e i m p o s e d o n this p r a c t i c e as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t . En
a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s m u s t n o t b e c o n f u s e d with s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s .
Naturally, this anaIysTsls~at flrsT plauslBle only for t h o s e political
civil rights, specifically t h e r i g h t s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d participa
tion, t h a t s a f e g u a r d t h e exercise of political a u t o n o m y . It is less
p l a u s i b l e for t h e classical h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e citizens'
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Chapter 10
private a u t o n o m y . H e r e we t h i n k in t h e first i n s t a n c e of t h e funda

m e n t a l r i g h t to t h e g r e a t e s t possible d e g r e e of e q u a l individual
liberties, t h o u g h also of basic rights t h a t c o n s t i t u t e m e m b e r s h i p
status in a state a n d p r o v i d e t h e individual with c o m p r e h e n s i v e legal
p r o t e c t i o n . T h e s e rights, w h i c h a r e m e a n t to g u a r a n t e e e v e r y o n e a n
e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r s u e his o r h e r private c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
g o o d , have a n intrinsic value, o r at least t h e y a r e n o t r e d u c i b l e to
t h e i r i n s t r u m e n t a l value for d e m o c r a t i c will-formation. We will d o
j u s t i c e to t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e classical liberties a r e co-original with
political r i g h t s only if we state m o r e precisely t h e thesis t h a t h u m a n
r i g h t s legally e n a b l e t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I
t u r n n o w to this m o r e precise s t a t e m e n t .
4
T h e Relation b e t w e e n Private and Public A u t o n o m y
H o w e v e r w e l l - g r o u n d e d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e , they m a y n o t b e p a t e r n a l istically foisted, as it w e r e , o n a sovereign. I n d e e d , t h e i d e a of citi

z e n s ' legal a u t o n o m y d e m a n d s t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e s of law b e able t o
u n d e r s t a n d themselves at t h e s a m e t i m e as its a u t h o r s . It w o u l d
c o n t r a d i c t this i d e a if t h e d e m o c r a t i c legislator w e r e to discover
h u m a n rights as t h o u g h t h e y w e r e (preexisting) m o r a l facts t h a t o n e
m e r e l y n e e d s to e n a c t as positive law. At t h e s a m e t i m e , o n e m u s t
also n o t f o r g e t t h a t w h e n citizens o c c u p y t h e r o l e of co-legislators
they a r e n o l o n g e r free to c h o o s e t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h a l o n e t h e y
c a n realize t h e i r a u t o n o m y . T h e y p a r t i c i p a t e in legislation only as
legal subjects; it is n o l o n g e r in t h e i r p o w e r to d e c i d e w h i c h l a n g u a g e
they will m a k e iise of. T h e d e m o c r a t i c i d e a of j e l f - l e g i s l a t i o n must
a c q u i r e its validityin_die]medûm of law i t ^ j f
t
However, w h e n citizens j u d g e in t h e light of t h e d i s c o u r s e priricip l e w h e t h e r t h e law t h ^ m a k e is legitimate, t h e y d o so u n d e r c o m

m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t m u s t themselves b e Teeally
instit^
civil rights, a n d for s u c h
institutionalization to occur, the;legal c o d e as s u c h m u s t b e available.
B u t in o r d e r to establish this legal c o d e it is n e c e s s a r y to c r e a t e t h e
status o F I e g a T p e T s o n i w h o as b e a r e r s of individual r i g h t s b e f o n g t o
^
v
o
l
u
^
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
claim t h e i r rights. T h e r e is n o law w i t h o u t t h e private a u t o n o m y of
261
legal p e r s o n s in g e n e r a l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w i t h o u t basic r i g h t s t h a t
s e c u r e t h e private a u t o n o m y of citizens t h e r e is also n o m e d i u m for
legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e citizens,
as citizens of a state, c a n m a k e u s e of t h e i r p u b l i c a u t o n o m y . T h u s
private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r in
s u c h a way t h a t n e i t h e r h u m a n r i g h t s n o r p o p u l a r sovereignty c a n
claim p r i m a c y over its c o u n t e r p a r t .
This m u t u a l presupposition expresses the intuition that, o n the
o n e h a n d , citizens c a n m a k e a d e q u a t e u s e of t h e i r p u b l i c a u t o n o m y
only if, o n t h e basis of t h e i r equally p r o t e c t e d private a u t o n o m y , they
a r e sufficiently i n d e p e n d e n t ; b u t that, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y c a n
arrive at a c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n of t h e i r private a u t o n o m y only if
they m a k e a d e q u a t e u s e of t h e i r political a u t o n o m y as e n f r a n c h i s e d
citizens.
T h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y h a s
b e e n c o n c e a l e d l o n g e n o u g h by t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e legal
p a r a d i g m s t h a t h a v e b e e n d o m i n a n t u p to t h e p r e s e n t . T h e liberal
legal p a r a d i g m r e c k o n s with a n e c o n o m i c society t h a t is institution
alized t h r o u g h private lawabove all t h r o u g h p r o p e r t y r i g h t s a n d
c o n t r a c t u a l f r e e d o m a n d left to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s w o r k i n g s of t h e
m a r k e t . S u c h a "private law society" is t a i l o r e d to t h e a u t o n o m y of
legal subjects w h o as m a r k e t p a r t i c i p a n t s m o r e o r less rationally
p u r s u e t h e i r p e r s o n a l life-plans. T h i s m o d e l of society is associated
with t h e n o r m a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t social j u s t i c e c a n b e realized by
g u a r a n t e e i n g s u c h a n e g a t i v e legal status, a n d t h u s solely by d e l i m
iting s p h e r e s of i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . T h e w e l l - f o u n d e d c r i t i q u e of
this s u p p o s i t i o n gave rise to t h e social welfare m o d e l . T h e o b j e c t i o n
is obvious: if t h e free "capacity t o h a y e _ a n d j t c q u i r e " is s u p p o s e d j t o
g u a r a n t e e social justice, t h e n a n ^ e ^ u a U
exist. As a m a t t e r of fact, however, t h e g r o w i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s in eco
n o m i c power, assets, a n d living c o n d i t i o n s have increasingly d e
stroyed t h e factual p r e c o n d i t i o n s for a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e
^ e f f e c t i v e u s e ) o f equally d i s t r i b u t e d legal p o w e r s . If t h e n o r m a t i v e
c o n t e n t of legal equality is n o t to b e i n v e r t e d , t h e n two correctives
a r e necessary. O n t h e o p e h a n d , existing normgjDjLpriYa^
^ s u b s t a n t i v e l y specified, a n d o n t h e o t h e r , b a s i c ^ c ^ j i g h t s m u s t
b e i n t r o d u c e d , r i g h t s t h a t g r o u n d claims to a m o r e j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n
262
Chapter 10
of socially p r o d u c e d w e a l t h a n d t o m o r e effective p r o t e c t i o n against

socially p r o d u c e d d a n g e r s .
I n t h e m e a n t i m e , of c o u r s e , this materialization of law h a s in t u r n
c r e a t e d t h e u n i n t e n d e d side efferts^jQlwelfare^paternalism. Clearly,
efforts to c o m p e n s a t e for a c t u a l living c o n d i t i o n s a n d p o w e r posi
t i o n s m u s t n o t l e a d t o " n o r m a l i z i n g " i n t e r v e n t i o n s of a sort t h a t
o n c e a g a i n restrict t h e p r e s u m p t i v e b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' p u r s u i t of a n
a u t o n o m o u s life-project. T h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e dialectic
of legal a n d factual equality h a s s h o w n t h a t b o t h legal p a r a d i g m s a r e
equally c o m m i t t e d
b a s e d o n i n d u s t r i a l capitalism. T h i s society is s u p p o s e d to f u n c t i o n
in s u c h a way t h a t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n of social j u s t i c e c a n b e satisfied
by s e c u r i n g e a c h individual's private p u r s u t of his o r h e r c o n c e p t i o n
of t h e g o o d life. T h e only d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e two p a r a d i g m s c o n
c e r n s w h e t h e r private a u t o n o m y c a n b e g u a r a n t e e d directly by n e g a
tive liberties (Freiheitsrechte), o r w h e t h e r o n t h e c o n t r a r y t h e
c o n d i t i o n s for private a u t o n o m y m u s t b e s e c u r e d t h r o u g h t h e p r o
vision of welfare e n t i t l e m e n t s . I n . b o t h cases, however, t h e i n t e r n a l
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n rjrivate a n d p u M
d r o p s o u t of t h e
picture.
5
A n Example: T h e Feminist Politics o f Equality
I n closing, I w a n t to e x a m i n e t h e feminist politics of equality to s h o w

t h a t policies a n d legal strategies oscillate helplessly b e t w e e n t h e
c o n v e n t i o n a l p a r a d i g m s as l o n g as they r e m a i n l i m i t e d to s e c u r i n g
private a u t o n o m y a n d d i s r e g a r d h o w t h e individual r i g h t s of private
p e r s o n s a r e r e l a t e d to t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens e n g a g e d i n
l a w m a k i n g . For, in t h e final analysis, private legal subjects c a n n o t
enjoy even e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties if t h e y themselves d o n o t j o i n t l y
exercise t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y in o r d e r to specify clearly w h i c h inter
ests a n d s t a n d a r d s a r e justified, a n d to a g r e e o n t h e r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s
t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h e n like cases s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d alike a n d different
cases differently.
Initially, t h e goal of liberal policies was t o u n c o u p l e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n
of status f r o m g e n d e r identity a n d to g u a r a n t e e to w o m e n e q u a l
o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for j o b s , social r e c o g n i t i o n , e d u c a -
263
On the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy
t i o n , political power, etc., r e g a r d l e s s of t h e o u t c o m e . However, t h e

f o r m a l equality t h a t was partially a c h i e v e d m e r e l y m a d e m o r e obvi
o u s t h e ways in w h i c h w o m e n w e r e in fact t r e a t e d unequally. Social
welfare politics r e s p o n d e d , especially i n t h e a r e a s of social, labor,
a n d family law, by p a s s i n g special r e g u l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g , for e x a m p l e ,
to p r e g n a n c y a n d c h i l d c a r e , o r to social h a r d s h i p in t h e case of
divorce. I n t h e m e a n t i m e feminist c r i t i q u e h a s t a r g e t e d n o t only t h e
u n r e d e e m e d d e m a n d s , b u t also t h e a m b i v a l e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s of
successfully i m p l e m e n t e d welfare p r o g r a m s f o r e x a m p l e , t h e
h i g h e r risk of w o m e n losing t h e i r j o b s as a r e s u l t of c o m p e n s a t o r y
r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in lower wage b r a c k
ets, t h e p r o b l e m a t i c issue of "what is in t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s , "
a n d in g e n e r a l t h e progressive f e m i n i z a t i o n of poverty. F r o m a legal
s t a n d p o i n t , o n e r e a s o n for this reflexively g e n e r a t e d discrimina
t i o n is f o u n d in t h e o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d classifications u s e d j t o label
d i s a d v a n t a g e d situations a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s of p e r s o n s , b e
c a u s e t h e s e "false" classifications l e a d to " n o r m a l i z i n g " i n t e r v e n t i o n s
i n t o h o w p e o p l e c o n d u c t t h e i r lives, i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t t r a n s f o r m
w h a t was i n t e n d e d as c o m p e n s a t i o n for d a m a g e s i n t o n e w f o r m s of
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h u s i n s t e a d of g u a r a n t e e i n g liberty, s u c h overp r o t e c t i o n stifles it. I n a r e a s of law t h a t a r e of c o n c e r n to f e m i n i s m ,
welfare p a t e r n a l i s m takes o n a literal m e a n i n g to t h e e x t e n t t h a t
legislation a n d a d j u d i c a t i o n a r e o r i e n t e d by t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h u s serve t o b u t t r e s s existing s t e r e o t y p e s of sex
u a l identity.
T h e classification of gender-specific roles a n d differences t o u c h e s
o n f u n d a m e n t a l levels of a society's c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
Radical f e m i n i s m h a s only n o w m a d e u s aware of t h e fallible c h a r a c
t e r of this s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is essentially
c o n t e s t e d a n d in n e e d of revision. It rightly insists t h a t t h a p r ^ c ^ r i ate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n e e d s a n d criteria b e a m a t t e r of p u b l i c d e b a t e
in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e . It is h e r e t h a t citizens m u s t clarify t h e
aspects t h a t d e t e r m i n e whicfi differences b e t w e e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e s
a n d living situations of (specific g r o u p s of) m e n a n d w o m e n a r e
r e l e v a n t f o r a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o exercise i n d i v i d u a l liberties.
T h u s , this s t r u g g l e for the. e q u a l status of w o m e n is a particularly
g o o d e x a m p l e of t h e n e e d for a c h a n g e of t h e legal p a r a d i g m .
264
Chapter 10
T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e two r e c e i v e d p a r a d i g m s w h e t h e r t h e
a u t o n o m y of legal p e r s o n s is b e t t e r s e c u r e d t h r o u g h i n d i v i d u a l lib
erties for private c o m p e t i t i o n o r t h r o u g h publicly g u a r a n t e e d enti
t l e m e n t s for clients of welfare b u r e a u c r a c i e s i s s u p e r s e d e d by a
proceduralist conception of law. A c c o r d i n g to this c o n c e p t i o n , t h e d e m o
cratic p r o c e s s m u s t s e c u r e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y at t h e s a m e
t i m e : t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e m e a n t to g u a r a n t e e to w o m e n t h e
a u t o n o m y to p u r s u e t h e i r lives in t h e private s p h e r e c a n n o t even b e
a d e q u a t e l y f o r m u l a t e d u n l e s s t h e affected p e r s o n s t h e m s e l v e s first
a r t i c u l a t e a n d justify in p u b l i c d e b a t e t h o s e aspects t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t
to e q u a l o r u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in typical cases. T h e private a u t o n o m y
of equally e n t i t l e d citizens c a n b e s e c u r e d only insofar as citizens
actively exercise t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y .
Notes
Editor's Introduction
1. It should be noted that "rule of law" generally translates the German term
"Rechtsstaat," which literally means "constitutional state;" hence the relevant intuition
can also be expressed as the claim that the_constitutional state is not possible without
participatory democracy. This guiding intuition iiTHealtwith explicitly in chapters 9
and 10, which offer a succinct exposition of Habermas's political theory and hence
are a suitable starting point for readers who are not familiar with his recent work.
2. This duality of "facticity" and "validity" is the central theme of Habermas's major
work in legal and political philosophy, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996).
3. Habermas does not claim to develop a theory of justice for all possible h u m a n
societies and is keenly aware that Western constitutional democracies emerged in
response to contingent historical developments. At the same time, he rejects contextualist attempts to base the legitimacy of the constitutional state on supposedly
"Western" values, on the grounds that the principles of justice enshrined in demo
cratic constitutions can claim universal validity for m o d e r n societies.
4. Rawls takes this contextualist turn in Political Liberalism (New York, 1993; expanded
pbk. ed., 1996).
5. T h e theory of communicative action holds that social actors are self-interpreting
subjects who acquire and reproduce their identities through communicative interac
tion; that action oriented to reaching understanding plays a more fundamental role
than strategic action in the reproduction of socio-cultural forms of life; and that
communicative actors implicitly or explicitly raise validity claims, including normative
claims, that admit of reasoned justification in discourse. These ambitious claims are
developed and defended at length by Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action,
2 vols., trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1985/1987).
6. Cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 107; also chapter 9, below, "Three
Normative Models of Democracy," esp. pp. 248ff.
266
Notes
7. In chapter 1 below, "A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality,"

Habermas defends the strong cognitivist position that moral norms admit in princi
ple of universal rational justification against a range of opposing philosophical posi
tions that have been taken on the question of whether moral disputes admit of
rational resolution.
8. Habermas's response to skepticism concerning the rational basis of the validity of
norms mirrors a duality that characterizes his general approach to questions of
normative justification: an internal reconstruction of the unavoidable pragmatic
presuppositions of argumentation is complemented by an objectifying analysis of the
role of communicative interaction in the reproduction of socio-cultural forms of life
and of agents' identities. See Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization: O n
George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans.
W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 149-204.
9. The corresponding conception of validity is captured by a principle of universali
zation which states that only those moral norms are valid that are such that all those
affected by their general observance could freely accept their anticipated conse
quences for the satisfaction of everyone's interests; see Habermas, Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge,
MA, 1990), pp. 92-93.
10. Cf. Between Facts and Norms, p. 122: "These three categories of rights result simply
from the application of the discourse principle to the medium of law as such, that
is, to the conditions for the legal form of a horizontal association of free and equal
persons." O n the justification of the system of basic rights as a whole see ibid.,
pp. 118-131.
11. Thus the nature of the constitution-founding practice means that autonomy in
the legal-political domain splits into private and public autonomy in a way that has
n o equivalent in the moral domain. O n this account, the distinction between private
and public domains is an artifact of m o d e r n legal systems, not a prepolitical fact
whose preservation is the main raison d'etre of the liberal state.
12. Habermas, following Kant, distinguishes between pragmatic, prudential, and
moral dimensions of practical reason. Ethical questions or questions of what is good
for me or for us have a different logic than do pragmatic questions of the appropriate
means to certain practical ends and moral questions of what I or we ought to do. See
Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical
Reason," in Justification and Application, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993),
p p . 1-17.
13. While any group of people can in principle come together to form a constitu
tional regimeprovided that an ongoing scheme of social cooperation between
them is possiblethis does n o t mean that any like-minded minority within an exist
ing constitutional state has the right to form an independent state of its own. O n the
contrary, Habermas takes a rather restrictive view of the right of secession because
secessions generally create new minorities who do not necessarily consent to the new
regime. Only when a minority suffers systematic discrimination against which its
members have n o genuine legal recoursein which case the existing regime is
illegitimate because it systematically violates the rights of some of its subjectscan it
claim a right to secede.
267
Notes
14. For example, Habermas's scheme is opposed to the increasing concentration of

ownership of print and electronic media and the increasing subordination of such
media to economic interests. Such developments tend to degrade public political
discourse and u n d e r m i n e its legitimating function by restricting access to the media
and making them susceptible to ideological exploitation.
15. For an extended discussion, see Between Facts and Norms, p p . 168ff.
16. See Between Facts and Norms, p p . 144-168, 34Iff.
17. These three interrelated lines of criticism are dealt with respectively in the three
main sections of chapter 2, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason."
18. For Rawls's detailed responses and countercriticisms see his "Reply to Haber
mas," TheJournal of Philosophy 92 (3), 1995: 132-180 (reprinted as an appendix to the
paperback edition of Political Liberalism).
19. See chapter 3, below, "'Reasonable' vs. 'True' or the Morality of Worldviews,"
pp. 89ff. Habermas's description of this shared standpoint as the "moral point of
view" is potentially misleading in light of the importance he attaches to the distinc
tion between morality and legality in his political theory. This looseness in termin
ology reflects the fact that the perspective from which citizens justify basic
constitutional principles approximates in its abstractness and universality to the
moral point of view.
20. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," p p . 138, 179. Rawls correctly argues that n o
theory of justice can be purely procedural, in the sense of avoiding any appeal to
substantive ideals, and that Haberrnas's discourse theory is n o exception in this
regard. T h e important difference, however, is how they ground their respective
substantive principles. Whereas Rawls appeals to normative ideas implicit in the
political culture of liberal democracies, thereby restricting the scope of his theory,
Habermas argues that a fully universal principle of normative validity can be
grounded in certain normative presuppositions of speech and action that communi
cative actors unavoidably make once they engage in practical argumentation. Thus
the procedure of practical discourse itself, and n o t a comprehensive metaphysical
conception of reason or the person, is the source of normative constraints.
21. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," p p . 139-141, 143-145.
22. For a discussion of some of the relevant issues see T. McCarthy, "Kantian Con
structivism a n d Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," Ethics 105 (1),
1994:44-63.
23. See J. Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in S. Shute and S. Hurley, eds., On Human
Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, 1993). p p . 41-82.
24. See K. Polanyi's classic, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1944).
25. See especially chapter 4, below, "The European Nation-State: O n the Past and
Future of Sovereignty a n d Citizenship," and chapter 5, below, "On the Relation
between the Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy."
268
Notes
26. See C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, 1996), and
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy (Cambridge, MA, 1985).
27. See, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, chapter 3, part 3, and "The European
Nation State," pp. 117ff.
28. See, e.g., D. P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington, MA,
1991).
29. See I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch," in H. Reiss, ed., KantPolitical Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 93-130; Kant, Werkausgabe, Vol. XI, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), pp. 195-251.
30. See chapter 7, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace," pp. 169ff.
31. Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not
Apply in Practice," in Political Writings, p. 92; cf. Kant, WerkausgabeXl, pp. 171-172.
32. See Kant, "Perpetual Peace," esp. pp. 102-108; WerkausgabeXl, pp. 208-217.
33. See ch. 7, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace," pp. 169ff.
34. See ch. 4, "The European Nation State," section V.
35. See D. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" European Law Journal 1 (3),
1995: 282-302. In the same issue, see also U. PreuB, "Problems of a Concept of
European Identity," pp. 267-281 and J. Weiler, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?
Reflections on Demos, Telos, and Ethos in the German Maastricht Decision,"
pp. 219-258. These papers are reprinted in P. Gowan and P. Anderson, eds., The
Question of Europe (London, 1997).
36. As Grimm puts it, "The Treaties are n o t . . . a constitution in the full sense of the
term. T h e difference lies in the reference back to the will of the Member States rather
than to the people of the Union . . . The European public power is not one that
derives from the people, but one mediated through States. Since the Treaties thus
have not an internal but an external reference point, they are also not the expression
of a society's self-determination as to the form and objectives of its political unity.
Insofar as constitutions are concerned with the legitimation of rule by those subject
to it, the Treaties thus fall short" (Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?"
p. 291).
37. The European Union is built around four institutions: the Council of Ministers,
the European Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. T h e
Commission is in charge of formulating policy, drafting legislation, preparing the
budget of the Union, as well as implementing policies accepted by the Council and
not vetoed by the Parliament. Part of its power derives from the fact that its drafts
are the only basis for decisions in the Council. Commissioners are expected to be
loyal to the Union, to which they swear an oath. (In this and the next three footnotes
we will be following the papers collected in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman, eds., The
New European Community, [Boulder, CO, 1991] and the very useful monograph by
E. Eriksen, A. Follesdall, and R. Malnes, Europeanisation and Normative Political Theory.
ARENA working paper 1/95 [Oslo, 1995].)
269
Notes
38. T h e Council of Ministers is the real decision-making body of the Union. It is made
u p of representatives of the governments of all member states. Representatives in the
Council stand in for the interests of their countries. Thus some commentators argue
that the council is the main reason the European Union falls short of a federation.
39. T h e European Parliament is, arguably, the least developed of the Union's major
institutions. Originally the Parliament's rights were limited to consultation and lim
ited veto powers. It has slowly gained additional competences, including the right to
ask the Commission for legislative initiatives over certain issues, and, most impor
tantly, the right to do second and third readings of some legislative drafts before they
are approved by the Council. Even with these enlarged powers, it should be clear
that the Parliament is significantly weaker than a normal national Parliament.
40. That is, precisely what Grimm attacks; see chapter 6, below, "Does Europe Need
a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm," p. 156.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 161.
43. See chapter 8, below, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitu
tional State," p. 210.
44. See "Struggles for Recognition," pp. 208, and "Individuation through Socializa
tion," pp. 221ff.
45. See C. Taylor, "The Struggle for Recognition," in A. Gutmann, ed. Multicultural
ism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, expanded edition (Princeton, NJ, 1994).
46. There is an important difference between equalizing the risks entailed by the
different cultural choices made by different groups on the one hand, and, on the
other, minimizing those risks. T h e latter is an attempt to guarantee through state
action the survival of existing cultures. See Michael Walzer, "Comment," in Gutmann,
ed., Multiculturalism, p p . 99-103. Habermas also argues against treating cultural
groups as if they were species u n d e r the threat of extinction; see "Struggles for
Recognition," section IV, pp. 220ff.
47. K A. Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social
Reproduction," in Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism, pp. 149-163. Identities are "tightly
scripted" when they impose a narrow definition of what it means to be African-Ameri
can, Quebecois, gay, etc., on those who accept these identifications or who are socially
identified (e.g., by skin color or behavior) as belonging to the groups in question
regardless of whether they choose to identify with them or not.
48. See Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of
Practical Reason."
49. Habermas's vigorous support of procedural democracy puts him at odds not only
with those theorists who are skeptical about the effectiveness of democracy in advanc
ing the goals of pluralism, but also with the increasing tendency in our political
culture to juridify social issues, that is, to appeal to judges rather than to democratic
legislative forums for the resolution of important social problems.
270
Notes
Preface
1. English translation: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996).
2. Between Facts and Norms, p p . 491-515.
Chapter 1
1. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London, 1974).
2. H. L. A. Hart took this view when he traced the unity of legal systems back to basic
rules that legitimate the whole corpus but do not admit of justification themselves.
Like the rules of a language game, these "rules of recognition" are rooted in a
practice that an observer can only register as a fact, whereas for the participants it
has the status of a self-evident cultural commonplace which is accepted and assumed
to be valid; see The Concept of Law, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1994).
3. See the impressive phenomenology of moral consciousness in L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), ch. 3.
4. J. Habermas, 'Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World," in
D. S. Browning and F. Schiissler-Fiorenza, eds., Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theol
ogy (New York, 1992), p p . 226-250; also Th. M. Schmidt, "Immanente Transzendenz,"
in L. Hauser a n d E. Nordhofen, eds., Im Netz der Begriffe: Religionsphilosophische Analyzen (Freiburg, 1994), pp. 78-96.
5. O n 'justice" and "solidarity" see J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica
tive Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1990),
pp. 200ff. and 'Justice and Solidarity: O n the Discussion Concerning 'Stage 6,"' in
T. Wren, ed., The Moral Domain (Cambridge, MA, 1990), p p . 244ff.; for a different
account see L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral, pp. I79ff.
6. J. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992).
7. For a critique of this view see J. L. Mackie, Ethics (New York, 1977), p p . 38ff. Today
the balance of the argument has shifted in favor of realism. J. McDowell has devel
oped the most subtle version of a value-ethic which starts from epistemological
premises but is grounded in a philosophy of nature drawing on Plato and Aristotle,
in Mind and World (Cambridge, MA, 1994), p. 82: "The ethical is a domain of rational
requirements, which are there in any case, whether or n o t we are responsive to them.
We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities.
When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are
opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons." McDowell makes
the transition to objective idealism by assuming an organically based formation
process (Bildungsprozefi), in light of which practical reason appears as a natural faculty
that can claim objective validity: "Our Bildung actualizes some of the potentialities we
are b o r n with; we do n o t have to suppose it introduces a nonanimal ingredient into
our constitution. And although the structure of the space of reasons cannot be
reconstructed out of facts about our involvement in the realm of law, it can be the
271
Notes
framework within which meaning comes into view only because our eyes can be
opened to it by Bildung which is an element in the normal coming to maturity of
the kind of animals we are. Meaning is not a mysterious gift from outside nature"
(p. 88). McDowell frankly acknowledges the metaphysical claim of this conception,
which I cannot go into in detail here: "The position is a naturalism of second nature,
and I suggested that we can equally see it as a naturalized platonism. T h e idea is that
the dictates of reason are there anyway, whether or n o t one's eyes are opened to
them; that is what happens in a proper upbringing" (p. 91).
8. H. Lenk, "Kann die sprachanalytische Moralphilosophie neutral sein?" in
M. Riedel, ed., Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, vol. II (Freiburg, 1974),
pp. 405-422.
9. See E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p p . 199ff.
10. O n the opposition between objective and subjective reason, see M. Horkheimer,
Critique of Instrumental Reason, trans. M. J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1974);
H. Schnadelbach, "Vernunft," in E. Martens, H. Schnadelbach, eds., Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1985), pp. 77-115.
11. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L. W. Beck (New York, 1990),
p. 34 (Akad. ed., p. 417).
12. A..C. Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA, 1994), ch. 9, pp. 184ff. Instead of
sympathy Baier goes back to the p h e n o m e n o n of childhood trust: " T r u s t . . . is letting
other persons . . . take care of something the truster cares about, where such 'caring
for' involves some exercise of discretionary powers" (p. 105). This has the advantage
of allowing moral concern to be described, true to experience, as a multifaceted
compensating mechanism, for dependency and vulnerability; but at the same time by
transferring a model developed for asymmetrical parent-child relations to the sym
metrical relations between adults, it has the disadvantage that it gives rise to the
problem of trustworthiness and the abuse of trust (cf. chs. 6, 7, and 8).
13. Nor can the problem of affective ties to strangers be solved through a shift in
focus from sympathy or trust to compassion. Although our capacity for empathetic
identification with creatures capable of suffering undoubtedly extends farther than
positive feelings toward people who are useful, agreeable, and trustworthy, compas
sion cannot ground equajjrespect for others even, and especially, in their empathetically
unbridgeable otherness.
14. Cf. Mackie, Ethics; also "Can There be a Right-based Moral Theory?" in
J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford, 1984), pp. 168-181.
15. E. Tugendhat, "Zum Begriff u n d zur Begriindung von Moral," in Phibsophische
Aufsdtze (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), pp. 315-333.
16. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 75.
17. J. Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, 1989), Ch. 3.
18. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, pp. 29 and 91.
19. A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p. 296.
272
Notes
20. Ibid., p. 84.

21. Ibid., pp. 72f.
22. Ibid., p. 193: "[A] speaker treats what he is saying as an objective matter of
rationality if he can d e m a n d its acceptance by everybody. More precisely, the test is
this: could he coherently make his demands, revealing their grounds, and still not
browbeat his audience? What makes for browbeating in this test is a question of
conversational inhibitions and embarrassments. . . . "
23. Ibid., p. 195 n. 2 refers to the theory of discourse.
24. Ibid., p. 223 (my emphasis).
25. Nor can this be achieved by the participants in discourse making the biological
description their own; for such an objectifying self-description would either destroy
the practical self-understanding of subjects capable of action or u n d e r g o a funda
mental change in meaning with the switch from the observer's to the participant's
perspective.
26. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 29.
27. M. Seel, Versuch uber die Form des Glucks (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 206.
28. Ibid., pp. 203f.
29. Ibid., p. 203: "It is true that the question 'Why be moral?' can stillindeed, can
*~onlybe answered by appealing to preferences, because moral conduct alone makes
possible a form of social existence based on friendship and solidarity; but while this
step may be motivated by preferences it commits us to modes of conduct that cannot
be traced back to orientations grounded in preferences."
30. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uber Ethik, p p . 87f.
31. This is even clearer in E. Tugendhat, "Gibt es eine m o d e r n e Moral?" in Zeitschrifl
fur philosophische Forschung 50 (1996): 323-338.
32. B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA, 1985), ch. 8.
33. Rawls speaks in this connection of "reflective ^qijjlihriiirn."
34. McDowell rejects an objectivistic interpretation of these "salient features" of
situations: "The relevant notion of salience cannot be understood except in terms of
seeing something as a reason for acting which silences all others." 'Virtue and
Reason," The Monist 62 (1979): p. 345. H e explains ethical insights in terms of the
interaction between the way of life and self-understanding of individuals, on the one
hand, and their evaluatively charged understanding of the particular situation, on
the other. These analyses can still be understoodwithout embracing realismin
terms of a neo-Aristotelian ethics informed by Wittgenstein.
35. J. McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 5 (1978): 13-29.
273
Notes
36. Ch. Taylor, The Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
37. Theories also raise a "higher-level" or more complex validity claim; they are not
"true" or "false" in the same sense as the singular propositions that are derivable from
them.
38. T h e existentialist sharpening of this decision into a radical choice fails to grasp
the character of this freedom as an epistemically guided process.
39. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p p . 184f.
40. Ibid., p. 187.
41. M. Seel (Versuch ilber die Form des Gliicks) tries to develop such a formal concept
of the good. But the idea_of.^formal delemiination of t h e gooddistinct from
morality in the Kantian senseis a self-contradiction. Seel's attempt to explain the
nature and conditions of the successful life cannot avoid privileging certain basic
goods (security, health, freedom of movement), contents (work, interaction, play,
and contemplation), and ends (self-determination that is responsive to external"
impulses). These ideas reflect faUibje anjhropological assumptions and valuations,
which are not only matters of dispute 5elwe<enaTfierent cufiureTBut remain contro
versial, and for good reasons, in intercultural dialogue. A noncriterial understanding
of such a projection of h u m a n potentialities has paternalistic implications, even when
it is only offered as well-meaning advice: "What if someone does not want this good?
We will tell her that she is rejecting what is best for her" (p. 189). T h e descriptive
content of an anthropology of the good that goes beyond the analysis of the form of
hermeneutic discourses of self-understanding in terms of a logic of argumentation
remains b o u n d to its context of discovery in a specific wayas is shown by the
example of Heidegger whose existential ontology betrays not only the jargon but also
the political prejudices of its time to any attentive reader one or two generations later
(cf. R. Wolin, The Politics of Being [New York, 1990]).
42. Seel, Versuch ilber die Form des Gliicks, p. 223.
43. R. Dworkin develops a similar approach in "Foundations of Liberal Equality,"
G. B. Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values XI (Salt Lake City, 1990).
44. See n. 41 above.
45. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 55 (438).
46. Ibid., p. 29 (412) (translation modified).
47. C. Korsgaard misunderstands this point; see "The Sources of Normativity," The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values XV (Salt Lake City, 1994), p p . 88ff.
48. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 52 (435).
49. T h e same holds true for Tugendhat (see above IV, 2).
50. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justifica
tion," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 66.
274
Notes
51. This is why, in important sectors of social life, the weak motivating force of
morality must be supplemented by coercive positive law; cf. Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996), pp. 104ff.
52. O n the following, cf. J. Heath, "Morality and Social Action" (Dissertation, North
western University, 1995), pp. 86-102.
53. D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1983).
54. Habermas, "An Excursus o n the Theory of Argumentation," in The Theory of
Communicative Action, Vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge, MA, 1984), p p . 22-42.
55. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," in E. LePore, ed., Truth and Inter
pretation (Oxford, 1981), pp. 333-353.
56. This reactive concept of "discursive redeemability," which is not oriented to ideal
conditions [of complete iiistification]Jbut to^ pQlentialîibje^tions, is similar to the
notion of 'superassertibility;" cf. C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA,
1992), pp. 33ff. For a critique of my earlier conception of truth which was still
influenced by Peirce, see A. Wellmer. The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley
(Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp. 160ff.; also Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Mora/, p p . 264ff.
57. For a pragmatist interpretation of the discourse-concept of truth, cf. J. Haber
mas, "Rorty's Pragmatic Turn" (forthcoming).
58. This also explains why moral discourses of justification must be supplemented
by discourses of application; cf. K Gunther, The Sense ofAppropriateness, trans. J. Farrell
(Albany, NY, 1993); also J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 109.
59. Cf. J. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy
77 (9) (1980): 515-572, p. 519.
60. A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, trans. J. Anderson (Cambridge, 1992);
R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).
61. JWingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral pp. 295ff.)Qn the perspective structure of action
oriented to reaching"understanding see the title essay in Habermas, Moral Conscious
ness and Communicative Action, pp. 116ff, especially pp. 133-141.
62. Wingert has rigorously explored the implications of this duality in Gemeinsinn
und Moral.
63. For this reason, the condition of impartiality is not satisfied simply by the fact
that an impartial j u d g e weighs the goods and harms that are at stake for "any"
individual; for a different view see Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 353.
64. Cf. Seel, Versuch uber die Form des Glucks, p. 204.
65. Cf. K. Ott, "Wie begriindet man ein Diskussionsprinzip der Moral?" in Vom
Begrunden zum Handeln (Tubingen, 1996), p p . 12-50.
66. Cf. M. Niquet, Transzendentale Argumente (Frankfurt am Main, 1991); "Nichthintergehbarkeit u n d Diskurs" (Habilitationsschrift, Frankfurt am Main, 1995).
275
Notes
67. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen iiber Ethik (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p p . 161ff.

Tugendhat's criticism refers to a version of my argument which I revised already in
the second [German] edition of Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, that is,
in 1984 (!); cf. Habermas, Justification and Application, p . 179, n. 17.
68. This point is emphasized by W. Rehg in Insight and Solidarity (Berkeley, CA, 1994),
pp. 65ffj cf. S. Benhabib, "Autonomy, Modernity a n d Community," in Situating the
SelfJWew York, 1992), pp. 68-88.
69. K. O. Apel, "Die transzendentalpragmatische Begrundung der Kommunikationsethik," in Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), pp. 306-369.
70. See n. 57 above.
71. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p p . 106ff. and "Postscript," (pp. 459ff).
72. See R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Frankfurt am Main, 1991);
K. Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany, NY, 1992); S. Benhabib,
"Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy," Constellations 1
(1994): 26-52; and especially R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit.
Chapter 2
1. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971) (hereafter TJ).
2. J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993) IV, section 1, p. 137 (hereafter
PL).
3. In preparing this essay the following works were especially helpful: K. Baynes, The
Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany, NY, 1992); R. Forst, Kontexte der Gere
chtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).
4. Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," in S. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values III (Salt Lake City, 1982), p . 16.
5. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political riot Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs
14 (1985): 223-251, p. 237 n. 20.
6. Thomas Scanlon also criticizes the traces of a decision-theoretical orientation,
though from a different standpoint, in "Contractualism a n d Utilitarianism," in A. Sen
and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, 1982), p p . 123ff.
7. I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 1990), p . 25.
8. This objection is n o t based on the thesis of the primacy of duties over rights, as
in O. O'Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge, 1989), Ch. 12, pp. 206ff.
9. H. L. A. Hart, "Rawls O n Liberty and its Priority," in N. Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls
(New York, 1975), pp. 230ff.
10. See W. Hinsch, "Einleitung" to Rawls, Die Idee des politischen Liberalismus (Frank
furt am Main, 1992), p p . 38ff.
276
Notes
11. Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," p p . 21ff. and 39ff.
12. See, e.g., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, 1977).
13. Cf. J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness, and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt
and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1990), and Justification and Application:
Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993); on the location
of discourse ethics in contemporary American discussions, see S. Benhabib, "In the
Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in
Practical Philosophy," in Situating the Self (New York, 1992), p p . 23-67. See also
D. Rasmussen, ed., Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics
(Cambridge, MA, 1990).
14. Cf. W. Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: The Idea of a Discourse Ethics (Berkeley, forth
coming) .
15. The Journal ofPhilosophy 78 (9) (1980): 515-572.
16. Rawls, "The Domain of the Political a n d Overlapping Consensus," New York
University Law Review 64 (1988): 223-255, p. 246
17. 'Justice as Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical," p . 230.
18. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7
(1987): 1-25, p . 6.
19. "What rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that under
lies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others
as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse" (PL 51).
20. Cf. my reflections in Justification and Application, p p . 25ff.
21. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," p . 25.
22. Habermas, "Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking," in Postmetaphysical Thinking,
trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p p . 28-53.
23. Cf. the Tanner Lectures, where h e writes at the e n d of section VII: "The idea is
to incorporate into the basic structure of society an effective political procedure
which mirrors in that structure the fair representation of persons achieved by the
original position" (p. 45).
24. "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," p . 13.
25. S. Benhabib, "Models of Public Space," in Situating the Self (New York, 1992),
pp. 89-120.
26. This principle of Kantian legal theory is taken u p in Rawls's first principle.
27. Cf. "On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy," below
pp. 256ff.
277
Notes
Chapter 3
1. I am grateful to Rainer Forst, Thomas McCarthy, and Lutz Wingert for instructive
criticism.
2. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993), p . 12 (hereafter PL).
3. J. Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (3) (1995): 132-180,
p. 141, n. 16 (hereafter R). [This essay, which contains Rawls's response to the
criticisms raised in the previous essay in this volume, has been reprinted as an
appendix to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, pp. 372-434. Trans.]
4. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas."
5. This is a further development of the objections oudined in the second part of the
previous essay.
6. J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, 2 vols. (Bos
ton, 1984, 1987). See also my essay "Sprechakttheoretischen Erlauterungen zum
Begriff der kommunikativen Rationalitat," Zeitschrift fur philosophische Vorschung 50
(1996): 65-91.
7. T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in A. K. Sen and B. Williams,
eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, 1982), p. 119.
8. J. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 77
(1980): 515-573; this approach is taken u p by R. Milo, "Contractarian Constructiv
ism," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 181-204.
9. L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), Pt. II, pp. 166ff.
10. I follow the sequence of "three kinds" of justification outlined by Rawls. This
logical sequence should not be understood as a temporal sequence of stages but
sketches the path along which any member of contemporary society can radicalize
her stance on current questions of political justice. Once her criticism places in
question the relevant underlying political consensus from the perspective of a com
peting conception of justice, h e r defense of this alternative must follow the path of
this logical genesis.
11. Cf. Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of
Practical Reason," in Justification and Application, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA,
1993), p p . 6f.
12. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p . 159.
13. Ibid., p p . 152-161 and 72ff.
14. [That is, the German counterpart of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Trans.]
278
Notes
15. "The particular meaning of the priority of right is that comprehensive concep
tions of the good are admissible . . . only if their pursuit conforms to the political
conception of justice" (PL 176, n. 2).
16. "In this case [i.e., when an overlapping consensus is achieved], citizens embed
their shared political conception in their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. T h e n
we h o p e that citizens will j u d g e (by their comprehensive view) that political values
are normally (though not always) ordered prior to, or outweigh, whatever nonpolitical values may conflict with them" (R 147).
17. I owe this argument to R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit.
18. I agree with Rawls's observations on procedural vs. substantive justice (R 170180); but his remarks do n o t capture the sense in which I use the expressions
"procedure" and "procedural rationality" when I assert that a practice of argumenta
tion instituted in a certain way tends to support the assumption that its results are
rationally acceptable.
19. As does R. Rorty's contextualist reading of Rawls's theory; see "The Priority of
Democracy to Politics," in R. Vaughn, ed., The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom: Two
Hundred Years After (Madison, Wis., 1988); also R. J. Bernstein, "One Step Forward,
Two Steps Backwards: Rorty O n Liberal Democracy and Philosophy," Political Theory
15 (1987).
20. Of course I agree with Charles Larmore's suggestion in The Morals of Modernity,
p. 216: "that our vision of the good life is the object of reasonable disagreement does
not entail that we should withdraw our allegiance to it or regard it as henceforth a
mere article of faith. . . . We should remember only that such reasons are n o t likely
to be acceptable to other people, who are equally reasonable but have a different
history of experience and reflection." Larmore evidently misunderstands my concep
tion of the ethical use of practical reason; cf. Habermas, Justification and Application,
pp. 1-17.
21. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit, p. 283.
22. O n the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy, see below, ch.
10.
Chapter 4
1. M. R. Lepsius, "Der europaische Nationalstaat," in Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen
(Opladen, 1990), pp. 256-269.
2. In his essay "On the Common Saying: T h i s May be True in Theory, But it Does
Not Apply in Practice,'" Kant famously distinguished "the equality (of the individual)
with everyone else as a subject" from the "freedom of the h u m a n being" and the
"independence of the citizen;" Kant, Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge,
1991), p. 74.
3. "The model of nations made its entry into European history u n d e r the guise of
asymmetrical contrasting concepts;" H. Miinkler, "Die Nation als Modell politischer
Ordnung," Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis 5, 3 (1994), p. 381.
279
Notes
4. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munich, 1994), p. 189.
5. This mistake was already made by the liberal constitutional theorist J o h a n n Caspar
Bluntschli: "Every nation is called and therefore authorized to form a state. . . . Just
as humanity is divided into a n u m b e r of nations, so should [!] the world be divided
into just as many states. Each nation a state. Each state a national entity" (quoted in
H. Schulze, Staat und Nation, p . 225).
6. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation, p. 243ff.
7. Cf. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA, 1996), p p . 409ff.
8. A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, 1990), p . 64; Beyond Left and
Right (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 78ff.
9. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1974).
10. Knieper, Nationale Souverdnitat (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), p . 85.
11. J. M. Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, trans. V. Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995),
p. 58.
12. Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, p . 99.
13. Today probably ten countries possess nuclear weapons, more than twenty chemi
cal weapons, a n d it is suspected that some Middle Eastern countries already possess
bacteriological weapons; cf. E. O. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch (Munich, 1993),
p. 93.
Chapter 5
I. H. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat (Berlin, 1994), p p . 33f.
2. Cf. M. R. Lepsius, "'Ethnos' u n d 'Demos,'" in Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen
(Opladen, 1990), p p . 247-256; Demokratie in Deutschland (Gottingen, 1993).
3. Cf. C. Leggewie, "Ethnizitat, Nationalismus u n d multikulturelle Gesellschaft," in
H. Berding, ed., Nationales Bewufitsein und kollektive Identitat (Frankfurt am Main,
1995), p . 54.
4. W. Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton, NJ, 1994), p. 202: "Our answer to that
often asked question, 'What is a nation?', is that it is a group of people who feel they
are ancestrally related."
5. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munich, 1994).
6. See, e.g., P. Sahlins, Boundaries (Berkeley, CA, 1989).
7. W. Bockenforde, "Die Nation," Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung, September 30, 1995.
8. Bokenforde, "Die Nation."
280
Notes
9. J. Habermas, Die Normalitat einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1995),

p. 181.
10. H. Wehler, "Nationalismus u n d Nation in der deutschen Geschichte," in Berding,
ed., Nationales Bewuftsein, pp. I74f.
11. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat, pp. 38f.
12. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928) (Berlin, 1983), p. 231.
13. Cf. I. Maus, "Rechtsgleichheit u n d gesellschaftliche Differenzierung bei Carl
Schmitt," in Rechtstheorie undPoilitische Theorie im Industriekapitalismus (Munich, 1986),
pp. 111-140.
14. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 228.
15. Ibid., p. 229.
16. Ibid., p. 243.
17. Ibid., p. 227.
18. Ibid., p. 234.
19. B. O. Bryde, "Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg der Demokratietheorie," Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 5 (1994): 305-329.
20. Cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996),
Ch. 3.
21. I. Mauss, "'Volk' u n d 'Nation' in Denken der Aufklarung," Blatter fur deutsche und
international Politik b (1994), p. 604.
22. R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), chs. 1 and 3.
23. Cf. Maus, Zur Aufklarung der Demokratietheorie (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).
24. R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven & London, 1989), p. 193.
25. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 231.
26. Ibid., p. 233.
27. T h e relevant issues of status were first definitively clarified for the European
powers when the unilateral declaration of independence of the United Netherlands
was recognized by Spain in the Peace of Westphalia of 1581.
28. J. A. Frowein, "Die Entwicklung der Anerkennung von Staaten u n d Regierungen
im Volkerrecht," Der Staat 11 (1972): 145-159.
29. Article 1 of the h u m a n rights agreement of December 16, 1966, which is tailored
to the era of peaceful decolonization after the Second World War, reads: "All peoples
281
Notes
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
30. A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1984), p. 318
(section 511).
31. Ch. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 1992).
32. J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States," this volume,
pp. 219ff.
33. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p. 204.
34. Cf. H . J . Puhle, "Vom Biirgerrecht zum Gruppenrecht? Multikulturelle Politik in
den USA," in: K. J. Baade, ed., Menschen ilber Grenzen (Herne, 1995), pp. 134-149.
35. J. Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," Dissent (Winter 1994): 67-79,
p. 77.
36. R. Wolfrum, "Die Entwicklung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes,"
Europa-Archiv 23 (1993): 681-690.
37. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1932) (Chicago, 1996).
38. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (1938) (Berlin, 1988).
39. For a discussion of this aspect of Walzer's work see B. J a h n , "Humanitare Inter
vention u n d der Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Volker," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 34
(1993): 567-587.
40. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1977)
(New York, 1992).
41. Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980):
209-229, p. 211.
42. Ibid., p. 214.
43. G. Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," Philosophy
and Public Affairs 8 (1978): 3-26, p. 19.
44. Cf. D. Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt? (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p . 185.
45. Cf. K O. Nass, "Grenzen u n d Gefahren humanitarer Interventionen," EuropaArchiv 10 (1993): 279-288.
46. Cf. Ch. Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" EuropaArchiv 23 (1993): 93-106.
47. J u d g m e n t of the second senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of October
12th, 1993: 2 BvR 2134/92, 2BvR 2159/92, Europdische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 1993:
429-447, p . 438.
282
Notes
48. Cf. D. Murswiek, "Maastricht u n d der Pouvoir Constituant," Der Staat (1993):
161-190.
49. O n this deflationary concept see H. P. Ipsen, "Zehn Glossen zum MaastrichtUrteil," Europarecht 29 (1994): 20: "By introducing the concept 'alliance of states'
[Staatenverbund] (the judgment) employs a terminology that is inappropriate because
of its economic-technical connotations. It ignores unnecessarily the language of the
European community and the other member states." [The German word "Verbund"
means a cooperative alliance among commercial enterprises. Trans.]
50. Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1993), p. 439.
51. J. A. Frowein, "Das Maastricht-Urteil u n d die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches bffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (1994):
1-16.
52. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat, p. 100.
53. C. Joppke, Nation-Building after World War Two (European University Institute,
Florence, 1996), p. 10.
54. The Federal Constitutional Court actually suggested this interpretation at one
point in its justification of the Maastricht verdict: "Democracy . . . depends on the
presence of certain prelegal preconditions, such as a peniiaiiejU
conflicting social forces, interests, and ideas, in which political g o a l s j i r e ^ s o ^ l a r ^ e d
ScF&ns^fojmed^ and in which a p u t ^ J ? J ^ ^
. . .
Parties, associations, the press, ancTmeelectronic media are both the medium and
a factor in this mediation process from which a European public opinion can take
shape" {Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1993), pp. 437f.). The reference to the
requirement of a common language which follows this statement is supposed to
bridge the gap between this communication-theoretical understanding of democracy
and the homogeneity of the citizenry which is elsewhere assumed to be necessary.
Chapter 6
1. See D. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution" in European Law Journal 1
(November 1995): 282-302.
Chapter 7
1. I. Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," in Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge, 1970),
p. 187; WerkeXI (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 364.
2. D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge, 1995).
3. In the "Conclusion" to Rechtslehre of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. 8c ed.
M. Gregor (Cambridge, 1996), p. 123; WerkeVm, p. 478.
4. Kant does indeed mention in his "Doctrine of Right" the "unjust enemy" whose
"publicly expressed will (whether by word or deed) reveals a maxim by which, if it
283
Notes
were made a universal rule, any condition of peace among nations would be impos
sible" {Metaphysics of Morals, section 60, p. 119; Werke VIII, p. 473); but the examples
he gives, such as the violation of international treaties or the division of a conquered
country (such as Poland in his own time), reveal the accidental character of this
conception. A "punitive war" against unjust enemies remains an idea with n o real
practical consequences so long as we assume that states have unlimited sovereignty.
For such states could not recognize a judicial authority that impartially adjudicates
transgressions of rules in international relations without jeopardizing their own
sovereignty. Only victory and defeat can decide "who is in the right" (Political Writings,
p. 96; Werke XI, p. 200).
5. Kant, Political Writings, p. 113; WerkeXL, p. 212.
6. Kant, "Theory and Practice," in Political Writings, p. 92 [translation modified];
WerkeXl, p. 172.
7. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Political Writings, p. 105; WerkeXl, p. 213.
8. In the "Doctrine of Right," Metaphysics of Morals, section 61, p. 119.
9. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 120 [translation modified]; Werke YIII, p. 475.
10. "Perpetual Peace," p. 104-105; WerkeXl, p. 212.
11. "Perpetual Peace," p. 113; WerkeXl, p. 225.
12. "Theory and Practice," p. 90; Werke XI, p. 169.
13. "Perpetual Peace," p. 100; Werke XI, pp. 205-206.
14. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munchen, 1994).
15. See D. Archibugi and D. Held's "Introduction" to their collection Cosmopolitan
Democracy (Cambridge, 1995), pp. lOff.
16. See "The Doctrine of Right," Metaphysics of Morals, section 62, p. 121.
17. "Perpetual Peace," 114; Werke XI, p. 226.
18. See G. Lukacs, The Young Hegel, trans. R. Livingstone (Cambridge, MA, 1976).
19. D. Senghaas, "Internationale Politik im Lichte ihrer strukturellen Dilemmata,"
in Wohin driftet die Welt? (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 121ff., p. 132.
20. This is Anthony Giddens's definition of globalization in The Consequences of Mod
ernity (Cambridge, 1990), p. 64.
21. Cf. R. Knieper, Nationale Souverdnitdt (Frankfurt am Main, 1991).
22. J. S. Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 153-171.
23. "Perpetual Peace," p. 121 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 238.
284
Notes

25. "Perpetual Peace," pp. 107-108; Werke, XI, pp. 216f.
26. O n the theme "Farewell to the world of nation-states!" see E. O. Czempiel,
Weltpolitik im Umbruch (Mimchen, 1993), pp. 105ff.
27. See the essays by A. Wellmer and A. H o n n e t h in Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit, ed.
M. Brumlik and H. Brunkhorst (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), pp. I73ff and pp. 260ff.
28. See the title essay of my Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik (Munchen, 1995),
pp. 165ff.
29. "Perpetual Peace," p. 114; WerkeXI, p. 226.
30. "Idea for a Universal History," in Political Writings, p. 51; "Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte," in Werke XI, pp. 46ff.
31. O n the idea of the people as a learning sovereign, see H. Brunkhorst, Demokratie
undDifferenz (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 199ff.
32. "Idea for a Universal History," p. 45 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 38.
33. J. Isensee defends a qualified prohibition on intervention "against the increasing
tendency to deviate from the n o r m " in terms of the surprising notion of "basic rights
for states" in "Weltpolizei fur Menschenrechten,"/wm&>c/^ Zeitung9 (1995): 421-430:
"What is valid for the basic rights of individuals also holds mutatis mutandis for the
'basic rights' of states, especially for their sovereign equality, their self-determination
as the supreme authority over persons and territory" (p. 424; see also p. 429). Draw
ing an analogy between the sovereignty of states recognized by international law and
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of persons as legal subjects misses not only
the fundamental importance of individual rights and the individualist orientation of
m o d e r n legal orders; it also misses the specifically juridical meaning of h u m a n rights
as the individual rights of citizens of a cosmopolitan order.
34. See the examples cited by Ch. Greenwood in, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare
Intervention?" Europa-Archiv 4 (1993): 93-106, p. 94.
35. See Habermas, The Past as Future (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1994), pp. 5-31.
36. "Theory and Practice," p. 77 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 144.
37. See J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional
State," below pp. 214ff.
39. In a discussion of a work by Georges Scelle, Precis de droit de gens Vols. I and II
(Paris, 1932 8c 1934) in C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff
(1938) (Berlin, 1988), p. 16.
40. Schmitt, Kriegsbegriff, p. 19.
285
Notes
41. O n the Vienna conference on h u m a n rights, see R. Wolfrum, "Die

des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes," Europa-Archiv 23 (1993):
the status of disputed rights to solidarity, see W. Huber's article
rechte/Menschenwurde," in Theobgische Realenzyklopadie, Vol. XXII
York, 1992), pp. 577-602; also E. Riedel, "Menschenrechte der dritten
Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1989): 9-21.
Entwicklung
681-690; on
"Menschen(Berlin/New
Dimension,"
42. In 1993 the Security Council established such a tribunal to prosecute war crimes
and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia.
43. As argued by H. Quaritsch in his postscript to C. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges (1945) (Berlin, 1994), pp. 125-247; here pp. 236ff.
44. See the analyses and conclusions of Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu
manitare Intervention?"
45. Greenwood comes to the following conclusion: "The idea that the UN could use
the powers granted in its Charter to intervene in a state on humanitarian grounds
now appears to be much more strongly established;" "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu
manitare Intervention?" p. 104.
46. Quoted in Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" p. 96.
47. "Perpetual Peace," p. 104; WerkeXl, pp. 21 Iff.
48. See R. Cooper, "Gibt es eine neue Weltordnung?" Europa-Archiv 18 (1993): 5 0 9 516.
49. A reasonable framework for discussing h u m a n rights is proposed by T. Lindholm,
"The Cross-Cultural Legitimacy of H u m a n Rights," Norwegian Institute of Human
Rights, No. 3 (Oslo, 1990).
50. D. and E. Senghaas, "Si vis pacem, para pacem," Leviathan (1992): 230-247.
51. E. O. Czempiel has investigated these strategies in light of many different exam
ples in "Internationale Politik u n d der Wandel von Regimen," in G. Schwarz, ed.,
Sonderheft der Zeitschrift fur Politik (Zurich, 1989), 55-75.
52. I am here following D. Archibugi, "From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan
Democracy," in Archibugi and Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy, pp. 121-162.
53. [Here the author has in mind the bicameral parliamentary system typical of
European states in which an u p p e r house (in Germany, the Bundesrat) exercises
legislative competence in a division of labor with the house of representatives (the
Bundestag). Trans.]
54. See H. Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill, 1944).
55. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge,
MA, 1987), p p . 336ff.
56. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, 1996), p. 54
[translation modified]. O n e finds the same argument in Isensee, "Weltpolizei fur
286
Notes
Menschenrechten," p . 429: "For as long as there have been interventions, they have
served ideologies: religious ideologies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
monarchical, Jacobin, a n d humanitarian principles, the socialist world revolution.
Now h u m a n rights and democracy are the order of the day. In the long history of
intervention, ideology has served to dissemble the power interests of the interveners
and to invest their effectiveness with the aura of legitimacy."
57. Cf. Schmitt, Glossarium 1947-1951 (Berlin, 1991), p. 76.
58. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin, 1963), p . 94. [This passage does n o t
appear in the English translation. Trans.]
59. See S. Schute a n d S. Hurley, eds., On Human Rights (New York, 1993).
60. O. Hoffe, "Die Menschenrechte als Legitimation u n d kritischer MaBstab der
Demokratie," in J. Schwardtlander (ed.), Menschenrechte und Demokratie (Strasbourg,
1981), p . 250; see also Hoffe, Political Justice, trans. J.C. Cohen (Cambridge, 1995).
61. S. Konig, Zur Begritndung der Menschenrechte: Hobbes-Locke-Kant (Freiburg, 1994),
pp. 26ff.
62. T h e implications of the rights to political participation for h u m a n rights are such
that everyone has at any rate the right to belong to one political community as a
citizen.
63. See H u g o Bedau's analysis of the structure of h u m a n rights, which draws on
H e n r y Shue's position, in "International H u m a n Rights," T Regan and D. van de
Weer, eds., And Justice for All (Totowa, NJ, 1983), p . 279: "The emphasis on duties is
meant to avoid leaving the defense of h u m a n rights in a vacuum, bereft of any moral
significance for the specific conduct of others. But the duties are n o t intended to
explain or generate rights; if anything, the rights are supposed to explain and
generate the duties."
64. Cf. S. Konig, Zur Begrilndung der Menschenrechte, p p . 84ff.
65. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p . 24; Werke VLIl, p . 337.
66. Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30; WerkeVlll, 345.
67. O n the differentiation of the spheres of ethics, law, and morality, see R. Forst,
Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p p . 131-142.
68. Cf. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges.
69. In both The Concept of the Political and Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff
70. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen, p . 19.
71. Schmitt, Glossarium, p p . 113, 265, 146, 282.
72. Schmitt, Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff, p . 1.
287
Notes
73. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p . 110. [This section is n o t included in the
English translations. Trans.]
74. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p . 33.
75. H. M. Enzensberger, Aussichten auf den Burgerkrieg (Frankfurt am Main, 1993),
pp. 73ff. See A. H o n n e t h , "Universalismus as moralische Falle?" Merkur 546/7 (1994):
867-883. Enzensberger n o t only bases his case on a highly selective description of
the current international situation which completely ignores the surprising expan
sion of constitutional regimes in Latin American, Africa, and Eastern Europe in the
last twenty years (cf. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch, p p . 107ff.). H e also casually
transmutes the complex relationships between fundamentalist politics, on the one
hand, and social deprivations and the absence of liberal traditions, on the other, into
anthropological features. But precisely the expanded conception of peace points to
preventive, nonviolent strategies and highlights the pragmatic limitations to which
humanitarian interventions are subject, as is shown both by the example of Somalia
and the different situation in the former Yugoslavia. For a case-based analysis of
different types of interventions, see D. Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt?, p p . 185ff.
76. A. Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral (Frankfurt am Main, 1969).
77. Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 259.
78. Ibid., p . 229; also The Concept of the Political, p . 63.
79. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 54.
80. Ibid., p . 36 [translation modified].
81. See Habermas, Kleine Polilische Schriften I-IV (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), p p . 3 2 8 339.
82. K. Gimther, "Kampf gegen das Bose? Wider die ethische Aufrustung der Kriminalpolitik," Kritische Justiz 17 (1994): 135-157.
83. Ibid., p. 144.
84. Ibid., p . 144.
Chapter 8
1. Cf. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996),
chap. 3.
2. A. H o n n e t h , Struggles for Recognition, trans. J. Andersen (Cambridge, 1994).
3. Cf. Ch. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition, rev. ed., A. Gutmann, ed., (Princeton, 1994), pp. 25-73.
4. A. Gutmann, "Introduction," Multiculturalism, p . 8.
5. Cf. Taylor, in Multiculturalism, pp. 58-59.
288
Notes
6. Ibid.
7. J. Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking,
trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p p . 149-204.
8. D. L. Rhode, Justice and Gender (Cambridge, MA, 1989), Part 1.
9. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs," in Unruly Practices (Minneapolis, 1989),
pp. 144-160.
10. S. Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York, 1992), Part 2.
11. P. Berman, ed., Debating PC. (New York, 1992); see also J. Searle, "Storm Over
the University," in the same volume, pp. 85-123.
12. J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam
bridge, MA, 1987).
13. As Gutmann remarks of the deconstructionist method, 'This reductionist argu
ment about intellectual standards is often made on behalf of groups that are underrepresented in the university and disadvantaged in society, but it is hard to see how
it can come to the aid of anyone. The argument is self-undermining, both logically
and practically. By its internal logic, deconstructionism has nothing more to say for
the view that intellectual standards are masks for the will to political power than that
it too reflects the will to power of deconstructionists. But why then bother with
intellectual life at all, which is not the fastest, surest, or even most satisfying path to
political power, if it is political power that one is really after?" "Introduction," Multi
culturalism, pp. 18-19.
14. R. Dworkin, Taking Bights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, 1977).
15. R. Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago, 1994), p. 138.
16. P. Alter, Nationalism (New York, 1989).
17. This essay was written in early 1993.
18. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, 1991).
19. S. Wolf, "Comment," in Multiculturalism, p. 79.
20. Cf. the Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
21. D. Cohn-Bendit and T. Schmid, Heimat Babylon (Hamburg, 1992), p p . 316ff.
22. J. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans.
C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993).
23. J. Rawls, ' T h e Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
7 (1987): 1-25.
24. J. Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate,
trans. S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
289
Notes
25. D. J. van de Kaa, "European Migration at the End of History," European Review 1
(January 1993): 94.
26. E. Wiegand, "Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der Festung Europa. Einstellungen zu
Fremden im europaischen Vergleich," Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ZUMA),
no. 9 (1993): 1-4.
27. M. Walzer, "What Does It Mean to Be an American?" Social Research 57 (1990):
591-614. Walzer notes that the communitarian conception does n o t take account of
the complex composition of a multicultural society (p. 613).
28. R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA,
1992), pp. 128ff.
29. Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, Heimat Babylon, chap. 8.
30. J. H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," Review of Politics 49 (1987): 271; cf. also
J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms, pp. 4 9 1 515.
31. R C. Emmer, "Intercontinental Migration," European Review 1 (January 1993):
67-74: "After 1800 the dramatic increase in the economic growth of Western Europe
could only be maintained as an 'escape hatch.' T h e escape of sixty-one million
Europeans after 1800 allowed the European economies to create such a mix of the
factors of production as to allow for record economic growth and to avoid a situation
in which economic growth was absorbed by an increase in population. After the
Second World War, Europeans also benefitted from intercontinental migration since
the colonial empires forced many colonial subjects to migrate to the metropolis. In
this particular period there was n o danger of overpopulation . . . . Many of the
colonial migrants coming to Europe had been well trained and they arrived at exactly
the time when skilled labor was at a premium in rebuilding Europe's economy"
(pp. 72f.).
32. With a justification that is outrageous from a constitutional point of view, on May
14, 1996 the second senate of the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the constitu
tionality of the clause concerning "third countries" and the clause defining "safe
countries of origin" laid down in the revised version of the Basic Law. This ruling
subordinates the constitution to functional imperatives that call for p r o m p t expul
sion of asylum seekers. As Heribert Prantl wrote (in the Suddeutschen Zeitung of May
14/15, 1996): "Quick expulsion is more important to the constitutional court . . .
than the right to asylum, more important than h u m a n dignity, more important than
the principle of due process."
33. K J. Bade, "Immigration and Integration in Germany since 1945," European
Review 1 (January 1993): 75-79.
34. Bade, "Immigration and Integration," p. 77.
35. See the title essay in J. Habermas, Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt
am Main, 1995).
290
Notes
Chapter 9
1. Cf. H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1965); On Violence (New York, 1970).
2. Cf. F. I. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," Tel Aviv University Studies
in Law 8 (1988): 283: "The political society envisioned by bumper-sticker republicans
is the society of private rights bearers, an association whose first principle is the
protection of the lives, liberties, and estates of its individual members. In that society,
the state is justified by the protection it gives to those prepolitical interests; the
purpose of the constitution is to ensure that the state apparatus, the government,
provides such protection for the people at large rather than serves the special
interests of the governors or their patrons; the function of citizenship is to operate
the constitution and thereby to motivate the governors to act according to that
protective purpose; and the value to you of your political franchiseyour right to
vote and speak, to have your views heard and countedis the handle it gives you on
influencing the system so that it will adequately heed and protect your particular,
prepolitical rights and other interests."
3. O n the distinction between positive and negative freedom see Ch. Taylor, "What
is H u m a n Agency?" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge,
1985), p p . 15-44.
4. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," p. 284: "In [the] civic constitu
tional vision, political society is primarily the society not of rights bearers, but of
citizens, an association whose first principle is the creation and provision of a public
realm within which a people, together, argue and reason about the right terms of
social coexistence, terms that they will set together and which they understand as
comprising their common good. . . . Hence, the state is justified by its purpose of
establishing and ordering the public sphere within which persons can achieve free
dom in the sense of self-government by the exercise of reason in public dialogue."
5. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
Voting Rights," Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 446f. (hereafter 'Voting Rights").
6. Michelman, "Voting Rights," p. 484.
7. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
T h e Case of Pornography Regulation," Tennessee Law Review 291 (1989): 293.
8. Cf. J. Habermas, "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Between Facts and Norms,
trans. W. Rehg (1996), pp. 463-490.
9. Cf. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, article 20, sec. 2.
Index
Anderson, Benedict, 110

Appropriateness, principle of, 45
Arendt, H a n n a h , 247
Argumentation, 38, 42-45
individual interests transformed in, 81
pragmatic theory of, 57-58, 82
public practice of, 68
Aristotle and Aristotelianism
and rational assessment, 6
and Rawls, 54
and Republicanism, 258
on will and reason, 12
Asylum. See Political asylum
Autonomous morality, and positive law,
256-258
Autonomy, 99
and law, 257-258
and popular sovereignty, 250
private and public, 131, 258, 259-262
and feminist politics of equality, 209,
262
in legal domain, 257, 258
and Liberalism 1, 207-208
in postpolitical world, 125
and postwar Europe, 120
and proceduralist conception of law,
264
and procedural popular sovereignty,
139
and Rawls, 67-72, 101
Balance of power, 126, 167, 168, 170,
184
Bluntschli, J o h a n n Caspar, 134
B o d i n j e a n , 250
Bokenforde, Ernst-Wolfgang, 132-133
Born minorities. See at Minorities

Bosnia-Herzogovina/ Croatia
ethnic conflict in, 219
intervention in, 182
Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), 178
Canada
decentralization in, 213
French-speaking minority in, 145, 2 0 6 207, 213, 219, 220
Meech Lake draft constitution for,
219
Carter, Jimmy, 186
Categorical imperative
discourse-theoretical interpretation
of, 33-34, 39
intersubjectivistic interpretation of, 34
and Rawls's original position, 57
Censorship, Kant on, 175-176
Citizen (ship)
double coding of, 113, 131, 132
and immigration, 228
liberalism vs. republicanism on, 240241
Michelman on, 290n.4
vs. philosopher (Rawls), 94-98
as politically autonomous, 71
and solidarity through democratic
process, 159-161
vs. subject, 112
Cognitivism, strong, 6-7
Cognitivism, weak, 6
Communication conditions, for
Socratic dialogue, 19
Communicative account of republican
ism, 139-140
292
Index
Communicative agreement, and moral

justification, 23-24
Communicative context, for demo
cratic citizenship, 159-161
Communicative form of life, 30, 39-41
Communicative freedom, 259
Communicative power, and republican
view on governmental authority,
241,243
Communicative structure of rational
discourse, 37
Communitarian view, 138, 143, 216,
217, 244. See also Republicanism
Community, morality of, 4
Consciousness, philosophy of, 248
Constitutional patriotism, 118, 132,
225-226
Constitutional state, xxxvii
and coercive force, 199
and democracy, 253 (see also Demo
cratic constitutional state)
jurisprudence and political science
on, 253
nation as basis for, 113, 116
permeation of by ethics, 215-216
Contractualism. See Social contract
Cooper, R., 184
Correspondence notion of truth, 36
Cosmopolitan democracy, 166, 186-188
Cosmopolitan idea, 178
Cosmopolitan law, xxxvi, 165, 168, 179,
181
and contemporary world situation,
171-172, 178, 183
and politics of h u m a n rights, 188
and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 193, 195,
199, 285-286n.56
Decentered society, 125, 251
Decisionism, 6
Deconstructionism, Gutmann on,
288n.l3
Deliberative politics, xxxvii, 239, 244,
245-246, 248, 251-252
Democracy and democratic process
deliberative politics on, 246, 248, 2 5 1 252
and discourse theory, xxxvii, 248
and law, 253-254
and autonomous morality, 256-258
and democracy as legitimizing, 254255
and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264
and h u m a n rights, 258-260

and private and public autonomy,
260-262, 264
liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 3 9 244, 246-248 {see also Liberalism;
Republicanism)
and Schmitt, 134-137, 197
social integration through, 159
Democratic constitutional state, 112,
203
and marginalized cultural forms, 205
Schmitt on, 138
undermining of, 123
Dialogical politics, 245
Disagreements, three kinds of, 91-93
Discourse, normative, 19-20
Discourse-ethical model of justification,
43
Discourse ethics, 39, 57-58
on moral point of view, 33, 41-45, 57
and religious foundations, 34-36
and validity, 36-38
Discourse principle, 41
and categorical imperative, 33-34, 39
and legitimacy, 260
moral point of view justified through,
41-45
and pluralistic society, 39-41
questions for, 46
Discourse theory, 248-249, 249-250,
251
and democratic procedure, 259
and minorities, 143
Discrimination
and multiculturalism, xxxvii
reverse, 221
and secession, 143, 145
Dworkin, Ronald, 28, 56, 206, 216
Emotivism, 6
Empiricism
and Gibbard, 16
and morality, 12-16
and Tugendhat, 16, 23
Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 197-198
Epistemic reasons, 16, 25, 35
Equality
democratic (Schmitt), 135, 136
feminist politics of, 208-209, 217, 2 6 2 264
legal and factual, 254, 262
and respect, 205
and rights vs. goods, 28
293
Index
Ethical insights, 25-26, 272n.34

Ethical point of view, 26-28. See also
Moral point of view
Ethical questions, 215-216
vs. questions of justice or morality, 66
and Rawls's theory, 98-99
Ethics
constitutional state permeated by, 2 1 5 216
legal systems permeated by, 218, 227
political culture permeated by, 225
Ethnic cleansing, 141-142, 219. See also
Genocide
Ethnic nation, xxxvi
Ethnonationalism, 129-130
and Schmitt's account, 134138
and treatment of minorities, 142
Eurocentrism, 213
European Community, 152
and immigration, 226-227
European public sphere, 177
European Union, 123-124, 150-153,
155-161
and communicative context of social
integration, 159-161
democratic deficit of, 155, 156, 157
and Security Council, 187
Evolution, and Gibbard on normative
discourse, 18, 20
Federalism, German, 161
Federalization, 220
Feminism, 208-210, 211
radical, 210, 263
Feminist politics of equality, 208-209,
217, 262-264
Fichte, J. G., atheism controversy over,
176
First World, 184
Flick, Friedrich, 195
Forst, Rainer, 91
France, development of national con
sciousness in, 234
Frederick II (king of Prussia), 175
Freedom. See also Liberties
of the ancients and of the moderns,
258
Kant on, 192
national and individual, 114, 1 3 1 132
Free rider problem, and Hobbesianism, 15, 80
French-speaking population of Can
ada, 145, 206-207, 213, 219, 220
Functionalist explanation of morality,

12
and Gibbard, 16-20
and Tugendhat, 16, 20
Fundamentalism, 223-224
and political integration, 229
Gehlen, Arnold, 198
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction,
xxxv
Genocide, 142, 195. See also Ethnic
cleansing
German federalism, as European
model, 161
Germany
adaptations needed by, 235-236
development of national conscious
ness in, 234-235
"historians' debate" in, 225
and political asylum, 227, 230, 2 3 2 234, 289n.32
and voting rights for resident aliens,
191
Gibbard, Allan, 16, 17-20, 24
Giddens, Anthony, 120
"Global domestic politics," 126
Globalization, 106, 120-122, 124, 1 2 5 127, 157-158, 174, 183
Global public sphere, 176-177
God, and morality, 7-10
Golden Rule, 31, 90
Good(s), 273n.41
and right(s), 28-30, 56
Grimm, Dieter, 155, 156-157, 158, 159,
161
Guehenno, J. M., 125
Gulf War
and Eurocentrism, 213
as expansion of limits, 182
and global public sphere, 176
and Security Council discretion, 180
Gimther, Klaus, 45, 200-201
Gutmann, Amy, 205, 206
Hare, R. M., 6
Hart, H. L. A., 56
Hegel, G. W. F , 40
and administrative state, 125
and capitalist development, 173
and history, 106
and Kant, 100, 188, 198
of Mussolini and Lenin, 198
and social contract theory, 138
and World Spirit, 178
294
Index
Heller, H e r m a n n , 151
Hobbes, Thomas, and Hobbesian view,
80
contractualism, 6
and free rider, 15
and m o d e r n law, 109
in path to Kant, 80-83
and Rawls, 54, 85
and rights over duties, 191
H o n n e t h , Axel, 204
Horkheimer, Max, 198
Humanitarian intervention, xxxvixxxvii, 146-150
H u m a n rights, 189-193. See also Rights
ambiguity of, 189-190
and Kant on law, 180-181
origins of, 189
politics of, 166, 186-193, 201
and popular sovereignty, 112, 258-260
vs. prohibition on intervention, 147
and Schmitt, 136, 188-189, 192-193,
197, 198-199
and UN, 181-182, 285n.42
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 40
H u m e , David, 13
Immigration, 226-232, 289n.31
and German politics of asylum, 227,
230, 232-234, 289n.32
and multicultural self-understanding,
159-160
Imperialism, European, 116, 172
Insights, ethical, 25-26, 272n.34
Instrumental politics, 245
International civil society, 177
International Court, 180
International law
and "civilizing" of war (Schmitt), 194,
197
and contemporary world situation, 183
and globalization, 174
and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 165
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as prece
dent for, 182
sovereignty in, 147
state as subject of, 108, 178
transformation of to cosmopolitan
law, 150
and war, 167, 178
International relations
balance of power in, 126
and cosmopolitan law, 165
and Kant's federation of nations, 179
and priority of right over good, 28
International trade, and Kant on fed

eration for peace, 171, 173-175
Intersubjectivistic understanding of pro
cedural popular sovereignty, 1 3 8 139
Israel, founding of, 212-213
Justice, 10
and ethical point of view, 27-28
vs. ethical questions, 66, 245
and priority of right over good, 28
and solidarity, 10, 30, 40
Justice, Rawls's theory of. See Rawls,
John
Justification. See also Argumentation;
Validity
moral, 5
communicative agreement in, 23-24
discourse-ethical model of, 43
normative, 43, 45
pragmatic conception of, 37
in Rawls's theory, 77, 84-98
semantic conception of, 36-37
Kant, Immanuel, 6-7
alternative to proceduralism of, 83-86
and autonomy, 112, 259
categorical imperative of, 57
on coercive law, 71
and democratic self-determination,
139
on freedom, 192
and freedom of nation, 114
and Hegel, 100, 188, 198
humanist morality of, 197
and instrumental rationality, 13
and justice, 30
on law, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255
on liberties of ancients and moderns,
69
and morality as self-legislation, 30-33
on norms as maxims of action, 17
in path from Hobbes, 80-83
and perpetual peace, xxxvi, 165-171,
282-283n.4
and contemporary global situation,
179-186
historical experience of arguments
for, 167, 171-178
and politics of h u m a n rights, 186-193
and Schmitt's critique, 188-189, 192201, 285-286n.56
and Rawls, 49, 85-86, 88, 100
and right(s), 140
295
Index
to equal individual liberties, 206

and universalization, 24
on will and reason, 12
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral The
ory" (Rawls), 59, 82
Kantian Republicanism, 101
Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 178
Kelsen, Hans, 187
Kierkegaard, S0ren, 6
Kurds, 219
Kymlicka, Will, 221
Language, in Gibbard's theory, 18
Law and legal norms, 71-72, 191, 214^
215, 217. See also Cosmopolitan law;
International law; Natural law
as coercive or as laws of freedom, 255
and culturally defined groups, 215
and democratic process, 253-254
and democracy as legitimizing, 254
255
and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264
and h u m a n rights, 258-260
and private and public autonomy,
260-262, 264
ethical neutrality of, 215
as factual constraint and as perfor
mative, 255
Kant on, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255
liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 4 1 243
modern, 71, 214, 254-256
and morality, 201, 256-258
moralization of, 198-200
positive, 71, 254, 256-258
proceduralist conception of, 264
public vs. private, 109
League of Nations, 126, 169, 178, 188
Legal system, as ethically permeated,
218,227
Legitimation and legitimacy
and discourse principle, 260
extension of citizenship for, 132
of legal norms, 256-257
and m o d e r n law, 254, 255
and nation-state, 111-112
and supernational units, 150-151
Walzer on, 149
Lenin, V. I., 134-135, 198
Lessing, Gottfried, 66
Liberalism, 258
and gender equality, 262-263
and morality, 29
neutrality of, 75
and pluralism, 78-79
political (Rawls), 76
political achievements of, 204
and private vs. public, 98-101
on role of democratic process, 239244, 246, 247-248, 249, 250
and Michelman on "bumper-sticker
republicanism," 290n.2
Liberalism 1, 205, 207-208, 210, 216
Liberalism 2, 205, 216
Liberal legal paradigm, 261
Liberal political culture, 177-178
Liberia, intervention in, 182
Liberties. See also Freedom
of the ancients, 69
of the moderns, 68-69
Locke, J o h n
and h u m a n rights, 189
and law, 254
and liberalism, 258
Liibbe, H e r m a n n , 129, 152
Majority rule, and minorities, 144
Marriage, conventionalism in guaran
tees for, 218
Marx, Karl, 108
Mead, G. H., 29, 40, 57-58, 81
Metaethical skepticism, 12
Michelman, Frank, 239, 245
Minorities
and politics of recognition, 205-210
struggle for recognition of, 211-212
Minorities, born, and democratic selfdetermination, 143-146
Minorities, national, 219-220
Modern condition, 78-80
Modern constitutions, 203
Modernity, and political correctness de
bate, 213-214
Modern law, 71, 214
formal properties of, 254-256
and individual rights, 256
Moral attitudes
empiricist view of, 13-14
and pragmatic reasons or prefer
ences, 16
Moral community, xxxvi, 29
Tugendhat on, 20-22, 23
Morality, xxxv
as cognitive, 3
and affective attitudes, 4-5
and discourse principle, 39-46
296
Index
Morality (cont.)
and empiricism, 12-16
and ethical insight, 25-26
and ethical point of view, 26-28
and Gibbard's approach, 16-20, 24
and Kant on self-legislation, 30-33
and loss of religious foundation, 7 12, 23, 34-36
m o d e r n moral programs on, 5-7
and moral rules, 4
and obligation, 3-4
and right-good relation, 28-30
and Tugendhat's approach, 16, 20-25
and validity of truth claims or moral
claims, 36-38
vs. ethical questions, 66
functionalist explanation of, 12, 16-20
and individual life-histories, 100
and law, 201, 256-258
and liberalism, 29
Moral person
freedom of, 101
in Rawls's theory, 59, 68
Moral point of view, 7, 31, 38, 39, 81.
See also Obligation
and application of norms, 45-46
discourse ethics on, 33, 41-45, 57
philosophy as clarification of, 72
and public practice of argumentation,
68
and Rawls's justification process, 95, 99
and Rawls's original position, 52, 57,
81,82
and social criticism, 98
Moral realism, 11, 36, 270-271n.7
Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79
Moral skepticism, 36
Moral universalism, 40
Multiculturalism, xxxvii
and equality for individuals in diverse
groups, 220-226
and ethical neutrality of law and poli
tics, 215-216
and federalization, 220
and inclusion, 145-146
nation-state challenged by, 117
social and cultural rights as require
ments i n , 1 1 8
Mussolini, Benito, and Hegel, 198
Nation (s)
democratic constitution as basis vs.
creation of, 133-134
and European union, 150-153
and humanitarian intervention, 146150

and minorities, 143-146
and national self-determination, 140143
and postcolonial Asian or African
states, 152-153
and procedural popular sovereignty,
137-139
and Schmitt's account, 134-137
development of consciousness of, 109111
and "ethnonationalism," 129-130
formation of, 153
as social integration, 112-113
vs. state, 107-108
National identity, 130-131
Nationalism, 132
and antisemitism, 111
and fundamentalism, 223-224
and republicanism, 114-117, 132, 224
and right of self-determination, 141
and self-assertion, 172, 173-174
Nationalist movements, 212-213
Nationality principle, 134, 140, 141,
142
National minorities, 219. See also at
Minorities
National self-determination
meaning and limits of, 140-143
right to, 116
Walzer on, 148
Nation-states, xxxvi
abolition or transformation of, 124127
and ambivalence in freedom of na
tion, 113-114
and ambivalence of nationalism vs. re
publicanism, 114-117
challenges to, 106-107, 117, 157-158
double coding of citizenship in, 113,
131, 132
history of formation of, 105-106, 147,
153,219
restrictions of internal sovereignty in,
120-124
and Schmitt on democracy, 134-137
as solution to problems of legitima
tion and integration, 111-113, 132133
and state vs. nation, 107-111
and subaltern peoples, 142
transformation of loyalties in, 131
unity of political culture in, 117-120
297
Index
Natural law
in creationist metaphysics, 9
and legitimacy, 255
Nazis, racist policies of, 116
Noncognitivism, strong, 5-6
Noncognitivism, weak, 6, 25
Nongovernmental organizations, 177
Normative governance, Gibbard on,
19
Normative justification, and principle
of universalization, 45
Normative statements, and Rawls, 63-64
Normativity, Gibbard's expressivist ac
count of, 18
Norms, vs. values, 54-55
North Atlantic Charter, 181
Nuremberg trials, 178, 182
Obligation, 3-4. See also Morality
and contractualist tradition, 80
vs. loyalties, 24
and norms vs. values, 54-55
vs. value-orientations, 26
Original position, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 59
Other, and universalism, xxxv-xxxvi
Paternalism
of Liberalism 1, 207
and Rawls's theory, 95
in substantive conception of good, 28
welfare, 262, 263
Patriotism, constitutional, 118, 132,
225-226
Peace, Senghasses' view of, 185
Peacekeeping, politics of, 150
Perpetual peace. See underKant, Immanuel
Perspective-taking, reciprocal, 42
Philosophy, 77
Hobbes-to-Kant path in, 80-83
in Rawls's justification procedure, 9 4 98
task of, 18, 72
Philosophy of consciousness, 248
Pluralism
and discourse principle, 39-41
as First World indicator, 184
and hidden interests, 244-245
and liberalism, 78-79
and nation-state, 117
and Rawls's theory, 59-61, 66, 68, 77,
85, 88, 94
and religion as basis of morality, 10

and social integration, 133
and universalization, 57
Political asylum, 227, 230
in Germany, 227, 230, 232-234,
289n.32
Political correctness, debate about,
213-214
Political culture
and ethics, 225
and legal constitution, 177
in multicultural society, 146
and postnational Europe, 153, 282n.54
unity of, 117-120
Political liberalism. See Liberalism
Political Liberalism (Rawls), 49, 77, 82,
83, 94, 96, 99. See also Rawls, J o h n
Political process, liberal vs. republican
view on, 243-244
Political public sphere. See Public
sphere
Politics of h u m a n rights, 166, 186-193,
201
Politics of peacekeeping, 150
Politics of recognition (Taylor), xxxvii,
205-210
and actualization of rights, 217-218
and equal rights to coexistence, 220226
and feminism, 209-211 (see also Femi
nist politics of equality)
and immigration, 226-232, 289n.31
and minorities, 211-212, 219-220
and nationalist movements, 212-213
and value of cultures, 221
Popper, K . R . , 6
Popular sovereignty, 250-251
and European Union, 151
and h u m a n rights, 112, 258-260
procedural, 137-139
Positive law, 71
and legitimacy, 254
Postcolonial states, 152-153
Postmodernism, xxxv, 214
Postnational forms of society, xxxvi, 119
Postpolitical world, 124-125
Practical reason
empiricist view of, 12-13
and Hobbes, 80
in Kantian tradition, 81
and pragmatic theory of argumenta
tion, 82
Rawls on, 64, 82-83
298
Index
Pragmatic conception of justification,

37
Pragmatic theory of argumentation, 5 7 58, 82
Primary goods
and liberal social reform, 204
in Rawls's theory, 54, 56
Principle of appropriateness, 45
Principle of universalization, 42-43, 45,
46, 57
Private autonomy. See under Autonomy
"Private law society," 261
Proceduralist conception of law, 264
Procedural popular sovereignty, 137138
intersubjectivistic understanding of,
138-139
Public autonomy. See under Autonomy
Public sphere
and Arendt's view, 247
in decentered society, 251
and Kant on federation for peace,
171, 175-178
Michelman on, 290n.4
on republican understanding of poli
tics, 240
Public use of reason
and assimilation, 228
in Kantian Republicanism, 101
in Rawls's theory, 59, 64-65, 68, 94
and acceptance, 61
and basic liberal rights, 72
consensus assumed by, 84, 92
and nonpublic reasons, 86
political stability preserved by, 70
procedural requirements for, 98
and "reasonable," 92
Quebec, French-speaking majority of,
206-207, 213, 219, 220
Rational agreement, 19, 272n.22
Rationalization, 250
Rawls, J o h n , xxxvi, 49-50
and alternative to Kantian proceduralism, 83-86
avoidance strategy of, 72-73, 75, 99
and ethically neutral legal order,
206
and Hobbes-to-Kant path, 80-83
and liberalism on public vs. private,
98-101
and m o d e r n conditions, 79-80
and moral point of view, 52, 57, 81
and nonfundamentalist worldviews,

224
and original position, 51-59, 89
and overlapping consensus, 59-63, 67,
68, 77-78, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 91, 100
and acceptability vs. acceptance, 6 1 63 .
and philosopher's vs. citizen's role,
94-98
points in critique of, 50-51
and political conception of justice, 5 9 60, 63, 65-66, 70, 75-77
and private or public autonomy, 6 7 72, 101
and rational agreement, 24
and "reasonable," 63-67, 86-89, 92,
93, 94
and right(s) vs. good(s), 56, 66, 93
Realism, moral, 11, 36, 270-271n.7
Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79
Reason, public use of. See Public use of
reason
"Reasonable," and Rawls's theory, 6 3 67, 86-89, 92, 93, 94
Reason in Rawls's outlook, 49, 82
and original position, 52
Reciprocal perspective-taking, 42
Recognition, politics of. See Politics of
recognition
Reflective equilibrium, of Rawls, 60, 76,
90, 97-98
Reflective reconstruction, and moral
justification, 5
Republicanism (republican principles),
117, 258
and collective identity, 159
communicative account of, 139-140
and Kant on federation for peace, 172
Kantian, 101
and liberties, 69
and nationalism, 114-117, 132, 224
and national self-determination, 141,
142
and nation-state, xxxvi
on role of democratic process, 2 3 9 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250
Schmitt in opposition to, 136-137
universalistic content of, xxxv
Reverse discrimination, 221
Rights. See also H u m a n rights
basic, 190-191, 258
to coexistence, 220-226
and equality for women, 210
vs. good(s), 28-30, 56
299
Index
Kant on, 140

on liberal vs. republican view, 241,
242-243
and m o d e r n constitutions, 203
and m o d e r n law, 256
as primary goods (Rawls), 54
and shift to popular sovereignty, 112
and social contract theory, 15
Rorty, Richard, 60
Rousseau, J e a n j a c q u e s
and autonomy, 112, 69, 259
and democratic self-determination,
139
and law, 254
and Schmitt on democracy, 137
Rushdie, Salman, 224
St. Pierre, Abb, 165
Scanlon, Thomas, 60, 80, 81
Schmitt, Carl, 134-138
on cosmopolitan law, 181
and Federal Constitutional Court,
151
and Grimm, 158-159
on international humanitarianism,
188-189, 192-201
and intervention, 147-148
and right of national self-determina
tion, 141-142
Schulze, H., I l l , 130
Scottish moral philosphy, 6, 13
Secession, justification of, 143> 145
Second World, 184
Seel, Martin, 22
Semantic conception of justification,
36-37
Senghass, Dieter and Eva, 185
Skepticism
metaethical, 12
moral, 36
value-skepticism, 79
Social contract, 13, 14-15, 16, 23, 80
and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 168,
169
vs. Schmitt's account, 137-138
Social democracy, political achieve
ments of, 204
Social integration. See also Solidarity
communicative context of, 159-161
and nation-state,* 111-113
in pluralistic societies, 133
solidarity as, 240, 249
Social welfare model, and critique of

liberal paradigm, 261
Social-welfare policies. See also Welfare
state
and equality for women, 209
and gender equality, 263
Social welfare state. See Welfare state
Social world, 38
Socratic dialogue, 19
Solidarity, xxxv-xxxvi, 10. See also Social
integration
democratic participation as source of,
112,159-161
and justice, 10, 30, 40
and material conditions, 119
nation as source of, 111
as social integration, 240, 249
Somalia
intervention in, 182, 231
as Third World, 184
Sovereignty
and boundary between domestic and
foreign policy, 174
external, 114, 146-147, 150, 179
and humanitarian intervention, 146150
internal, 146, 147, 170, 179
in international law, 147
limits of in nation-state, 120-124
popular, 112, 137-139, 250-251, 2 5 8 260
State. See also Constitutional state
apparatus of, 108-109
arid European Union, 155
vs. nation, 107-108
and national identity, 130-131
in postcolonial Asia and Africa, 152
social makeup of, 218
sovereignty of, 146
Stevenson, C. L., 6
Strong cognitivism, 6
Strong noncognitivism, 5-6
Taylor, Charles, 205, 216, 226, 227. See
also Politics of Recognition
Theory of Communicative Action, The
(Habermas), xxxv
Theory of Justice, A (Rawls), 49, 53, 61,
82, 88, 94. See also Rawls, J o h n
Third World, 183-184
Tokyo military tribunals, 178, 182
Truth
cooperative search for, 19
correspondence notion of, 36
300
Index
Truth (cont.)
and reasonableness (Rawls's theory),
63, 65-66, 67, 77, 95
in religious or metaphysical worldviews, 85
as validity, 36-37
Tugendhat, Ernst, 16, 17, 20-25
Underclass, 122-123, 158
United Nations, 105, 107, 126, 127,
178, 179-180
as "cosmopolitan democracy," 186-188
and First World, 184
General Assembly of, 149, 183, 187
overall safeguarding by, 231
and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 197
and war crimes, 285n.42
United Nations Charter, 179
and prohibition of intervention in,
147
and Schmitt, 193
on self-determination, 143
United States, 113
and ethical permeation of legal sys
tem, 227
and immigration, 159-160, 228
as Maastricht Treaty analogy, 151
political culture of, 118
recognition of independence of, 143
and World Court (Nicaragua case),
180
Universalism, xxxv-xxxvi
moral, 40
postmodern suspicion of, xxxv
Universalization, principle of, 42-43,
45,46,57
Utilitarianism, 5-6, 11-12
and Rawls, 54
Scanlon's argument against, 80
Validity, 35-38
Value-orientations, 81
vs. obligations, 26
Values, vs. norms, 54-55
Value-skepticism, Rawls's rejection of,
79
Veil of ignorance, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 52, 57-59
Vienna conference on h u m a n rights,
182
Vietnam War, and global public
sphere, 176
Voltaire, 175
Walzer, Michael, 148-149, 205, 216

War
as crime, 167, 178
and Schmitt's analysis, 147-148, 188,
193, 194-196, 197-198
in Third World, 184
Weak cognitivism, 6
Weak noncognitivism, 6, 25
Weber, Max, 70, 105, 108, 130
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 129, 133
Weimar Republic, 134
Weizsacker, C. F. von, 126
Welfare paternalism, 262, 263
Welfare state. See also Social-welfare poli
cies
class antagonisms pacified by, 174
in postwar Europe, 119-120
and private vs. public autonomy, 71
and supranational institutions, 157158
Wilson, Woodrow, 134-135, 178
Wolf, Susan, 221
World Court, 187
Yugoslavia, former, 184, 285n.42

Habermas The Inclusion of The Other Ok

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The Inclusion of the Other

Studies in Contemporary G e r m a n Social T h o u g h t (partial listing)

The Inclusion of the Other

This translation 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ISBN 0-262-08267-5 (he) 0-262-58186-8 (pb)

I H o w Rational Is the Authority o f the Ought?

3 " R e a s o n a b l e " versus " T r u e , " o r t h e Morality of

III Is T h e r e a Future for the Nation-State?

6 Does E u r o p e N e e d a Constitution? Response to

IV H u m a n Rights: Global and Internal

V What Is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"?

T h e w i d e - r a n g i n g essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e p r o v i d e a n overview

H a b e r m a s ' s political p h i l o s o p h y is m a r k e d by a d u a l focus t h a t

However, this n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h to law a n d politics is in n e e d of

T h e Discourse T h e o r y o f Morality and Law

c o n s e n s u s " o n basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w h i c h t h e y justify separately

universal s c o p e . However, t h e very n a t u r e of m o r a l i t y m e a n s t h a t it

b e a c c o m p l i s h e d t h a t is, positive, coercive lawset strict limits o n

i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y or, alternatively, of

solved; b u t in pluralistic societies d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d decisions c o n

Public R e a s o n and Deliberative D e m o c r a c y

H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for

tions t h a t m a k e possible a flourishing civil s o c i e t y . T h e p u b l i c

H a b e r m a s claims t h a t this p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative

c h a n g e of i d e a s in t h e " b a c k g r o u n d c u l t u r e of civil society" in w h i c h

of p u b l i c justification m e a n s t h a t Rawls m u s t restrict t h e validity

T h e Future o f the Nation-State in an Era o f Globalization

T h e essays c o l l e c t e d in P a r t s III a n d IV of this v o l u m e r e p r e s e n t

to m o s t a r g u m e n t s for c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , however, H a b e r m a s ' s p o i n t

H a b e r m a s ' s m a i n t a r g e t in this discussion is t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t

Moreover, t h e c o n c e r n to leave i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r

d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n is precisely to s t r e n g t h e n its political

Multiculturalism and the Rights o f Cultural Minorities

H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m serves to illustrate t h e

t o w a r d difference a n d h e n c e with difficulties in d e a l i n g with s o m e

T h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r a n d originality of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of politi

as a m a t t e r of cultivating p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life, c u s t o m s , a n d values

(2) A s e c o n d a s p e c t of H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k t h a t u n d e r g i r d s its sensi

h a r m o n y b e t w e e n basic legal n o r m s a n d morality, for H a b e r m a s

O f t h e essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e , I a m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e

a m i n d e b t e d to P a b l o D e Greiff, Vic P e t e r s o n , a n d Bill R e h g for

T h e studies c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e w e r e w r i t t e n since t h e a p p e a r

d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a n d e x t e n d s its p e r m e a b l e b o u n d a r i e s ever further.

How Rational Is the Authority of the Ought?

n o n c o g n i t i v i s t views s u c h as emotivism (e.g., t h a t of S t e v e n s o n ) a n d

voluntaristic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s n o t yet e n d o w n o r m a t i v e validity

by a divinely a u t h o r i z e d way of life t h a t we a r e e n j o i n e d to e m u l a t e .

two different perspectives o n t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e .

its force, a n d with it t h e soteriological c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r j u s t

E m p i r i c i s m identifies practical r e a s o n with i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n .

T a k i n g this as t h e i r basis, t h e two classical e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m s

(b) Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y overlooks t h e d i m e n s i o n of solidarity

t i o n of a system of j u s t i c e directly t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e individual,

b e t r u e o r false, b u t only t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l . A n d t h e only war

t r u s t i n t h e o r i e n t i n g p o w e r of " n o r m a t i v e discourses": "I shall call

T h e preferences that T u g e n d h a t sp^

H e r e I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e o u t s e t b e t w e e n value-orientations (Wertorientierungen) a n d o b l i g a t i o n s (Verpflichtungeri). We j u d g e

b e " t r u m p e d " by d u t i e s a n d r i g h t s by r i g h t s (as D w o r k i n p u t s i t ) .

If we i n t e r p r e t j u s t i c e as w h a t is equally g o o d for all, t h e n t h e

"free." O n l y s o m e o n e w h o lets his will b e d e t e r m i n e d by i n s i g h t i n t o

T h e n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t flows f r o m t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself as

T h e abstract opposition between a u t o n o m y a n d h e t e r o n o m y nar

clarification a n d discourses of n o r m a t i v e justification ( a n d applica