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2nd edition
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Second edition
March 2007
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March 2007
Published by
ENERGY INSTITUTE, LONDON
The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003
Registered charity number 1097899
Endorsed by
The United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association and the HSE Offshore Safety Division
The Energy Institute gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions towards the scientific and
technical programme from the following companies
BG Group
BHP Billiton Limited
BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd
BP Oil UK Ltd
Chevron
ConocoPhillips Ltd
ENI
ExxonMobil International Ltd
Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd
Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited
IV
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword
vii
Acknowledgements
viii
Introduction
Background to the revision of Guidelines for the management of safety critical elements 3
Applicable legislation
7
7
7
7
7
7
Identification of SCEs
13
15
17
17
18
19
20
Change management
9.1 Modifications
9.2 Temporary equipment
21
21
21
23
vi
FOREWORD
In 2005, the UKOOA led Installation Integrity Working Group (IIWG) requested that the Energy Institute manage
the review and revision of the UKOOA Guidelines for the management of safety critical elements, first issued in
September 1996. This project required the formation of a separate (sub) Working Group from the parent IIWG
members.
The revision exercise was part of a programme of work undertaken by the IIWG which included development and
promotion of industry good practices and suitable performance measures. A principal deliverable of this Working
Group was the Asset Integrity Tool Kit, which includes an Assurance and Verification Tool outlining the
requirement for identification, assurance and verification of Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements.
These Guidelines are therefore considered as providing valuable input for this element of the management of
installation integrity.
It is intended that these Guidelines should provide good practice for the management of safety critical elements for
offshore installations and will be of use principally for those involved in assurance and verification. The document
should also provide a useful guide for duty holders, managers of operations, safety, engineering and maintenance
functions, and an initial introduction for those who wish to become involved in the subject.
This document has been compiled as guidance only and while every reasonable care has been taken to ensure the
accuracy and relevance of its contents, the Energy Institute, its sponsoring companies, the document writer and the
Working Group members listed in the Acknowledgements who have contributed to its preparation, cannot accept
any responsibility for any action taken, or not taken, on the basis of this information. The Energy Institute shall not
be liable to any person for any loss or damage which may arise from the use of any of the information contained in
any of its publications.
These Guidelines will be reviewed in future and it would be of considerable assistance for any subsequent revision
if users would send comments or suggestions for improvements to:
The Technical Department,
Energy Institute,
61 New Cavandish Street,
London
W1G 7AR
e: technical@energyinst.org.uk
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Institute wishes to record its appreciation of the work carried out by the following individuals:
Tim Walsh of Lloyds Register EMEA, for the drafting of this document.
Members of the Joint Industry Working Group, which was set up to steer the re-drafting programme and who have
provided valuable expertise:
Keith Hart
Lee Broadley
Simon Brown
Bernard Emery
Peter Griffiths
Paul Kefford
Bob Kyle
Alex Macleod
Bill McKenzie
Alan Richardson
Ian Wright
BV
BV
BV
DNV
The Institute also wishes to recognise the contribution made by those who have provided comments on the Draft
document which was issued during an industry consultation period.
viii
1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to provide industry
guidance for the management of Safety Critical
Elements (SCEs) on offshore installations operating on
the UK continental shelf. SCEs are the equipment and
systems which provide the basis to manage the risks
associated with Major Accident Hazards (MAHs). This
document should be read in conjunction with the
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Guidelines. This
publication replaces that of the same title produced by
the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) in
1996.
The starting point for this guidance is a review of
the applicable legislation and a summary of the key
concepts underpinning the management of SCEs. The
These include:
Major modifications being carried out to existing
installations as they are developed for changing
field characteristics and functions, which may be
very different to those for which they were
originally designed.
Replacement of verification aspects of the Offshore
Installations (Design & Construction) Regulations
(1996) by the Offshore Safety Case Regulations
(2005).
Installations that are being operated well beyond
their original design life.
Changing ownership, and in some cases, multiple
changes of ownership, of many older assets and the
prevalence of smaller independent operators, some
of whom are new entrants to the UK sector.
The increasing importance of decommissioning
activities.
3
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION
The requirement for industry to manage SCEs is
covered either directly or indirectly by the following
regulations:
The Offshore Installations
Regulations 2005.
Regulations
OSCR 2005
(Safety
Case)
Section
Regulation 2
Areas covered
Definition of Safety Critical Elements
Definition of Major Accident Hazards
Assurance of the fitness for purpose of SCEs
Independent Competent Persons
PFEER 1995
Regulation 19
Schedule 7
Regulation 5
Performance Standards
Regulation 19
its purpose.
It is a requirement that Performance Standards
should be established for all SCEs.
4.4 VERIFICATION SCHEMES
Verification schemes are written schemes implemented
to confirm, or otherwise, that SCEs are suitable and
remain in good repair and condition. As from April
2006 verification schemes should also cover specified
plant required by PFEER and previously subject to
PFEER written schemes of examination.
IDENTIFICATION OF SCEs
Although there are various different, and equally
acceptable, ways of identifying SCEs there are steps
10
IDENTIFICATION OF SCEs
PRIMARY
MAJOR
HAZARDS
PRESSURE VESSELS
PIPING
PIPELINES
WELLS
IGNITION
CONTROL
Ex CERTIFIED EQUIP.
ELECTRICAL TRIPPING EQUIP.
EARTHING AND BONDING EQUIP.
FIRE
EXPLOSION
MAJOR
ACCIDENT
SCENARIOS
MAJOR
ACCIDENT
HAZARDS
HELICOPTER
CRASH
SAFEGUARDING
SYSTEMS
FIRE
PROTECTION
NAVIGATIONAL
AIDS
SHIP
COLLISION
STRUCTURES
MAJOR
HAZARDS
REGISTER
STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
DROPPED
OBJECTS
LIFTING
EQUIPMENT
ROTATING
EQUIPMENT
COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT
TURBINE
DISC
FAILURE
FLOW
ESCAPE,
EVACUATION AND
RESCUE EQUIPMENT
11
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
AND ASSESSMENT
12
6
DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS
This activity follows from the identification of MAHs
and selection of SCEs described in Section 5.
The creation of Performance Standards (PSs) is the
process by which a duty holder sets out what is
expected of an SCE. The PSs are the criteria against
which the initial and ongoing suitability of an SCE is
assessed. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessments may
be used to develop PSs for instrument based protective
systems.
Performance Standards for SCEs are generally
defined in terms of:
13
14
2.
3.
4.
15
16
8.1.2
3.
4.
8.1.3
5.
6.
Verification activities
17
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4
Execution
(i)
Identification
of design
deliverables
for
verification.
Timing of verification submissions for design.
Scope of procurement/fabrication verification
activities.
Scope of verification activities during Hook up
Installation and Commissioning (HUIC).
Verification during start-up activities.
Close-out of Construction (Project) Verification
Scope.
8.3.1
8.3.4
ICP Recommendations
Scheme revision
8.4 DECOMMISSIONING
Reporting
8.4.1
Review of MAHs.
9
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Identification of new SCEs.
Reassessment of existing Performance Standards
and the need for new Performance Standards for
new SCEs.
Need to clearly document project verification
activities for "initial suitability".
Incorporation of changes and modifications into
ongoing operational verification (and maintenance)
regimes with any proposed revisions to SCE
maintenance regimes being reviewed by the ICP.
Involvement of operations and the "Operational"
ICP in project scope.
9.1 MODIFICATIONS
9.1.1
9.2.2
9.2.3
22
10
REFERENCES AND
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
10.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
FEED
HUIC
ICPs
MAHs
MDR
OSCR
PFEER
PSs
SCEs
UKOOA
23
24
Energy Institute
e: pubs@energyinst.org.uk
www.energyinst.org.uk