Function and Functional : A Synthetic Perspective Martin Mahner, Mario Bunge Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), 75-94. Stable URL: http flinksjstor.orgsici?sici=003 1-8248 % 28200 103% 2068%3A | 3C75%3 APAFASP3E2.0,CO*SB29 Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at flip: feworwjtor org/aboutterms.htmal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in par, that unless you fave obtained pcior permission, you may not dowaload an cnt isus of @ journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial uss. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bhupsferww.jstoc.org/joumals‘ucpresshtel. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving.a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact jstor-info@umich edu. hup:thvwwjstor.orgy ‘Thu Mar 18 09:55:18 2004Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective’ Martin Mahner and Mario Bungett ‘Cente fr Inquiry-Europe; Departnent of Plosophy, MeGill Univesity In this paper we examine the following problems: How many concepts af function are there in biology, social science, and (echnology! Are they logically related and if +0, how? Which of these function concepts effect a functional explanation ax oppased to a mere functional account? What are the consequences of a pluralist view of functions fo functionals? We sutwait that there are five concepts of function in biology, whic are logically related in a particular way, and sx function concepts in social science and technology. Only two of thera may belp effet a geauine functional explacation, Finally, ‘our synthetic approach allows us to distinguish four diferent varieties of functionalist, in biology, psychology, social scence, and technology: formalist, black boxist, aday- tationist, and teleological. And only one of them is explanatory in the strong sense defended here 1. Introduction. Philosophical analyses of the concepts of function and functional explanation are legion. It is obvious from these studies thatthe ‘word ‘function’ does not designate a single all-purpose concept of fumc- tion, but in fact a plurality of function concepts. However, it is still not clear how many function concepts there are, and whether they are logically related, and if so, how. Nor is it clear which of these many function con- cepts occur in which scientific disciplines: Is there one or more universal function concept which can be found in any branch of science, and are there specific motions occurring only in a particular science? Furthermore, if the Word ‘function’ designates a plurality of concepts, what precisely is ‘Received March 1999; revised October 2000. Send requests for reprints to Martin Mahaer, Center for Inquiry-Europe, Arhilger ‘Weg 11, 1-64380 Rossdorf, Germany; email: mabner@gwup.org. We thank Michel Kary and Dan A. Seni, aswell as an anonymous referee for useful suggestions that helped (o improve the original manuscript. ep Sinn an 5 pp. ODO ns. ‘Copan 20! by loopy af me Anoaeicn Al ina ore 186 MARTIN MABINER AND MARIO BUNGE 4 functional explanation? And what about the term “functionalism: does it, accordingly, designate different functionalisms too? [In this paper we shall try to answer these questions. We begin by an- alyzing the notions of function occurring in biology and proceed to ex- amine whether these can also be applied to social science and technology. In so doing, our aim is not to review all the previous studies on the notion of function, but to find unity behind this diversity, which emphasizes in particular the logical relations of the various function concepts distin- ‘uished. We shall then explore the consequences of our analysis for the notion of functional explanation. Finally, we shall apply our synthesis to funetionalism in biology, social science, and technology, which will allow us to distinguish as many types of functionalism as there are notions of function, 2. Functions in Biology. The concept of function has been one of the mai topics in the philosophy af biology: se, ¢., Bock and von Wahlert 1965; Cummins 1975; Wright 1976; Nagel 1977; Prior 1985; Bigelow and Par- ‘getter 1987, Millikan 1989; Brandon 1990; Neander 1991; Godfrey-Smith 1993; Griffiths 1993; Kitcher 1993; Amundson and Lauder 1994; Buller 1998; Preston 1998; as well as the largely unknown work of Bernier and Firlot (1977). These studies have proposed, for example, the notions of | ‘Cummins funetion, causal role function, function as survival value, system function, design function, etiological or proper function, or historical evo- lutionary function. However, there are only a few studies which tried to systematize some of these notions (e.g., Walsh and Ariew 1996, and, pub- lished while we were already revising this paper, Wouters 1999}. And these ‘seem not to have realized the logical relation among the various function concepts, For thisteason, itwill be worthwhile to try again and take another Took at biological functions. In so doing, we shall improve on our earlier analysis of the notion of function in biology, Mahner and Bunge 1997, ‘We submit that, in biology, the term ‘function’ is used in at least five different, though related, senses. There are two basic concepts which help define the other three. The first basic concept is that of internal (biotic) activity. More precisely, the internal activity of some organismic system, ‘or subsystem, such as a tissue or an organ, is simply the set of all processes ‘oveutring in it, Think of the uncounted biochemical reactions occurring in the liver. Whether or not these processes are of any use to the organism, ‘or to anything for that matter, is immaterial—at this stage of analysis. In ‘other words, this notion has no evolutionary, adaptive, or teleological connotations whatsoever. ‘This concept may appear so broad as to be useless. Indeed, in principle, the internal activity of any concrete system may range from microphysical processes at the quantum level to macrophysical ones such as develop-