Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Townsend
Townsend
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OPINION
Plaintiffs, Michelle Townsend, individually and on behalf of her
minor son, Jacob, brought a personal injury action in the circuit court
of Cook County against defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company
(Sears). A question arose as to whether Illinois or Michigan law
would govern the liability and damages issues presented in the case.
The circuit court ruled that Illinois law governs these substantive
issues, but certified the following question of law for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):
Whether Illinois or Michigan law applies to a products
liability and negligence action where the plaintiff is a resident
of Michigan and the injury occurs in Michigan, the product
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therein); see, e.g., Vision Point, 226 Ill. 2d at 354 (reviewing the
circuit courts orders that gave rise to the appeal).
The circuit court ruled that Illinois law governs the liability and
damages issues presented in this case. It is generally held that a trial
courts choice-of-law determination is reviewed de novo. Morris B.
Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 307 Ill. App. 3d 92, 99
(1999), affd, 193 Ill. 2d 560 (2000); see Gramercy Mills, Inc. v.
Wolens, 63 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Dorman v.
Emerson Electric Co., 23 F.3d 1354, 1358 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that district courts choice-of-law determination is a legal issue subject
to de novo review); Malena v. Marriott International, Inc., 264 Neb.
759, 762, 651 N.W.2d 850, 853 (2002) (same).
Plaintiffs, however, in support of the appellate courts judgment,
disagree with this generally accepted holding. According to plaintiffs,
cases holding that choice-of-law decisions are reviewed de novo
assume a standard of review without discussing or addressing
situations where fact questions must be resolved as a predicate to
choosing a states law. Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court made
both findings of fact (what Sears did and where it did it) and findings
of law (which states law applies, based on those facts). Plaintiffs
suggest that the manifest weight of the evidence standard for fact
finding is more appropriate for reviewing choice-of-law
determinations.
We disagree. The circuit court did not hold an evidentiary hearing,
weigh the testimony or assess the credibility of witnesses; the record
consists solely of documents. Where the circuit court does not hear
testimony and bases its decision on documentary evidence, the
rationale underlying a deferential standard of review is inapplicable
and review is de novo. Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc.,
226 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (2007). In any event, while the methodology of
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws may raise factual issues,
the task of evaluating and balancing the choice-of-law principles
embodied in the Second Restatement, as they apply to the facts, is a
matter of law rather than fact and one that is more properly left to the
judge. Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 295, 693 A.2d 675, 679 (1997).
Because these issues involve the selection, interpretation, and
application of legal precepts, review is de novo. Dent v.
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Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1986). We now turn to the
merits of this appeal.
B. Identifying the Conflict
Subject to constitutional limitations, the forum court applies the
choice-of-law rules of its own state. Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws 5, Comments a, b, at 9 (1971); accord Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516, 97 L. Ed. 1211, 1215, 73 S. Ct.
856, 857 (1953). In 1970, this court adopted, for tort cases, the
choice-of-law methodology of what would become the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42
(1970) (citing preliminary draft of Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws). During the subsequent 37 years, this court has had only a
relatively few occasions to address choice-of-law issues arising from
the Second Restatement. See Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp.,
836 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois law, observing
that the Supreme Court of Illinois has not dealt with conflicts
questions for many years).3 In the present case, the appellate courts
analysis and the arguments of counsel before this court indicate that
a thorough discussion of choice-of-law principles and methodology is
necessary.
For example, we take this opportunity to stress that a choice-oflaw analysis begins by isolating the issue and defining the conflict. A
choice-of-law determination is required only when a difference in law
will make a difference in the outcome. Morris B. Chapman, 307 Ill.
App. 3d at 101; Kramer v. Weedhopper of Utah, Inc., 204 Ill. App.
3d 469, 474 (1990) (and cases cited therein); see Barron v. Ford
Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying Florida law) (cautioning that before entangling itself in
messy issues of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself that
there actually is a difference between the relevant laws of the different
states). In the present case, the parties agree that three conflicts exist
between Illinois and Michigan law. The first conflict involves liability.
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Illinois has adopted a rule of strict liability in tort for product design
defects. See, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill. 2d 510, 528-29 (1990)
(and cases cited therein). In contrast, Michigan has refused to adopt
the doctrine of strict liability, instead imposing a pure negligence
standard for product liability actions based on defective design.
Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 421 Mich. 670, 690-91, 365
N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (1984). The difference between the two theories
lies in the concept of fault. A real conflict exists because, in a strict
liability action, the inability of the defendant to know or prevent the
risk is not a defense. However, such a finding would preclude a
finding of negligence because the standard of care is established by
other manufacturers in the industry. Blue v. Environmental
Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 97 (2005).
The second conflict concerns compensatory damages. Illinois
currently does not have a statutory cap on compensatory damages for
noneconomic injuries. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d
367, 384-416 (1997) (declaring statutory cap unconstitutional). In
contrast, Michigan currently imposes caps on noneconomic damages
in product liability actions. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 600.2946a
(West 2000); Kenkel v. Stanley Works, 256 Mich. App. 548, 665
N.W.2d 490 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of statute). The third
conflict concerns punitive damages. Illinois does not prohibit the
recovery of punitive damages in product liability cases when
appropriate. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186 (1978)
(discussing when punitive damages may be awarded). Subject to
specific statutory exceptions, it is well established that generally only
compensatory damages are available in Michigan and that punitive
damages may not be imposed. McAuley v. General Motors Corp.,
457 Mich. 513, 519-20, 578 N.W.2d 282, 285 (1998) (collecting
cases).
C. Overview: The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
A full understanding of current choice-of-law methodology,
including its development, is necessary to properly apply it to the
above-identified conflicts.
Traditionally, questions of choice of law have been solved
by applying the law of the place of the wrong (lex loci delicti),
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We agree with the concern that the bench and bar have
overemphasized the general sections of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws and have undervalued the specific presumptive rules.
The opponents of mechanical rules of conflict of laws
may have given too little weight to the virtues of simplicity.
The new, flexible standards, such as interest analysis, have
caused pervasive uncertainty, higher cost of litigation, more
forum shopping (a court has a natural inclination to apply the
law it is most familiar withthe forums lawand will find it
easier to go with this inclination if the conflict of law rules are
uncertain), and an uncritical drift in favor of plaintiffs
Kaczmarek, 836 F.2d at 1057 (dictum).
Accord 56 Md. L. Rev. at 1246 (observing that, in a tort case,
following the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws means more
than relying on sections 6 and 145).
For example, plaintiffs, in support of the appellate courts
judgment, actually contend that this court has never expressly
authorized use of legal presumptions in choice-of-law determinations
in personal injury actions, observing that the word presumed is not
found in Ingersoll. Alternatively, according to plaintiffs: Even if this
court meant to utilize a legal presumption in favor of the state of
injury, presumptions in Illinois are governed by the bursting bubble
hypothesis. Therefore, according to plaintiffs, if the presumption
exists, it is evanescent and easily overcome by any contact with
another state.
We emphatically reject this contention. In Ingersoll, adopting the
proposed draft of what would become section 145 of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, this court held that the local law of
the State where the injury occurred should determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties, unless Illinois has a more significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. (Emphasis
added.) Ingersoll, 46 Ill. 2d at 45. Thus, a presumption exists, which
may be overcome only by showing a more or greater significant
relationship to another state. Further, subsequent to Ingersoll, this
court has repeatedly declared that we have adopted the choice-of-law
analysis of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Morris B.
Chapman, 193 Ill. 2d at 568; Esser v. McIntyre, 169 Ill. 2d 292, 297-13-
See, e.g., Barbaras Sales, slip op. at 16 (concluding that section 148
of Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws applies more specifically to
fraudulent misrepresentation cases than general sections 6 and 145).
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its local law should control than if the tort rule is designed
primarily to compensate the victim for his injuries *** . In the
latter situation, the state where the injury occurred would
seem to have a greater interest than the state of conduct. This
factor must not be over-emphasized. To some extent, at least,
every tort rule is designed both to deter other wrongdoers and
to compensate the injured person. Undoubtedly, the relative
weight of these two objectives varies somewhat from rule to
rule, but in the case of a given rule it will frequently be
difficult to determine which of these objectives is the more
important. (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws 146, Comment e, at 432-33 (1971).
Despite this explicit caution, the appellate court not only undervalued
the strong presumption in favor of Michigan law, but overemphasized
its perception of the interests Illinois and Michigan have in their
different concepts of tort damages.
Illinois certainly has a legitimate interest in the liability to be
imposed on Illinois-based defendants under strict liability or
negligence principles. However, Michigan has an equally legitimate
interest in the remedies to be afforded its residents who suffer such
tort injuries. And if the substantive law of these two states looks in
different directions, each state would seem to have an equal interest
in having its tort rule applied in the determination of the conflicting
issues presented in this case. See Hardly Able Coal Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 494 F. Supp. 249, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(applying Illinois law, concluding that law of Kentucky, where injury
occurred, governs). We conclude that a section 145 analysis does not
override our strong presumption that the law of Michigan, as the state
where plaintiffs reside and where the injury occurred, governs the
conflicting issues presented in this case.
In sum, a court begins a choice-of-law analysis in a tort case by
ascertaining whether a specific presumptive rule, such as section 146
in a personal injury action, applies to the disputed conflict. Next, if the
presumptive rule points to a specific jurisdiction, then the court must
test this presumptive choice against the principles embodied in section
6 in light of the relevant contacts identified by the general tort
principle in section 145. The presumptive choice controls unless
overridden by the section 145 analysis.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court and
the order of the circuit court of Cook County are vacated, and this
cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment vacated;
circuit court order vacated;
cause remanded.
JUSTICES KILBRIDE and BURKE took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
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