Domingo v.

Rayala
February 18, 2008
Nachura, J.
Manzano

SUMMARY: Domingo filed a complaint for sexual

harrassment against DOLE Chairman Rayala. Office of the
President created a Committee to investigate on the
complaint. OP ruled against Rayala and ordered his
dismissal. CA modified the penalty and imposed
suspension for the maximum period of 1 year. Domingo,
Rayala, and the Republic filed their respective petitions for
certiorari. SC consolidated the cases and ruled that Rayala
is guilty for sexual harrassment and suspended him for the
maximum period of 1 year.
DOCTRINE: Basic in the law of public officers is the threefold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal
and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others. This rule applies with full force
to sexual harassment.
FACTS:
1. Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala before the DOLE.
2. Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences
of sexual harassment complained of:
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman
Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at
hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay
nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga
pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa
akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol
sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na
panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8 th Floor,
may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung
nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin
sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito.

Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr.

Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid.
Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na
bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga
magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako
ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at
inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at
kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya
magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan
opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may
makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I dont give
them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8 th Floor at pumunta
ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang
nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito
kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng P 3,000.
Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay
natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita
Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang
pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito
ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang
naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14,
1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa
akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay
at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?

Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.

Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman
Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng
kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay nakaleave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan
ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako
sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib
tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na
sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata
sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex.
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala
sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay
ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may
pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni
Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si
Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa
likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na
pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi: Chairman: Saan na ba tayo
natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya
pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang
balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa
kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang
tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na
maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na
nararamdaman ko.
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence
and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the
Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in
the Department of Labor and Employment.

3. Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary

referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to
investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a
committee for such purpose. Secretary Laguesma issued
AO No. 280, Series of 1998, constituting a Committee on
Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with
Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995.
4. Committee submitted its report and recommendation
finding Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty
provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months.
5. OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119
dismissing Rayala from service.
6. Rayala filed a MR which the OP denied.
7. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court.
However, the same was dismissed for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts.
8. Rayala filed an MR. The Court recalled earlier Resolution
and referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
9. The CA held that there was sufficient evidence on record
to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts
he was charged with.
10. Rayala filed an MR. CA modified its earlier to the effect
that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the
penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period
of 1 year is IMPOSED upon the petitioner.
11. Domingo filed a Petition for Review with the SC which
was denied for having a defective verification. She filed an
MR which the Court granted; hence, the petition was
reinstated.
12. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this
Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of
sexual harassment.

13. Republic filed a MR of the CAs Resolution. The CA

denied. The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.
14. On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation
of the 3 petitions.
a. G.R. No. 155831: Domingo assails the CAs
resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of
the President from dismissal to suspension from service for
the maximum period of one year.
b. G.R. No. 155840: Rayala asserts that Domingo
has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand,
or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued
employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the
acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It
was merely Domingos perception of malice in his alleged
acts a "product of her own imagination" that led her to
file the sexual harassment complaint.
Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA,
that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of
absence of malice is unavailing.
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed
in RA 7877.
c. G.R. No. 158700: Republic contends that there is
no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed
by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under
the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman
solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides
only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP
from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala.
ISSUES and RATIO:
1. Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? YES.
a. Five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were
unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and
the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee
and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis
of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the

respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses." They

differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
b. That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was
guilty of sexual harassment is the common factual finding
of not just one, but three independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered
that when supported by substantial evidence, factual
findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies
are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.
The principle dictates that such findings should bind us.
Rayala: his acts do not constitute sexual harassment,
because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there
was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as
a condition for her continued employment or for her
promotion to a higher position. Rayala urges us to apply to
his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.
SC: We are not convinced. Basic in the law of public
officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states
that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer
may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability.
An
action
for
each
can
proceed
independently of the others. This rule applies with
full force to sexual harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is

RA 7877. Section 31 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines
the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6,
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for
damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 42, also in relation to Section 3, governs the

procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
CA correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877,
because he is charged with the administrative offense, not
the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It should be
enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,

Education or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer
or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual
harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement
or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the
employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and
jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their
duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the
investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.

Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual,
or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper

courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall
include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace
and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual
harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be,
with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and
prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be
composed of at least one (1) representative each from the management,
the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the
rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall
be composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration,
the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case maybe.

and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence

to support the administrative charge.
Even if we test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in
Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable.
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that
the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable
sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
It is not essential that the demand, request or requirement
be made as a condition for continued employment or for
promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of
Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment
for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding
of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested
transfer to another unit.
Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta is misplaced,
because the factual setting in that case is different from that
in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of
the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding
Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She
complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall
disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.

kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her
shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice Josefina G.
Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga
found that "the complainant failed to show by convincing
evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a
kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso fashion, were carried out
with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by
malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that
most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and
special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of
other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation
or happiness of the moment."
Rayala: AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that
AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the
incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program
and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even
assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within
its coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
SC: Whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real
consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show
that the administrative charges against Rayala were for
violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed
jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the
participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created
by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation
process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of
the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate
action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been
applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely
as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the
orderly conduct of the investigation.
Rayala: CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an
offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an
essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he
should be absolved of the charges against him.

SC: What is before the SC is an administrative case for

sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of
sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is
immaterial.

honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said

tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties affected.

Rayala: the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to

get him out of office and thus constitute merely political
harassment.

The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all
these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the
beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to
try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and
participated in the proceedings.

SC: A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing

evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the
evidence presented by Domingo. The acts imputed to
Rayala have been proven as fact. He has not proven any ill
motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which
would be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him.
On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo
and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time
stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences
for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual
harassment.
Rayala: there was violation of his right to due process. He
accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial
for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision
finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct"
under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation
of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for
"disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the
verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
SC: Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous
cases, this Court held that in administrative proceedings,
due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution
of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested
with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment

amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any
finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the
basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
2. What is the applicable penalty? Suspension for the
maximum period of 1 year.
Rayala: under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a
period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He
also argues that since he is charged administratively,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
SC: Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year, while the penalty for the second offense is
dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both
provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable
by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the

age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as

provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge
the duties of the office.
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the
proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether
there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC
Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase
"for cause as provided by law."
Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief
Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such
offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first
offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President
to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the
service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon
commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took
advantage of his high government position, it still could not
validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance and where only
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is
suspension for one (1) year.
DISPOSITIVE: CA is affirmed. Penalty
suspension for the maximum period of 1 year.

imposed

Ferrer v Sandiganbayan
March 14, 2008

is

Austria-Martinez, J
Rods

SUMMARY: Ferrer was charged with violation of Sec 3(e)

RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. He sought the
dismissal of this case by virtue of his absolution from an
admin case which was based on the same set of facts. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion to quash the
information, and the SC agreed, saying that the 2 actions
do not preclude the filing of the other.
DOCTRINE:
The dismissal of an admin case does not necessarily bar
the filing of a crim prosecution for the same or similar acts
which were the subject of the admin complaint.
The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal
liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is
mainly to protect the public service, based on the timehonored principle that a public office is a public trust. On
the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is
the punishment of crime.
The rule is that administrative liability is separate and
distinct from penal and civil liabilities.
FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to annul the
Sandiganbayan resolutions denying the Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause filed by accused
Dominador Ferrer, and the other one denying the MR and/or
Motion to Quash.
Ferrer was charged with violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019,
alleging that he was the Administrator of Intramuros
Administration, and while in the performance of his duties,
he gave unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and
Development Company by awarding Lease Contracts to the
latter without public bidding, as required by Joint Circular 1
of DBM, DENR and DPWH, and by allowing construction of

new structures in the leased areas without building permit

or clearance required in the Intramuros Charter.
Ferrer filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was denied.
He filed an MR, and a supplemental MR, this time alleging
that complainants in this case were guilty of forum
shopping, because there was already a dismissal of
an administrative case against him. This was denied
again. Sandiganbayan ruled that there was no forum
shopping since the admin and crim cases are two
different actions, so neither resolution on the same
would have effect of res judicata on the other.
Ferrer filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, but was
denied for being filed out of time. His MR of the same was
also denied. Before he can be arraigned for the crim case,
he filed a Motion for Re-determination of probable cause,
invoking the ruling of the Office of the President
absolving him of administrative liability. This was again
denied, along with his MR. Sandiganbayan said: the
dismissal of the admin complaint does not negate the
existing crim case pending before the Court.
ISSUES: WON the crim case should be dismissed because
of the dismissal of the admin case?
RULING: No, the dismissal of the admin case cannot
operate to have the crim case dismissed as well.
RATIO:
In Paredes v Sandiganbayan, the SC denied a petition to
dismiss a pending crim case with the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of the dismissal of an admin case against the accused:
As we have held in Tan v Comelec, the dismissal of an
admin case does not necessarily bar the filing of a crim
prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the
subject of the admin complaint. Hence, the crim case
against Ferrer may still proceed despite dismissal of the
admin case.

The same rule applies to cases which have not yet been
filed in court. In Tan, it was held that an investigation by
Ombudsman of the crim case for falsification and violation
of Anti Graft and Corrupy Practices Act and an inquiry in to
the admin charges by the Comelec are entirely independent
proceedings, neither of which results in or concludes the
other. The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the
same or similar acts which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.
Ferrer argues that the crim case requires a higher quantum
of proof for conviction than the admin case (beyond
reasonable doubt v substantial evidence). The Court in
Valencia v. Sandiganbayan noted that the administrative
case against the accused was dismissed by the Ombudsman
on a finding that the contract of loan entered into was in
pursuance of the police power of the accused as local chief
executive. The Ombudsman, however, still found probable
cause to criminally charge the accused in court. SC said in
that case: the basis of administrative liability differs
from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service,
based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust. On the other hand, the
purpose of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime.
To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely adopt the
results of administrative investigations which would not only
diminish the powers and duties of these constitutional
offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal
and administrative cases against public officials. This will
also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial
and investigation before these bodies will be made to await
the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is
not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
laws governing public officers.

Ferrer cites Larin v Exec Sec, but the SC said that the case is
not on all fours with the case at bar. In Larin, the accused
was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis of this conviction, an
administrative case was filed against him. Upon appeal, he
was acquitted of the crim charge upon a finding that the
acts he had committed were neither illegal nor irregular.
The present case differs from Larin because here, the
administrative case was filed independently of the criminal
case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a
criminal conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was
dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case.
This is in contrast with Larin, where the administrative case
was dismissed only after its basis, the criminal conviction,
was overturned on appeal.
The rule is that administrative liability is separate and
distinct from penal and civil liabilities. In Larin, no less than
the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of charges of
wrongdoing; in the case at bar, no court of justice has yet
declared petitioner not guilty of committing illegal or
irregular acts.
The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates
that the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's
criminal liability without its hands being tied by what
transpired in the administrative case. The court is dutybound to exercise its independent judgment. It is not ousted
of its jurisdiction.
Under the Rules of Court, absolution from admin liability is
not a ground for a Motion to Quash. Also, Ferrer lacked the
right to file this petition because he already raised the issue
in his supplemental MR, which has already been denied.
When he filed the petition with the SC, it was already out of
time, and with the denial of such petition, the decision of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petitions with the latter, such

petitions have become final. Hence, this petition with the SC

must necessarily fail.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.

Civil Service Commission

v. Colanggo
April 30, 2008
Corona, J.
Paolo Q. Bernardo
For the facts, you can simply read that indicated in the
Summary box; it should be enough.
SUMMARY: Colanggo passed the Professional Board
Examination for Teachers.
However, it appeared that someone other than Colanggo
filed his PBET application and still another person took the
exam for him.
Thus, the CSC-CARAGA charged Colanggo for dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
The CSC held that Colanggo did not apply for and
take the PBET exam. It found Colanggo guilty and
ordered his dismissal.
Colanggo then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
because the pieces of evidence admitted and taken against
him were INADMISSIBLE as they were UNAUTHENTICATED
PHOTOCOPIES of the PBET application form, picture seat
plan and PDS.

The CA ruled in Colanggos favor

The CSC appealed from the CA decision. It argued that
there should be no strict adherence to technical rules of
evidence in administrative proceedings such as in
investigating complaints against civil servants. The SC
agreed.
DOCTRINE:
The CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants,
is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable in judicial proceedings.

It appeared that someone other than Colanggo filed his

PBET application and still another person took the exam for
him.
Thus, the CSC-CARAGA charged Colanggo for dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
The CSC held, in Resolution No. 021412, that
Colanggo did not apply for and take the PBET exam.
It found Colanggo guilty of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service and ordered
his dismissal.
The CSC held that the picture and signatures
affixed on the PBET application form, picture
seat plan, and PDS, of Colanggo, belong to
three different persons which clearly serve a
ground to establish a just cause for CSCCARAGA to issue a formal charge on January
13, 1999 against respondent.

FACTS:
Tristan C. Colanggo (Colanggo) passed the Professional
Board Examination for Teachers. Afterwards he was
appointed Teacher I and was assigned to a public high
school in San Jose, Surigao del Norte.

Colanggo then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA

alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing Resolution No. 021412.

Subsequently, a complaint questioning the eligibility of

teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed in the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) CARAGA Regional Office No. XIII (CSCCARAGA) in Butuan City.

He pointed out that the pieces of evidence against

him
were
INADMISSIBLE
as
they
were
UNAUTHENTICATED PHOTOCOPIES of the PBET
application form, picture seat plan and PDS.

The CSC-CARAGA discovered irregularities in Colanggos

documents.
The photographs of "Tristan C. Colanggo" attached to
the PBET application form and to the October 25,
1992 picture seat plan did not resemble Colanggo.
The signature found in the PBET application form was
different from that affixed on respondent's personal
data sheet (PDS).

The CA granted Colanggos petition.

It ruled that the photocopies of the PBET application
form, picture seat plan and PDS should have been
authenticated.
In this petition or review on certiorari, the CSC avers that
the PBET application form, picture seat plan, and PDS,

though unauthenticated photocopies, should have been

admitted as evidence.
The CSC cited The Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), which does
not require strict adherence to technical rules of
evidence in administrative proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. [Relevant] WON unauthenticated photocopies should
be admitted as evidence in administrative
proceedings such as in investigating complaints
against civil servants.
2. WON the CSC was correct in ordering Colanggo's
dismissal.
RULING:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Section 39 of the Uniform Rules state that the
CSC, in investigating complaints against civil
servants, is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable in judicial
proceedings. The provision provides:
a. Section 39. The direct evidence for the
complainant and the respondent consist of
the
sworn
statement
and
documents
submitted in support of the complaint or
answer as the case may be, without prejudice
to the presentation of additional evidence
deemed necessary but was unavailable at the
time of the filing of the complaint and the
answer upon which the cross-examination, by
the
respondent
and
the
complainant
respectively, shall be based. Following the
cross-examination, there may be re-direct or
re-cross examination.

Either party may avail himself of the services

of counsel and may require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence in his favor through the compulsory
process
of subpoena orsubpoena
duces
tecum.
The investigation shall be conducted for
the purpose of ascertaining the truth
without
necessarily
adhering
to
technical rules applicable in judicial
proceedings. It shall be conducted by the
disciplining authority concerned or his
authorized representatives.
b. The CSC correctly appreciated the
photocopies of PBET application form, picture
seat plan and PDS (though not duly
authenticated) in determining whether there
was sufficient evidence to substantiate the
charges against the respondent.
i.
Besides, Colanggo never objected to
the veracity of their contents.
ii.
He merely disputed their admissibility
on the ground that they were not
authenticated.

2. The penalty (of dismissal) imposed on respondent

was therefore fully in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
a. As a general rule, a finding of guilt in
administrative cases, if supported by
substantial evidence (or "that amount of
evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion"),
will be sustained by this Court.

i.
ii.

iii.

The CSC granted Colanggo's motions

to ensure that he was accorded
procedural due process.
Moreover, it exhaustively discussed
the differences in appearances
between Colanggo and the persons
whose photographs were attached to
the PBET application form and the
picture seat plan.
It likewise compared the various
signatures on the said documents.

DISPOSITIVE: The Court held that the CSC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the admission as
evidence of unauthenticated photocopies of documents and
in ordering the dismissal of Colanggo.

Reyes, Domo-ong &

Principio v. Rural Bank of
San Miguel
February 27, 2004
Tinga, J.
Francis G. Francisco

such information in the seminar, Command Responsibility

or even Respondat Superior does not apply. All heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on the good
faith of their subordinates. The negligence of the
subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the
absence of evidence of the latters own negligence. The
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that a head of a
department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable
for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or
misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of.
Although
the
SC
equates
"brokering"
with
unprofessionalism, the word "brokering" clearly indicates
the performance of certain acts for monetary consideration
or compensation. All that Reyes did was to introduce
RBSMIs President to the President of TA Bank and EIB.
Nothing more. The BSP is an independent body corporate
bestowed under its charter with fiscal and administrative
autonomy. As such, its officials should be granted a certain
degree of flexibility in the performance of their duties and
provided insulation from interference and vexatious suits,
especially when moves of the kind are resorted to as
counterfoil to the exercise of their regulatory mandate.

SUMMARY: The bank filed a letter complaint against the

petitioners alleging that in a seminar under their
supervision, training materials containing information on
the banks financial distress was used and the alleged
brokering done by Reyes in introducting Soriano, the
president of Rural bank of San Miguel,to officials of other
banks for a possible sale of the bank.

FACTS: In a letter to the BSP Governor, Rural Bank of San

Miguel (Bulacan), Inc.(RBSMI) charged petitioners with
violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). In an investigation it was
disclosed that the examination team headed by Principio
noted 20 serious exceptions/violations and deficiencies of
RBSMI.

DOCTRINE: The SC exonerated them of the administrative

liability. There was no evidence that they supervised the
seminar. Even if it was their subordinates that introduced

MB directed a special examination on RBSMI. RBSMI

President Hilario Soriano alleged that Reyes was urging him
to consider selling the bank. Reyes introduced him through
telephone to Mr. Villacorta, President and CEO of TA Bank. In

his Affidavit, Villacorta confirmed that he and Soriano met

but the meeting never got past the exploratory stage since
Villacorta was merely contemplating a possible buy-in but
Soriano wanted to sell all his equity shares. Thereafter,
Reyes introduced Soriano by telephone to Castillo of the
Export and Industry Bank (EIB). No negotiation took place
because Soriano desired a total sale while EIB merely
desired a joint venture arrangement or a buy-in.
The MB ordered RBSMI to correct the major exceptions
noted and to remit to the BSP the amount ofP2,538,483 as
fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves
against deposit liabilities. Among the banks board approved
actions was the banks request addressed to Domo-ong for
BSP "to debit the demand deposit of the bank in the amount
of P2,538,483" representing the payment of fines and
penalties.
A year after, RBSMI asked for a reconsideration the
imposition of the fine. The MB approved the interim reversal
of the entire amount of the penalty "pending the outcome of
the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of
the penalty."
The alleged "brokering" by Reyes and the petitioners
"unsupported" recommendation to impose a penalty
of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the
bank to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners
with "unprofessionalism."
The CA imposed a fine on the Petitioners equivalent to 6
months salary. In the 2003 SC decision, the SC found
Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable for
violation of the "standards of professionalism" prescribed by
RA 6713 in that they used the distressed financial condition
of RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP
seminars and did the "brokering" of the sale of RBSMI. The
SC reduced the fine to 2 months salary for Reyes and 1
month salary for Domo-ong and exonerated Principio of the

administrative charges. RBSMI filed a Motion For Partial

Reconsideration as to Principio.
Reyes and Domo-ong filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that: (1) it was not under their auspices that the
seminar, which used training materials containing two case
studies on RBSMIs financial distress, was conducted but
under that of another department and other officials of BSP;
and, (2) they did not do any act which constituted
"brokering" of the sale of RBSMI or deviated from the
standards of professionalism.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the petitioners are liable for the use of
training materials containing 2 case studies on the bankss
financial distress-NO
2) W/N petitioners acted unprofessionally-NO
RATIO: The MR of Reyes and Domo-ong is meritorious. In
pinning liability on Reyes and Domo-ong for the seminar
which used the rural bank as a case study, the SC 2003
decision said that the very fact that the seminar was
conducted under their auspices is enough to make
them liable to a certain extent. Reyes, as Head of the
BSP Supervision and Examination Sector(SES), and Domoong, as Director of the BSP Department of Rural
Banks, should have exercised their power of control and
supervision so that the incident could have been
prevented or at the very least remedied."
The conclusion on petitioners culpability is grounded on a
mere inference that the seminar was conducted under their
auspices. The extent of their responsibility is uncertain.
It is conceded that there was no evidence that the seminar
was conducted under petitioners patronage in the 2003 SC
decision. But, as shown in the Motion For Reconsideration, it
was the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Institute (BSPI), an office
separate and independent from the SES, which is directly

under the control and supervision of another Deputy

Governor
for
the
Resource
Management
Sector
(RMS) which is charged with conducting seminars and
lectures for the BSP, including the seminar involved in this
case.
RBSMI argues that since information on the state of its
finances found its way as a training material of RMS, the
event could have transpired only because the SES permitted
it. Even if the subordinates of petitioners were the source of
information, under the principle of command responsibility,
petitioners could be held liable for negligence.
SC: Again, there is no evidence on petitioners role in the
disclosure of information. Command Responsibility, an
accepted notion in military or police structural dynamics or
its counterpart of respondent superior in the law on quasidelicts does not apply. Given that petitioners are high
ranking officers of the countrys central monetary authority
theycannot be expected to monitor the activities of their
subalterns.
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, the SC held that all heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith
of their subordinates. The case specifically involved the
liability of the head of office in the preparation of bids,
purchase of supplies and contract negotiations done by his
subordinates. In the same fashion, petitioners in this case
owing to their high ranks cannot be expected to acquaint
themselves with such minutiae as the flow of files and
documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as
those are, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor
employees. Delegation of function is part of sound
management.
The negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his
superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own
negligence. The immunity of public officers from liability for
the non-feasances, negligence or omissions of duty of their

official subordinates and even for the latters misfeasances

or positive wrongs rests, according to Mechem, "upon
obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of
the public service and the perplexities and embarrassments
of a contrary doctrine. These official subordinates, are
themselves public officers though of an inferior grade, and
therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public
officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that a head of a
department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for
the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or
misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of.
As to the imputation of unprofessionalism, the 2003 SC
decision categorized Reyes telephone introduction of
officials of other banks as "brokering" which in turn
constitutes violation of the standards of professionalism. The
standards are set forth in Section 4 (A) (b) of RA 6713, as
follows: Public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter
public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty.
They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
The SC equates "brokering" with unprofessionalism. The
crucial question is whether Reyes conducted himself in an
unprofessional manner in doing the acts imputed to him.
The acts of Reyes do not constitute "brokering." Case law
defines a "broker" as "one who is engaged, for others, on a
commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with
the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator
between other parties, never acting in his own name but in
the name of those who employed Thus, the word "brokering"
clearly indicates the performance of certain acts for

monetary consideration or compensation. All that Reyes did

was to introduce RBSMIs President to the President of TA
Bank and EIB. Nothing more. There was not even a hint that
he was motivated by monetary consideration or swayed by
any personal interest in doing what he did.
Soriano himself admitted that the talks with Villacorta and
Castillo never got past the exploratory stage because the
two wanted a buy-in while he was for a total sell-out. This is
an indication that Reyes was not personally involved in the
transaction. If he were, he would at least have an inkling of
the plans of Villacorta and Castillo; otherwise, he would not
have wasted his time introducing them to Soriano.
All told, there is neither legal nor factual support for holding
Reyes and Domo-ong liable.
As to the motion for partial reconsideration filed by RBSMI, it
is argued that Principio should be administratively penalized
for his undue haste in submitting his report to the MB, in
making an unsupported recommendation for imposition of
penalties for legal reserve deficiencies, and for taking
charge of the examinations of RBSMI three consecutive
times. RBSMIs arguments are not new, they having been
previously presented to and squarely ruled upon by the
Court.
The BSP is an independent body corporate bestowed under
its charter with fiscal and administrative autonomy. As such,
its officials should be granted a certain degree of flexibility
in the performance of their duties and provided insulation
from interference and vexatious suits, especially when
moves of the kind are resorted to as counterfoil to the
exercise of their regulatory mandate. Elsewise, the
institutional independence and autonomy of the BSP as the
central mandatory authority would be rendered illusory.
DISPOSITIVE: MR of Reyes and Domo-ong is GRANTED.
They are not liable administratively.

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
February 17, 1997
Javie

SUMMARY: Tabuena and Peralta, officials of Manila

International Airport Authority (MIAA) withdrew 55M from
MIAA funds and delivered the same to the personal
secretary of Pres. Marcos. They did this in compliance with
a Presidential Memorandum issued by Pres. Marcos. A case
for malversation was filed against them due to the said
transfer of funds and the Sandiganbayan found them
guilty. The SC acquitted them on the ground that they
acted in good faith and that their rights to due process
were violated.
DOCTRINE: This is not a sheer case of blind and
misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly
executed order. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself,
the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face,
the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the
payment of an obligation illegal. Besides, the case could
not be detached from the realities then prevailing at that
time, that is, that the people were not free.
FACTS:
- President Marcos instructed Tabuena, General
Manager, over the phone to pay directly to his office
in cash the 55 million pesos owed by Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) to Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC)

A week later, Tabuena received from Mrs.

Gimenez, personal secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memo reiterating the order
o The Presidential memo refers to the case
owed by MIAA to PNCC as stated in the memo
of Minister of Trade and Industry Ongpin
Ongpins memo details the amounts
owed by MIAA to PNCC
In compliance with the memo, Tabuena, with the help
of Peralta and Dabao (Dabao is at large, hence, not
included in this case) caused the released of 55M
from MIAA funds by means of 3 withdrawals
o The transfer of cash all happened in the same
manner: Tabuena withdrew the money, placed
it in peerless boxes and duffle bags, loaded in
a banks armored car and handed to Mrs.
Gimenez
o Upon the 3rd transfer, Mrs. Gimenez issued a
receipt with her as the signatory
o The manner of disbursement was not based
on the normal procedure in MIAA
o No vouchers to support the disbursement
o No receipt from PNCC
A case for malversation under Art. 217 of the RPC
was filed against Tabuena and Peralta before the
Sandiganbayan which they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
o Tabuena General Manager
o Peralta Assistant Manager
Tabuena and Peralta filed the present petition for
review before the SC, their defense was: they acted
in good faith and were merely complying with the
Marcos Memo
o

ISSUE:
- WON Tabuena and Peralta should be acquitted? YES
o They acted in good faith
o Their rights to due process were violated

RATIO:
On the defense of good faith
- US v. Catolico: To constitute a crime, the act must, except
in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by
a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal
intent
- Tabuena acted in good faith

1) Tabuena had no other choice but to make the

withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do
o Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior
the former being then the President of the
Republic
who
unquestionably
exercised
control over government agencies such as the
MIAA and PNCC
o Tabuena is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of "Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose.
The subordinate-superior relationship
between them is clear
The Marcos Memo was lawful as it has
for its purpose partial payment of the
liability of one government agency
(MIAA) to another (PNCC)
Even
granting
the
Sandiganbayans
contention
that the Memo was unlawful, it
will not affect Tabuenas good
faith
the MARCOS Memorandum is
patently legal (for on its face it

2)

3)

directs
payment
of
an
outstanding liability) and that
Tabuena
acted
under
the
honest belief that the P55
million
was
a
due
and
demandable debt and that it
was just a portion of a bigger
liability to PNCC.
even if the order is illegal if it is
patently
legal
and
the
subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not
liable, for then there would only
be a mistake of fact committed
in good faith.
Althought the disbursements did not comply with the
rules and regulations, Tabuenas non-compliance was
inevitable
o He did not have the luxury of time to observe
all auditing procedures of disbursement
considering the fact that the MARCOS
Memorandum
enjoined
his
"immediate
compliance" with the directive that he forward
to the President's Office the P55 Million in
cash
o Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot
escape responsibility for such omission. But
since he was acting in good faith, his liability
should only be administrative or civil in
nature, and not criminal
The court disagrees with the Sandiganbayan that
Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated
the P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs.
Gimenez and not to the PNCC
o the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena
"to pay immediately the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, thru this office the
sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION. . .", and that was

4)

what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered

the money to Mrs. Gimenez
o The delivery was delivery to the Office of the
President
o the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered
the money to the President's office (thru Mrs.
Gimenez), in strict compliance with the
MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected
even if it later turned out that PNCC never
received the money.
Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind
the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out public
money for the personal benefit of those then in
power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to
Tabuena
o There is no showing that Tabuena had
anything to do whatsoever with the execution
of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there
proof that he profited from the felonious
scheme
o no conspiracy was established between
Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55
Million
All that has been said in exculpation of Tabuena
equally applies to Peralta for he acted in good faith
when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped
facilitate the withdrawals
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided
obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly
executed order.
o the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the
land. It carries with it the presumption that it
was regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law
makes the payment of an obligation illegal

Besides, the case could not be detached from

the realities then prevailing at that time, that
is, that the people were not free

DISSENT, Davide.
-

Henceforth, all those similarly situated as the

appellants or those who could simply provide any
reason for theircompelled obedience to Mr. Marcos
can go scot-free. The meaning of EDSA and its
message for history would thus be obliterated

The Marcos Memo cannot be considered as lawful

order
o The order to deliver 55M was based on the
Ongpin Memo which, If read carefully, readily
shows that there was no 55M owed to PNCC
o The Ongpin memo only states that 34.5M
were due to PNCC, not 55M
o Not an iota of good faith was shown in the
conduct of the appellants.
Being responsible accountable officers of the MIAA,
they were presumed to know that, in light of "the
undeferred portion of the repayment" of PNCC's
advances in the amount of P63.9 million, the MIAA's
unpaid balance was only P34.5 million. They also
ought to know the procedure to be followed in the
payment of contractual obligations.
Although President Marcos was a dictator, he was
reported to be, and even projected himself as, a
"faithful" advocate of the rule of law. As a matter of
fact, he did not hesitate to issue a decree, letter of
instruction, or any presidential issuance in
anticipation of any planned actions or activities to
give the latter the facade or semblance of legality,
wisdom, or propriety. When he made the order to
appellant Tabuena, President Marcos must only be
understood to order expeditious compliance with the
requirements to facilitate immediate release of the
money. There was no way for Tabuena to entertain
any fear that disobedience to the order because of its
unlawfulness or delay in the execution of the order
due to compliance with the requirements would

Right to due process was violated

-

The court notes that it was struck by the way the

Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning
of a defense witness and of the accused themselves.
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by
the Sandiganbayan
o PNCC asked 16 questions
o Prosecutor asked 6
o Sandiganbayan asked 27
It then further asked 10 questions
o When
Tabuena
took
the
stand,
the
sandiganbayan asked 67 questions
o In Peraltas case it asked 41 questions
The questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing
and insinuation.
The court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge
to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his
mind upon any material point which presents itself
during the trial of a case over which he presides. But
not only should his examination be limited to asking
"clarificatory"
questions, the
right
should
be
sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the
court should stay out of it as much as possible,
neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of
the trial.
Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in
fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta

Wherefore, Petitioners are hereby ACQUITED.

cause his head or life. He offered no credible

evidence for such fear.