latter Benjamin Critique of Violence Go ‘The uk of a eritque of violence cam be summarized as that of expounding its relation to law and justice. For a cause, however effective, Becomes violent, in the precise venve of the Non only when it bears on moral issues. The sphere of these Tues is defined by the concepts of law and justice. With regard to the Set of these itis clear thatthe most elementary rele tdooship within any legal system is that of ends to means and further, that violence ean Best be sought only inthe realm of fneans not of ends. These observations provide a eitique of Mllenor with more—and certainly dfferent—premises than pethaps appear. For if violence is a means, a criterion for Piticking fe might seem immediatly available, Yt imposes {tel in the question whether violence, in = given case, i & nea toa just or an tnjust end. A critique of it would then be implied in a system of just ends. This, however, ts nos». or what such a system, suming it co be secure against all ‘doubt, would contain is not a eiterion for violence ieself as prindple, but rather, the cteion for cases of is ue: The ‘Question would remain open whether violence, 8a principle ‘Eard bea moral means evento just ends. To resolve this ques tion a more exact criterion is needed, which would discrim inte within the epbere of means themselves, without regard for the ends they seve. “The exclusion of this more preie critical approach is per- taps che predominant feature of a main current of legal phil ‘up. sacral Iw. Ie perceives inthe ws of violent means fo jut ends no greater problem than a man sees a his “ight” to move his body in the direction of a desired goal. Accord: ng to this view for which the terorism in the French Revola7 Reflections tion provided an soc foundation} violence isa product of nature a0 twee sentria the te of whlch in no sey peat nes einai ce rding to the tery of sat of atural la, people gv i heir ln for teak of teste, it ede om he sumption (bch Spor fr expe ate expla ie Tracts ThologioPoliteu) that he nvidia, before be Condon of ths ratonal contact has de je the ight to teat wil the ance that defacto at his dps Perhaps thee ewe have bee een reine by Darwin's Bolg stich n't thoroughly dogma manner, ard ence the only eigial tea Beads natal section, appopet ne wall the vial ends of ature. Poplar Darwin ios ‘py hasten shown ow tort step es rom hs ogea of Shiu hater tothe sll ede one of lost loopy, hich ts ha te lene hat slot loc, spproprie {oan ends heey ai lg “Tis hess of natural Taw at regde once ax anata datum is diame oppo to tn of postive lw, which tes violence a product of iso I aatralaw ca judge St eta ow only ining nda pase Iw ea Judge al Craving lw oly incite or {herein of ends ley dat of means Notwabcanding this ant however, bah hols mee a ir common cdg jt end canbe attained by tied mean, an fed mea vied for jo end. Natal aw atempts, bythe Junta of he end to "Joly" the mesnapotve Iw to "arate" the anne othe ends ough the useon cfite meas Tae ationy would prove inlubie i the come tien dogmatic anion were ia oie meas on he Greta and Jot ends onthe ater were i ineconlabe conti No ight into this problem could be gine, ow vera the clr argment had been broken, an Sul Independent teria both of ust ends anda used seam wer ctalibed “The realm of endy and therefore ao the queion of « Critique of Violence 279 eiterion of jstnes is excluded for the time being from this ‘tidy Instead, the ental place given tothe question of the outfation of certain means that constitu violence, Prin {ples of natural law cannot decde tis question, bu can only ead to botiomlescaruistry. For if postive law is blind eo the bvolutenes of ends, natural 1aw is equally 20 to the con Cingency of means. On the other hand, the postive theory of avr is acceptable asa hypothedeal bai at the outset of this fudy, because it undertakes a fundamental distinction be tween Kinds of violence independently of cases oftheir applic ‘rion. This distinction ie between historically acknowledged, Geatledsancioned violence, and unsanctioned violence. If the following considerations proceed {rom thsi cannot, ofcourse fmeam that given forms of violence are classified in tems of ‘whether they are sanctioned or not. For in a eitque of vow ence a criterion for the latter in postive law cannot concern ‘ics but only its evaluation, The question that concer us fer wha light is ehrown on the nature of violence by the fact that sucha eiterion or distinction can be applied to it tall, ton in other words, what is the meaning of this distinction? ‘That this distinction supplied by postive law is meaningful, aed on the nature of violence, and irreplaceable by any ‘cher, wil soon enough be abown, but atthe same time light iit be shed on the sphere in which alone such a distinction Ton be made. To sum up: ifthe criterion established by post tine Into atc the legality of violence can be analyzed with ogard tits meaning then the sphere of is application must De critic with regaed to its value. For thi ertique a stand point outside postive legal philosophy but also outside natural Tw must be found. The extent to whch it ean only be fur- shed bya historieo philosophical view of aw wil emerge. “The meaning of the distinction between legitimate and Itegitimate violence is not immediately obvious. The mis understanding in natural Iw by which a distinetion is drawn pemeen violence wed for just and unjust ends must be ex hatlaly rejected. Rather, thas aleady been indicted hatoe Reflections Positive law demands ofall volenee a proof ofits historical ‘origi, which under certain conditions is declared legal, sane: tioned. Since the acknowledgment of legal violence is mos tangiby evident in a deliberate submision to its ends a hypo thetical distinction between kinds of violence must be bated fon the presence or absence of a general historical acknowl ‘edgment of its ends. Ends that lack such acknowledgment may be called natural end che other legal ends. The dering fanetion of violence, depending on whether i serves natural oF legal ends can be most eesny traced against a background of specific legal conditions For the sake of simplicity, the follow {ng discussion will relate to contemporary European conditions ‘Gharacteristic of these, a far as the Individual as legal sub- Jeti concerned, is the tendency not to adit the natural ends ‘of such individuals inal those cases in which such ends cou, in a given situation, be usefully pursued by violence, This ‘means: this legal system tres to erect, in all areas where i dividual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can only be realized by legal power. Indeed, it strives to limit by legal ends even those areas in which natural ends are admited in principle within wide boundaries, like that of ‘education, as soon at these natural ends are pursued with aa fexcesive measure of violence, at in the laws relating to the Timits of educational authority to punish. I ean be formulated ‘asa general maxim of preventday European legislation that all the natural ends of individuals must collide with legal ends it pursued with a greater or leuer degree of violence. (The com tradietion beoween this and the right of self-defense will be resolved in what follows) From thismaxin it follows that law sees violence in the hands of individuals as ‘mining the legal system. As a danger nullifying legal ends and the egal executive? Certainly not; for then violence a8 such wouldnot be condemned, but only that directed to ilegal ends. 1e willbe argued chat a system of legal ends eannot be mate tained if natural ends are anywhere still pursued violently. In the fst place, however, this ina mere dogma, ‘To counter it Critique of Violence 28 xe might perhaps conde the sping pity ta the Inve tere int monopoly of viene ses nies isnot explained bythe invention of peering eal ends but, uh by tha of pesrvng ela tat lene, hen Svinte hands cel, thveatns ot by the en that ie ray puree but by ia mere existence outa the law The fume fay be mote dally nggeted Hf one tele Bow Shen the gure heres” eal, howee plete has may hve ee, hat sowed the sce airaton a the public This cme eat hom hi ded, bat oly fom the lence toch bear wine In this cu theo the Tiles of wich proeat ay law i eng in all ares of eve to apie the india spears really heteng. fd aroues een inde the pathy ofthe mass agaist By wha fancies can ah rson ee eae ning to law, and be ered by mum be epecialevdent thers applon even nthe resent eg et at thee inte da rugs fr she wore pened iit te Ogatnor tout tom th sat pode on shone jes en SES soci we Apt io te ay Sheshfeion a nonin of sons 1 smc, vk ‘ase sy tts be ected ree ch com “on a eit atone tee oak ones a ager vse: Dt trun unetond and stent meet Ie ive tne onion an non ers wr tru gp toa tering toa cn bese evel, ps enn Anita ho le a ot Tw the rig to second to boreal to tabs cca ven butter cosy om Vince Inet exerted yh eerie ontoing ie ty undovtely oc tne ois vee oly 2 Nao enngemet om te employer Te a Dinca ven wee ely ied,28 Reflections ee Sa el SSeS ice Sn se ore errs Undewod in th wey. rig to wie oe In the ee eed eee eee rabbis ea eos eee ee ee eee area erg rl eeepets eared ees Ee rs, ee ee aeetce meee Peart rire pet eee Se epee ee eet mertaareaced ae Critique of Violence 283 strike shows, however, that it canbe seat it sable to found and modify legel conditions, however offended the sense of justice may Sind itself thereby Twill be objected that uch a fonction of violence is fortuitous and isolated. This can be rebutted by consideration of military violence. ‘The posibility of military law vest on exactly the some objective contradiction in the legal situation as does that of ‘see law. that sto ay om the fae that legal subjects sanction Wiolence whose ende remain forthe sanctioners natura ends, tnd can therefore ina crisis come into conflict with their ow Tegal or natural ends. Admittedly, miliary violence is inthe fit place used quite directly, a8 predatory violence, toward fas ends. Yee it is very striking that even—or, rather, precisely in primitive conditions that know hardly the beginnings of ‘constitutional relations, and even in cases where the victor has ‘Guablshed himself in invulnerable posession, a peace cere ‘ony is entirely necenary. Indeed, the word “peace.” in the fenve in which itis the correlative to the word “war™ (for there is alo a quite diferent meaning, similarly unmetaphor- feal and politcal the one used by Kant in talking of “Eterm Peace"), denotes this prior, necessary sanctioning, regardless ofall other legal conditions, of every victory. This snction tonssts preciely in recognizing the new conditions a3 3 new rns" quite regardless of whether they need de facto any guarantee oftheir continuation. If, therefore, conclusions an ‘be drawn from military violence, as being primordial and para- igmati ofall violence wed for natural end, there is inherent inallsoch vilencea lawmaking characte. We sal ecura ater to the implications of this insight. It explains the above mentioned tendency of modern Ia to divest the individual, at leat as a legal subject, ofall violence, even that direced only to natural end, In the great criminal his violence con- rons the law with the threat of declaring a new law, a threat that even tay, despite its impotence, in important instances hhrtifes the public as it did in primeval times, The sate however, fears this violence simply forts Iawmaking character,284 Reflections being obliged to acknowledge it as lawiaking whenever exter nal powers foree it 19 concede them the Fight to conduct wwarfze, and lasses the right to suike 1 in the lat war the critique of military violence was the starting point fra passionate ertque of violence in genel— ‘which taught at last one thing, that violence is no longer ‘exercised and tolerated naively—neverteles, violence was not ‘only subject to rican for its lawmaking character, but wat ‘also judged, perhaps more annihilatingly, for another of its functions. For a duality in the function of violence is char acteristic of militarism, which could only come into being ‘through general conscription, Miltarism is the compulsory, tuniveral wie of volence ara means to the ends of the ate. ‘This compulsory use of violence has recently been scrutinized 38 closely 25, of suill more dosely than, the ute of violence iteelt.In it violence shows islf in a function quite diferent from its simple application for natural ends. It consists in the tue of violence as a means of legal ends. For the subordination ‘of citizen to lawo—in the present cat, to the law of general conscription legal end, If that frst funtion of violence is cailed the lawmaking function. this second will be called the lawpreserving function. Since conscription is a cage of law: reserving violence that i not in principe dstinguthed from others, a really effective eritque of i is far less easy than the Aedamavions of pacifist and acivns sugges. Rather, such a ritque coincides withthe etique of all legal violence—that js, with the critique of legal or executive foree—and cannot be performed by any leer program, Nor, of course—unless ‘one is prepared to prodaim a quite childish anarchism—is it achieved by refusing to acknowledge any constraint toward, persons and declaring "What pleases is permitted.” Such a maxim merely excludes reflection on the moral and historical spheres, and thereby on any meaning in action, and beyond this on any meaning in reality ivelf, which cannot be con- stituted if “ation” is removed fom its sphere. More important is the fact that even the appeal, so frequently attempted, to ice a Critique of Violence 285 the caugorial imperative, with its doubles incontestable ‘niu pogramact inch way tat tal ime you use umaniey bot in your pron andi he penon a al oes mend and wer meta a meats in olf adequate ieemoch a cque* For pose aif eanicow of ts 04 frit rainy cai co aizovledge and promote the interest Urmsnkind in the person ofeach ind Tes hint Gein te representation and preseraon ofan oder imposed Sy tue Wie iis view, whch aime to pres Law in 8 sey bus amor cvape ein, peverlew al stacks that Tene merely inte oan of formes "edom” without log ate to speiy this higher order of feedom, remain potent age i And mos impoen ofall whe, inead st cuacking the loi sytem oot and Branch they pagn fae he oF eat rac that he a of couse takes Ender the prtcion of power, wich ree in the fact hoe there only one fate and that what ext ane in p= cer atten Delonge inva ts ore. Fo proering violence fa thresteningvslence. And is eret Rot inended athe deren that uninformed ber teor- ina tnerpret it to be. A deterrent in the exact sense would ‘ute recrainy tnt coma te tere of «heat and {Por atin by any lw ince there i alaysbope of le Ings arm Th makes eal she more ating ke ate cm which spends whether the criminals apprehended. The ‘eepen purpove of the uncranty ofthe legal threat will nrg fom the ier conseaton ofthe shee of fate in Stich originate There sa veal pointer tin che spre 3 potsments Among them. ince che valy of postive the ay ber ale into, capa punishment hs pr oked more econ han all otvers However spertcal the omen ay in most coves have bon, thee modves were ni me toned in principe ‘The opponents of thee ees nem, te ct water hi oor emi oc ttl sean a lt tn Sec nosy p= me Ya et em rh286 Reflections felt perhaps without knowing why and probably involuntarily, that an attack on capital punishment assails, not legal meas ‘ure, not lava, but law itelf in its origin. For if violence, violence crowned by fate isthe origin of law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs inthe legal sytem, the origins of lw jut ‘manifestly and fearsomely into existence. In agreement with this is the fac thatthe death penalty in primitive legal systems is imposed even for sich crimes a ofenses against property, to which it seems quite out of “proportion.” Is purpose isnot to punish the infringement of law but to establish new law. For in the exercize of violence overlie and death more thaa {in any other legal act, law reafirms isl. But im this very vior lence something roten in law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the later knows itself to be inGinitely re. smote from conditions in which fate might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence Reason must, however, attempt to approach such conditions all the more resolutely fi is t0 bring toa conclusion its critique of both lawmaking and law. reserving violence. Tn far more unnatural combination than in the death pen aly, in a kind of spectral mixture, thee two forms of violence are present in another institution of the modern state, the police, True, this is violence for legal ends (in the right of diz sition), but withthe simultaneous authority to decide thee fends iulé within wide limits (in the right of decree). The ig rominy of such an authority, which is felt by few simply be- ‘cause its ordinances sufce only seldom for the cradest act, Dut ate therefore allowed to rampage all the more blindly ia ‘the mos vulnerable areas and against chnkers, from whom the tate Is not protected by law—this ignominy lies in the fact that in this authority the separation of lawmaking and law preserving violence is supended. Ifthe Sst is required t0 prove its worth in victory, the second is subject to the restric: tion that it may not ae itel€ new ends. Police violence is ‘emancipated from both conditions. Ie is lawmaking, for its Critique of Violence 287 characteristic function isnot the promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree, and law-preserving, ‘because it is at the disposal of these ends. The aserton that the ends of police violence are always identical or even con- necied to those of general law is entirely untrue. Rather, the "aw" of the police really marks the point at which the state, ‘whether from impotence or because of the immanent connec: ‘tions within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal sytem the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. Therefore the police intervene “for security reasons” {in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists, when they are not merely, without the slightest elation to legal ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through & life regulated by ordinances, or simply supervising him. Unlike law, which acknowledges in the “decision” determined by place ‘and time a metaphysical category that gives ita claim to criti ‘al evaluation, a consideration of the police institution en ‘counters nothing essential at all. Its power is formless Ike its nowhere tangible, all pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of CGvilied states. And though the police may, in particulars everywhere appear the same, it cannot finally be denied that ther spirit is less devastating where they scpresent, in absolute ‘monarchy, the power ofa ruler in which legislative and execu- tive supremacy are united, than in democracies where their ‘existence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to the ‘greatest conceivable degeneration of violence. ‘AI! violence as a means is either lawmaking or Jaw-presery= ing. If it lays laim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all vs however, that all violence as a means, even. plicated in the problematic nature of law ite And if the importance of these problems ‘cannot be astesed with certainty at this stage of the invest ‘gion, law nevertheless appears, from what has been said, im © ambiguous a moral light that the question poses itself ‘whether there are no other than violent means for regulating ‘conlicting human interest. We are above all obligated to note288 Reflections that a totally nonviolent resolution of colts can never lead to a legal contract. For the latter, however peacefully it may have been entered into bythe paris leads nally to posible violence. It confers on both parties the right to take recourse to violence in some form against the other, should he break the agreement. Not only that; lke the outcome, the origin of ‘every contract aso points toward violence, It need not be “ively present in it as awmaking violence, but i represented Int insofar as the power that guarantees a Tegal contract i in tum of violent origin even if violence isnot introduced into the contract itll. When the consciousness of the latent pres ‘ence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the insticu- tion falls into decay. In our time, parliaments provide an fexample of this. They offer the familiar, woeful spectae be ‘ase they have not remained conicious of the revolutionary forces to which they owe their existence. Accordingly, in Ger ‘many in particlar, the lst manifestation of such forces bore no fruit for parliaments. They lack the sense that a lawmaking violence is represented by themselves; no wonder that they fannot achieve decrees worthy ofthis violence, but cultivate {ncompromise a supporedy nonviolent manne of dealing with poled afirs. This remains, however, a “product situated ‘within che mentality of violence, no matter how it may disdain all open violence, because the effort toward compromise is ‘motivated not internally but from ouaide, by the opposing fort, because no compromise, however freely accepted is con ‘evable without a compulsive character Tt would be better ‘otherwise’ i the underlying feling in every compromise.” Signifcandy, the decay of parliaments has perhaps alienated fa many minds from the ideal of a nonviolent resolution of political cont as were atwacted to it by the war. The pack fists are confronted by the Bolsheviks and Syndicalists, These hhave elected an annihilating and on the whole apt eritique of presentday parliaments Nevertheles, however desirable and gratifying 4 fourshing pueliament might be by compar + Unger, Poli and Met, Rsin, j j | Critique of Violence 289 ton, discussion of means of politcal agreement that are in principle nonviolent cannot be concerned with parliamen: tarlanism. For what parliament achieves in vital affairs can ‘only be those legal decree that in their origin and outcome are attended by violence. Ts any nonviolent resolution of confice posible? Without doube. ‘The relationships of private persons are full of ex- “amples ofthis. Nonviolent agreement is possible wherever a Guid outlook allows the we of unalloyed means of agree- tment. Legal and illegal means of every Kind chat are all the fame violent may be confronted with onvilent ones as wn Slloyed means. Courtesy, sympathy, peaceablenes rust, and whatever else might here be mentioned, are their subjective preconditions, ‘Their objective manifestation, however, fs de- fermined by the law (¢he enormous scope of which cannot be Aisused here) that unalloyed means are never those of direct, tout always those of indirect solutions, They therefore never spply divecly to the resolution of confit between man and man, but only to matters concerning objects. The sphere of fonviolent means opens up in the realm of human conflicts lating to goods. For this reason technique in the broadest fense of the word is their mos particular area. Its profoundest tecample is perhaps the conference, considered asa technique ‘of evil agreement. For init not only is nonviolent agreement posible, but also the exclusion of violence in principe fs quite Explicitly demonstrable by one signifant factor: there is no sanction for lying. Probably no legislation on earth originally feipulated such a sanction. This makes lear that there is 2 Sphere of human agreement that is nonviolent to the extent that fis wholly inaceewble to violence: the proper sphere of “understanding” language. Onl late and in a peculiar process cof decay has it been penetrated by legal violence in the penalty placed on fraud. For whereas the legal sytem at its origin, {rusting to its victorious power, i content to defeat lawbreak- ing wherever ft happens to show ive, and deception, having Itelf no ace of power abou it, was, onthe principle fs cite290 Reflections vigilant sriptum est, exempt from punishment in Roman land ancient Germanic law, the law ofa later period, lacking ‘confidence in is own violence, no longer fle tuelf 2 match for that ofall others. Rather, fear of the latter and mistrust of itself indicate ie declining vitality Ie begins tose if ends, ‘with the intention of sparing lawpreserving violence more taxing manifestations. It turns to fraud, therefore, not out of moral considerations but for fear ofthe violence that it might ‘unleash in the defrauded party. Since such fear confes with, the violent nature of law derived from its origins, uch ends are Inappropriate to the juried means of law. They ree not ‘only the decay of ts own sphere, but alo a diminution of pare means. For, in prohibiting fraud, law restiets the wse of ‘wholly nonviolent means because they could produce reactive iolence. This tendency of law has also played a part in the Concession ofthe right to strike, which contradicts the interests fof the sate, Ie grants this right because it forstlls violent factions the sate is afraid to oppore. Did not workers pres ‘ously resort at once to sbotage and set Gre to factories? To induce men to reconcile their interests peacefully without in valving the legal sytem. there vires, one efective motive that often enough puts tot reluctant hands pure instead of violent means; itis the fear of mutual disadvantage that threaten to arise from vio- Jent confrontation, whatever the outcome might be. Such mo- tives are clearly visible in countess cases of confit of interests between private perions. Ie is diferent when cases and na tions ate in confit, since the higher orders that chresten t0 ‘overwhelm equally victor and vanguished are hidden from. the feelings of most, and from the intelligence of almost all. ‘Space does not here permit me to trace such higher orders and ‘the common interest corresponding to them, which consiute ‘the mot enduring motive fora policy of pure means We ean therefore only point to pure means in polities as analogous not ee Unger pp 18. wean it Critique of Violence 29r to tow which govern pec ntcoune Bewen priate room gd ds srg in hem ie mut ner ex at ctor be sents pe sean To eal eseRnds fare the pbs of whlch ave led (ee ie mont nw be more fly hartere,Srl Neem pate ene tan purely het ne Sneot ving Sangued hem. He en huh a pia dhe tein ele Rane in then fo see TES of ne fomer he aye The asengening of sate vet bets nr conn nthe prea og TeSun te police te dente vaca) ae aed aaa ee und ora song ceed and diplined Fee be imperiou ec om the opposton vs a ping sen ot ang encod SENS “iin pole ener wike demonstra how he eit toe of ts oengh ow power waned ts We peeged to he pie, how the ma of fro- Heelan: tr mater” none t polil ca ie obi incidentally exo have been sed sabe eer elec he protean er Sie oa he mle kof deoying wate power vide althe log omc leery pole “Ip preansx een theo popular elo a sues This genera sate dey anaes tinier vested att gin tg omg by eligi Msi abla sae iste ar oly tebs decent of the rng romp inal ene Set See rom he burden torn by he ple” While seta frm of merupon af work lent sine eases sein cca modfn otter odo he cod 2ypure mer rome, For bs ple notin read Sen's tune we following exeral concent ands Soren ur Mec, 8 Ps 190 95.292 Reflections ‘or tha modifcaton to working conditions but inthe determi- nation to resume only 2 wholly ransormed work, no longer enforced by the state, an upheaval that this kind of strike not 0 much causes as consummates For this reaton, the Sst of these undertakings is lawaking but the second anarchste. ‘Taking up occasional statements by Marx, Sorel rejects every ind of program, of utopia—in a word, of lawmaking for the revolutionary movement: “With the general strike all these fine things disappear; the evolution appears asa clea, simple revolt, and no place is reserved either forthe wodolo. tits of for the elegant amateurs of socal reforms or for the Sntllctuals who have made it their profesion to think for the proletariat.” Against this deep, moral, and. genuinely evolutionary conception, no objection can stand that seks, fon grounds of its possibly catastrophic consequences, to ‘rand soch a general strike ax violent. Even if it can righely bbe said that the modern economy, sen as a whole, resembles ‘much les a machine that stands idle when abandoned by ts soker than a beat that goes berierk as soon as its mer turn his back, nevertheless the violence of an action can be ‘ssewed no mote from its elects than from its ends, but only ‘rom the law of is means. State power, of course, whch has ‘eyes only for effects, opposes precy this kind of strike for its alleged violence, as distinct from partial strikes which are for the most part actually extortionate, The extent to ‘which such a rigorous conception of the general svike as such is capable of diminishing the incidence of actual violence in revolutions, Sorel has explained with highly ingenious arguments. By contrast, an outstanding example of violent ‘omission, more immoral and cruder chan the political general strike, akin to a blockade, is the strike by doctors, such as several German cities have seen. In this is revealed at its ‘most repellent an unscrupulous use of vilenee that Is pos- tively depraved in a professional dass that for years, without the slightest attempts at resistance, "tecured death its pre.” land then at the frst opportunity abandoned life ofits own Critique of Violence 293 tc il Morley an in eet dre he means SNES Sgecnen hme declpe tn ounods of rere kory of mae. Only Sesonaly doe te Tex ot aploma in ei uansctons consi of mocatons ger etme Fendenclly they fave, entity on he a eapeanen bower pte enon Fete ER Seiya ues ft te, pny se oe ec Adel ak hat ae ous rt by setae bat etd of ston that ih Fite aaleve tt of terete beau bjt all Par a aed three teond vile Acoedog ie ‘mor of priate poms at of poms seed own rms and ites, wich were not away set fmaiescren though hy tae me. ss fons of wolencepericdby both mtr sett ie ower eon at Be fe el verstetee mur ae) nd of ep vec fw eey cma talon to hunan robles sesige of dle rom the conte all he wor macau of esene sbi Mier remain ‘agouti olen tol excel in pence te teres cml ess oer Kno eer an See age ea try. cate etme Benes ae th of te fe dg coon to ath SEED ctr rn beaten by ied meas, oid ere eer jen Haw wool tb therfore all Et imgor ye ng iden, were of ol weet fe wih ends ad at te se we Siren Linda leer cae it ew that cer iG, Guid te iter Joel or the unui Sle at wot led hema means BPM ao aiteen way Te wou how Hi re isnssnd tf dsauaging doe a he mate Sy a al leg pete (ih a hopeless tap campers nly othe pot of enelue aon "igh sed "wong Ing ae204 Reflections guages): For it ie never reason that decides on the justification ff means and the justness of ends, but fateimposed violence fon the former and God on the latter. And insight that is ‘uncommon only becatse of the stubborn prevailing habit of foncelving those just ends as ends of a posible lav, that is, fot only as generally valid (which follows analytically from the nature of jute), but also a¢ capable of generalization, ‘which, as could be thown, contradicts the nature of junice. For ends that for one situation are jus, universally aceptabl, and valid, ate co for no other situation, no matter how similar it may be in other respects, The nonmediate function of violence at issue here is ilustrated by everyday experience. As regards man, hei impelled by anger, for example, to the most ‘inible oucbursts of a violence that is not related as a means toa preconceived end. Tt isnot 2 means but a ma Moreover, this violence has thoroughly objective manifesta- tions in which it can be subjected to tism. These are t0 ‘be found, mos significantly, above all in myth. ‘Mythical violence in ts archetypal form is a mere man festation of the gods. Not a means to their ends, scarcely a manifestation oftheir wil, but frst of all a manifestation of their existence. The legend of Niobe contains an outstanding example of this True, it might appear that the action of ‘Apollo and Artemis is ony a punishment. But their violence ‘establishes a law far more than it punishes forthe infringe ‘ment of one already existing. Niobe's arrogance calls down, fate upon itself not because her arrogance olflends against the law but bectuse it challenges fate—to a fight in which fate must wiumph, and can bring to light a law only in its tuiumph. How litle such divine violence was to the ancients the lavepreserving violence of punishment is shown by the Iheroie legends in which the hero—for example, Prometheus— challenges fate with dignified courage, Sights it with varying fortunes, and ie not left by the legend without hope of one day bringing a new law to men. Ie is really this hero and the Tegal violence of the myth native to him that the public ties Critique of Violence 295 to picture even now in admising the mixeant, Violence therefore bursts upon Niobe from the uncertain, ambiguous phere of fae. Kis not actually destructive. Although it Tring a cruel death to Niobe's children, it stops shor ofthe life of their mother, whom it leaves behind, more guily than before through the death of the children, both as an eternally mute bearer of guile and as a boundary sone on the frontier Deoween men anid gods If ths immediate violence in mythical manifestations proves closely related, indeed identical to law Iking violence, i reflects a problematic ight on Tawmaking “olen, insofar as te latter was characterized above, in. the ecount of military violence, as merely a mediate violence, ‘At the same time thle connection promises further to ile ‘inate fate, which in all eases underlies legal violence, and to Conclude in broad outline the eitique ofthe latter. For the fonction of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking pursue as its end, with violence as the means, ‘phat isto be established at law, but atthe moment of fnstate- tment doesnot dismiss violence; rather, at chis very moment of Tiwmaking. it specifically establishes as Iaw not an end wn. oye by violence, but one necesarlly and intimately bound ‘oie under the te of power. Lawimaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence Jace isthe principle ofall divine end making, power the principle of al mythical lawmaking, ‘An application of the later that has immense consequences Istobe found in constitutional Iw. For in thissphere the etab- Tishing of frontiers, the tsk of “peace” aftr all che wars of the mchical age, i the primal phenomenon ofall lawmaking lolence, Here we see most dearly that power, more than the mont extravagant gain in propety, i what is guaranteed by all lawmaking violence. Where frontiers are decided the tuversiy it aot simply annihilated; indeed, he is accorded fights even when the vicior’s superiority in power i com: plete And chose ae, in a demonially ambiguous way, “equal” Tigh for both parties tothe weary i is the same Tine that298 Reflections may not be coed. Here apenas teiby pimiive form the sane mph sigs of lv that may not be ining” to ich Anal Fate resell when he sy Toor aad sch ae equally forbidden to pend the eh under th ridge” aio sppears tat Sorel touches bet mercy on cata hisorel bu alo ona metaphueal {Toh in srmisng tat in the beginning all ight Wat the precgaive of te Hing or the noblein wort, of the Fgh and cat, mats matandi wil remain 0m og Et exna For tom the point of vw of olence, wich lone am porate hse io cqaliy,b athe met ual pee nen Theat of Sng fone, Bower {Sto duit foram wtestnding of aw in ater opect Law and unnashed frontiers rena, at ett in rine tie enwsten Inve Aman can onwngly Entnge upon them and tur Incr rebut. For ech intercon a tai provked ty sn eee gies he fuwrien aod known lew calle, in contaisincion te panidment, rrbaon, Bit however unl 1 may etl i wnupetng wc, igure a he under anilingus I, hme, tte sowing Lal ee tain in in detente autipity. Hernan Catenin a Meteeteton on the ance conception of ae, has poken lin eae reno” tt a em rs that oct cme and ing abut tht inagement, Shivofeme* To spa law eve the modern pote fin ignorance of a not proton sui ponent teste Jota the sage ver wien aw in he aly evo of the ancet Geek common to be waertood a reellon agains te pr of yh att Por from inaguringa pore pre, the mle ma feanion of inmate Voleoee shows Tut fondamentaly dene wid all Il lene, snd trea mpcon com tering the liter Ine cxanty ofthe pence of a Hinonel fncon, the deraction of which thes Beomer +m re, lr ls no. Re obligatory. This very task of destruction poses agin, fast resort, the question of a pore immediate violence that tight be able to all a hale to mythical violence, Just spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all upecs If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence fi Tawedestroying, if the former sts boundaries the latter Poundlesdly destroys them if mythical violence brings a ‘once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates f the former threatens, the later strikes, if the former is bloody, the later Is lethal without spilling blood. The legend of Niobe may be confronted, as an example of this violence, ‘with God's judgment on the company of Korah, Tt strikes Privileged Levites arikes them without warning, without Threat and does not sop short of annihilation. But in fnniilaing it alto expiates, and a deep connection between the lack of bloodshed and the expiatory character of this ‘iolence is unmistakable. For blood is the symbol of mere Iife The dissolution of legal violence stems, as cannot be ‘shown in detail here, from the goilt of more natural ie, ‘Mhich consign the living, innocent and unhappy, © a ret ution that “expates” the guilt of mere 1f—and doutless taka puries the guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law, For ‘pith mere life the rule of lae over the living ceases. Mythical TJolence is bloody power over mere life for it own sake, Uvine violence pure power overall life for the sake of the fing, The frst demands eric, the second accep it. "This divine power is attested no only by religious tradition ‘but i so found in preent-day life in at last one sanctioned tmanifesation. ‘The educative power, which in its perfected form stands ouside the law, ie one ofits manifestations. These fre defined, therefore, not by miracles directly performed ‘by God, but by the explating moment in them that strikes ‘Without bloodshed and, finally, by the absence of all law Thang. To this extent itis jusifble to call this violence, i: but itis s0 ony relatively, with regard t0298 Reflections goods, right, life, and suchlike, never absolutely, with regard to the soul of the living. The premise of such an extension of pure or divine power is sure to provoke, particularly toda the most violent reactions, and to be countered by the argu ‘ment that taken to its logical conclusion it confers on men ‘even lethal power aginst one another. This, however, cannot ‘be conceded. For the question “May I kil?" meet its ized ible answer in the commandment “Thow shalt not kil” ‘This commandment precedes the deed, just at God was “preventing” the deed. But just ae it may not be fear of punishment that enforces obedience, the injunction becomes Jnapplicable,incommensurabe once the dee is accomplished. [No judgment of the deed can be derived from the command. ment. And so neither the divine judgment, nor the grounds for this judgment, can be known in advance. Those who ‘ase a condemnation ofall violent killing of one person by ‘another on the commandment are therefore mistaken, It exists not as a criterion of judgment, but as a guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases to take on themelves the responsibility of ignoring it. ‘Thus it wos ‘understood by Judalan, which expresly rejected the conden nation of killing in sel'deente. But thove thinkers who take the opposed view refer to a more distant theorem, on which they posibly propose to base even the commandment itself. ‘This is the doctrine of the sanctity of life, which they either apply to all animal or even vegetable life, oF limit to human life. Their argumentation, exemplifed in an extreme cave by the revolutionary kiling of the oppresor, runs a8 follows: "HT do not bill I shall never establish the world dominion of justice... that is the argument of the intelligent teres. ++. We, however, profes that higher even than the happiness and justice of existence stands existence itelL”™ As certainly 88 this last proposition is false, indeed ignoble, it shows the necensity of secking the reason fr the commandient no longer ‘Kort Hier ina yetoak of ar Zi, Critique of Violence 299 sche ee een ee ne Se ahs thats however, if existence, of beter, Mle (words whose we ret es ani incon ie lt, aA ae att eerie be aid wo coincide with the mere Ke in him st oe im i my So na ie sale ee st cet eye a emai en en fay gt et nt crime ter ee Se300 Reflections decisive approach to its temporal data. A gaze directed only at what {5 dose at hand ean at mote peresive a dialectical ‘Hsing and falling in the lawmaking and law-preserving forms- tions of violence. The law governing their oxlation rests fon the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, in its ‘duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence repre- sented by it, through the suppresion of hostile counter violence. (Various symptoms of this have been refered to i. the course of this study) This lasts until either new foees or those earlier suppresed triumph over the hitherto Iawmaking Violence and thus found anew law, destined in its turn to decay (On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythical forms ‘of law, on the suspension of law with al the forces on which it depends as they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new historical epoch is founded. IE the rule of myth is broken occasional in the present age, the coming age is not so unimaginably remote that an atack ‘on aw is altogether futile. But if che existence of violence foutside the law, 2s pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof that revolutionary violence, the highest rmaniteaton af rnaloged violene hy man, ix posible, and bby what means. Less porsible and also lese urgent for human- kind, however, is to decide when unalloyed violence has been realized in particular asex For only mythical violence, not divine, willbe recognizable as such with certainty, unless it be “Incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of vio- ae open to pure divine violence, which myth Bastardied with Jaw. Te may manifest itself in 2 crue war exactly a5 in the divine judgment of the multitide on a criminal. But all, ‘mythical, lawmaking violence, which we may cll executive i pernicious. Pernicions, too, is the law preserving, administra tive violence that serves it Divine violence, which isthe sgn land seal but never the means of sacred execution, may be called sovereign violence The Destructive Character could happen to someone lang back over is He ha sealaeh tae stow al the deer obigon, Be had ve le rane rgnste a people on whove"Zvrue Seeder eveyone was sped, He wold sunble Sr te one dy parup bychanc, andthe ener the wa Gein, the beer eis canes of plcring the tensive arse. ows only one watchword: make J deuce dinar oon for fresh air som only one cy ig wa Hed “Stpen pce stonge han 27 Seen carer young and crt For acre irene ceaing ray the es of FO on ene erring ested sey mente the Beet fesucon nced erento of seer ii, Bue what enuresis. of all © tan image of Ue desroyer te eon of How aon eee is tmpied when eed for swore ace "sith pre tond embracing and wing sete ia sigh afords the deocne Charset pecare fepet aro “inne eect aay Biya work ey hat dats ho tempon Inde at Hens fF be TE eu er. Oterie she ll ake rhe srction tence Se salon inpies te done crac. He hs few wenn ee eioe them to knw wh il pace wat wee ate Fi a a ors moment et ep vane ine where te hing 08 ote ici Ie