Management Kritik

1NC/Overview

Management K
Exploration and development of the ocean space is rooted in a destructive,
ontological state of management.
Deuchars, 13
Deuchars, Robert. "Governmentality and Risk: Managing Ocean Space."Research Paper International Environmental Law (LAWS
530) (2013): n. pag. Web. Faculty of Law Victoria University of Wellington

The majority of the literature on international environmental law does not consider any of the
above to be anything other than part of the lexicon of terms that are used to describe and to
analyse environmental problems. Similarly ocean space is now increasingly divided up by regional
bodies, established by conventions to oversee the management of (usually) labelled species that are to be managed
and or protected by these bodies that have a series of measures that have been designed to ensure the survivability of the
resources under our gaze. Ernst Haas asked the provocative question in the 1970s Why ocean space rather than the
human environment, the ecosystem, atmospheric space or outer space?1 What Haas did was to ground the
concept ocean space as materiality giving that space a territorial function for the purposes of regime
construction. In that sense Haas made a valuable early contribution to thinking about the vastness of the oceans and of the living
things that constitute ocean space by attributing to it the same ontological status as territory. It is, of course a double-edged
sword contribution as once the oceans are perceived on the same plane of reality as land a
twofold effect occurs. Firstly, there is the recognition that the ocean space is not limitless; it has boundaries.2
And secondly, once boundaries are concretised, there is ample room for territorial disputes over the
space itself and increasingly the resources contained within those boundaries. Ocean space and
the ecosystem which is used in the legal definition of the methodological approach to the
management of ocean space in fisheries are described as complex adaptive systems and the behaviour of the parts or
individual scale-entities has a co-evolutionary effect on the behaviour of all the other agents. In other words nonlinearity represents

a clear break with Cartesian certainty and opens up theoretical space for uncertainty, irreducible
indeterminism and exposes the weaknesses of our fondness for reductionist forms of analysis.
Breaking things down into their smallest constituent parts seems to have much appeal but when we reveal the objects of our enquiries
are more often than not repeated practices and processes situated in irreversible time we are confronted with the in-built limitation
of both static analysis and reductive analysis.3 This is not an entirely new idea and has been well explained in other texts. Karl
Mannheim in his classic work Ideology and Utopia exposes our tendencies to attempt to make rigid and fixed practices and processes
to give the illusory appearance of spatiotemporal stability. Again, this situation may make for a certain utility of analysis, but covers
up critical areas of experience such as complexity, emergence and the inherent instability of identities. He notes: The world of
external objects and of psychic experience appears to be in a state of continuous flux. Verbs are more adequate symbols for this
situation than nouns. The fact that we give names to things which are in flux implies inevitably certain stabilization oriented along
the lines of collective activity. The derivation of our meanings emphasizes and stabilizes that aspect of

things which is relevant to activity and covers up, in the interest of collective action, the
perpetually fluid process underlying all things.4 Mannheim published this work in the 1930s, not so long after the
establishment of quantum mechanics, which had revealed a number of fundamental problems for physics but which also became
germane to the study of social systems too. However Mannheim appears to be acutely aware of the functional reasons why we do not,
in most cases, attempt to designate things as they really are. He acknowledges that the interest of collective action

serves to simplify and solidify unstable entities for the explicit purpose of functional activity.
This logic gives impetus for us to problematise the fluid concepts of nation-states, the system of
nation-states and the myriad conventions that constitute most aspects of global governance,
including international environmental law. The nation-state and the international system of states are on-going
projects and can never be said to be fully complete. There is a continuous ebbing and flowing of people, information, laws and
norms, and the transportation of matter-energy flows. When Mannheim mentions the the perpetually fluid process underlying all
things we should be careful to place this phrase in context. It can be taken too far thus disabling our attempts to analyse any given
phenomenon. The stabilization of things is often required for us to make any meaningful statements about them. Although
Mannheims statement may be correct, stability is often required for analytical convenience even when we know that it merely
represents an approximation of the real. In this essay I will consider one body that has been established to manage

the ocean space within set geographic boundaries. As stated in article 2 of its convention the objective of
this body is to act through the application of the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach
to fisheries management, to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fishery resources
and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which these resources occur. This body is the
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), which was instituted after years of negotiation under the

Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean in November 2009
and entered into force in December 2012.5 The Convention itself falls under the auspices of United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 which was established the 1982, although many similar regional regimes predate the present framework for
ocean governance. In the pages that follow I will outline a critique that takes the terms mentioned at the very beginning of this essay
into account and suggest that far from being reasonable and unproblematic, it is more reasonable to suggest that these

words and terms, and others similar to them, and the framework of thinking in which they inhabit,
are indicative of the culturally modernist ontology and predominantly positivist epistemology that
tend to dominate the discourse of so-called advanced industrialised societies. In doing so I will have to
open up the scope of my enquiry well beyond environmental law and into areas of philosophy and
in particular the question of the relationship humans have with nature, the international political
economy of industries beyond fishing techniques and accepted practice, and the great uncertainties and gaps in scientific
knowledge7 in general and of the deep seas in particular. Furthermore, my point of departure necessitates a
questioning of the use and abuse of technology to pursue questionable ends in general8 and
technological practices in particular, especially those practices that have enabled humans to fish
in deeper waters using techniques that do not discriminate between fish, marine mammals, other
life-forms and the ocean space.

This form of ontological thought destroys our value to life and makes planetary
destruction inevitable.
McWhorter 92 (Ladelle, Asst Prof of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State Univ., Heidegger and the Earth, p. x)
In "Earth-Thinking and Transformation," Kenneth Maly shows us ways in which

Heideggerian reflection upon the

fact of our being as earth-dwellers can be transformative of our thinking at its very core and
therefore transformative of our world. Maly believes that our culture's insistence upon a divorce
between rationality and other ways of thinking and knowing has resulted in an
impoverishment of our being and a destructive distancing from the earth that gives rise to, shelters, and
sustains us. When we take ourselves and the earth as fixed entities to be comprehended by
rational observation and theoretical constructs we lose sight of earth and being-human as
process, as forever unfixed, as changing, growing, outgrowing, as living and therefore dying. It is only when we
begin to think human being and earth as unfixed, as always undergoing transformation in a
living unfolding of our/its being that a new, less destructive understanding of humanity-in/onearth can come into being. And such understanding, Maly would argue, is absolutely necessary if we

are to avoid destroying the earth.

Alterative: Reject the 1AC and its managerial relations with the ocean.
We must do nothing in the face of the affirmatives call for action only through
this passivity can we escape the cycle of control created by managerial thought.
McWhorter 92 (Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth Essays in Environmental Philosophy, Thomas Jefferson University Press,
pg. 4-5)
Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and

decisive action is so loudly and urgently

called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a
call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, We begin to undergo the frustration
attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose. to will, to do nothing? The call itself
places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our
passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for
acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus
surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course,
those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as
individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great
courage, "the courage to make the truth of our Own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals
into the things that most deserve to be called in question3 Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through

the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most
basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

Overview
Every time they say exploration and development, they mean exploitation and
envelopment the 1AC is an act of otherizing and managing nature and using it as a
standing reserve our Deuchars in 13 evidence says that using the ocean as a
consumable good for human gain through exploration and development is a form of
domination of the environment which sees this space as "out there" allowing for
endless exploitation.
It turns case this environmental management lock us into a calculative mindset
that perpetuates and magnifies the root cause of the affirmatives harms.
McWhorter, 92
[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, p.20]

Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death; it means thinking
catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this
planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must
not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for
immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce
expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already
done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very
notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems,
our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a
metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. It is the thoughtless deployment of
these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first
place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting
subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood
in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in
with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding
itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

Extend the first piece of McWhorter evidence it gives two impacts against the
affirmative:
1. Extinction Our constant attempts at management of the Earth inevitably causes
carelessness for the health of our planet, causing mass ecological damage that
results in planetary extinction.
2. Value to Life The attempt at domination makes entire populations disposable in
order to achieve complete control this causes a regime of power that dictates our
being this outweighs the affs extinction claims for in a world where there is no
value to it we are already the walking dead and death becomes irrelevant.
No risk of offense any part of the affirmatives managerial thought before the
alternative causes error replication makes their impacts worse.
Burke 5
(Anthony, Politics and IRUniversity of New South Wales, Iraq: Strategy's burnt offering', Global Change, Peace & Security, 17:2,
191 213]
Yet Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, had already sounded a warning - pointing to the emptiness of
a utilitarianism that gets caught in an 'unending chain of means and ends' in which 'all ends are

bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends'.116 This

perfectly describes the rolling disaster of the United States' policy towards Iraq, from the time the Reagan administration decided to
make of Saddam a 'strategic asset', then sought his removal through a decade of failed and ever more destructive policy, until only the
invasion and occupation of the country could seemingly achieve US goals. It perfectly describes the geopolitical panic

and ambition of the Bush neoconservatives, who have sought to build one illusory strategic
'victory' on another (Afghanistan, Iraq, then) without consideration of what counts as victory, its
manifest failures and its unbearable human, economic and political costs. Strategy, seeking one proliferating end
after another, becomes an end in itself and the ultimate, narcissistic source of meaning. To use Arendt's
words, it 'defies questioning about its own use utility established as meaning generates
meaninglessness'

Our alternative is to reject the 1AC and its managerial relations with the ocean
our McWhorter evidence proves that only passivity in the face of their call to action
can allow us to question the ontological underpinnings of the 1AC and destroy the
managerial foundations that exist upon them the 1AC can happen under a world
of the alternative but not the other way around only rejecting a call for action can
allow policy to happen without calculative modes of thought.
Finally the role of the ballot is to endorse the best intellectual advocacy in the round
our advocacy is a rejection of entrenched managerialism your ballot resists the
static future imbedded by the management ontology and restores value to life denied
by dominative violence.
Bleiker, 2000
(Roland; Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, p 281-2 ]

Transversal forms of dissent cannot succeed overnight . An engagement

with linguistically and discursively entrenched forms of domination works slowly and
indirectly. The effects of such interferences are difficult to see or prove , especially if oneapproaches the
question of evidence with a positivist understanding of knowledge. But transversal dissent is
nevertheless real. It enters the social context in the form of what the East German poet Uwe Kolbecalled 'a trace
element'. 7 It does not directly cause particular events . It engenders human agency through a multi-layered
and diffused process, through a gradual transformation of societal values. This process has no
end . No matter how successful they are, discursive forms of dissent , even if they manage to transgress national
boundaries, are never complete . There is no emancipatory peak to be climbed . Dissent is the very act of
climbing , daily, doggedly, endlessly. It is not an event that happens once, a spectacular outburst of
energy that overcomes the dark forces of oppression and lifts liberation into an superior state of
perpetual triumph . 'Everything becomes and returns eternally', Nietzsche says. 'Escape is impossible!' 8 Even the most just
social order excludes what does not fit into its view of the world. Inclusiveness lies in a constant process of disturbing language and
rethinking meaning, rather than in an utopian final stage. If we are to gain and retain a viable understanding of

human agency in global politics we must embrace the transversal and the transitional as inevitable
aspects of life. Human agency not only engenders transition, it is itself transition. The role and
potential of agency, its ability to open up new ways of perceiving global politics, can be appreciated once we accept, with Rilke, and
as a permanent condition of life, that we always 'stand in the middle of a transition where we cannot remain standing'. A discursive
notion of human agency is grounded precisely in this recognition that there is no end to circles of revealing and

concealing, of opening and closing spaces to think and act. Revealing is always an act, not
something that remains stable. Anything else would suggest a static view of the world, one in
which human agency is annihilated, one in which the future can never tear down the boundaries
of the present . Just as the interaction of domination and resistance has no end, efforts at coming to terms with them will never
arrive at a stage of ultimate insight. Because discursive dissent operates through a constant process of becoming something else than
what it is, a theoretical engagement with its dynamics can never be exhaustive. It can never be more than a set of open-ended
meditations. An approach to understanding dissent and human agency thus remains useful only as long as it resists the temptation of
digging deeper by anchoring itself in a newly discovered essence, a stable foundation that could bring the illusion of order and
certainty to the increasingly transversal domain of global politics.

Framework/Perms

Framework
A. Interpretation Our interpretation for the debate is that the affirmative should
get a topical plan, and the negative should get to test the plan at the level of
justification and representations.
B. Dont Buy Their Abuse Claims:
1. Affirmative Ground The aff can always have state good offense against the
criticism this ground checks any differential in the strategy or predictability
arguments.
2. Reflexivity DA Policy planning is rooted in a series of value judgments
questioning these assumptions is the only way to effectively learn about policy and
develop good research practices means we control topic education and global
uniqueness.
Bristow, 2005
(Gillian, Professor of School of City and Regional Planning @ Cardiff University, Everyones a Winner: Problematizing the
Discourse of Regional Competitiveness, Journal of Economic Geography, 2005, pp.285-304)

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-dened
content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute the
only valid currency of argument. Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived, they have as
yet failed to make a signicant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantiable form of output-related regional
competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately benecial. The answer appears to lie within the policy

process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the
public sector. This therefore includes the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work
which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions,and all the talk, work and collaboration
which goes into translating these into practice. A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope
and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-makinga debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis
upon evidence-based policy-making. Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he
argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts. However, Majone
has signicantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy
alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence selectively to

justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgments. It is thus persuasion (through
rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalization) that is the key to the policy process, not
the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas that shape policy
making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community. Thus, critical to
understanding the power of the discourse is rstly, understanding the appeal and signicance of the discourse to business interests and,
secondly, exploring their role in inuencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites.

3. Our interp is key to negative ground aff choice makes going negative
unpredictable since they could have read a K aff and said we dont get policy
arguments affirmatives defending a plan and the negative being able to criticize
that plan is essential to negative predictability the affirmative should get the
resolution and we should get things that are outside of that action.
4. Their interpretation doesnt solve our offense you could run a CP that PICs out
of one part of the 1AC and have a criticize of those representations this would be
net worse for the affirmative because they could not garner offense off of their plan
which would destroy their ability to compete.
Finally even if they win their framework this is not a voting issue this is a reason
why you would evaluate their impact claims and we would win in that world as
well because we have a value to life DA to their plan and all of our link argument
are reasons why their plan would not be able to solve.

A2 Perm Do Both/Nearly All Perms

1. Extend the conceded links here any part of the affirmative before the passivity
of the alternative links into the managerialism of ocean engagement that magnifies
and is the root cause of the affirmative impacts.
2. Doesnt solve you cannot reject their assumptions of being while perpetuating
action within those assumptions by passing the plan the permutation destroys alt
solvency by elevating management (Also gut check, how do you reject the 1AC and
not reject the 1AC?)
Kinsella 2007
Kinsella, William. "Heidegger and Being at the Hanford Reservation: Standing Reserve, Enframing, and Environmental
Communication Theory." Enviormental Communication 1.2 (2007): 194-217. Print.
All beings (das Seiendes) share the characteristic of being (das Sein), but only human beings exhibit the particular mode of
being that Heidegger calls Dasein. The

cumbersome expression human-being-in-the-world captures a key

feature of Dasein, namely, an ongoing, practical engagement with the world that entails thrownness
(embeddedness in pre-existing conditions) and projection (perception and action oriented toward
practical projects and goals). Human beings meet, encounter, confront, respond to, take a stance toward, and
operate upon the world, and in doing so both change and are changed by the world. Here again
Heideggers phenomenology is consistent with a bounded constitutive model of communication. While oriented to our
projects, these encounters with otherness are also constrained by the recalcitrant, obdurate, ontic characteristics of the entities with
which we are thrown into contact. Heideggers concept of Dasein stresses that human being is a product of interactions
with the world, even as it acts upon that world . Thus Dasein is not a static, unchanging
phenomenon; rather, it evolves over time, recursively, as a result of its continuing practical
engagement.

3. Theory The permutation either severs its use of the environment or adds a new
clause to overcome the links both of these are voting issues because it destroys the
ability for the negative to create strategies also rigs the game in favor of the aff
because they have the last speech to make one more perm and win the round

A2 Perm Other Instances

1. Its intrinsic and not okay the other instances is not in the 1NC or 1AC text
its a voter because it destroys the ability for the negative to create strategies also
rigs the game in favor of the aff because they have the last speech to make one more
perm and win the round
2. All of our link arguments are DAs to the perm the alternative has to be a prerequisite and to question every political decision means the permutation cant
solve
4. This is not an argument you wouldnt accept racism in one instance because you
had the opportunity to reject it in other instances if we prove the aff is undesirable
then you vote neg

Links

Development Link
Oceanic development enframes ecology as resources it reduces the environment to
a resource base, terraforming it through networks of consumption like highways
and airports that ensures separation from nature and produces new strategies of
social control
Luke 97,
dept of poly sci @ Virginia Polytechnic institute
(Timothy W., The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.PDF)
An environmental act, even though the connotations of most contemporary greenspeak suggests otherwise, is a disciplinary
move.33 Environmentalism in these terms strategically polices space in order to encircle sites and

subjects captured within these enveloping maneuvers, guarding them, standing watch over them, or even besieging them. And,
each of these actions aptly express the terraforming programs of sustainable development. Seen from the astropanopticon, Earth
is enveloped in the managerial designs of global commerce, which environmentalize once wild
Nature as now controllable ecosystems. Terraforming the wild biophysical excesses and unoptimized geophysical
wastes of the Earth necessitates the mobilization of a worldwatch to maintain nature conservancies and husband the worldwide
funds of wildlife. Of course, Earth must be put first; the fully rational potentials of second nature's

terraformations can be neither fabricated nor administered unless and until earth first is
infrastructuralized.34 This is our time's Copernican revolution: the anthropogenic demands of terraforming require a
biocentric worldview in which the alienated objectivity of natural subjectivity resurfaces objectively in managerial theory and
practice as "ecosystem" and "resource base" in "the environment." Terraforming the Earth environmentalizes a once wild piece of
the cosmos, domesticating it as "humanity's home" or "our environment." From narratives of world pandemics,

global warming, or planetary pollution, global governance from the astropanopticon now runs its
risk analyses and threat scenarios to protect Mother Earth from home-grown and foreign threats, as the latest
security panics over asteroid impacts or X-File extraterrestrials in the United States express in the domains of popular culture.
Whether it is space locusts from Independence Day or space rocks snuffing out Dallas in Asteroid, new security threats are
casting their shadows over our homes, cities, and biomes for those thinking geo-economically in the astropanopticon. From

such sites of supervision, environmentalists see from above and from without, like the NASA-eyed
view of Earth from Apollo spacecraft, through the enveloping astropanoptic designs of administratively controllable terraformed
systems.35 Encircled by enclosures of alarm, environments can be disassembled, recombined,

and subjected to expert managers' disciplinary designs. Beset and beleaguered by these all-encompassing
interventions, environments as ecosystems and terraformations can be redirected to fulfill the ends of new economic scripts,
managerial directives or administrative writs.36 How various environmentalists might embed different instrumental rationalities
into the policing of ecosystems is an intriguing question, which will be explored below.

Exploration Link
Exploration approaches to ocean management creates a us and them mentality
separating humanity from nature and creating an inauthentic relationship that
perpetuates managerialism
Irwin 2008
Irwin, Ruth. "Technological Enframing." Heidegger, Politics, Climate Change and Risking It All. New York: ContinuumInternational
Group, 2008. N. pag. Print.
The narrow perception of technology as tools to be skillfully wielded sets humanity up as the master

of nature and encourages the forgetting of our own objectification as standing reserve and potential
resources under the enframing of technology. In the desire for universal calculation of more and
more efficient means of production and consumption, humanity, Heidegger argues, has lost the
focus on enquiry and meaning fullness that are the particular and most important aspects of what it is to be human.
Rational calculation might enhance technological innovation but it also reinforces the illusory view that
humanity is in control and mastery over nature. This chapter aims to analyze the limitations of
subjectivity, language and machine, particularly our transmission of meaning and understanding from and between one another,
whether pedagogical or merely coexistence. What collides in Heideggers philosophy is the culture of individualisms and
consumerism that characterizes modernity and the change in nature of technology in scale, efficiency and long-term mass storage.
With special attention to information communication technologies I wish to examine what elements of technology enframe or
subjective experiences of the world as distinct from the interpolation of people into the modern paradigm. Computer programmers,
institutional set ups, approaches to materialism; curriculum and pedagogical relationships are dominated by modern capitalist concepts
of subjectivity, society and the environment. It is impossible to bracket technology out of modern culture as the two are so
intertwined; yet technology and modernity are not exactly synonymous. Technological equipment affects our

subjective phenomelogical experiences of our environment. Distinguishing technology from

modernity as two interlinked but separate elements make it possible to forge a new Unsprung or
origin, which begins new modes of social and environmental interaction with a deeper
commitment to ecological, equable and ethical living arrangements. It opens the possibility of an
ecological fut-ure that includes technological innovation rather than assuming the moderation of
consumerism is inevitably backwards looking, utopian romanticism. It is often argued that humanity is
unique among living beings because we are capable of self-reflection and thinking about the world that we live in.
While individualism has been co-opted by a surveillance regime and governance style based on consumer choices. it is
very difficult to abandon the notion that we each have personal, active agency that is a result of
reflective thinking and from which we might influence predominate world-views and instigate
change. The determinism of Jungers Gestalt and the usurping of all aspects of nature and character into the war
machine closes down the possibility of anything more than swallowing and willing consumerist
culture. Heidegger describes emphasis on master as creating the illusion that each individual has more choices
than ever before. However, These choices are circumscribed the technological horizon of disclosure
which obscures any other ways of knowing or enquiring into the meanifullness of being

alive . Yet, these kinds of discussion make the narrow limitations of the technological gestell, or
horizon, more visible and, paradoxically, introduce a window into a new paradigm. The
environment has been in sore need of reflection and requires a commensurate change in the
attitudes and lifestyle that dominates Western culture and is increasingly becoming a global
phenomenon. The global phenomenon of modernity has become a victim of its own success. Modernity and
change that will result in new philosophies, new attitudes, new narratives and interests and new lifestyles. How the transformation
might take place is difficult to forsee. It has been to the detriment of the entire plane that consumerism has

become the right of people everywhere. The ability to think our way of the enframing of
technology has some potential, although the impossible dreaming often sidelines such thinking, or
it is co-opted into ever-increasing science of govermentality (Foucault, 1979).

Impact

Impact Extension
The logic that informs affs thinking is the same logic that drove the death camps of
Auschwitz, the genocide of Native American and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima
all forms of destruction are inevitable absent the alternative
George, 93
(a lecturer in the Dept. of Poly Sci @ Australian National Univ., 93 (Jim, Of Incarcaeration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the
New/Old World Order Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol.22 No. 2)
For Flax this represents a growing recognition that the Enlightenment dream is over, that people everywhere

are
increasingly awake to dangers of the Enlightenment narrative of reason, knowledge, progress and
freedom. This is an important theme in any context concerned to open up incarceration and closure because
it allows for (effectively) silenced voices to be heard again, including those associated with anti-Enlightenment
sentiments, such as Nietzsche. It is important, in this sense, because it acknowledges the nightmarish dimensions
of the Enlightenment dream, which, for example, connects the ascent of the modern, rational subject
with the experiences of Hiroshima and Auschwitz. The point, of course, is that a celebration of the age of
rational science and modern society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass
slaughter or the techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic of liberty and
emancipation be easily detached from the terror waged in their names, by, for example, the major Cold War
foeseach proclaiming itself the natural systemic heir to the Enlightenment dream. And while many in the 1990s celebrate
the `end' of the Cold War, as the victory of one Enlightenment based economic doctrine over
another, the other side of this particular coin must also be confronted, in the poverty of so much of the
world, and in the growing underclasses in `developed' societies where neo-classical and neo-Marxian
`scientific' approaches have dominated the economic debates. It is worth pondering too, in this context, that the issue of 'ethnic
cleansing' rightly condemned by the Western powers in the 1990s (and resisted in the 1940s) is an integral part of
modern Western history, particularly via its Realist narrative which celebrates the process of modern
state making, the march to the present of modern rational man. Most significantly, ethnic cleansing is an intrinsic
element of the story of Anglo-American triumph over imperial adversity. Even a rudimentary
appreciation of silenced histories implies as muchthe histories, for example, of the Huron, the
Ogala, the Mandika and the Pitjantjatjaraall victims of 'ethnic cleansing' for the greater good of
a unified, homogeneous state system, and the eradication of (anarchical) difference. The point made
here is not the simple one, nor is it riven with the kind of paradox characteristic of IR study in general. It is not an attempt at
impossible detachment from subjects. Similarly it resists any grand theorised condemnation of the Enlightenment (or more precisely
its dominant scientific project) in favour of some ready made alternative 'realism', unfettered by its distorting influences. It is
consistent, rather, with the Foucault of 'What is Enlightenment?' who, in retaining a deep suspicion of modernist rhetoric and
ambition, acknowledges that: the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but
rather the permanent reactivation of an attitudethat is of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our
historical era.68 This perspective, which dissents against the dominant discursive practices of modem

life, while acknowledging the positive ontological and social potentials of modernity, connects a
reflectivist CSTapproach to the 'concrete' policy concerns of Post on Bosnia, Lapham on US strategy and Havel on
Eastern Europe, and distinguishes it from the narrow, abstract 'problem solving' rituals of the neo-Realists. It does so in its
understanding of the need to go beyond simple dichotomy, traditional formulae and respectable
polemic. It does so in Flax's terms in its acknowledgement of the need for a positive critical ambivalence to the ambiguities,
paradoxes and uncertainties of everyday realities and the way we understand and cope with them.69 This perception, of course, is no
source of comfort for contemporary thinkers, critically inclined or otherwise. Indeed, as Flax has put it, `the more the fault lines in
previously unproblematic ground become apparent, the more frightening it appears to be without ground'. 7 Hence the 'intellectual
vertigo' she speaks of. There are, however, many who have taken up the challenge of modernity in a positive, constructive manner:
still suffering from 'vertigo' to be sure, still shaken by both the extraordinary achievement and colossal brutality that is their heritage,
but now no longer willing to celebrate the former while remaining blind to the latter. This has meant more than a surface

level consciousness of the need to think and act in more sensitive and tolerant ways. It has meant a more profound
willingness to critically confront the way we think and act, to strip bare the very basis of thinking
and acting, to reinterrogate its meaning and the ways we legitimate the social and intellectual
'givens' that for so long have been reality: the way the world is 'out there'. It has resulted in a

range of works which resonate with alternative images of global politics derived often from previously
alien sources, e.g., German Critical Theory, Gramsci and varieties of post-modernism.

VTL Impact
Calculative thought kills the value to life by treating all things instrumentally
McWhorter 92
[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, P.7]

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the
secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any
other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human
management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now
especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results
in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger
says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No
plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we
say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of
human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the
face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a
stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source.Even
people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. >

A2 Aff Outweighs
1. The devastation of being always outweighs annihilation while annihilation is
finite, being can always be further destroyed also the fact that we have a extinction
impact as well forces a gut check to preventing ontological destruction.
2. Their form of extinction is impossible their claims depend on a status quo
conception of being that compartmentalizes life so that it can be purely destroyed
means only our impacts are true, because we destroy the lens of calculative thought.

3. Managerialism threatens to destroy the essence of humans which would

allow humans to go on living without dignity which is worse than
annihilation
Rojcewicz, 2006
(Richard Rojcewicz [Professor of Philosophy at Point Park University] The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger, pp.141142)
Heidegger now launches an extended discussion of the danger inherent in modern technology. It needs to be underlined that for
Heidegger the threat is not simply to human existence. The prime danger is not that high-tech

devices might get out of hand and wreak havoc on their creators by way of a radioactive spill or
an all-encompassing nuclear holocaust. The danger is not that by disposing of so many
disposables we will defile the planet and make it uninhabitable. For Heidegger the danger- the
prime danger-does not lie in technological things but in the essence of technology. Technological things
are indeed dangerous; the rampant exploitation of natural resources is deplorable; the contamination of the environment is tragic. We
need to conserve and to keep high tech things from disposing of us. Yet, for Heidegger, conservation, by itself, is not the

answer. Conservation alone is not radical enough. Conservation is aimed at things, technological
things and natural things, but it does not touch the outlook or basic attitude that is the essence of
modern technology, and it is there that the danger lies. It may well be that conservation will succeed and
that technology will solve its own problems by producing things that are safe and nonpolluting;
nevertheless, the prime danger, which lies deeper down, will remain. For the danger is not
primarily to the existence of humans but to their essence: "The threat to man does not come in the first instance
from the potentially lethal effects of the machines and devices of technology. The genuine threat has already affected humans-in their
essence" (FT, 29/28). In a sense, the threat inherent in modern technology has already been made good. Though we have thus

far averted a nuclear disaster, that does not mean the genuine threat has been obviated. Humans
still exist; they are not yet on the endangered species list. It would of course be tragic if humans made that list. Yet, for
Heidegger, there could be something more tragic, namely for humans to go on living but to lose
their human dignity, which stems from their essence. Here lies the prime danger, the one posed
not by technological things but by the disclosive looking that constitutes the essence of modern
technology. The prime danger is that humans could become (and in fact are already
becoming) enslaved to this way of disclosive looking. Thus what is primarily in danger is human
freedom; if humans went on living but allowed themselves to be turned into slaves-that would be the genuine tragedy. The danger
in modern technology is that humans may fail to see themselves as free followers, fail to see the challenges directed at their freedom
by the current guise of Being, and fail to see the genuine possibilities open to them to work out their destiny. Then, not seeing

their freedom, humans will not protect it. They will let it slip away and will become mere followers, passively imposed
on by modern technology, i.e., slaves to it, mere cogs in the machine. For Heidegger, there is an essential connection between seeing
and freedom. The way out of slavery begins with seeing, insight. But it is the right thing that must be seen, namely, one's own
condition. The danger is that humans may perfect their powers of scientific seeing and yet be blind

to that wherein their dignity and freedom lie, namely the entire domain of disclosedness and their
role in it. Humans would then pose as "masters of the earth," and yet their self-blindness would make them slaves.

Alternative

Alternative Solvency
Rejecting the management of the 1AC solves only doing nothing in the face of the
call for action generates ontological investigation that challenges the drive for
control and domination
McWhorter 92 (Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth Essays in Environmental Philosophy, Thomas Jefferson University Press,
pgs. vii-viii)

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or perhaps better: when
we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site
of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter
annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet
itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which
must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We
must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than
anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking
Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach
to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics
that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that
has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking

Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject,
willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very
selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as
knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act
decisively to put an end to deliberation. but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself,
to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

A2 Ontology Not 1st

Ontology is a prior question to political action it always comes first
Dillon 99
[Michael Dillon; Professor of Politics at University of Lancaster; Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics; 97-99; MV]
As Heideggerhimself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the politicalnever
tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and

inescapable. For one cannot say anything about any-thing that is, without always already having
made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already

carries ontology sequestered within it . What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to
challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through-out the entire mode of thought,
demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue,
the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This
applies as much to any modem discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of
science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its
industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very

authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of
freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and
what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche,
Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and
inescapable difficulty, or aparia, for human being of decision and judgment.In other words, whatever ontology you

subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not
you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action
for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche
and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of
life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of
Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock- innocent
political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

A2 Cede Political
The alternative does not preclude politics it revolutionizes activism and coalition
building, allowing politics to tailor itself to context, rather than grounding itself in
enframing
Joronen 10
(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On
Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 223)

In spite of the revolutionary sense of power-free-letting-be, our role as the ones who let
being to make its transformation poses number of questions concerning our part in this
radical turning from the ontological violence to the other beginning of abyssal being. What is
exactly our relation to the finitude of being? Should we only wait for the end of the prevailing mode of being and thus hope a
new sending of being? At least Heideggers comment in his posthumously published Der Spiegel

interview about only god (i.e. a new sending of being) being capable of saving us seems to imply
this, apparently leaving little room for human activism (Heidegger 1976:107; see also Schatzki 2007:32).
Hence, is our part just to question the prevailing unfolding and so to wait for the new sending, the other beginning, the new
arrival of being? First of all,

it is crucial to recognize that waiting for the world-historical

turning is not inactivity but a revolution that turns power-free thinking into
praxis . It is a non-violent revolution, which can take many forms of activism such as
disobedience and protests. In fact, Fred Dallmayr even compares this praxis of non-violent
resistance with the paths of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. (2001:267). Altogether, as Malpas writes, there
is no reason why the world-historical turning of being cannot be waited through political
activism, as long as such activism avoids being taken up by a machinational mode
of unfolding and thus remains non-violent and aware of its limitedness and finitude (Malpas
2006:300; see also Irwin 2008:170, 188189)

A2s

A2 Nazi DA
1. We arent Heidegger we wouldve rejected the Final Solution; at worst weigh
our other sources and drop our Heidegger cards, Oh wait, we dont read any.
2. Their argument is invalid Heidegger recognized Nazism as based on
technological thought and exploitation, which caused genocide we solve this
argument
Thomson, 09 (Associate Professor and Graduate Director of the Department of Philosophy of the University of New
Mexico, 09. Palgrave Macmillan, New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, ed. by: Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Soren
Riis, p. 151-152)
As such critical references to breeding suggest, Heidegger associates the Nietzschean danger of technological

thinking with National Socialism in 1938. By 1940, however, when America directly enters the Second World War in
response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Heidegger is no longer sure Germany will win the massive arms race for global control
he thinks all nations are being driven into by the technological ontotheology underlying the
age. Heidegger thus concludes his 1940 Nietzsche lectures dramatically, interpreting (for those students who have not already gone
off to war) Nietzsches famous prophecy that: The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried
onin the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines. According to the reading Heidegger will never subsequently relinquish,
Nietzsches ontotheological understanding of the being of entities predetermines the destiny of our contemporary world.
Nietzsches ontotheological
only intensifies

understanding of the totality of entities as such as eternally recurring will-to-power not

the struggle for the unrestrained exploitation of the earth as a source of raw

materials (a struggle already implicit in the modern subject/object divide), it also generates our distinctively last-modern reflexive
application of that limitless objectification back upon the subject itself. This objectification of the subject dissolves the subject/object
distinction itself and so lays the ground for what Heidegger already recognizes in 1940 as the cynical
exploitation of human resources in the service of the absolute empowering of will to power (N3
250/NII 333).

A2 Managerialism/Tech Inevitable
1. This is wrong McWhorter proves providing passivity can solve calls to action
that are calculative its not inevitable
2. This is a logical fallacy Civil rights and the ability for women to vote proves that
the managerialistic mindset can and has been weakened by passivity, rethought and
action this is another example of how our alt can overcome calculative and
technological thought
3. This argument is essentially that because bad things happen, we should just let
them happen, racism proves that this should be rejected every instance that
managerialistic thinking can be solved, should be solved

A2 Management Good
Management good args are grounded in flawed truth claims they assume the earth
is a mechanistic system whose causal relations are already pre-determined that
places humans at the center of the universe and creates an anthropocentric relation
to nature this description destroys humans and inevitably produces violence
Padrutt 92(Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, Heidegger and Ecology in
Heidegger and the Earth ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 19-21)
The place of consciousness is the place of the objectifying Cartesian subject. This subject, the "thinking substance" of
the "I think therefore I am," tyrannically brings objects before itself. It stands in the center,
surveys, and examines on all sides - sees in perspective - from its own point of view. It is no accident that
construction from a central perspective was discovered by two architects in the early Renaissance and soon took its place
victoriously in painting. This perspectival relationship of the primary (human) subject to the perspectivally observed world (a
relationship that emerged in the Renaissance) - this perspectival "worldview" - is inextricably linked with the

emergence of the method of natural science grounded in mathematics. The self-certain domination
of the subject and the objectifying method that yields certainty belong together; together they form what I
would call 'objectifying subjectivism'. The objectifying method - wanting to measure and calculate everything, for the sake of
certainty - has to reduce everything that is to measurable and calculable quantities. Weight, distance, and duration were most
easily available to exact measurement; but then the objectifying method reduced nature, too, to a coherence of

motions of a whole series of points in a three-dimensional, geometric space, coursing in a onedimensional time, thought as a 'time-axis', and reduced things to geometric substances with defined
extension. Since this reduction robbed events of their singularity, a repeatable reeling off of the same
event became thinkable; repeatable experimenting and engineering set forth on its triumphal procession, and along with it
the interpretation of nature and the whole world as a machine. In objectifying subjectivism human beings see themselves
as "master and owner of nature" and the world as a large machine. Finally, theobjectifying turns
back to the subject and, with the supremacy of the machine, itself gets interpreted more and more exclusively as a
functional, psychosomatic apparatus. In order to get closer to the meaning of being, the meaning of the little
word is which gets said in manifold ways (Aristotle) and which also oscillates unsaid in everything that is and in all that
happens Heidegger in Being and Time in a certain sense beings where Descartes left off. I think, therefore I am; but what does I
am mean? In order to get closer to the everyday Dasein, which in any case has in its being a relation to its being (and to being in
general). Dasein is in the world, not as an item of clothing is in the closet, but rather - thrown into the world - it has the task of
being its being as its own being. Dasein is "my own" "thrown projection" in connection with what encounters it: care (Sorge). But
Dasein is not a substance that is merely at hand, not a thinking substance, and not a psychosomatic apparatus. And,
respectively, Dasein is also not merely a specimen of a living organism or of the species animal rationale, rational animal. In
Dasein there takes place a disclosure or opening of being - in the disclosure of self in singular manner as well as of the world. But
this disclosure is through and through 'ec-static', outside itself, not closed up in itself, but 'outside' - out there, as the Freiburg
Cathedral earlier.This being-out-there refers not only to the present, but also and equally to the world horizon of the future and of
the past. What Heidegger in Being and Time called the horizonal-existential disclosure of being in Dasein - in the disclosure of
self and of the world - later, after the so-called "turning" in his thinking, he spoke of more and more as the indwelling opening-out
of the clearing of being, as indwelling in the temporal, threefold open and the opening-out of this indwelling through the whole of
Dasein. Ex-sistenz then meant indwelling opening-out of the open expanse of the Da. The shifting from the

objectifying subject to the open expanse of the Da leads us away from the standpoint of the
subject which stands in the center of the world, to the mystery of the world itself, to the Ereignis of being
and of time, which we do not have at our disposal, but into which we are let. This shift is a re-thinking and a retuning all in one, a leap into the open expanse of the Da. The re-tuning is nothing else but the re-tuning already mentioned, from
the dreadful, shortsighted Uf3pl<; into the pain-filled, buoyant, spirited, released coming-forth holding-in-reserve. And the rethinking leads away from objectifying calculating and measuring to phenomenological. meditative
thinking, from natural science's reduction of phenomena to the upholding of their fullness, from the perspectival worldview to a
regard for the inseparable interconnectedness of thinking, world, human, death, sky, earth, and language: to mindfulness of
Ereignis of being and time, of Ereignis of the world-fourfold: Rethinking leads away from progress to "overture:' This shift has
many further consequences that have varied significance for various disciplines. For ecology the following consequences seem to
me to be of fundamental importance: The world now is no longer the universe, 'all of the world', the sum of everything, but rather
the play of world" in which we are inseparably connected co-players. What we call space and time also belong in this play of the
world. However, space is now no longer the three-dimensional, calculable. geometric space, but rather

the play of places, the playing together of the places of a region;" And time is no longer a one-dimensional
time-axis, but the play of time, which grants presence and absence in the three dimensions of future, past, and present.

A2 Tech Good
1. Our link proves their specific instance of technological thought is bad the
affirmatives drive for ocean engagement is based on a logic that views the earth as
an object under the influence and control of human actions it reduces all being to
a standing reserve
2. Rejecting technologys control over being IS synonymous with accepting the
benefits of some forms of technology means we access all of the offense you just
read, but youre still managerialistic sucks to suck get reked nerd.
Dreyfus, 93[Charles B., Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics chapter of The
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 308]
Modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the

space proper to his

essence. That essential space of mans essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something
beyond itselfthat is the way in which the safekeeping of being itself is given to belong to the
essence of man as the one who is needed and used by being. (QCT 39; TK 39) This transformation in
our understanding of being, unlike the slow process of cleaning up the environment, which is, of
course, also necessary, would take place in a sudden gestalt switch: The turning of the danger comes to pass
suddenly. In this turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of being suddenly clears itself and lights up (QCT 44; TK 39). The
danger-namely that we have a leveled and concealed understanding of being-when grasped as the
danger, becomes that which saves us. The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the
saving power (QCT39; TK 39). This remarkable claim gives rise to two opposed ways of understanding Heideggers response to
technology. Both interpretations agree that once one recognizes the technological understanding of being for
what it is-a historical understanding-once gains a free relation to it. We neither push forward
technological efficiency as our sole goal, nor always resist it. If we are free of the technological
imperative we can, in each case, discuss the pros and cons. As Heidegger puts it: We let technological
devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside,as things which are
nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment
toward technology which expresses yes and at the same time no, by an old work, releasement towards
things (DT 54; G25).