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To cite this article: John Subritzky (2000) Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of
empire in Southeast Asia, 196165, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 28:3, 209-227, DOI: 10.1080/03086530008583106
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086530008583106
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JOHN SUBRITZKY
In early 1965 Britain had over 60,000 servicemen deployed in the Far East,
together with a surface fleet of over eighty warships.1 The main reason for
this extraordinary level of deployment was Indonesia's Confrontation of
Malaysia. Started in January 1963, Konfrontasi had become, by 1965,
Britain's gravest colonial crisis of the 1960s. This essay places Britain's
Confrontation policy in its international context. No nation's foreign policy
is formulated in a vacuum. For British officials, both the creation and the
subsequent defence of Malaysia were inextricably linked to Britain's
relationship with the United States and, to a lesser degree, Australia and
New Zealand. It is contended in this essay that Britain's primary motivation
for establishing Malaysia was to preserve its influence in the region in an
era where formal empire was no longer tenable. A continued British
political and military presence in Southeast Asia, based in Singapore, was
regarded in London as a vital element in securing strategic partnership with
the Americans, and in maintaining Commonwealth solidarity with the
Australians and New Zealanders.
But Konfrontasi turned British plans on their head. The asking price to
be paid for remaining a Far Eastern power proved too high. Although
history records that Malaysia did eventually survive, albeit without
Singapore and Brunei, the same could not be said for British influence in the
region. Faced with enormous costs associated with protecting this influence
east of Suez, the Wilson government initiated plans for disengagement in
late 1965. For Britain, Konfrontasi was a pyrrhic victory. Insofar as British
withdrawal and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, not the destruction of
Malaysia per se, was his ultimate objective, the Indonesian president,
Sukarno, had succeeded beyond expectation.
I
The genesis of Konfrontasi lay in Britain's plans to divest itself of formal
empire in Southeast Asia. Although independence had been conceded to
Malaya in 1957, Britain retained significant colonies elsewhere in the
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'Although we can certainly carry on for some time', wrote the Minister of
Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, 'it will not be possible for the present state of
affairs to continue indefinitely. The Indonesians can readily increase their
pressure, and we should then have no choice but to step up our own military
action and make further calls upon our strained military resources.'30 The
British made it clear, as prospects for a quick end to Confrontation
disappeared, that strong support from key allies was vital for eventual
success. The response from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand,
however, merely contributed further to the gloomy outlook.
The Kennedy administration had warned London early in the crisis that
American military intervention was highly unlikely. The President and his
advisers, noting the strategic importance of Indonesia, and the fragile
domestic political balance there between the Army and communists, did not
want to risk an open breach with Jakarta. They feared that escalation might
only result in a communist takeover in Indonesia, much to the detriment of
Western interests in the region. 'The real danger in the Far East', warned
Averell Harriman, Under-Secretary of State for political affairs, 'is
communist China and it is therefore essential to save Indonesia from
communist influence. If Indonesia did go Red there was no hope for other
countries in Southeast Asia.'31 To avert such a catastrophe was the
paramount objective of the Kennedy administration. 'To me,' argued
presidential adviser Robert Komer, 'it's worth every resource of
preventative diplomacy to forestall the kind of blow-up over Malaysia in
which our very success in blocking Sukarno may lose us Indonesia.'32
Australian and New Zealand politicians agreed with these sentiments.33
In its relations with these three allies, Britain faced a dilemma between
its interest in establishing Malaysia, and the Cold War imperative,
underlined continuously by the allies, that Indonesia must remain noncommunist. Crucial American support would be forthcoming only when
London's interest in Malaysia could be reconciled to Washington's wider
regional objectives, focusing on Indonesia. Until then, Britain would be
largely alone in bearing the full force of Sukarno's Confrontation. The
difficulty in balancing imperial against Cold War requirements was
recognized by Macmillan's successor as Prime Minister, Alec DouglasHome. 'We must defend Malaysia of course; but it will help neither
Malaysia nor ourselves, nor the Western cause in general, if in the course of
defending Malaysia we drive Indonesia into the arms of communist Russia
or China. It is probably considerations of this sort that make our friends and
allies less than wholehearted in our support.'34 R. A. Butler, the new Foreign
Secretary, did not disagree, but pointed out that Britain's available options
were limited. He saw little alternative but to retain a strong defensive
posture in Borneo until more favourable circumstances developed.35 The
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cannot keep them going; but to fold his hands and let them crash
would be irresponsible. We had the grim story of the Belgian Congo
to warn us against precipitate abandonment of imperial rule. The
juggler must extract from the circle one plate after another and put it
safely on a table until his job has become manageable. The Cabinet
had already decided that we must divest ourselves of responsibilities
east of Suez, though we knew that this would be the work of several
years.55
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carry the weight of its commitments east of Suez was being rapidly eroded.
'By whatever means it may be contrived', outlined the British paper
released at the talks, 'we need an early end to Confrontation.'59 As a result,
the only option was to negotiate a settlement directly with Sukarno, even if
this damaged British prestige. Minimum requirements for Britain in any
such deal were that no part of the original Federation should be placed in a
position of complete helplessness in the face of future Indonesian
aggression, and that there should be an orderly withdrawal from Singapore.
The reaction of Britain's allies,. especially the Americans and
Australians, was scathing.60 United States officials took issue even with
Britain's basic premise: that tenure of the Singapore bases was now
uncertain and unlikely to remain beyond the medium term. They also felt
that any attempt to negotiate a settlement with Sukarno would fail.61 Once
the Indonesian leader received clear evidence of weakening British resolve
he would no doubt wait until virtually all Indonesian demands were met.
The result could potentially be disastrous for the Western position in
Southeast Asia.62 Over the previous twelve months Sukarno had
increasingly edged Indonesia towards communism, taking the country out
of the United Nations and into a de facto alliance with China. In contrast to
the first years of the crisis, the Western allies now wanted Britain to
maintain a strong military deployment in the region, principally as a means
of keeping Sukarno's ambitions in check. An abandonment of that role was
considered unacceptable in Washington, Canberra and Wellington. Britain
was in no position to ignore the representations of its allies. Australia and
New Zealand now had troops on the ground in Borneo. American
diplomatic support was vital to putting further pressure on Jakarta.
The Wilson government had little choice but to heed these concerns and
maintain existing force deployments in Malaysia. 'It is clear,' Burke Trend
told Wilson, 'that we could not insist on making an early move to end
Confrontation without causing grave offence to our allies and prejudicing
the prospect of their future collaboration.'63 In his messages to Menzies and
Holyoake reporting on the talks, Wilson assured them that there would be
no precipitate withdrawal and that further consultation would take place.
But he concluded by warning that 'our assessment of the situation is that
time is not on our side, either as regards our tenure in Singapore or the
continuation of Confrontation'.64
Less than a week after these messages were sent political violence
erupted in Indonesia. On 1 October 1965 a group of army officers, led by
Colonel Untung, attempted to seize power in Jakarta. The coup ended in a
dismal failure, the fledging rebellion being ruthlessly crushed by troops
loyal to Major-General Suharto, commander of the strategic reserve. This
event heralded a major transformation in Indonesian politics. Increasingly,
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Borneo until April 1965, over two years after the crisis had begun. Early
that year, as Wilson recollected in his memoirs, the trooping the colour
ceremony was in risk of being cancelled if there had been one further
deployment of troops overseas.67 British military and financial resources had
been stretched to the limit. Although Sukarno failed in his task to 'crush'
Malaysia, it should also be recognized that the British failed in theirs. Any
ambitions of being a global power of substance, and retaining a significant
role for itself east of Suez, had vanished by December 1965. The Wilson
government had resigned itself to disengagement. Although implementation
took several years, there is little doubt that Confrontation hastened the end
of empire in Southeast Asia.
NOTES
1. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (London, 1988), 290.
2. The British had argued for many years that the most logical form of decolonization was a
union of Britain's territories in the region, starting with Malaya and Singapore. This had been
strongly opposed, however, by Malayan leaders; see A. J. Stockwell, 'Insurgency and
Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency', Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, 15 (1987), 71-81.
3. Memo, by Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Cabinet, 7 April 1961, DO
169/25; see also David Easter, 'British Defence Policy in South East Asia and the
Confrontation, 1960-66', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1998, 400-03,
who emphasizes British concern about the future of the military bases, given the rise in
popularity of the Barisan Socialis and the inevitability of formal independence for Singapore.
4. Memo., Kuala Lumpur to State Department, 8 June 1961, 790.00/6-861, Decimal Files,
1960-63, RG 59, National Archives and Record Administration, Washington.
5. Memo., Singapore to State Department, 16 June 1961, 790.00/6-1661, ibid.
6. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security
System, 1957-1971 (Cambridge, 1983), 179.
7. A. J. Stockwell, 'Malaysia: The Making of a Neo-Colony?', Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), 138-56.
8. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila on 8 Sept. 1954 by
representatives of Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the
Philippines and Pakistan. The crucial operative clause was Article IV: 'Each Party recognises
that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties (or
against Cambodia, Laos or the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese
government) would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees that it will in that event act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'
9. Minute of Chiefs of Staff meeting, 3 Aug. 1961, DEFE 4/137.
10. State Department to London, 12 Oct. 1961, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 'Malaya and
Singapore - general', National Security File, box 140; Australian Prime Minister R. G.
Menzies to Lieutenant-General Sir William Oliver, British High Commissioner to Australia,
28 Aug. 1961, PREM 11/3418; New Zealand Prime Minister K. J. Holyoake to Macmillan,
20 Oct. 1961, PREM 11/3422.
11. Selkirk to Macmillan, 30 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/3866.
12. Minute of Chiefs of Staff meeting, 3 Aug. 1961, DEFE 4/137.
13. Note by Amery, 4 Oct. 1961, D(61)66, CAB 131/2.
14. The literature on Macmillan's continued belief in Britain's status as a world power is
226
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
considerable: see in particular John Turner, Macmillan (London, 1994), 272; Peter Clarke, A
Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London, 1991), 229-31.
Sir James Cable, counsellor in the FO, 1961-63, head of Southeast Asia department
1963-66, interview with author, Cambridge, 16 Sept. 1994.
Selkirk to Macmillan, 30 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/3866.
John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-1965 (London, 2000), 37-8.
Leslie Fry, British embassy, Djakarta, to Fred Warner, head of Southeast Asia Department,
FO, 11 Aug. 1961, DO 169/28.
For leading commentaries on Indonesian policy during Confrontation, see J. A. C. Mackie,
Konfrontasi: the Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974); Ide Anak
Agung gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 19451965 (The Hague,
1973), and Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London, 1983).
CC(63)6th mtg, 24 Jan. 1963, CAB 128/37; OP(63)4th mtg, 'The Future Defence of
Malaysia', 24 April 1963, CAB 134/2371.
Macmillan to Home, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.
Minute by de Zulueta to Macmillan, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4189.
Memo., Heath to Macmillan, 23 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.
Memo., Macmillan to Home, 3 April 1963, ibid.
Mountbatten to Thorneycroft, 30 Sept. 1963, DEFE 13/387.
Minute by W. I. McIndoe, Cabinet Office, to T. J. Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to
Macmillan, 24 Sept. 1963, PREM 11/4183.
Memo, by Warner, 'Four Years in South East Asia 1960-1963', 28 Nov. 1963, FO
371/169688/D 1051/41.
Ibid.
Warner to Marshall, 20 Sept. 1963, FO 371/169688/D 1051/37; memo., Lord Head, British
High Commissioner to Malaysia, to Sandys, 11 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169907/DH 1062/124.
Thorneycroft to Douglas-Home, 7 Jan. 1964, PREM 11/4905.
Memcon, FO, 16 Oct. 1963, FO 371/169909/DH 1071/31/G.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol.23, Southeast Asia (Washington DC,
1994), 742.
David Ormsby-Gore, British ambassador in Washington, to FO, 12 Feb. 1963, FO
371/169695/D 1071/23.
Minute by Home to R. A. Butler, Foreign Secretary, 19 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169894/DH
1051/102/G.
Memo, by Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Home, 8 Jan. 1964, PREM 11/4905.
FO memo., 'British Policy Towards South-East Asia', 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7. The
memorandum was approved by the Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee on 14
October, and later by the Cabinet; DO(O)(64)21 st mtg, 14 Oct. 1964, CAB 148/4; memo.,
Gordon Walker to Cabinet, 19 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/17.
Ibid.
Memo, by Luce to COS, 30 June 1964, DEFE 4/171.
FO memo., 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7.
Ibid.
Report by long-term study group, 23 Oct. 1964, CAB 148/40.
DO(O)(64)21st mtg, minute of Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee, 14 Oct. 1964,
CAB 148/4.
D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London, 1996).
Memo, by Douglas-Home, 17 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
R. R. James, Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964-1970 (London, 1972), 61.
Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), 270; Chris Wrigley, 'Now you see it now
you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's foreign policy, 1964-1970', in R. Coopey, S.
Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments (London, 1993), 132; Leslie Stone,
'Britain and the World', in D. McKie and C. Cook (eds.), The Decade of Disillusion: British
Politics in the Sixties (London, 1972), 126; Philip Ziegler, Harold Wilson: The Authorised
Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London, 1993), 210-19; Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise:
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London, 1989), 97-9; Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London,
1992), 383-6.
Easter, 'Confrontation', 412-3.
Treasury memo., 11 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/40.
Callaghan to Patrick Walker, 1 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180205/D 1051/7.
CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 19 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180206/D 1051/25/G.
Trend to Wilson, 11 and 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
Minute of COS meeting, 11 June 1965, DEFE 4/185.
Memo., Trend to Wilson, 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
Ibid.
Michael Stewart, Life and Labour: An Autobiography (London, 1980), 144.
Healey to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, PREM 13/431.
Hughes to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, ibid.
Memo., Brown to Wilson, 26 Aug. 1965, ibid.
London to New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA), 2 Sept. 1965, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Head Office, Multiple-Number Subject Files, ABHS, series
950, accession W 4627, 434/8/1, pt. 9, box 4670, New Zealand National Archives,
Wellington (hereafter NZNA).
Memcon, Stewart with Ball, 8 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431; Canberra to Ministry of Defence,
7 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529/IM 1193/135/G.
FO to Washington, 9 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431.
Djakarta to State Department, 7 Sept. 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin Texas,
'Indonesia country file', vol.4, National Security File, box 247.
OPD(65)41st mtg, 23 Sept. 1965, CAB 148/18; memo., Trend to Wilson, 21 Sept. 1965,
PREM 13/431.
Wilson to Menzies and Holyoake, 25 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529AM 1193/152/G.
Report by NZDEA, 17 Feb. 1966, ABHS, series 950, accession W 4627, 434/8/1, pt. 10, box
4670, NZNA.
Report by NZDEA, 10 March 1966, ibid. pt. 11, box 4670, NZNA.
Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971),
42.