The New Phenomenology A Philosophical Introduction J. AARON SIMMONS AND BRUCE ELLIS BENSON BLOOMSBURYCONTENTS Acknowledgments vi A note on the collaboration Introduction: Welcome to the family 1 1. The sources of new phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger 13 2. How to be a phenomenological heretic: The origins and development of new phenomenology 43 3. Phenomenology and onto-theology 73 4 Phenomenology and theology reconsidered 99 5 New phenomenology on the existence and nature of God 137 6 The call, prayer, and Christian philosophy 157 7 Proposals for new phenomenology and analytic philosophy of religion 177 8 Normativity: Ethics, politics, and society 203 Conclusion: Possible futures for new phenomenology 235 Notes 243 Bibliography 257 Index 2772 ‘THE NEW PHENOMENOLOGY CHAPTER ONE y. AS we see it, new phenos with ethics, politics, and soc ethics, and polities are a cal accounts of philosophy of religion, specific ways of thinking about phi enterprise, but as a Sores The sources of new phenomenology in story of i Husserl and Heidegger presei final is book as th “Classical” phenomenology: five of his most fundamental ideas that are all appropriat in various ways) by new phenomenologis the epocke, (4) the phenom- ersubjectivity. cenological reduction, and (5) subj Consider the following scenari monstrate that philosophy, in general, is better off when it attends to new phenomenology. fiat ite4 ‘THE NEW PHENOMENOLOGY right band is a cup of tea (Earl Grey, say). Coming through the speakers of your computer is a guitar-heavy song with lyrics that sound like a lament for a lost lover. As you listen to the song, you are reminded of a rather disappointing lunch that you ate a few bours ago. This is no hypothetical example: i describes one of our offices and a specific experience. But any of us could imagine ourselves in such a scenario, or at least a very similar one. So how might one make sense of this scenario? Immediately a host of alternatives present themselves. A sociologist might investigate the situation as it stands as a manifestation of the practices of the twenty-first-century scholar. Alternatively, a research psychologist might investigate the scenario as a case study used to explore the complicated neuzo- logical processes that allow for the brain to perceive such things as the computer screen and the books on the desk, to interpre! tea as pleasurable to the taste, and to hear the music as not merely an auditory illusion. An audiologist might investigate the ways in which the music is a result of one’s eardrum recei and vibrating in parti the scenario as a manifestation of the way in which academic life tends to be a solitary one as a result of the individualism of aca- demic produc nurse, the list of various ways of 180 on: biological, nportant, there is one basic aspect that is missed by them “experience” of hearing the music, typing on the computer, allow ing the tea to cool off, wishing to be outs ng the trees, and remembering that one’s lunch that day was not as good as one had hoped. And, crucially, itis not just that one’s experience is missed, but your experience is. It is here that phen ogy begins to sense as a distinctive perspective from these other sciences, For the phenomenologist, underlying biology, psychology, anthro- ology, and, indeed, all positive sciences is the experience itself as experienced. One of Husser’s guiding, insights is as there are sciences to deal with the things that are experienced, so there ‘ought to be a science that investigates the experience itself. One SOURCES OF NEW PHENOMENOLOGY 6 sway of getting a handle on what is going on in a phenomenological approach as distinguished from the approaches of other sciences is by considering the difference between “what” appears and “how” it apy see, this distinction between the “what” and the “how”—that which appears and the appea itself increasingly becomes 2 contested issue as phenomenology develops. Phenomenology isthe attempt to make sense—by way of deserip- tion and analysis—of experiences as they are actually experieneed.* In this way, phenomenology (as much as possible) tries to offer a first-person account of experience. Instead of the third-person ‘accounts offered by positive sciences that depend on data that is often understood as “objective,” “ and “repeatable,” phe nomenology is informed by the evidence of one’s own expe Central to this idea of experience is what Husserl calls “evider (Evidenc], which he claims is “in an extremely broad sense, an ‘experiencing’ of something that is, and is thuss it is precisely a ig of something itself” (Husserl 1999, 12, emphasis in original). This phenomenological account of evidence is important because it distinguishes between the sort of “data” that would be used in the positive sciences and that whieh is used in phenomenol- ‘even use this conception of evidence to inciples,” which he defines as follow: Every originary presentive intuition is « legitimizing source of ion...everything originarily (s0 to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply ‘as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Husserl 1982, 44, emphasis in original} Husset insists that phenomenology must start with what we know by way of intuition or experience. In slightly more phenomeno- logical terminology, we could say that we must take seriously and inguire into things that give/present themselves {or appear) in the very way that they are given/presented (or appear). Husser!’s goal to get beyond all assumptions, presuppositions, theoretical frame- ‘works, and metaphysical commitments such that we move “back to6 ‘THE NEW PHENOMENOLOGY the things themselves!” As Husserl says: “Away with empty word analyses! We must question things themselves, Back to experience, to sccing, which alone can give our words sense and rational justi fication” (1981, 176). To turn to experience is to turn to conscious- ness. Husserl terms this the “personal character” of consciousness (1975, 26). Yet how is it that phenomenology allows us to get back to the chings themselves (zw den Sachem Selbst) and not simply the appearances of those things? Isn't there an insidious appear- ance/reality distinction operative in phenomenology that would threaten to land Husser! squarely in skepticism? Hlusserl’s answer is “intentionality.” Simply put, consciousness is never only ter of immediate subjective life, b ship to the transcendent world, As Husserl explains, “the stream of consciousness is permeated by the fact that consciousness relates itself to objects” (1975, 18}. Or, more famously, “consciousness is always consciousness of something” (1975, 13; 1982, 75). To intend” something is simply to direct one’s consciousness toward such a way as to make it the abject of thought. So, as [look at the computer screen, the phenomenologist would describe this as ntending” the screen. Importantly, intentionality is not limited to straightforward perception; I can intend something in the mode of remembering, desiring, hoping, and so forth. As Husserl explains, We must distinguish, n relation to the intentional content taken as object of the act, between the object az itis intended, and the object (peri) which is intended. In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that manner, and as such may be the target of varying intentions, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc, (Husser! 2001 v.2, 113, emphasis in origin. Nonetheless, in light of this passage, it might seem that all inte tionality would yield is the object as intended rather than the ‘object itself. In response to such a worry, Husscrl claims that itis a misunderstanding of intentionality to think that it reintroduces a representational theory of perception. According to a represen- tational theory, things in the world affect my cognitive apparatus in such a way as to produce a mental representation of the thing itself, which is then the proper object of consciousness, But, if this SOURCES OF NEW PHENOMENOLOGY "7 is case, then there are two entities, a mental one and one “out there.” In contrast, an intentional theory does not introduce this dualism. The computer sereen that I intend is the actual computer screen itself and not simply a mental image of it. Husseel speaks of “the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving” of the ‘object to consciousness. He insists thar iris “itself there,” “imme- diately intuited” (Hussee! 1999a, 57). Yer, this does not mean that ng right about the object itself. Indeed, one’s intentional gaze is always limited, and in a her of ways, For the sake of brevity, we will just consider three adumbrated perspectives, rom the beginning of western philosophy, the goal of knowing can be characterized by what medieval philosophers term “adae- quatio intellectus et rei:” Literally translated, the phrase simply means “adequation of the intellect and the thing.” According to both Plato and Aristotle, we know something when our under- standing of the thing by our intellect is “adequate” to the thing. The more I know about, say, cricket, the more Ican be said to have an “adequate” knowledge of it. In this case, “adequate” means something like an “exact equivalence.” My intentional relation to what | experience, however, generally does not meet the high standard of adequation, For instance, if Tam standing in St Peter’s of immediacy of experience of what Tsee and hear. That experience is much superior to having a mere “signative” intention, in which I intend St Peter’ by way of a sign, perhaps one that reads “St. Peter’s Basilica this way.” Ie is also Superior to a postcard showing the facade of St Peter's. So there ate different “levels” of intentionality and this has to do with the notion of adumbrations. Let’s assume that you arc look- ing at a small statue of Socrates that is sitting on a desk. From one perspective, you can sce his face, complete with a prominent brow fd full beard, From another perspective, you can see his profile ‘hich allows for a good view of his ear, the shape of his nose, and angle of his neck. From yet another perspective, you can see the back of his head, which is largely bald. Although these are only three perspectives from which one might look at thisstatuc, there are infinitely more perspectives that could be considered: from directly above, from many yards away, while laying down looking up at it, etc. The point is impossible to perceive the statue Spee eee eee se eeceeceeceeeae