s

BACKGROUND
GUIDE 2012

The 6 Day War

Crisis Director: James Fahey

Chair: Erika Walsh
Vice-Chair: Amani Ahmed

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Hello Delegates!

My name is James Fahey, and I will be the chair of the Israeli side of the Joint Crisis
Committee on the six day war. I am also the author of your background guide. I am a freshman at the
University of Massachusetts and have been involved in Model U.N since I arrived on campus. I am
pursuing a double major in Journalism and Spanish, and my eventual goal is to become a foreign
news correspondent. I play golf and the guitar, and founded a club on UMasss campus designed to
facilitate collaboration between musicians on campus. But, enough of thaton to the Six Day War!
The simulation is a Joint Crisis Committee, meaning that there will be two independent
committees reacting to the same crisis. Newton famously said that for every action there is an equal
and opposite reaction, however in this case the reaction may be far from equal in magnitude. Each
separate committee will be given the same crisis or issue to deal with; the decisions of one committee
will directly affect the other, and vice versa. Your decisions may set off a chain of reactions
unforeseeable and indeed irreversible. The Six Day War, for instance, was largely the result of small
actions resulting in large, disproportionate reactions and effects.
In this committee, you will be divided into two sides: the side of the Israelis or the side of the
joint Arab states. The Israelis, obviously, are composed entirely of the new state of Israel (created
merely 19 years before the Six Days War broke out), whereas the joint Arab states is trickier web of
alliances. They are mainly made up of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt (then known as the United Arab
Republic.) However, this is a simplification: the Arab Expeditionary Forces also lent their forces to the
Arab States, prominently including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Liberation Organization as
well as ostensibly at least six other Arab Countries.
Your characters will be assigned before you arrive at FCMUN 2012. Your characters are quite
well known and you will be able to find out more by researching on your own. You may be assigned
Moshe Dayan, for instance, a man who men feared and women loved, sporting an eye patch from his
heroics in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; or you may be assigned General Amer, one of the most brilliant
military commanders in Middle Eastern history. Once you arrive at FCMUN, you will be thrust into the
milieu of terror and tense international relations immediately before the onset of the June 5th war.
Both sides will be presented with a singular issue, and from there on, there is no telling what will
succeed. Because Joint Crisis committee is a very demanding mode of debate, you will have to
research thoroughly so that you may faithfully portray your character or party (though, obviously,
some leeway is given.)
It is important to keep in mind that the lines between political and military leaders was far
more blurred in the Middle East of the 1960s than we are accustomed to now. Leaders were
expected to have military experience; indeed, leaders on both sides were needled if they were
deemed lacking in that area. Because of this, you are the unique position to make decisions that
seem to be only military matters but in fact have far reaching effects in the political realm as well.
Sincerely,
James Fahey.
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The simulation is a Joint Crisis Committee, meaning that there will be two
independent committees reacting to the same crisis. Newton famously said that for
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, however in this case the reaction
may be far from equal in magnitude. Each separate committee will be given the same
crisis or issue to deal with; the decisions of one committee will directly affect the other,
and vice versa. Your decisions may set off a chain of reactions unforeseeable and indeed
irreversible. The Six Day War, for instance, was largely the result of small actions
resulting in large, disproportionate reactions and effects.
In this committee, you will be divided into two sides: the side of the Israelis or the
side of the joint Arab states. The Israelis, obviously, are composed entirely of the new
state of Israel (created merely 19 years before the Six Days War broke out), whereas
the joint Arab states is trickier web of alliances. They are mainly made up of Jordan,
Syria, and Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic.) However, this is a
simplification: the Arab Expeditionary Forces also lent their forces to the Arab States,
prominently including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Liberation Organization as
well as ostensibly at least six other Arab Countries.
Your characters will be assigned and short biographies will be provided to you
before you arrive at FCMUN 2012. However, your characters are quite well known and it
is likely that you will be able to find out more by researching on your own. You may be
assigned Moshe Dayan, for instance, a man who men feared and women loved, sporting
an eye patch from his heroics in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; or you may be assigned
General Amer, one of the most brilliant military commanders in Middle Eastern history.
Once you arrive at FCMUN, you will be thrust into the milieu of terror and tense
international relations immediately before the onset of the June 5th war. Both sides will
be presented with a singular issue, and from there on, there is no telling what will
succeed. Because Joint Crisis committee is a very demanding mode of debate, you will
have to research thoroughly so that you may faithfully portray your character or party
(though, obviously, some leeway is given.)
It is important to keep in mind that the lines between political and military leaders
was far more blurred in the Middle East of the 1960s than we are accustomed to now.
Leaders were expected to have military experience; indeed, leaders on both sides were
needled if they were deemed lacking in that area. Because of this, you are the unique
position to make decisions that seem to be only military matters but in fact have far
reaching effects in the political realm as well.
Geography:

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Figure 1: Political Map of the Middle East. Pay special attention to the Straits of Tiran (between
Yemen and Djibouti) and the Gulf of Aqaba (the Gulf directly below Eilat.)

Figure 2: Showing Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt, Israel and Jordan are pictured (in that
order from West to East.)

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Figure 3: Detailing the creation and expansion of the State of Israel from 1948 until present day.
The seizure of Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights is pictured in the second panel; blue
and white stripes denote areas where Palestinians and Israelis reside.

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Figure 4: Default Map of Israel and surrounding countries. Most important cities are labeled
here, particularly Gaza, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Amman, Elat, and AlAqabah.

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Figure 5: Map of the Golan Heights and bordering Countries.

Figure 6: Map detailing the loss of Palestinian territory from 1946 until 2000.

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Figure 7: The Syrian FrontFigure 8: The Battle for Jersusalem

Understanding the Geography of the Middle East is paramount to understanding
the crisis that erupted there in June of 1967, and that had been simmering for at least
19 years before that. The very land where these battles were fought was important to
both of the major religions that participated in the fightingJudaism and Islamas well
as the religion of the superpowers who backed the war to a certain degree, Christianity.
The battles were fought in places you may have never heard of, such as the skirmish in
the Jordanian town of al-Samu or in the Sinais Jebel Libni, but Sherman Tanks and MiG21 airplanes also patrolled the airs and rolled down the streets of Nazareth, Bethlehem,
and even the old city of Jerusalem. The historical and religious importance of these sites
affected the fighting, where commanders would forgo or increase attacks based on the
relative holiness of the sites. Shots were common around the outskirts of Jersusalem,
for instance, but Israeli soldiers even removed the magazines from their Uzis while near
particularly holy sites for fear of damaging them.i
More important, however, was the land and territory that had a particular role in
the economic and political functioning of the countries involved. The War of 1967 was
fought on 3 different fronts, and spanned vastly different environments and
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geographies. Because of this, the fighting and the policies of the governments were
affected based on their goals and the geography they faced. Like all good armies, both
sides understood that certain areas would be more difficult to conquer, or required a
different style of fighting. It is no coincidence that in the greatest Military treatise of all
time, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, geography is the primary focus of the first and most
famous chapter. Indeed, the major reason that the Israelis won was not because of
greater numbers, or indeed because they were better trained, but rather because they
understood where to spend their money before the war and how to best utilize their
resources during the war in terms of the geography they faced, particularly the Sinai
peninsula. Furthermore, one of the immediate causes of the War was the closing of the
Straits of Tiran, a narrow passageway at the entrance of the Red Sea. The 1949
Armistice Agreements, following the first Arab-Israeli War (the 1967 War was the third),
determined that the Straits of Tiran were international waters, and that the closing of
them could be seen as an act of War.ii Listed below are some of the major geographical
features that played a prominent role in the lead up and duration of the Six Day War.
The Straits of Tiran: The Straits of Tiran are located at the passageway from the Red
Sea into the Gulf of Aqaba. The strait is incredibly narrow, averaging about eight miles
wide, and can be blockaded relatively easily by Egypt from Sharm-al Sheikh. The straits
are Jordans only access to ocean shipping, through the port of Aqaba, and also
represent Israels only access to the Indian Ocean and ports east through the Indian
ocean. Sharm-al Sheikh is located on the western side of the straits; it is here that the
Egyptians blockaded the Straits during the lead up to the 1967 War. Usage of the Straits
by the Israelis is debatablesome historians claim that the port was rarely, if ever, used
and that the Israelis preferred to use their seaports on the Meditterranean rather than
the smaller port of Eilat. However, records indicate that probably up to 500 ships docked
in the port of Eilat during the two years immediately preceding the war, though that is
admittedly but a small portion of the cargo ships which docked at Israeli controlled ports
during that time period. Nevertheless, this area was extremely contentious, and it was
the blockade of these straits (as well as the expulsion of United Nations Emergency
Forces by Nasser) that were the immediate Catalysts for the Six Days War.
The Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal: The gulf of Suez is located between Egyptian
mainland and the Sinai peninsula, and at its northern mouth it transforms into the
famous Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was prominent in the eponymous Suez
Crisis/Second Arab-Israeli War of 1956, but was less relevant in the 1967 war. The
Israelis stopped short of seizing the canal in 1967, much to the chagrin of some foreign
leaders. The reasoning behind this was to prevent themselves from appearing as an
imperial power, and of categorizing the 1967 war as an expansionist war. The
nationalization of the Suez in 1956 led to Gamal Abdel Nassers fame and glory
throughout the Arab World; his expulsion of the French from his territory was viewed as
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one of the first Arab countries to break free from the shackles of imperialist colonialism.
Nasser was revered and loved for his actions; it is possible that he believed himself far
more powerful than he was because of the great success of the 1956 war and the
capture of the Suez. In 1967, Nasser also renewed the prohibition of Israeli shipping into
the canal, largely a symbolic move but one which angered many Israeli politicians.
Sinai Peninsula: The Sinai Peninsula is a triangular shaped landmass, now owned by
Egypt that spans the gap between Africa and Asia. It has long been a particularly
contentious region, due to its geopolitical significance: he who owns the Sinai owns the
Suez Canal and thus the premier shipping route between Europe, Africa, and Asia. The
geography of the Sinai is almost entirely desert, though there are numerous towns
strewn about the peninsula the total modern population is less than 500,000 people.
However, it is also the site of Mount Sinai, one of the holiest sites of all of the Abrahamic
religions: where God gave the Ten Commandments to Moses. Indeed, there is both a
mosque and a Greek Orthodox Church located on the summit of Sinai. Because Sinai is
largely desert, ground forces were far less relevant than Air Force Dominance. It was
this fact that led to the success of Operation Focus on the first day of the war by the
Israeli Air Force.
Golan Heights: The Golan Heights is a large rocky plateau located in the Anti-Lebanon
mountains in modern day Syria. Though internationally recognized as Syrian territory,
the Israelis have occupied and administered the heights since their conquest in the Six
Days War. The Heights contain landmarks such as Mount Hermon, the Yarmuk River, as
well as bordering the Sea of Gallilee in the southeast. The plateau is steeper and rockier
in the north, however, the south is far from level and presented a problem to invading
forces during the first phases of the Six Days War. The Golan Heights are extremely
fertile as they compose part of a volcanic plateau, as well as being a rich source of water
from the Jordan River: approximately fifteen percent of modern day Israelis drink from
water found in the Golan Heights.
West Bank: The West Bank is one of the most famous and contentious areas in the
Middle East. Originally given to the Palestinian state in the two state solution of 1948,
King Abdullah of Jordan (King Husseins father) annexed the West Bank in a move
recognized and accepted by the UK and the United Nations. It is located in the East of
Israel, known as the West Bank because of its location relative to Jordan. The majority
of Palestinians reside in the West Bank, making it a particularly important region for
ensuring peace in the Middle East. The West Bank was conquered, along with the Gaza
Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights during the 1967 war. Recent settlements in
the West Bank are considered illegal under the terms of the 1949 Armistice which
established The Green Line, likewise, controlling the West Bank would have been seen
as impinging on the sovereignty of Jordan in 1967.
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Gaza Strip: The Gaza Strip is a narrow strip of land bordering Egpyts Sinai Peninsula
and Israel. It is approximately 25 miles long and around 5 miles wide. It is one of the
most densely populated areas in the Middle East, containing nearly 2 million people in
only 125 square miles. The strip is not particularly fertile; it is subject to drought and
famine in particularly dry years. The Strip was conquered by the Israelis in the war; and
it was not until the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993 that plans were finally made for Israeli
evacuation of the strip, leaving it in control of the Palestinians. This will be one of the
more contentious areas during peace talks.
History:

It is perhaps a fools errand to determine how far back in history we should travel
in order to better understand the Six Days War. The consensus is that one must at least
have some knowledge of the first two Arab-Israeli Wars, as well as the sporadic crisis
which occupied the years between 1948 and 1967. Furthermore, it is beneficial to
understand the genesis of the state of Israel, which is where we will start.
One of the most confusing aspects of the Middle East is the fact that Jewish
tradition does not clearly distinguish between religious, ethnic, political, or racial
identity.iii Because of this, it is difficult at times to determine what exactly was
responsible for the genesis of the so called Zionist movement. The fact was that Jews
felt a strong tie to the homeland, particularly the land of Canaan, or the traditional term
of Eretz Yisrael. The bible makes numerous references to a final home for the Jews, a
land of milk and honey where troubles will be forgotten and their suffering will be
rewarded with their ancestral home. In modern times this land became a symbol of
refuge from the wrongs that had been inflicted on them. The movement of Zionism in
the late 20th century was the first to name the exact region where they wanted to
establish their country: in the Holy Land, the land of Palestine. The Zionist movement
was hastened by the horrors of the HolocaustJews would not truly be safe from
destruction until they had their own land which they could defend. The murder of six
million of their own hung heavily on the minds of Jews during the following Arab-Israeli
wars, who believed they were battling for their very existence as a people that may very
well be swept off the earth, as was almost accomplished a few years before.
The Zionist movement gained steam in the 20th Century, and was viewed
beneficially by the Western Powers, the United Kingdom and the United States,
specifically after the discovery of the concentration camps by victorious allied forces
towards the end of World War II. In 1923, the British Mandate of Palestine had
determined that their should be a home for the Jews in Palestine, but stressed that the
movement of Jews into greater Israel should not disrupt the Palestinian way of life. Many
Jews moved to Palestine, but a national identity and government were not created until
1948. In 1948, Britain proposed the division of the Holy Land as shown in Figure 6
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above, an alternative to the British Mandate of Palestine. It was a two state solution
determined by borders known as the Green Line. A civil war broke out between the
Palestinians and Israelis, and, in May of 1948, Jewish leader David Ben-Gurion declared
Independence. The fighting involved from a Civil War into a war between two sovereign
states when the Arab forces invaded Palestine(according to the United Nations) in what
would become known as the First Arab-Israeli War. iv
The monikers bestowed on this war by the belligerents is particularly telling: the
Arabs refer to it as The Catastrophe whereas the Israelis refer to it as either The War
of Independence or the War of Liberation. The war was considerably more back and
forth than the following Wars: on the eve of Israeli independence, the joint forces of
Egypt, Syria, Transjordan (modern day Jordan), Lebanon, and Iraq all invaded Israel. At
the outset, the Jews were beaten back and it seemed that their sovereign state would be
one of the shortest lived in history. The Egyptians gained some territory in the Negev in
the south, and the Jordanians conquered all of Jerusalem conquered all of the Old City.
As the fighting became more and more vicious with casualties mounting, the United
Nations pushed for an immediate four week truce. Skirmishes occurred during this time,
but largely the front was quiet.v The four week break benefitted the Israelis far more, as
they spent their time reorganizing militarily while the volatile alliance between the Arab
states caused bickering over the spoils of war and a general loss of focus.vi After the
truce, Israelis had managed to rally their forces and began beating back the Arab forces:
though they were vastly outnumbered, their weapons from the United States and other
Western powers were far superior to the Arabs. Another truce was imposed; this truce
was shorter lived and in August the Jews launched a ferocious assault, capturing the
major port of Haifa and prompting a massive Arab exodus. At this point, it was clear that
the Jews had won the war; peace talks commenced and ended with the 1949 Armistice
Agreements.
The 1949 Agreements were a point of contention during the 1967 war; both sides
interpreted the agreements and the promises made therein in radically different ways.
The agreements were particular in that Israel essentially signed four different peace
treaties, relating to its four neighbors: Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Between Egypt
and Israel, there are two major points that were extremely relevant during the 1967
war: the creation of a small strip of land near the Mediterranean controlled by the
Egyptians known as the Gaza Strip, and the fact that the armistice lines were not
considered a political or territorial boundary. This meant that troops could pass over
these lines without technically violating the peace agreement: this hole in the agreement
in part led to the 1967 war. The agreement with Lebanon was perhaps the most simple
and part of the reason why Lebanon played little part in the 1967 war. The Israelis
agreed to withdraw from the Lebanese villages that they had occupied, and both sides
agreed that they would honor the Green Lines demarcations as set two years before by
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the United Nations plan. The agreement with Jordan concerned itself largely with
territory trading: the Jordanian forces maintained their presence in Eastern Jerusalem,
including the Old City, as well as taking over positions in the West Bank which had
previously been occupied by allied Iraqi troops. In exchange, the Israelis received the
Wadi Area and the Little Triangle, and secured the removal of Jordanian troops from the
Plains of Sharon. The agreement with Syria was simply for Syria to withdraw from the
occupied territories, and return to the boundaries set before the war. Persistent terrorist
activity and shots were fired for the following five years after this, but forces were
largely quiet until the second Arab-Israeli War in 1956, also known as the Suez Crisis.
The 1956 Arab-Israeli were is one of the most curious in history in that both the
Israelis and Arabs claim to have won the war; this claim is not at all far-fetched. The
military victory surely was enacted by the Israelis, who demonstrated their ability to
push across the entire Sinai peninsula whilst barely enduring a dent in their defenses.
On the side of the Egyptians, the crisis led to the rise of one of the most figures in
modern Middle Eastern history: President Gamal Abdel Nasser. His actions in this war led
to his meteoric rise to prominence as a champion of Arabs rights in an imperialist world.
The war started with an incredibly bold move by the Egyptian president: he decided to
nationalize the Suez Canal, a zone previously occupied and administered by the French
and British. This led the French and British to sign new agreements with Israel,
strengthening Israels position in the region.
In October of 1956, directed by Moshe Dayan (later the defense minister and
primary commander of Israeli forces in 1967) invaded the Sinai Peninsula in a
devastating combination Air strike and ground raid.vii British and French forces invaded
the Canal Zone, creating a pincer movement that essentially doomed the Egyptians to a
catastrophic failure. These actions were internationally condemned by the United
Nations, and in November a cease-fire was signed. Though Israel had captured Sharm-al
Sheikh, the Gaza Strip and the Suez Canal, they retreated for fear of international
retribution. Though Egypt was dominated militarily, Nasser convinced his people that it
was his leadership that caused the Israeli forces to retreat, and that they were fighting a
righteous war against Western Colonialism. By the end of the war, Nasser was one of
the most popular figures in the region, beloved by his people and just self-delusional
enough to believe that he really had a direct role in how the second Arab-Israeli war
ended. The United Nations also permanently played their Emergency Forces (UNEF) in
the Sinai Peninsula and in ports around Egypt as a reaction to the events of the Suez
Crisis.
In 1960, war nearly broke out again in the Sinai Peninsula in what was known as
the Rotem Crisis. This was prompted by an increase in Syria-Israeli tensions, tensions
which would bubble over in the year immediately preceding the 1967 War. In a pattern
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imitated over and over, Moshe Dayans forces would cross the border into Syria in an
armored tractor, drawing enemy fire from the Syrians: they would then use this as an
excuse to attack in vicious retribution. Moshe Dayan himself later admitted that
approximately 80% of the skirmishes in the Golan Heights (the border between Syria
and Israel) were the fault of the Israelis.viii Egypt began to believe that these repeated
strikes against Syria would soon boil over into all out war, and they amassed their
troops along the Sinai/Israel border. Israel, not expecting war on the southern front,
was caught unawares and nearly retaliated out of primal fear. However, Israelis perhaps
should have realized that attacks on the North could spark tensions in the South: Egypt
and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, a political union of the two
countries. What was most important regarding the Crisis, however, were the lessons
that both countries drew from the Crisis: Israel believed that the Egyptians would be
more cautious in massing their troops, because they knew how close they had come to
war. Egypt, on the other hand, viewed the Rotem Crisis as a strategic success, as they
now knew they could mass their troops in the Sinai Peninsula without any fear of
retribution due to Israels newfound policy of deterrence. These miscalculations and
misunderstandings would set the stage for the war that broke out less than a decade
later.
Context:

The Six Day War commenced when Israel launched a surprise air strike against
the Egyptians in the wee hours of June 5th, 1967. The Israelis clearly struck first,
however, there is furious debate over whether or not the air strike was a preemptive
strike or a response to Egyptian and Syrian aggression. Those who believe that the
Israeli attack was defensible point to numerous actions taken by Egypt and Syria against
Israel in the months leading up to the June 1967 war. These actions were numerous
strikes by the PLO and al-fatah against northern Israeli settlements, the expulsion of
UNEF forces from Egypt, the blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the massing of Egyptian
forces along the Sinai/Israeli border. Furthermore, the decision of Jordan to join the war
was largely due to the Israeli initiated fighting in the village of al-Samu in late
November, 1966.
Skirmishes between the Syrians of the Golan Heights and the Israelis started in
1948 and continued until 1967, escalating in the period immediately before fighting
broke out in June of 1967. The fact that skirmishes had essentially been a fact of life for
Northern Citizens meant that these attacks may not have had a direct effect on
launching Operation Focus (Israelis first strike), but they most certainly effected
decision making during the war regarding the seizure of the Golan Heights on the latter
days of the war. As seen earlier, Israeli was in fact responsible for a large amount of the
skirmishes in the Golan region. Because of this, Syrian aggression was not considered a
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legitimate reason to go to war against any of the surrounding Arab States. Instead,
Israel turned against Jordan when increased Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
(specifically the al-Fatah faction) left dozens of citizens dead; the deaths were largely
the result of mine attacks.ix In a disproportionate and surprising response, Israel
launched an attack against the town of al-Samu in the West Bank. Surprising because,
for the three years preceeding the attack King Hussein had been meeting with foreign
minister Golda Meir and deputy Prime Minister Abban Eban regarding continued peace
between the two countries. However, on the fateful night of November 11 th, 3 Israeli
police officers were killed and six more were wounded when they drove over a mine
planted by Fatah. Hussein, fearing retribution, immediately sent a letter of condolence to
the Prime Minister in Tel Aviv through the American Embassy. However, in a cruel twist
of fate, Barbour, the ambassador at the embassy in Tel Aviv did not believe the message
to be urgent and failed to forward it to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in time. x The Israelis,
falsely believing Hussein to be in collusion with the terrorists, struck back against the
village of al-Samu.xi Eskhol was heavily criticized by the international community for
striking against Jordan instead of against Syria, the real seat of PLO power. Jordan
fought vigorously against the Israelis largely because of this raid, believing that the
Israelis could not be trusted, and instead King Hussein turned to the Egyptians when the
war came. First, however, he jabbed at Nasser, claiming that the Egyptian president was
content to hide behind UNEFs skirt.xii This particularly barbed comment may have led
to one of the most inflammatory actions in the lead up to the war.
The expulsion of UNEF forces from the Sinai Peninsula (they were placed there
after the 1956 Suez Crisis) sent a clear message to Israel that another war was
imminent. Nasser had received false reports from Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union
that the Israelis were massing on the border; Nasser responded in kind, escalating a
phantom war into a real conflict. On May 16th of 1967, less than half a year after the alSamu incident, Nasser drove into the Sinai peninsula, on the way expelling the UNEF
forces from the Peninsula. The UNEF forces had previously rendered the Sinai essentially
a demilitarized zone, a remilitarization struck the Israelis as nearly an act of war. They
were particularly concerned because of the 1960 crisis, they believed the Egypt would
not have massed on the border if they were not going to wage war. Miscommunication
and misinterpretation was the name of the game, both the Arab States and the Israelis
falsely believing that a war was unavoidable. In less than three days, Egyptian forces
rolled through the Sinai, expelling UNEF forces and seizing the port of Sharm al-Sheikh.
The UNEF forces asked to be stationed in Israeli, Israel, for reasons still unknown denied
them entrance.
Once Egyptian forces seized the port of Sharm al-Sheikh, they made the critical
decision of closing the port of Aqaba to Israeli traffic. The port of Aqaba was Israels only
access to the Indian ocean, and, according to the fateful 1949 Armistice agreements,
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Israel viewed the closing of the Straits of Tiran as an act of war, and that it gave them
clearance to return in kind. They believed themselves to be backed into a corner, and
now they had the justification for the third Arab-Israeli War. UNEF forces were expelled,
forces were massing at their border, al-Fatah had killed their citizens: they believed they
were completely justified in bring war to the Arabs. The only question was when to bring
it to them. A 3 week period known as The Waiting between Egyptian occupation of the
Sinai and the start of the June 1967 War passed; in which a National Unity Government
was formed and Moshe Dayan was given reign over the entire assembled Israeli forces.
On June 4th, a cabinet meeting, jointly led by Dayan and Eshkol, made the decision to go
to war. The next day, the Israeli air-force launched Operation Focus, the first military
move in the Six Day War.
Summary of the War:

At 7:10 in the morning, June 5th, 1967, sixteen Magister Fouga jets took off from
an airfield located in the Jewish airfield of Hatzor, signaling the start of Operation Focus,
the brainchild of Chief of Operations Ezer Weizman.xiii They turned their radios to
frequencies normally used by Mystere and Miraje jets, jets which the Egyptians knew
performed regular patrol missions near the Sinai Peninsula. These jets flew in regular
patrol patterns, but they were merely a decoy: soon after, more than 175 other aircraft,
Mirages and Mystere and Ouragan Bombers took off from the same airfield, flying
incredibly low to avoid detection by Egyptian radar sites. The planes split, some heading
off to the Mediterranean before banking back towards the assembled Arab Forces while
the others sped off towards targets deeper into Egypts interior.
They were not, however, completely undetected. Jordans rather facility at Ajlun,
supplied by Britain, was far more sophisticated than any of Egypts rather detection
sites. At around 8:15 A.M, a mere hour after the Israeli jets took off, the radar screen at
Ajlun exploded into a terrifying assortment of dots and specks, each representing an
Israeli fighter jet bearing down on the Sinai peninsula. The radar operator relayed the
code word for war to command central in Amman, where General Riyad radioed the
information to Defense Minister Shams Badran. However, in a bungling of epic
proportions, the previous day the Egyptians had changed radio frequency without
alerting the Jordanians. The planes flew onward, and around 9:00A.M Egyptian time the
Israeli planes reached their targets, turning belly up and rising to the altitude of 9,000
feet. From there, the jets dove downward, bombing on their first run and returning 2 to
3 times in order to strafe the scrambling pilots. The jets were completely exposed: the
national defense budget was running low and they did not believe that they could afford
Airport hangars. This was perhaps the greatest tactical blunder of the entire war
airplanes are great in the sky, fearsome eagles, but on the ground they were the
proverbial sitting ducks. The bombs, specially made by the French, drove themselves
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into the pavement and created enormous holes in the airways that rendered them
unusable. The Egyptians were caught completely off guardsixteen MiGs were
destroyed within the first three minutes of combat. Forty five minutes later, at 9:45 A.M,
at least six major airways in the Sinai Peninsula were already destroyed, stranding those
planes still intact on the runway for the duration of the war. As time passed, the second
wave of Israeli fighters reached targets West of the Suez Canal and began bombing their
targets, exceeding expected kill ratios by 100%.xiv The strike was a success of epic
proportions: Egypt started the morning with 420 functional aircraft and ended with only
134, essentially rendering the air force irrelevant for the duration of the war.
Egypt, however, instead of facing facts began broadcasting to their citizens that
they were in fact victorious. Radio Cairo broadcast the message that With an aerial
strike against Cairo and across the UAR, Israel began its attack today at 9:00. Our
planes scrambled and held off the attack.xv They claimed that 86 Israeli aircraft were
destroyed while only 2 Egyptian pilots were killed. Though they suffered heavy losses in
reality, Nasser still believed that the opening of hostilities was good newsthat the
Egyptians still had a chance to mount a reaction and destroy the Zionist state. This was
because he himself was not informed of the actual situation: Amer, the General in
command of Egyptian forces, was unreachable and would not explain what had
happened. Those around him who knew what had transpired feared to tell himbecause
of this, the leader believed that the Egyptians had the upper hand until at least the early
afternoon.
A mere hour after the final Israeli fighter jets had struck their intended targets,
the first Ugdah, under the command of General Tal, and composed of 250 tanks, 50
guns, and a paratrooper brigade mobilized and headed towards the Egyptian forces
assembled in the Sinai. Egyptian intelligence believed that the tanks rolling forward was
their own, and the Israelis were able to roll through the forces front lines without much
resistance.xvi The greatest advantage that the Israelis enjoyed, however, was the fact
that their tanks were far more modern than the EgyptiansCenturions and Pattons as
opposed to recycled Shermans. Furthermore, Generals in the Egyptian army were
largely based on politicking whereas the Israelis placed a high value on experience in the
1948 and 1956 wars, meaning their armies were extremely mobile and well
commanded. What began as a battle turned into a rout, as 2,000 Egyptians were killed
and their forces rolled back deeper into the Sinai to Mitla Pass, a narrow road which
represented essentially the only way to the Suez Canal and to further into Egyptian
territory. The pass changed hand several times until the Israelis, under the leadership of
Ariel Sharon, broke through in nearly pitch darkness at 10:00 in the evening. They were
poised to strike at dawn, further into the Sinai, when Sharon and Tal received the news
that a new front had opened up along the Jordanian border. Here, the dominance of the
Israeli Air Force would be less relevant in vicious, pitched battle.
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Before the battle on June 5th, it was unknown to what degree the Jordanians would
support the Egyptians, and how vigorously they would fight the Israelis. At 11:15 A.M on
Day 1 of the Six Day War, that question was answered: Howitzers launched nearly 6,000
shells towards West Jerusalem, the area owned and occupied by the Israelis. This was
pretext for the Israelis to attack the Air Forces of Amman and and Aljun; they were
neutralized with stunning efficiency in less than 9 minutes. From there on, Battle moved
to the narrow streets of Jerusalem, around some of the holiest sites to 3 of the worlds
largest religions. They were forced with the decision of whether or not to use heavy
artillery in some of the holiest sites of the Abrahamic religions. After four hours of
fighting, the Israelis had suffered heavy losses but managed to navigate through the
stone streets to the border of the Old City. No Israeli had set foot in the Old City, site of
their holiest shrine, the Western Wall, since 1948. The question of whether or not to
seize the Old City, and thus start to capture territory not under Israeli control before the
war, dominated the Israeli war cabinets discussion for the next twenty four hours.
The Western Bank of Israel is exceedingly mountainous, not at all suited to tank
warfare. Furthermore, so many holy sites were contained in a relatively small area that
air support was limited to strafing and tactical strikes; no widespread bombing was seen
on the Western front. This favored the Jordaniansthough their air force was destroyed,
they still possessed the superior defensive position and a well-trained military. Indeed,
the Jordanians were heavily praised by their Israeli opponents by the end of the war for
their spirit and tactics. However, Jordan may never have attacked Israel had Amer not
sent a message to Hussein on the first day, urging him to escalate the war and create a
veritable second front as 75% of Israelis air force and ground forces had been
destroyed.xvii This, of course, was a lie, but Jordan sent their 11 infantry brigades and
the Iraqi expeditionary forces to defend the West Bank, and to engage Israeli forces in
all out war. Jordanian forces, in fact, were the first to cross the 1949 Armistice Lines and
took Government House, the UN headquarters in Jerusalem. The Israelis responded,
sending Uzi Narkiss to the Government House, where, after a fierce but brief battle
ensued, ending when the Jordanians fled. In the morning of the second day, the Israelis
launched an offensive to seize the village of Sur Baher, unremarkable except for the fact
that control of the Sur Baher signified control of the road from Jerusalem to Bethlehem
and Hebron. Jordanian forces requested backup, but the remaining Israeli air force
strafed all columns advancing towards the mountainous regions, far from the holy sites,
and no reinforcements reached Jerusalem. Thus, at the end of the first day of fighting
the Jordanians, and faced two large tasks: clearing the Jordanians from the rest of the
West Bank, and storming and taking the Old Cityif they were given permission by
defense minister Dayan.
Meanwhile, Syrias air force had been destroyed by sorties by the IAF to the bases
of Dmair, Damascus, Saiqal, Marj Rial and T-4, and Iraqs air force was also struck at HPage 17 of 27

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3.xviii As with the Jordanians, shelling of the Golan started from Kibbutz settlements in
the North of Israel. Around 2:30, as shelling intensified, the first attempts at Diplomacy
by Washington and Moscow were attempted. However, as both sides believed that they
still had a chance at striking a decisive victory in the war, neither side was willing to
accept a cease-fire. The Syrian front would remain quiet, in fact, for the first three days
of the war; Syria continued to rain artillery fire onto northern Israeli villages with little to
no reply.
The dawn of the second day brought a sobering realization to the Egyptianstheir
forces had been routed, and another arm of the Israeli force was attempting to divide
their force into two, leaving the forces of General Tal and Ariel Sharon to pick off the
remaining Egyptians in a so called turkey shoot. During the early morning hours of the
second day, General Sharon realized that the Egyptians, believing the sand dunes
between the major cities of Rafah and Abu Agheila were impassable, had decided not to
station any soldiers there. As luck had it, the IAF had realized during the 1956 Suez
Crisis that it was indeed possible to cross the Wadi dunes if tires were slightly deflated
and one proceeded cautiously. General Yoffe was tasked with the duty of bringing a third
of the Israeli force through these dunes and around the rear, surprising reinforcements
on their way to Rafah and Abu Agheila. The Israelis routed the reinforcements in more of
a massacre than a battle, and the cities of Rafah and Abu Agheila fell by nightfall. The
cities passed into Israeli control; the Israelis now had control of the Central Sinai and
from there could mount their attacks into the rest of the Peninsula. Indeed, at this point,
the battle for the Sinai was essentially overCommander Amer cracked under the
pressure, ordering the full retreat of all forces to areas west of the Canal a day later,
and 96 hours after the war in the Sinai begin it was functionally over.xix A separate
mission was launched to topple Sharm al-Sheikh, however, no battle was foughtthe
defenders had already fled. The battle for the Sinai officially ended on the fourth day,
but the third and fourth days were almost exclusively devoted to full retreat by the
Egyptians with Israeli forces trailing behind, occasionally pestering the forces. By the
time the final Egyptian soldier had crossed the Suez Canal on the fourth day, 11,500
Egyptian soldiers were killed at almost 50,000 were injured. The Israeli losses were
significantly less275 soldiers killed, and 800 were wounded.xx The Israelis had won the
Southern front: aside from the decision of whether or not to seize the canal, the Israeli
government could now deal with the other fronts: the Eastern front with Jordan, and the
as of yet unmolested northern front, the Golan Heights and Syria.
The second day of fighting in Jordan was known as The Battle for Jerusalem, and
by the end of it Israelis had finally taken control of their holiest shrine, a shrine no
Israeli had seen in 19 years. Gurs forces started the festivities by taking control of the
heavily defended Police School, during which his paratroopers crossed the Mandelbaum
Gate, the division between East and West Jerusalem. Gurs forces then moved towards
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Ammunition Hill, the aptly named high ground that witnessed one of the bloodiest
battles of the entire Six Day War; 36 Israeli soldiers were killed as well as 76 Jordanian
soldiers. Eventually, however, the superior weaponry and numbers overwhelmed the
outgunned, smaller Jordanian force and the Israelis took Ammunition Hill. Gurs other
battalions fought a significantly less bloody fight near the American Colony, and they
eventually reached the walls of Old Jerusalem. However, suppressive fire from Victoria
Hill, a ridge overlooking Jerusalem from the East, meant that they could not yet expose
themselves and capture the Old City.xxi They would have to wait until morning of the
next day in order to ensure paratrooper support that would allow them to take the city.
At 8:30 the next morning, paratroopers reached the Old City, and by the light of
day the Israeli forces launched a three-pronged assault to seize the Old City. The
decision of whether or not to take the city was difficult to makeeventually, the thought
of finally controlling the holiest shrine, and to take full control of a city they intended to
make their city overwhelmed the Israeli cabinet. This decision was not an easy one, as
they were crossing the 1949 Armistice Lines and the battle could be viewed as
imperialistic, one country greedily invading a sovereign nation merely to capture a
country holy to all Abrahamic religions, not merely Judaism. Two prongs attacked
August Victoria hill from Mount Scopus and the valley below it, while forces personally
led by Gur broke through St. Stephens gate. August Victoria hill was taken by surprise
by such a bold offensive, and they fell at approximately the same time that Gurs
halftracks bursted into the inner sanctuary of Jerusalem. Gur made a beeline to the
Western Wall, and radioed his commanders in what would become a famous message:
The Temple Mount is in our hands. The fighting in the other parts of the West Bank,
particularly in Judea and Samaria, simmered down as Israeli air force arrived from the
completed mission in Egypt and beat back the Arab League forces.xxii By 8 P.M on the
third day, June 7th, 1967, a U.N cease-fire was reached between Israel and Jordan that
would signal the end of fighting on the Eastern Front. The final three days of the Six Day
War were almost entirely fought in the Golan Heights.
Curiously enough, Syria was perhaps the Arab country most responsible for the
outbreak of the Six Day War. Though the immediate cause was the blockading of the
Straits of Tiran and the expulsion of UNEF forces, among other actions by Egypt, Israel
probably would not have gone to war had it not been in a state of high tension due to
Syrian terrorist attacks along its borders. This is not to say that this was a reasonable
state of mind to be in; the Israelis were in fact provoking the Syrians to strike back, and
the terrorist attacks could logically be justified as merely retaliatory. However, the
Syrians were always engaged in inflammatory rhetoric, and once the war started they
shelled the Northern Israeli cities far harder than the perfunctory attacks by Jordan. On
the second day, two infantry brigades were sent from Syria to attack Kibbutz Tel Dan in
the north, breaking over the Armistice Lines of 1948.xxiii The Israelis did not respond,
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largely because their forces were already occupied in Jordan and in Egypt. However, on
the fourth day, the Sinai and West Bank were essentially taken care of and the Israelis
turned their attentions toward Syria.
As those offensives in the Sinai and the West Bank wound down, Israeli leaders
started to support an offensive against Syria as punishment for the state that, in their
mind, had far more to do with the outbreak of war than Jordan did. Finally, the United
States entered the fray when the US National Security Adviser contacted Abba Eban,
asking him why he had yet to strike against Syria when they were the most belligerent
and most irresponsible Arab state.xxiv With what essentially amounted to permission
from the dominant world power, the Israelis started an intense shelling in order to drive
the Syrians from the Golan Heights. Again, the Israelis demonstrated their military
capability and the Syrians demonstrated their shocking inability to understand that the
Israelis would try to surprise themthe major attacking force struck in the North. This
was surprising to the Syrians as the north was most advantageous to the defenders, as
it was the most mountainousbecause of this, it was extremely lightly fortified. The
northern route was the largest, though it was not the only route, as four other attacking
forces, each composed of at least two brigades, struck at different points on the Golan
Heights all along different mountainous roads.
The fighting favored the defenders, as the narrow roads presented excellent
targets for the Syrian defense positions.xxv Indeed, in one brigade of 800 soldiers
attacking the north (proceeding towards the town of Qala), only four soldiers survived
without injury; the other 796 were killed or seriously injured.xxvi The fighting was fiercest
near the town of Qala, but after 5 and a half hours they made headway and overtook
the bunkers at the crest of the Golan Heights. Three out of the other four 2-brigade
forces made headway; another was beaten back across the border in one of the few
battles won by the Arab forces during the entire war. However, most of the Syrian forces
fell within a matter of hours largely because the Syrian officers treated their soldiers
poorlythey did not wish to fight for commanders they did not respect, and many of
those selfsame commanders fled without informing their soldiers where they had gone.
Furthermore, after the Israelis came into close contact with the Syrians, their guns were
far better equipped to the situation. Close combat in the Golan Heights was expansive,
and the Uzi, a light submachine gun, was far better equipped than the AK-47, classified
as a heavy assault rifle. By the night of June 9th, eight of ten Israeli brigades had
reached the Golan Plateau, where they could be reinforced and replenished.
In fact, by June 10th most of the fighting in the Golan Heights had already been
finished. Two brigades joined in a pincer movement, however, when the two brigades
came together at the end of their maneuvering, neither one of them had fired a single
shot. As in the Sinai, the Syrians had realized that they would probably be destroyed
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and had instead fled deeper into the Golan. Indeed, Damascus Radio broadcasted that
the crucial city Quenitra had fallen before Israeli forces had even reached the city. xxvii
Soldiers heard this on their own radios, and morale fell drastically. It is surmised that
Syria broadcast this in an attempt to hasten a UN cease-fire before they were utterly
destroyed. On June 10th, the Israelis stopped moving forward according to pre-arranged
cease-fire lines; the next day, they signed a cease-fire. The Six Day War had ended.
Aftermath:

The war, according to anyones reckoning, was a great success for Israel. They
seized the Golan Heights, parts of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Gaza
Strip and the Golan Heights. Aside from the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis retained
possession of all conquered territory indefinitely after the conclusion of the war. Partly
because of their lack of willingness to give back these territories, during the Khartoum
Arab Summit, the Arab League steadfastly denied negotiation with Israel as a legitimate
state. During this summit, the Arabs issued a resolution which became famous for its
declaration of the 3 nos: that is, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with Israel. These policy of Arab rejectionism directly led to the Yom Kippur
War of 1973, a failed attempt by the Joint Arab States to reclaim the area conquered
and controlled by Israel in 1967.
However, effects of the war were seen in more than just the diplomatic realm.
During fighting in the West Bank, nearly 300,000 Palestinians fled in fear from Israeli
bullets to the state of Jordan, where the refugee problem contributed to growing unrest
in the country with regards to King Hussein.xxviii Furthermore, there was an immense
loss of life during the conflict: between 776 and 983 Israeli soldiers were killed, with
another 4,517 wounded. The Arab states suffered far greater losses, as large amounts of
them were gunned down by Israeli tanks even as they attempted to retreat or had
already clearly lost the battle. Egypt alone suffered between 10,000 and 15,000 killed,
the large discrepancy is the result of the fact that during the Egyptian retreat
approximately 5,000 soldiers went missing or fled their posts. It is assumed that
thousands of them died of dehydration in the Sinai desert. However, a far more sinister
explanation has been put forward by numerous corroborating sources: that the Israeli
soldiers murdered captured Egyptians after forcing them to dig their own graves.xxix This
theory is lent some weight by the fact that a widely distributed cable was sent by
commander Moshe Dayan on the third day of the Six Day War: it stated that no Egyptian
POWs were to be mistreated or killed, and that any soldier found transgressing this
order would be court-martialed. The fact that this widely understood humanitarian policy
had to be reissued and explained suggests that there was some problem with following
it. These supposed mistreatments are partially the reason that Egypt refused to
negotiate with the state of Israel.
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Overall, the war did little to settle any conflicts between states and in fact ensured
conflict for years to come. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 is viewed as a direct result of
this war, and the conquered territories controlled by Israel are the main basis of the
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only in 2005 did Israel withdraw from the Gaza strip;
Israel left the West Bank according to the Oslo Peace Accords in 1978, but re-entered in
recent years. Indeed, Israeli settlements in the West Bank are growing and are perhaps
the most contentious issue in the entirety of the modern Middle East. Indeed, the
militant leader of Hamas, Mahmoud Zahar, claimed in May that the Arab countries
should have accepted the 1967 borders and that even now there would be peace
between Palestine and Israel if Israel drew back to said borders.xxx In the words of
historian Michael B. Oren, The 1967 war never truly ended. The reverberations of this
war have been felt for 45 years, and will continue to be felt until there is lasting peace in
the Middle East. Perhaps in your simulation, you can find a way to lasting peace.
Pertinent Questions/Issues and Goals of the Committee:

The War was an overwhelming success for the Israelis, and an abject failure for
the assembled Arab States. The heat on Nasser was so intense that he actually resigned,
before rescinding his offer to resign two days later. The Israelis increased their total land
area by approximately 30%, gaining the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and large parts
of the West Bank. However, the war did not have to end this way, with intense
bloodshed and with complete failure of the Arab assembled forces. The goal of this
committee is to navigate this conflict that has never truly ended, not only the Yom
Kippur War but the conflicts that plague the region to this very day. The simulation
starts essentially after the point of no-return, perhaps the conflict can be postponed but
nearly all historians agree that the third Arab-Israeli conflict was an inevitability.
However, what occurred in this war is not an inevitablyrun this war over again
with slightly different positions, and it may have resulted in the success of the Arab
States, in a cease fire, in the complete destruction of the Israeli state. You are placed in
such a volatile situation that your decisions will intimately effect what occurs before,
during, and after the war. The first question you will be faced with, on both sides, is
whether or not you should strike first: the Arabs clearly had the forces necessary to
attack, but elected not to due to outside pressure, whereas the Israelis through caution
to the wind and struck first and struck decisively. Will you decide to do the same?
Furthermore, throughout the crisis, you will be presented with specific military decisions
that have vast political ramifications. You will need to be both a General and a diplomat;
for these two positions were not as separate as they are today. Your final goal, and the
most important, is to rectify the error that these two sides made upon the conclusion of
the Six Day War: the lack of a peace agreement. The 1948 Armistice Agreements
postponed war for merely 8 years, but it marked a step in an attempt to solve the
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problem diplomatically. You have the benefit of hindsight, yes, but you must think as a
1967 Israeli or Egyptian, a Syrian or a Jordanian. Your task is, quite simply, to create
conditions that will foster peace in the Middle East. Or, if you are a war mongerer,
perhaps you will simply try to make the world burn. I think I knew which you will pick.
Countries Involved:

Israel: Israel, as mentioned before, was a relatively new and reactionary country. They
are driven by fear for their imminent destruction. They have no allies immediately
surrounding them, they are at war or on the brink of war with nearly every country
surrounding them. They are a Parliamentary democracy, the head of which is a Prime
Minister. During the 1967 war the Prime Minister was Levi Eshkol, member of the Mapai
party. The government was divided into terms called Knessets, the 1967 War occurred
during the 5th Knesset. It is possible to reform the government through a vote of no
confidence in the Prime Minister, at this point the Senators and Cabinet members will
attempt to reassemble and create a new functional government. The night before the
Six Day War, the fifth Knesset formed a National Unity Government in light of the
imminent war. Your characters are exclusively Senators or Cabinet members; you will all
be free to voice your opinion in our room, cozily named The Pit. Decisions will be made
by a vote or by general consensus (this can be changed during the simulation.)
Egypt: Egypt is the most important country on the side of the Arabs. They have the
largest standing army in the Middle East, though they are less well trained and less well
equipped than the Israelis. They are led by the charismatic president Gamal Abdel
Nasser, though he holds far more power than a normal President would, and held
incredibly sway over his people. Because Nasser was such a strong figure in his
government, he only listened to the opinion of a few of his most trusted military
commanders and aides. Because of this, a large amount of his cabinet has been left out
in favor of other countries leaders. In this simulation, we will pretend that the jointly
assembled Arab Forces would all be able to meet in the same room and discuss matters
which would affect each of their countries.
Jordan: Jordan in 1967 was a monarchy, ruled by their commander in chief King
Hussein. He enjoyed complete power over the government, though lived in constant fear
of rebellion due to a failed assassination attempt when he was merely 15 years old.
Decisions regarding Jordan ultimately go through King Hussein, though he was quite
susceptible to advice from his right hand man and his other military commanders.
Jordan is located to the West of Israel and shares the largest border with them, thus
presenting one of the biggest threats to Israeli freedom in the mind of the Israelis. Their
military is accomplished by far smaller than that of the Egyptians and Israelis.

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Syria: Syria is in a curious position in that though they were one of the main aggressors
against the Israelis, they only faced a very small faction of the extensive Israeli forces
during the War. They are particularly important because the Golan Heights are
internationally recognized as being part of Syria, any peace agreement will have to take
this into account. In 1967 the Syrians had a Baathist democracy, headed by rebellious
commanders who ousted the Syrian government in a bloody 1966 coup. In Syria, the
PLO enjoyed some amount of refuge: indeed, the vast majority of strikes against the
Northern Settlements of Israel were launched from Syria.
Characters:
Israeli Side
Levi EshkolPrime Minister (played by James Fahey or Kevin Kirby, the chairs)
Yitzak RabinChief of State of Israeli Defense Forces
Moshe DayanCommander of Southern Forces
Zvi DinsteinDeputy Defense Minister
Ezer WeizmanDeputy Chief of Staff of IDF
Abba EbanIsraeli Foreign Minister
Colonel Rafi HarlevChief of Israeli Air Force
Major General Mordechai HodLeader of Operation Focus
Yigal AllonDeputy Prime Minister
Haim GvatiMinister of Agriculture
Zerach WarhaftigMinister of Religions
Minister of TourismMoshe Kol
Eliyahu SassonMinister of Police
Haim-Moshe ShapiraMinister of Internal Affairs
Ariel SharonMajor General and head of most powerful armored division
Zvi DinsteinDeputy Minister of Defense
Yosef BurgMinister of Welfare
Yaacov HerzogSpecial Emissary to Jordan
Egyptian and Arab States side:
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Gamal Abdel NasserPresident of Egypt

Hussein bin TalalKing of Jordan
Sharif Zaid ibn ShakrCommander in Chief of the Jordanian Military
Ali SabriVice President of Egypt
Abdel Hakim AmerEgyptian Military Leader and Nassers right hand man
Abdel Hamid SarrajHead of Syrian security services
Muhammad Sidqi MahmudCommanding General of the Egyptian Air Force
Anwar al-QadiDeputy General
Anwar SadatProminent Aide, Friend of Nasser, Future president of Egypt
Yasser ArafatLeader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
Hafez Al AssadSyrian Defense Minister
Salah al-Din al-Bitar---Head of National Front Government (Baath regime)
Shams BadranDefense Minister of Egypt
Gamal AfifiAir Operations Chief General

Works Cited
Bron, Gabby. Egyptian POWs ordered to dig graves, then shot by the Israeli army. Yedioth
Ahronoth 17 Aug. 1995: n. pag. umass.edu. Web. 12 Mar. 2012.
<http://www1.umassd.edu//mideastaffairs/.htm>.
Cohen, Stuart A. Israel, Army and Defense--A Dictionary. Tel-Aviv: n.p., 1976. Print.
Gelber, Yoav. Palestine, 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem.
N.p.: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. Print.
http://www.sixdaywar.org//southernfront.asp. SixDayWar.org. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012.
infoplease.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012. <http://www.infoplease.com///.html>.
Israel: A Campaign for the Books. time.com. Time Magazine, n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012.
<http://www.time.com////0,9171,837237,00.html>.
jihadwatch.org. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. <http://www.jihadwatch.org///leader-well-accept-1967borders-but-never-recognize-israel.html>.
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Meir, Golda. Statement to the General Assembly. United Nations. mfa.gov. Web. 17 Jan. 2012.
<http://www.mfa.gov.il//+Relations/+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htm>.
Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New York: n.p., 2008. Print.
Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.
Schemann, Serge. Generals Words Shed a New Light on the Golan. New York Times 5 May 1997:
n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 21 Jan. 2012.
Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. New York: n.p.,
2007. Print.
Zeitman, Solomon. The Jews. Race, Nation or Religion? Philadelphia: Dropsie College Press, 1936.
Print.
i

Six Days of War, Michael Oren, pg. 174.

Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 1 March 1957.
iii
Solomon Zeitlin, The Jews. Race, Nation, or Religion? (Philadelphia: Dropsie College Press, 1936). Cited
in, Edelheit and Edelheit, History of Zionism: A Handbook and Dictionary
iv
Gelber, Yoav Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem. 2nd
ed. Sussex Academic Press, 2006 p. 138.
v
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856666.html
vi
Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.
vii
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856667.html
viii
Schmemann, Serge (1997-05-11). "General's Words Shed a New Light on the Golan". The New York
Times. Retrieved 2010-05-03.
ix
Six Days of War, Michael Oren. 2005.
x
Michael Oren (2005). "The Revelations of 1967". Israel Studies 10 (2): 114.
xi
Israel, Army and defense - A dictionary, Zeev Schiff & Eitan Haber, editors, Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1976,
Tel-Aviv Hebrew
xii
Six Days of War, Michael Oren. pg. 110
xiii
Ibid, 171.
xiv
Ibid, 176.
xv
Ibid 177.
xvi
Ibid 180.
xvii
Ibid.
xviii
Ibid 195.
xix
http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/southernfront.asp
xx
Ibid
xxi
http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/easternfront.asp
xxii
Ibid.
xxiiixxiii
http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront.asp
xxiv
1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Changed the Middle East. Segev, Tom.
xxv
http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront.asp
xxvi
Ibid.
xxvii
"A Campaign for the Books". Time. September 1, 1967.
xxviii
^ "Distribution of the Palestinian Population And Jewish Settlers In the West Bank and Gaza Since
1967"
ii

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xxix

Bron, Gabby 'Egyptian POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot By Israeli Army', Yedioth Ahronoth,
August 17, 1995
xxx
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/05/hamas-leader-well-accept-1967-borders-but-never-recognizeisrael.html

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