People v CFI Rizal

F: CFI ordered inadmissible evidence against Sgt. Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina for the alleged violation of section
3601 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The ASAC Agents were informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to
Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car
a light blue Dodge car with Plate No. 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope
answered "I do not know."
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo
Inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo was done. The contents of the boxes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist
watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands
Hope testified he never knew that these are untaxed commodities that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City
to Manila in his car upon request of his girlfriend Monina as a personal favor;
RTC held search was unreasonable and declared evidence inadmissible.
I: W/N the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents commissioned to enforce customs laws without
warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such
merchandise are inadmissible in evidence.
H: NO. We find for petitioner. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings that the articles were
smuggled. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal. Rather, they are purely
administrative and civil.
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Code, who in order to discharge their official duties more
effecttively may at any time open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articlesintroduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid (Section 2211, emphasis supplied)
The Code does not mention the need of a search warrant. The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of
the home In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. in the
extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed
except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved.
What they (ASAC Agents) did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code. The
circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully be
effected without the need of a warrant. The constitutional guarantee has not been violated.

Roan v Gonzales
F: The petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities.The challenged
search warrant was issued by the respondent judge. The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. But officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets
Respondent judge said when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984,
he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise
presented to me their respective affidavits
He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was
applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses. In other words, the
applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence
informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were
made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made
by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the
forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard
as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the
petitioner in his house This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the
house while he was near the gate. 18He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two
were.38 caliber revolvers. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be
so certain even as to the caliber of the guns and other questions
I: Seeing that the warrant was invalid, w/n the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner
were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant.
H: NO. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no
valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived. It does not follow that because an
offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were
otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the
petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant.
WHEN SW IS NOT NEEDED: search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frished for
weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent
smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft are also
traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been
held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon
them inadvertently.
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions.
The conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.

Nolasco v Pano (Incident to lawful arrest daw)

F: The undisputed act is that petitioner Mila Aguilar Roque was arrested at 11:30 and aboard a public vehicle on the road (at
Mayon and P. Margal Sts). The pronouncement by the majority at that time, that as an incident to her arrest, her dwelling at
239-B Mayon Street could be searched even without a warrant for evidence of the charges of rebellion filed against her
SC had ordered SW 80-84 null and void but certain personalities seized by the constabulary would be retained to be used as
evidence:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the
National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money
from foreign or local sources.
The court previously held the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
The questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause.
Thus SC previously annulled the SW but did not apply exclusionary rule
I: W/N Exclusionary rule should be applied
H: YES. The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant
issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate
The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence. All the articles thus seized fag under the
exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby
annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue
of the illegal Search Warrant are hereby ordered returned to petitioners.
THK, Concurring
Totally applying the exclusionary rule by declaring that the search and seizure of the personalities at petitioner Mila Aguilar
Roque's dwelling at Mayon Street, Quezon City was illegal and could not be deemed as incident to her arrest earlier on board a
public vehicle
In this case, the arresting CSG group of the military themselves knew that they needed a search warrant but they obtained the
void general warrant in question. Necessarily, the seizure of documents and personal effects with such a void warrant could not
be justified "as an incident of an arrest" outside petitioner's dwelling

Papa v Mago
F: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released
Elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods. It was alleged Remedios Mago was the owner of the
goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. The lower Court, with the
conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since
the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation. Respondent Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond
I: whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order releasing the goods in question.
H: The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected
on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties,
taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser
of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the
goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and
the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the
goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. The articles contained in the nine bales in
question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent
court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code mentions exceptions to SW rule.
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken
to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Carroll v US: X X X or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
The seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that
seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods
Obiter: the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of
Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967.

People v Lo Ho Wing
F:This case involves the unlawful transport of methamphetamine.
The Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation
of illegal drugs thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected
syndicate. The recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate;
Tia was one of those recruited.
Appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone
Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return.
China adventure.
When they came back, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip given by
Tia. The car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to
stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape.
The second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City. Lim was likewise
apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
I: W/N THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
H: The contentions of the respondent are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set
forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving
vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that the
search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
appellant and his co-accused.
The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
the search on the basis of practicality. a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought." the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which
appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the
accused from China. Thus there was PC to conduct the warrantless search.

People v Malmstedt
F: Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines. The accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902 to Baguio
Checkpoint was ordered by Cpt. Vasco. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.
Officers saw a suspicious bulge in accuseds waist. It was hash.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get
two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. They also had hash.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects.
I: W/N Search was valid
H: Where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
XXX
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph
(1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and
there committing a crime
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably
believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search.

Posadas v CA
F: Ungab and Umpar of INP conducted survey op @ Davao. They saw PET w/ buri bag. He was shady.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt
to get away was thwarted
they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Found Guilty.
I: W/N Search on PET was valid
H: At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
*However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search"
Checkpoints are legal.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the
case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall
have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

Anaig v COMELEC
F: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban.
Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan
requesting the return of the two (2) firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner immediately instructed
his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them.
PNPs Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty
minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint.
They searched the car and found the firearms. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the
house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious.
Petitioner explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec.
261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
I: W/N Search was lawful
H: As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not
absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and
the seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are
not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly
packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
There was no mention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car
was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search.
The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case.
There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning,
transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be
valid.

#Granted

Malacat v CA
F: In Manila, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade,
without first securing the necessary license. Petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
INPs Yu, testified in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of shady Muslim-looking men. Apprehended them.
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest. CA Affirmed.
I: W/N CA ERRED IN HOLDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER LEGAL.
H: serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioners
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized
if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at
Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow
officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty
minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio,
such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution, which provides for the rights of the accused.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will
be discussed below.
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop
and frisk."
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
As re: Stop and frisk, it was held in Terry that police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing.
while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist
a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest
of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
Yus claim is not supported by report or record or corroborated with by any other officer;
Petitioners behavior could not have given rise to suspicion - merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble;
no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as
he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
#Acquitted

Mustang Lumber v CA
F: Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard.
The team was able to secure a search warrant. team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of
narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
The team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized
articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.
Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he
ordered CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately 311,000 board
feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.
in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were
committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went
to the business premises of the petitioner. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumberdealer's permit had already been suspended.
the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.
I: W/N search was valid
H: It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied
with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power
vested upon a forest officer or employee. The search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
OBITER: e also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive
Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it
may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period

People v Aruta
F: In the City of Olongapo, Philippines, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried
marijuana packed in plastic bag. She pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City with
a large volume of marijuana.
Aling Rosa alighted from a Victory Liner Bus. She was apprehended.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure.
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused
I: W/N the trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the
latters constitutional rights.
H: The State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an
individual. The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is
a most basic and fundamental one.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers had reasonable
time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting
suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant
requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. Consequently, there was
no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.
Compared to jurisprudence on valid warrantless searches and seizures, did not fall under any of them.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE

Asuncion v CA
F: In Manila, the accused was found with shabs. He pleaded not guilty
The Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with specific instruction to
look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas.
Informant informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the purpose of selling shabu. The policemen
immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the driver, who turned out to be herein accused Jose
Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy
Advincula then asked the accused if they can inspect the vehicle. As the accused acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a
search on the vehicle and he found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be meth.
He was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from his underwear, which when
voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be meth.
A decision was rendered by the trial court finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
I: W/N Search was valid
H: Yes. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards
a moving vehicle petitioners vehicle was flagged down by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the
police authorities were justified in searching the petitioners automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded
immediate action.
Case was compared to People v. Idel Aminnudin y Ahni, wherein it was held that warrantless arrests could not be justified
unless the accused was caught in flagrante delicto or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed. Even
though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and confirmed the area where he
allegedly was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in the vicinity. Secondly, they were
uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that petitioner used different cars in
going to and from the area. Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the
petitioner, who was then able to evade arrest.

People v Canton
F: Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Shabs.
At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, the accused have in her possession 998.2809 GRAMS of meth.
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam.
Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying Excuse me maam, can I search you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt
something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN.
Susan was thoroughly searched. The trial court rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense.
I: W/N Search was valid
H: YES. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest - If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her
will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers
of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested.
Stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior. In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 holders of airplane tix are subject to search.
It is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for
prohibited materials or substances. After the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the
discovery of packages on her body. The strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case. Shabs seized during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence against accused. There it was held
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified.
The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
#Dismissed! #Guilty

Fajardo v People
F: Fajardo, and one Valerio were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866. They had in their possession, custody and control two
(2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial
number , two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and
fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition.
agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is a resident of
Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live
therein;
4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders
PISOG were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the
complaint of concerned citizens that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area.
Valerio fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner. The policemen desisted from entering petitioner's
house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house
Nava, who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something.
The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioner's house.
Warrant served. The team found and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he
threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched
the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any
proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.
I: W/N Search was valid
H: First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that
view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.19cralaw It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the
fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and

sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived
engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed.
Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly,
considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown
might be contraband items, or evidence
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably
inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely
requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item maybe evidenceof a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm.
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2
Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw
petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
Petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen
at the rooftop of petitioner's house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner's participation, knowledge or consent in
Valerio's actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing illegal
possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit
the criminal act committed by Valerio.
#Acquitted

Luz v People
F: Accused was driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance
He noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged.
There was shabu.
RTC and CA found him guilty BRD.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding
that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance.
I: W/NTHE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
H: We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. There was no intention to take petitioner
into custody.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if
the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was
actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred. In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers.
These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct.
#Acquitted

Material v Natividad
F: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against
petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30.
On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of the following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities
4. All letters exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and Harry Lyons,
between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas,
between October 9, 1946 to March 31, 1947.
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons.
Respondent judge, granting both motions, required petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in question.
The inspection of said books and papers are sought through proper order of the trial court, and the Constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioners precisely allows inspection of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of the court.
Moreover, this provision of our Constitution creates no new right, being merely a re-enforcement of the Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
W/N search was valid.
H: The inspection of the said documents is not for the purpose of "fishing evidence" but with a view to enabling the respondent
Lope Sarreal to designate with the particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be obtained in connection with trial
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or
confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production
and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and
followed by respondent judge place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question that,
upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question, that they are material and
important to the issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the
controversy are placed before the trial court.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has
power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of
the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence
upon lawful order of a court of justice.
#Denied

Oklahoma v Walling
F: Subpoenas issued by The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor sought the production of
specified records to determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, including records relating to
coverage want judicial enforcement. Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, maintain that the Act is not applicable to
them
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that the Administrator was entitled to enforcement upon showing of "probable
cause."
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit likewise rejected the company's position, one judge dissenting on the ground that
probable cause had not been shown.
Fourth amendment = right v unreasonable searches and seizures
I: whether or not enforcement of the subpoenas as directed by the Circuit Courts of Appeals will violate any of petitioners'
rights secured by the Fourth
H: The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in these cases present no question of actual
search and seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been
validly made; and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside.
No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises
Nor has any objection been taken to the breadth of the subpoenas. The Petitioner, in other words, is seeking immunity from
the act which provides: the Administrator can "enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such transcriptions
thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts as he may deem appropriate to determine whether any person
has violated any provision of this Act.
The very purpose of the subpoena and of the order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and procure evidence.
The primary source of misconception concerning the Fourth Amendment's function lies perhaps in the identification of cases
involving so-called "figurative" or "constructive" search with cases of actual search and seizure.
The confusion, obscuring the basic distinction between actual and so-called "constructive" search has been accentuated where
the records and papers sought are of corporate character, as in these cases. It has been settled that corporations are not
entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related matters. As has been noted,
they are not at all within the privilege against self-incrimination, although this Court more than once has said that the privilege
runs very closely with the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company
cannot refuse to produce its records in his possession upon the plea that they either will incriminate him or may incriminate it.
No specific charge needed unlike warrant. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the
power of Congress to command.
It is impossible to conceive how a violation of petitioners' rights could have been involved. Both were corporations. The only
records or documents sought were corporate ones.

#subpoenagood

Camara v Municipal Court

F: An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment
building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the citys Housing Code. The inspector was informed
that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and
demanded to inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The
Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellants apartment a second time two days later, and again the Appellant
refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district attorneys office.
The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were
again refused because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ
of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a
regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection
which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.
Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it
authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a
violation of the Housing Code exists therein.
I: Whether or not administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights
H: We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the
risk of a criminal penalty.
Probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
Moreover, [t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a
reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither
endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement
in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack
the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v.
Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of
the Fourth Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under consideration, however, these
conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of
these inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the
question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights is essential.
#Unconstitutional

Harvey v Defensor-Santiago
F: A petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are foreigners from Pagsanjan. The case stems from the apprehension of
petitioners from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were
also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code
I: W/N Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since
the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.
H: One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable
cause.
Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private
person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and
(2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months
during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds
to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia"
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued
against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the
Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons,
therefore, has become legal.
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity
attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.
#denied

People v Aminnudin
F: The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of
illegally transporting marijuana. The PC officers had received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana
leaves took him to their headquarters.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when
they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from
a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause.
I: W/N THE SEARCH CAN BE JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST
H: It is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin
who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed.
he search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
#granted

People v Burgos
F: Through the testimony of Pat. Bioco, and Sgt. Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the
Constabulary and INP units, one Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA at a seminar.
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm. Accused
denied but wife said it was buried in the ground.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a
stock pile away from his house.
I: Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful?
H: The Trial Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an
urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
(rule a = in flagrante delicto) Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
(rule b = crime just committed) In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect
that the accused had committed a crime.
The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein it has been held that: As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Obiter na wow: The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged
subversive documents were hidden. Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to
the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during
the custodial interrogation.
#acquitted

Umil v Ramos
F:8 petitions for habeas corups. The respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available
to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons
detained have not been illegally arrested.
1. Umil and Villanueva charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and double murder. Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers was found in a hospital and transferred to the medical
facilities of CAPCOM