ASSESSING THE RISK

OF BIOTERRORISM AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR
DUAL-USE RESEARCH
Panel 7: Potential Risks of GOF
Research II: Biosecurity
Symposium on Potential Risks and
Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research
National Academies of Science
Washington, DC
December 15, 2014
1

THE BEGINNING OF BIOTERRORISM RISK

ASSESSMENT

Tokyo subway
sarin attack
(March 20, 1995)

Oklahoma City
bombing
(April 19, 1995)

Larry Wayne
Harris arrested
(May 12, 1995)
2

WHAT IS RISK?
Risk=
Threat (Capability x Intent)
x
Vulnerability
x
Consequence (Hazard-Countermeasures)

FRAMING THE DEBATE ON

BIOTERRORISM

Optimists
Pessimists
Pragmatists

THE OPTIMIST PERSPECTIVE

2003 ricin threat letter

Lack of Past Use

Terrorist
Conservatism
Role of Norms
High Technical
Hurdles
Importance of
Tacit Knowledge

THE PESSIMIST PERSPECTIVE

Increasing
Lethality
Terrorist
Innovation
Role of Religion
Diffusion and
Deskilling of S&T
Emphasis on
Vulnerabilities and
Consequences

THE PRAGMATIST PERSPECTIVE

Intersection of
Capability and Intent
Will be Rare

Importance of
Organizational,
Ideational,
Sociotechnical, and
Material Conditions

Small-Scale Attacks
are Feasible
7

IMPLICATIONS FOR DUAL USE RESEARCH

OVERSIGHT

Level of Demand by Terrorists

Ease of Translating Research into
Product
Weighting Benefits Versus Risks
8