Structural Blast Design By Tamar S. Kieval BSS. in Civil Engineering ‘Washington University in St. Lowis, 2002 Submitted tothe Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements forthe Degree of Master of Engineering in Civil and Environmental Engineering atthe “Massachusets Institute of Technology TSETERS ‘ reenauoer JUN 07 2004 LIBRARIES, Sune 2004 © Tamar S. Kieval, All rights reserved. ‘The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in par. Signature of Author: Departmey?of Cini ghd Envirogiental Engineenng May 7, 2004 erie: iC Top = ey ! and Enron! Engng "hes Sepa mal Tea Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering (Chairman, Committee of Graduate Stents AitHivesStructural Blast Design ty ‘Tamar. Kieval ‘Submitted tothe Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering on May 7, 2004 in Partial Fulfillment ‘of the Requirements fr the Degree of Master of Engineering ‘in Civil and Environmental Engineering. ABSTRACT Blast design is a necessary part of design for more buildings in the United States. Blast design is no longer limited to underground shelters and sensitive military sites, ‘buildings used by the general public daily must also have satisfactory blast protection Integrating blast design into existing norms for structural design is a challenge but itis achievable, By looking tthe experience of structural designers in Israel over the past several decades itis possible to see successful integration of blast design into mainstream buildings. Israel's design techniques and policies can be used as a paradigm forthe United States, A structural design fora performing arts centr is analyzed within the context of blast design. Improvements in the design for blast protection are suggested, These design improvements include camouflaging the structural system, using blast resistant lass, reinforced concrete, and hardening of entical structural members, is shown that integration of blast design into modern mainstream structures is achievable. New techniques and creative problem solving must be used to adapt blast, design to work alongside current design trends, “Thesis Supervisor: Jerome J. Connor Title: Professor of Civil and Envivonmental Engineeringable of Contents le Page Abstract. List of Figures 1. Introduction 2, Israel as a Case Study and Paradigm 3, Design Principles for Protection of Stwotues, Preventative Measures.. Hardening ofthe Structure. Preventing Progressive Structural Collapse. 4, Structural Response to Blast Loading, Blast Characteristics and Behavior Structural Response Positive Phase Duration versus Natural Period. Response Limits. SDOF System. 5. Connor Center for the Performing Arts Blast Analysis and Design Introduction Background, Blast Analysis. Preventative Measures. Hardening. Progressive Collapse Analysis Blast Design Preventative Measures Hardening. Progressive Collapse Prevention 6. Conclusion References,List of Figures Figure 21, Entrance to an underground shelter in Israel Figure 2.2. Sholter used asa playroom, Figure 23. Shelter used asa playroom. Figure 24. The change from underground shelters to protected spaces Figure 25, Example of Israeli structural blast design Figure 26, example of Israeli structural blast design Figure 2.7. Example of traditional American structural blast design Figure 4.1. Schematic of a blast. Figure 4.2. Blast wave parameters Figure 43, Blast wave pressure-time profile Figure 48, Response of system forall three regions. Figure 45. SDOF free body diagram, Figure 5. Curent Flet Pavilion Figure 5.2. Site layout for CPA, Figure 53. Site rendering for CCPA. Figure 54. Aluminum shell design, Figure 55. Rib structural system Figure 56. Interior design Figure 5.7. Aluminum roof design Figure 5.8, Axial load in undamaged exterior shel! Figure 5. Deformation of shell with front columns removed, Figure 5.10. Deformation of shel with front cross beams removed... Figure 5.11. Axial load in interior system. Figure 5.12. Moment in interior system, Figure 5:13. Deformation of structure after removal of interior columns Figure 5.14. Deformation of structure after removal of many interior members1. Introduction Structural blast design is the design af strictures to withstand loading due to explosions “This includes the protection of the building's srucural integrity as well a the protection ‘of people and equipment inside the building. Explsions that need tobe designed tor can ‘come from many different sources. These sources include but are not limited to nuclear devices, gas explosions, high explosive bombs, vehicle hombs, package bombs, and missiles (Smith and Hetherington, 1994), Some of these explosions canbe accidental, but the majority are intentionally detonated to cause human and material damage, For all ‘ofthese cases it is impossible to predict when o fa building would be subjected to such a oading. I this paper I wil be focusing on blast loading due to close range explosives such as vehicle hombs and other forms oftronstatvity Blast design is bocoming a necessary part of design for more buildings inthe Unite States. As erorsm is becoming more widespread throughout the world building ‘design must adapt to protet people as wells possible. Inthe past shelters were ‘designed under the assumption that people would have enough time to be evacuated from the building they were in and reach the shelter. In situations suchas teronst attacks \where there is no warning time, shelters must be integrated into the building itself. Blast design sno longer limited to underground shelters and sensitive military sites. People must now be protected From explosions on a day to day bass As blast design sintered into mainstream constuction it will have 1 coexist ‘with ther components that influence a building's design such as architecture and ‘economics. Modern architecture is developing in the direction of light, graceful structures, with extensive esteriorplaving. These architectural rends make buildingseven more dangerous in the event of an explosion, Many ofthe injures sustained hy the occupants of «busing during an explosion are duc to glas fragments and fying debris (Eytan, 2004), In many cases this cam he more ofa thet to te people then the actual explosion, If the architectural design fora building calls forextensive glazing laminated orblst resistant lass must he used. Architects should also keep several guidelines ‘mind while designing a building, The cladding system of a building should be designed so that the fixings are easily accesible so that it canbe easily inspected and fixed after an explosion, In addition architects should avoid design 1 Facade with dep indentations because it provides places for concealing explosive devices, and also the indentations can ‘magnify blast effets by reflecting the pressure wave off ofthe many surfaces (Mays and Sith, 1995). All ofthese considerations in design increase the cost ofa building, Just lke with seismic design, a building’ risk as well as its desired state after an event must be analyzed and an appropriate level of protection forthe building must be determined, The building owner must device what stat the building shouldbe in after an attack, whether ‘he building shouldbe usable after the attack or jst repairable. Then based on how much money the owner is willing to invest in protection ofthe building, he must decide what kind of protective design should be sed (Mays and Smit, 1995), This added protection in design docs add cost to building project, but nthe end st could save building owners Alot of money,2. Israel as a Case Study and Paradigm (Over the course of is history Ire has alapted military blast design o blast design to > ‘used a8 @ par of civilian structures. Israel's methods for inte ating blast protection ints tts society can be used as an example forthe rest ofthe world as its increasingly subjected to more security threats, When the state was founded in 1948, Israel had already constructed unde! shelters across the country (see Figure 2.1). Underground shelters were the fist forms of civilian blast protection because “one of the most effective methods of providing pretection fora structure is to ury it (Smith and Hetherington, 1994)". Underground bomb shelters do have some benefits they are generally larger than what could be previded for inside ofa building so they are more comfortable fr lng periods of time In addition, when the shelters were not in use they could he used for recreational purposes (Einstein, 2003). Many shelters were tured into libraries and meeting places for youth groups (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). These underground shelters became a part cf cet, rae nan nero ternigre 22. Shor wed a a play Front Command. 2008), Ise Home Figure? 3. Sher used as playroom {sat Home From Command, 200. In the 1970's civilians in Israet were being threatened along its border with Lebanon, Katusha rockets were being unc red over the Lebanese border into the Israel cites on the other side, and Israel needed to provide its citizens with protection from the attcks. Throughout northern Israel rooms designed to protect a building's inhabitants from an explosion were included in most homes as well 3s schools and public build(Sunder, 2003). This was the beginning of the transition from underground shelters separate from buildings, to shelters integrated into daily structures The biggest change in Israel's policy toward protecting its eitizens care in 1991 with the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein threatened Israel with Scud missiles und this not ‘only inereused the threat due 10 explosions, but it also introduced the strong possibibty of bic-chemical threats. People were now required to have protected spaces within every home, office, and public space (see Figure 2.4 below), ‘The windows had tobe able to be sealed around the edges, and doors would have a wet towel placed atthe bottom. The 00m also had tobe blast proof so that in an attack cracked walls and windows would not allow poisonous gas to seep in Fipure 2.4 The chang from underground shelters to protested spaces (Enstcn, 2003), [New building requirements to have these protected spaces in al ivan strctures, and how to design these spaces were developed and knovn as “Haga repirements (Einstein, 2003), These regulations were fully integrated ita the Israel building code snd continue tobe maintained in ordse to protect rel eivlans. While the regulations being put into the building code was instigated by a need to provideprotection against chemical warfare, the importance of regulating the integration of protected spaces into buildings remains and extends into blast protection Protecting build fom explosions is now an i al part of building's design, Ithas forced Israeli structural engineers to design “out secunty risks while preserving the essence of the design (Einstein, 2003)”. Israel society can not have all of its buildings feel lke concrete fortified structures even if they really are, Figures 25, 2. 6 and 2.7 are examples of Istaei blast designed structures, versus the current blast designed structures in the United States, Fipwe2S. Example of ral structural lat design (Einstein, 2003)Figure 26. Example ofeach sustrallast design Ginstcin. 2009, igre 27. Example of iin Am (Einstein, 2003), structural bls design Since Septemiser 11, 2001 and the destruction of the World Trade Center due to terrorism, it has become apparent that the U.S. must also change its approach to protecting its citizens from explosions. Israel has successfully integrated blast protection ino its society and buildings as a result of years of terror and theeats, By making bast protection a permanent part ofthe building code, professionals have been Forced to come‘up with new ways of designing buiings that protect their inhabitants but stil maintain people's quality of life (insten, 2003). Because of the increased and continuing threat to the United States tis cear that structural engineers here 00 will have to make Bast design an integral part of al structures. The more this mentality is pu into practice the sooner blast design wil be abl coexist with current structural design considerations such as architecture, sustainability, usability, and economics3. Design Principles for Protection of Structures Designing a building to withstand blasts includes more than just hardening the structure ‘A Tot of thought must go into the sian to take into account moe conceptual design aspects such as preventing an atack to begin with, maintaining @ large stand-off distance sncase ofan tach, and designing the bung so that st wall emsin standing inthe ease of localized damage. While discussing the principles of blast design I wll focus on he protection of structures in the event of a close range bomb, most similar to present terrorist activities. This includes explosions duc to suicide bombers near or inside a ‘building, ruck and car bombs near or driven inside a building, and package bombs. 8 and Preventative Measures “The fest step in making a building blast resistant isto try to prevent a terrorist tack from occurring in the first place. This can be accomplished by making a terrovit's {job as difficult as possible. Theres less of a chance of terrorist targeting a building i te foc thatthe chance of success is small (Mays and Smith, 1995). Preventing acess {tothe building isthe fist way to deter @ terrorist. Heavy security as wel as physical barriers can make entering building dificult. Also, if space allows, spreading outa complex makes an effective terrorist attack more dificult 10 execute. A bomb in one location will have fess overall eect on a buling Hal ofthe building's assets ae spread cut (Mays and Smith, 1995), This strategy is only effective for buildings that are not set inthe middle ofthe et and can afford to expand outwards, In addition, sites that couldbe possible terrorist targets such as intllgence or defense buildings shouldbe kept smonymous sf possible (Mays and Smith, 1995) “The next thing to consider is how to disguise the entical parts ofa buikling. Whe ‘energy from a bomb is wasted on an unimportant pat of the building the consequences wt an attack can be much less severe (Mays and Smit, 1995) [tis important to prevent the placement of explosives near sensitive structural members. Ways of accomplishing this Include hiding columns and other important stroctural members, especially near the round floors of a building where the structural members are the most enitical (Eyta 2003), By using tinted glass you can hide the exact structural system from outside viewers as wel (One of the most important principles with blast design i to keep a large stand-off distance between the building ané the potential blast. The strength of a blast deereases in ‘elation to the cube of the stand-off distance from the explosion (Mays and Smith, 1995) refer to chapter 4 for more details), this indicates that as you get father away from the blast the intensity of the peak pressure dies off substantially, Smith and Hetherington lustrate this by saying that, “Keeping vehicle bombs avay from your structure i ‘probably the single, most cost-effective device you can employ Hardening of the Structure “Then next principle mstractral blast design is to harden the structure i the ease that blast does take place. ‘The main way to harden a structure isto design the structure with a lot of ductiity integrated throughout the system. Explosions generate an {enormous umount of enespy and the role ofthe structure's ductility is to absorb thisenergy. As result steel and reinforced concrete are the hest materials to ase in a blast resistant stuctute, Other siuctural concems include how the Tloors are attached tothe rest ofthe structural frame. Floors need to be securely ted tothe frame and be able to ‘withstand stresses i te direction opposite the normal gravity loads (Mays and Smith, 1995). Explosions cause a strong uplift pressue that can dislodge flors from their supports they are not ied securely. Floors many times work asa diaphragm that caries lateral loadin astuctre, a a result if the floor is removed from the rst ofthe structural system progressive collapse can ensue (Mays and Smith, 1995) Gazing isa major concem when hardening a building. Because normal glass a title material it has almost no chance of remaining inact during an explosion Secondary injuries and damages due to shards of pss flying at high speeds through the air can be very severe and are usally very frequent. There are several techniques for {increasing the blast resistance of glazi “These techniques in combination with dynamic design of the stractral frame can greatly increase the performance of glazing in an explosion (Mays and Smith, 1995). These techniques include + Using blast resistant las. + Applying polyester ant-shtter film tothe inside surface ofthe glass + Insaling bomb bast nt curtains inside of the glas Lo prevent the shards from entering the interior ofthe building). + Installing blast cesistant glazing inside the existing exterior glazing (Mays and Smith, 1995).In onde to farther protect the occupants of building itis vmportant to design the building so that itis atleast three bays wide (Mays and Smith, 1995), This provides space so that i the case ofan explosion people can move away Irom the exterior ofa building. Also, the center area of the structure should he designed as & concrete core ‘This concrete cre can be designed asa hardened are that can be used as proected space for the building occupants. In addition tall of these design techniques Eytan has developed a method of hardening structure in ayers. Hardening a stricture in layers i effective because it ‘ensues thatthe failure of one hardening ayer will not lead to the catastrophic failure of the structure de to redundancy ofthe protective systems. The fist hardening layer isthe layer farthest away from the structure. The role ofthis layer i to prevent a teronst's forced entry into a building (ike & vehicle crashing into the building), and to protect the rest ofthe structure fom a large exprosion outside ofthe bung ‘The second layers the envelope ofthe external siruetual system. The role of| this layer isto prevent a terrorists forced entry further into the building. Ht should shield the res of the building fom lying debris and shrapnel from a bomb. In ation, it should protect main structural elements from close range explosions. And, ofcourse it Should farther protect the structure from the pressure wave reated by a bomb outside of the building “The thind layer, isthe layer that protects the iteral structural system, “This layer red to needs to protect the building from all ofthe things that the second layer is desig protect, In addition, this layer must be able to protect the stusture from explosions detonate inside ofthe structurePreventing Progressive Structural Collapse [Afterall ofthese other hardening teiniques are use the most important thing 1 that a building be designe so that progressive structural collapse does not occur in the ease of severe structural damage. As we have seen in events such asthe World Trade Center bombing, as destructive asthe explosion itself was, the greatest damage and los of ie ‘was due to the eventual collapse of the strucre that was asa result of structural damage. Preventing structural collapse is necessary so that as many people as posible can get out ‘ofa building safely after an atack. If progressive collapse occurs it magnifies the effect, of any terrorist event and allows terrorist to accomplish more damage then they ever could on their own. Tete ate several guidelines that shouldbe Kept in mind inorder 10 design a building tobe protected rom structural collapse (Eytan, 2004) + Create many different load paths and redundancies within a structure so that it will not collapse in the case of several columns of ertcal members being damaged or destroyed, + Design floors to withstand reverse loading (as mentioned previously) + Design connections 1 withstand pester loading (as mentioned previously). + Design ertical members, such a lower flor columns to withstand higher bast losing to prevent severe damage to the mos important members + Design critic! meres tobe surrounded by energy absorbing materials or members Some other techniques (developed by Eytan) for protecting columns inside a structure include: using composite material shields around the column with an ait gapbetween the shield and the column, Columns can be designed 10 be part of heavy walls ‘so that they will not experience local failure. ‘The strength ofthe colurnns is improved if they are designed as part of a moment frame where the connections can ry large amount of moment and dissipate alot of energy. Also. columns should be designed to ‘withstand a greater buckling load in case its unsupported length is inereased by damage toadjacent beams, joists, and slabs.4, Structural Response to Blast Loading “When a bomb is detonated, very high pressures are generated which then propagate away from the source. ..When the wave strikes the target, transient load is applied to the structure (Smith and Hetherington)” Blast Characteristics and Behavior ‘When an explosive is detonated an immense amount of energy is generated which causes theexplosive gas to expand forcing the surrounding air out of the space tha st previously ‘ccupied, This produces a layer of compressed air which forms the blast wave. The blast ‘wave contains most ofthe energy generated by the explosion (Smith and Hetherington, 1964) and propagates quickly ina hemispherical form away from the blast site (see Figure 4.1), Fgone 41 Schemti ts lt (Smith a Hetberngtn, 194)A he blasi waveton (a radius Ro), the pressure is Known as the peak state ‘overpressure, ps, this quantity is given by: for p> 10 bar (an for 0.1< ps <10 bar », where Z isthe sealed distance and its given by (43) Here R is the distance from the center ofa blast in meters, and W isthe mass ofthe explosive given in kilograms of TNT. Below, Table 4, lists values that ar used to conven differen types of explosives into hilograms of TNT. The fist range ofp given hove i forthe peak overpressure closer in tothe center ofthe blast, where the second range is for when the peak overpressure is farther away from the center ofthe Mas. (Other equations have also been developed to estimate the peak overpressure. The equations forthe close range tend to very the most because ofthe complexity ofthe gus movement close to the center of the blast (Smith and Hetherington, 1994),Explosive Mavs Specific Energy | TNT Fqnavalens ___ Q.tkike) | (0/0 na) ‘Amato! 80720 (BOT ammonium nitrate 2650 0,586 20% TNT) ‘Compound B (604% RDX. 409% TNT) 5190, Laas RDX (Cyclonite) 5360 Lass HMX. 3080 1256 Lead aride 1540 0340 Mercury fulminate 1790 0.395 Niteoglycerin liquid) 6700 1a81 PETN 5800 1282 Pentolite SO/S0 (50% PETN, 506% TNT) 5110 V9 Terry! 4520 1.000 TT 4520 1.000 orpex (424% RDX, 40% INT, 18 7540 1.667 Aluminum) Blasting gelatin (91% nitroglycerin, 4520 1.000 7.9% nitrocellulose, 0.9% antacid, 0.2% water) 60% Nitroglyeerin dynamite 2710 0.600 “Tale 4.1. Conversion factors fr deen types of explosives afer ‘Sith nd Hetherington 1993) The velocity of the wavefront is known as U, and the maximum dynamic pressure is known as q, (Smith and Hetherington 1994), All ofthese quantities are given by the equations below: (4) 7 Sp (43) Ap. +7P,) 1p, = Ambient air pressure ahead of wave «4, ~The speed of sound in ambient conditionsAnother important quantity wth respect to blast Waves isthe duration of the positive ‘phase... whichis the amount f ine afer an explosion when the pressure is greater than the ambient pressure. This values mportant because i the design process its compared t the natural frequency of building to determine the structures response to the blast. Ts canbe determine from the graph in Figure 4.2 helow where different Wi, the specific impulse ofthe wave, which is the parameters are ploted against Z. area under the pressure-time curve from time ta tothe end of Ts. A typical pressure-tire ‘uve fora blast is shown in Figure 4.3 below. Figue 42. Blast wave ormetrs (Smith and Hetierington, 199,Fewte 4. Blast wave presie tne profile (Smith and Hetheington. 1998) ‘When a blast wave comes in contact witha objet more dense then its original ‘ransmiting medium it refleets off of it. When a blast wave is reflected, the air molecules, that are already compressed, are compressed yet again as they are forced to come to sop tthe solid object. This ests n anew blast wave that as an even ‘veater overpressure than te orginal wave (Smith and Hetherington, 1994). This is why, as mentioned previously, keeping a building’ facade smooth i important when considering blast loading. ‘This behavior also means tht closely spaced ety streets cause “Tunneling effect forthe blast wave, and it wil take a longer distance forthe wave to rcp off than if it was in an open space (Mays and Smith, 1995). For zero incidence he peck reflected pressure, pis given by p(y, (46)where Specific heat ratio (47) “The density ofthe air «and u isthe particle velocity behind the wavetront, given by eG] i. [Equation 4.6 can now be rewritten as: (49) ap | 124. app, ‘Structural Response ‘Two things need tobe considered when determining the response of a structured to blast loading. The behavior ofthe structure when modeled as an elastic dynamic single degree of freedom (SDOF) system, and how 7, he positive phase duration ofthe blast load, relates to T,, the natura perio of the structure (Mays and Smith, 1995), Positive Phase Duration versus Natural Period According to Smith and Hetherington (1994) as well as Mays and Smith (1995) by ‘comparing the positive phase duration of an explosion and the natural pestod of suctre you can categorize how the structure will respond © the los17, substantially longer compare to, then the response ofthe structure can be categorized as quast-sate. The maximum delletion has occurrd long before the force has decayed substantially. In his case the displacement i function ofthe suns and the peak bast load, F 17, is mach shorter than T, then the response can be represented by an impulse loading. In this case the bast has Finished acting before the building has had a chance to deflect at all because most deformation occurs mes ater than When T, i very similar toTy the structure acts dynamically. ‘Tis behavior is similar to how a building is excited by an earthquake that has a penod close to its natural period, In this case the equation of motion ofthe structure must be determined using ‘éynamie analysis. ‘This is discussed ltr in the chapter fora single degre of freedom system, Response Limits ‘A graphical representation of the three response regions discussed above, quasi-static, dynamic, and impulsive, can be developed by determinin the asymptote limits of quasi static loading and dynamic loading (see Figure 4.4 on the following page), For each case the work done on the structure by the loading is equated tot strain energy developed by the deforming structure (Mays and Smith, 1994),Figure 43. Response of stem for all dhe regions (Sth ant Hethergion, 1984. ‘Tre work done on the structure 1s W=Fs, (4.10) ‘The strain energy developed by a structure as it deforms is given by (au (au ere FIK isthe displacement that would occur fF was static load, This results in a ‘ale of 2 forthe upper limit ofthe respons, in this case quasistatic, and can be ploted 1s the upper asymptote (Smith and Hetherington, 1994), Im onder to find the second asymptote, the impulsive asymptote, a different Principle is used. When an impulsive load acts on a structure it causes an instantaneous ‘elit change, and as result the structure takes this kinetic energy and converts ito stmun energy as it deforms (Smith and Hetherington, 1994), The instantaneous velocity hen toa structure by an impulse toads» (3) us M Where |= The impulse generated by the load, given in eqn. 4.18 [As a result the kinetic energy imparted onthe structure by the impulse is (4.14) (4.15) yr shor as F/K (FIKWKM 2 (4.16) ‘Determining these two asymptote allows us to draw the enti response of the structure shown in Figure 44 on the previous page. SDOF System The dynamic response ofa strcture subjected ta blast loading, tobe used when evaluating the dynamic region of a structure's response, can be modeled a a single degree of freedom (SDOF clastic systom subjected 10 an idealized bast load. ‘The blast, oad epresented by a triangular pulse that has the duration T, and a peak force F (Mays and Smith, 1995). This force is given by: -4] G7The impulse enerated by this loading 1s, (4.18) 1 we writ the equation of motion for this system from the free ody diagram shown in Figure 45 below, we ge: Mav ke= FO) (4.19) Where: (M="The mass ofthe structure K = The stiffness of the structure he force applied tothe system, given above in eqn. 4.17 — ecuusaum rosiion Figure 45. SDOF tres hody diagram (Smith and Hetherington, 1998) By solving the differential equation of motion we get the solution F-coser)+ | = E(\-cosea)e (420) where: = YKTATIno to get Xquethe Worst ase displacement forthe structure we differentiate eqn 4.120 yet the velocity equation and then set it equal t0 zero, The maximum displacement will cur when the velocity is zero (Smith and Hetherington, 1994) (20) Here ty i the time at which Nay occurs, and can be solved for from this equation (Smith and Hetherington, 1994)5. Connor Center for the Performing Arts Blast Analysis and Design Introduction In April, 2004 a replacement forte Flect Pavilion in Boston was designed by Michael Chen, Ray Kordah, Krystopher Wodaicki nd me. The replacement is knovn asthe Connor Center for the Performing Ars (CCPA), and when built wil be a large venue for different ats events in the Boston area ‘Tne CCPA will be a high profile structure within Boston, and in adition it will house events that concentrate thousands of people into one lotion atone time, ‘These factors make the building a very possible target for terrorists. tis important too analyze this structure within this context in order to provect the thousands of people who will use this building, as well as the large investment ofthe building owner, Inthe remainder of this chapter, the current design forthe CCPA with respect to blast protection is analyzed ‘sing the design principles discussed previously in chapter 2, and changes inthe design ‘that should be made in order to design this structure to withstand a blast are discussed, Background ‘The current Fleet Pavilion structure (see Figure 5.1 below) is an ope ic amphitheater on ‘the south Boston waterfront that Seats approximately 5,000 people. Itis used mainly for concerts the summertime. ‘The structure itself is fabrc-covered frame that ison top ‘of asphalt, where folding chairs are used as seating for the audience. Our tsk as structural engineers was to designs structure to be used 4s replacement forthe currentstructure, The structure we were 10 design would have t9 be suitable or year ound use have a similar no larger seating capacity, and be 2 unique landmark structure gue $1, Curent Feet Paviton (Chen ea 000 The new design forthe performing arts center isu aluminum shell design (see Figure 5.4 on page 33) please refer to Chen etal. (2004) fora detailed design ofthe steucture, The main structure sis ona man made “island” right off the coast of downtown Boston. The island willbe constructed out of a concrete pad supported by piles in the water. The island will have the main performing ants structure, smaller structure for concessions, an outdoor amphitheater, and two pedestrian bridges to connect the island w the mainland. See Figures 5.2 and 5.3 on the following page forthe layout othe island The mai stucture itself can e broken up into the exterior structural system and the interior structural system which work independently from each other. ‘The extenor system is. shel system made up of a nib skeletal system (see Figure 5.5 on page 83) ccavered by an aluminum shell. The rib system is made up of extruded aluminum pipes. steel perimeter pipe. and steel columns. ‘The system has heen divided up into the008), ieue 52. Sie layout for CCPA (Chen eta Figue 5.8 Site endring for CCPA (Chen ta primary ribs which num transversely across the shell, and the secondary bs which run longitudinally across the shell. The aluminum pipes are made up of several eross sections. The primary ibs have a eross section with a nine inch ameter, The thickness ofthe pipe wall varies from one quarter of an inch fo an inch, depending on where the ribIs located. The pipes nea the Front and hack edges tend to have larger thicknesses The secondary ribs havea eros section with ast inch dhameter nd a wall thickness hat ‘varies fom one quarter ofan inch othe quarters of an inch The aluminum pipe ibs ‘coanect to steel pipe that runs around the perimeter ofthe sell. This pipet nine inches in diameter and has a wall thickness of a half an inch. ee. Figure $4, Aluminum shell design (Chen Figure 55. Ribsractaat system (Chen et seal, 2008) 2008, ‘The interior system isa traditional beam and column design made with steel wide flange members (se Figure 5.6)All of the connections in the structure are designed to e moment carrying connections. Blast Analysis Preventative Measures “The CCPA design has characteristics that help protect it from blasts as well as characterises that make it more vulnerable to blasts. ‘The fact thatthe structure i onan ‘sland is both good and bad with respect oblast protection, Being onan island allows the structure to mainiain a safe stand-off distance from any vehicle that would attempt to approach the stcture. Also, having two pedestrian bridges limits the flow of the people Con to the island and creates a situation where people are more easily monitored. At the same time, being onthe water exposes the structure to bombings fom approaching boats 1Fan explosion were to occur outside ofthe structure the blast would dissipate more auickly and be magnified by nearby buildings less than if the structure was in the mide of the Another drawback to the structure i that he exterior has ery “naked” steuctral system (see Figure 8.7 onthe next page). The modular panel system ofthe aluminum traces out the patter of the intemal ibs and allows outside observers to really see how the structural sytem is Setup. This exposes the strcture to attacks that ean target entical parts of the structural system. The interior isnot as vulnerable to this threat asthe outside is, The interiors very hidden from the outside view and most ofthe beams and columns will be hidden within walls For aesthetic purposes.Figure 57. Aluminum rot design (Chen t 2000, Hardening ‘This structure does not have many characteristics which make it hardened to blast loading. The structure has a substantial amount of glazing on the front and sides ofthe building (see Figure 5.40n page 33), This makes the structure very dangerous in the vent of a blast, Thousands of injures could accur from glass fragments alone. good thing is thatthe ees of the structure is very tile. The entire shel is made out of slurinum and the interior out of tel. This can dissipate fot of energy inthe case of an explosion Progressive Collapse Analysis [A SAP 2000 model ofthe interior and exterior of the building was used inorder to determine whether the structure would collapse in the case of extreme damage to critical structural members ‘The exterior system survived fairly well o damaged members. By analyzing the undamaged exterior structure itis apparent that most of the load is carried by theperimeter heam near the columns and the columns themselves (see Figure $8). The light gray rectangles are the areas ofthe structure that take most ofthe load Frew 58 Axial loadin undamaged exterior sel “This analysis indicates thatthe exterior will he most sensitive to damage along the columns and the perimeter beam. This is due to the fact thatthe shell part ofthe structure Alistributes the load very evenly across the members, Even ifthe shell were to be damaged i has so many redundancies builtin that the loads would just be redistributed and it would emain standing. {A simulation was run where the two main front columns were removed as if damaged in an explosion (see Figure 5.9 on the next page). In this case the maximum Aisplacement was 9M, this occurred where the columns were removed. Besides ths there Wass minimal excessive deformation to the shell. This indicates that the hel oul stil suppor itself even with these members destrayed,Newt the model was run where the thre front cross beams were knocked out This sential because the two Front columns ate approximately 75 fet long without the ‘ross heams,an unbraced length that is very ficult co design for. The results ofthis simulation ae shown in Figure 5.10 on the next page, While the maximum displacement along the stactere is approximately 007 ft, whichis minimal, the columns ae stil supporting too much load for their current unbraced length, Figure $9. Deformation of shall wath ent columns removedFigure $10. Defocation of shel with ont cross beams removed “The interior structural system also survives fairly well with localized damage to ential structural members. This is due tothe numerous members and bays creating structural redundancies and the Fact that the system is broken up into three independent sections. This allows damage in one region to not affect he other regions. Fist, by analyzing the undamaged structure, tis clear thatthe most lod is carrie by the columns under the balcony ateaand the cross beams atthe font ofthe balcony (see Figures $.11 and 5.12),Figue S11, Axial oad ininterior sytem. ite 5.12. Momeni interior ym{A simulation was run where bottom columns underneath the balcony wore removed. ‘The results are shown in Figure 5.13 below. These is maximum deflection of 2 anches and this ozeurs ontop ofthe balcony directly above where the cohumns have been removed. Asal forces in the surtounding remaining columns snerease From about 75 ips to 120 kis, indicating the redistribution of load Fipwe S13, Deformation of structure after removal of ineior cons, ‘The amount of damaged done tothe structure was increased and the mode! was rum again. ‘The results ofthis simulation are shown in Figure 5.14, This time the deformation a the top ofthe balcony is approximately 5 inches while underneath the balcony, where the columns have been removed, the deformation i 7 inches, This me ‘he loads inthe remaining columns go up to 200 kips from their original 75 Kips,Figure 5.14, Deformation of siete after removal of many interior members Bhst Design ‘With the structures current design CCPA is minimally prepared to handle an explosion. “The following are design modifications that I suggest forthe CCPA design. Preventative measures Security checks at all pedestrian bridges leading om to the island to make t more itficult for a eros to get into the building Patrol boats during events to prevent a boat approaching with explosives ‘Video monitoring ofthe underwater piles. The piles under the island ad another <éimension ofthe structure that canbe targeted Design the shell to have a reinforced conerete exterior instead of alumina panels. This will give the look ofa smooth exterior and hide the structural details from outside viewersHardening + Use lastesistant glass or laminated glass fr al ofthe glazing surrounding the facade + Design the extrior shel as first layer of hardening. Because t works independently from the interior system, ithe exterior was damaged! by an ‘explosion the structure would stil have the interior standing. The reinforced ‘conerete fr the shel (as indicated above) can be designed ta dissipate more ‘energy then the current aluminum design would, Progressive Collapse Prevention Due tothe fact thatthe exteriors a shell there ste many redundancies within the structure. If any part of the shell were to be damaged the loads could be quickly redistributed and collapse ofthe exterior would he unlikely. ‘The columns in the font facade are fairly enitical tothe structure, They take a fot ofthe load and are very slender. In adit, they are right behind the glazing snd are hard to hide from outside viewers. ‘These columns need 10 be able to withstand an explosion andthe connections between the beams andthe columns along the glass need tobe designed to disipae a large amount of energy. Is important thatthe beams and columns remain intact because the unsupported length of the front columns is visually impossible to design for, due to buckling, without the cross bears. From the analysis ofthe interior above iis apparent which of the members ofthe interiorsystem are entical. The members inthe area under the balcony are the mast«tical and could eause the most damage to the overall Structure if they were destroyed. {hese critical members should be designed with extra capacity and be able to withstand a blast. In addition they need to be designed for more than twice their normal capaci ‘case of redistribution of loads due to loss of ther members,6. Conclusion “Terrorism isa daily threat that continues to spread throughout the world. Places such as ‘the United States, that have ony had to deal with terrorism on extreme eocasions now hhave to consider terrorism when determining daily policies. These daily policies include the design of most public buildings. Blast design for structures was only used for iiltary and extremely sensitive buildings until now. As a result, structural engineers hhave not had to mesh blast design with other aspects of structural design, Because blast {design was only used for very few, specific buildings it was acceptable for blast protected buildings to look like concrete warehouses. It takes alot of innovation and creative problem solving to design a building that is protected from explosions and is stil aesthetic, economic, and a place that people can live and workin, The only way that structural design inthis country will overcome this challenge is for engineers to realize that this is the reality we are living in and structural design has to adapt. Only wit Practice, lke the Israclis have had, can structural engineers design everyday structures to be safe as well as beautiful and functionalReferences Chen, Michael, Tamar Kieval, Ray Kordahi, and Krystopher Wodicki. The Connor Center for the Performing Arts. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of “Technology, 2008. Einstein, Shuki, Building Theest Midation in a Highly Vulnerable Society. 26 February 2003. 20 April 2008. -chutp: www wpi.edu/Academics/DeptsCEE/News/infrasiucture_secunty files!2.26.ppr> Eytan, R, “Protective Structures in the 21st Century.” Proceedings of the Intemational ‘Symposium on Defense Construction. Singapore, April 2002 Hetherngion,J.G., and P.D. Smith. Blast and Ballistic Loading of Seuctures. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann Lid, 1994, Iseaeli Home Front Command. 29 April 2004 -chuip www id iVoretisitelhelmain.asp> ‘Mays, G.C., and P.D. Smith. Blast Effects on Buildings. London: Thomas Telford Publications, 1995, ‘Sandler, Neal, “Building fora Secure Future.” Engineering News Record. | December 2003. 11 March 2004, hhup:/lenr construction convfeaturesbizlabor/archives!031201e.asp