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Valhalla 08 B Store Slam Tap
Valhalla 08 B Store Slam Tap
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Casing Design
Review of Design Methodology
Contents:
Page:
Summary
1. Project description
10
21
5. Summary of review
30
6. Recommendations
31
Abbreviations
32
References
33
34
Summary:
The design documentation used by BP is reviewed. The casing design manuals are of high
quality.
This report also presents an evaluation of BP methodology for well construction using a well
incident of well 2/8-A5B at Valhall as a case. Severe circulation losses led to pumping of a
gunk pill. This plugged the drill string leading to a shut-in wellhead pressure. A well control
operation stabilized the well, which was eventually sidetracked.
The review found that the casings had sufficient strength in burst and tension and collapse. It
is, however, recommended to consider more realistic design scenario. Severe losses indicate
that a gas filled casing scenario should be appliad rather than a kick margin for burst design.
This will require a higher casing test pressure. Likewise, circulation losses gives more severe
loading than base-oil filled casing for collapse design. However, in the subsequent sidetrack
(A-08 C9 more severe design scenario were used.
The risk worksheet cover normal losses, but does not identify total losses in the reservoir as a
potential risk. A strategy for combating lost circulation in the reservoir should be developed.
The decision to continue to circulate the well after a positive flow check, and the unsuccessful
pumping of a gunk pill should be re-visited, with a view to clarifying what procedures would
be applicable in a future similar situation.
1. Project Description
The objective of the project is to investigate the methodology for casing design for several
operating companies in Norway. The present report focuses on BP. The project will evaluate
the design manuals, the methodology for data collection, the quality and the use of these in
the course of the well design.
The background for the project is that the PSA has observed cases where the casing design
was the limiting factor for the well at several operating companies. Because one expects a
number of HPHT wells in the near future, the design basis each operator uses is identified to
search for improvements.
This project uses a well control incident of well 2/8-A8B as a case to search for
improvements. A review of the operational aspects of the incident has also been performed.
It is implied in these policy statements that the importance of design criteria (pore and frac
pressure) and, the assessment of risk (setting depth-safety margin) are key factors in the
design of a well.
Part 2: Quick Guide contains the following subchapters:
1. Introduction
2. Data needed before design
3. Design summary
4. Casing setting depths
5. Collapse design
6. Burst design
7. Tension design
8. Tri-axial design
9. Buckling and compression
10. Casing wear
11. Temperature
12. Special design cases
13. Reliability
14. Connection selection
15. Materials selection
16. Kick tolerance
This part is a compact reference for well designers familiar with the remainder of the manual.
References are provided to details defined in other chapters. The Quick Guide provides a
good summary. We will not discuss this further, but provide comments to the chapters to
follow.
Part 3: Detailed Manual contains the following subchapters:
1. Introduction
2. Data needed before design
3. Casing design software in BP Amoco
4. Casing setting depth guidelines
5. Collapse design criteria
6. Burst design criteria
7. Tensile design criteria
8. Tri-axial design analysis
9. Buckling and compression design considerations
10. Casing wear
11. Temperature considerations
12. Special design cases
13. Casing design reliability
14. Connections
15. Corrosion
16. Kick tolerance
Part 3 is the major part of the manual and contains a lot of information. Although different
design criteria can be applied, the manual reflects current industry understanding. A few
comments will be tied to certain subchapters.
detail. The second comment about gas(oil) filled casing will be addressed in the discussion of
well A8B later in this report.
Also the burst design chapter discusses the external pressure profiles for burst load design. In
summary, the following conditions are given(our short version of the conditions):
-External pressure equal to pore pressure in cemented intervals.
-External pressure equal to mud mix fluids (i.e. hydrostatic of water for waterbased
mud and hydrostatic of base oil for oil based mud).
-Mud density for short time applications.
The classical back-pressure used in the oil industry is the pressure caused by water. Because
water is the only mobile phase, and particles settles out over time, this very conservative
criterion is used by many operators. However, for critical wells the mud weight is used as a
short time scenario. It should be stated that the back-pressure issue is not fully resolved
throughout the industry.
Subchapter 10 covers casing wear. Their treatment includes practical experience,
experimental tests on casing, tool joints and mud. They also state the well known fact that the
theoretical solutions for wear are not particularly good.
Casing wear reduces the burst and collapse strength of the casing strings. Equations are
presented to perform these calculations. Additional comments that could be included are:
1) Tools that measure casing wear have a given resolution, and may not give a correct
picture, and, 2) in critical wells it may be advisable to pressure test casings if there is
uncertainty about the degree of casing wear.
Subchapter 13 covers casing design reliability. It is interesting to observe the following
statement:
The most important parameter in determining the reliability and success of a
casing design is the pore pressure. This means drilling engineers must work closely
with all supporting groups to determine pore pressure confidence levels and ensure
that all parameters impacting pore pressure predictions have been addressed.
This demonstrates the fundamental coupling between various elements of the well design.
Part 5 presents a design example. This worked example serves well as a guide as many
important elements are included.
2.2 Discussion of BPs Casing and Tubing Design Manual.
The manual is modern and a document of high quality. The manual reflects the understanding
and emphasize the four key parameters:
-the pore pressure
-the fracture pressure
-the density of the formation fluid
11
12
3.2
13
Risk 3610. Loss of circulation during running casing and cementing. Consequences were
indicated as poor zonal isolation behind casing and mitigation was good drilling practices
and Opticem cement job calculation. This does not address total losses while drilling
Risk 3625. Run out of active mud while drilling down the 9 5/8 liner if major losses occur.
The mitigation strategy was to ensure sufficient mud reserves available by storage on boats so
that drilling without returns would be possible. This risk is addressed at the 12 hole
section and, as such, does not cover the 8 hole section. The mitigation strategy certainly
does not seem to have been in place for this incident.
Risk 77. Mud losses penetrating the Tor with drilling string. This again addresses losses in
the 12 section with the mitigating strategy to have a gunk system ready for use. Gunk was
first pumped on this incident about 5 days after losses were seen. Losses did in fact come in
the Tor formation, but not while drilling down the liner, and 62 m below the shoe after the
mud weight had been cut back.
It appears that total losses in the 8 section were not expected/considered as a risk, and a
mitigating strategy had not been considered. Although the internal BP report indicate that the
reservoir drilling risk evaluation identified losses was a risk, and contingency plans made, the
risk worksheet does not confirm this. Although the losses were stopped and a trip to change
the BHA and remove the radioactive source was made successfully, well integrity was not
sufficient, and losses were again induced, finally leading to an influx being taken.
Activities that should be instigated should include investigation into the best total loss
circulation combating strategy, with identification of applicable LCM materials (including
gunk) and combination of same, together with procedures for use of them.
The gain seen during the flow check after the trip to change the BHA was interpreted as
ballooning, which in this case may have been erroneous. In hindsight, a full circulation over
the choke at constant bottom hole pressure would have been advisable to confirm the gain
was, in fact, ballooning. Most well control policies demand the well be shut in if a gain is seen
at a flow check. Due to the loss problem, it is perhaps understandable that circulating over the
choke was not done. This again goes back to evaluation of applicable strategies for combating
loss circulation.
The strategy chosen led to the use of the gunk pill, which was identified as a mitigating
strategy in the 12 section. The result of this action, was possibly the worst possible. The
drill string was blocked during this process, and the losses were not cured. This worsened the
situation significantly. The procedures used in this case need to be investigated and improved
to avoid blocking the drill string, possibly in the form of a best practice procedure to ensure
optimal execution. We are in agreement with the need to focus on both temperature
differences to normal gunk pill jobs on Valhall, and the base fluid type (sea water).
14
Date
Description
Comments
5.12.03
6.12.03
7.12.03
8.12.03
9.12.03
Differential sticking
indications
15
Date
10.12.03
11.12.03
Description
Comments
16
Date
Description
Comments
SIDPP 0
SICP 236 psi
SIDPP 0
SICP 155 psi
Slowly pumped down string
to avoid plugging
DP 0
CP 160 psi
112 bbl/hr
Some rig power problems in
connection with ESD
17
Date
Description
Comments
13.12.03
14.12.03
15.12.03
DP 652 psi
CP 630 psi
Gas peak 25%
SIDPP 475 > 537 psi
SICP 548 -> 605 psi
Gas migration
18
Date
16.12.03
17.12.03
18.12.03
19.12.03
20.12.03
Description
Comments
Bullheaded annulus volume with SW, 60 bbls hivis mud, second annulus volume, 64,5 bbls hi-vis
mud, SW, 30 bbl hi-vis mud, 52.4 bbl LCM pill,
30 bbl hi-vis behind, SW
Squeezed LCM pill in gently in stages
Observed pressure
Allow to build to 1300 psi, bleed back to ca.
1200 psi continually
Allowed pressure to build to 1450 psi, bled off to
1300 psi
Lubricate 15 ppg WBM into annulus
19
TOC at 270 m
20 at 370 m
13 3/8 window at
1296.8/1251 m
9 5/8 TOL
at 2092 m
11 TOL
at 1223.4m
11 liner at
2292/2103 m
9 5/8 liner at
2994/2437 m
Influx
Losses
TD at 3056 m
20
4.
Burst:
Tension:
During drilling:
Lost circulation at max. 9-5/8 setting depth (maximum 2600 mTVD).
Mud weight 15.8 ppg (frac grad. at 13-3/8 shoe)
Mud level drop to 10.5 ppg at bottom, that is to 872 m TVD.
Collapse:
During production:
Collapse at 9-5/8 liner lap. 5.0 ppg inside, 12.5 ppg outside(frac press.
at 20 shoe). Both collapse scenario corrected for wear.
Burst:
P-110 casing.
21
Tension:
During drilling:
Lost circulation at max. 9-5/8 setting depth (maximum 2600 mTVD).
Mud weight 15.8 ppg (frac grad. at 13-3/8 shoe)
Mud level drop to 10.5 ppg at bottom, that is to 872 m TVD.
Collapse:
Burst:
Kick with max frac. Grad at casing shoe equal to 16.4 ppg. Reservoir
fluid density is 5.0 ppg. External pressure equal to pore pressure at 133/8 shoe equal to 10.5 ppg.
Tension:
Inside 5.0 ppg, outside 15.8 ppg mud, plus temperature induced
pressure behind of 2000 psi. Design depth at 13-3/8 shoe at 1360
mTVD, alternatively at 2600 mTVD
Burst:
Tension:
Inside 5.0 ppg, outside 15.8 ppg mud, plus temperature induced
pressure behind of 2000 psi. Design depth at 13-3/8 shoe at 1360
mTVD, alternatively at 2600 mTVD
22
Burst:
Tension:
Inside 5.0 ppg, outside 15.8 ppg mud. Design depth 2800 mTVD.
Burst:
Tension:
The table below summarizes the results of the generic design that gives lowest design factor.
Casing size(in, grade, Depth
ppf):
(mTVD):
20, K55, 94
13-3/8, P110,
13-3/8. N80
11-3/4,
9-5/8, NT95HS, 47
7-5/8, Q125,
7, , 29
5, Q125, 18
Design
factor,
Collapse
1.97
1.10
1.36
1.00
1.26
1.42
1.19
1.56
Design
factor,
Burst
2.64
1.33
1.59
2.49
1.63
2.47
1.63
1.48
Design
factor,
Tension
2.68
2.93
2.54
2.85
1.81
4.37
3.21
4.88
Design
factor,
Coupling:
1.55
1.62
3.27
2.37
3.60
It is observed from the table above that casing collapse is the most critical parameter except
for the 5 in. liner. All safety factors are well above minimum, except for the 11-3/4 in. casing.
For burst design, all strings except the production casing, are based on a limited fracture
gradient. This implies that a kick margin defines the safe pressure levels. Full well integrity
is obtained if the influx to the borehole is less than the kick margin. Reference 7 discusses in
detail the aspects of full or reduced well integrity.
Because of the fracture criterion, the strings are not designed for gas filled casing.
23
NPD PERMIT NR
Casing
Depths
Prognosed
(except 20)
P er Survey revision
2.2.8
RIG
Valhall DP
TOTAL DEP TH
106
TOC ~ 270m
ACP 352 m
SIZE
(in)
20
13-3/8
11-
9-5/8
6-5/8
WT
(ppf)
203 x
94.00
72.00
65.00
53.50
65.8
GRADE
CONNECTION
TYPE
Buttress
ID
(inches)
Drift ID
K-55
P-110
Q-125
Q-125/C-95
Q-125
New Vam
H-SLX / H-511
H-523
Hydril MAC - II
12.347
10.682
8.535
4.375
12.25
10.625
8.50
4.250
11 TOL @ 1270 m MD
13 3/8 window 1300 m MD, 1270 m TVD
13-3/8 casing is preset
Note: Error in Table above. 13-3/8 csg. is N80 quality , not P110.
After the well control incident, BP performed a casing design evaluation for well 2/8 A8B,
which is given reference 10.
In the following the main criteria from ref. 10 will be listed.
24
Burst:
Lost returns filling up annulus with base oil, and cementing phase.
Burst:
Pressure tested to 900 psi, with a 14.6 ppg mud. While setting the liner
hanger the casing was subjected to 2800 psi over 2 minutes.
Tension:
100 000lbs over pull, pre- and post-cementing static loads, running in
hole loads and service loads.
Lost returns filling up annulus with base oil, and cementing phase.
Burst:
Pressure tested to 2500 psi, with 14.6 ppg mud.(Equivalent to 4500 psi
surface pressure).
Tension:
100 000lbs over pull, pre- and post-cementing static loads, running in
hole loads and service loads.
25
We assume that the well is completely gas filled. It is difficult to determine the actual pore
pressure from the documentation received, as the reservoir is depleted to a low pressure.
However, the overburden just above the reservoir has a pore pressure gradient of about 14 ppg
at 2400 mTVD (ref. 11). If we assume that this formation has a kick potential (permeability),
the following parameters are used:
Depth:
Reservoir pressure grad:
Reservoir fluid density:
Density behind casings:
2400 mTVD
14 ppg (1.68 s.g.)
5.0 ppg (0.60 s.g.)
8.6 ppg (1.03 s.g.)
Reservoir pressure:
0.098 x 1.68 x 2400 = 395 bar
Weight of reservoir fluid:
0.098 x 0.6 x 2400 = 141 bar
Surface pressure if shut-in gas-filled casing:
395 141 = 254 bar = 3683 psi
At surface, there is no back pressure. Worst case scenario is therefore that the 13-3/8 in. casing is
exposed to the surface pressure above. The burst strength of the casing is 510 bar.
Worst case burst design factor, 13-3/8 in. P110, 72 lbs/ft casing:
510
= 2.01
254
If we assume that the reservoir fluid is nearly weightless gas, the design factor would become:
510
= 1.29
395
which exceeds a minimum requirement of 1.10. In Appendix A this calculation is also
performed for a fully 3-dimensional design. The result of this calculation is a design factor of
2.17, exceeding the minimum requirement of 1.25 for 3-D.
The top of the exposed 11-3/4 in. Q125 65 lbs/ft casing is at 1296 mTVD. Repeating the
computation for this casing:
Weight of reservoir fluid to 1296 mTVD:
0.098 x 0.6 x (2400 - 1296) = 65 bar
Pressure at 1296 m if shut-in gas-filled casing:
395 - 65 = 330 bar
With a wellhead elevation of 40 m above the sea level, the back pressure becomes:
0.098 x 1.03 x (1296 - 40) = 127 bar
The burst load is:
330 - 127 = 203 bar
The burst strength of the casing is 685 bar.
Worst case burst design factor, 11-3/4 in. casing:
26
685
= 3.37
203
For completeness, this evaluation is also performed for the 9-5/8 in. Q125 53,5 lbs/ft
production casing which starts at 2292 mTVD.
Weight of reservoir fluid to 2292 mTVD:
0.098 x 0.6 x (2400 - 2292) = 6.4 bar
Pressure at 2292 m if shut-in gas-filled casing:
395 6.4 = 388.6 bar
Assuming a wellhead elevation of 40 m above the sea level, the back pressure becomes:
0.098 x 1.03 x (2292 - 40) = 227.3 bar
The burst load is:
388.6 227.3 = 161.3 bar
The burst strength of the casing is 854 bar.
Worst case burst design factor, 9-5/8 in. casing:
854
= 35.29
161.3
Below is a comparison between the two design approaches:
Casing, BP limited kick Worst case, gas
in:
margin:
filled casing:
13-3/8
2.11
2.0/1.29*
11-3/4
2.48
3.37
9-5/8
2.15
5.29
Table 3.1.: Comparison of burst design factors,
not corrected for wear.
*Assuming weightless gas
The exposed 13-3/8 in casing has highest load. All design factors are considerable higher
than the minimum requirements The well has sufficient burst resistance. Please observe that
the reason for difference in design factors is different design assumptions. This will be
further discussed in the following.
Casing test pressure.
Assumes virgin pore pressure, the wellhead pressure would be 4680 psi. However, the field
is depleted. According to ref. 11, the expected pressure in the Tor formation was 2760 psi at
reservoir level. This leads to a surface pressure of:
2760 2552 = 218 psi assuming reservoir fluid of 0.6 s.g. density or:
2760 psi assuming methane (weightless) gas
The well control incident measured a casing pressure of 1900 psi, as opposed to the test
pressure of 1500 psi. The casing should have been tested to a higher pressure for three
27
reasons: 1) there is uncertainty about the pore pressure. The reservoir is highly depleted, but
it is uncertain if a formation above has sufficient permeability to produce a kick, and 2) it is
uncertain what density this formation fluid has. For future wells methane gas may be
assumed as it is the gas with lowest density, and 3) a gas filled casing scenario probably
applies rather than the limited kick size used.
We will not define an exact test pressure in this report, but it should for future wells exceed
1900 psi. BP should base the on analysis on realistic scenarios.
Collapse design:
The basic design criterion from ref. 10 is lost returns filling up annulus with base oil. A more
severe, but realistic scenario is lost returns with 14.6 ppg mud in the hole. Assuming that the
annulus level stabilizes at a bottom-hole-pressure equal to normal pore pressure, the depth of
the annulus fluid level becomes:
0.098 x 1.03 x (2495 - 40) = 0.098 x 1.75 x (2495 H)
H = 1445 m
This is near the shoe of the 13-3/8 in. casing. We will perform a collapse evaluation at this position.
The well is empty (zero inside pressure) down to this depth. Assume that the back-pressure is caused
by 13.3 ppg (1.60 s.g.) mud, as used by ref. 10. The collapse load then becomes:
0.098 x 1.6 x 1445 = 226 bar
With a collapse rating of 323 bar, the design factor in collapse for the 11-3/4 in casing becomes:
323
= 1.43
226
Wear and bi-axial derating is not included in the calculation above.
Ref. 10 operates with a design factor of 2.03 in collapse. The discrepancy is caused by their
assumption of a base-oil-filled casing. It appears that this condition is not creating the most
severe collapse loading.
The casing back-pressure is the most important factor for the low design factor above. The
two extreme conditions are (from ref. 7):
-A short time scenario using mud weight above the cemented interval.
-A long time scenario assuming that particles settles out leaving only water as the
mobile phase creating pressure.
There is not yet full consensus in the oil industry about the application of these criteria. For
the above analysis we will conclude that the well have not been exposed to a loading
exceeding the collapse strength of the casing.
It has been difficult to determine the bottom-hole pressures when circulation losses arose. It
is possible that a sub-normal loss pressure exists due to reservoir depletion. The above
collapse calculation would become more critical for this case.
28
4.4
Summary of incident
The well is designed with a tie-back production casing. This was not in place during the well
control incident, so both the 13-3/8 in, the 11-3/4 in and the 9-5/8 in casing string were
simultaneously exposed to the reservoir pressure.
Each of the two largest casings were designed for the drilling phase, and not for reservoir
penetration.
The well was not designed for full a gas filled casing scenario, but for a reduced integrity case
with the casing shoe fracture pressure as the weak point in the well. However, the casing
strings used are of sufficient strength.
This brings up a general problem. If we assume a kick entering the well at the bottom, we can
base the design on circulating this out. This implies a pressure distribution throughout the
well caused by the pore pressure, the gas column and the mud column on top. If we on the
other hand assume completely gas filled well, a totally different pressure distribution arise,
with a surface pressure equal to the pore pressure minus the weight of the gas column. In the
present case it appears that BP based the design on a limited gas kick, whereas the kick
control incident approached a gas filled casing scenario. Please also note BPs philosophy as
quoted on page 7 in this report.
The well was designed for drilling with a casing test pressure of 1500 psi. However, during
the well control incident a surface pressure of 1900 psi was recorded. Clearly, the well was
not exposed to a limited gas kick situation. For future wells gas filled casing should be
considered.
The collapse evaluation was based on a base-oil filled casing. Circulation loss with drop in
fluid level is in some instances a more severe
29
5. Summary of review
The review concludes that BPs casing design manual is a document of high quality. It
addresses the many factors of importance for a good well design.
The lost circulation/kick problem of well 2/8-A8B has also been reviewed. The following
conclusions came out of this investigation:
-The 13-3/8 in. casing was the weakest exposed casing string. It was sufficiently
strong for burst and collapse.
-The well section was designed for a limited gas kick scenario. However, due to
circulation losses, a gas filled casing may be a more realistic scenario. This will
require a casing test pressure exceeding 1900 psi. (1500 psi was used).
-There is uncertainty about the depth of the kick, the pore pressure and the fluid
density. A revised analysis of this and a risk analysis is required to determine the
magnitude of the casing test pressure.
-The assumption of base oil filled annulus may not be the most severe collapse
scenario. Circulation losses with drop in fluid level is in some instances more severe
than base oil filled annulus and should be considered as a design criterion.
-Risk evaluation of the incident appears to be incomplete. It should also include the
risk of losses in the Tor formation.
-After a positive flow check, the well was circulated with an open well. This
procedure should be clarified.
-Well design of the particular well is missing, as BP uses a common design used
many well.
The contingency solution for lost circulation should be reviewed.
Operational procedures for setting the gunk pill should be evaluated.
30
6. Recommendations
It is recommended to perform a casing design for each well, and to accurately address
changes in design conditions.
The increasing reservoir pressure depletion, and also the subsidence, increase the likelihood
of lost circulation during drilling. For this reason BP may consider a stronger burst criterion,
that is designing for full gas filled casing instead of assuming a maximum kick margin. It is
advisable that all reservoir penetration is designed for gas filled casing as this scenario is
realistic during production of the well. Furthermore, loss zones, formation pressures and
formation fluid densities should be reviewed to obtain improved design conditions for future
wells. The results of this evaluation will define the required casing test pressures.
In the event of considering circulation losses as a future challenge, it is recommended to
initiate a separate program to handle these. One example of such a program is to set up a task
force to follow up all operations. This group may measure mud properties systematically
before, during and after the loss events to derive a data base. In this way the drilling fluids can
be tailored to Valhall. Such a program can be developed using Stavanger Universitys
unique fracturing lab.
Risk evaluation should include lost circulation potential in the Tor formation. It is advisable
to develop a strategy for use of gunk material and LCM, and also a best practice document
to help ensure efficient lost circulation procedures.
31
Abbreviations
BOP
BHA
BU
CP
DP
ECD
FCP
FIT
ICP
LCM
LOT
LWD
MD
M/U
MT
OBM
POOH
P/U
PBR
R/T
RIH
RT
RWC
ROP
SW
SICP
SIDPP
TD
TRSCSSSV
TVD
W&W
WL
WBM
32
References
1. BPA-D-001 BP Drilling and Well Operations Policy
2. BPA-D-002 Well Control Manual
3. BPA-D-003 Casing Design Manual
4. BPA-D-004 Directional Survey Handbook
5. BPA-D-005 Offshore Site Investigation Manual
6. B.S.Aadny (1990): Inversion Technique to Determine the In-Situ Stress Field from
Fracturing Data. Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, (1990); 127-141.
7. Modern Well Design by B. S. Aadny. A.A.Balkema Publishers Rotterdam/Brookfield,
1996, ISBN 90 5410 633 6.
8. Valhall A-8 B Investigation of Lost Circulation and Wellcontrol Incident. Internal BP
report of 01.02.04, rev.1 of 17.03.04. Authors: E.Braune/S.Samuelsen.
9. Valhall General Drilling Plan, DRL-M-002: 6.0 Casing Design. Amoco Document of
09/23/98.
10. Valhall well A-08B Casing Evaluation. T.J. Tjstheim 06.02.2004.
11. Valhall Field Well 2/8-A-8 B Drilling Program. Date: 1/23-2004.
33
34
Casing Wizard
Well Experts
Casing Wizard
Select units of input data
Metric units (default)
Oilfield units
Design parameters*
Formation depth
Casing shoe depth
Casing top depth
Depth to seabed
Depth to sealevel
Depth to top of cement
Formation pressure gradient
Formation/influx fluid density
Mud density
Cement density
Density behind casing
Bouancy factor
2400,0 m
1251,0 m
0,0 m
m
40,0 m
m
1,68 s.g.
0,6 s.g.
s.g.
s.g.
1,03 s.g.
0,87
7874,0 ft
4104,3 ft
0,0 ft
ft
131,2 ft
ft
14,0 ppg
5,0 ppg
ppg
ppg
8,6 ppg
0,87
Casing data**
Casing OD
Casing ID
Specific weight
Crossectional area
Wall thickness (API)
OD-thickness ratio (API)
Geometry factor, (API)
Yield strength
Burst strength
Collapse resistance
Pipe body yield strength
33,97
31,36
107,20
133,92
1,14
29,75
15,39
7584,24
510
199,3
1,016
cm
cm
kg/m
cm2
cm
bar
bar
bar
kdaN
13,37
12,35
71,97
20,76
0,45
29,75
15,39
110000
7396,92
2890
2284
inch
inch
ppf
inch2
inch
psi
psi
psi
klbf
** Note that a API 12.5% reduced wall thickness is applied for 3D analysis
395,1
254,0
126,3
0
114,2
852,7
0,1459
0,5155
2,17
2,17
2,01
2,01
bar
bar
bar
bar
kdaN
bar
5731,0
3684,2
1831,5
0
256702
12367
0,1459
0,5155
psi
psi
psi
psi
klbf
psi