V.

Judicial Department

A. Concepts
1. Judicial power
*The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect
to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. - The City of Manila vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, et
al., G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014. FC#95
2. Judicial review
Judicial review; review of executive policy. Petitioner here seeks judicial review of a
question of Executive policy, which the Court ruled is outside its jurisdiction. Despite the
definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is
not within the province of courts. Such determination belongs exclusively to the Executive
branch. Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, et al., G.R. No. 188296. May 30, 2011. FC
*To doubt is to sustain. The constitutionality of a law will be sustained if the issue can be
determined without having to decide its validity. - Mirasol vs. CA, G.R. No. 128448,
February 1, 2001. cd
*Justiciable question A definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. - Cutaran vs. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001. FC
*Justiciability Requirements:
#1. That there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute;
#2. That the interests of the parties be adverse;
#3. That the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power;
and

#4. That the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the
complainant. - Justice Nachura, Separate Opinion, De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No.
191002, March 17, 2010. CD
a) Operative fact doctrine
*Declaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact. An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact is
an exception this rule. It applies as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects
of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that
cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. The doctrine cannot be
applied to this case, as to hold otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner who was illegally
dismissed from employment and would allow his employer to profit from a violation of an
unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management and
Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532. May 30, 2011 FC
*Under this dictrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter
of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission
that the law is unconstitutional.
In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact
doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or
executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the
executive branch which were later nullified. - Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011. CD
b) Moot questions
*An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead, as when subsequent events
have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. - Gonzales vs.
Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000. CD
c) Political question doctrine
*political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if
an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary
action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to
be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,
"[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments

on the one question. - Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. G.R. No. 157584, April
2, 2009. CD
B. Safeguards of Judicial independence
*Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that
individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the
judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free
of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the
Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct
concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional
independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political or popular
influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand,
institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence
refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body."
xxx
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge
and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints
of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to
hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his
personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial
independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government
and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are
preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is
maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this
confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. Recognizing the vital
role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial
power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution
provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and
maintained.
#1. The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a
law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary;
#2. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and
#3. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as
exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
#4. The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting
any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and

#5. The Constitution ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office." With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by
any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by
their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when
and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and
court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the
terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG
Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any
kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme
Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
- Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012. NONE
C. Judicial restraint
*Judicial Restraint A theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges to limit the
exercise of their own power in certain cases.
As a judicial stance, it is anchored on a heightened regard for democracy. Deference
to the majority rule constitutes the flagship argument of judicial restraint which
emphasizes that in democratic governance, majority rule is a necessity principle. It nudges
the judge who considers democracy as an intrinsic and fundamental value to grant that the
discretion of the legislature is large and that he cannot correct any act or enactment that
comes before the court solely because it is believed to be unwise. Adherents of judicial
restraint warn that under certain circumstances, the active use of judicial review has a
detrimental effect on the capacity of the democratic system to function effectively. - Justice
Puno, concurring and dissenting opinion, Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003. FC
D. Appointments to the Judiciary
*The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the
JBC. - De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.
Francisco Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013. CDThe 1987 Constitution allows only one (1) member of a bicameral Congress to sit in the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). This, according to the Supreme Court in a majority
decision penned by J. Mendoza and promulgated last April 16, 2013, was the intention of

the framers of the Constitution who conceived of the JBC as an independent body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process to recommend
nominees to the President in order to rid such process of partisan political activities, and
carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.

The majority cannot accede to the argument of respondents that allowing only one
representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral
nature, and that the failure of the framers to make the proper textual adjustment where
there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight. According to the
majority, every language in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
and that in opting to use the singular letter a to describe representative of Congress, the
Filipino people through the framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat
in the JBC. There could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of the provision
since the other provisions of the 1987 Constitution were amended accordingly with the
shift to a bicameral legislative body (e.g., Sections 4, 8 and 18 of Article VII where
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted
upon by the two Houses of Congress), and this Court has no power to add another member
by judicial construction.
According to the majority, it is clear that the framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in the JBC because (i) it was not in the exercise
of its primary function to legislate, considering that the JBC was created to support the
executive power to appoint and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function, and (ii) there was no need to recognize the dichotomy
of each House and to consider the interplay between the two Houses in their participation
in the JBC because there is no interaction required between these two Houses in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Thus, in providing for the membership of the
JBC, the framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the
interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
And the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice versa is misplaced because any member of Congress is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.
The majority went on to cite various authorities who, having perused the records of the
Constitutional Commission, are of the view that to allow Congress to have two
representatives with one vote each is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government, the interpretation of two votes for Congress would give Congress
more influence in the appointment of judges and would also increase the number of JBC
members to eight, which could lead to a voting deadlock and is a clear violation of the seven
enumerated members in the Constitution, and no parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative and
constituent powers under the Constitution while the latter justifies the separateness of
the two Houses as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.

E. Supreme Court

*Primus Inter Pares (first among equals) The Latin maxim indicates that a person is the
most senior of a group of people sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used
to describe the status, condition or role of the Chief Justice in many supreme courts
around the world. - (De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, Carpio-Morales,
J. Dissenting Opinion)
*Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from occurrence
thereof. - The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby,
section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The
failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. - De Castro
vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.
1. En banc and division cases
*It bears stressing that where, as in the present case, the Court En Banc entertains a case
for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that
the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be
concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was
merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its
actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the
action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of
this highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in
interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and
Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of
law be observed.
While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its Divisions,
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone and concededly recognized that "[t]he
only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either
rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en
banc." - David Lu vs. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 153690, February 15, 2011. FC
2. Procedural rule-making
*The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.
This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary
of Justice17 that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress":
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. x x x x

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to
rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its
Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges
or dues of all kinds." Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court
described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as
"one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence":
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts
exclusive domain. - Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO), etc.
vs. Hon. Iluminada Cabato-Cortes, Executive Judge, RTC, Baguio City, G.R. No. 165922,
February 26, 2010. FC
3. Administrative supervision over lower courts
*The ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against a judge; he must first indorse the case to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action. - Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124925,
October 23, 2001. FC
*Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded
by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of
X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.
The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the
sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision. - Dela Pea, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177828,
February 13, 2009. FC
4. Original and appellate jurisdiction
*Section 4(7), Article VII provides that the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. - Tecson vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004. CD

*It is well settled that the jurisdiction to try a case is to be determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
Consonant with this principle, the time of commission is not material to determining which
court has jurisdiction. It stands to reason that administrative jurisdiction over petitioner
belongs to the Supreme Court, the action having been instituted by the CSC at the time
when petitioner was already a judicial employee. - Ampong vs. CSC, G.R. No. 167916,
August 26, 2008. FC
*Contempt Powers
*Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during
litigation. - Inonog vs. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009. FC
a.) Direct contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so. - Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court.
b.) Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not commited in the presence of the
court. It is the failure to do something ordered done by the court or judge, such as
failure to appear at a hearing or in the use of disrespectful language in a pleading. A
direct contempt may be punished summarily while an indirect contempt can be
punished only after charge and hearing. - Zarate vs. Balderian, A.M. No. MTJ-001261, March 31, 2000. FC
*The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the
power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. - Inonog vs. Judge Ibay,
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.
F. Judicial privilege
*Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with it
the license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?
In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral
made in the course of judicial proceedings are classified as absolutely privileged
communications. However, this doctrine applies only in such cases where the
statement is relevant or pertinent or material to the case. In this respect,
respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or relevance of such
statement like " Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of our
judicial system had, in fact confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of judges, after
the judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped
conversation both actual and/or by telephone" in the appealed case involving
recovery of property and cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact is relevant,
why did the respondents make such fact known to the Court of Appeals only when
the appealed case has already been submitted for decision. Respondents timing
makes their claim of good intention a doubtful claim. It seems that the real intention

is to influence the Court of Appeals in an improper way. - Johnny K.H. Uy vs. Atty.
Depasucat, et al., A.C. No. 5332, July 29, 2003.