Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies ‘Thomas Risse-Kappen World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Tul., 1991), pp. 479-512 Stable URL: bhtp:flinks,jstor-org/sici?sici~0043-887 128 1991079294343 A4%3C479%3 APODS AP%3E2.0,CO%3B2-6 World Potiics is curcently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding aay Fuster use ofthis work, Publisher contact information ray he abained at fpr jstoronpournalihupAti. Each copy of any part ofa JSTOR transenission must contain the same copyright tice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission, ISTOR isan independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive ot scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact suppom@jstor org. hup:thvwwjstor.orgy ‘Mon May 15 06:06:58 2006PUBLIC OPINION, DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, AND FOREIGN POLICY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES By THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN* ‘OW is it co be explained that similarly powerful states more often chan not respond differently (o the same international conditions and constraints? Bfforts to answer this question lead inevitably to the study of the domestic sources of foreign policy and international politics. One issue, though, is rarely addressed by the available literature: Who is in charge of the forcign policy-making process in liberal democratic states? Elites or masses? Who influences whom? What is the policy im- pact of societal actors and public opinion? Ace public attitudes on foreign affairs manipulated by the elices? Finally, if public attitudes follow sim- ilar patterns, what accounts for differences between various countries ia the policy impact of public opinion? ‘This paper tries to shed light on the celationship between public opin~ ion and the forcign policy of liberal democracies.‘ I will argue that the policy impact of public opinion does not depend so much on the specific * Deafs of this paper were presemed atthe Eucapean Consortium of Political Reseach (ECPR) Warkshop an “Public Opiason, Foreign Poly, and the Democratic Bracers” Bor hur, West Germans, April 3-7 1690, and atthe Annual Convention of the Interational Studies Assocavan, Weskingion DC, Apa 10-14. 1992, Por very valusble comments E thank Richard Eichenberg, Matthew Evangelist, Philip Eserts, Kjell Goldmann, Pal Jo- sep, Claudia Keppen, Peter Katzeartcin, Richard N. Eebow, David Meyer, Nobuo Oks. swara, Hams Revinger, Broce Russet, and the pacticipans inthe ECPR workshop. For their help and advice regarding pubic opinion cite thank Lia Beandes and Richard Fichenberg, "The paper i patt of growing body of lteraure. See, for example, Méchsel Barnet, “High Paice Is Low Poliues The Domestic and Systemic Sources nf les, Securcy Palicy, $e tary” Won Fics 2 uly 190, sa Racherd Echeerg Public Onion ond Nein erty Wan Boge tues SY. Cornell Unser Br 98h Saco Evangelist, Innosasion and she Armas Race thaca, N'Y Carnell University Beet, 1988); Geet Krall Rutangudynamid und Ricengrkonpolle: Die guelichefichen Awcinandertsungen un SALT in den USA rg6y-raps (Peanklurt ain Main: Haag. ued Heschen, coh, Richard Ne Labor, Betucer Pate and War Baltimore, Md. Johns Flapkins Univeraty Pres eB) Jack Ley, “Demi aes ad Wat! lead f Imraan Hoy 38 Spin 88, G57: Erwin Miller, Raswnppotnd and Rastangetorsrale: Fal USA (Bacen Baden: No” tron, 1983); Bruce Resuet, Contoing the Sword: The Democratic Gasermance of Natioadt Seourisy Cambridge: Harvaed University Pres 19ge); and Paigene Wittkopt, Faces of Iner- tationalion: Public Opinion and Amorcan Foreign Policy (Durham, Nic: Duke Unive Press, 1990. World Politics 43 Quly to91), 49-512489 WORLD POLITICS issues involved or on the particular pattern of public attinides as on the domeiic structure and the coalition-building procesres in the respecti country. The paper analyzes the impact of public opinion an the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. I will show that differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures account (or different forcign policy out- comes when the impact of the international environment is controlled for and public attitudes follow similar patterns across countries. Thus, the four councries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despice more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion. The analysis of the interaction between public opinion and elite coalition building processes in the four countries reveals that the policy outcomes differ according to variances in domestic structures and not in the inter- national status of the states. Punic Opinion ano Poneien Pottcy: THeorericat Conceers anp Mer#opotocicat PRomLems Wnt Fottows Wiiom? Exives ano Masses Most of the available literature on the interaction between mass public ‘opinion and clites in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democ- racies can be categorized according to two broad concepts.” In accordance with the pluralist theory of democracy, a "bottom-up" approach assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the for- ‘eiga policy-making process In sum, leaders follow masses. However, the bottom-up concept is difficult to reconcile with the following empir- ical counterevidence: in Western Europe, the U.S, and Japan, elites and masses show sim- ilar support for basic foreign policy goals and institutions. Prevailing po- litical, celigious, and ideological cleavages steucture elite as well as mass public opinions + Por exellent reviews af the debate, se Philip Everts and Antu Peber, “Public Opinion, Foreign Plic, and Democracy” (Paper presented a the ECPR Workshop "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, a the Democratic Process” Bochum, Apel 3-7, rao) see Rast ln 1'ee, eg, Benjamin I. Page std Robert ¥-Shapic, “ees of Public Opinion on Poi Amerie Bola! Science Review 73,00. (383) 5-3. "For Western Europe, see Fichenberg (fn. #), pt. For che US, see Ole R. Holst and James N, Rosenau, “The Domestic and Poreign Polcy Belief of American Leaders Journal of Conflics Reation 42 (ne 1983), ag8-guj anc Wittkept (fo. 1) For Papse, sce Davis FBabrow, Tapan ie che World: Opinion from Defeat Succes," Journal af Confis Reouion 33 [December ug8gh 571-63LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 4a —There are many cases in which eracial forcign policy decisions have bicen taken in the absence of mass public consensus. Examples are the U.S. decisions in favor af an active inteenational role in the postwar world and of becoming permanently involved in European security affairs; the West German decisions to rearm and join xato in the early 19508 and to pursue ‘an active Oxpoliik in the late 1360s; the French decisions to build an in- dependent nuclear force in the 19508 and co leave waro's military institu cians in the mid-1960s. ‘Therefore, a second approach representing the conventional wisdom. in the literate suggests a “top-down” process, according ta which pop- ular consensus is a function of the elite consensus and clite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion. This viewpoint concurs with either (C. Wright Mills) or a state-centered and realist approach to foreign poliey. Ics assurned that the public is easily manipulated by political leaders, because of (1) the low salience, or significance, of foreign and security policy issues as compared with economic policies, (a) the low degree of knowledge about the issues invalved, and (3) the volatility of public opinions Again, empirical evidence suggests that these assumptions are ques- sionable: While only 2 minority can be regarded as politically active, large por- tions of the public seem regularly to fallaw news about foreign policy in the mediaé While domestic problems ustally outweigh foreiga and secu rity issues in publi salience, data reveal that substantial minorities con- sider foreign affairs among the most important problems facing their re- spective countries. Op the average, 20-30 percent of the public indicate serious concern about foreign affairs? See, eft, Noam Chomsky and Edwaed Herman, Monsfacuring Comat (New York: Panthesn 1988); Benymin Crave, The Cpice Pale Flas Mac Option Promeset Sate Power (Near York: Bsc Booka, 1988), Benty Flughen The Dometic Conse ef dmorcen Foreign Poy Gan Francisco: Freeman, 1979), Michael Macgols snd Gary Mauace cy Mamboing Pic Opn. Ey on PableOpa ar 2 Bape Vaal tran Gaile Wadeworth, «ah nd Tames N. Rosenay, Pubic Opintn and Fovcgn Poy (New York: Random Hose, "During lection caipaignsin he US. for expt the enajrty ofthe public was aware ofshe dere forig policy holes under dla an could enn) che postions a he picsidenal candidutes See John FL Aldich ot a. “Foreign Affais and tatu Voting! Do Presdemual Candidates Waltz before + Blind Acdhence** American Political Sconce Rese Seg ol ag 4 Hane Rage. Focgn Paley nd Seco) hansen nan Vating Behavior inthe 1o84 U.S Preadental Election” (Paper presented a the EUR ‘Wackshop “Publiz Opie, Foreign Policy, and the Demoeraie Paces, Bocham, Aped 27, ooh Se aso Thomas Gahan, “The Paterna! enporsece of Public Knowledge in {ha Nuclese Age” fal of Confit Resolution to, 2 (0589), get “Bar the US, se Tora W. Smith, "The Pol Ametca's Mott agotant Probe, Pat & staal and itera Pu mon sry 40.3 gh 26474 Foe West Germany, and Japan, sce Hastings and Hansogs, edo, nds inctional Pade Opinin, rsa (NetrVor: Greemtcod, 1984), 585 ead 98g,a2 WORLD POLITICS Public auitudes, at least on basic foreign policy isues, seem to be more stable chan is usually assumed. A large percentage of che public does tot change auitudes Feequently. Ia sum, the public seems to be more ratio, nal and less apen to eice manipulation than the rop-. 24) 434-40 Hy Watt fn) 44-46, 4am4g. In Fae the esloicl cleavages ere desper than chose ia the rocindemagraphe realm, Se aa Rating (6) ‘On the U.S, armaments industry, se, eg, Gaedon Adams, The Pals of Defnse Cone spacing: The Jeon Tviongle (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 18th; Fen 0. Hiarnpson, On-guaded Maser How Ameres Bugs Ts Weapon (New York: W- W. Norten, 1983} anche US. peace movements see David 8 Meyer, Winter of Discontent: The Nuxteat race and American Poliics (New York: Praeger, 1ggo and Frances B. McCrea and Gees EMashle, Minute to Midaighs: Nucleor Waapont Pater in Amerce (Newhoury Bec, Calif: Sane, 98 TF For che igs sce Rsse-Kppen fn 17), For che toss, see Mare Cie, Pax Atomics: The Nuctatr Define Debate in Wett Germany daring the Adenauer Esa (New Yorks Colima University Press, 1988).LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES o even in foreign and security policy. ‘The openness of the political system provides the society with comparatively easy access to the decision- making process. Accordingly, corporatist structures such as the military- dustrial complex linking business, military, and political intecests have only a limited impact om foreign policy decisions beyond the ‘weapons-procurement process and demands for a certain level of defense spending.” The policy network in Prance, by contrast, seems to be almost com- pletely dominated by the state and, above all, the presidency, particu- larly concerning foreign and defense policy. Even when Socialist Presi- dent Mitterrand was forced into “cohabitation” with 2 Conservative government from 1986 to 1988, he continued to control the foreign pol- iey-making process.” State dominance in the policy necwork is facili- tated by the famous French “defense consensus” among the elites and all political parties in support of French independence in world politics and of the force de dissuasion. As a result, the French foreign policy-making process has been described as that of a “nuclear monacchy.”* Differing from the French and U.S. cases, the situation of the Ger- mans and Japanese resembles the corporatist model. In the Federal Re~ public the party system not only permeates the state institutions, but it also forms the most important link between society and the political sys- tem. The two major parties—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD}—ace essentially catchall organi- zations that integrate rather divergent societal demands. Sometimes in~ traparty divisions are greater than the cleavages between parties, as was the case with the CDU and Onpoliti during the r970s and with the SPD and detecrence during the 1980s. Additionally, institutional arrange- ments as well as the political culture emphasize consensus building and the mutually beneficial reconciliation of diverging societal interests (In- tevessenausgleich). Thece is a clear analogy between the domestic empha- sis on social partnership and a foreign policy trying to achieve its goals by security partnership with Germany's neighbors.«* Consensus building is of similar and probably even greater importance Th a ka te nn of ais sin Sz fr cram, Sapien Rove, e pte tn) and Meee). On te lacy prem paces oe Flange O° eritipe 6. tePrer, “Les of Cato," Pier, Pc Sec Polen Dasxring Word (Boulder, Clo: Lynne Renner 1980), 15-47 ‘See Philippe G. LePreste, "Lessors af Catabitstia, in t Theoughout the 19708 the public con- sensus in favor of détente stabilized, and by 1980, despite the Soviee arms © See Philip G. Cesay, “Gaullan, Nudlear Wespont, and the State" in Howorth and ‘Chilean (a. 39), 46-74; 20d Davi Hanley, “The Patios and the Nuclesy Consensus; id ‘75-98. On the iontiaiinsl uncertainty of the French sysern 262 dominant feature of the Cseteycpalicy ecorack, gee Aahford ff, 38 “"Tndepencence,” for example, as understood io an age-Soviet sense by che French For deus, see Risse-Kappen (fn. 17), pt Be >For the following, ace deals bed, On the prace movernen in particlar see foref r= ning etal eds, Fradonbourgungen Cologoe: Wissenschal- und Palit, 1987} ard Thomas Rochon, The Poiser ofthe Paace Movement Wesara Euyape (Princeton: Peicetoe Univer sity Press, 1988.LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES sar 1984 the SPD had adopted an antinuclear stance. In sum, the coalitions within the policy network gradually moved to the Lefc—in line with trends im general public opinion and in response to the protests of the issue publics, ‘The consequences of both the détente debate and the antinuclear pro- tests were scen in the mid- to late 1980s. Germans were the first to em- brace Gorbachev's new policy, because it responded favorably to what hhad previously emerged as a consensus on Ostpolitik and common sccu- rity, Moreover, the opposition to new auclear weapons increasingly ia- dluded the CDU, the consequences of which became apparent during ato's debate on the modernization of battlefield auclear weapons in the spring of 1689. There was a coincidence of publi opinion, left-wi tinuclearism, and conservative fears that short-range systeras would 'sia- ‘gularize” Germany in the aftermath of the 1NF treaty. Asa result, Chaa- cellor Kohl had no choice but to resist a modernization decision by NaTo. ‘To conclude, the role of public opinion in West German security pol- icy changed over time and moved closer to the bottom-up model during the ro80s. The general and the issue publics decisively affected the coalition-building processes within the party system, which in turn con- siderably narrowed the range of options available to policymakers. How- ever, the change has nothing to do with public opinion as such. For cx- ample, the public had been as ambiguous about the deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany in the 190s as it was in the 1980s, although the policy impact was markedly different in the latter case. Rather, the difference in influence seems to reflect a change ia the do- mestic structure that opened up German polities to societal pressures Adenauer’s “chancellor democracy” changed into a “party democracy” during the 1960s, thereby establishing a democratic corporatist policy network, On top of that, new social movernents—from the student pro- tests of the late 1960s to the enviranmentalists of che 1970s and the peace ‘groups of the 1980:—affected the political culture and were erucial in ‘opening the party system to societal influences. In contrast to France the domestic structure of the Federal Republic was open enough to allow for such changes ia the first place, And unlike the United States, the strength of the party system in the policy network allowed for the insti- tucionalization of the societal consensus. 2»For analyse ofthese change see Kendall Baker el, Germany Transformed: Faia Guar rt oe New Po Carridge: Haryad Unversity Peay 198, Sul Barnes SVsPalical econ Maw Poracipavon i Five Wenern Domocrscie:(Bevecy ils Celi. Sages 1a79) Karl Werner Brand etal, Ajbrach nee andere Glacaf Neue tae Beep: io de Berea Dilan pace Wench Veiga Reka sed Parton Handbuch,» vole (Opladen: Weatdeutscher Vtg, 195 4.08 WORLD POLITICS CONSERVATIVE LEADERS VERSUS PUBLIC OPINION: JAPAN Given the Japanese domestic structure and the stability of Japanese pub- lic opinion, the case is expected to resemble Germany. If one considers the low-key approach of Japanese military security policy over the last forty years, the self-imposed arms-control measures such as the non- nuclear principles and the limits on defense spending, and the reluctance to play a more global role in world politics, Japanese public opinion and foreign policy seem to be more or less in line. Indeed, almost every anal- ysis of Japanese defense policy points to the constraining forces of public ‘opinion on the margins of maneuver of the policymakers At first glance, Japanese forciga policy during the 1980s seems to con- firm the analysis. Prime Minister Nakasone met with firm domestic op- position when he talked about making Japan an “unsinkable aircraft cartier and tried to move Japanese security policy toward a more pro- defense stance and to initiate a major military buildup progeam. While all Japanese governments of the 1980s declared that they wanted to aban- don the principle of not exceeding x percent of the oxp for defense ex: pendicures, they were onty able to do so fram 1986 ta r989. The principle was reinstated in December 1989. Finally, Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union remained in line with the comparatively high degree of public threat perception (see data above). Japan was reluctant to react to Gorbachev's peace initiatives and to the changes in Soviet forcign policy. In contrast co the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo only grudgingly accepted the 1vF treaty after having insisted that the Asian-based Soviet 8-205 be included in the zero option.* However, this description gives only half of the picture. The very fact that Nakasone and his successors were able to change Japanese defense posture as well as to implement a more globally oriented foreign policy belies che notion that Japanese policy-making is dominated by trends in public opinion, Moreover, the 1 percent ox limit on defense procure- Sea, for example J. W. M- Chapman, R. Deifie, and LT. M. Gow, Japan's Quet for Comprekersive Secanity (New Work: Se Mactn's Pres, 1a), Sealapioa Os 3h and Welle nog) "aim March 1985, 72% of Japanese were wortied about Nakasone’s defense policy; 48% inageeed with bis remarks about the “oneinkable aierae carrie” Whole pubic opposition ta Nekasone' polcer declined somewhat over he years he sas aerertheless unable to ‘hhange the prevailing wends Foe daca, sce Hastings and Hastings, de ndex ao Fntrmational Pubic Opinion, 1982-1984 (New York: Greenwood, 1964), 324. Far analyses of Japanese foreign policies daring the 1980s, see, eg, Drife (fe 3h Mem, Japan's Rue to Tntrmstions! Reponibilvier (London: Athlone Press, 196); and Malcolm Mlntoth, Japon Re-Armed (Condon: Frsnces Pinte, 1985) “See deta ie Dette. 75,1990) 48-58.LIBERAL DEMOCRACTES 509 ment seems to be largely symbolic and primarily meant for domestic. consumption, [fone uses Nato criteria to measure military expenditures, Japan had the chird highest military budget worldwide in 1988. Finally, Takyo's tough-minded policy vis-a-vis Gorbachev's Soviet Union re- flected public opinion on only a superficial level. As the above-quoted data suggest, most Japanese would have been perfectly willing ta support a policy that tried to resolve the grievances wich the USSR—particularly the dispute over the northern terricories—by means of diplomacy. ‘The contradictory evidence is explainable: simply pus, the LDP’s coa- servative leaders did not share che general public’s outlook on Japan's role in the world and moreover felt under constant U'S. pressure to build up the milicary. In essence, security poliey seems to have remained the cone issue-arca in Japanese polities in which the beliefs of the leaders of the conservative coalition did not accord with public attitudes. As a re- sult, Nakasone and his successors had to conduct their defense policy againsc the prevailing trends in public opinion; unable to change ie and given Japan's domestic steuccure, however, they had to acquiesce 10 it. They thus muddled through while stretching public tolerance 0 its lim- its. [fone accepts the notion that the Japanese governments indeed felt vulnerable to public opinion, che strange coincidence of law-key rhetoric (except for Naasone’s carly years) and considerably more active security policies becomes explicable. ‘Thus, in the 1980s Japanese publie opinion placed broad, but never- theless effective, constraints on the actions of policymakers. The impact ‘of the public was reinforced by the peculiarities of the Japanese domestic structure, in particular, the emphasis on consensus building in the policy network, Unlike France and more comparable to Germany's corporatist process, issue publics and societal actors were able to affect the coalition- building processes within the LDP by forcing it to take account of the viewpoints of the oppasition parties. As a long-term consequence of the 1960 crisis, the conservative coalition tried to include the opposition par- ties in major decisions concerning foreign and security policy. The insti- tutionalization within the LDP of “policy tribes” corresponding to the particular ministries and Dict commiuees also enhanced the cansensus- building capacity within the LDP and reduced che impact of factional- ism.” 2 Thank Nabe Okawara for poiating this au tore, See so Cale (43), 463. The sont reeeot domestic tare. in Fagan ah how to deal with the crisis and the war Io he Persian Gulf cannes the sealysis that mage public opin severly contaies the country's rulieg conserative alton510 WORLD POLITICS Coxctustons ‘The study leads to chree major conclusions. First, mass public opinion ‘mattered in each of the four countries, albeit to very different degrees. Policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against an over- whelming public consensus, In most cases, mass public opinion set broad and unspecified limits to the foreign policy choices. In the U.S. and— more recently—Germany it also defined the range of options available for implementing policy goals. Additionally, general issue salience seems to be of minor importance, once there is a clear majority in favor of certain policies. In the Japanese case the issue salience of foreiga palicy ‘was comparatively low; decision makers nevertheless fele the pressure of ‘mass public opinion. In sum, public consensus may substitute for a lack of issue salicace, whereas highly mobilized societal actors may be able to influence policies even in the absence of such consensus. Neither was the case in France. However, there are discernible limits to the impact of the general pub- lic on foreign and security policies. Rarely does general public opinion directly affect policy decisions or the implementation of specific policies. In sum, the bottom-up and the top-down models are too simplistic to fit the reality in the four countries. Second, mast of the previous research on the policy impact of public opinion tceats the domestic decision-making process as a black box and directly compares opinion polls with policy outcomes. This study sug- gests, however, that the indirect effect: of public opinion are far more im- portant. To the extent that the empirical material was available, it could be shown that the main role of the public in liberal democracies is to influence the coalition-building processes among elite groups. In che U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany public opinion had a cru pact on elites as they reconfigured their coalitions; groups in line with public preferences were able to carry the day. In Japan the public forced the ruling conservative coalition to integrate the opposition into the decision-making process, at least to some extent. Moreover, support by mass public opinion seems to be essential for issue publics, public interest groups, and other societal actors te influence policy decisions. This accounts for the partial success af the peace move- ments in Germany and the U.S, and of the otherwise marginalized op- position parties in Japan in affecting the debates in the policy network. Tait proved tobe a major limitation of thi tay, particularly in the French case. The ferevalling resi paradigm i international relations ane the focus of roert studies om eles 449 nat encourage scholars co trace the impact of publi opin and societal actors 06 c= siens in deiLIBERAL. DEMOCRACIES su For both the political elites and societal actors, mass public opinion proves to be a resource for strengthening one’s position in the coalition building process, The third conclusion concerns the usefulness of the domestic structure approach. Domestic structures seem indeed to account for the differences between the four countries. The degree of mass public consensus on for- cign policy correlates strongly with the degree of sacictel fragmentation, in particular, the ideological divisions between Lefdiberals and Right? conservatives. Japan as the most homogencous society of the four coun- {ies also enjoys the most stable public foreign policy consensus. By con- tast, the divisions in Prench public opinion on security policy reflect the ‘country's ideological and class cleavages. The U.S. and Germany are cases in between. Furthermore, there is strong empirical evidence that domestic struc- tures are the intervening variable between public opinion and foreign policy. Under given international conditions and despite relatively simi lac public attitudes across countries, variances in the interaction between the general public and elites in the foreign policy-making process can be explained by differences in domestic structures. The degree to which political institutions are centralized and the degree to which the state dominates the policy networks seem to be the determining factors. In both categories, France and the US, are located at opposite ends of the spectrum. The two countries also form the two cases in which public opinion seems to have the greatest (U.S.) and the least (France) impact cn policy decisions. The Federal Republic of Germany changed over time from top-down to a more interactive or even bottom-up process, which in curn seems to reflect changes in the overall domestic structure In the Japanese case the stable public consensus in favor of a nonmilitary security policy severely constrained a political elite that tried to pursue a mote active foreign policy. Moreover, societal protest such as was expe- rienced during the 1960 crisis left a discernible mark on the consensus- building process in the conservative coalition and, asa result, on Japanese forcign policy. At first glance, the empirical findings appear to confiem the distinction between strong and weak states. The steonger the state institutions and the greater their control of the policy networks, the less access che public hhas to the policy-making process. However, while the strong versus weak state distinction scems to make sense regarding the input side of the political system, itis fawed if one considers the relationship between societal demands and policy outcomes. The strong French state and cor- poratist Japan both pursued comparatively low-key and noncommittalsi WORLD POLITICS, policies with respect to the Western alliance system, arms control, and the Soviet Union during the 1980s, but for very different reasons. French forcign policy reflected not so much state strength as the fragility of an elite consensus and a general Jack of policy legitimacy in the absence of societal input into the decision-making process. But Japanese foreign policy was constrained by the institutionalization of the domestic consen- sus—elite and public—in the policy network. ‘The comparison between the weak U.S. state and corparatist Ger- many is also revealing. Both countries pursued comparatively active and highly visible foreign policies (Germany at least in the East-West con- text), But there are important differences that reflect the respective do- mestic structures, The frequent volatility and unpredictability of Amer- ican policies seems to result from constantly shifting coalitions in ‘Washington's domestic process, In comparison, the Federal Republic has pursued a more stable foreign policy over the last cwenty years. In con- trast co the U.S., but similar co Japan, the German policy network and the policical structure emphasize consensus building and the institution- alization of coalitions in support of specific policies. As a result, the Ger- mans have less direet input into the policy-making process than the ‘Amiricans have, but their impact on policy outcomes seems to last longer. Tam aware chat this paper suffers from a number of limitations and that farther comparative tesearch is indicated. First, while this article ‘more of less covers the spectrum of domestic structures in liberal democ- racies, it deals neither with authoritarian regimes nor with one-party systems. Does the empirical evidence confirm the conventional wisdom that public opinion does not count in those countries, or do systems that are not democratic in the Western sense provide che inasscs with differ- cent ways to influence policies? Second, the role of cultural factors to fa- cilitate or to complicate the public's impact on foreign policy has to be cxamined systematically. The emphasis on consensus building asa social value in both Japan and Germany suggests, for example, that the domes- tic steuctute approach as presented here might have ta be expanded. Fi- nally, this paper does not deal with the role of the media, though it is fair to assume that the media play a critical role both in che process of pinion formation and in conveying public attitudes to the policymakers.