WHO ARE WE?

AMERICA'S GREAT DEBATE

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

CHAPTER 1 2

Twenty-first Century
h e r i c a : Vulnerability,
Religion, and National

h e r i c a n identity began a new phase with the new ce

salience and substance in this phase are being shaped by
new mlnerability to external attack and by a new N m to
gion in most of the world.
ofthe soviet Union, the United States be
w i t h the
only superpower, holding a commanding lead
every dimension of global power. September 11 demons
was more vulnerable to attack than it had
ever, that it
almost two hundred years. The last time that somet
september 11 happened in the continental United States
~~~~t 25, 1814, when the British burned the White H
1815 ~mericanscame to assume that security and invu
were inherent and lasting characteristics of their nation. Th
tieth.cenNry-s
were fought across thousands of miles 0
behind which they sat safe and free. Geographical se
the contextfor how they detined themselves as a nafion.

tember 11 brutally awakened Americans to the new reality

distance no longer meant invulnerability. Americans found
lves in a new war fought on many h n t s , the most important
ich was right at home. After September 11, President Bush
We refuse to live in fear." But this new world is a fearful
and Americans have no choice but to live with fear if not in
oping with these new threats requires difficult trade-offs
the preservation of what Americans have assumed to be
ditional freedoms and the preservation now of that most
t freedom which they had taken for granted: the freedom

1
I
I

I
nerability is central to how Americans define themselves
new phase in the evolution of their national identity. In the
en Americans spoke of their "homeland" they usually meant
try from which they o r their ancestors had come to
e new vulnerability made it clear to Americans, as
ewman explained in Chapter 1, that America is their
and that the security of that homeland has to be the prition of government Vulnerability gives new salience to
identity. Vulnerability does not, however, end the identity
r conflicts of the previous half century
ult, at the end of the twentieth century the Creed was the
1source of national identity for most Americans. TWO factors
d i s importance. First, as ethnicity and race lost salience and
otestant cultwe came under serious attack, the Creed was
e only unchallenged sunivor of the four major historical
ts of American identity. Second, the Creed had acquired
SaNS, comparable to what it had in the Revolution, as the
haracteristic distinguishing America fmm the ideologies of
an, Japanese, and Soviet enemies. Hence many Americans
ve that America could he multiracial, multiethnic, and
1x1 core, and yet still be a coherent nation with its idened solely by the Creed. Is this, however, really the w e ? Can
e defined only by a political ideology?
ral considerations suggest the answer is no. A creed alone

1i!

i
I
!I

1
,
I;
I

WHO ARE WE?

Historically, American identity has involved three 0th
componentsas well as die Creed. For the Creed to become
source ofnational identity would be a sharp break from th
addition, few nations have ever been defined only by an idea
set of political principles. The most notable modern cases '
communist states where that ideology was used either t
people of different cu~turesand nationalities, as with
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, or to separates
from other people of the same nationality, as with East
and NO& Korea. These creedal or ideologically defined s
the result of coercion. When communism lost its ap'pea
incentive to maintain these entities ended with the Cold

People can with relative ease change their political i

Communists have become fervent anti-communists; denlo
era]$ have embraced Marxism; socialists have adopted c
~n 2000, there could well have been in Dresden peop
eighties who in their youth were sincere Nags, then beta
communists, and after 1989 were sincere democrats. T
the former communist world in the 1990s, former mmm
regularly redefined themselves as liberal democrats, free

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

343

nondiscrimination, rule of law-are markers of how to

ze a society. They do not detine the extent, boundaries, or
ition of that society. Some proponents of a creedal concept
argue that the Creed's political principles are in theory
ble to people everywl~ere.If this is the case, however, they
t be the only basis for distinguishing Americans from other
. Democracy in various forms has spread to many more
es, and 110 significant other secular ideology exists. Russians,
e, Indians, and Indonesians who subscribe to the creedal
les share something with Americans but they do not thereby
Anmicans so long as they stay in their homeland, remain
ed to that homeland and its culture, and identify primarily
eir fellow Russians, Chinese, Indians, and Indonesians. They
Americans only if they also migrate to America, participate
rican life, learn America's language, history, and customs,
erica's Anglo-Protestant culture, and identify primarily
nca rather than with their country of birth.
le are not likely to find in political principles the deep emocontent and meaning provided by kith and kin, blood and
g, culture and nationality. These attachments may have little
asis in fact but they do satisfy a deep human longing for meanommunity. The idea that "We are all liberal democratic
in d ~ American
e
Creed" seems unlikely to satisfy that need.
n, Ernest Renan said, may be "a daily plebiscite," but it is a
te on whether or not to maintain an existing inheritance. ~tis,
an also said, "the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacd devotion."' W~thoutthat inheritance, no nation exists, and
bisdte rejects that inheritance, the nation ends. America is "a
d~the soul of a church." The soul of a church,however, do=
solely or even primarily in i s theological dogma, but in its
ymns, practices, moral commandments and prohibitions,
rophets, saints, gods, and devils. So also a nation may, as
oes, have a creed, but its soul is d e h e d by& common his~tions,cxlture, heroes and villains, victories and defeats,
in its "mnystic chords of memory."
reed was the product of people with a distinct Angloant culture. Although other peoples have embraced elemens

WHO ARE WE?

of this creed, the Creed itself is the result, as Myrdal argue
~ ~ ~traditions,
l i ~ dissenting
h
Protestantism, and Enlighte
ideas of the eighteenth-century settlers. "The customs
Americans of the United States are, then," Tocqueville sa
peculiar cause which renders that people the only 0
~mericannations that is able to support a democratic gov
Their democratic institutions are the product "of the pra
rience, the habits, the opinions, in short, of the custo
~ ~ ~ ~"Wei the~people
s of
. the
~ United
2
States" had to en
common ethnicity, race, culture, language, and religion b
could "ordab and establish this Constitntion ofthk United
America." The Creed is unlikely to retain its salience
abandon the Anglo-Protestant cnlnlre in which it has
A multicultural America will, in time, become a mu
with groups with different cultures espousin
political values and principles rooted in their particular
September 11 dramatically symbolized the end of the

identity takes on new relevaice in this environment.

AMERICANS TURN TO RELIGION

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

in politics and culture.'" By the end of the century, the relius resurgence had become sufficiently extensive to generate
m among secularists who had thought history was on their side.
ligion is intrudimg in areas that are very disturbing," as the chairf one secular humanist group complained in 2002.'
aspects of this development were of crucial importance. First,
bers and proportions of Americans who were evangelical
testants or who identified themselves as "born-again Christians"
eased significantlyin the latter decades of the cennuy, as did the
er and activities of evangelical organizations. Second, large
ers of Americans became concerned about what they saw as the
e in values, morality, and standards in American society and
e to feel personal needs for believing and belonging that seclogies and institutions did not satisfy. The interaction of
lytizing and institutional dynamism of the Christian cons and the spiritual needs and moral concerns of large
of Americans made religion a key factor in public life and
lity again a central feature of American identity.
of Conservative C W f y . Between 1990 and 2000, the
growing denominations in terms of adherents were the
ons (with a 19.3 percent increase) and the conservative evanI Christian Churches and Churches of Christ (18.6 percent
ase) and the Assemblies of God (18.5 percent increase), folby the Catholic Church (16.2 percent increase). The
nhip of the Southern Baptist Convention increased by 17
between 1973 and 1985, while mainline Protestant groups

In,1984, the Reverend Richard John Neuhaus ~ublish

The Naked Public Square: Religion and D m w a c y in Amen'
he decried the absence of religious influences, perspec
groups from American public life. A decade later the s
filling up rapidly. In the 1990s, religious ideas, conce
groups, and discourse underwent a dramatic resurgenc
presence of religion in public life far exceeded what it h
lier in that century. "One of the most striking and
features of late-20th-century American life," Patric
observed, "has been the re-emergence of religious feeling

ealed to 30 percent or more of the American people. The

rt to organize this constituency comprehensively was the
Majority, founded by Jerry Falwell in 1979. It faded in the
980s and was siiperseded by the Christian Coalition, estahby Pat Robertson in 1989, which by 1995 reporredly involved

WHO ARE WE?

roughly 1.7 million people. Other evangelical organiza
included Focus on the Family, with two million SuPPorte
American Family Association, with 600,000 memben, the P
Keepers, involving hundreds of thousands of men, and Con
women for ~merica,which with 600,000 members was purpo
the largest women's organization in the counU$ Christian
multiplied in number and circulation. By 1995, some 130pu
were bringing out Christian books, and forty-five others were
k g textbooks and other school materials. The sales of
books, marketed by seven thousand Christian book retailers
to $3 billion a year between 1980 and 1995. Christian nove
best-sellers, with the Left Behind series by Tim LaHaye andJ
~ ~ ~selling
k i 17~ million
s
copies by 2001. Five million co
~ r ~ ~aretti's
n k
three religious novels had been sold by 199
1995, there were more than 1,300 religious radio stations
television stations. By the late 1990s, a huge network of
retail stores had come into existence selling a variety of
with Christian themes and doing billions of dollars' wo
six hundred or more mega-churches with congregations
thousand to twenty thousand that had emerged by 2002.
In the 1990s, extending their reach beyond their co
stimency, kvangelical organizations, most notably the C
coalition, moved into politics and elections. Thqrfocused
roots organizing, local issues, and raising funds in small
from large numbers of supporters. Numerous in the
gelicals traditionally voted Democratic. As they b
politically conscious, however, their artisan loyalties chan
matically. Fifty-one percent of evangelicals voted for Ji
in 1976, but Ronald Reagan successfully appealed to the
and by 1988 they were solidly Republican. In 2000, Ge
Bush received 84 percent of the votes of white
Protestants who attended church regularly, and evang
up perhaps 40 percent of his mtal vote.' Evangelicals ha
key force within the Republican Party
The Christian Coalition and other groups were mu
cwful in appealing to the general public on particular i

Twenty-first Century America

to remove Clinton from office failed in the Senate and was not
orsed by the American public. Their efforts to prohibit abomon
to promote other policies that challenged centrist opinion came
aught. Their substantial electoral activities in 1998, including
hristian Coalition's disaibution of 45 million voter gujdes, did
reduce the gabs they had hoped for. Following that election,
lservative Christians were ready to give up politics and conon promoting their values at the individual and c 0 m - v
The "political mobilization of conservative Christians has
,"Andrew Kohut and his associates concluded in 2000. TWO
later, it was reported that many of them had become "disillud with the world of Caesar," and the Christian Coalition was
shadow of its former self."8
limited success of the Christian conservatives in pushing
ar items on their political agenda was overshadowed by their
5s in responding to the psychological and moral needs of
ricms. They advanced a compelling arpment that morality
lue, which ultimately derive from religion and which had
the 1970s and 1980s, must be reasserted in social and polit. The "religious-conservative movement," as ~ ~ v i d
an said in 1999, was comparable to the civil rights and
movements of the mid-twentieth century in the impact it
on American thought, values, and discourse. "Religious cons have changed the American conversation. They have
who participates in that conversation, they have changed
ions brought to bear on that conversation, they have
tone of that conversation, and they have changed the
of it. They may even eventually change the conclusion of
ole Shields, president of People for the ~mericanway, a
organization opposed to the Christian right, regretfully
"They've changed the rules. What's bad is good, what's good
All of what they have done changes how we think about

a!ndReligion. The religious conservatives were able to

gioll back into the public square only because vast numben
'cans were eager to welcome it there. In the 1980s,

348

WHO ARE WE?

Americans increasingly and overwhelmingly focused on

could be interpreted as evidence of moral decay: tolerant
behavior previously considered unacceptable, teenage pre
single-parent families, mounting divorce rates, high levels
widespread drug use, pornography and violence in the me
the perception that large numbers of people were living the
on the welfare rolls funded by hardworkingtaxpayer
there seemed to be feelings, first, that more meaningful
community and civil society had disappeared, and, as
Pumam demonstrated, Americans were bowling alone ra
coming together; and, second, that the prevailing
deriving from the 1960s, held there were no absolut
moral principles and everything was relative.
and behavioral standards in schools had eroded, and Am
Daniel PaaickMoynihan said, "defining delinquencydoum,
foms of belief and behavior, short of the clea
tolerated.
Facing these challenges, Americans increasingly turned
gion and religions concepts to meet what Michael Sand
"the vague but pervasive hunger for a public life of lar
ings."lQAs the sponsors of a 2000 poll on religion in
concluded: "One message arrived loud and clear:
strongly equate religion with personal ethics and hehavio
ering it an antidote to the moral declme they perceive in o
today. Crime, greed, uncaring parents,
believe that all these problems would be mi
more religious. And to most citizens, it doe
gion is involved."" Between 1987 and 1997, Kohut an
colleagues demonstrate, increases of 10 percent or more
the proportions of Americans who "strongly agreed" th
no doubt God existed, that inevitably they
their sins before God on Judgment Day, that God per
cles in today's world, that prayerwas an important part of th
life, and that clear guidelines distinguishing good from e
weryone everywhere. These increases took place in eve
religious category: evangelical, mainline, and black Pr
Catholics, and even seculars. In 2002, after the attacks on

Twenty-first Century America

349
t of Americans believed that the apocalyptic prophecies of
ok of Revelation would come mie."
e need ofAmericans to secure moral reassurance and psychoa1 security from religion took popular form in the exaaord'mary
1craze that swept the country in the 1990s. In 1993,69 percent
s said they believed in angels, stimulating CBS to launch
Angel, which by 1998 had become one of 737's most
rograms, with 18 million viewers. It "touched a chord,"
executive accurately observed, 'which America desperts."" Evangelical preachers and writers also responded to
nt. As the sociologistJames Davison Hunter has shown, the
of evangelical ministers such as James Dobson,
on the Family, were a "breathtaking" combir~ationof
ology and traditional biblical teaching. The evangelought "to co-opt psychology for their own purposes, making
cepts subordinate to biblical wisdom. The premise is
ychology provides tools that are, by themselves, theologind morally nentral but useful all the same when linked to the
of the Christian faith.""
e turn to religion was evident in the corporate world. "Driven
arch for meaning, unsatisfied by bigger paycheh or lofty
tions, and a desire to reconnect with their faith," it was
d in 1998, "white-collar workers are crowding breakfast
er meetings and lunchtime Bible studies in conference rooms
versity clubs." Reportedly the number of workplace
an groups doubled to ten thousand between 1987 and 1997,
me there also were an estimated one thousand Torah and
ed Muslim study groups in the American corporate world.
onps, it was argued, provided an antidote to the "rampant
,cut-throat competition, and greed" prevalent in
'or denominations also tended to renun to or to adopt more
onal religious practices. In the 1970s, the country's largest
tant denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, with 16
n menibers, had moved in a conservative direction, endorsing
~calinerrancy," the belief that the Bible is the very word of
,,completelywithout error. In subsequent years, it affirmed its
sition to abortion and homosexuality and its approval of the

WHO ARE WE?

to their husbands, the latter stance c
of
to lose one ofits more prominent members, Ji-Y
Carter.
he leaders of Reform Judaism overwhelmingly voted to
many of the rituals and practices associated with Orthodox
induding wearing of the yarmulke and expanded use of H
~~~i~~ the 1990s the number of Catholic dioceses Per
masses in L ~ &or in English and Latin increased from six to 1
70 percent of the total."
B~ the 1990s, Americans overwhelmingly ~ U P P O * ~a ~
role for religion in American public life. In a 1991 survey, 78
of the respondents favored allowing children on school gro
to have voluntary Bible classes, and to hold mee
say
voluntary Christian fellowship groups. Some 67 percent favor
display ofnativitysceues or menorahs on government ProPe
percent approved prayers before athletic games; and 74 P
opposed removing all references to God from oaths of pub
$5 percent said they thought religion
this same
l i d e influence in American life, while 30 percent thought it
fight amount, and 11 percent (roughly equal to the propo*
say they are agnostic or atheist) thought it had too
hei- also viewed more favorably the role of churches
affairs. I~ the 1960s, 53 percent of Americans thought that c
should not be involved in politics, while 40 percent thou
amptable. By the mid-1990s, the proponions had reverse
centthought that churches should speak out on political and
issues, 43 percent thought they should not.''
~
~ in poljtja.
l
@ The ~activities
~ of the religious come
and the sentiments of the public made religion a key ele
&merim politics In 2000, the moderate Republican gov
I(ansas, Bill Graves, referring to the religious conserva
that in 1990 YOUtalked about economic issues 90 pe
time and some of their kinds of things 10 percent of the
you're talking about their issues 50 percent of the time a
ofissue 50 percent of the time!' Following the Christian
tives and Republicans, Democrats and other groups mshe
in the crusade for values, particularly "family values." '

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

~~w~

mot afford to ignore these things."19 ~ n they

d
e amount of space devoted to values and cultural issues in
m s of the major pames increased dramatically (although
ss than 10 percent of the total platforms), with he~~~~~,-+i~
rms of 1988 and 1996 devoting about twice as much space to
issues as the Republican ones. And in 1999 A1 G~~~declared
With respect to g o v e m e n t support for religion, " ~ moment
h ~
me for Washington to catch up with the rest of~merica,"'"
shington was already beginning to catch up with ~
~
gworld War n, the idea had become widely prevalent &ar
nstitution required the total separation of government and
n. Governments should not provide supporn of any sort for
s groups or activities andshould not allow religious groups
e public facilities. .Federal courts held that it was illegal to
e God in public school ceremonies, to require prayer in ,-lass,
0 have Bible readings in school. Governmental agencies went
derable lengths to avoid any form of engagement with
es and religious organizations. The latter were, in effect,
d from forms of participation in society and public life open
t other p h t e organizations.
e'*efigioussurge of the 1980s and 1990schallenged dris exclufreligion from public life, and Congress, the executive branch,
t importantly, the coum began to respond positively. ~n
an opinion outlawing state subsidies for the salaries of
schoolteachers, the Supreme Court held that to be con1, government actions had to have a secular purpose, could
dvance or inhibit religion, and could not create ccexcessive
hmX" of government with religion. wth the appointments
deral bench by the Reagan and firstBush administrations,
the courts began to become more tolerant of religion
ic square. Signaling this shift, Chief sig ti^^ willjam

WHO ARE WE!

in
1985,
"The wall of separation between ch
Rehnquist
and state is a metaphor based on bad history. It should be fr
abandoned."" And slowly but surely the wal
and
breached if not abandoned. According to Kenneth
analysis building on that of Joseph Kobylka, between 1943
of twenty-three supreme court cases invol
1980,
church-state.issues were separationist in their outcome, eight
accommoda~onist,a n d ' M ~
were mixed. Bemeen 1981 and
hebalance shifted dramatically: out of a total of thhnythre
the decisions were separationist in twelve, accommodationi
and inone mixed." The issues that came UP wereho
tested by religious and secular groups, the battles taldng P
three fronts.
government provide financial or
F&~,to what extent
,pport to educadonal and charitable activities carried outb
gious organizations? Many private groups, some religious,
not, argued that churches and other religious orga*zatiO
peculiarlysuited to cope with the problems of crime, drugs
quency, teenage pregnancy, single-parent families preval
~
~ inner cities.
~
~ e s~~ o n d i ni g 'these
t o ~argumenal
~ .
y
congress
passed and Clinton signed a welfare reform
"charitable choice^^ provision that authorized states to con
religious organizations to support welfare and community
,ntprograms.
his option, howwer, was not extended
bureaucratic resistance limited the fun
social programs,
acmally wentto religious organizations. As governor
G~~~~~
W. ~~h actively promoted charitable choice an
merit supportfor social services provided by religious Or
including christian ministries to those in Texas pds
faith-based organizations became a central theme of his Pres'
ampaign, and in 1999 ~lGore endorsed this cause: "IfYou e
president, the voices of faith-based organization will be int
the policies set forth in my administration." "We must
embrace fai&.based approaches that advance our share
Americans," he told the Salvation Army."
T~~days after his inauguration, President Bush set 0
gram for federal support for religious groups perfomn

352

Twenty-first Century America

353
Nice, including the creation of a White &use ofice
of ~ a i t h sed and Community Initiatives and centers in five cabinet
a-ents
to facilitate this program. Congress did not approve
slation to implement it and, as a result, in December 2002, ~~~h
sued a broad executive order prohibiting federal agencies from
uding religious organizations from receiving funds for cornmurograms and social services. "The days of discriminating
religious groups just because they are religious,3J~~~h
"are coming to an end." His statement, according to the
Erk Timer,was'."infnsed with references to faith and was built
dtheidea that religion can and should occupy a
place
d private life.""
e biggest step toward government support for religion, howwas the Supreme Court's 5-to-4 decision in J~~~2002
onzing Parents to use government-issued vouchers to pay for
tion of their children in church-m sch001s. nedecision was
hailed and denounced as the most important court decision on
e-church relations in the forty years since it outlawed
01 Prayer. The general proposition that seemed to emerge from
~ d other decisions is that government may give aid to
nizations and use them, like other private organizations, to
on'ote accepted public and social purposes, provided it does not
minate among religious groups.
e second area of conflict and change concerned he use of
ent Property or facilities, particularly s c h o o ~by
, religious
s or for religious purposes. In 1962 the Supreme court
had
ked compulso~
prayers in schools. This holding has not met
1 challenge, but efforts have been made to explore what
activities might be permissible in government facilities.
Fess passed the Equal Access Act, requiring
to
it the use of their facilities by religious groups on the same
they did for secular groups. The Supreme Court's decision in
upholding its constitutionality was followed by the proliferastudent religious clubs and prayer groups in the sou&
1995, the Clinton administration issued guidelines prog school officials from preventing students praying or
religion at school. The Constitution, clinton said, "does

Twenty-first Century America

not requirechildren to leave their religion at the schooIh0us

T~~years later, Adam Meyerson repom, the administration

ent support for activities by religious organizations that

useful social purposes. The creation in the %te H~~~~
of
flice for Faith-Based and Charitable Initiatives was an unprece-

t in a way in which it had never been before.

fis

legacy" could be "his leadership in reducing th

were more. concerned with the moral or economic problems
h e country, 58 percent of Americans chose moral problems

cus on religion. h a poll taken immediately after heelecPercent of Americans said that "more religion is the best
~mengthenfamily values and moral behavior in ~
~
~
Percent =id they wanted the influence ofreligion in ~~~~i~~

t t 0 how they voted. Denominational membership has always

laced to partisan choice. In the mid-twentieth century, main-

move in the Democratic direction, while non-~spanic

the Republicans. Voting in
2000 contimed

CS shifted toward

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first Centnry America

eerlring these denominational differencs, however, W

development involving differences in reIigiosity. Begin&
1970s, the differences between the two 'major parties Over
and culhlral issues increased significantly. Bemeen 19y2 a
as ~ ~ ~Layman
f fhasrshown,
~ delegates
~
to Demomatic
who anended church weekly or more never a c e
40 percent and by 1992 had dropped below 30 Percent.
cencdge of Democratic delegates who said refigion provi
witha great deal of guidance in their lives never went
centand in 1992 was 25 percent. The propomon
delegates who regularly attended church, in contrast, r
about 43 percenr in 1972 to 50 percent in 1992, with 5 5 P
the 1992 fist-time delegates falling in that category. Th
of Republican delegates for whom religion provided a
guidance wentfrom 35 percent in 1976 to 44. percent in 199
for first-time delegates. Democratic Pnml ac
49
short, consistendy had low levels of religious activity and
while the religious involvement of Republican
over two demdes. A new "Feat dim
increased
religion had emerged. "Religious conservatives from'mo
major Christian traditions," Layman concludes, "but Par
among evangelical Protestants, tend to support the R
Party, while the Democratic party draws 1% support dispr
of religious liberals in the major faithen
atelyfrom the
and ~ecnlarists."~~
These tendencies became dramatically &dent amon
2000. Frequency of church attendance rivaled incom
although not race, a s a predictor of voting behavior (see
~h~ differences between the more and less religiously
existed wjthin denominations. T h e proportions votin
among the following groups were:
More observant
WThite mainline Protestants
White evangelical Prorestants

Tabk 12.1

Votes for President 2000

e differences coincided with growing differences between fie

activists on culmral issues such as abortion, the ~~~~l ~
i
~
dmenb
conmol, gay rights. Fifty-six percent of the 1996
lican and
27 percent of the Democratic delegates s ~ d
vemment&odd do more to promote baditional values,
pmYer was endorsed by 57 percent of the Republican
20
t of the Democratic delegates:9
th, the election also wimessed a totally new level of discusf their religious beliefs by candidates for national
~ i k ~
her =ends,
too had been developing during the
John E Kennedy had tried to separate his religious
his political mle, saying he favored "a president whose
are his own private affairs." Jimmy carter
started
Pattern, articulating and explaining his religious beliefs,
s successors except for the first Bush. "Ever sincethe elecllmY '&ter i
n 1976," Wilfred McClay noted in 2000, "he
n the expression of religious sentimen6 by~mericanpolitders seems to have been steadily eroding, to fie extent that
idential candidates in the current campaign have been
od and Jesus Christ at a pace not seen since the days of
Bryan." With the lone exception of Bill ~
~
~
Oo0 national candidates responded to what they saw as the
interest in and endorsenlent of refigion by serringfod and

WHO ARE WE?

faith in America's public life. As a people, we need to reaffir

faith and renew h e dedication of our nation and ourselves
and God's p~rpose."'~
by the other candidates were notable h
~h~

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

of themselves as a religious and a christian people,

T H E GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF RELIGION*

candidates for the Republican nomination went on 'ha

over faith as a source of human

~h~ ninesaw increasing confidence that science would d e h o n e
n. Mankind, it was widely believed, was moving intoa new

would ask himself "What would Jesus do?""

this firstelection with a Jewish candidate for nation
candidates thus shifted from "God talk" to "Chri

In the Public arena, refigion gave way to ideology. people,

social movements were defined by their identification
one of the major secular ideologies: liberalism, socialism,

rtions of this section are taken from my essay 'q-he ~ ~ lpactor

i in
~ i
Poli~a,"Swiss Institute of International Studies, universiry ,,f zuri*, 24

WHO ARE WE?

alignments and conflicts, and provided n ~ o d e l s ~ ~

organize their p~liticsand economies.
,irt,,,,,
In the last quarter of the twentieth cenmry, however, the
was reversed. An almost global resurgence
mTVad
gion got under way, manifest in almost every Part
world-CePt
in western Europe. Elsewhere in countries
theworld, religious political movements gained suPPorters.

majority of the global population, are in the midst of a

The resurgence is most strongly affecting
comnniSt
cou&es of Eastern Europe, Central Asia,
caucasus,
as well as Latin America, the Middle East, Ah-ic

Twenty-first Century America

movement, and a religiously defined political party won an election
agovernmentin 2002. N e w s concept of kdia as a set-

and took control of the government. B ~ ~ -

Pam ofthe world. These conflicts often havepoli+ical or ecor

i in disputes
~
~ over territory or resources, po1itidans,

rly acute in conact zones such as B ~ ~K-~,

~ ; ~C h, e h y a ,
and the rest of India and Pakistan, N
~ beland,
&
~
he ~
sub-Saharan Africa, and parts o f ~ i a : ~ ~
following
e

MILITANT ISLAM VS. AMERICA

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

WHO ARE WE?

created by Gorbachev with an unmistakably

new

smggles between pro- and anti-communists in

erican unions in the 1930s and 1940s. President ~~~~~i
refer-

differences, however, exist between the

was but

'la

branch or an agent Of the U.S.n'8

cOntemPorq Islamist movements. First, a single major srate

well describe America's new Islamic enemies:

hatit is desirable and necessary that the internal harm0

be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destc
authority of our state be broke*?'

m Christians fought against Muslim rule. ~

governmen* in Iran and Sudan, militant non-~slamist

L i b ) , and Muslim terrorist organiza~ons,most

Twenty-first Century America

WHO ARE. WE?

in the 19gOs and 1990s, to the "war on terrorism" after Septe

11 to a full-scale conventional war against Iraq in 2003. This e

erica as their
If that is a fate Americans
avoid,
alternative is to accept it and to take the measures necesRecent

Muslims see as a war on Islam.

unfavorablen view of America in Turkey and Lebanon. In

an rnfavorable view of the United States."

part hornAmerican support for Israel. It also has deeper

suggests that America is likely to be involved in

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America
In this new phase, three broad concepts exist of America in
on to the rest of the world. Americans can embrace the world,

ideal would be an open society with open borders, encouraging

national ethnic, racial, and cultural identities, dual citizenship,

make the war a "real" war.

be multiethnic, multiracial, multiculnual. Diversity is a

identity and reasonably high levels of national unity.

war in ~ r a was
q part ofthe war on terrorism and belonge
Iraq posed serious threats to American security and the a
tion was respon&mg efficiently and economically. Critics a
effect that the war belonged in Box B: Iraq had not
b e r i c a , posed no serious threat to America or its vital in

eliminated communism as the overriding factor shaping

Reserves), while American soldiers were being M e d a1

policy goals without having to confront the charge that those

)mpromised national security and hence to promote nation
IMPERIAL, AND/OR NATIONAL?

WHO ARE WE?

the idea of an h e r i c a n empire and the we of b e r i a POwe

according to American values.
reshape the
*heimperial impulse was thus fueled by beliefs in the supre
of h e r i c a n power and the universality of American
America,spower, it was argued, far exceeded that of otherindivid
nations and groupings of nations, and hence America had
responsibility to create order and confront evil throughout
world. ~
~to the universalist
~
belief,
~
the people
~
of Other
d
so i
do
eties have basically the same values as Americans, or if
have them, they want to have them, or if they do not
them, heymisjudge what is good for their society, and
have he responsibility to persuade them or to induce the
a
embrace the universal values that America espouses. In
b e r i m loses its identity as a nation and becomes the donun
,,ponent
of a supranational empire.
assumption nor the universalist ass
the
don accurately reflects the state of the e a r l ~ - t v J e n t y - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~
world. ~mericais the only superpower, but there are Other
powers: ~ ~ Germany,
i ~ ~ France,
i ~ Russia,
,
China, Japan at a
level, and Brazil, India, Nigeria, Iran, South Africa, Indonesia
their regions. ~ m e r i c acannot achieve any significant goal
the cooperation of at least some of these co
world
~h~ culture, values, traditions, and institutionsof othersode
also often notcompatible with reconfiguringthose societiff in
, f b e r i c a n values. Their peoples normally feel deeply co
to their indigenous cultures, traditions, and institutions, an
efforts to change them by outsidem from alie
fiercely
mres. ~n addition, whatever the goals of U.S. elites, the Ameri
ranked the promodon of demonay ab
public has
as a low-priority foreign policy -goal. In accordance with '<theP
dox of democracy,"the introduction of democracy in other so
also often stimulates and provides access to power for an
as nationalistic pop&* movements in La
forces,
and fundamentalistmovements in Muslim countries.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ and
~ ~imperialism
l i t attempt
a ~ ito ~reduce
m or
inate the social, political, and cultural differences bemeen
societies. A national approach would recognize and

Twenty-first Century America

hat distinguishes America from those societies. b e r i c a cannot
ecome the world and still be America. other peoples cannot
come American and still be themselves. America is different,
at difference is defined in large part by its A
~
~
Icul- ~
and its religiosity. The alternative to cosmopoliclnism
~erialismisnationalism devoted to the preservation and enhance.
mentof those qualities that have defined America since ie fouodkg.
~ Religiosity
~
distinguishesAmerica from most other western
sociAmericans are also overwhelmingly christian, which
stin~ishesthem from most non-Western peoples, ~ h ~ ireli,.
Osin/leadsAmericans to see the world in t e r n of good and evil to
much greater extent than others do. The leaders of other societies
find this religiositynot only extraordinary but also exasperatB for the deep moralism it engenders in the consideration of
cal, economic, and social issues.
and nationalism have gone hand in hand in the listory of
St As Adrian Hastings has shown, the former often defined
content of the latter: "Every ethnicity is shaped
by
On just as it is by language. . . . F E
~ christianity
~
~has ~
national fornation.""The connection bemeen
and
nalism was alive and well at the end of the twentieth century,
Ose
that are more religious tend to be more
UweY of fo3-one countries found that those societies in which
": People gave a uhi&" rating to the importance of ~~d in their
were also those in which more people were
proud,, of
eir country (see Figure 12.1)>
comnies, individuals who are more religious also tend to
nationalist. A 1983 survey of fifteen, mo+ E
~
~
that "in every counhy surveyed, those who said the,, were
religious are less likely to be proud oftheir country.n onaverage,
difference is 11 percent.& Most European peoples rank low in
lief in God and their pride in country. h e r i c a
and Poland close to the top on both dimensions, Catholicism
ssential to Irish and Polish national idel,tity. ~
~
j
~
tantism is tend to America's. Americans are overwheJmingly
tted to both God and mutry, and for Americans dley are
In a world in which religion shapes the allegiances, rhe

WHO ARE WE?

Pride
t i and
~ thelrnpormnce
~ ~ l of God

NOTES

Chapter 1. The Crisis of National Identity

1. L-a Research Co. survey of 1,WO adults, 3 October 2001, reportedin
USA T*, 19-21 October 2001, p. 1.
2.NmErk Em, 23 September 2001, p. B6.
3. Rachel Newman, "The Day the World Changed, I Did T O O , " N ~1 ~ & ,

1990-1991 World Values survey, R O W ~ngleha*

~ ~
and Marit' Carballo"
Latin America Eist) ( h d ls 'l-herea ConfucianCulture?):A GlobalAnalysis
of CrossCulmral Ditferen,..s; ps: polirical Srienrc and Politid, 30 (March 1997), p.

heantagonisms of people on every continent, it

allimces,
again turn to religion to find their
not be surprising if ~~~~i~
national identity and their national p1-e.
Significant elements of American elites are favorably disposed to
America becoming a cosmopolitan society. Other elites wish it to
ass,me an imperial role. T h e overwhelming hulk of the American

remains ~
~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ Imperial?
o~ l i t aNational?
i n ? ~T h e choi~
~ e r i c m make
s
will shape their future as a nation and the