Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Constitutional Law 2 Collated Digests
Constitutional Law 2 Collated Digests
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 2
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELATION WITH THE COURTS
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]
Facts:
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The
justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent
filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis.
Held:
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to,
not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
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1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so
as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to
the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
Held:
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they
are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1)
it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if
within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
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MIRASOL VS CA
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
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Held:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its
promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police power. In addition, it is only
rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax
levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said
Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134.
Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10.
Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a
tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may
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Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a
word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
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Held:
No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent
makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical
entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking
of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the
property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and
ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the
property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property.
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Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement
as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the
fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed
this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed compensation.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
[43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate
of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed
by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the
defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor
General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already
prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the
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Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property
of newspaper or magazine publishers.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
[395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]
Facts:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose
for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters
from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the
construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose
in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights
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The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion
may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for
the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation
taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of
political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is
nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is
reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
OSMEA VS. ORBOS
[220 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 99886; 31 MAR 1993]
Facts:
On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General
Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting
from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27,
1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the
underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as
a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government
objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof
is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI
of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax,
who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to
tax." 12
Issue:
Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of
Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No.
1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution.
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Held:
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices
of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the
following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources
of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy.
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while
it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump
rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment
the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit
on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that
what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What
is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision
authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of
taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act
with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power
of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as
proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of
the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
[14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
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THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
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Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos
waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a
bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in
the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he
was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be
used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but
the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what
he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence presented.
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself.
Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and
facts and not simply accept subordinates views
Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know
the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives
an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the
media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to
the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed
on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people
being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
[69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts:
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
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The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same
is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
[222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
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(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Art 3, Sec. 1.
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts:
Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called
native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of
said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification
under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and
the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area
and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is
not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of
the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect
the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
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Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I.
Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino,
Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management
Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment
Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-FlueCuring and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
1
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Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against
the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense.
Issue:
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.
Held:
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court,
this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation
evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating
the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property.
On the enumerated reasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge
to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question are too general.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules
and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos
himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners.
The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the
press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE
[246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Facts:
In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received
information that Petitioner had in his possession at his house M-16 Armalite rifles, hand
grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents, which were used or
intended to be used for illegal purposes. The application was granted.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized 2 envelopes
containing P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy
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The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts,
gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
MORANO VS. VIVO
[20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November
1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage:
Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau
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Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46
of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth.
The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of
3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to
the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the
arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the
foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and
the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become
legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the
sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.
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Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing
the money of Antonieta Silva.
Held:
Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form
of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable
by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The
questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on
the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the
motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money.
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized
the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for
marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.
*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court
Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with their affidavits.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE
[210 SCRA 97; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992]
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline
Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the
position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and
his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently
residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys,
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The
Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys
and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of
the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to
Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the
master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners
so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.
Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being used as a safehouse
of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter
the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner
Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the
presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family
friend of the Veroys.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in
Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa
Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna
Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of
George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's
room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the
search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live
bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing
printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's
recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's
brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs
men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a
book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a
telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the
master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and
receipt of the articles seized, in the house.
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Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they
concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search
once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of
their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to
an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo
Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of
herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for
rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house
but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed
granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not
follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita
but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners
in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
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The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not
informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to
the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not
proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.
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Held:
The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a
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Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version
of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store,
he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of
the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest,
the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the
policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers
companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled
him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him
for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person
and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and
valid manner.
Held:
The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute
illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act
quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to
a stop and frisk.
The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to
apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not
act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stopand-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
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PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions
in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were
turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon
was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver.
For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed
to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest.
He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his
appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had
been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of
Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has
committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
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Held;
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana
and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this
case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer
pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
Facts:
In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in
the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7)
NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out
of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not
feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSEDS DEFENSE
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1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime.
There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no
probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The
seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and
shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
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The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
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Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.
Held:
The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he
every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the
course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go
abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable
at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995]
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for
medical treatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for
Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental
medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition"
requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in
China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto
Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of
the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or
orders or any judicial action of respondent court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad
because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking
the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no
necessity to get medical treatment abroad.
Held:
No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to
give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had
to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The
court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her
request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court
obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case
against them.
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In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It
should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
medical treatment in foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states
that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise
and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments
of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave
to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the
determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists
recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
[39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands.
It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of
the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
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One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art 3, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
[64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is
however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052
advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance
of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
GARCES VS. ESTENZO
[104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of
April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through
the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be
made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after
a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it
was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
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It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,
however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
GERMAN VS. BARANGAN
[135 SCRA 514; G.R. NO. 68828; 27 MAR 1985]
Facts:
Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined
Malacaang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.
Held:
Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and
shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the
exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed
to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and
foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure
the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has
a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the
officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to
stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public
safety or the security of Malacanang.
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
[219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993]
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for
raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS
and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public
school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses
believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al
v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any
religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national
anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic
consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious
worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.)
Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to
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Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of
an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
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Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case
was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the
author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to
say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is
obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to
be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and
to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is
in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is
to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG
[160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and
international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama"
style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a
script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of
his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to
film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
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Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures
were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]
Facts:
In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of
which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to a passing
United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army
plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other
things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the
place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing
no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers.
Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man named
Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial
article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned
out to be false it brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area
are sick sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.
The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and
that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but when
the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. However
a correction was published immediately.
Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages
alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. Defense interposed that
they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his favor. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
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They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not
mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an
ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from
being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P.
No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the
legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain
events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to
the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and
trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.
880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that
B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P.
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint,
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law.
FERNANDO VS. ESTORNINOS
[G.R. NO 159751; 6 DEC 2006]
Facts:
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The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is
Kahit sa Pangarap Lang with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different
magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they
deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTCs decision.
Held:
No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must
justify the regulation or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
[129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to
explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then
on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their
failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before
the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of
the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed,
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held:
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity
taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
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The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
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1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him.
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Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed
suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were
extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal
attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel
of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him.
Held:
No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately
after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the
custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to
appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna,
the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used
against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in
Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:
1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before
attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical
assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigos "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandulas fractured rib.
3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to the accused.
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO
[244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995]
Facts:
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of
the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao
Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7
karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid
gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot
LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him
mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's
house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already
signed by Lucero.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking
towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a
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Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant
and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
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Testimony
- only Alcantara was identified
- only 3 assailants had a
- conference
- failed to identify Alcantara
- at the hospital and in open
- court (pointed to another person)
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.
Held:
YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption.
The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited.
There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give
too much weight to Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous identification at the
hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio.
The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure
of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper
suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.
Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused.
Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade
education). Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay
desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law.
CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC
[194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991]
Facts:
Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity,
he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
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R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC
and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged
and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business
transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in
nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
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CITIZENSHIP
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Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are
candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998
elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the
proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding
the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent
is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the
petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant
to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual
citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC
reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the
position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal
of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue:
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Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been
his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to
all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.
BENGZON VS. HRET
[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001]
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process
of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
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