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Civil Law Review Digests
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement
of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative
fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
[8]
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they
are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficient to comply with
the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
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The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case
against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law.
ISSUE:
WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest???
RULING:
NO.
Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and
borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury,
procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.
ISSUE
Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for
computing the filing fee relative to GMAs application for the amendment of its articles
of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term?
RULING
The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the
basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.s (GMAs) application
for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term. The appellate court agreed with the SECs submission that an
extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as
a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such,
it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of
incorporation. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the
appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in
general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity. Rate-fixing is a legislative
function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and
other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to
determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a
persons right to property. The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
Judicial Decisions
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Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned
to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and produced
3 children.
Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before the probate court,
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. After Lorenzo died, Paula
filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over his estate in his
favor. Alicia filed as well.
RTC found that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia is void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid.
HELD: YES.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to the concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Furthermore, in the case of Quita v. CA, that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the CA must be reversed. The
divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. (The SC remand the case to the TC for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will is left to the TC.)
Application of Chapter 2: Human Relations
De Tavera vs PTS
Petitioner is a doctor, specializing in treating tuberculosis. She was appointed as
member of the Board Directors of defendant Phil. Tuberculosis Society. However,
she was alleging that she was removed from her post without informing her of the
lawful cause and thereafter, Romulo was appointed as her replacement. She was
claiming that 4 members of the Board were not members of the Society and hence,
they did not have the power to be appointed in the Board and to vote. She filed a
case against them, claiming that they violated the Human Rights provisions of the
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collectively and duty owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers
who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex.
Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that
competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to
pass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single
himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind covers
those who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by a
particular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receive
their compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil process
for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a
private individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc.
When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can have
no cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is if
the individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers
improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that an
individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act
or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or
injury to the former.
A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a
duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of
valid admin regulations. Its a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire
public who would be affected by such rule.
Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional for violating the
due process requirement or the equal protection clause. Court only said that the RMC
did not meet the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily on
that case as its cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of action
for failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32. Fortune failed to show that
it incurred some particular wrong or injury.
Finally, Sec. 227 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 provides: Satisfaction of Judgment
Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against
any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the
performance of official dutyany judgment, damages or costs recovered in such
action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner. No such judgment, damages or
costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or
in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondents complaint does not
impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court
against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.
Duty to act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan
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grandmother in Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and
wife for 21 days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite.
However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed
was a suit for damages based on a breach of a promise to marry. The trial court
decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry?
Decision: No.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except
where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the
Civil Code which states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to
Cirilo were proper.
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court. In this case, the injunction partook the nature of suspension of action by
legislative fiat i.e. law on corporate rehabilitation. This is equally effective as when the
injunction was issued by a higher court.
Liability of public officers
14. Aberca v Ver (1988)
Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They conducted raids
against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca, etc), claiming that they were
communists. In doing so, Ver, et al, used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al,
took the personal belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them
without warrants.
Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are immune from suit.
Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private citizens can be
held liable for damages for infringing upon the rights of others.
FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are employees of PAL who
have been dismissed after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom.
Garcia et al filed an illegal dismissal case against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The LA ruled in favor of Garcia et al and ordered PAL to immediately reinstate
petitioners. On appeal to the NLRC by PAL, the decision of the LA was reversed.
Meanwhile, the LA issued a Notice of Garnishment the Writ of Execution for the
reinstatement aspect of its decision. When PAL tried to enjoin the reinstatement and
garnishment, NLRC affirmed such Notice and Writ but suspended and referred the
action to the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL which at that time was undergoing
rehabilitation receivership. However, when PAL manifested that SEC had approved its
exit from the rehabilitation, SC resolved to entertain the issue of whether PAL should
pay backwages to the Garcia et al from the time the LA ordered their reinstatement up
to the time the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA
ISSUE: Whether or not compelling PAL to pay backwages despite the fact that the
NLRC ruled in its favor on appeal constitutes unjust enrichment
HELD: NO. the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable
the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to article 223 of the Labor Code,
the order of reinstatement of the labor arbiter is immediately executor even pending
appeal. The reinstatement may be actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the
employer. HOWEVER, in this case, PAL is excused from complying with the
obligation to reinstate Garcia et al either actually or otherwise because while the case
was before the LA and the NLRC, it was under rehabilitation. It is basic in corporate
rehabilitation that all actions against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation is ipso
jure suspended. This includes labor actions. True, the implementation of the
reinstatement order is a ministerial duty of the LA unless it is restrained by a higher
Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In
times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to
remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule
of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties
of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
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Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with the DOJ against
officers of Wincorp, one of them was Reyes, for falsification of commercial and private
documents.
The DOJ filed the criminal case with the MTC. Later, however, DOJ uSec
Merciditas Gutierrez ordered the withdrawal of the Informations. This decision was
reversed by the DOJ Sec., thus the case proceeded.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, where he raised, among
others, that the SEC case is a prejudicial question to the criminal case for falsification.
CA denied certiorari thus criminal case proceeds.
Issue: Is the SEC case a prejudicial question that has to be resolved before the
criminal case for falsification may proceed? NO.
Ruling: SC affirms CA. Case proceeds.
A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
It comes into play generally in a situation in which a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there
is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there
a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
One of the issues taken in the SEC case is whether Pearlbank has
outstanding loans with Wincorp. However, a finding that Pearlbank indeed has
outstanding debts will not totally absolve Reyes of any criminal liability, in other
words, its not an absolute defense. Since, what is determinative in the Falsification
case is whether there really were falsified documents.
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congenital condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for
the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with her
unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes
his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in her birth certificate from female to male.
Prior existing marriage
Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy
143 SCRA 499 (1986)
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on the ground of LILIAs previous existing
marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion but claimed that
their marriage was null and void because she and Maxion were allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.
During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl Wiegel was the
status of the first marriage (void or voidable?).
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an
opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their
marriage, was already married to someone else.
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24. TY v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August
27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies
officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was
still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his
civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as
Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void
his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977,
and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents
were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private
respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that
private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate
court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage before a subsequent marriage can be contracted is not applicable in the
present case. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent being
void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless
there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared
to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit
and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence
on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years
earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that
he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory
of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it
refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense
during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was
used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for
we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the
defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was
not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we
cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from
what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
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27 Aranes v Occiano
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in
a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with
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jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the churchand not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote placesor where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married man on the basis of
an affidavit of presumptive death? NO
Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding outside his courts
jurisdiction? NO
Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the FC for the declaration of the death
of the absentee. Absent this judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his
first wife. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage
under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not falling under Art. 41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided under Art. 7. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
Marriage License
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were blessed with 2
children. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition, which was later
on affirmed by the CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner, for the first time, is raising the issue that there is an absence of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate is September 14, 1974, while the date of the celebration of the
marriage is on November 15, 1973.
Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of
a married man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge
confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years.
Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage
may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony
Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took
place. Therefore, the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
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Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Marriages exempt from marriage license
Ninal v. Badayog
Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine. Case is also
discussed under declaration of nullity.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE & PEPITO NIAL, JR.)
. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepitos death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
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BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayogs marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966.
They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque
Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and
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In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in RTC, stating that Alices business (the
Galleon Shop) is a conjugal property. He is asking for an accounting of the business
to be rendered, and seeking to be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Alice moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court where
Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property.
The Court below denied the MTD on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is the
subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her American
husband is binding on the American husband. The decree is therefore binding upon
Richard, being a citizen of the U.S.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized here in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves marriage.
An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped
from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal
property. Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alices husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard
and still subject to a wifes obligation cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petition is granted.
Garcia vs Recio
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6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
38. Amor-Catalan v. CA
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They
migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in
1988.
2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had
a subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that
the marriage brought her embarrassment.
RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for
being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed.
Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope
marriage?
Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and
Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been divorced.
Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their
naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired
American citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the kind of
divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii)
which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the
bond in full force.
Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were
married, and even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now provides that only the husband
or the wife may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
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To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact
that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a
suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage. With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in
fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
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41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship. He
married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Shortly after the wedding,
Corpuz went back to Canada for business. When he returned to the Philippines he
found out that Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talagatsk, tsk, tsk).
Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry another Filipina so he
registered the divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless,
he was informed by a NSO official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and
that for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by
Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to
institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
the remedy provided in the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Issue:
Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article 26?
Held:
No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no
rights in favor of aliens.
However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 does not
necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to the rules
of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the 2nd paragraph of
Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule 39.
Void and Voidable Marriages
42. CARLOS v SANDOVAL
FACTS: The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving 6 parcels
of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes, Felix, during his lifetime, transferred to
his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and 3 with the condition that Teofilo will transfer petitioner
Carlos (another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of Carlos.
Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the name of the heirs
of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad Sandoval who was his surviving
spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner sues claiming that the marriage between
Teofilo and Felicidad was null and void for lack of marriage license. Furthermore,
petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was neither an adoptive or natural son of
Teofilo Carlos.
Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized
marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo Carlos II wherein it was stated that
Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval are the parents. By virtue of these documents,
respondents move for summary judgment. Petitioner also moved for summary
judgment and presented as evidence the certificate of the civil registrar attesting to
the fact there is no birth certificate of Teofilo II on record.
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2.
The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an action for the nullity
of the marriage. However, in Carlos v Sandoval, the Court said that this wont apply
to:
1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the rules came out)
2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003
The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil Code. It was way
back in 1949. The AM has no application to them.
The old Civil Code does not specify who can bring actions. However, this does not
mean that anyone can just bring actions to declare absolute nullity. The plaintiff must
still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party in interest.Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving
heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in the Rules of Succession.
However, petitioner must implead Leonila since there are some cases under the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license was not needed for a valid marriage. She must be
given a chance to say her side.
Held: Yes.
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time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
DINO V. DINO
Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were
married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogios
first wife died on May 2004.
On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died.
The respondents are Eulogios heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception
could not apply since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months.
Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as
husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner
contended that it is only the contracting parties while living can file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case.
Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC.
Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity? NO.
Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed
by the heirs.
First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by
the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3,
1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. It is clear. Thus, the
heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed!
Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition
for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code.
What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can
be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek to protect their property rights
they can always impugn the legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in
the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased faither.
CA decision AFFIRMED.
Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting
marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first
marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is
not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to
someone else at that time.
ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void?
HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed.
RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
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he exerted every effort to look for her, but it proved to be fruitless. He even sent
letters to the address of the bar where the couple first met, but they were all returned
to him. He also inquired from their friends, but they had no news about Janet. He also
alleged that he had no knowledge of Janets family background and that even after
they were married, she still refused to disclose such information. Nolasco also
testified that he did not report the incident to Philippine authorities. The RTC granted
the petition. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the declaration of Janets presumptive death is
REVERSED, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Art. 41 of the Family Code provides for 4 requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death, namely:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The SC, in reversing the CA, held that Nolasco did not comply with the third
requirement as he failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence
as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. The investigation allegedly
conducted by Nolasco in his attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Janet is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. For instance, when he arrived in Antique, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London. His testimony showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this
casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. There is no analogy
between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool,
on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around 350 km apart.
We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a
simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views Nolasco's claim that Janet declined to give any information as
to her personal background even after marrying Nolasco as too convenient an excuse
to justify his failure to locate her. Neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony.
Psychological Incapacity of Parties
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5.
6.
FACTS: On August 16, 1990, Roridel Molina filed a verified petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity. She alleges that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo presented signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as both husband and father as Reynaldo: preferred to
spend time with, and spend money on, his friends; was dependent on his parents for
aid, and; was always dishonest with her about the familys finances.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986 and Rorida had
been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987, she resigned from her job and went
to stay with her parents. Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre,
and had since abandoned their family.
7.
8.
Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family
Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as regards parents and
their children.
Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be given great respect
by the courts.
Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed
down without the Solicitor Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will
be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days
from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The marriage subsists.
RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is
more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. Roridels evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get
along.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities are not
tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rather than merely failing to meet marital
obligations, it is necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so because
of a psychological illness.
Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most serious of psychological
disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity,
judicial antecedence, and incurability.
(Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court)
1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the plaintiff. Doubt is
resolved in favor of the continuation of the marriage.
2. The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.)
alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.) clearly explained in
the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the
parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have known the
obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly
assume them.
3. Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of
a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the celebration, but the illness
must be proven to exist at such moment.
4. Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent.
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Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As
correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that
Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.
RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause
of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied
motion.
In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and
maintained that PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER
allegedly wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to
marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER
maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually died).
RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed
between the parties.
Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy
of their Marriage Contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan
Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1) PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible maladaptive behavior
even at the time before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from a
Personality Disorder.
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
Held: No. Petition denied.
1.
2.
b.
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v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
c.
3.
d.
e.
Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI.
Summary of Evidence
a.
b.
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of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed
coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with
other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort
Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of
their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a
security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear
these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No.
97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of
psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent (Bona)was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder. The RTC granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA
reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD: NO.
After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on
several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose.
Likewise, Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same
conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological
incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate
credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
Also, the psychiatric report of Dr. RondainregardingBonas psychological condition
was gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses.
Contrary to Joses assertion, Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal
home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration.
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Cojuango v. Palma
FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70s . Cojjuangco was a client of ACCRA
and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Consequently, Palmas
relationship with Cojuangcos family became intimate. He traveled and dined with
them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangcos 22-year old
daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent.
Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It was only the next
day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma assured him that everything is legal.
Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3
children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable.
HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palmas act constitute grossly immoral conduct,
a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary
to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangcos resources by securing a plane ticket
from Cojuangcos office in order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent.
Palmas culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.
Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage
license was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.
56 De Castro v De Castro
Declaration of Nullity
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for at least five
years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he
and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by
exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to
marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him
to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have a
marriage license to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking
the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void.
FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage license which
however expired so instead they executed an affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a
judge. They in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging in sex
in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995.
Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from Reilen as his wife
and for their child. He says that their marriage was void ab initio because they
executed a fake affidavit; that he was just asked to sign the marriage contract
because she wanted to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant
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Ratio:
As far back as 1995, the SC made the declaration that Art. 40, which is a rule of
procedure, should be applied retroactively because Art. 256 of the FC itself provides
that the Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does nor prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general law, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws.
In the case at bar, Victorias clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
her first marriage and thereafter to invoke the very same judgment to prevent her
prosecution for bigamy. She cannot have her cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Art. 40 of the FC, contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy (the original case said that for bigamy to exist, it is enough that
the first marriage subsisted when the second marriage was entered into).
Antone v. Beronilla
Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her
marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter
contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the
information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC.
Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the
information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information
Held: Yes
A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point
of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information.
The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage
The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for
the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the
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counsel of record is binding upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of
his former counsel to inform the trial court of Tuasons confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Tuason
has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did
not inform the court of this fact.
2. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity
of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, Tuason was not declared in default by the trial court for
failure to answer. Tuason filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of
action alleged by Maria. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private Respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred
contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Tuasons
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Tuason that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court.
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YU VS. YU
FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging
that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the
custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to
him of the custody of Bianca.
Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of
absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The petition also included a
prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by
the CA of his petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue???
RULING: YES.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)17
Art. 50. x x x x
The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings." (Emphasis and underscoring added)
By Erics filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC
he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.
After the CA subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for
Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family
Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Legal separation: Procedure
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE,
EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V.
CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation
of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete in 1938 in
Cotabato. In 1948, Pacete contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which Alanis only learned of in 1979.
During Alanis marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and
other dummies.
The defendants were each served with summons on November 15, 1979.
They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The
court granted the motion. The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of
another 30 days which was granted but reduced to 20 days. The Order of the court
(reducing the extension) was mailed to defendants' counsel but it appears that the
defendants were unaware of this so they again filed another motion for an
extension of 15 days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously
sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, the court denied this last
motion on the ground that it was filed after the 20-day extension had expired. The
plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation,
and declared the properties as conjugal properties of the plaintiff and defendant half-
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Eufemio then moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the
ground that the death of Carmen abated the action. The court issued an order
dismissing the case. Notably, even if Eufemio filed counterclaims (for nullity of the
marriage), he no longer pursued this after the case was dismissed.
Issue: Does the death of a plaintiff (before final decree) in an action for legal
separation abate the action?
Held: An action for legal separation which involves just a physical separation of the
spouses is purely personal. Thus, being purely personal in character it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
The resulting property relations would also appear to be the sole effect of the
decree of legal separation issued. Thus, the property rights cannot also survive the
death of the plaintiff.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of
the decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence.
As to the action of Eufemio to declare his marriage with Carmen as void ab
initio, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic after Carmen died
because such death automatically dissolved the union. Their property rights should
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition.
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Lerma vs CA
Lerma and Diaz were married. However, Lerma filed a case against his wife Diaz and
a certain Ramirez for adultery. While this case was pending, Diaz likewise filed a
complaint for legal separation against Lerma based on 2 grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life. During the pendency of the legal separation case, Diaz
moved for and was granted support pendente lite. Lerma opposed, saying that the
pending adultery case against her is a sufficient basis to deny the motion for support
pendente lite. (it must be noted that later on, Diaz was found guilty of adultery by the
trial court)
ISSUE: Is the pending adultery case valid ground to deny the other spouse support
pendente lite?
SC: YES
Jurisprudence provides that adultery is a good defense.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by
one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same
Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced
heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has
given cause for legal separation."
67. Sabalones v. CA
Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein
respondent Remedios, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15
years.
When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and
building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he
was 68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He needed his share
of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs.
Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property in
Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids and that they merely depended
on support from the rentals earned by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She
also alleged that Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids.
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the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the
private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal
assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied
that as the petitioner's legitimate wife, Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said
estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his
wife and children. Inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in
the meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent
wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed
her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from
the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance
with Article 61 of the Family Code.
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reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the
property.
Exercise of Profession
Go v CA
Facts: The Ong spouses contracted the services of Alex and Nancy Go to provide
video coverage of their (Ong spouses) wedding. Three times thereafter, the Ongs
tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their
relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then
agreed that the tape would be ready upon the return of the Ong spouses.
When the Ongs came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out
that the tape had been erased and therefore, could no longer be delivered. They sued
the Go spouses for damages. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of the Ongs.
The SC ruled in favor of the Ongs and held that the Gos are solidarily liable.
However, Alex Go contended that his wife, Nancy Go should be the only one liable as
when his wife entered into the contract with the Ongs, she was acting alone for her
sole interest.
Issue: Are the Go spouses solidarily liable to the Ong spouses?
Decision: No, only Nancy is liable.
Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
In this case, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract with the
Ongs. Thus, she is solely liable for the damages awarded, pursuant to the principle
that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them
CPG: Exclusive Properties
70. Sarmiento vs. IAC (153 SCRA 104)
Facts: 2 cases. First was an action for support filed by Norma Sarmiento against
Cesar Sarmiento. Court granted, awarding P500/month support in favor of Norma.
Second case was an action filed by Norma asking for a declaration from the court that
the retirement benefits of Cesar from PNB is part of the conjugal property, 50% of
which should be given to her. Cesar failed to appear during the pre-trial. Eventually,
the court ruled in favor of Norma and ordered PNB to refrain from releasing to Cesar
all his retirement benefits and to deliver thereof to Norma.
Issue:
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ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land levied upon form part of the conjugal
property YES
Whether or not the obligation incurred by Katrina is chargeable against the
conjugal
property
NO
HELD:
1.
2.
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provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment,
not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations
entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the
family is benefited.
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the
Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any
part of the conjugal property. Thus, when Ching entered into a surety agreement he,
from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the
family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of
donation.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the
signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a
surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted
for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of
an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
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1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and constructed a 2 story
residential house over the subject parcel of land. This was secured by a real estate
mortgage over the land.
1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute sale for the total
consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that under the said sale, the spouses were
given a chance to repurchase the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so.
The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being falsified because
what they entered into was a mortgage contract and not a deed of sale. They claim
that they asked Munoz for a loan of P602,000 pesos. Munoz agreed but gave them
P200,000 only and promised to give the P402,000 after they cancel the GSIS
mortgage. The spouses cancelled the GSIS mortgage and turned the TCT over to
Munoz but he refused to give the balance. He also had the TCT of the spouses
cancelled and a new one issued for himself depriving the spouses of their property.
The spouses claim that the results of an NBI examination show that the
signatures of Eliseo on the purported deed of sale are all forgeries.
Munoz claims that even though these signatures are forged, they would be
immaterial because the property was the parphernal property of Erlinda and
therefore, the consent of Eliseo, manifested by his signature, was immaterial.
The CA applied art. 158 of the CIVIL CODE, and ruled that since
improvements were made over the parcel of land using conjugal funds, the parcel of
land was converted from paraphernal to conjugal therefore the consent of Eliseo was
needed in order to validate the sale.
Issue:
W/N the parcel of land is conjugal?
W/N the sale with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage?
1. The land is paraphernal. The CA erred in applying the Civil Code because
what properly applies in this case is art. 120 of the FAMILY CODE that
states that if the improvements made with conjugal funds have a higher
value than the paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become
part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in favor of the
spouse who lost property. In this case, the house had a value less than the
lot. Because of this, the property remained parphernal. The signatures of
Eliseo are therefore immaterial.
2. It was an equitable mortgage.
Ownership, Administration and Disposition of ACP/CPG: Presumption of
Ownership/Effect of Registration in name of one of the spouses
MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997
Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a parcel of land between
Munoz and the spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos.
Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named
Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose.
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CRUZ V LEIS
FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April 1923.
On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of land in Marikina.
The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was
issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow.
On 2 December 1973, Adriano died.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Cruz, in
the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The
loan was secured by a mortgage over the property.
On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding obligation when the
debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of the
petitioners. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same
property. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was
consolidated in favor of the petitioners.
On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private
respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new
owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing an action before the
RTC of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by Gertrudes
Isidro.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that the land was conjugal
property, no fraud attended the execution of the contracts, and that the petitioners
failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a
judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be
recorded in the Registry of Property.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE W/N the petitioners acquired ownership over the land?
HELD It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose
of her share in the property owned in common.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered solely in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the
undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto,
issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land
even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a
person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens
on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To
require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system."
It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of
Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua
non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property
since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year
period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title
and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the
stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory
condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over
the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to
consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or
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Anno v. Anno
G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419)
Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno
(Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they
acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was
declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert.
Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed two documents of
transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of Waiver where Albert waived and
quitclaimed in favor of Dolores first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights
over a portion of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the
remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents, Albert declared that
he is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. Thus, the documents of transfer did
not bear the signature and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The
land was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo
Bested.
Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of the Waiver of
Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages. She alleged the
land belongs to their conjugal partnership and thus could not have been validly
conveyed by Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding
testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the
land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his
marriage to petitioner.
MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the
consent of the other.
Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. However, a careful examination of the records shows that Dolores
evidence (their marriage contract and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the
property) failed to prove that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership.
Moreover, since it is Dolores allegation that the land belongs to their conjugal
partnership of gains, then she has the burden of proof to substantiate, by
preponderance of evidence, that the land was conjugal in nature. This she failed to do
(i.e. Dolores failed to identify when she and Albert, first occupied and possessed the
land). While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974, it cannot be
automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of the subject land was likewise
done in the same year. To so conclude will amount to speculation or conjecture on the
part of the court. Declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated with
its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land
usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the
1974 tax declaration presented by Dolores cannot be made a basis to prove its
conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her
husband, Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive property. Tax declarations,
especially of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
Since the circumstances do not show when the property was acquired by spouses
Anno, the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property allegedly acquired by
the spouses Anno during the subsistence of their marriage cannot be
applied. Consequently, the land is the exclusive property of Albert which he could
validly dispose of without the consent of his wife.
Sole/Transfer of Administration
REYES v. ALEJANDRO (RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE)
141 SCRA 65, G.R. No. L-32026. January 16, 1986.
Doctrine: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding
separate from and prior to a petition for administration
FACTS: On October 25, 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition praying for the
declaration of her husband, Roberto L. Reyes, as an absentee.
Erlinda and Roberto were married on March 2, 1960. In April 1962, Roberto left due to
a misunderstanding, and Erlinda alleges that: (1) she has not heard from him since;
(2) they have not acquired property during the marriage; (3) they have no outstanding
obligations; and (4) her purpose for filing the petition is to establish the absence of
Roberto.
She invokes Article 384 of the Civil Code and Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court.
The lower court dismissed the petition because Roberto left no properties, stating that
the sole purpose for the declaration of absence is to enable the taking of necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of absentee.
ISSUE: W/N a judicial declaration of absence is proper when the absentee spouse
left no properties NO.
RATIO: The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is: (1) when he
has properties which have to be taken care of or administered by a Court-appointed
representative; (2) the spouse present is seeking a separation of property, or the
spouse is asking that the administration of the conjugal property be transferred to her.
The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the
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Uy v. CA
Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration
Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of
Court, not under the Family Code.
Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a petition for
guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a need for a court-appointed
guardian to save his fathers properties and assets, and further added that in the
meantime, no properties shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons.
Ernestos wife then filed petition declaring Ernestos incapacity and assumption of
powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties, and prayed to Court that she be
granted permission to dispose of a land for the medical expenses of her husband.
Court granted.
Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in effect a petition for
guardianship over person and properties of Ernesto, and should be covered by
Special Proceedings under the ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as
a conjugal partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also averred that
the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical expenses! Nonetheless, Ernestos
wife still sold land to her daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering
sale of land void.
Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of sole power of
administration over properties and dispose of land with court approval?
Held: Petition denied.
Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of CC inapplicable
(covers only absence, separation in fact, abandonment, or withheld consent). And so
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse
due to incapacity or incompetence to give consent.
As such, ernestos wife should observe procedure for sale of wards estate required of
judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings under the
Family Code. In the case at bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC,
and even FC (no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition
should not be granted).
Dispositions/Donations
SIOCHI V. GOZON
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the
name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case
was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the
land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife
Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply
with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment
of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As
regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of
donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating
the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18
million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of
Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated
as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse
before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the
sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of
their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.
HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the
disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
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Fuentes v. Roca
Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a
deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell
prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated
that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down
payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of
his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of
the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether
or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable
to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.
As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid
him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued
in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with
the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.
RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed
Held:
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conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will
result in the termination of the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil
Code. She says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended
in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave
the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's
family although able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home
to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968
constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution
of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but
the Court said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses
half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the
conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
Separation with Dissolution Effects
86. TODA v. CA
Facts:
Benigno Toda and Rose Marie Tuason were married in 1951 and were married and
blessed with 2 children. But because of individual differences and the alleged
infidelity of Benigno, Rose Marie filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership
for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds.
To avoid further disagreeable proceedings, the parties filed a joint petition for judicial
approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Art. 191 of the CC. This petition
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares
in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the civil case filed by
Rose Marie. The compromise agreement was incorporated in the petition for
dissolution, which was approved by the court.
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable
settlement of all the disputes. Instead of terminating a litigation, it spawned two new
petitions. The parties are now arguing on the award of cash dividends, which
depends on the date of the effectivity of the compromise agreement. Rose Marie said
that it became effective only after judicial approval and not upon its execution.
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The brother and sister of Victorina are claiming 2/3 of the estate, while the
mother of Bienvenida and the other sister of Victorina are claiming 1/3
Issue: How should the estate of Victorina be partitioned?
Held:
When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary coownership. It was also at this point of time that the inheritance was transmitted to the
heirs of Bienvenida (5 children). The heirs will receive of the conjugal partnership
property which pertained to Binevenida. The other half belongs to Cesario.
Due to the marriage of Cesario and Victorina, the fruits and income of
Cesarios share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the
property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership of
properties of he second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through
these properties would also be conjugal in nature.
The problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two
conjugal partnerships. According to the Civil Code, whenever the liquidation of the
partnership of 2 or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried
out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal
property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the
partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion
to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.
Property Relations of Union without Marriage: Either not Capacitated to marry
or not living together exclusively
TUMLOS V. TUMLOS
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housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner's bare allegation,
there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
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divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by
the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
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Cario vs Cario
Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime. The 1 st was with
Susan Nicdao and the 2nd was with Susan Yee (hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh
noh? Haha). When Santiago died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago worked
for (he was a police).
Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Susan
Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao did not file her answer and was
declared in default. Susan Yee admits that her marriage to Santiago took place
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of Santiago to
Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1 st marriage was void ab initio
because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented the
marriage certificate of Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license
number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar showed that they had
no record of the marriage license.
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago is bigamous
having been solemnized during the subsistence of another marriage which is
presumed to be valid, article 148 applies.
The disputed claims in this case are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
proof to the contrary is shown, it cannot be said that Susan Yee contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common they belong to the deceased alone and Susan Yee has no right
to claim them.
By intestate succession, these death benefits shall pass to the legal heirs.
But since Susan yee is not legal wife, she is not a legal heir.
3) Article 147 govern the property regime of Santiago and Susan Nicdao (1st
null marriage). This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to marry but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons.
Under this article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute. Thus, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by Santiago alone,
art147 creates a co-ownership entitling Susan Nicdao to share thereof.
Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is claiming from
Susan Nicdao?
Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Despite this however, the records
reveal that their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As such, their
marriage is void ab initio.
However, this does not automatically mean that the 2nd marriage is already
valid. Under art40 of the family code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1 st
marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the declaration otherwise the 2 nd
marriage will also be void. Hence, since Susan Yees marriage to Santiago was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void,
theirs is also void ab initio.
2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the separation of property
of the spouses. Considering that the 2 marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime wont be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The
marriages are governed by Art147 and 148 of the FC on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.
Under art. 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships...etc. Under this regime, the property acquired by the parties
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